0:01

Blinken went to China. Why did he

0:03

go? What happened? What does it mean?

0:06

Is World War Three more or less likely

0:08

to happen thanks to this visit? To

0:10

discuss, I have two fantastic

0:12

guests today, Professor Dali Yang

0:15

of the University of Chicago, as

0:17

well as Nathaniel Scherr, who works at the Carnegie

0:19

Endowment. Thanks so much for joining China Talk,

0:21

YouTube.

0:23

So let's take a step back. Blinken was...

0:26

Oh, sorry. So we're recording this on Juneteenth,

0:28

just a few hours after Secretary

0:32

of State Blinken... He's

0:34

probably on the plane back to the US. He's probably on the

0:36

plane to Europe right now. Anyways. So early 2023,

0:40

Blinken was supposed to go to Beijing,

0:42

but then something happened flying

0:45

in the air. I think getting

0:47

back to the Bali meeting, of course,

0:49

it's truly the first meeting

0:52

after President

0:54

Biden became the president. And of course, the

0:56

two had many meetings and spent

0:58

a lot of time together previously when

1:01

actually Biden and Xi were

1:04

both vice presidents on both sides,

1:06

actually. So they knew

1:09

each other

1:10

quite well in

1:12

that process. What's truly remarkable

1:14

was because of zero COVID in particular,

1:17

the

1:17

relationship really

1:19

was in deep freeze. And

1:22

of course, Xi didn't

1:24

make international visits since

1:27

returning, after returning

1:30

from actually Burma in January 2020.

1:34

So that was the first major meeting

1:37

between Xi and Western leaders,

1:41

actually as a sort of major international setting

1:44

for

1:45

actually more than two years, actually.

1:48

And what actually truly struck me was

1:50

the photo that was released

1:54

by both sides, actually, with Xi

1:56

and Biden

1:57

in broad smile.

1:59

really is a sort of smiling with

2:02

hearty smiles. And I think we really

2:04

intended to send a message that we really

2:07

want to review this relationship and so

2:09

on. And of course, in

2:11

the process, they also outlined a number

2:13

of areas actually

2:15

to sort of to work on, including

2:18

for example, the issue of green security,

2:21

climate, global health, and so on,

2:23

agriculture a little bit. Although

2:25

not much substance at that

2:28

point, but

2:29

the effort,

2:30

it was made very clear by both

2:32

sides that they wanted to stabilize

2:35

the relationship, especially after a very,

2:38

very destabilizing

2:40

summer of 2022. So

2:43

we have summer of

2:46

Pelosi goes to Taiwan, lots of drama there.

2:49

In the fall, I think it was November,

2:51

right? We had the G20 meeting

2:53

in Bali, where we have this like magic, I don't

2:55

know how magical it was, we have a spirit

2:57

of Bali where it seems things are not about

3:00

to entirely fall off of a cliff and sort of building

3:02

off that. There was this expectation in early 2023

3:05

that Secretary of State Blinken would go to

3:07

China. We have a balloon,

3:11

which gets a spy balloon,

3:13

which gets dramatically shot down off

3:16

the coast of Myrtle Beach of all places.

3:19

For our international listeners, this is like

3:21

a spring break party location

3:24

famous for lots of mini

3:25

golf. And then sort of following

3:28

that, Blinken decides to call off his visit

3:30

and we have sort of six,

3:33

four or five months of this

3:35

interesting, rather awkward

3:37

dance of the US and

3:41

trying to figure out just how

3:43

they're gonna want to re-engage at the

3:45

highest levels. We have Blinken, we have the balloon.

3:48

And then I think there's this debate

3:51

that starts popping up of whether

3:53

it even makes sense to keep sort of

3:56

pushing for these high

3:58

level dialogues. What's the point?

3:59

What are the potential downsides

4:04

of the US trying to pursue these high level

4:06

meetings?

4:07

I think just

4:09

from a high

4:12

level, the US and China

4:14

have many issues in the relationship that

4:17

have potential to lead to

4:19

crises, if not conflict.

4:21

That high level dialogue, while it can't

4:24

resolve the many structural

4:27

issues in the relationship, it can

4:29

at least ensure

4:31

that

4:33

each side does not misunderstand

4:37

the other side's intentions towards

4:39

these structural issues. To give

4:41

one example, the US often

4:44

mentions this phrase of reducing

4:50

the risk of miscalculation. To

4:52

put that in concrete terms, I think there is

4:54

a very real risk at

4:56

the present moment that

4:59

on Taiwan, obviously each side

5:01

has divergent

5:04

interests that dialogue

5:06

alone can never solve. But

5:10

at the same time,

5:12

if each side misinterprets

5:15

the other's intentions, then what

5:18

can happen is a structural issue

5:20

that maybe long term can result

5:23

in a short term crisis, if not conflict. On

5:26

both sides, the Chinese side, there is a

5:28

view that the US is using Taiwan

5:30

to not only contain but potentially

5:33

instigate

5:34

some sort of conflict

5:36

with China in order to

5:39

derail China's national rejuvenation.

5:42

I think that couldn't be farther from the

5:44

truth. The US has no interest

5:46

in conflict with China. On the US

5:48

side, there's a view that Xi has

5:51

an accelerated preordained timeline

5:53

for reunifying with

5:55

Taiwan, and this is leading

5:58

to an increase in the US.

5:59

increased urgency to provide

6:02

for Taiwan self-defense. But

6:05

I think experts in the US

6:07

generally assume that an

6:10

invasion is not imminent.

