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Hello and thank you for
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listening to the history of World War
2:38
II podcast. Episode
2:40
453, Operation
2:42
Barbarossa, what's plan
2:44
B? Last
2:46
time during Operation Typhoon, the
2:48
plan to take Moscow, the
2:50
Panzers reached the capital's outer
2:52
limits. As we've seen on
2:54
November 27, the 7th Panzer
2:57
Division had crossed the Moscow
2:59
Volga Canal and created a
3:01
bridgehead. They were now only
3:03
22 miles or 35 kilometers from the Kremlin. Of
3:08
course, then the 1st Shock Army joined
3:10
by the 20th Army drove
3:12
them back. Next, even
3:14
closer to Moscow, the 2nd
3:17
Panzer Division reached Krasnaya, Poliana,
3:19
modern day Lovnya, just 12
3:22
miles or 19 kilometers from
3:24
the Kremlin itself. Typhoon
3:27
had been launched in early
3:29
October, but on November 7th,
3:31
Stalin ordered that the traditional
3:33
military parade take place in
3:36
Moscow for Revolution Day. The
3:39
troops and tanks and trucks marched
3:41
or drove through Red Square and
3:43
then directly to the
3:45
front. And it's a good thing they
3:47
did. The Germans were getting
3:49
ever closer, though pain and blood.
3:52
But as the 2nd Panzer Division
3:54
was halted, General Hautner ordered a
3:57
three-day rest. Then they
3:59
would finish. what they had started. Thus
4:03
had General Zhukov bested von Bock
4:05
to the north, south,
4:07
and now in front of Moscow.
4:10
But it might not have been
4:12
thus as the German generals were
4:14
telling von Bock that Field Marshal
4:16
von Kluge, commander of the 4th
4:18
Army, had been slow in sending
4:20
in one of his flanking attacks.
4:23
And after all the screaming reached von
4:25
Kluge's ears, he got his
4:27
men going, though offering up no excuse.
4:31
So on December 1st, von Kluge
4:33
ordered 20th Army, flanked by the
4:35
57th Panzer of only 70 tanks,
4:38
to move forward towards
4:40
Nairoh-Fominsk, just five miles
4:42
from the southwest corner
4:45
of Moscow's outer suburbs.
4:47
This advance also included the 9th
4:50
Army Corps. The
4:52
first day of this attack seemed
4:54
promising, as the Soviet 43rd Army
4:56
was roughed up and bypassed. Soon,
4:59
the men of the 258th Infantry
5:01
Division were engaging the Soviet 5th
5:04
Army that was acting as a
5:06
second echelon of defense. As
5:09
the 5th Army had been
5:11
protecting the Minsk-to-Moscow Highway, this
5:13
was quite dangerous for the
5:15
Soviets. With the mud rising as it was, one
5:17
of the few main and raised highways was
5:19
the only way to get around, and the
5:22
Germans seemed to be on the
5:24
cusp of controlling one. Either
5:28
this was easy enough to predict,
5:31
or Zhukov was learning his German
5:33
generals. When the sun rose
5:35
on the second day of the attack, Zhukov sent
5:37
in the 33rd Army, led by
5:40
Lieutenant General M.G. Yefrenov,
5:43
and these men were supported by
5:45
the 5th and 11th Tank Brigades,
5:48
plus one tank and two ski
5:50
battalions. As these
5:52
units entered the target city, narrow
5:54
from Minsk from the east, their
5:57
T-34s went prowling for
5:59
the German soldiers. an assault gun or
6:01
StuG. These were based on
6:03
the Panzer III and Panzer IV
6:05
medium tank chassis, respectively. But, as
6:08
they did not have a regular
6:10
tank turret, its main weapon could
6:12
only be aimed by moving
6:14
or turning the entire vehicle,
6:16
which was pretty good for defense, but
6:19
not offense, as the Germans were about
6:21
to find out. But
6:23
to give any chance to the
6:25
Germans was to draw the ire
6:27
of Zhukov or Stalin, so the
6:29
Soviet Air Force was sent in
6:31
to demolish the buildings of the
6:33
town. Soon the T-34s
6:36
had a better line of fight
6:38
and started slamming shells into the
6:40
enemy vehicles. The Germans
6:42
retreated, and none too smoothly. In
6:45
fact, they were sent back to
6:47
their starting lines, a powerful
6:49
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this, on December 2nd, von
7:25
Bock, being a politician, told
7:27
his generals von Kluge, Hoppner,
7:29
and Reinhardt that the enemy
7:31
was about to break. They just had to
7:33
keep up the pressure. The
7:35
generals were starting to wonder what
7:37
von Bock could see that
7:39
they did not. But then von
7:42
Bock, becoming once again a serious
7:44
military man, told OKH
7:47
Chief of Staff Halder that
7:49
he doubted the success of
7:51
Operation Typhoon. One
7:53
