0:02

The

0:02

Australian Federal Police, or AFP,

0:05

is Australia's national policing agency.

0:07

Its role is to outsmart serious

0:10

crime with intelligent action. The

0:13

AFP is opening their case vault

0:15

to give us detailed insight into their

0:17

investigations, tactics and,

0:20

most importantly, perseverance

0:22

through this Crime Interrupted podcast. As

0:26

the national law enforcement agency with

0:28

international reach, the AFP

0:30

investigates and disrupts crime,

0:33

aiming to minimise the damage inflicted

0:35

on victims while maximising

0:37

the damage to the criminal environment.

0:40

Some of these cases may surprise you

0:42

with the extent criminals are prepared to go

0:45

to, and that these crimes do

0:47

in fact occur or are planned in

0:49

our own backyard. Once

0:52

you get a glimpse into the AFP and what

0:54

it does to protect our way of life, you

0:56

will be glad the AFP has your back.

1:01

Just a reminder that the operation

1:03

that follows is true crime and

1:05

listener discretion is advised.

1:31

The Melbourne Waterfront has a colourful criminal

1:33

history of murder and mayhem. It

1:36

was once ruled by the notorious Federated

1:38

Ship Painters and Dockers Union, known

1:40

for short as the Painters and Dockers.

1:44

Members included such characters as Alfred

1:46

the Ferret Nelson, Freddy the Frog

1:49

Harrison, Jack Twist and

1:51

Billy the Texan Longley. One

1:54

story that has the status of an urban

1:56

legend happened in 1958.

1:59

Frog Harrison went to the docks

2:01

to collect his pay packet and to return

2:03

a borrowed trailer. As

2:06

he was removing the trailer from his car,

2:08

a gunman appeared out of nowhere and shot

2:10

Harrison in the head.

2:13

There were 30 men there that day. No

2:16

one saw anything.

2:18

Twelve said they were in the toilet when

2:20

the shooting happened.

2:22

It must have been crowded, because the

2:24

toilet had only two stalls. The

2:29

painters and dockers were notorious for solving

2:31

problems with violence and gunfire.

2:35

It was the subject of the Costigan Royal

2:37

Commission which began looking into the state

2:39

of the wharfs in 1980. The

2:42

Royal Commission found that the painters and

2:44

dockers union actively recruited hardened

2:47

criminals and there were 15 murders

2:49

linked to its members or union activity.

2:53

The Royal Commission also identified crimes

2:56

such as assaults, tax fraud, drug

2:58

trafficking and intimidation. Those

3:02

days ended with the deregistration of the

3:04

union in the early 1990s and

3:06

the troubled and violent past was put

3:09

to rest.

3:10

But that doesn't mean the waterfront

3:12

isn't still vulnerable to crime. What

3:16

happens now is less overt than the

3:18

days of gun battles and murders, but

3:20

that's not to say that wharfs all around

3:23

Australia aren't still places for law

3:25

enforcement to monitor closely. The

3:28

multi-agency Trident task force

3:30

was set up to look at the waterfront and

3:32

identify any areas of vulnerability.

3:35

Inspector

3:37

Matt Cronert from Victoria Police

3:40

joined the Trident task force at the beginning.

3:43

He'd had experience with the joint

3:45

agency task forces and appreciated

3:47

the value of sharing information and

3:50

expertise.

3:59

And as a result, decisions were made to create

4:02

joint task forces, not just in Victoria,

4:04

but around the country. And

4:07

eventually four joint task forces

4:10

were created, and Trident was

4:12

the Victorian

4:13

task force. But I already had a background

4:15

in the joint agency policing. So I always

4:17

asked if I'd be prepared to help set up the new task

4:19

force, I mean Trident,

4:21

as a proper joint agency task

4:23

force. We're a little bit different to

4:25

the other three in that we were state-led,

4:28

so Victoria Police actually had the lead,

4:30

whereas the other three around the country were

4:32

AFP-led. So it was a little bit of a difference,

4:35

but in reality it was joint agency,

4:37

so it didn't really matter

4:38

who the leader was. We had

4:41

Victoria Police AFP, ATO

4:44

had a member embedded, OSTRAC had

4:46

a member embedded, and we

4:48

also had access through the operational

4:51

arm of customs as well, so we had the uniform

4:54

presence to be able to do some of our disruption work for

4:56

us. Matt explains

4:58

that the power of interagency policing

5:00

lies predominantly in information sharing

5:03

without the usual restrictions.

5:05

We had a blended team.

5:07

We also had access directly into the

5:09

intelligence functions of all agencies,

5:11

so all six agencies have their

5:14

own intelligence areas, but

5:16

they were all actually co-located within the building.

5:18

So that gave us the opportunity to be able to

5:22

go directly to the intel cell and

5:24

get all information that was held in relation

5:26

to particular entities,

5:28

which is unusual. In state-based policing,

5:30

you'd normally just have access

5:32

to your own information, and then information

5:35

you wanted from other agencies, you need to do formal

5:37

requests. They can take quite some

5:39

time. Some of the agencies may take

5:42

three to six months to come back with the intelligence that

5:44

you require.

5:45

So it might be a case that we have an entity, we

5:48

check Victoria Police indices, we have

5:50

nothing.

5:51

Normally for us we'd go, that's the end of it, but

5:53

then we could go and check AFP,

5:55

customs, tax, and you end

5:57

up getting a full picture of what it was that you had.

5:59

you were looking at. So we may have nothing, AFP

6:02

may have nothing, but customers may

6:04

go, hang on, we have this information

6:06

or intelligence here to suggest that the entity has

6:08

been involved in importing drugs, but

6:10

we haven't been able to prove it.

6:11

So it might be that's the vital piece

6:14

of evidence or information that we need to

6:16

commence an investigation. So that was the

6:19

big advantage of being in the joint past four spaces

6:21

that we had access to.

6:22

All this intelligence was shareable under

6:25

a memorandum of understanding, which

6:27

meant there were no formalities that needed to go

6:29

through just to have a check done.

6:32

Victoria Police were integral, as

6:34

was everybody else, because we were all working

6:36

together. The Trident

6:38

task force had an important grief. Its

6:41

focus was on organised crime.

6:43

What

6:44

Trident was formed for, it

6:46

was to prevent, deter and defeat serious

6:49

and organised crime, but we also looked

6:51

at vulnerabilities on the

6:53

waterfront. So there was the criminality aspect

6:56

of it, so the organised crime, but

6:58

we're also there to try and target harden the

7:00

environment, to stop the criminals

7:02

from being able to use the vulnerabilities

7:05

through the waterfront,

7:07

to

7:08

perhaps stop them being able to exploit those

7:10

vulnerabilities. So a simple example,

7:13

identify there's no security cameras down

7:15

at the docks on a particular part of a fence. We

7:18

find the fence has been cut. So we then work

7:20

with the container terminal operators or the

7:22

Port of Melbourne, so it might be as simple as putting up

7:24

a CCTV camera. It might be

7:26

around processes of people entering and exiting

7:28

the wharf. So we identified those

7:30

vulnerabilities

7:31

in order to try and reduce the opportunities

7:34

for organised crime to exploit those

7:36

vulnerabilities. Scott

7:39

is a leading senior constable who has been

7:41

with the AFP for 17 years.

7:44

He worked over a variety of crime types

7:46

before joining the Trident task force.

7:49

His focus was on the Melbourne wharves.