6:12

And if that's accurate, if we believe

6:15

also the

6:16

Chinese statements that an

6:18

invasion is the last resort,

6:21

if that is an accurate understanding of the

6:23

issue, then

6:24

I think generally there needs to be

6:26

a wider understanding in order

6:29

to

6:31

derail what has been at least

6:34

a relatively

6:35

stable structural issue

6:38

over the past five decades that at least

6:40

hasn't resulted in a kinetic conflict.

6:44

My sense

6:46

is the balloon in many ways

6:48

actually really epitomized the fragility

6:51

of US-China relations and

6:54

we really have to take a little

6:56

longer time frame in looking back in

6:58

the sense that the last six and seven years

7:00

with the trade war, which the

7:03

Chinese leadership essentially said they

7:05

were going to fight it in the spirit of the Korean

7:08

War. And also China's actual,

7:11

I mean actual

7:13

really alliance

7:15

with Russia in many ways or certainly

7:18

no objection to Russia making

7:21

the moves into the Ukraine

7:24

in terms of the military and certainly the

7:26

invasion of Ukraine, all of that

7:28

and of course the pandemic and the intense

7:32

information and disinformation wars between

7:34

the two countries in many ways actually all

7:37

of those come together. You do have the sense,

7:39

the feel

7:40

that the US and China is not

7:43

the question whether the two countries are going

7:45

into a cold war. Because the two countries

7:47

were

7:48

actively wrestling with each

7:50

other in a way that was very dangerous

7:53

and especially and in that context

7:55

actually the Taiwan threat last

7:57

year and also and

7:59

all that just

7:59

give you the feel that it's almost, for

8:02

me at least, it almost felt like

8:04

actually we are just on the cusp of something

8:06

of a Cuban missile crisis kind

8:09

of atmosphere, which is why

8:11

many Chinese felt the same way as well.

8:13

In fact, there were massive, really

8:15

the Chinese stock markets plummeted

8:18

partly because of that sense that war

8:20

was imminent

8:22

and so on. And of course, in that sense,

8:24

I think actually it's, in

8:27

fact, on Chinese social media is really interesting

8:30

when many people began to say

8:33

that US-China relations, there

8:35

is this big

8:36

mega cycle, but the mega cycle

8:39

started with that little ping

8:42

pong ball, but ended with this gigantic

8:45

balloon, this round structure, right? That's

8:47

another ball essentially in the air. And

8:50

I think actually that really put it

8:52

very much in context. I

8:54

think actually we are always, especially

8:56

for many people who know intimately

8:59

the history of the Cold War, especially

9:02

during the height of the Cold War, there were a

9:04

lot of efforts at confidence building, at

9:06

open skies, at efforts at arms

9:08

control, and a

9:10

lot of those followed

9:12

the Cuban missile crisis in particular.

9:14

And I think there is a sense of urgency on

9:16

both sides that this relationship

9:20

is just too important in a way

9:22

for global peace to

9:25

be left just

9:26

really sliding into

9:29

increasingly open confrontations

9:32

and so on. And I

9:34

think actually in this case, the US

9:36

in particular has a lot of experience

9:39

in terms of all the people, and

9:43

including some more students of the

9:45

Kissinger era, and so on, this emphasis

9:48

in thinking that you have to try to manage.

9:50

And I think the Chinese side actually bought the

9:52

rhetoric as well in the sense of the need

9:55

to stabilize the US-China relationship.

9:58

So we had this All

10:01

right, so we have the sort of,

10:06

I think,

10:07

Washington clearly wanting to do something

10:10

to stabilize the relationship. Also she,

10:14

you know, he's agreed to these meetings, so apparently

10:17

there was some sort of will in there as well.

10:20

There was a debate, which maybe we won't get into so much

10:22

on this episode, about just how much

10:25

the U.S. was quote unquote sacrificing

10:28

in order to sort of bring up, bring

10:30

till today this

10:33

like seeming rapprochement of a

10:35

handful of meetings in Washington where Chinese

10:37

ministers came over to meet with the U.S. Commerce

10:40

and Treasury Secretaries and then, you

10:43

know, the big coup de grace is

10:45

Blinken going to China.

10:48

So yeah, let's dive into what happened over

10:50

the past weekend. It was a very interesting setup

10:54

because there were extraordinary

10:56

low expectations. I think there was a readout

10:58

by senior NSC official Kurt Campbell

11:01

talking to the media before saying like,

11:03

hey guys, like don't expect like anything

11:06

to come out of this. This is not one of the meetings

11:08

where you're going to have a big list of

11:10

accomplishments. But

11:13

you know, there were some readouts and I think

11:15

there are interesting sort of wrinkles that

11:18

you can see reading at what the U.S.

11:21

and China both said in their experience

11:23

of the meetings. So what

11:27

struck out to you two? Let's go

11:29

sequentially. So first we have Ching

11:32

Gong. Professor, who is he

11:33

and

11:36

what came out of that meeting? Yeah,

11:38

I think, well, first of all, expectation

11:40

management is built into the White House

11:42

operations nowadays. It's not just actually

11:45

about foreign policy. It's also in

11:47

elections and so on. Right. So sort of a way,

11:49

you know, Kurt Campbell

11:52

was doing his job. But

11:54

of course, it's

11:55

also a reflection of

11:57

the frozen, the state of relations.

11:59

And of course, the part of

12:01

the issue here is also

12:04

there is a desire to make sure that the

12:06

Secretary of State would be the first

12:08

to go, rather than some other cabinet

12:10

member, even though China appears to

12:12

be much more willing to

12:14

let the others happen. And I think there

12:16

is some sense that the Secretary

12:19

in particular has been leading the

12:21

effort

12:22

to realize, in terms

12:25

of

12:25

confronting China and

12:28

so on. Well, Chinga, of course, as

12:30

many in the audience would remember, was

12:33

actually the Chinese ambassador to

12:35

the United States. And in

12:38

fact, he served as ambassador.

