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I'd like to start today by welcoming Andrea
1:00
Kuya and Claire Moylan to today's podcast.
1:03
My name is DKA Stack and I am Vice
1:06
Chair of Education in ALA's
1:08
Business Law and Governance Practice Group. My
1:11
consulting practice advisors on finance, valuation
1:13
and transaction matters. So I'm really looking
1:16
forward to talking to Andrea and Claire about distressed
1:18
healthcare transactions. Andrea
1:21
and Claire presented about this at last year's
1:23
a HL Aran Healthcare Transactions Conference.
1:26
Um, so the BLG Practice Group invited them
1:28
to continue that conversation today. So
1:31
before we get into it, I'm gonna ask
1:33
Claire , Andrea, will you each introduce yourselves?
1:36
Sure. Hi, <laugh> . It's great to be here with
1:39
you and , um, great to see you again. Um,
1:42
Andrea. Um, I'm
1:44
Claire Moylan. I'm a principal and co-founder of
1:46
Gibbons Advisors. We specialize in middle market
1:49
healthcare restructuring and consulting.
1:52
Um, we cover the national
1:55
practice , um, but we're headquartered in Nashville.
2:00
Hi. Um, thanks Jessica and Claire. Always
2:02
great to see you again and work with you. Um,
2:05
my name's Andrea Kya . I'm a partner at
2:07
k and l Gates. Um, I do healthcare
2:10
mergers and acquisitions, but am a recovering
2:12
bankruptcy attorney. So constantly
2:15
find myself in this mix between distress
2:17
healthcare transactions. Great.
2:21
Welcome. Um, so just to kick it off,
2:24
we're talking about distress transactions.
2:26
So just to sort of lay the foundation , um,
2:28
can you expand on what you mean when
2:31
you say distress transaction and maybe
2:33
give a couple examples?
2:35
Yeah, sure. I'll take that one. Um, so
2:38
when we're talking about distressed transactions , um,
2:41
hopefully it's not the people in distress, though
2:43
many times the people are in distress, <laugh>
2:45
. Um, we're talking about the businesses
2:47
being in distress. Um, in
2:50
a bankruptcy scenario that's pretty obvious. You
2:52
know, you've got a , a business that's failed and
2:54
it's going through a bankruptcy process and a
2:56
transaction. Um, most
2:59
of the time from what we've experienced,
3:02
a transactions part of that, it's section 360
3:05
3 sale or other. Um, but
3:07
outside of the bankruptcy court , um,
3:10
there are other sales , uh,
3:12
other transactions that take place. Um,
3:15
in cases where you might have a shortage of liquidity,
3:18
you might have , uh, the equity completely
3:20
wiped out by debt. Um,
3:22
so it's different dynamic there
3:25
when you're trying to sell the business where you've got different
3:27
stakeholders involved. Um,
3:30
a transaction in, in my mind also
3:32
includes when it's not necessarily a sale of
3:34
assets, but it could be a settlement of
3:37
claims or liabilities that enable
3:39
the business to continue
3:41
without those liabilities moving
3:43
forward. And the type
3:45
of buyers and , um, and
3:47
players in a distressed transaction are
3:49
typically a little different than what
3:52
you'll find in a , a strong performing
3:55
business. The market is a little different.
3:57
There's still a structured process , um,
4:00
but the, the lenders, the
4:02
people that lend into a distressed sit situation,
4:05
the buyers that are attracted to distressed businesses
4:07
can be a little different. So , um,
4:10
when we're talking about distressed transactions,
4:12
we're talking about those types of things. Shortage
4:14
of liquidity , um, where
4:17
there's no equity left where you're
4:19
in bankruptcy. And , um,
4:21
and the , the stakeholders , um,
4:24
and the players involved are a little different that
4:26
help you get to get to the solution and get something
4:28
over the line.
4:31
Got it. And I think in the
4:33
presentation you gave last year, you talked about the
4:36
increase in this activity. Um, can
4:38
you expand on what you think is driving
4:41
the distress in healthcare?