7:53

Like Matt, Scott saw the strength

7:55

of the Trident task force was in its

7:57

partnerships. of

8:00

organisations that were attached to

8:02

the task force around Australia to support

8:06

each of the areas so customs would

8:08

help

8:08

Australian Federal Police and Australian Federal Police

8:11

help Victoria Police and other agencies

8:14

in that work so that everyone would support each

8:16

other. With the Trident task

8:18

force set up to identify vulnerabilities

8:21

on the waterfront, one of the main crimes

8:23

that had flourished since the bad old days

8:25

of the painters and dockers was drug

8:27

importation. A

8:29

lot more drugs were coming through into

8:32

the borders and we're finding more

8:34

and more narcotics and border control

8:36

drugs even chemicals coming through we need

8:39

to address it the task force gets created

8:41

and we're there to identify vulnerabilities

8:43

and that could be something as simple as

8:46

people walking off ships or multiple

8:48

containers coming through filled with narcotics.

8:51

I

8:51

think that it has been a long-standing

8:54

issue rather than

8:55

sticking to the same strategies we need to be

8:58

proactive and look at a better option and I think that's

9:00

where the task force came into it.

9:02

The more the Trident task force investigated

9:05

all aspects of the docks the more

9:07

they found areas of vulnerability.

9:09

It could be something as false licensing

9:12

of truck drivers it could be security

9:14

workers it could be actual workers on site

9:18

even something I mentioned before when shipping

9:20

crew come off and they've got

9:22

their 24-hour access leave what

9:25

are they bringing into the country via backpack

9:27

you've got waterways that may or may not

9:29

be caged off or secured

9:31

in any way so therefore can

9:33

someone just drive a boat in and here's

9:36

some stuff see you later they're

9:38

all the things that we found along the way that

9:40

are part of the problem so it was

9:43

a case of we need to act and be proactive

9:46

what we've learned from previous operations

9:49

to future ways people are trying to get

9:52

importation through you've always got to try

9:54

mitigating as many risks as possible

9:56

and that was part of what the task force

9:58

was designed for

10:00

As well as drugs coming through the waterfront,

10:02

the Trident team found other vulnerabilities.

10:06

There were a number of other offences identified

10:08

where truck drivers would be driving a truck

10:10

to collect containers but not using

10:12

their own ID, using somebody else's, or not

10:14

even registered to the company. Vulnerabilities

10:18

could be anywhere right through

10:20

to anything that would come into the border

10:23

that could potentially pose a threat to

10:25

the Australian population.

10:28

Some of those could have been something as easy

10:30

as a cruise ship person, something

10:32

where it's got dropped off the side of the ship,

10:35

access containers while

10:36

docking and things happening, you know, import,

10:39

waiting to come into dockside,

10:42

even right down to background checks

10:44

of individuals. What length does each

10:46

company go to before hiring?

10:49

So there was several main

10:51

things that we looked at, but obviously predominantly

10:54

the border control drugs was the main

10:56

part of the vulnerabilities of

10:59

detecting and deterring.

11:01

With so many different potential crime

11:03

types, the Trident task force was

11:05

an incredible opportunity for those working

11:08

it.

11:09

It gives you the opportunity to learn, develop and

11:11

increase your own skillset because you're looking at completely

11:13

different offence types. You

11:16

need to look at how you're going to gather the

11:18

evidence to meet all those

11:20

requirements in order to be able to lay charges.

11:22

So for us and I

11:24

think for most of the guys who are attached to the team,

11:28

we're extremely excited that something

11:30

new and something that was never really achieved

11:32

before came to fruition and

11:34

that everyone took it and really

11:37

worked hard at creating

11:39

what was the Trident task force. Working

11:42

in the multi-agency space, each

11:44

agency had its areas of expertise.

11:47

Victoria Police for State Offences, ourselves

11:50

as Commonwealth,

11:51

customs guys purely for getting in

11:53

and around and access to waterfront organisations

11:55

like Australian Tax Office that would come in and

11:57

assist.

11:58

And they're all sort of...

12:00

mesh together in a way that we could bounce

12:02

off each other. So it would be a case

12:05

of, okay, we can't deal with this. Can you guys look

12:07

at this? It might be a case of a GST

12:09

component that they can look at and

12:11

liaise with the company and say, look, you haven't met

12:14

your requirements. Let's get this up to speed.

12:17

The beauty of these partnerships when everyone

12:19

works together in the same space is

12:22

that an AFP investigator might be

12:24

sitting at the desk next to an expert

12:26

from the Australian Tax Office. And

12:28

the two might discuss tax or GST

12:31

solutions to an investigative problem.

12:33

You're actually walking away probably a 10 time

12:36

better investigator with

12:38

that knowledge saying, okay, well, we can't

12:40

do this, but let's look at option B, C

12:42

and D.

12:44

As part of the Trident task force,

12:46

information came to light that a major

12:48

security company was paying cash wages

12:51

to employees. Rival

12:54

companies had reported this practice to the

12:56

AFP because it made it impossible

12:58

to compete for business.

13:00

If cash is being paid on a large scale

13:03

to employees, then chances

13:05

are the company involved is dodging

13:07

its tax obligations.

13:10

This means it can outbid any competitors

13:12

for contracts.

13:14

Boscabelle, I guess, is a sub operation

13:17

within Trident. So Trident's the overarching

13:19

task force and each of the teams would

13:21

have their own investigation. So operation

13:23

Boscabelle was an investigation that

13:25

was assigned to my team. But

13:27

the way that the investigation commenced was we

13:30

have some very intelligent people within

13:32

the intelligence field. And

13:34

we had a particular customs analyst who

13:36

had done a lot of research and

13:39

there was intelligence coming in to suggest that a particular

13:41

company was doing some cash

13:43

payments that they were running things off the book. But

13:46

there was also some strong links back to organised

13:48

crime. So she put together an intelligence

13:51

brief in relation to what she'd found. And

13:54

that was presented to me. And then I pushed that up

13:56

to our command

13:57

saying, I really believe this huge vulnerability.

14:00

is here because it linked directly back at that stage

14:03

to the waterfront. So as the investigation

14:05

progressed, the focus changed a bit, but

14:07

the initial focus was around vulnerabilities on the

14:09

waterfront and how they might have been exploited by organised

14:12

crime.

14:13

So why is using cash payments

14:15

to run things off the books such a

14:17

red flag where the waterfront is concerned?

14:21

You have people potentially who aren't qualified

14:23

or don't hold the appropriate licence to be working

14:26

down on the docks. They're getting paid cash. So

14:28

the vulnerability potentially is that they're then influenced

14:31

by their superiors to allow particular

14:33

things to happen. So for instance,

14:35

and I'm not saying this is what the company did, but

14:37

there's a potential for the phone call to be made

14:40

to say a particular container is going to come off

14:42

the wharf and be driven through the gate. Don't make

14:44

any inquiries, just let it go.

14:46

So there was supposed to be a

14:48

matching system so that they check as they exit

14:51

the docks that the container

14:53

on the truck matches. So

14:55

it may be a case that the security guard didn't

14:57

check the number on the container and the wrong

14:59

container has been taken off the dock. So

15:02

our concern was around what the vulnerability

15:04

was

15:05

with the security guards, whether there was corruption

15:07

within security guards and what influence the company

15:10

may have had on those security guards to

15:12

allow particular things to happen.

15:15

At the beginning of the investigation, all

15:17

of this information still had to come to light.

15:20

The team at Trident and then Operation

15:22

Boscobell first had to gather their intelligence.

15:25

Then decide how they were going to proceed.

