0:04

I'm

0:07

Bonnie Lin, director of the

0:09

China Power Project and senior fellow for

0:11

Asian Security at the Center

0:14

for Strategic International Studies. In

0:16

this episode of the China Power

0:19

podcast, we're discussing China's nuclear modernization

0:21

through a comparative lens. How

0:24

does China's growing nuclear arsenal compare to

0:26

that of the United States, Russia, India,

0:29

and other nuclear powers? How

0:31

does Beijing's strategy differ? What

0:34

is China's approach to nuclear arms control

0:36

and what are the implications for strategic

0:38

stability? Here to

0:40

dig into these issues is Dr. Hans

0:43

Kristensen, director of the Nuclear

0:45

Information Project at the Federation of

0:47

American Scientists. Hans provides

0:49

the public with analysis and background information

0:52

about the status of nuclear forces and

0:54

the role of nuclear weapons using

0:56

the Freedom of Information Act. He

0:59

is co-author of the Nuclear Notebook column in

1:01

the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and

1:04

the World Nuclear Forces Overview in the Cypriot

1:06

Yearbook. Hans, thank you for joining

1:08

me today. Thanks very much for

1:10

having me. So I'd like

1:13

to structure our discussion today through several

1:15

big buckets, but first to talk about

1:17

China's actual nuclear capabilities. I

1:19

think it will be useful to begin

1:22

by contrasting the overall size of China's

1:24

nuclear stockpile with that of

1:26

the United States and Russia's and just

1:28

the range of capabilities China has. Can

1:31

you give us a sense of how you

1:33

would compare China to the United States and

1:35

Russia with respect to their overall nuclear capabilities?

1:39

First of all, I mean, China comes

1:41

from a nuclear past, one

1:44

in which it was not very engaged at

1:46

all in sort of what you could call

1:48

this typical competition or

1:50

more in-depth competition between the Soviet

1:52

Union and later Russia and

1:55

the United States. So that

1:57

has colored its nuclear capabilities on

1:59

the nuclear. posture. That

2:01

said, of course, the Chinese have always

2:03

wanted to have a nuclear arsenal that

2:05

was, in their view,

2:07

secure and capable of responding

2:10

sufficiently to attacks. And

2:13

that is now beginning to change. Normally,

2:15

they have been sort of

2:17

around a couple of 100 nuclear weapons in

2:19

their stockpile, and a

2:21

limited number of missiles to deliver them,

2:24

very limited ballistic missile

2:26

submarine capability, and almost

2:29

no bomber capability. Recently,

2:31

we've seen a change where they're moving

2:33

to build up significantly,

2:36

specifically the land-based portion of

2:38

their arsenal. We can get

2:40

into the details, but if you look

2:42

at it overall, so that's basically where

2:44

we see the differences between China, Russia,

2:46

and the United States. Typically, that

2:49

both the United States and Russia

2:51

have a very large force of

2:53

land-based ballistic missiles and ballistic missile

2:55

submarines and strategic bombers, completely

2:58

integrated in strategic war

3:00

planning over many, many decades. China

3:03

is now beginning to come up. And

3:05

so right now, we estimate so

3:07

are the numbers that we hear out there, but

3:10

also sort of what

3:12

we can observe on the ground via,

3:14

for example, commercial satellite imagery in terms

3:16

of their base structure and that type

3:18

of stuff, that they

3:20

have something in the order of

3:22

around 500 nuclear weapons in their

3:24

stockpile. Compared to the United

3:26

States and Russia, it's

3:29

a lot smaller. The United States has about something

3:32

on the order of 3,700 nuclear warheads in its stockpile, and

3:37

Russia, perhaps 4,300

3:40

something in that range, depending on how you

3:43

count it. There is a

3:45

great deal of uncertainty, both on

3:47

the Chinese and the Russian side, about exactly

3:49

how much and how one counts it. And

3:52

the US is a great deal more transparent, but

3:54

we've seen in the last three years that there's

3:57

also been an increase in

4:00

the U.S. secrecy about its stockpile number. It has

4:02

not been released since 2020. So

4:06

that's sort of overall how it falls. Thank

4:09

you, Hans. As we compare

4:11

China's modernization effort with that of

4:14

other countries, China is

4:16

still significantly behind the United States and

4:18

Russia. Across the board,

4:20

as you mentioned, China's deal with capabilities

4:22

are not newly as sophisticated or

4:24

integrated. What is

4:27

China prioritizing as it seeks to improve

4:29

its nuclear program? Is it

4:31

the land-based components or is

4:33

China prioritizing development across the

4:35

triad? Yeah, in

4:37

terms of the knots and bolts, so

4:39

to speak, it's definitely the land-based forces

4:41

that are being prioritized. This is where

4:43

we, beyond comparison to anything else happening

4:46

in the Chinese arsenal and seeing an

4:48

expansion of the number of long

4:50

range intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, whether

4:53

they are silos, that's where we

4:55

see most of the expansion, but

4:57

also road mobile systems. China

5:00

typically has also had a

5:02

large force or relatively large

5:04

force of medium

5:07

or intermedium range, sort of theater capabilities,

5:09

if you will, that were

5:12

intended for engaging US,

5:15

Russian and Indian targets that are

5:17

closer by. And so, you know, you

5:19

could think of Guam or US bases

5:21

elsewhere in the region, for example. That

5:24

force has also increased significantly. It's

5:27

a little more difficult to judge

5:29

it because especially in terms

5:32

of the intermediate range system that is

5:34

now taking over in the nuclear role,

5:36

that system is a dual cable system. So

5:39

it's very hard to figure out how

5:41

many warheads are actually assigned to that

5:43

force, assuming that since it's

5:46

dual capable, they may not necessarily

5:48

assign a nuclear war to every single launcher.