4:44
Yeah, I will. Um, so what
4:46
we're talking about today , um, is
4:49
more on the healthcare services
4:52
businesses , um, more so than
4:55
other aspects of healthcare like pharmacy
4:58
, um, and , um,
5:01
and medical equipment. If we focus more
5:03
on the healthcare services businesses like
5:05
hospitals, nursing homes, senior
5:07
living, hospice, home
5:10
healthcare , um, those types of businesses, the
5:13
drivers , um, are
5:16
numerous. And it's a very difficult market at
5:18
the moment , um, for providers and,
5:21
and everybody actually. Um, that
5:24
said, it's not all doom and gloom. There
5:26
are , um, changes
5:29
and whenever there's big changes in a
5:31
sector, there's opportunities for some and
5:33
there are headwinds for others. Um,
5:35
but I'll just go through some quickly 'cause we
5:37
could spend a whole hour talking about this <laugh> . Um,
5:40
yeah , so on the capital market side, the interest
5:42
rate environments made things very difficult. Not
5:45
only affecting cash flow when you've
5:47
got the floating rate exposure, but also
5:50
valuations and ability to get
5:52
financing for a transaction. Um,
5:55
the thresholds have got more difficult
5:57
in this interest rate environment. There
5:59
might be hope on the horizon in the second half
6:01
of 2024, what people are
6:04
expecting. Um , but for now it's
6:06
a , it's a tough environment. Um,
6:09
there's been fewer m and a deals as
6:11
well, and we'll maybe come back to that. Um,
6:14
there's increased , um,
6:17
antitrust emphasis. So
6:19
that's put , um, another layer
6:22
of , um, of
6:24
potential barriers for some strategic
6:28
large strategic transactions. Um,
6:31
labor and cost supply . Supply
6:34
cost pressures have been massive the past few
6:36
years. Um, that's going to continue
6:39
, um, maybe not increasing at
6:41
the same rates as it did through
6:43
, um, the backend of, of the
6:46
pandemic, but it's definitely set
6:48
a new baseline. It's not going to get cheaper.
6:50
It might just slow down getting more expensive.
6:53
Um, but on the other side, on the revenue side,
6:56
the , the rates haven't gone up
6:58
at the same rate as the cost . So there's
7:01
a margin squeeze. And I think there's
7:03
a big question in everyone's mind
7:05
and maybe a realization that the margins
7:07
that you could get in
7:09
healthcare pre covid may
7:12
be gone forever. It may be just the
7:14
margins are, are lower , um, for
7:16
the foreseeable future. And that impacts
7:20
businesses when they've got a , a capital structure
7:22
and a debt structure that's based on expected
7:25
returns that maybe you just
7:27
won't be able to get anymore . Um,
7:30
other aspects , um, on drivers,
7:33
I don't, I haven't seen this play out yet, but I
7:35
think it's something to watch is the unwinding
7:38
of Medicaid continuous enrollment.
7:41
So through the pandemic , um, the
7:43
government allowed people to stay on Medicaid
7:45
if they qualified for Medicaid and not have
7:47
to re-enroll, but through 2023
7:51
from May, that
7:53
was unwound. So every state is going
7:55
through a process of everybody having to re-enroll
7:58
in Medicaid. And already
8:00
as of the middle of January , um, 15
8:03
million people were dis-enrolled from
8:06
Medicaid because they no longer qualified. So
8:08
the impact of that on providers , um,
8:11
I think will start to see this
8:14
year. It won't happen immediately, but as those
8:16
people need healthcare , and then if
8:18
they're not insured with Medicaid and
8:20
they don't have other insurance , um, that'll
8:22
start to pinch. It's a , it's a massive number
8:26
and every state's not impacted the
8:28
same. Some states are more , uh,
8:31
impacted by that than others. Um,
8:33
and then the last thing is the macroeconomic
8:37
shift, which has been coming
8:39
for as long as I've been in healthcare
8:41
about 20 years. Um, moving
8:44
out of hospital and out of an institutional
8:46
setting into a community-based setting. And
8:49
the pandemic really helped to accelerate
8:51
that. But businesses that
8:53
haven't , um, transformed
8:55
their care to be able to take advantage of
8:58
that trend. And they're left with a legacy infrastructure
9:01
that's not fit for purpose, that's bigger than
9:03
what they need, and that's expensive to , um,
9:06
keep in good order, they're really going
9:09
to continue to suffer. On the other
9:11
side though, there's the opportunity of
9:13
who's getting that business. So ambulatory
9:15
surgery centers and, and others that
9:18
have got that model , um, that
9:20
that's where the care is moving to. Um,
9:23
so there's opportunity at the
9:25
same time in the same token as we talk about challenges.
9:29
Got it. Okay. So there's a lot going on
9:31
that's pushing people to sell
9:34
or do a transaction. Um, and
9:36
in that there's a subset that are truly distressed
9:38
when they enter that process. So they didn't , they need
9:41
to jump on the first wave or get
9:43
into it early. Um, so Andrea, I'm
9:45
gonna turn over to you for a moment. And can you talk
9:47
about what makes the distress
9:49
transaction different than one
9:52
might enter into the transaction space
9:54
for some of these reasons, but in a different way because
9:56
it's what we're calling distress
9:59
today. Right.
10:01
And as Claire mentioned, I usually, when you have
10:03
a distressed company, you have a company that's
10:05
facing liquidity issues. They may be having
10:08
problems making payroll , um,
10:10
they've probably delayed payments to unsecured
10:13
creditors. Um, they're probably negotiating
10:15
with their lenders. There's a
10:18
lot usually going on at the company
10:20
where funds are needed. Um,
10:23
and as Claire just mentioned as well, access
10:25
to cash is not as easy these days.