15:29

Soon, one big company emerged

15:31

as a main offender in off the book's payments.

15:34

So there was a lot of other intelligence that

15:37

came in within that intelligence brief. So

15:39

we're looking at links to organised crime.

15:42

So the cash payments were a small part

15:44

of it, but it was also what

15:47

we saw as the vulnerability through the influence

15:49

of organised crime figures on the company.

15:52

So there was potential for people

15:54

to be placed in positions.

15:56

So they put their own people in. There

15:58

was potential for...

15:59

security guards allowing things just to come

16:02

out through the gates. So we

16:04

saw this as being a real vulnerability

16:06

to be exploited by organised crime through the

16:09

company. Cash payments were

16:11

their mechanism for getting

16:13

people into places. We took

16:16

a four-pillared approach, which was a

16:18

little bit unusual. Normally with our investigations

16:20

it's criminal. We're looking at the criminal aspect

16:22

of it. With this one we looked at

16:24

regulatory, so we had a look at their licensing

16:27

criminal, which was the eventual charges.

16:30

We engaged the tax office in relation to their

16:32

ability to investigate

16:34

around the taxation issues. And

16:36

we also had process of crime, so

16:39

we're looking at potential money laundering, whether

16:41

using

16:42

the cash payments as part of the

16:44

end of a money laundering cycle.

16:46

So we took this four-pillar approach to

16:48

try and make sure that we covered all

16:51

our bases in relation to doing the investigation

16:54

to get the best result.

16:56

Anytime cash is being paid in large

16:58

amounts, especially on the wharves,

17:00

it's a red flag.

17:02

It's a vulnerability that we need to definitely look

17:04

at

17:06

by unfolding through the

17:08

information that we receive from the public

17:11

and then doing, obviously, further enquiries on

17:13

that. A lot started coming to light, and

17:15

we thought, OK, this is beyond the point of

17:18

us just receiving more and more info.

17:20

It's more of a case of, let's look

17:22

at this closer. And we found

17:24

over the time that the more we looked at it, the companies

17:27

around Australia were having pretty

17:30

much a 50-50 on the books, off the books regime.

17:33

And part of that was contract-based,

17:36

so a particular contract may be attached

17:38

to a venue or a waterfront

17:40

or whatever it might be.

17:42

As for the people on the receiving end of the

17:45

cash payments, some knew that it was

17:47

a rort, while others may not

17:49

have. Matt

17:51

doesn't think there was a strong understanding from

17:53

the workers on just what they were missing

17:55

out on by receiving cash.

17:58

I think some people... want

18:00

to know. It was a job, they were getting paid and

18:02

they were happy with that because bearing in mind of course

18:04

it's well below what wages but the fact

18:06

that tax is not being paid into that probably

18:09

plays into their mind about thinking well it's

18:11

not so bad that I'm getting paid less because

18:13

of course that was all part of the off the books

18:15

business model around how

18:17

the company could win the contract so cheaply. It was

18:20

around that business model of not paying tax, not paying

18:22

super. So they'd be looking

18:24

for people that were prepared to

18:26

take the money

18:27

without all the other things that went behind it

18:29

so I think you had vulnerable people that were desperate

18:31

for work and weren't concerned

18:34

probably people who didn't understand and

18:36

I think probably those that didn't care.

18:39

If a worker is paid cash that

18:41

usually means the employer is not paying

18:44

tax on their behalf or superannuation

18:47

or the work cover premium or

18:49

payroll tax.

18:51

They're also not allowing for any worker entitlements

18:54

like sick leave, carers leave, holiday

18:56

pay or long service leave.

18:59

Not having to pay all of those things gives

19:02

a company the ability to undercut other bids

19:04

by 30 or 40 percent.

19:07

The more the Trident task force looked into

19:09

it the more widespread they found

19:11

this practice to be.

19:13

The company doing it was rapidly

19:16

expanding as a result.

19:18

That's what we start to see from a lot of the

19:20

primary companies is the fact that all

19:23

these contracts that were in and around the various

19:25

states were being absorbed overnight

19:28

almost so that you could say that they grew too

19:30

fast too quickly and before

19:33

you know it they've got to find people to fill those

19:35

shifts. You might have a

19:38

particular venue that needs 20 people

19:40

but you might have four or five that actually physically

19:42

there plus the manager of that group

19:45

but you're still receiving the same income as a part

19:47

of that contract. It can

19:51

be quite obvious through financial

19:53

information that essentially that that's

19:55

what's happening. You see the contracted money

19:57

going into the companies and a poor

19:59

of going out and then the bulk of

20:02

it either stays or moves on to other accounts.

20:04

There's a misconception about cash payments.

20:07

If there's no tax then people assume

20:09

they will get more.

20:11

That was not what the Operation Boscobell

20:13

investigators found.

20:15

There were too many people up the chain

20:18

all taking a cut. What we

20:20

saw through Boscobell was a case of

20:23

what they were likely to receive per hour

20:25

on the books would cover

20:27

a lot more so you'd have your sick leave, your holiday

20:29

pay, your superannuation. Where

20:32

if you're off the books

20:34

you're likely to lose all that

20:35

but more because the off

20:38

the books regime was all about whoever's

20:40

managing you as a person and an employee

20:44

would take a cut of that as well. So

20:46

if we broke it down

20:48

to a figure for example

20:51

you might have $20 per hour for working a

20:53

shift at a particular venue. By

20:56

the time you actually receive that

20:58

money as a cash payment it

21:00

could be $14 an hour. That's

21:04

the company receiving the actual contracted

21:06

money then the person who runs

21:08

that company takes their cut then the

21:10

manager takes their cut

21:12

then the person who's dealing the cash

21:14

out takes their cut. Before

21:17

you know it you've lost $6 an hour.

21:19

Whether you're better off you're getting

21:21

cash in hand yeah probably but if

21:24

you look at the bigger picture you know for someone

21:26

who's getting $42 and everything else covered

21:30

then you got to look at it and weigh up your options

21:33

as to which one suits you best but realistically

21:35

you're probably losing out quite a bit.

21:38

As that one particular company grew

21:40

and became the focus of Boscobell information

21:43

and intelligence flooded in. The

21:45

information from the public as well as

21:47

our own side of investigations and

21:49

it just sort of stemmed really

21:52

quickly in

21:53

that it was not so

21:55

much direct but

21:57

the way it was being done it

21:59

was quite...

21:59

obvious. With

22:01

reports of cash payments, it explained

22:03

a practice that Boscobell investigators

22:05

had seen on the docks,

22:07

money being received in white envelopes.

22:10

One of the moments we knew we were on the right track

22:13

was around the white envelopes.

22:15

And I remember we were working a surveillance

22:17

shift one day and we were on a particular premises

22:19

where the allegation was there was large amounts of money

22:22

passing through.

22:23

And

22:24

we'd been sitting there for a while, there'd been

22:26

nothing coming. And then all of a sudden we

22:29

start having person after person coming through the

22:31

door. They're coming out white envelope in hand.

22:33

And it was one of those almost an aha moment where

22:36

you go, yeah, what we've got is right. We're

22:38

on the money here and the investigation is going to progress.

22:41

So that was probably one of the standouts where we actually had

22:44

that confirmation that what we've been told

22:46

was right. And from there the investigation

22:48

progressed.

22:50

The investigation showed that the company

22:52

was putting part of each contract on the books

22:55

and part of it was cash.