5:50

It could be that most of them perhaps,

5:52

or half of them or whatever their

5:54

situation is, that they have a

5:57

focus on the conventional mission and then the smaller

5:59

number of them. But so

6:01

that's just to emphasize here, that's a lot

6:03

of uncertainty in the Chinese force

6:05

structuring. Also important for them

6:07

now, of course, is that they now

6:09

sort of finally have a ballistic missile

6:12

submarine force, somewhat limited, six

6:14

ballistic missile submarines. And

6:17

they're relatively noisy by US

6:19

and Russian standards. But

6:22

they're building more advanced systems for

6:24

those submarines. They will

6:27

build up a bit that force,

6:29

probably not significantly over the next decade and

6:32

a half, but some. And

6:34

then we're seeing that the bomber force is

6:37

getting much more attention. It

6:40

is being sort of upgraded to an active

6:42

nuclear bomber force. And right

6:45

now, most of the focus is on sort of an

6:47

air launch ballistic missile that might have nuclear capability. But

6:49

you can imagine in the future, not

6:51

so far into the future, that you might

6:54

also see China deciding to have air launch

6:56

cruise missiles with nuclear capability, like Russia

6:59

and the United States already have. So

7:02

it's a broad modernization, but I will definitely

7:04

say that most of the focus is on

7:06

the land-based ballistic missile force. And

7:08

why is that? Why is the focus on

7:10

the land-based? Is it because it's easier to

7:12

control than, for example, submarines

7:14

that might be more difficult to maintain

7:17

and control? Or why is China,

7:19

I think, so much on land-based force? Well,

7:21

so there are a lot of uncertainties about why

7:23

China is doing what it's doing. They don't say

7:25

much about it. And it's hard to

7:28

get a conversation going with people that know about

7:30

it. So there's a fair amount of speculation. Most

7:33

of what we hear, we get sort

7:35

of predominantly from military

7:38

agencies in other countries. And

7:40

that is a lens that is a little

7:43

risky to look through because, of course, military

7:45

intelligence is supposed to look for enemies and

7:47

threats. And so it can be

7:49

harder to trust that there is a sort of a, what

7:52

do you say, conservative assessment of

7:54

what's going on that involves other

7:57

aspects. And so, but

7:59

it's unfortunate we don't hear. much from the Chinese

8:01

about it. It is possible that

8:03

it is a combination of factors. It's most

8:05

likely that it is. There's an element of

8:07

it, of course, that has to do with

8:09

what function do the

8:12

ballistic missiles on land

8:14

serve. And in the

8:16

past, they've had relatively few of them compared to

8:18

Russia and the United States. They've

8:20

clearly decided that that's not enough. The

8:23

reason is, is that because of

8:25

national prestige? Is it because of

8:28

concern about how vulnerable they are

8:30

to Russian and US attacks? Or

8:32

is it something about military or

8:35

institutional or national prestige? Lots more money,

8:37

you want to be a big power,

8:40

and therefore you build up forces

8:42

that are visible? Or a combination

8:44

of all of that? These are some of the difficult

8:47

questions that are hard to answer. But

8:49

there's no doubt that whatever

8:52

the reason is, the motivation has

8:54

certainly changed them into building a

8:56

force structure that is unlike anything

8:59

we've ever seen in China before. Let's

9:02

compare China's modernization efforts with what the

9:04

United States and Russia are doing.

9:07

Is it correct to say that China is

9:09

focused mainly on modernizing its land-based

9:11

forces, whereas the United States and Russia are

9:14

modernizing more across the board, across

9:16

the triad? Well,

9:19

they're all modernizing all their aspects

9:21

of their posture. But the Chinese

9:23

posture looks different than Russia and

9:25

the United States. Like

9:27

we discussed most by far in

9:30

terms of numbers of the modernization

9:32

is happening, and the emphasis

9:34

is happening on the land-based ballistic missiles.

9:37

Russia and the United States are

9:39

also modernizing their land-based ballistic missiles.

9:41

These modernization cycles happen not necessarily

9:44

at the same time. It all

9:46

depends on what priorities the different

9:48

countries have, but also when they

9:51

introduce their missile systems and

9:53

how long can they last, what kind of

9:55

quality do they have. So these

9:57

cycles don't happen at the same time necessarily.