mistake piled atop another. But
7:57
let's remind von Bock how we got to
7:59
this point. After the
8:01
battles of Viasma and Briansk, the
8:03
Panzers had the Russians reeling
8:06
and panicking. By the
8:08
second week of October, Viasma was
8:10
under German control, but then, without
8:12
really planning on it, it was
8:15
more of a need after weeks of battle, most
8:18
of Army Group Center took a
8:20
much needed break, one that
8:22
went on longer than planned. This
8:25
allowed the Russians to also rest and
8:27
bring up more men, and
8:30
when von Bock did get back to attacking,
8:32
he did so in
8:34
a sequential way, a piece at
8:36
a time, mostly due to a
8:38
lack of supplies, which allowed Zhukov
8:40
to do the same thing. He saw
8:43
an attack and rushed reinforcements there,
8:45
enough to either stop or slow down
8:48
the Germans. It wasn't pretty,
8:50
and many men were lost, but
8:52
it was effective, and now, the
8:55
other mistake. When the
8:57
Panzers rolled in close to Moscow,
8:59
as close as they ever would,
9:01
Guderian, Hopner, and Reinhardt all begged
9:03
von Bock to let them be
9:05
the one to deliver the death
9:07
blow, the one that would see
9:09
the Panzers rush into Moscow. Basically,
9:12
what they were asking for was the
9:15
supplies to do it, because von Bock
9:17
could not give everyone the supplies they
9:19
needed at the same time. But
9:21
for all those begging, the honor,
9:24
if you will, went to von
9:26
Pluge, who, quite frankly, did
9:29
not know what to do with it. The
9:31
German generals complained about each other, to
9:34
each other, and to von Bock. Meanwhile,
9:37
von Pluge, not taking guff
9:39
from anyone, complained back. Von
9:42
Bock, it turned out, was the ringmaster
9:44
of a circus that was
9:46
completely out of control. And
9:49
Chief of Staff General Franz Halder
9:51
should have seen this coming. Back
9:54
in mid-November, he, Halder, had
9:56
held the Orsha Conference near
9:59
Smolensk. And he got to
10:01
see for himself that yes, German troops
10:03
and panzers were moving forward, but
10:06
the price had been high to get there
10:08
and would probably be higher still to
10:10
keep moving. So Halder's
10:12
idea was to threaten
10:15
Moscow versus taking it, forcing
10:18
Stalin to bring in more and more
10:20
troops to defend a town that would
10:22
never be attacked. But
10:24
Hitler stepped in and said,
10:26
no, the war needed Moscow
10:28
to be taken. So
10:30
Army Group Center went ahead, though
10:32
it did not have the means
10:34
to do so in an effective
10:36
or realistic way. The
10:38
other thing that caused the panzers to be held
10:40
back at arm's length was simply
10:43
Zhukov. Before late November,
10:45
the Russian defenses were in tatters,
10:48
certainly in front of the capital,
10:50
but six weeks after
10:52
Zhukov was allowed to be in
10:54
control, he had mastery over the
10:56
front, the information, and once more,
10:59
he had Stalin's confidence by then.
11:02
Thus was an experienced man behind
11:04
the wheel, though Stalin would
11:07
still occasionally call for massive offenses
11:09
of their own before they
11:11
were ready. But the time would
11:13
come when the Soviets were ready and
11:15
that order would be given out. And
11:19
the last part, of course, was in
11:21
Von Bock's Very Diary, written down on
11:23
November 29th, by then far
11:26
too late to change Hitler's mind.
11:29
That the Russians obviously had
11:32
huge reserves, that is huge
11:34
enough to stop or
11:37
to counter typhoon, but surely
11:39
not enough to launch their own massive offenses,
11:43
right? No, the Germans
11:45
had time. Yes, they had been
11:47
stopped, but this wasn't over. In
11:49
time, the attacks would start up again and
11:52
he was right, but it wouldn't
11:54
be his offensive that he had
11:57
to be concerned about. In
11:59
truth, Moscow had war games.
12:01
All of this they knew or
12:03
guest to The Germans would be
12:06
able to make substantial gains in
12:08
driving east, but they did not
12:10
anticipate them knocking on the Kremlin's
12:12
door. Since. The panic but
12:15
the German tied had been
12:17
painfully deflected and now they
12:19
sat there rusty. the supply
12:21
lines spotty at best and
12:23
their flights were all but
12:25
surrounded on three sides. Yes
12:28
this have been planned for and
12:30
during the first few days of
12:32
December issue cause explain to Stalin's
12:34
which he wanted to do. And.
12:37
The Soviet premier said. Yes,
12:40
Which. Would start on December says.