10:28
So , um, you really have this
10:30
tight timeline of can
10:33
we make this company work? Um,
10:35
and if so, you know, finding a
10:37
buyer on this compressed timeline. So
10:40
usually that is
10:42
difficult on the seller side because they're
10:44
forced to find a buyer quickly
10:47
or a strategic partner quickly negotiate
10:50
with lenders and, and they're trying to also operate
10:52
a business. Right? But you also have the
10:55
pressure on a buyer to be able to come in
10:57
due diligence quickly. Usually they're,
10:59
they're essentially stepping into the company. So
11:03
a lot of these are stock deals or
11:05
, um, it's a little more difficult
11:07
in healthcare to do an asset transaction outta bankruptcy
11:09
, um, with payer agreements and
11:11
, and non liability of certain contracts.
11:14
So you see a lot of them being stock
11:16
transactions , um, merger agreements.
11:19
And so you're essentially stepping into all
11:21
of the liabilities of a company and you have this
11:23
tight timeline to due diligence
11:25
to figure out what are those risks, what
11:28
are you stepping into, what are you inheriting?
11:31
Um, and trying to build all of that into
11:33
a purchase price for a value proposition
11:36
of, you know, what are you going to assume
11:38
as liabilities? What are you paying in cash?
11:42
Um, who are the different constituents that you're
11:44
negotiating with? Is there lender
11:46
debt? If so , um, if they can't
11:48
be paid in full, is the lender taking a
11:50
haircut? If so, you
11:52
know, what are they willing to do? A
11:54
lot of the times, and we've seen recently, lenders
11:57
being more proactive and more involved
11:59
in these negotiations, oftentimes
12:02
even replacing entire boards.
12:05
Um, so you're trying to figure out who you're
12:07
negotiating with , um, and you're also
12:09
trying to figure out what you're
12:11
pricing this, you know, proposition
12:14
for, for this acquisition, but
12:16
on a very tight timeline where you don't
12:19
really have recourse. So
12:21
you have a company that's failing. You would typically
12:24
do things like have indemnification,
12:26
you'd potentially have escrows to
12:28
backstop reps and warranties. Usually
12:31
in these situations you get very minimal
12:33
reps and warranties. Um, you're
12:36
stepping into whatever you're stepping in, you just need
12:38
to figure out what that is and you need to figure
12:40
it out quickly. Um, and
12:43
you don't typically have the escrows
12:45
, um, that you would normally have for
12:47
a year or two to back your up some
12:49
warranties. So it really
12:52
puts a lot of pressure on the buyer and the buyer's
12:54
advisors to be able to determine what
12:57
is going on with this company very quickly. What
13:00
are the biggest risks, how exactly if
13:02
there are risks, do we mitigate them? Um,
13:05
especially in healthcare where you had , you
13:07
know, potentially healthcare fraud and other things that
13:09
carry over , um, with Medicare
13:12
and payer agreements and billing audits,
13:14
you don't, don't have time typically to do
13:16
billing audits and coding audits. Um,
13:19
so it's just a matter of really
13:21
relying on your advisors
13:23
to determine what those risks are,
13:25
making sure you're not stepping into something that you
13:28
haven't built into the price that
13:30
you're paying for this company.
13:33
I think as well , um, the
13:36
healthcare overlay on all of, I
13:38
agree with everything that, that Andrea was saying, but
13:41
when you've also got the healthcare overlay,
13:44
it's not like we've got a , a factory where
13:46
the product just stays in the factory while
13:48
we sort out the transaction. Um,
13:51
it's, it's a people business. You've
13:53
got physicians, you've got patients,
13:56
and you've got staff and
13:58
those PE people have choices and
14:00
they can go elsewhere. Um,
14:02
and the community in , in
14:04
a lot of the hospital cases, we , um,
14:07
we have, have a massive interest
14:10
in wanting to see what's
14:12
the future of that, that hospital. Um,
14:15
so while you've got
14:17
the, the transaction logistics
14:20
to manage as well on getting the , the
14:22
buyer lined up , um, on the,
14:24
on the seller side , um, you've
14:27
gotta also keep everything , um,
14:30
held together to actually
14:32
make it through to a transaction without losing
14:35
your physicians, losing your key
14:37
staff members, losing your , um, your
14:40
key people in the leadership team, patients
14:43
deciding to go elsewhere. Um, so there's
14:45
a whole stakeholder engagement , um,
14:48
aspect of, of healthcare , um,
14:50
which I think is a bit different
14:52
to other types of sectors when you're dealing with
14:55
distressed transactions.
14:57
Of course, for sure. Um, and
14:59
are there any examples that you wanna share where
15:02
you address some of these risks? We don't have
15:04
to cover all of them , hopefully not
15:06
every transaction you do has the whole laundry list
15:09
of distress. Um , but
15:11
are there any maybe within the past year or two that you've
15:13
seen that you wanna speak about? Yeah,
15:17
so , um, there's
15:19
definitely always risks , uh, that
15:21
come in these transactions. And there's always the
15:23
fear of the unknown, but then there's also the
15:25
known, right? And there's the things of how
15:28
do you mitigate the known. And
15:30
so we had a company who was doing
15:32
really well during covid , um, as
15:34
a lot of companies did, and ended
15:37
up distributing out to all
15:39
of their investors a significant amount of cash,
15:41
not keeping reserves. And then
15:44
a year later, suddenly financial difficulties
15:46
hit , um, with all the market conditions
15:49
Claire is talking about. And the company
15:51
immediately went into distress, immediately
15:53
went into marketing for a quick sale.