10:00

Russia has been very

10:02

busy modernizing its entire ICBM

10:04

force since the

10:06

late 1990s. And

10:08

they're now something in the order of, I would

10:11

say 85%, perhaps a little more done with

10:15

that. We still need to see

10:18

some of the big old multiple

10:20

warhead systems like the SS-18 be replaced. That

10:24

is only beginning to happen now. But

10:26

it's well underway. The United States is

10:29

just now beginning its modernization

10:32

of its ICBMs. But

10:34

that's because it has upgraded

10:36

them previously and life

10:38

extended them, et cetera. But

10:40

now they're shifting gears and we're seeing

10:42

a very expensive and large program to

10:44

replace the whole thing. And

10:46

the same thing, of course, with ballistic missile submarines

10:49

and both in Russia and the

10:51

United States, we see this continuous upgrade of

10:54

the systems, enhancement to the ballistic missiles

10:56

or their warheads. But also

10:58

when old types get

11:00

too old, we see a new class

11:02

coming in. Russia has their

11:04

new class, the BORA class that has been

11:07

building for several years and will continue to build

11:09

for the next decade too. The

11:11

United States is beginning to build

11:14

its class, a Columbia class, ballistic

11:16

missile submarines that are scheduled to

11:18

replace the existing Ohio class. I

11:21

think the first one is supposed to sail out

11:23

there sometime in 2031. And

11:27

then on the bombers, both of them are

11:29

modernizing. The US is doing

11:31

it in a more advanced way,

11:33

you could say. It is introducing

11:36

a whole new bomber, the

11:38

B-21, that's going to replace the

11:41

conventional B-1 bomber and also the

11:43

relatively small number of B-2 stealth

11:45

bombers. Russia, on

11:48

the other hand, is sort of taking

11:50

old aircraft they have and

11:53

either upgrading them or

11:55

putting them through a

11:57

significant sort of life extension facelift.

12:00

They are working on a completely

12:03

new tight, but it

12:05

remains to be seen when that is

12:07

going to start test flying because their

12:11

industry is pretty constrained right now.

12:14

But that's sort of the basic lay of the land

12:16

here for how they approach it compared to the United

12:18

States and Russia. In DC,

12:20

we constantly hear the assessment that

12:22

China is rapidly and aggressively modernizing

12:25

its nuclear force. But

12:27

as you lay out, it seems the United

12:29

States and Russia are also moving quite fast

12:31

in their nuclear modernization efforts too. So

12:34

how would you compare the case of modernization

12:36

between China compared to the United

12:38

States or Russia? Yes, you're

12:41

correct that they're all modernizing. Nuclear

12:43

powers, when they have nuclear weapons, they are

12:46

modernizing and you have systems and

12:48

you rely on them for time to time, they have

12:50

to be upgraded. And then you can have new

12:53

political situations where things change

12:55

or get more tense and

12:58

suddenly agencies begin to argue

13:01

and advocate for additional capabilities, et

13:03

cetera, et cetera. So

13:06

I see the most significant

13:08

difference in the way that the Chinese

13:10

and the United States and Russia are

13:12

doing these right now is just that

13:14

the Chinese numerical modernization,

13:16

its increase of its force

13:19

is significantly different compared to

13:21

what the United States and Russia are doing. Although

13:24

there are some increases in

13:26

certain categories of Russian nuclear

13:28

forces, overall, it's not

13:30

something that fundamentally rocks the boat.

13:33

And the same thing in the United States, there

13:35

are some people who advocate for getting

13:38

some new weapons, including a nuclear

13:40

cruise missile for the attack submarines.

13:43

But overall, the modernization is

13:46

by and large upgrading the

13:48

existing structure, if you will.

13:51

So that's the difference, I would say main difference

13:53

in the way the Chinese go about this compared

13:55

to Russia and the United States. including

14:00

from our Department of Defense, that

14:03

China is interested in tactical nuclear

14:05

weapons. What is happening on this

14:07

front? Yeah, one has

14:09

to be a little careful about the tactical

14:11

because tactical nuclear weapons in

14:13

the historical sense in terms of the

14:15

way the United States and the Soviet

14:18

Union did this was the

14:20

tactical nuclear weapons were sort of battlefield

14:22

weapons. They were weapons that were intended

14:24

to go out and fight other nuclear

14:26

forces in regional limited scenarios. I mean,

14:28

they could be big, but compared to

14:30

global nuclear war, it was somewhat limited.