22:58

Often the cash was paid to the employee

23:00

by a different company and the onus

23:03

was on the employee to have an ABN

23:05

number and paid the tax themselves.

23:08

Scott found that the employees

23:11

weren't always told this and most

23:13

wouldn't have done it even if they'd known

23:15

how to.

23:16

That cash regime was pushed out to others

23:19

and all the onus was put onto those entities

23:22

to fulfill the requirements. I

23:24

would suggest that they would have

23:26

passed that onto the individual. So, well, you

23:29

need to have your own ABN, you need to have

23:31

this, but there's no certified

23:33

or no signature on any of the

23:35

documents that would allude to that to say,

23:38

yes, I'm taking full ownership. So it was a bit

23:40

of a multitude of information

23:42

that was coming through that would indicate that this

23:44

was going on. And it came to

23:47

our attention being that they were one of the main

23:49

companies that were overseeing security

23:51

of the waterfronts.

23:53

With all the information coming through, Matt

23:55

knew the team would rely on the use of a

23:58

criminal intelligence analyst to prove that the

23:59

process it.

24:25

A

24:29

criminal intelligence analyst is someone who not only collects

24:31

and analyse the data,

24:42

but

24:48

uses their analytical thought in

24:51

order to influence decision making

24:53

at operational and strategic

24:56

levels of the Australian Federal Police, but

24:58

also our national security

25:00

and law enforcement partners. They provide

25:03

a strategic forecast or an overview

25:05

of what's actually happening in the criminal environment

25:08

and don't just focus on the small tactical

25:10

level at the very basic investigations,

25:13

but they look at the holistic picture

25:15

of what's happening around Australia

25:17

and in Australia's interests offshore as well.

25:20

As an analyst, Tim processed

25:22

the incoming information and offered advice

25:25

on evidence-based data.

25:27

We attempt to provide direction to

25:30

the investigators as to maximising

25:33

evidentiary collection and also

25:36

the deployment of specialist police resources

25:39

in order to assist in that evidentiary collection

25:41

as well. We also provide advice

25:44

as to criminal networks

25:46

that are developing and opportunities

25:49

and vulnerabilities.

25:59

began with little knowledge of how the waterfront

26:02

worked.

26:03

I'm a graduate of a

26:05

criminology degree, and one

26:08

of the key topics within

26:10

one of our policing

26:13

units in the degree was the Painter and Dockers Union.

26:16

And that was probably the earliest

26:18

and only exposure I ever had

26:20

to this environment. As

26:22

the saying goes, getting thrown in the deep end

26:25

pretty much sums it up. I

26:27

had very little knowledge about how the

26:29

ports and the wharves and more

26:32

generally the waterfront operated. As

26:35

a junior intelligence officer, I was very

26:37

open to learning new things, and

26:40

I

26:41

took up the opportunity. A joint agency

26:43

appealed to me to learn something new

26:45

and develop my skills.

26:47

As part of their commitment to gather as much

26:49

information from as many sources as they

26:51

could, Scott and his colleagues went

26:53

down to the docks to talk to dock workers.

26:57

We were always plain closed to keep that friendly

26:59

approach, but we got down there

27:02

ad hoc whenever we could to just meet

27:04

and greet realistically. If you hear anything,

27:06

if you see anything, let us know. For

27:08

us, it was just get down, have a chat and see

27:10

what we could see at the same time. Word

27:13

of mouth got around and some people were happy to talk,

27:15

others weren't. Some were happy to talk off

27:17

record, others

27:19

were happy to do more.

27:21

A recurring theme among the dock workers

27:23

who were getting paid cash was that

27:26

they didn't question it.

27:28

Speaking to a lot of people throughout the investigation,

27:30

it was nothing shy

27:32

of, I worked for this company, I

27:35

got paid through this company, did you find

27:37

it weird? Absolutely. But

27:39

I never questioned it because I was getting cash in the background.

27:41

So, and whatever was happening

27:44

on the legitimate side, yeah, they'll get in the

27:46

hours, but it was all the extra work that was not

27:48

being reported. So yeah, it's

27:51

just one thing after the other kept unfolding

27:54

and led to the investigation being pushed

27:56

on.

27:57

Another concerning practice came to

27:59

life.

28:00

People would swap out shifts with others

28:03

who weren't necessarily qualified to

28:05

do the work.

28:06

Individuals were swapping out

28:08

for people that may or may not hold licenses

28:11

as well.

28:12

If someone comes in, may not

28:14

have any skill in that industry, may

28:17

not even have English as their primary language.

28:19

So issues were coming out of it

28:21

that we'd see became

28:24

twofold really, that whether people were

28:26

sort of swapping out and

28:27

falling asleep on shift or doing

28:30

triple shifts to be able to get more and more money,

28:33

it was just one thing after the other. We kept finding

28:36

and seeing and chatting and learning what was

28:38

going on.

28:39

The investigators soon saw a link between

28:41

security on the waterfront and security

28:44

with major sporting events.

28:46

It turned out that the same people were

28:48

often doing both the jobs.

28:50

The majority of the security work

28:53

that was done down at the waterfront, there was other

28:55

contracts held with other

28:58

organisations, sports or

29:00

otherwise, where the same member

29:02

would then do almost like a double

29:04

shift or come back later to a weekend

29:06

shift. Everything in and

29:09

around the security side was

29:11

on the books for what we saw and

29:13

then post that to

29:16

top up wages or whatever the reason

29:18

being was anything in a different

29:20

venue was going to be off the books

29:22

cash through a different subsidiary

29:24

company. That's the bare

29:27

bones of how it operated.

29:28

With security provided outside of the

29:31

waterfront, the payments were more likely

29:33

to be cash.

29:35

For security on the waterfront, there

29:37

were generally more legitimate on the books

29:39

payments,

29:40

perhaps because those doing the cash payments

29:43

knew there would be more government scrutiny

29:45

on the docks.

29:46

So for what we found, I think it was more of a case

29:49

of don't disrupt the

29:51

main bread and butter. We found over

29:53

time that the waterfront

29:56

side of the house was

29:58

fairly legitimate. We would have to sort of... to dive

30:00

into it a lot more as to

30:03

were those physical members attached on

30:05

that spreadsheet to say that they were the ones

30:08

working or was it just a name on a spreadsheet

30:11

and what skill set did they bring and did they have

30:13

the experience or did they even have

30:15

a registered security license? They're

30:17

the issues as you got more

30:19

and more into it but for the bare bones

30:22

it was always a case of most

30:24

of the contracted waterfronts

30:27

were the legitimate angle but

30:29

the second sort of the company was

30:32

anything outside of that is where the cash

30:35

top ups would help each person to

30:38

increase their wages.

30:40

The thing that kept investigators on their

30:42

toes was the speed at which the company

30:44

grew.

30:45

It's logical when you think about it.

30:48

The company could outbid all competitors

30:50

because of the cash payments and then

30:52

get contract after contract.

30:55

In order to fulfil them they needed more

30:57

and more people and more and more subsidiary

31:00

companies to help them.

31:02

How fast did this growth look like

31:04

to Scott? Oh overnight,

31:07

overnight without doubt the way it unfolded

31:09

was just

31:10

we've got this foot in the door, Victoria's

31:13

got the contract, New South Wales got a contract,

31:15

let's keep going, let's keep going. Call

31:17

it what you want whether it's power agreed,

31:19

whether it's status I don't

31:22

know, it's just it just grew and it grew

31:24

bigger than you can imagine.

31:26

Tim the criminal intelligence analyst

31:29

watched the investigation grow as

31:31

fast as the company expanded.