12:41

He succeeded the former ambassador,

12:44

Xi Tiankai,

12:45

and only actually

12:48

relatively recently, a year

12:50

and a half ago, more or less. And

12:52

then he got this fast promotion, in fact,

12:56

to sort of back to China, was

12:59

made a central committee member

13:01

last October, and

13:04

then of course was made not only the

13:06

foreign minister, but also a state

13:09

councilor.

13:10

So it was extremely fast

13:12

promotion, which also indicates

13:15

the importance of the Chinese

13:17

leadership attaches to actually to U.S.-China

13:20

relations. There is a little history,

13:22

though. Because of the frozen

13:25

state of U.S.-China relations, Ambassador

13:27

Ching was in the United States. He

13:30

was immensely frustrated

13:32

because

13:33

he couldn't get to meet people in the administration

13:35

in any serious way. Actually,

13:38

he wasn't received by the president, for

13:40

example, and so on. And likewise

13:42

for the

13:43

U.S. ambassador in China, and

13:45

both actually were making efforts to travel,

13:48

although the U.S. ambassador in China was having

13:50

greater difficulty because of the zero COVID

13:52

issues.

13:53

Ching Gong, though,

13:55

actually got a lot of attention

13:58

back in China for traveling the Texas

14:00

to the Midwest and other parts

14:02

of the US as well. And he has decent English

14:05

and so on. He's serving Europe.

14:07

And so in this case, actually,

14:10

he becomes the foreign minister.

14:12

But unlike Secretary of

14:15

State Blinken, though,

14:18

Qing Gong, even though he's the foreign

14:20

minister,

14:21

he actually is not the highest ranking

14:24

foreign ministry official because within the

14:26

Communist Party, there is this office

14:29

for the central commission on

14:31

foreign affairs. And the chairman

14:34

of that commission happens to be Xi Jinping himself.

14:36

The office director

14:38

is the former foreign

14:40

minister, Mr. Wang Yi, who actually

14:43

has gained a tremendous

14:45

amount of attention for being a lead

14:48

wolf warrior in recent years, especially

14:50

in the battling with

14:52

the United States foreign policy

14:55

arena.

14:56

So in essence, that's where actually Qing Gong is.

14:59

That's why he's the first one

15:01

to meet. And of course, in some ways, it's

15:03

a little bit of a tricky situation because

15:05

we tend to think, well, shouldn't there be

15:08

equals meeting equals?

15:11

And in the US and China lineups,

15:14

very often it doesn't work exactly like that.

15:16

So that's, so Qing Gong and

15:20

Secretary Blinken, they met for actually

15:24

five and a half hours, I think initially,

15:26

and then followed by a working

15:28

dinner. So altogether it came

15:30

to something like seven and a half an hour. So

15:33

apparently they had a long list of issues.

15:36

And of course, to

15:38

talk, to air their grievances,

15:40

to talk about actually what they hope to achieve

15:43

and so on.

15:44

But of course, here is the key

15:46

also. So after that meeting, the Chinese bureaucracy

15:49

works very hard in producing minutes

15:52

in summarizing what happened.

15:53

And by the evening, overnight,

15:56

they would actually be reporting what happened

15:58

during the day. actually to Mr.

16:01

Wang Yi, to Mr. Xi,

16:03

so that they can actually

16:06

plan out what happens the next day.

16:08

And likewise, in many ways, actually, the

16:10

US side would be doing

16:12

the same, but probably

16:15

less elaborately, so sort of

16:18

essentially with menace, and of course,

16:20

communications back to the White House as well.

16:23

Yeah, this is a long weekend, come on. These

16:26

poor State Department officials, they don't get the time

16:28

off. So

16:30

one interesting thing I noticed from the

16:33

Qingdong readout

16:34

was this idea that

16:37

both sides want to help more students, scholars,

16:41

and business people interact

16:44

across the Pacific. And on the one hand, it sounds nice,

16:47

but the thing that actually has probably

16:49

been most dramatic, where

16:52

there are structural things that the government

16:55

isn't doing, is on journalists.

16:57

So that was one sort of oversight, which I assume

17:00

was brought up by the

17:02

State Department, which China apparently

17:05

had no interest in letting the US

17:08

passport holding journalists

17:10

end up making a grand triumphant

17:13

return to their

17:15

former posts in Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu,

17:18

and so on. Nathaniel, any other

17:20

thoughts on Qingdong before we move up to the,

17:23

before we go up one rung on

17:26

the CCP hierarchy?

17:28

Sure, yeah. I mean, the sequence of meetings

17:30

was highly orchestrated. I

17:33

do think most of the progress,

17:36

ironically, was made at the lowest

17:39

level during the first meeting, which was the

17:41

longest, over seven hours, including the

17:43

dinner.

17:45

Compared to the readouts with

17:47

Wang Yi and Xi,

17:49

the meeting with Qingdong is really where

17:51

the action was. There was somewhat of an interesting,

17:55

perhaps a good cop, bad cop

17:57

strategy going on here with the CCP.