15:56
And one of the biggest issues was
15:58
this had to be a merger transaction,
16:01
so stepping into all the liabilities, and
16:04
there was a lot of concern on the
16:06
buyer side of, you know,
16:08
what is that the risk for the directors
16:10
and officers, because that risk is essentially
16:13
being inherited. And when
16:15
you're wiping out equity in a merger
16:17
transaction and they're getting minimal amounts
16:20
back, a lot of the times stockholders
16:23
can just become litigious. And this was
16:25
a very significant cap table, a lot of stockholders,
16:28
a lot of , um, well off stockholders
16:30
who had those funds. So
16:33
we didn't want, as a buyer representing the
16:35
buyer for them to step into that liability
16:37
of, you know, immediately a director and officer liability
16:40
suit with the DNO policy that
16:43
had bankruptcy exclusions. Um,
16:45
we were trying to do this outside of bankruptcy,
16:48
so we were trying to, you know, keep
16:50
the, the policy in place by
16:52
a tail policy, but also had
16:55
to go out and get releases from every
16:57
single director and officer , um,
16:59
which is not an easy thing to do when they
17:02
are very concerned about their own
17:04
liability as well, and the decision
17:07
making they did. But we ended up getting all
17:09
of the releases. Our client was very clear
17:11
they were not buying this company without them. Um,
17:14
and then the company ended up reserving
17:16
funds and purchasing an extra tail policy
17:18
, um, to cover them
17:20
. But, you know, as a buyer, we
17:22
just couldn't walk into potentially,
17:25
you know, a hundred million dollar liability of
17:27
funds that were distributed. So that
17:30
was probably one of the bigger ones. <laugh> .
17:32
Yeah, right. Gosh, I've
17:34
got some other , um, examples
17:37
of risks that we've
17:40
kind of learned from , um, and
17:42
will we'll make sure we incorporate in
17:44
our , um, in our future , um,
17:48
businesses , uh, future transactions.
17:50
So one of the cases we did , um,
17:53
was a , a business that was
17:55
, um, on
17:58
the brink of closing , um, pre-bankruptcy.
18:01
So it was a , a bit of a free
18:04
fall filing. Um, the, the CEO
18:06
had died, and then the
18:08
incoming CEO , um, which
18:11
was his wife died of
18:13
, um, COVID shortly after. I
18:16
mean, it was a terrible situation. And
18:18
, um, so we got a
18:21
appointed as the financial advisor for
18:23
the debtor, and , um, ran
18:26
a quick process to have
18:29
a bankruptcy auction. The
18:31
auction was successful and , um,
18:35
and there was a winner,
18:37
but the winner just disappeared
18:41
days after the transaction couldn't
18:43
be contacted, was obviously
18:45
not going to , um, come
18:48
through with the deal that they had agreed to
18:50
, um, at the auction. So
18:53
fortunately we did have a backup bidder, which
18:56
is, which is pretty typical. So I just wanna
18:58
make sure everybody, make sure you have your backup bidder
19:00
because you can't be relying on the, the
19:03
first bidder. Um, and
19:05
, um, and in
19:07
healthcare you don't close
19:10
the transaction immediately after
19:12
having the auction because there's all of
19:14
the transfers of licenses and , um,
19:17
and all those agreements, which can take months, even
19:19
years to, to have that all
19:22
, um, go through the government process. So
19:25
, um, what
19:27
ended up happening in this case is that it was
19:29
nine months down the road before
19:32
it was due to close , and
19:34
the business continued to lose money.
19:36
It was losing money before the transaction.
19:39
The buyer was aware of that, it continued
19:41
to lose money, and maybe they didn't do the due
19:44
diligence like , um, like
19:46
Andrea would recommend, and
19:49
, um, it was losing
19:51
more money than they expected. So by the
19:53
time it comes to closing
19:55
on the transaction, they wanna retrade,
19:57
you know, they think, well, I'm not paying the same
20:00
amount that I committed to nine months
20:02
ago. This is a disaster company,
20:04
and I don't, I don't think it's worth it that anymore.
20:07
Well, nine months down the road, the
20:10
third and fourth bidders, they're long gone.
20:12
You know, they've moved on to other things and they're not
20:14
in the market necessarily for this anymore. And
20:17
plus the business is not doing
20:19
well, so maybe they're not even interested. So
20:21
then you're facing , uh, uh,
20:23
dealing with one party and , and trying
20:26
to negotiate with one party and one buyer,
20:28
and you know, what the balance of power is, they're
20:31
very difficult to try and get something
20:33
over the line when you've only got one person
20:35
interested in the , in the assets.