31:32

The nature

31:34

of the business was actually a nationwide

31:37

business with many offices in the major

31:39

capital cities

31:40

so

31:42

based on information

31:44

that was available to police we were able

31:46

to identify a number of individuals.

31:49

Our primary persons of interest

31:51

for the investigation we started

31:53

with two or three at the time but as

31:55

we started to collect information on

31:58

them we

31:58

were able to trio.

31:59

based on who else

32:02

may be of interest. And I guess once

32:04

we started to get a lay of the land as

32:07

to who was our main target,

32:09

we started to look at the next layer.

32:12

And we were looking at not just the

32:14

business itself, we're starting to look at

32:16

a subcontractor level,

32:18

who was our primary players there. And

32:20

we started to look at the information

32:22

that we had around them. And we started to get a clear

32:25

indicator of who was actually involved in

32:27

significant criminality. Well, it starts

32:29

off big. It sort of didn't at the same

32:32

time because we had a fair idea at the start

32:34

who we wanted to start looking at based on the

32:36

information that was available to police at the

32:38

time. And then we just expanded out

32:40

from there.

32:42

What they also found was a knowledge of

32:44

criminality. What we saw

32:46

through

32:47

this particular investigation was

32:49

criminality, or at least knowledge of

32:51

criminality all the way to the top, all the

32:53

way down to the lower level management

32:56

of the business. And I would say at

32:58

least many, but not all, of those

33:00

who were contracting to the business or

33:03

full-time employees to the business would

33:05

have had some knowledge as to what was

33:07

happening or at least some suspicion

33:10

or heard

33:11

rumours that these individuals were doing

33:13

the wrong thing. Once Operation

33:16

Boscobell began focusing on people

33:18

within the company, their behaviour became

33:20

predictable to Tim.

33:23

During the investigation, we received

33:25

a number of pieces of information from a number

33:27

of different sources, which

33:29

enabled us to actually get an idea

33:32

of what was happening.

33:33

From a financial perspective, we started

33:35

to see unusual financial activity, which

33:38

was repetitive. And we also

33:40

started to see activities where

33:43

individuals would perform particular

33:46

transactions and head to the same locations

33:49

on a regular basis. We were actually

33:52

able to predict where individuals

33:54

would be at what particular time,

33:56

almost down to the minute. Their behaviour

33:58

became so repetitive and negative. that

34:00

we were able to observe the cash handovers

34:03

in

34:04

envelopes, but also observe

34:07

their activities of undertaking the transactions and

34:09

be able to significantly collect evidence against

34:11

those individuals as well.

34:13

Vic Polman-Danat explains the

34:16

importance to the investigators of the information

34:18

that Tim processed. A

34:20

lot of what they do is profiling. So

34:23

profiling of the companies, of the

34:25

individuals. So they'll go and they'll dig

34:27

and they'll look for all the information

34:28

so whether it's information, intelligence,

34:31

evidence, they put all together into a package. Tim

34:34

produced

34:35

lots of those types of profiles, which

34:38

then allowed us to go and identify opportunities

34:40

to progress the investigation. So they will identify

34:43

opportunities

34:44

for investigators to then go and develop

34:47

to try and gather that evidence to put before

34:49

the court because of course there's a big difference between

34:52

intelligence

34:53

and evidence. Intelligence is what we go

34:55

and do our investigation around in

34:57

order to capture the evidence before the court.

35:00

With Tim analysing data coming

35:02

in and the team investigating widely,

35:05

the job of Operation Boscobell was

35:07

always about narrowing the case down to

35:09

a list of suspects.

35:11

Scott explains this natural progression.

35:15

There's a multitude of investigation

35:18

inquiries that you make and you start to see

35:20

the picture as to who's controlling

35:23

and then you see the middle management who's

35:25

controlling. It's almost like a stone in

35:27

the river. The more you throw in, the

35:30

bigger the ripples and therefore you keep going and

35:32

you get right down to each

35:35

and every individual security person and

35:37

or other contracted person. And

35:40

each of those ripples, you take a portion of that and you

35:42

say, you know what, let's look at this and

35:45

we'll see what comes of that. What we found

35:47

through Boscobell specifically, there's evidence

35:49

coming

35:50

from a lot of different factions and

35:52

we'd target the next level and then the next level and the next

35:54

level and the next level and we go, okay, well, predominant

35:57

control is coming from these particular...

35:59

people.

36:01

They're dictating, they're the ones saying we've

36:03

got to maintain

36:05

the cash flow, we've got to maintain the contracts,

36:07

we've got to maintain the subcontractors.

36:10

So with all that in mind, it narrowed

36:12

it down quite easily over time between

36:15

the information we're receiving, the evidence

36:17

we collected, and then from

36:19

there it was just a case of, well, let's

36:21

keep going on these particular people and

36:24

the entities and the organisations, that's

36:27

where it

36:28

became quite direct. We

36:30

knew what we're targeting, we knew how we were to target,

36:32

we

36:32

knew the evidence that we had to support each

36:35

of those main people involved

36:37

and the companies involved, and that's

36:40

pretty much how it just kept going from there.

36:43

Operation Boscobell needed the knowledge

36:45

of the team's financial experts to

36:47

interpret and explain the information

36:49

that was coming in.

36:51

We relied heavily on financial

36:54

analysts, ATO assistants

36:56

and a variety of other key players

36:59

to help because there

37:01

was a lot of stuff that we received and we were

37:03

saying, I'm not the experts in this, we need to go direct

37:05

to them to say, look, you need to explain

37:07

this for us to see what comes

37:10

of that. Is there an offence behind these

37:13

points of information? So for these

37:16

particular people, 100%, there was a case of we

37:19

found all this information and evidence

37:22

that became evidence purely on the information

37:24

that we received, the way it was explained,

37:26

and each of those stepping

37:29

stones that we walked through became a case

37:31

of, well, there is a fraud here. We're

37:33

not only looking at the company holistically

37:37

in its own income tax, but we're

37:39

looking at GST, we're looking at withholding, and

37:41

that was explained more and more as

37:44

the financial analysts went

37:46

through it all saying, look, from what we can see, this

37:48

is what's missing. And then we had

37:50

that supported by the ATO to say, look,

37:52

there's undeclared amounts for these

37:54

years, but we can get

37:57

that pushed up and

37:59

make sure that that's done. and once

38:01

that's done and we know what's in, then we can say

38:03

that this has not been adhered to. And all

38:06

these stepping stones therefore unfolded.

38:09

And we did find that there was GST fraud

38:11

and that we found that the tax

38:14

withheld wasn't being paid and the

38:16

stuff that wasn't

38:17

back-captured finally got back-captured, and

38:19

we found that there was income tax fraud for

38:22

the companies which were eventually

38:24

paid out, but all still stemmed

38:26

into a fraudulent offence of

38:28

some description. Once

38:31

we knew where that endgame

38:33

was, then we were able to home in

38:35

on specific offence types and

38:38

what charges were to be laid.

38:40

Another AFP officer who joined the

38:42

team was David.

38:44

He had been a member of Victoria Police

38:46

for 25 years, 20 of those

38:49

as a detective.

38:50

He joined the AFP in 2010.