18:00

the sequencing? I do

18:02

think actually and also I do want to say

18:04

a little bit about the journalists and which

18:07

is interesting because I think China

18:10

of course China was very aggressive in

18:12

expiring

18:13

some journalists and then followed

18:15

by US expulsions during

18:17

the pandemic in basically March

18:20

if you would recall

18:23

but what's interesting however is US

18:25

newspapers have not stopped reporting

18:28

on China. They are now reporting on China

18:31

from Singapore, Taipei,

18:34

so and so my

18:36

hunch is just getting giving

18:39

the mainland side or the PRC

18:41

side some idea that maybe it's

18:43

not as a good thing to actually

18:46

force all those journalists to be reporting

18:48

on China from those places and especially

18:50

from Taipei rather than from Beijing so

18:54

my hunch is therefore there is actually

18:57

the Chinese side has a greater desire

18:59

now to try to change some of those issues. Yeah

19:02

I mean the whole like you know Zhang Haojong

19:05

the Gu shi thing like telling China's

19:07

story well like the things

19:09

that are actually the most humanizing

19:12

and make the world empathize with

19:14

China are ones you have to report from

19:17

the ground because they're about sort of like

19:19

random you know content creators

19:21

or like small business people or someone owns a restaurant

19:24

that you're not going to get if

19:27

all you're reporting on is like you know high-tech

19:30

stuff and the trade war or whatever and it's just

19:32

such a weird dynamic

19:35

because like the other crazy thing is like Ling

19:37

Ling Wei still has crazily sourced

19:39

articles so it's not like you're

19:42

necessarily cutting off the sort of

19:44

like gossip train that flies

19:46

you know that dribbles out of dribbles

19:49

out of Zhongnanhai into you know the Wall Street Journal

19:51

and New York Times but what you're doing by having

19:54

the journalists out is just like making

19:56

it less of a human thing

19:59

which I think is really unfortunate.

20:03

If you are trying to tell China's story

20:06

well, but apparently they don't, people

20:08

who have the decision to make on this are not, don't

20:11

necessarily see it that way.

20:14

Let's now go to Wang Yi. Professor,

20:17

who's he? And what happened in that meeting? Well,

20:20

of course, Wang Yi is

20:24

now actually a member of the Politburo,

20:27

so he's 24

20:28

men who

20:30

are the

20:32

two power holders in China today.

20:34

And of course, he was the previous

20:38

state counselor and Minister of

20:40

Foreign Affairs. He actually is a

20:42

Japan specialist and

20:44

served as Chinese ambassador to Japan

20:47

at one point. But

20:49

of course, as is known,

20:51

his reason, actually,

20:54

he apparently has a very good relationship

20:57

with Xi. And of course,

20:59

it's Xi who gave

21:01

emphasis to the idea of telling

21:04

China's story well of

21:06

discourse power and also

21:08

how to

21:10

make the foreign ministry

21:11

really, rather than the

21:14

diplomatic ministry, the discourse

21:16

power ministry in some way in recent

21:18

years. And Wang Yi led that effort,

21:22

introducing the very aggressive style

21:25

of pushing China's positions

21:27

and attacking, and in fact,

21:30

day in, day out, for example, represented

21:33

this of the Chinese foreign ministry.

21:35

Today, still on Twitter,

21:37

they would

21:38

actually make comparisons between the US

21:40

and China, and of course, always

21:43

trying to put the US on

21:45

flattering light and so

21:47

on. And Wang really led

21:49

that effort. The irony, however,

21:52

is given that he was a Japan specialist

21:54

and so on, he actually was known

21:56

initially for being very diplomatic

21:59

and so on. So

22:00

it just shows actually how the structure has

22:02

changed.

22:03

Now he is the director

22:05

of the general office of

22:07

the Central Commission on

22:10

Foreign Affairs, which

22:12

she leads. And of course that

22:14

commission also connects with the

22:16

National Security Commission and some other commissions

22:19

as well. So the Communist Party has a set

22:21

of those commissions which she

22:24

generally leads. In fact,

22:26

he's really the chairman

22:29

of

22:30

most of those commissions in a way.

22:32

And they are the daily

22:34

operators of the key, really

22:37

overseeing key issues. And the gatekeepers

22:40

also of the attention of

22:42

Mr. Xi as well.

22:45

I do think there was a bit of a, it's

22:47

funny you mentioned this good cop, bad cop

22:49

thing. I feel really bad for Blinken. He's

22:51

jet lagged. He just had like a 14 hour day the

22:53

day before. And

22:55

then Wang Yi has to listen to

22:58

Wang Yi tell him about, what is it? The

23:04

Li Shire, Luo Ji He,

23:08

Li Ran, Chuxu Shire. So

23:10

like the historical logic

23:13

and the sort of inevitable tendency

23:16

of like China's rise. And

23:19

Blinken much is just supposed to be there like, man, I flew

23:21

all the way here for this. Like did we get

23:23

this in Anchorage? Come on, guys.

23:26

Anyways, Nathaniel, what thoughts

23:31

on Wang Yi, meeting number two?

23:50

Second

23:55

day Blinken was in Beijing. He met

23:57

with Wang Yi and Xi already.

23:59

exceeded some people's

24:02

expectations, although

24:05

the meetings themselves may

24:07

not have been as productive. I

24:10

mean, this idea of Zhonghao,

24:12

Zhongguo, and Gusha,

24:16

his primary point during this three-hour meeting

24:18

was that the U.S. has this misjudging

24:21

China, Wupan, Yangguo,

24:25

and these incorrect perceptions

24:30

are leading to the incorrect policy. So

24:32

most of it was about trying to explain,

24:34

you know, China doesn't see

24:36

hegemony, China doesn't

24:39

challenge the U.S. position,

24:41

and

24:42

that somehow if China can

24:45

convince the U.S. of its

24:48

strategic intentions, then it'll lead to a

24:50

correction in China's, I mean,

24:53

the United States'

24:55

misguided policies, i.e.