14:34

The Chinese hadn't really done that, but

14:36

they have the very first weapons than the

14:38

Chinese have. They were of course medium range

14:40

and later intermediate range weapons. And

14:43

in some literature received from, for

14:45

example, the US intelligence community, the

14:47

military intelligence community, they

14:49

describe Chinese medium

14:52

range nuclear capable forces as

14:56

tactical. Even though they're

14:58

not strictly speaking developed to function as

15:00

sort of a tactical weapon in a

15:03

regional war. It's just that some

15:05

targets are further away than others. But

15:07

of course, as arsenals begin to

15:09

increase and they get

15:11

more resources and there's

15:13

more emphasis put on how

15:16

the nuclear arsenal should function, it

15:19

is likely of course, that you will see

15:21

some modifications of it. Right

15:23

now, what's happening in sort of

15:25

what some people call

15:27

the tactical nuclear weapons or non-strictly

15:29

nuclear weapons of China is

15:32

in the medium and intermediate range. So

15:34

in the intermediate range, we can see

15:36

the overwhelming focus is on this system

15:38

that's called the DF-26. That

15:41

is a intermediate range dual

15:43

capable force or ballistic missile

15:45

that's road mobile. They

15:47

have a large number of those, about 250 launchers

15:49

and I think 300 missiles, if

15:52

I remember correctly, but it's in that

15:55

order. But that is now

15:57

replacing what used to be a ballistic missile

15:59

with a medium. range, which was called

16:01

the DF-21. So we

16:03

see some reorganization there of the

16:05

Chinese regional forces. One

16:07

speculation is whether the Chinese now will begin

16:10

to put sort of warheads

16:12

on this system that have lower

16:14

yields. And this is a difficult

16:17

conversation because lower

16:19

yield is pretty much anything

16:22

less than the big yield they

16:24

originally had. Lower yield

16:26

doesn't necessarily mean low yield,

16:28

like down to very few

16:31

kiloton of explosive power. So one has to

16:33

be a little careful what that means. It

16:35

could simply be, of course, that they

16:37

want to have a warhead on this

16:40

system that is not overly dirty in

16:42

terms of collateral damage, depending

16:44

on where they're going to operate it. But

16:46

it could, of course, also be that the Chinese

16:48

are beginning slowly to entertain

16:51

potential scenarios where

16:53

they're envisioning sort of a stepping

16:55

up of the escalation ladder, where

16:58

you begin with these shorter range

17:00

missiles, and then you

17:03

gradually escalate if the deterrence signaling

17:06

or the war fighting or whatever

17:08

is going on at that point,

17:11

if it doesn't work, then you can sort

17:13

of escalate further from that into use of

17:15

longer range systems. So we will

17:17

have to see how that is playing out. But just

17:20

to emphasize here, there's a lot of uncertainty

17:22

in exactly what we're

17:24

seeing. Let's unpack these potential

17:26

scenarios that you mentioned. When

17:29

you say that the escalation ladder could

17:31

start with shorter range missiles and then

17:33

move up to longer range systems,

17:36

is it shorter range missiles

17:38

with low yield warheads? Or

17:40

is it shorter range missiles

17:42

plus larger yield warheads? I'm

17:44

trying to understand what exactly is on this

17:46

ladder. Yeah, we don't

17:48

know how, at least in public, how

17:50

the Chinese are structuring that force in

17:52

terms of exactly what the war capabilities

17:54

are. All we hear are these rumors

17:56

that there's conversation, there's chatter going on

17:58

in the world. inside the

18:00

Chinese expert community and military

18:04

establishment about what

18:07

such a capability look

18:09

like and what is needed and all that kind

18:12

of stuff. But it's not

18:14

something they have deployed yet. It's not

18:16

something that we have heard is sort

18:18

of imminent. And

18:20

it could be that potentially that the

18:24

warhead that they currently have is

18:26

considered a little too powerful or

18:29

that what accurate capabilities of the

18:31

delivery system, the ballistic missile itself,

18:34

allows them to lower the yield so

18:36

it's not necessary for them to have

18:38

such a high yield anymore. So

18:41

these are some of the uncertainties

18:43

that we're seeing here. But

18:45

we know from reports about the Chinese

18:47

nuclear testing program in the past that

18:50

they have worked on a

18:52

variety of different systems, including

18:55

what was described by the US

18:57

intelligence community as tactical weapons, also

18:59

for very short range ballistic missiles.

19:01

But it is believed

19:03

that those capabilities were developed but

19:06

put on the shelf, so to speak,

19:08

and not fielded into the force at

19:11

the time. So it could potentially

19:13

be that you see some capabilities that

19:15

were developed at that time that they

19:17

might reconsider to add to the force,

19:20

for example. But again, this is

19:22

all speculation. We really do not have a very

19:24

good picture of what's going on there. Hans,

19:26

you mentioned that China is making quite a

19:28

bit of progress on the DF-26. What

19:32

is the current yield of a warhead on a DF-26? Yeah,

19:36

we don't know. I mean, really, we really don't

19:38

know what the yield is. We

19:41

are speculating that it might be typically sort of

19:43

from 100 to 200, maybe more, depending on

19:47

what the mission is and what the system is. But

19:50

we have really no reference point for this.

19:52

This is very opaque. One

19:56

way we can sort of gauge is to

19:58

think about how did the... the Russians and

20:00

the United States do this when they develop warheads

20:03

for their systems. Of course, the bottom

20:05

line in terms of military requirements is

20:08

whatever the yield is, it has to

20:10

be sufficient to what it is that

20:12

the military planners envision that that warhead

20:14

has to destroy. So, if

20:18

that system is not very accurate,

20:20

then you tend to have a larger warhead

20:23

on it that can compensate for the inaccuracy.

20:25

But if you get a system that is

20:27

more accurate, it allows the planners to lower

20:30

the yield, the requirement for that

20:32

system. And so, if

20:34

a system like the DF-26 is

20:37

supposed to knock out Guam, like the

20:40

military facilities in Guam or

20:42

some US-based facility

20:44

in Okinawa, whatever the

20:47

system is, a more accurate system

20:50

would allow them, of course, to lower the yield

20:52

somewhat. But it still requires

20:54

quite a punch to be able to

20:56

knock out a large area

20:58

facility like an air base or something

21:00

like that. So, I would

21:04

caution little against thinking of this

21:07

as very low yield warheads. It's more

21:09

a question of modifying

21:11

the yield to what is militarily required,

21:14

I think. And when you say

21:16

a range of 100 to 200, you mean 200 kilotons? Yeah,

21:20

that's correct. I mean, it's one of these

21:22

areas where we really don't know, like I said, but

21:25

you can assume that that might have been

21:27

a fair estimate up

21:30

until now, and then

21:32

we'll see where it goes. But

21:34

again, we're just very cautious to sort of

21:36

make specific statements

21:39

about that without emphasizing

21:41

that the significant uncertainty

21:44

that exists here. Since

21:46

what warhead yield in delivery vehicles

21:48

China chooses is dependent on the

21:50

target that China is trying to

21:52

hit, we should also discuss

21:55

what China views as appropriate targets.