38:54

So Scott was at

38:56

Boscoville before me, of course. He was there from

38:58

day one. I came

39:01

in maybe 12 months, I think, after

39:03

Scott had started. I

39:05

assumed that I was probably picked

39:08

for the role to go down there just

39:10

simply because of my investigative

39:13

experience. The principles of investigations

39:17

are pretty much the same. No matter what

39:19

crime type you might be

39:21

looking into, yes,

39:23

they can get a lot more specific when

39:26

you're talking financial crime, obviously. But

39:29

the general principles of an investigation

39:32

as a detective are pretty much

39:34

the same in any investigation. So

39:37

when I came on board, it was just a

39:40

big mixture of AFP

39:42

members, Victoria Police, the

39:45

Australian Taxation Office, the

39:47

ACIC were involved. It

39:49

was a good

39:51

multi-jurisdictional task

39:53

force. When David joined

39:56

Operation Boscoville, the team was

39:58

still narrowing down their target.

40:01

They still hadn't decided when I arrived

40:04

who the final

40:07

targets were going to be, because there were a lot.

40:10

So that was still in motion. There was

40:12

still a lot of book work going on,

40:14

spreadsheet work, the use

40:17

of forensic accountants.

40:20

That actually became very important in

40:22

this job. So there was still

40:24

a lot going on. It was very busy when I arrived.

40:26

It was a really good investigation. The main

40:29

security company had far-reaching

40:32

tentacles way beyond. Even though we were based

40:34

in Melbourne, Victoria, the

40:37

company's tentacles went Australia-wide.

40:40

So even that had its own complexities, because

40:42

we were flying into

40:44

other states as well and conducting investigations

40:47

in multiple jurisdictions.

40:50

Even though David jokes about the amount of spreadsheets

40:52

involved in the investigation, the reality

40:55

was that they were only their beginning.

40:58

No one likes to look at spreadsheets, obviously.

41:02

Was that part of my job

41:04

and Scotty's job? Yes, it was, clearly,

41:07

but not solely. I

41:09

think it was just getting down to that nitty-gritty

41:12

of

41:13

who were the people we're going to target and why,

41:16

and

41:17

exactly what is it that they're up

41:19

to, what's their lifestyle like, are

41:22

they living beyond their means. And

41:24

then to take it another step, taking witness statements

41:28

and preparing affidavits

41:30

and search warrants for the investigation. One

41:33

interview reminded the team that not everyone

41:35

accepted the corrupt practices.

41:38

One woman resisted, and it cost

41:40

her her job.

41:41

I can specifically remember taking

41:44

a very interesting statement from

41:47

a witness interstate.

41:50

She worked in the security industry, and once

41:54

this main company

41:56

got up and running, she

41:59

was approached. by someone

42:01

from that company telling

42:03

her that she would now have to accept cash and

42:07

that that would be handed to her on a fortnightly

42:09

basis in an envelope and she

42:12

just said that's not right and I want no

42:14

part of it. She was then basically

42:16

told if she didn't want to go along with

42:18

that scheme that

42:21

she'd have to find another job. She

42:23

knew it was wrong straight out. She was

42:25

told in no uncertain terms to keep her mouth shut.

42:28

This probably went on for a couple of months. She actually

42:30

said in the end I just want no part of this so

42:33

they got rid of her

42:34

and then

42:36

she and several other people in the same

42:38

position wrote a letter

42:40

to the AFP saying this

42:43

is what's happened to me and I think it should be

42:45

something that's looked at. So once we

42:47

found that information out that was then passed

42:50

on to the Boscobell Task Force we

42:52

then tracked her and others down and

42:55

approached them to ask if they'd like to make a statement

42:58

and most were on board and provided very good

43:00

statements. The team at Operation

43:02

Boscobell were keen to pinpoint the level

43:05

of threat and manipulation being used

43:07

against the workers.

43:09

Violence was never mentioned

43:12

by this particular person. She

43:14

told me that although

43:17

there was no violence associated

43:19

with what was going on with her particularly

43:23

she did feel threatened in the sense that

43:25

she was also warned not

43:27

to tell anyone else about it, don't speak about

43:29

this, don't let anyone else know that this is going

43:32

on but she was so

43:35

steadfast on saying no that

43:37

that is wrong,

43:39

this is right

43:41

and I'm sticking to my principles

43:44

and if it means I'm going to lose my job

43:46

so be it but I'm going

43:48

to make waves

43:50

and let the police know

43:53

what's going on here. It takes a brave

43:55

person to do that.

43:57

There wasn't an enormous amount of females

43:59

involved.

44:00

in the security industry. I think she also

44:02

felt pressure back then

44:04

as wanting to speak out. But

44:07

obviously we're glad she did and

44:09

others.

44:10

The investigators were impressed by the

44:12

act of courage it took to speak out

44:14

about it.

44:15

And once one came forward, others

44:17

quickly followed. That

44:20

statement that I took from that particular individual,

44:23

she was able to give us other

44:26

names of people in the industry

44:28

that were

44:29

being told the same thing. Basically,

44:32

take cash, we'll see you later.

44:34

And then it was just a matter of following up with those other people,

44:37

making an approach, and

44:39

asking whether they're willing to... Because it is one

44:41

thing to speak out,

44:43

but then to actually put it down on paper and

44:45

sign it,

44:46

knowing that once you sign a police statement

44:48

that you may have to give evidence in court

44:50

at some stage down the track.

44:53

So the statements were extremely helpful.

44:55

It was impossible to target everyone

44:57

involved from management to the person

45:00

on the street opening a wide envelope.

45:03

When Operation Boscobel narrowed the investigation

45:06

down, those in charge made

45:08

the decision.

45:10

In the end, there were six main

45:12

targets. Management

45:15

had to make a decision because

45:17

Boscobel was going on and a decision just

45:19

had to be made. Who are

45:21

we actually going to target

45:24

and charge? And then once

45:26

that decision was made, then it was full

45:29

steam ahead. And there was a very good reason

45:31

why those six people were

45:33

targeted. You had your general without a doubt,

45:36

and then you had five under him, and they

45:38

were the main players. So that's who we

45:40

went after.

45:41

Once that decision was made, the six

45:44

main players in the cash payment fraud

45:46

became the focus of the investigation.

45:49

I met all six of them at some

45:52

stage throughout the investigation. Once

45:54

the six were decided by management, then

45:58

management

45:59

made the decision.

45:59

made a decision as to which

46:02

Boscobel investigator would be

46:04

assigned. So there was an individual investigator

46:07

assigned to the six. I

46:10

was given person C and

46:12

he

46:13

was my entire focus

46:15

for the rest of the investigation.

46:17

One of the six suspects would regularly

46:20

go to the bank and take out huge amounts

46:22

of cash.

46:23

One of the six, I'd say out of

46:26

the six, if we had a scale from one being

46:28

the boss or the general down to the lowest,

46:30

number six. The guy that was number six,

46:33

we found out that

46:35

he was given the role by the general

46:38

to

46:39

attend a particular bank

46:41

in Carlton on a regular basis

46:45

and collect

46:48

large amounts of cash and

46:51

then once collected,

46:54

literally drive from that bank straight

46:57

to the main

47:00

security company's headquarters where

47:03

he would usually meet in the coffee

47:05

shop on the ground floor and exchange

47:07

the money. We knew what he was doing but we

47:09

didn't know how much but obviously then once

47:11

we conducted bank warrants,

47:14

we were then able to find out

47:16

exactly how much cash was being

47:18

transacted

47:20

and on some occasions,

47:22

the amount of cash was that big

47:26

that the bank manager

47:28

at the time made this guy

47:31

give him three days notice so he could

47:33

have the money ready in the bank because

47:35

the bank usually didn't hold that

47:38

amount. So we're talking a lot of money, certainly

47:41

hundreds and hundreds of thousands of dollars.