24:57

hyping the China threat, as he says,

25:02

technological suppression, sanctions

25:04

on Chinese officials, etc. So this meeting

25:06

was really to blame

25:08

the United States for the downturn in relations,

25:12

potentially to correct

25:15

some sort of high-level strategic understanding

25:18

about China's intentions. Not

25:20

sure how successful that will

25:23

be,

25:23

but it didn't seem like any

25:26

attempt to reach any

25:29

common ground on any issues, really.

25:33

So my sense is this particular

25:35

speech of what he, it's

25:38

essentially a lecture

25:40

blaming the U.S. and so

25:42

on,

25:43

and asking the U.S. to reflect on

25:45

what you've done and done wrong,

25:48

understanding China and so on,

25:50

is primarily intended

25:53

for the domestic audience in a way. But

25:55

at the same time emphasizing,

25:58

oh, China is not trying to change.

25:59

change everything. So actually,

26:02

but that actually is very interesting as well,

26:04

in the sense that

26:06

it's suddenly basically, Wang

26:09

Yi in particular on behalf of the Chinese

26:11

leadership is basically saying, look, we never

26:14

try to be revisionist. We

26:17

actually, in a righteous way, all

26:20

the keepers

26:21

of cooperation, we want

26:23

to move forward and so on.

26:25

Now, I end up blaming the US

26:29

for messing things up. But at

26:31

the same time, though, by taking that stand,

26:33

it actually does put China

26:36

in the position of saying that, well,

26:38

this justifies us to continue.

26:41

Now that the US is coming to us to meet,

26:43

therefore, we are willing to forgive

26:46

and,

26:47

of course, to work together on

26:49

some issues, essentially.

26:51

All right, so we had this sort of awkward will he or won't

26:53

he a few hours

26:55

where it wasn't clear if Blinken was going to meet with Xi. I

26:57

do like the idea that maybe Xi, if

27:02

the meetings went really badly, would

27:04

have just decided to go

27:06

for a swim or something. But

27:09

they have this meeting.

27:11

Anything in particular came

27:14

out of that that's

27:16

notable to either of you two. There was this Lotus thing

27:18

that's interesting. There are a few

27:21

notable

27:22

aspects of the readout,

27:25

obviously, much shorter, only a 35-minute meeting.

27:29

As Professor Yang said, there's a domestic

27:32

audience for these readouts. There's clearly

27:34

also an international audience. Xi multiple

27:36

times mentioned the international community

27:38

and the importance of

27:41

handling the bilateral relationship well,

27:44

which bears on the entirety

27:46

of the international community. And

27:48

the US, as well, mentioned

27:50

in its readouts that

27:53

the US-China relationship bears on

27:55

bilateral interests as well as those of the international

27:58

community. And this is kind of a...

27:59

a wrestling match going on about

28:02

which side is presenting itself

28:05

as the more responsible actor

28:07

to the international community. I mean,

28:09

I think to begin with the fact that the United

28:12

States is

28:13

requesting

28:15

all of these meetings regardless of

28:17

the fact that it may look somehow

28:21

like we're clamoring for meetings

28:24

as some have suggested, just

28:26

shows the importance that the U.S. places

28:29

on these meetings as well. And for

28:31

the domestic audiences, you'll notice

28:33

that Xi always speaks

28:36

about high-level principles.

28:38

I mean, this is the idea that Xi

28:41

is this profound, you

28:44

know, he's this profound thinker. It's

28:46

the tangible issues in U.S.-China relations, not

28:48

worth discussing in

28:50

this meeting with the Secretary

28:52

of State, although hopefully they

28:55

do have those discussions at

28:57

the head of state level. There are some historical

28:59

echoes here too, right? Didn't Mao oftentimes

29:02

when heads of state come, he'd like,

29:05

you know, a leader would say like, I want to talk about this, this

29:08

and that specific thing. And he'd be like,

29:11

no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no,

29:13

no, I'm here to talk about history. Like

29:15

talk to Zhou Enlai about whatever it is you actually want

29:19

to, you know, get accomplished here. That's what he did

29:21

to Nixon, right?

29:24

Well, yeah, when Nixon went to

29:27

China, to Beijing on February 21, 1972, Mao was

29:29

not on the agenda actually.

29:33

So they didn't,

29:34

there was an agreement that he would

29:36

get to meet with Mao actually.

29:39

And the timing was also

29:41

essentially dependent on Mao's sleeping schedule,

29:43

you know, where

29:57

So

30:00

part of the reason that Mao wasn't as interested

30:03

in the details was also because

30:05

of his health conditions. And John

30:08

Locke was minding all the details and

30:10

so on,

30:11

actually. So

30:14

there was a unique historical issue

30:16

there. Of course

30:20

Nixon was the leader

30:23

of the most powerful nation of the world

30:25

at that point. And he goes to Beijing

30:27

and be treated like that. And as you can see,

30:31

in some ways there is a little bit of an echo.

30:34

Especially because Mao

30:35

tended to work at night

30:38

and sleep into

30:41

the day and so on. And

30:43

his schedule was just not predictable

30:45

in a way. And

30:47

of course then there was the situation where

30:50

Nixon went to see Mao when he finally

30:52

was asked, oh you come to see him

30:54

now. So Kissinger joined him.

30:58

So did Winston Locke. But they excluded

31:02

Secretary of State Rogers at that

31:04

point, actually. So there was a remarkable

31:06

kind of, well as you can see, all

31:09

those kind of things. This is nothing

31:11

compared to

31:12

that particular drama

31:15

in a way. But

31:18

to add to what Nathaniel

31:20

was

31:21

mentioning, the

31:22

setting for Xi's meeting

31:24

with Secretary Blinken executed

31:28

really a sense of power of

31:30

the kind of control that he has.