21:57

You mentioned potentially Guam.

22:00

and U.S. military facilities on Okinawa. But

22:02

right now, as you look at Chinese

22:04

writings on the use of nuclear weapons,

22:07

are you seeing the priority being a

22:09

strategic use or are you seeing more

22:11

emphasis on battlefield purposes? And

22:14

if it's for battlefield purposes, what

22:16

have Chinese experts listed out as

22:18

potential targets beyond fixed

22:20

military bases or facilities? Well,

22:24

so it's a bit of an all in the sense that

22:27

the emphasis is definitely on the strategic

22:29

mission of the weapons focused,

22:31

of course, on the United States, some

22:34

side planning for Russia, and then of

22:36

course, for the Chinese, India is also

22:38

a potential factor. And so in

22:40

the regional scenarios, they

22:43

have always going way back, of

22:46

course, had planning for regional missiles

22:48

with medium range and

22:50

intermedium range against base

22:52

facilities in the region. We

22:55

don't know really if they

22:58

would go after

23:00

cities per se. I mean, in the past,

23:03

this has been an assumption about the Chinese,

23:05

of course, because, you know, since

23:08

it was sort of a more brunt

23:10

nuclear deterrent strategy, and they

23:12

had fewer weapons, the assumption was that they

23:14

didn't have enough capacity to go after military

23:16

targets per se, and therefore

23:18

cities would be more likely to be targets.

23:20

But as their forces growing, you can imagine,

23:22

and it appears to be from some of

23:25

their writings and the conversations we hear, that

23:27

they're more focused or increasingly focused

23:30

on sort of military

23:32

targets specifically, bases,

23:34

supply lines, command

23:36

and control systems, potentially

23:38

leadership, but certainly military industry and

23:41

these types of things. So

23:44

there, this is still an area where

23:46

there's where they're developing, they're evolving. And

23:48

we and there are discussions, of course,

23:50

about what function should

23:54

regional and limited scenario

23:56

scenario planning have, and what should be

23:59

the objective here. Because of

24:01

course, at the

24:03

outset, you would imagine a planner

24:05

would want them to sort of

24:08

cause an adversary to stop and

24:10

back down in their aggression. But

24:12

if that doesn't happen, how do you have to

24:15

scale up in order to try

24:17

to convince them again? And

24:19

if it doesn't work and we get to sort

24:21

of a full-scale type of

24:23

scenario, do you have

24:26

enough to inflict sufficient damage on

24:28

the adversary that you're

24:30

confident that they will lose? Or

24:33

certainly realize that there

24:36

is enough damage coming

24:38

back at them that they will not

24:41

want to go into a war with China? So

24:44

the Chinese are playing with many of the

24:46

same considerations that our planners and

24:48

our strategists have been struggling

24:50

with over the years. What is the

24:52

most appropriate posture? And what are the

24:54

objectives? What are the functions that it

24:56

has to serve? When do you

24:59

have enough? Do you ever

25:01

have enough? All these

25:03

questions, there's always a debate about that. As

25:06

I noticed, you were saying that Chinese planners

25:08

are now taking into account questions

25:10

that we have long struggled with

25:12

when developing our nuclear capabilities.

25:15

But you didn't mention the Russians. Is

25:18

there something different about how Russian planners

25:20

think about their nuclear weapons compared

25:22

to how China thinks about them?

25:24

Yes. When I say we, I think. I

25:27

was just thinking us out here and the rest of the

25:29

world. But the point is

25:31

well taken, of course, that there are

25:34

differences that are nuances between the various

25:36

nuclear armed states, how they think about

25:38

their particular role and what their particular

25:40

objectives for nuclear weapons use is. And

25:43

so that goes for the Russians as

25:45

well. And so right now, we've seen a

25:47

lot of discussion about theories

25:49

that the Russians are getting more ready

25:53

or willing, if you will,

25:55

to accept nuclear risks and

25:57

potentially use nuclear weapons

25:59

earlier. than previously. There

26:02

is also a lot of discussion about

26:04

whether that characterization is valid or

26:06

to what extent, because Russia

26:09

of course has always had a

26:11

large inventory of non-strategic forces that

26:14

they obviously had plans for. And part

26:16

of the plans were to use them

26:18

earlier in a conflict than strategic forces.

26:21

That goes for the United States too,

26:23

of course. We have a lot more

26:25

emphasis on non-strategic forces back in the

26:27

80s, since the end of the Cold War.