20:38
So it happens frequently
20:41
, um, particularly in the
20:43
type of , um, um, in the middle
20:45
market where you don't have always
20:48
the most attractive assets coming through and,
20:50
and people aren't jumping at <laugh>
20:52
, they're not lining up to buy some of
20:54
these assets. You've got part , you've
20:56
got parties that are , um, have
20:59
a unique interest in it, and for some reason, you
21:01
know , they've got the ability to make it work, whereas not
21:03
everybody can. So
21:06
the retrade risk is something that's,
21:09
that's very real and it makes an
21:11
enormous difference , um, for
21:13
the outcome of the case. So trying
21:16
to design the process so that you've got
21:18
a competitive process and you , um,
21:23
takes steps to tie in the
21:25
buyer and, and get deposits
21:27
and, and have them , um, really
21:30
committed to the, to the
21:32
deal , um, to mitigate that ability
21:34
for them to retrade down the line is
21:36
, um, is something that I'd really recommend.
21:40
Well , we're talking about bids and the types of
21:42
buyers you mentioned , um, some
21:45
buyers have that specific interest, which is
21:47
why they're willing to take on some
21:49
of these risks or enter into this distress.
21:52
Is there any particular
21:54
group or different characteristics
21:56
of buyers that you see , um, to
21:59
be, whether it's typical or maybe
22:01
in the current market willing to
22:03
enter? Um, or is it really case
22:06
specific based on the , um, what's
22:08
for sale? Like
22:12
, I don't know , Claire , if you wanna orient
22:14
Andrea <laugh> , take a swing on what
22:16
you're saying .
22:18
Are there typical buyers? That's the
22:20
question. Are
22:20
You seeing like a consistent buyer type is
22:23
I guess one way you could look at
22:25
it? Or are there certain characteristics
22:27
across the different fire types that
22:30
are entering?
22:32
Um, It
22:34
, it depends what the type of the asset and
22:37
whether the assets a potential , um,
22:41
platform , um, deal
22:43
for someone or it's something that they can easily
22:45
bolt on to an existing platform.
22:49
Um, if we take the example of a
22:51
a community hospital , um,
22:55
the strategic, the strategic
22:57
buyers are going to be larger regional
22:59
systems , um, but
23:03
the hospitals aren't always bought by strategic
23:05
buyers. Um, we had
23:07
a case , uh, last
23:10
year or the year before where it was
23:12
a community hospital that couldn't
23:14
make ends meet, and all
23:17
of the strategic buyers in
23:19
the market were interested, but
23:21
they wanted to close inpatient services and
23:24
create a new outpatient facility
23:26
for this community. And
23:29
the community didn't want that. They really wanted
23:32
to have inpatient services, so they ended
23:34
up , um, agreeing to sell the hospital
23:37
to a non-strategic buyer . And
23:39
, um, and that enabled them to,
23:42
to keep the inpatient services. But
23:44
you don't have that kind of hub
23:47
and spoke , um, model happening
23:49
in that market. I'm still not convinced
23:52
whether that that
23:54
will , um, not still end up happening
23:56
one day. Um, but for the time being,
23:58
that was the solution that that was , um,
24:01
the community wanted at that time. So,
24:04
so you always think it's gonna be
24:06
a strategic buyer because they can make
24:08
more out of it than a
24:11
non-strategic buyer, but it , it's
24:13
not always the case that, that the strategics
24:15
win.
24:18
Interesting. Yeah,
24:20
I think that that's what makes healthcare transactions,
24:23
you know, unique, especially in those community
24:26
situations where you have these other
24:28
third parties where , um,
24:31
you know, you have community healthcare services
24:33
you're providing to them, right? So that's very
24:35
personal to a community. Um, and
24:38
that personal, you know, community
24:40
feel versus what financially makes
24:43
sense don't always align. So,
24:45
you know, closing OB services is
24:48
always a big dispute in these hospitals
24:50
because it's very expensive. It's one of
24:52
their highest, you know, liabilities and,
24:55
you know, people wanna give birth in
24:57
their community and they want those services available.
25:00
But, you know, when hospitals are
25:02
considering, you know, all the financial economics
25:05
that Claire was discussing and, you know,
25:07
determining where to cut costs , um, sometimes
25:10
it's cutting lines of service that people in the community
25:12
really want. It's really hard
25:14
to find a buyer , um, who
25:16
can figure out and do exactly
25:19
what that buyer did , which is keep
25:21
all the services in place , um,
25:23
but also keep the facility opening
25:25
and running. And we'll see, I guess how that
25:27
works out long term . Like Claire said , um,
25:30
obviously cutting physician compensation
25:33
obvious is also on the top of the list
25:35
of heavily negotiated things. Um,
25:38
so it , it definitely makes healthcare unique
25:41
compared to other , um, service line
25:43
. Yeah. I'm
25:45
gonna shift gears a little bit. Um, we've
25:48
talked from the beginning about different financial
25:50
stresses. Um, in what cases
25:53
or examples, where have you seen
25:55
bankruptcy , um, as
25:58
the solution or an effective tool rather, to
26:02
ultimately have the best
26:05
outcome for the situation at hand?