31:32

The meeting took place in

31:34

the

31:35

Fujian Hall of the Great Hall of

31:37

the People. And Fujian happens to

31:39

be the place where Xi served

31:41

the longest in his long career

31:44

in the Chinese bureaucracy. And

31:46

the painting behind

31:49

him actually is a mountain range

31:52

in Fujian. And then

31:54

the lotus flower, of course lotus

31:57

in Chinese, is essentially the flower.

31:59

the first word, hé,

32:02

sounds like both the first word

32:04

for peace and also the first word for

32:07

cooperation.

32:08

But there is another personal side to it.

32:10

The lotus flower is practically

32:13

the flower

32:14

for the hometown

32:16

of Madame Xi Jinping, namely

32:19

Madame Peng Liyuan. So

32:21

it's famous also for the lotus.

32:24

So as you can see, this is a setting

32:27

that

32:28

clearly there's a lot of thought that

32:30

has gone into it. But also it shows

32:33

that

32:33

it's Xi who is in control,

32:36

the setting is made to his order,

32:39

and so on. And it essentially

32:42

primarily also him talking.

32:45

But at the same time setting the general

32:48

tone, saying that, oh, you have reached some

32:51

agreements, some details, he didn't go into

32:53

those, but those can be followed up.

32:55

But he set the tone. But we can

32:58

actually nonetheless speculate if

33:00

there wasn't such a meeting and the

33:03

secretary of state flies back.

33:05

It just feeds into all the panel

33:08

as to sort of disenchantment with US-China

33:11

relations in Washington DC and

33:13

so on. And of course it helps in

33:16

some ways with the coalition of the willing

33:18

in some ways of the US and the EU

33:20

and Japan and so on,

33:24

allowing to deal with China.

33:27

So in that sense, actually, I think the Chinese

33:29

leadership recognize the importance that

33:31

they do want

33:32

to treat

33:33

a secretary of

33:35

blinking in such a way to manage

33:37

this relationship. At the same time, though,

33:40

the setting, the hierarchical setting,

33:42

though,

33:43

put Mr. Xi in the role

33:45

of the leader of the room, the convener,

33:47

the moderator, really the teacher

33:50

practically, Yian Erco

33:52

of Mao, actually.

33:54

Yeah. So we're

33:57

on a podcast here, but the visual

33:59

was...

33:59

was she at the head of the table, behind

34:02

him was this like, you know, gigantic

34:05

scaled green mounted

34:08

Chinese landscape painting, which

34:11

I don't think is like the prettiest, but for more on that,

34:13

listen to- It's the Wu Yi mountain

34:15

from Fujian. But for

34:18

more art criticism of CCP painting, check

34:21

out my podcast last

34:23

year with Arnold Chong. Anyways,

34:26

and then sort of on both sides, you

34:29

had Blinken and then sort

34:31

of Wang Yi set up with them, with Xi,

34:33

yeah, as like the elder statesman, talking

34:36

to these, you know, children at

34:39

a table about, you know, their table manners

34:41

or what have you. Perhaps

34:43

the most interesting thing to

34:45

come out of this was Blinken's

34:48

press conference, which he did at 6.20

34:50

in the morning, Beijing

34:52

time, poor guy. So

34:55

let me just run down briefly some

34:57

of sort of my notes and first impressions

34:59

of that. He hoped for progress on

35:02

food insecurity, particularly the Black Sea

35:04

Grain Initiative. He talked about fentanyl.

35:07

I mean, who knows what's actually gonna come out

35:09

of that, but we'll see. The people-to-people

35:12

stuff as we discussed, you

35:14

know, some future visits, Qing

35:15

Gang is gonna come to the US apparently.

35:17

And then you got to this interesting

35:20

discussion around sort

35:22

of decoupling and de-risking. The quote

35:25

was, we don't want to economically contain

35:27

China, no decoupling, but de-risking.

35:30

This idea of like conflating

35:32

decoupling with economically containing

35:35

China is interesting. He

35:38

also sort of talked about this idea of

35:41

sort of narrowly tailoring

35:43

risks around dual use, dual

35:46

use military technology and technology used to

35:48

repress. So I think China

35:50

would take issue to China, as well as,

35:53

you know, Bight Dance and Alibaba would

35:55

probably take issue to that characterization

35:58

of the export controls we've seen. But

36:00

he also sort of makes the case, which is very out of vogue

36:03

nowadays, of Chinese

36:05

economic success actually being in the US

36:07

interest. So

36:09

he sort of mentioned what

36:12

Professor Yang said earlier is probably

36:14

the biggest sort of sort

36:16

of damocles aside from Taiwan, this idea

36:19

of Russian, Chinese support

36:21

to Russia saying that, you

36:23

know, China's really promised to us that

36:25

it won't give lethal aid. But

36:28

we are concerned about private companies

36:30

in China that may be providing assistance

36:33

in some cases, dual use and in some

36:35

cases directed at helping Russia's

36:37

military capacity in Ukraine. And

36:39

he, quote,

36:39

urged them to be vigilant.