26:30

Our military has decided that that

26:32

was less relevant and has phased

26:35

out the overwhelming numbers of

26:37

US non-strategic forces. We're down to just a couple

26:39

of hundred of gravity bombs that are

26:41

left. And that's not

26:43

because they didn't think regional scenarios were likely,

26:46

but it's just that they thought, we

26:49

can do a lot of those

26:51

regional scenarios with conventional capabilities, where

26:53

we previously required nuclear, but our

26:55

conventional capability has evolved so much

26:58

that we can serve some of those missions with that.

27:01

And by the way, to the extent that

27:03

nuclear is required in a regional scenario,

27:06

we can use some of the strategic

27:08

capabilities predominantly here, the air launch

27:10

cruise missiles and gravity bombs and

27:12

long range strategic bombers to serve

27:14

that function. So there are

27:16

different ways of doing this. And so

27:18

it's a little, it's

27:20

very difficult to sort of compare the

27:22

countries directly in that sense,

27:25

because they come from different backgrounds

27:27

and they have different interests in terms

27:30

of what they think nuclear weapons have

27:32

to serve. Thank you. Just

27:34

taking a quick step back. You

27:36

mentioned that Russia has a large inventory

27:38

of non-strategic forces. What is

27:40

the size of that inventory? How

27:43

does that compare with the current size of

27:46

US and Chinese forces? Yeah,

27:48

so Russia has an

27:50

inventory of shorter

27:53

range nuclear weapons. And

27:55

that in common language, I guess, means

27:57

everything that is not covered by the

27:59

new. start treating. So

28:02

that means everything from anti-ship

28:04

cruise missiles, land attack

28:07

cruise missiles, regional tactical

28:09

bombers, short-range ballistic

28:11

missiles, air defense systems,

28:14

you name it. They have a large inventory

28:16

of that compared to the United States. It

28:19

is assumed that that number of warheads

28:21

assigned to those types of forces today

28:23

is on the order of one to

28:25

2,000 warheads. In comparison, the

28:27

United States has, we think, something

28:30

in the order of 200 tactical

28:32

bombs left. So, you know,

28:34

an order of magnitude difference between the United

28:37

States and Russia. But as I said, this is a

28:41

development that has happened because of,

28:44

you know, fundamentally different ways of looking

28:46

at military capabilities and the way that your

28:48

short-arranged nuclear weapons have to serve. We also

28:50

have to keep in mind here, US

28:53

borders with countries that could

28:56

potentially require use of nuclear weapons are

28:58

far, far away. Not so

29:01

for Russia. Russia has a lot

29:03

of its potential scenario for nuclear right

29:05

up against its border. So they don't

29:08

need long-range, strategic nuclear forces to deal

29:10

with some of those scenarios, whereas the

29:12

United States forces sort of fly to

29:14

the other side of the Pacific Ocean

29:17

or the Atlantic Ocean to deal with

29:19

those scenarios. And that's why tactical nuclear

29:21

weapons are shorter systems, one

29:23

of the reasons for why they have a greater

29:25

role to serve in the Russian military. Another

29:28

is that the Russian

29:30

military traditionally has been,

29:32

in the post-Cold War era, has

29:35

been far less capable in its

29:37

conventional capability than US

29:39

and NATO forces. And

29:41

this is a development that is continuing. Therefore,

29:44

Russian military strategists have been able to argue

29:46

that they need tactical

29:48

nuclear weapons to some extent to

29:51

compensate for that disparity. And

29:54

this is a development that is

29:56

going to intensify, I think, now

29:58

after the... the Russian

30:01

bad experience in Ukraine where they have

30:03

lost enormous amount

30:05

of conventional capability. So

30:08

I was thinking here for the next decade or

30:10

two, we're probably going to see

30:12

a Russian military that is,

30:15

if not necessarily going to increase, then

30:17

certainly at least continue

30:19

to emphasize the role that nuclear

30:22

weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons, serve

30:24

in their strategy. China

30:26

is very different because, like

30:29

I said, they've had regional systems

30:32

all the way back to when they first acquired nuclear weapons.

30:34

So the DF-26 is not a new thing, per se, in

30:38

Chinese posture. They're building

30:40

more of them. But it's

30:42

basically continuing that regional deterrence

30:44

policy. There, the only unknown,

30:47

I would say, is how much emphasis

30:51

they put on that role. And what is it

30:53

going to look like? Is it going to be more structured

30:56

escalation scenarios, similar

30:58

to what we've seen with the United States

31:01

and Russia over the years? Or

31:03

will we have some kind of Chinese version

31:05

of it? It's really very opaque,

31:08

I would say, and too

31:10

hard really to discuss sort of details

31:12

on what the Chinese are thinking about

31:14

that. When you mentioned structured escalation

31:17

scenarios, are you talking about an escalation

31:19

ladder in which one side moves up

31:21

and the other side moves up to

31:23

step two? Or are you

31:25

talking about something

31:28

else? I mean, it's basically a

31:30

sort of a metaphor for how

31:32

you step up the pressure

31:35

against an adversary. And so, you

31:38

know, originally nuclear powers have few weapons,

31:40

and they sort of threaten with them.