26:08
Um , I'll take that one. There's , um, there's
26:11
a case that , um, we
26:13
, um, we weren't on
26:15
the debtor or the, or the credit aside. Um,
26:18
in this case we had a little bit of an
26:20
involvement, but, but , um, I
26:22
watched from afar and was
26:24
pleased to see the outcome . So the
26:27
case , um, is Borrego
26:29
Community Health Foundation in California.
26:32
That company had a
26:34
, um, a historical , um,
26:37
fraud and they
26:39
changed their board and they had
26:42
taken measures to , um, to
26:46
prevent it from happening. Um,
26:49
but there were still issues for , for
26:51
some reason. Um, the department
26:53
of , um, health and care services
26:56
in California decided to suspend payments
26:59
of Medi-Cal for Medi-Cal, and
27:01
this provider is a nonprofit and
27:05
primarily served a Medicaid population.
27:07
So cutting those payments would
27:10
mean an immediate closure of
27:12
the, of the whole operation, which was pretty
27:14
sizable and served a rural community.
27:17
Um, so in that case, the
27:20
, um, the debtor filed
27:22
bankruptcy and was able to
27:24
use the bankruptcy process and
27:26
the automatic stay , um, to
27:29
, um, to stop the suspension
27:31
of those , um, Medi-Cal payments. And
27:34
the reason I chose this one to talk about
27:36
is because they , um, have
27:39
just , um, submitted
27:41
the plan and I think agreed the plan in
27:43
January this year , um, which
27:46
, um, solidified,
27:48
you know, they had a , a very successful sale.
27:51
Um, they were able to settle the
27:54
claims with the Department of Health and
27:57
care services, pay all the secured
27:59
creditors, and also , um, have
28:02
a plan which would provide for a 100%
28:04
return to general unsecured. So
28:07
that's a , um, incredible
28:09
outcome , um, for a
28:12
community that really needed these
28:14
essential services , um,
28:16
essential healthcare services for
28:19
a rural and very , um, low
28:21
socioeconomic community. And
28:24
if that hadn't happened, the outcome
28:26
would've been closure and , and a scrambling
28:29
to try and , um, find other providers
28:32
to , to deliver those services.
28:34
And at the time, the analysis was
28:36
that they just weren't, they weren't providers
28:38
in the market to be able to do it. So that
28:41
in that case, the automatic
28:43
stay in bankruptcy and the ability
28:45
to use the , the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
28:48
court to have as the forum
28:50
for dealing with the government liabilities was
28:53
, uh, extremely effective. And
28:55
I think the, the , the outcome
28:58
for patients and for , um,
29:01
for that business at , at this
29:03
stage looks extremely positive. Can
29:07
you think of any other examples, Andrea, where
29:09
bankruptcies been an effective tool
29:12
in your experience?
29:14
Yeah, so the
29:16
biggest thing for healthcare
29:19
is the , the nons assignability of
29:21
payer contracts. And now there's
29:23
essentially this evolving case
29:25
law out of Delaware that is essentially
29:28
saying, not only can
29:30
you force the assignment of these payer contracts
29:32
, um, which we've all assumed
29:35
is, you know, you're taking all of the liabilities,
29:37
especially with Medicare and with companies
29:39
that, you know, especially the
29:41
lab business, you know, had a
29:43
, a lot of closures because a lot of
29:45
the fraud and , and people couldn't take over
29:47
those businesses because they, they couldn't take those payer
29:50
contracts. And so a lot of
29:52
the times if there's, you know, historical
29:55
billing issues , um, you have
29:57
a facility's that risk because
30:00
you , no one's gonna step into those Medicare liabilities.
30:02
And Medicare historically has not been willing to
30:04
negotiate those. And so now
30:07
you have this, this case law coming
30:09
out that's saying, well, we
30:11
don't think that this is an executory contract where
30:14
you actually have to essentially
30:16
cure, which is pay whatever liabilities
30:19
are on that contract to assign it , um,
30:21
or step into that liability. But
30:23
we think that these are actually statutory entitlements.
30:26
And so in that case, these
30:28
are just assets that can be sold like
30:30
any other assets. And so you don't have to
30:33
cure those liabilities. So essentially
30:35
you're taking a Medicare agreement
30:38
, um, and you
30:41
aren't taking on those liabilities, which
30:43
for a lot of facilities has been
30:46
a huge issue. And, you know, I was in-house
30:48
at a company, I filed bankruptcy
30:50
, um, and that was,
30:52
that was the biggest problem. Nobody was going
30:55
to take over the healthcare company with
30:58
the liabilities that they had with their
31:00
payers. Um, and had they
31:02
, had they been able to take over those
31:05
contracts free and clear, without those liabilities
31:07
, um, those facilities would still
31:09
be open. And if
31:12
they're not using the bankruptcy
31:14
process , um, are
31:17
there other options or what risks would
31:20
there be if these similar sellers
31:22
weren't going through that process if
31:24
they tried to do
31:27
their transaction without those protections?