36:43

You know, this is coming off of reporting

36:46

that

36:47

the US both at the very

36:49

beginning of the

36:52

war in Ukraine was really aggressive to China

36:54

telling them don't do this, as well as over

36:56

the past, over this past spring. Apparently,

36:59

Blinken having to make the case again, presumably

37:02

some new intelligence or what have you, making

37:04

them focused on sort

37:07

of reiterating the fact that this is a real red

37:09

line for the US. So

37:13

last thing, this idea of mill to

37:15

mill communications is something that China

37:17

is clearly just not interested

37:19

in. The US has been asking about

37:22

this for over

37:24

a decade now in the Obama administration. I

37:26

remember this was something that was there was a lot of discussion

37:28

about. But those sort of like

37:31

crisis communication, whatever things, you

37:33

know, just in the Cold War, they didn't really exist

37:35

before

37:38

before Cuban Missile Crisis. And

37:41

I guess it might take something as bad as that

37:43

for the current Chinese leadership

37:45

to change their mind on this, this idea of mill mill communications

37:47

being something that they're going to be doing. And

37:50

that's in China's interest. So

37:52

maybe to conclude,

37:55

is US-China relations boring? You

37:58

know, if this is all we have,

37:59

get out of a big meeting,

38:02

aside from sort

38:04

of readjusting our expectations

38:07

of like the percentage of World War

38:09

III breaking out, which obviously is something

38:11

very interesting. I mean, it seems to me to

38:13

be just like the upside, absent

38:16

an alien invasion, a new

38:19

president, or she passing on from political

38:22

power, it

38:27

seems like there's really very little upside

38:29

in these two countries

38:32

doing anything besides not starting

38:34

a war with each other. Well,

38:38

I do think it's very important. Number

38:40

one, the Russian connection

38:42

is very important. The fact that

38:45

the administration could actually repeatedly

38:47

go to China, tell them that you shouldn't

38:49

do this and that, and I'm pretty sure during

38:52

those meetings in Beijing, the US side

38:54

actually even included more detailed

38:56

intelligence on what

38:57

might be happening.

38:59

So in that sense, actually keeping

39:01

China from being too close to Russia,

39:03

in supporting Russia,

39:05

is of great importance, especially

39:07

given China's capabilities. Of

39:09

course, there are a lot of civilian goods and other

39:11

things flowing into Russia,

39:13

but for the US actually and for the West,

39:16

it's just so important in this.

39:18

So sometimes, of course, one of the big

39:21

problem is, it's hard to claim

39:23

credit for what's not happening,

39:25

but in fact, I really

39:27

cannot emphasize how important it is, given

39:30

how challenging it is for the Ukraine

39:32

to combat

39:34

Russia. At the same time

39:36

also, the US has this daunting

39:38

task of keeping the coalition

39:40

together. So in that sense, actually, while,

39:44

especially actually in terms of managing

39:46

the relationship with China. So there are

39:48

a lot of, there is a lot of finesse

39:50

here in terms of

39:52

really, I think actually, when we talk about

39:54

managing the relationship,

39:56

it's managing the differences

39:58

so that it doesn't threaten.

39:59

But at the same time, in fact,

40:02

one could imagine if China suddenly turns 180

40:04

degrees, becomes actually

40:06

such a nice partner.

40:09

That also could be very challenging

40:11

for Washington, because then

40:14

it would actually help to dissolve

40:16

the kind of get together in terms

40:18

of the West and so on.

40:20

So in some sense, actually,

40:23

China, by being playing tough,

40:26

actually gets into the

40:28

trap of basically being portrayed

40:30

as this rising geopolitical

40:34

adversary going forward.

40:37

Yeah, I think there's a really interesting dynamic

40:41

of America trying to herd the

40:44

global geopolitical

40:47

cats of the G7 and NATO

40:50

allies and whatnot, and getting them to focus

40:53

and recognize that China is challenging

40:55

and a competitor, maybe not one

40:57

in the US, not wanting World War III to start anytime

41:00

soon. So Bill Bishop tweeted out, I hope the

41:02

PRC realizes that Biden is trying to stabilize

41:05

things and take the hit, rather than just

41:07

lecture in private

41:07

too that everything is America's fault. The

41:09

message from G7 leaders, quote, don't be

41:11

the president that gets into a war with China was

41:14

important to Biden. And maybe

41:17

that is sort of the hopeful

41:19

arc is, yeah, maybe the sort of like,

41:22

on the one hand, I'm sure

41:24

there were sharper words said behind

41:28

closed doors and your idea that aside

41:31

from just saying, yeah, we think there might be some private

41:35

companies doing bad things, we've

41:37

seen entity listings right over the past few months

41:41

of Chinese firms getting caught for

41:43

shipping drones and what have you to

41:45

the PRC. So that balance

41:48

of being tough when being tough is important,

41:50

but also not sort of going too

41:52

far over your skis from the perspective

41:55

of wanting to sort of build this global

41:57

coalition about this understanding of what

41:59

I'm.

41:59

you know, she's trying to end 2023 is really

42:02

all about is a very tricky balance

42:04

and the sort of trade offs that

42:07

may have been have had to have been

42:09

made over the past few months to to

42:11

set the groundwork to to have

42:13

this meeting. It's it's a little early to

42:15

tell I think whether whether

42:17

it has necessarily paid off for the for

42:20

the administration to potentially

42:22

have slow rolled some stuff and you know made

42:25

this Tiananmen Square June

42:28

4th announcement like one paragraph

42:30

instead of the five that it's been for the past

42:33

few years, you know, all those all those things

42:35

where it's it's you know,

42:37

we're still on the day that they had the meeting.

42:40

So it's a little early to to make such

42:42

a big judgment about whether or not this all made

42:44

sense. But there clearly is a lot of thinking

42:46

going on about having to to balance

42:49

a lot of different aspects of this relationship. Nathaniel

42:52

any any closing thoughts about what

42:54

what we saw and what we might you know

42:57

what it might mean for the future?

42:58

I do think if we can keep us China

43:00

diplomacy boring, that

43:02

might not be the worst thing actually,

43:06

you know, discussing tangible

43:09

low hanging fruit in the relationship.

43:13

You know, not turning it into a

43:16

conversation about whether the US is

43:18

reverting to a policy of engagement.