31:42

And it's sort of an all-out

31:45

blow, if you will. After

31:47

some years when they have nuclear weapons,

31:49

their strategies will begin to argue that,

31:52

well, this is not very credible, because

31:54

do you really believe that we will throw

31:57

everything At the first instance we have to

31:59

use? Nuclear weapons and therefore less

32:01

developed. Some lower levels of escalation

32:03

with with with regional systems or

32:05

so called tactical systems are before

32:07

we get to the big banks

32:09

of speak so that's a typical

32:11

way of of military strategist I'm

32:13

in nuclear weapons takes to to

32:15

sort of argue about it. Unique.

32:18

Of course was that is Britain

32:20

in the Kingdom. We've seen that

32:22

after the into the Cold War,

32:24

they moved out of that we are

32:27

planning and they only have one

32:29

system now to see launched ballistic

32:31

missiles on their sufferings. All their gravity

32:33

bombs for aircraft whether they were

32:35

land based, sea bass, depth charges

32:37

against submarines and what have you. All

32:39

of those systems have been retired

32:41

so they're down to only one

32:43

kind. So. That's a unique posture

32:46

among the nuclear arms states. Fulfil.

32:48

He mentioned earlier about how we

32:50

might feel better place more emphasis

32:53

on youth and nuclear weapons as

32:55

life. potentially the deployment a tactical

32:57

nuclear weapons as as as a

32:59

Soviet that sounds as in Ukraine.

33:02

Is acidosis? How does this impact?

33:04

Haida? To see this as

33:06

potentially further you billings had as know

33:08

for his policy. Well

33:10

so let's let's start with no

33:12

first use firsts. There is a

33:14

lot of sort of both romanticism

33:17

but also over emphasis on your

33:19

first whose policies in my view.

33:21

No. First use policy is not. It's.

33:24

Not a lock. It's not a

33:26

technical. Block. Or

33:29

potential to use of nuclear weapon if

33:31

the statement it's a political intention. The.

33:33

China right now, despite it's official

33:36

no first use policy has. An

33:38

has had for many decades the ability

33:40

to use nuclear weapons first is if

33:42

it was necessary. You. Can always do

33:44

that. And in fact, I don't think

33:47

you can trust and to first use policy. Is

33:49

there is a war? Because if there is

33:51

a war, I think any

33:54

country will of course, take

33:56

whatever action it needs to take a

33:59

in order to avoid defeat.

34:02

And whether you have nuclear no first use

34:04

policy or not, I think it's somewhat irrelevant.

34:06

I think the value of a no first

34:09

use policy or the impact of a no

34:11

first use policy is more in

34:13

terms of how it shapes a country's

34:16

development of

34:19

its force structure and

34:21

its strategy. Because of

34:23

course, if it's a serious policy and they

34:25

really mean it, it can

34:27

manifest itself in certain different ways.

34:29

For example, you might have

34:32

a much more relaxed posture that

34:34

doesn't have as significant

34:36

requirements, military requirements, as

34:39

you would have if you had a different

34:41

kind of posture where you had a requirement

34:43

to plan for using nuclear weapons first. You,

34:46

it could be that it drives the size

34:48

that if you have a first strike policy,

34:51

you need to have more weapons in order

34:53

to, for that policy to be credible,

34:56

et cetera. So that right

34:58

now there's a lot of emphasis on

35:00

how is China going to change its

35:02

posture here because of its modernization. And

35:05

your question of course, Russian changes,

35:07

will that influence that as well? And

35:10

it is possible of course that

35:12

it can influence how confident

35:14

they are that they don't

35:17

have to have a first

35:19

use strategy. You could

35:21

imagine if they feel too pressured, that

35:24

would be a policy that would suffer that

35:28

might even disappear. If

35:30

they felt there were certain needs to

35:32

plan for nuclear use early in the

35:34

conflict. You can imagine, I mean, I've

35:36

asked Chinese military officials about

35:39

a potential scenario in which the United

35:41

States uses its advanced conventional forces to

35:43

take out a great

35:45

number of the Chinese nuclear forces. And

35:48

I asked them, in that scenario, would you just

35:50

sit there and let that happen and not use

35:52

nuclear weapons? And they said, of course

35:54

not. We would defend us in

35:57

any way we can. And so it

35:59

may not be that. the Chinese nuclear no

36:01

first use policy is what people

36:03

sometimes assume it is sort of a lock

36:05

on what they can do with their nuclear forces.

36:08

Russia and Chinese relations

36:10

in the future could, of course, develop

36:13

in a way where they

36:16

don't deepen this collaboration we see right

36:18

now because of Russia's difficulties in Ukraine

36:20

and Chinese interests in the Taiwan Strait

36:23

and South China Sea and these types

36:25

of issues. They have a

36:27

long border and they are

36:29

still posturing nuclear forces along each other's

36:31

border assuming, I

36:34

imagine, that you

36:36

can imagine a potential scenario in the future

36:39

in which they would need to use them

36:41

against each other. So that's just to say

36:43

I think they're covering their bets and

36:46

see where things go but I just

36:48

don't see no first use policy as

36:52

so dramatic. I see I think

36:54

it's more first use policy

36:57

that is dramatic because it

36:59

has to be translated into military

37:01

capabilities to make your threat

37:03

of potential first use credible.

37:07

But again there's also of course first

37:09

use or no first use to what effect.