31:31
Yeah. And , and so that, that adds some risks
31:33
, right? Bankruptcy gives you a lot
31:35
of finality. Um, it , it allows
31:37
you to have an order that says these things are
31:39
free and clear. You know exactly what the cure
31:41
amounts, if you're taking over certain executory
31:44
contracts , um, you mostly know the liabilities
31:47
have been disclosed , uh, so
31:49
you have a lot more information,
31:52
a lot more guarantees. And then you have a sale
31:54
order that says you've now purchased these assets
31:56
free and clear based upon the purchase price, and
31:58
those proceeds will attach , um, the
32:01
liens will attach to the proceeds of the sale, so
32:03
that that is not something you're
32:05
gonna get outside of bankruptcy. Um, and so
32:08
you have to figure out exactly
32:10
what those liabilities are. Um,
32:13
and you're also buying a
32:15
company most likely at a depressed price
32:17
because it's, you know, distressed
32:20
and you have a lot of creditors
32:22
that might not get paid , um, unhappy
32:25
shareholders who aren't getting paid.
32:28
Uh, so you have fraudulent transfer risk
32:30
. And so trying to determine
32:33
what that proper purchase price
32:35
is , um, knowing that
32:37
that is a potential issue of
32:39
unhappy constituents at the end of
32:41
the day, at the end of this transaction when you close and
32:43
not stepping into those liabilities is
32:46
one of the biggest issues. And so a
32:48
lot of the times you don't have time
32:50
for a fair market value opinion. You have to do the
32:52
best you can to document what that
32:54
value is. Um, a lot of the times
32:57
we get either a broker
32:59
price opinion, we get some type of opinion
33:01
from essentially a
33:03
banker on the marketing process, how those assets
33:06
were marketed, who they were marketed to
33:08
, um, the timeframe from
33:10
which they were marketed. Uh, and
33:12
you just have to do the best you can to mitigate
33:15
that fraudulent transfer risk. If somebody comes
33:17
in and says, we think that you did
33:19
not pay enough for this company , um, you
33:22
underpaid for these assets, or, you
33:24
know, the , the stock that you bought for this company , um,
33:28
and mitigate those risks. And we, we've
33:30
seen a lot of people becoming more litigious
33:32
about that , uh, with
33:34
buyers and these, you know, essentially
33:37
fire sales , um, for lack of a better
33:39
word,
33:41
When time, like it must be hard , um,
33:43
Andre , because when time is of the essence, you
33:46
know, you've got liquidity and you're just trying
33:48
to make it over the line to a transaction, the
33:51
, the choice might be, you
33:54
know, you take the deal that's in front of you or
33:56
the place closes, and
33:59
then after the fact having a challenge that
34:01
says, oh, well you didn't get fair value,
34:04
and you think, well, the conditions
34:06
really didn't provide the time for
34:09
a very robust marketing. I mean,
34:12
no one was willing to fund the
34:14
transaction process, the marketing process
34:16
to actually have
34:18
that happen. So pretty challenging,
34:21
I guess, to prove when
34:23
you've , um, got a
34:25
whole lot of , um, stuff flying
34:27
in the air and you're just trying to get something over
34:30
the line ,
34:31
Right? And you don't always have a market for those
34:33
assets, right? So, you
34:35
know, sometimes they've been marketed, sometimes there
34:38
was no time to market them. Um , yeah , sometimes
34:40
we try to slow down the transaction. They
34:43
have had clients who are willing to, you know, essentially
34:46
pay an option fee, a couple million dollars
34:49
to allow the business to continue to operate. So
34:51
we could at least do some form of diligence
34:53
in a couple of weeks that is, you know, not
34:55
perfect, but at least some diligence.
34:58
Um, and if , if they decide to walk away, they
35:00
just assume that that's a fee for, you
35:03
know, looking at the business. Um,
35:05
and sometimes you have to do that because you need, you
35:08
know, especially if you have very litigious stockholders
35:11
or creditors who are being wiped out,
35:13
you need something, you need a fairness opinion,
35:16
you need something to show that
35:19
you're , what you're paying is the right value, even if
35:21
there is nobody else, it's hard to prove a negative,
35:23
right? So you need somebody else to
35:25
come in and be able to provide that to you
35:28
otherwise, you know, you're essentially just walking
35:30
into litigation.
35:32
Yeah, it's difficult because you can
35:34
have a piece of paper that says what a value is,
35:36
but the market really talks.
35:39
One of the things that we often do when
35:41
, um, we're faced with a
35:43
, you know, business is losing money and
35:45
there's an offer on the table, but
35:48
you think, okay, well how, how
35:50
much is it going to cost for us to run a
35:52
60 day process and
35:56
are the losses , um, that need
35:58
to be funded going to be covered
36:01
by the potential for getting more money
36:04
<laugh> if we run a robust process, versus
36:07
just taking the offer that's in front of our
36:09
face right now and doing the deal. Um,
36:11
so it depends on the operating
36:14
losses and if anybody's willing to fund them
36:16
if they're out of cash.