43:21

I think

43:22

the illusions of you

43:24

know, shaping China's political

43:27

system or or economic

43:29

system at this point. I

43:31

think

43:34

those in Washington policymakers in

43:36

Washington have given

43:38

up those illusions.

43:39

But we can still

43:42

maintain communication to try to

43:44

resolve

43:46

specific issues in ways that advance

43:49

US interests. And from here,

43:52

I think the next steps are pretty clear that

43:54

Chingong may visit DC,

43:56

we may have follow on visits.

43:59

or Secretary

44:01

Yellen to China.

44:04

She may attend APEC in November

44:07

and I think this is

44:10

what how US-China diplomacy

44:13

should be. The two sides maintain communication,

44:16

try to solve issues and

44:20

I don't think the US should give

44:22

concessions to bring China to

44:25

the negotiating table. Obviously

44:27

that reinforces a

44:29

pattern in Beijing where they can use dialogue

44:32

as a bargaining chip but I do think the US generally

44:34

is maintaining its competitive

44:37

approach.

44:38

As you mentioned Jordan there have been

44:41

over 50 entity listings

44:43

in the past month related to supercomputing,

44:45

involvement in Iran's missile program,

44:49

companies involved in

44:51

sentinel precursor production. I

44:53

think if the US was really orchestrating

44:56

a thaw for its own sake in the interest

44:58

of returning to the engagement policy we

45:01

would probably avoid doing things like that.

45:03

In addition to a trilateral

45:06

reconnaissance, drone reconnaissance agreement

45:08

with Taiwan and Japan,

45:10

you can point to examples on all sides.

45:12

I still think the administration is

45:15

simultaneously competing and pursuing

45:17

diplomacy which has been their

45:20

strategy from the beginning. I

45:21

guess some boring you

45:23

know Anchorage and Balloon Gate good for good

45:26

for ratings, boring diplomacy

45:28

that you know

45:29

lowers the likelihood of World

45:31

War III less but I'm willing

45:33

to sacrifice my my YouTube ad dollars

45:36

for the future of humanity. Professor

45:38

Final words?

45:40

This is truly the most consequential

45:43

relationship and it's just so important

45:46

in so much rise on this relationship

45:48

going forward.

45:50

So I think actually it's a set of we

45:52

are however just getting allow

45:54

at this particular moment I do

45:56

hope that both countries build on this in

45:59

a way.

46:00

Not that you could

46:02

expect to get back to the time of

46:04

the ten year visas and frequent travels,

46:07

but certainly actually

46:09

create the conditions for some sort

46:11

of a greater stability in global peace.

46:15

And it's good for humanity in many ways.

46:17

But at the same

46:20

time, however, looming on the horizon,

46:22

all US elections and so

46:24

on, who knows? May

46:27

not be the repeat of the balloon, but

46:29

there are always a few things

46:31

that happen that are unexpected as

46:33

well. Thank you so much

46:35

for being part of the channel. Well,

46:38

thank you for having me.

46:56

Thank you so much for being part of the channel. Thank

46:58

you so much for being part of the channel. Thank

47:26

you. I

47:56

gave my all and they all know it.

48:00

That you turned me down and now it's showing

48:03

And took a moment to replace us

48:06

Like it was easy Made me think

48:08

I deserved it In

48:11

the thick of healing Yeah,

48:13

yeah We'd

48:15

always go into it blindly

48:19

I needed to lose you

48:21

to find me This

48:24

dancer was killing me softly

48:29

I needed to hate you to

48:31

love me I

48:38

needed to lose you to love

48:41

me You

48:52

promised the world and I fell for

48:54

it I

48:56

put you first and you adored it Set

48:59

fires to my forest And

49:02

you let it burn Sing off key

49:04

in my chorus To

49:10

love me To love

49:13

me To love me I

49:15

needed to hate you to love

49:18

me To love me To

49:22

love me To love me I

49:25

needed to lose you to

49:27

love me To love me To

49:30

love me And

49:34

now the chapter is closed

49:37

and done To love me To

49:40

love me To love

49:42

me And now it's goodbye,

49:45

it's goodbye for us I

49:50

feel weak We've

49:52

been here before Cause

49:56

I feel weak Keep

49:58

going back and forth Maybe

50:03

it's over, maybe

50:06

we're through But

50:08

I honestly can't

50:10

say I still

50:12

love you Maybe

50:15

we reached the mountain peak And

50:17

there's no more left to climb

50:20

And maybe we lost

50:22

the magic piece And we're both

50:24

too blind to find Let's

50:27

start over Let's

50:31

give love and wings Let's

50:33

start over Stop

50:37

fighting, must the same old thing Let's

50:39

start over We

50:43

can't let our good luck die Maybe

50:47

we can start over

50:51

Give love another life I

50:54

can see that we're not

50:57

happy here So

50:59

why would we

51:02

keep pretending when there's nothing there

51:06

Maybe you like

51:09

it, well I don't

51:12

And maybe you said

51:14

so, well

51:17

I won't Maybe

51:19

we reached the mountain peak And

51:22

there's no more left to

51:24

climb And maybe we lost the

51:26

magic piece And we're both

51:28

too blind to find Let's

51:31

start over Let's

51:35

give love and wings Let's

51:37

start over Stop

51:41

fighting, must the same old thing Let's

51:43

start over We

51:48

can't let our good luck die

51:51

Maybe we can start over

51:55

Give love another life I

51:58

know that this will hurt I

52:01

know you cry I

52:04

know I called you selfish,

52:07

but that's a lie I

52:10

feel I know that's best

52:13

for us I'm

52:30

tired of fighting but the same old

52:33

things Let's all know

52:37

that we all know that we

52:39

all won't die Maybe

52:42

we can't find a long way

52:46

And give love another life