37:12

I mean if you have a first use

37:14

policy the United States has rejected of

37:17

course a no first use policy for

37:19

forever for decades and reserves

37:22

the right to use nuclear weapons first

37:24

if it wants to. And

37:26

what are those scenarios? What

37:29

would they look like? And I think today most

37:32

of that scenario has to do

37:34

with not nuking Russia first or

37:36

nuking China first or something like

37:38

that but are more related to

37:41

scenarios involving large

37:44

biological attacks or large

37:46

conventional attacks where something

37:48

happens and it's

37:51

a smaller much much smaller subset

37:53

of the nuclear strategy than the

37:56

role of nuclear weapons against nuclear

37:58

forces. Great thank you. I

38:01

want to close by discussing arms control.

38:03

The United States and China recently held arms

38:06

control talks as part of the broader effort

38:08

to restart communications across

38:10

the board. Do you

38:12

see anything substantive coming from these talks?

38:15

And are you optimistic as we move forward

38:17

in terms of either

38:20

US China arms control talks or

38:22

US China Russia arms control talks?

38:25

I think right now the biggest win is that

38:27

they have them. The fact that

38:29

they're talking. That is a very

38:32

important development and

38:35

quite frankly a breakthrough. They

38:37

seem to have a new mindset at least on

38:39

the need to have that kind of dialogue.

38:43

Much less so on the substance

38:45

of it. It's very difficult. It's

38:48

very uncertain to

38:50

what they want to accomplish. They have very

38:53

different ideas about this. It is

38:55

a broad set of conversations. It's not

38:57

just of course nuclear by any means.

39:00

So it is very likely that

39:02

it could have some benefit in trying

39:04

to manage some of the tension

39:06

happening in the Taiwan Strait and

39:08

South China Sea area. Rules

39:11

of the roads, behavior, how

39:13

to respond to crisis situations

39:15

and misunderstandings, these types of

39:17

things. So that's I

39:19

think some of the most

39:22

important of this. On that

39:24

note also very much so the fact that

39:28

they're trying to reestablish military

39:30

to military communication or

39:32

military to military links. That

39:34

is really important obviously because

39:36

those would be some of not just for

39:39

understanding what each other's are doing but

39:41

also handling scenarios or crises

39:43

that could sort of blow up

39:46

in each other's faces. So it's

39:48

very good but a nuclear, it

39:50

still remains to be seen because

39:52

clearly the Chinese at least so far have

39:55

signaled they're not interested. Their

39:57

position over the years has always been one.

40:00

you come down to our force levels,

40:02

nuclear force levels, then we can

40:04

talk. But you guys, the

40:06

Russians and the Americans, you still have

40:08

significantly more nuclear weapons than we have.

40:11

Ironically, here's where China's modernization

40:13

might play out to

40:15

some extent, because on

40:18

certain aspects of their nuclear

40:20

force structure, they will

40:22

be approaching the force structure the United

40:24

States and Russia have on ICBMs, on

40:26

intercontinental land-based ballistic missiles. We

40:29

can already see that they're approaching a force structure

40:31

that is equal to, if not a little greater

40:34

than that of the United States, either United States

40:36

and Russia. So in that sense, they

40:38

are approaching parity on that

40:41

force numerical. So it could be

40:43

that there is potential room for

40:46

conversations about how to

40:48

manage and structure those elements of the

40:50

nuclear postures. We'll have to see, but

40:52

I think the main good

40:54

news is that they're having these conversations. Thank

40:57

you. One final question for Yihan.

41:00

As we continue to monitor

41:02

China's nuclear development, what

41:04

is the most important thing that we should be focusing

41:06

most of our attention on?

41:09

Well, I quite clearly think that it

41:11

is about whether the Chinese

41:13

thinking on nuclear weapons, the use

41:15

of nuclear weapons, is moving more

41:17

in a sort of war fighting

41:19

direction, where you

41:21

have a broadening range of potential areas

41:24

where nuclear weapons could come into play.

41:27

Whether they think they

41:30

can do more, be more

41:33

bold and risk-taking because they have a

41:35

greater nuclear force, except how

41:37

is it going to influence that? But

41:39

certainly also in terms of people monitoring

41:41

the Chinese, for God's sake, try

41:44

to find out what do the Chinese say about

41:46

this? Who are the

41:48

people in Chinese who can speak with authority

41:50

on these matters? Where are they going? Do

41:53

people who are in the expert community even

41:55

know what the thinking is inside

41:58

the planners community? So, So

42:00

trying to get more insight to that

42:02

aspect of I think will be really, really important.

42:05

And it seems to me that you

42:07

do believe China is moving to view

42:09

nuclear weapons as having a war fighting

42:11

role. But we need more

42:13

evidence and more analysis. I

42:16

think it's possible that part of it

42:18

can go in that direction. Yes. But

42:21

again, the Chinese thinking about nuclear weapons is

42:23

not the Soviet or the US thinking about

42:26

nuclear weapons necessarily. So we have to make

42:28

sure that whatever they are doing, we

42:30

are reading what they are doing, not

42:34

what we think we recognize

42:37

from the way we and the Russians did it. Awesome.

42:40

Thank you, Han, so much for this

42:42

very in-depth conversation, not only how China

42:44

views its nuclear capabilities and what China

42:46

might do, but also comparing China with

42:49

the United States and Russia. Thanks.

42:52

Great conversation. Thank

42:57

you.