47:44

Just as the investigation was almost

47:46

finished gathering evidence on the six main

47:48

players, Operation Boscobell

47:50

received information that the company

47:52

was being sold.

47:55

Scott explains the impact on the

47:57

investigation.

47:59

the company was selling because what they

48:02

were doing was being targeted. It

48:04

was almost you've been found out,

48:06

realistically, that's what it came down to. There

48:09

possibly were other motivations in

48:11

selling the company, whether that was a financial

48:14

game, whether that was a career move,

48:16

who knows.

48:17

But for us, it wasn't a bad thing,

48:19

it wasn't a good thing, but I suppose realistically,

48:23

from a part of that sale, we were

48:25

able to look at saying, well, we've

48:28

identified fraudulent fences where

48:30

we're going to seize some financial money

48:32

in this sale. So good,

48:35

bad, however you perceive it, it was

48:37

a case of this is why it's unfolding.

48:40

That was what was the cards we were dealt with and we're

48:42

always aiming to move forward, trying

48:44

to look at how we're going to finish this job up. And

48:46

that almost forced our

48:48

hand a little bit in that sense because

48:51

with the sale, there was no contractor

48:54

held by those companies anymore. So we're forced to

48:56

just sort of look at finishing it up and sort of saying,

48:58

okay, well, this is what we can charge with now. This

49:00

is how we're going to proceed, pushed it

49:03

through and management agreed and said, yep,

49:05

this is where we're calling it. So you

49:07

move into the next stage and

49:09

move forward and lay the charges need be.

49:12

With the sale of the company, the original

49:14

asking price was $40 million.

49:18

But because of the Operation Boscobell

49:20

investigation, this figure was significantly

49:23

reduced. The

49:24

true cost of the fraud committed

49:27

by the company ended up being in the tens

49:29

of millions.

49:30

There was a case of it

49:33

started off with this is what we want

49:35

in that $40 million space. And

49:37

then once everything

49:39

was abolished through accountants, through

49:41

solicitors, it came to an ultimate

49:44

figure of 13 million or thereabouts.

49:47

And we looked at that and said, well, there's still an

49:49

amount owed to the ATO. There's still an amount

49:52

that hasn't been paid off to possible

49:55

other entities. So it rapidly

49:59

came right down around. that 13 million and

50:01

that's what we sort of looked at saying well there

50:04

is that fraud can we do this and

50:06

with the support of management that's the avenue

50:08

it went.

50:09

Once Operation Boscobell moved into

50:11

the arrest phase David would follow

50:14

his target, Person C, through

50:16

to the arrest, the search warrant, then

50:18

the interview.

50:20

We did search warrants on all their houses of course

50:22

and some of the businesses associated with

50:25

those people. So

50:28

Person C I, along

50:30

with several other members went and did a search

50:32

warrant on that guy's house. He

50:35

was arrested at the end of it, took

50:37

him back to the police station and then I conducted

50:39

the interview with that particular gentleman.

50:42

Given the huge investigation with

50:44

paperwork that would later fill a truck,

50:46

the investigators knew the case so thoroughly

50:49

they were well prepared for the interviews.

50:52

I think the most important thing prior

50:56

to conducting an interview with your

50:58

suspect

50:59

there needs to be a lot of pre-planning

51:01

going into an interview, knowing

51:04

all your points of proof, knowing what

51:07

you need to cover off in

51:09

order for that interview to be accepted by the court

51:12

and then ultimately

51:14

show on to the jury.

51:16

In a police interview the detective

51:18

has to read the demeanor of the suspect.

51:21

Those who've had interactions with police

51:23

before may interview differently

51:25

to those who haven't.

51:28

In my opinion it's pretty easy to tell

51:30

by their demeanor, the way they speak

51:32

to you, the answers they give you, whether

51:35

they've had interaction before. My

51:38

particular person

51:40

assigned to myself, he had

51:42

had dealings with the police before, but

51:46

on this particular occasion he was happy to talk.

51:49

But quite interestingly, which was I thought

51:52

unusual at the time, he was more

51:54

interested

51:56

in speaking about the other suspects.

51:58

more

52:01

so than himself and his

52:04

particular role. So,

52:07

yeah, it was an interesting interview. As

52:09

he sat opposite person C after

52:12

many months investigating him,

52:14

David was aware that he lived in a

52:16

normal house, despite the money

52:18

they knew he was making.

52:21

His only indulgence was to rent

52:23

a very, very nice car.

52:26

His house was nothing special at all.

52:28

Just an average house

52:31

in an average suburb.

52:32

Although I know that he was making good money

52:34

out of this whole scheme, about the only

52:36

thing that he had

52:39

to show for it was his car. He

52:42

did have a very, very nice car, which

52:45

didn't match what he was supposed to be

52:47

earning. In David's experience,

52:50

people making big money out of criminal

52:52

endeavours either really splurgered

52:55

or they really don't.

52:57

It's very interesting with these types of criminals

53:00

when it's financial

53:02

crime and trappings and I

53:05

think you just have two types. You've got the

53:07

type that will just

53:09

lash out, buy the expensive cars,

53:12

buy a beautiful big house, buy

53:15

a boat, buy a holiday house,

53:17

just go crazy, fancy

53:19

clothes, Rolex watch.

53:22

But then you've got the other types that although

53:25

they might be making a lot of money

53:27

illegally, they're

53:30

what I call personally smarter because they

53:32

don't go out and

53:34

buy all those things that I just mentioned so

53:36

that they fly under the radar.

53:39

After the arrests and interviews, the

53:41

six men were free to leave.

53:43

Scott explains that the investigators

53:46

did not oppose bail.

53:48

For this particular case, there was no contest

53:50

by us. It was a case of this is the

53:53

arrests that took place when

53:55

opposing bail. There were bail

53:57

conditions set to maintain...

53:59

addresses etc.

54:01

With the length of the investigation and the amount

54:04

of offenders, preparing the case for

54:06

court was a huge endeavour with

54:08

millions of pages of documentation.

54:11

Just how much evidence does it take

54:14

to get a conviction? The simplistic

54:16

answer is it

54:18

would be good to have a lot. There are so

54:20

many different working parts to this and

54:23

it's all on here's all the information

54:26

but we've just got to review it all. There's

54:28

property seized from search warrants, there's

54:30

information from other organisations,

54:32

there's financial banking information,

54:35

there's people that are fresh into

54:38

looking at that information so you'd had

54:40

multiple financial analysts, you've

54:42

got people that are new to the Trident

54:45

task force that have come on board to help.

54:47

It could be two people as we found

54:50

right through to 20 people.

54:52

When you go to arrest you have that

54:54

court deadline so that means you've got

54:56

to meet a brief handout and

54:58

that gives all defence members

55:00

the opportunity to read the information and

55:02

digest it, come up with a defence

55:05

and then put that towards the next court

55:07

date. Realistically for myself

55:10

and one other it was just a case

55:12

of get in get

55:14

it done. We've got deadlines working

55:16

to all hours of the night, weekends, whatever

55:18

it took to get it done. We met

55:20

most of those deadlines I think on one

55:23

or two occasions we had to seek extension because

55:25

we had multiple financial analysts

55:28

involved and if it

55:30

wasn't us delaying the court process it was

55:32

defence and that came back to

55:34

we need to set up an

55:37

array of computer

55:39

systems for them to go through the electronic

55:41

data and we're talking multitudes

55:45

of terabytes

55:46

for information that was absorbed and

55:49

by

55:50

the time we even looked at it it was a case

55:52

of this is going to take months and months

55:54

to get through searching

55:56

through the databases of company software

55:59

individuals. accounts and all sorts

56:01

of information to find what

56:03

we were looking for to really put the extra

56:07

bit of evidence together to say this has now

56:09

made the story complete.