36:19
Yeah, I mean , just coming back to that compressed timeline
36:21
and imagining any buyer without
36:24
the time to really dig in
36:26
and do that diligence, whatever offer
36:28
they put in place, they're trying
36:30
to even , you know, it doesn't matter
36:33
how well intended they are, they're looking at
36:35
all of their risks and to the extent
36:37
that they can do diligence or not. Um,
36:40
so I imagine that while
36:43
they might put in as many caveats as they can, whether it's
36:45
starting with an option or trying to figure
36:47
out , um, some
36:49
kind of tiered transaction or
36:51
, um, I know
36:53
healthcare has a little bit of struggle with option
36:56
models inside that purchase price.
36:59
Um, yeah, it's just a lot <laugh>
37:02
pressure for everyone right, on these deals. Um,
37:05
it's been really interesting to follow this conversation
37:07
through that distress transaction and all these different
37:09
risks. Um, I especially appreciated
37:11
examples that you brought
37:13
up because it helps really see specific
37:16
scenarios and what , um, individual
37:18
sellers and buyers did when
37:20
they were in that difficult position.
37:23
Mm-Hmm. <affirmative> , is there anything else, any
37:26
other examples you wanna share or anything you wanted
37:28
to maybe you thought
37:30
about saying and , um, wanna come back to before
37:32
we wrap up?
37:35
I , I think I'll say something that
37:37
, um, what I've
37:39
found is that, you know, you think that you're
37:41
dealing with rational players
37:44
on all sides. You know, people will make
37:46
decisions in their own economic interests,
37:49
and so you can do some analysis based on that.
37:52
Um, but there's, there's always a curve
37:55
ball , you know, <laugh> , no one, no one just
37:57
looks at the numbers on the page and, and, you
37:59
know, and acts, there's the emotions, there's
38:02
the historical relationships. They
38:04
may have other reasons for wanting,
38:07
you know, a certain outcome that might not be
38:09
the most economically advantageous.
38:12
Um, so yeah , it reminds me
38:14
of , um, that, that , um, Tom
38:16
Cruise and Jerry McGuire , when, you know, you've got a
38:19
client and you're like, help me help you
38:21
<laugh> , help me help you, you know , um,
38:24
you want them to act in their rational interest,
38:27
but they don't always , and that's on all
38:29
sides. So it means trying
38:31
to get things over the line sometimes. Um,
38:34
you know , we'd recently had a case where
38:37
it looked like it was lined up for a
38:40
, um, a good settlement and
38:42
one of the parties just came
38:45
to the, to negotiation with,
38:47
with the curve ball and threw , blew
38:50
the whole thing up. Um, and there
38:52
was really no , um, rational
38:55
reason to do that. It was, they'd
38:58
had, you know , just years
39:00
and years of acrimony with the other
39:02
party and they just couldn't help themselves <laugh>.
39:04
So that type of thing happens all
39:07
the time. Um, and
39:09
, uh, so when you know you do get the
39:12
transaction over the line and it's successful
39:14
and you can have the business , um,
39:16
go on, its merry way, it, it is
39:19
really satisfying. But there's a , that's
39:21
why it's a bit of a wild ride, don't you think , um,
39:23
Andrea,
39:24
Yes, absolutely. Completely agree
39:27
with Claire . Um, you
39:29
, you think you know what you're walking into , but
39:31
in these situations yeah, emotions tend
39:33
to run high and, and convincing people
39:36
of the right thing versus , um, you
39:38
know, what they feel is , is
39:40
, could be difficult for sure, <laugh> . Definitely
39:43
. Alright , well
39:45
thank you guys. Thank you both Claire and Andrea
39:48
for sharing your expertise. Um,
39:51
if the listeners wanna get in touch with you, is there
39:53
a preferred way you'd like them to reach out?
39:58
Sure. Um, our website, it's
40:00
Gibbons, G-I-B-B-I-N-S
40:03
advisors . And our con contact information
40:05
is there , um, myself
40:07
and Ron Winters, we the principal. So
40:10
reach out to either of us, would be delighted
40:12
to speak to you.
40:14
Yeah . And Andrea , um, yeah, you
40:16
can reach us at um, kl
40:18
gates.com or on LinkedIn.
40:21
Um, all of the phone numbers ringed my cell phone
40:23
, so it's pretty easy to get ahold of us . Awesome.
40:27
And you can find the business law and a
40:29
governance practice group for the A HLA communities
40:32
where there's lots of conversations
40:34
and activities happening there as well. Um,
40:37
yeah, so thanks again. It's been a pleasure
40:39
.
40:40
Thank you so much ,
40:41
Jessica . Thanks Claire .
40:49
Thank you for listening. If you enjoyed
40:51
this episode, be sure to subscribe to
40:54
a HLA, speaking of health law wherever
40:56
you get your podcasts. To
40:58
learn more about AHLA and the educational
41:00
resources available to the health law community, visit
41:04
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