12:43
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see site for details. Which
13:15
is where we are going to
13:17
leave Army Group Center for now
13:19
so we can catch up with
13:21
Armor Group South. And it was
13:24
Armor Group South. There was to
13:26
make a thousand year reich possible
13:28
how by taking Ukraine's farmland it's
13:30
minerals. And it's industry. Year
13:34
before we leave Von Box soon
13:36
not to be in command of
13:38
Army Group Center. It's worth noting
13:40
a few things. At first,
13:42
yes, things were going well for Armor
13:44
Group Center. Sure there were some with
13:47
just a call and even tactical mistakes
13:49
made along the way. It's what, but
13:51
having five hundred thousand men under one
13:53
commands will do that. So. Momentum,
13:56
it seems has covered up several
13:58
hiccups that would soon. Be
14:00
exposed, what with a lack
14:02
of supplies, a lack of
14:05
replacements, and a staggering lack
14:07
of respect for the Communists
14:09
machinery to recruit outset and
14:11
move around. millions of men.
14:14
And equipment. Yes, at
14:16
the end of the day, it's
14:18
simple to see that Armor group
14:20
centers part of barbarous Us became
14:22
less focused as the men get
14:25
closer to Moscow. It's like after
14:27
the great victory at Smolensk even
14:29
die as much. There seem to
14:31
be no solid. Already. Thought
14:33
out plan. Of what to do
14:35
next. And for every
14:38
German victories there was time
14:40
last recovering from said victories,
14:42
but it seems that the
14:44
Soviets used that time. Better
14:46
than the Germans did. And
14:49
with multiple views of what to
14:51
do next within the German camp
14:53
and even them changing from day
14:55
to day, the mentality seems to.
14:58
A return to basic thinking.
15:00
I eat. Take. The
15:02
enemies capital. But. As we
15:04
have seen, that did not happen.
15:06
The Germans had lost the momentum
15:09
which is often sustaining in desperate
15:11
times. But now it was the
15:13
Germans asking themselves while they arrested
15:15
for a few days. Late.
15:17
With the Russians do, how badly
15:20
are they really beaten? The.
15:22
Answer would come in the next few days.
15:25
Another. Reason the Germans just realized that
15:28
they had bit off more than they
15:30
could chew was simply it's their string
15:32
of victories. How could it
15:34
not seem to those staff officers and
15:36
Berlin's that all they had to do
15:39
was push pins and mats and draw
15:41
arrows. That. Their men could go
15:43
anywhere and through anything. Confidence
15:46
is one thing, planning on
15:49
never losing that something else
15:51
entirely. as for
15:53
the question of supplies is worth
15:55
remembering that that has three parts
15:58
the creation of the supply the
16:00
transport of the supply, and finally
16:02
its delivery. Even in
16:05
late 1941, Hitler had not yet
16:07
turned the country over to
16:09
a complete war footing. There were
16:11
still domestic goods being made, and that
16:14
was because Hitler wanted the people placated
16:17
as much as possible. More
16:19
supplies might not have helped in the delivery
16:22
of them, but having them around
16:25
is never a bad thing. And
16:27
lastly, and the most shocking, is
16:29
that Berlin, certainly Chief of
16:31
Staff Halder, was shocked, even
16:34
stunned, by their own initial
16:36
successes, and this caused them
16:38
to second-guess themselves. Which is
16:40
why the number of changes to goals. At
16:43
first, not Moscow, and then Moscow,
16:45
and then Kiev, and then go
16:47
destroy more Russian armies, only to
16:49
return to taking the capital in
16:51
a flanking move that again ultimately
16:54
failed. But it had
16:56
been Hitler who finally quieted
16:59
his bickering generals by
17:01
making the decision himself. It
17:03
would be Moscow. But
17:06
even here, Hitler was playing
17:08
politics. No, it was
17:10
not necessarily an automatic victory if
17:13
Moscow fell, but it
17:15
might push the Turks over the line
17:17
into coming into the war on
17:19
the Axis side. And perhaps if
17:21
Finland saw Russia on its knees,
17:24
they would try harder. These
17:26
possibilities were hovering
17:29
in Dafira's mind. But
17:31
despite so much, the Germans
17:33
had achieved incredible things. They're
17:36
overwhelming victories in a
17:38
general sense, like Adminsk,
17:41
Ivanskow, Eman, Smolensk, Kiev,
17:43
Vyazma, Bryansk, Melit-Pepol, and
17:45
the Crimea. Any one
17:48
of these could have been a back-breaking
17:50
defeat for Moscow. But
17:52
none were. Why? Because
17:55
Stalin would never give up. He
17:58
could be killed, he could be overthrown. He
18:00
could be defeated on the field, but
18:02
he would never stop fighting. Fighting
18:05
is all he had known since a
18:07
young boy. And
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