56:11

For Scott and David, it was the most

56:13

evidence they had ever compiled for a case.

56:16

And because of the six offenders, the

56:19

huge briefs of evidence had to be copied

56:21

over and over.

56:23

I think Scotty and I probably hold the record

56:26

for the most

56:27

trips to a printer's office ever. Clearly,

56:31

once we charged these six people, we

56:34

had to prepare a brief of evidence individually

56:38

for each one because they all had different

56:40

roles to play.

56:42

But then you've got to do multiple copies because

56:45

your suspect needs a copy, his

56:47

lawyer needs a copy, the court

56:50

needs two copies, and

56:52

then you've got the original copy which stays with

56:54

the case officer. I

56:56

never found out what the printing bill was

56:59

in the end for this case, but I'd

57:01

be very shocked.

57:03

I think when it finally came to the day

57:06

when Scott and I went around serving

57:09

all the copies of the briefs on all those people

57:11

I just mentioned, we literally

57:13

had to hire a truck.

57:15

With such a wealth of evidence against

57:17

them from years of investigation, did

57:20

the six-man plead guilty once the case

57:22

made it to court?

57:23

Long story yes, when it came down to

57:25

the sale of the company changing of charges,

57:28

yes, so income tax fraud,

57:30

the flip of it was

57:32

early plea and reduced

57:35

or a different result possibly,

57:38

but yeah, so the guilty pleas came

57:40

through eventually through defence

57:43

into the court system and made way to

57:45

completion.

57:46

A guilty plea carries a sentence reduction,

57:49

but despite any penalties the court might

57:52

hand out in the case of huge financial

57:54

crime,

57:55

the true penalty to the offenders was

57:57

in the tens of millions of dollars they lost.

58:00

in the sale of their company.

58:02

Some were actually sentenced. Others

58:05

received suspended sentence plus fine or

58:08

suspended sentence.

58:10

For this circumstance, most of them

58:12

were suspended sentence with fine

58:14

and should anything occur again down the track,

58:17

would likely to be remanded and jail

58:19

time.

58:21

Tim explains that not all penalties

58:23

for this crime type are obvious.

58:26

If we look at it from a holistic perspective

58:28

and not just whether someone is going

58:30

to serve a prison sentence or get a slap

58:32

on the wrist or anything like that, police

58:34

in particular, AFP and our partners, tend to

58:37

go for the hip pockets. And

58:39

that's for our criminal assets and the confiscation

58:41

task force. We use our best

58:44

abilities in order to obtain criminally

58:47

obtained finances and hurt them where

58:49

it hurts the most. And that is their hip pocket. And especially

58:51

when we start to look at the greed that

58:54

some of these managers were actually showing, the

58:56

disregard they had for their employees,

58:58

when you start taking away their funds or their

59:00

sources of income, you see them start

59:02

to collapse because ultimately, the

59:05

life as they know it is starting to end.

59:07

From a director's perspective or high

59:10

level management perspective, if this company

59:12

was to continue to operate, they then

59:14

have that inability to obtain

59:17

serious work contracts or tenders because

59:19

it hurts their business reputation as

59:21

well. Anyone involved from lower level

59:23

management all the way down to the bottom, if

59:25

they put on their resume that they had worked for

59:28

that particular company, that will hurt their reputation

59:30

as well, I would argue.

59:32

For Scott, he knows that for the workers

59:35

who are now being paid correctly, the

59:37

true benefit of the work he and the team

59:39

at Boscobel did, may not be

59:41

seen for another 40 years, when

59:44

the accrued benefits of working on the books

59:46

finally pay off.

59:48

And that's a key point. Someone who may

59:51

have half of their super put into that and

59:54

think the rest is there and

59:56

knocks on the door to say, OK, where's my pension?

59:59

OK, but that's... That's all you've got. That's a big

1:00:01

problem. Absolutely huge problem. And

1:00:04

again, it still comes back to government because what

1:00:06

does that person do? They have to go onto a pension,

1:00:08

so it's government funded. So they're

1:00:11

all the issues that cascade upwards eventually

1:00:13

at some point.

1:00:15

Criminal intelligence analyst Tim

1:00:17

believes that despite the best efforts of

1:00:19

law enforcement, crime on the waterfront

1:00:21

will never stop.

1:00:23

It just changes with the time. And

1:00:25

people will always find ways to exploit

1:00:28

the vulnerabilities on the wharves.

1:00:30

That's why the work of the AFP and

1:00:32

their multi-agency task forces is

1:00:35

so vital.

1:00:36

I don't think there's ever an

1:00:39

ability to eradicate something, but

1:00:41

I think it's best to have an understanding of what

1:00:43

our vulnerabilities are and how

1:00:46

best to risk mitigate those circumstances

1:00:48

in those environments.

1:00:50

With the way the criminal landscape

1:00:53

is happening now, with the nature of transnational

1:00:56

organised crime, whether that be

1:00:58

drug importations, illicit firearms

1:01:00

imports and the illicit tobacco

1:01:03

importations as well, we start to

1:01:05

expect that the criminal networks will

1:01:07

use every potential vulnerability

1:01:10

at their disposal

1:01:11

in order to help their cause. And

1:01:14

to have the

1:01:16

waterfront posed as a significant

1:01:18

threat, it's always going to be a measure

1:01:20

that we need to have optics over. And

1:01:22

it's something that's, I

1:01:25

guess, will always be a vulnerability to Australia.

1:01:28

David believes that Operation Boscobell

1:01:31

was one of the best examples of what

1:01:33

a multi-jurisdictional task force can

1:01:35

do.

1:01:36

But he also appreciated how much he

1:01:38

learnt from the others in the team.

1:01:41

I genuinely believe that multi-jurisdictional

1:01:44

task forces are

1:01:46

probably going to reach a better outcome.

1:01:49

Boscobell was a perfect example of that.

1:01:51

It wasn't Scott or myself

1:01:54

or the AFP that succeeded.

1:01:58

It was all of those things.

1:01:59

organisations working

1:02:02

closely together and when I mean closely

1:02:04

I don't mean you make a phone call to the

1:02:07

ATO or make a phone call to the

1:02:09

ACIC,

1:02:10

we were all sitting side by side

1:02:13

and that in itself was fantastic. I

1:02:15

personally learnt a

1:02:17

hell of a lot more sitting beside

1:02:20

people from other organisations because you don't

1:02:22

normally get that close

1:02:24

with them you know so that

1:02:26

was a huge benefit. It was something that I really

1:02:28

enjoyed.

1:02:35

If you are interested in learning more about

1:02:38

how the AFP works to protect our waterfront

1:02:40

and how Matt, Scott, David and Tim

1:02:43

investigated this case visit

1:02:45

afp.gov.au.

1:02:48

The

1:02:50

AFP is all about protecting Australians

1:02:52

and Australia's way of life.

1:02:55

Stay tuned for our next installment of

1:02:57

Crime Interrupted as we take you behind

1:02:59

the scenes of a case of online scammers

1:03:02

who were able to hack into systems to steal

1:03:04

millions of dollars in superannuation.

1:03:23

you