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The Feds Take Big Tech to Court

The Feds Take Big Tech to Court

Released Saturday, 30th September 2023
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The Feds Take Big Tech to Court

The Feds Take Big Tech to Court

The Feds Take Big Tech to Court

The Feds Take Big Tech to Court

Saturday, 30th September 2023
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Episode Transcript

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0:00

Hey, I'm Ryan Reynolds. At Mint Mobile, we

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0:35

All right,

0:38

welcome to Deconstructed. I'm Ryan

0:40

Grim. Earlier this week, the FTC,

0:43

joined by 17 state attorneys

0:45

general, launched a landmark suit against

0:48

Amazon. Meanwhile, the Department of Justice is

0:50

in its third, heading into its fourth week in a

0:52

trial against Google.

0:54

Might be the biggest moment for antitrust in

0:57

decades. Today, I'm joined by Matt Stoller,

0:59

Director of Research at the American Economic

1:01

Liberties Project, and also Amanda

1:03

Lewis, who's a partner at the law firm of Cuneo,

1:06

Gilbert, and Laduca. She's also co-founder

1:09

of what's called the Responsible Online Commerce

1:11

Coalition, which represents third-party

1:13

sellers and others operating on

1:15

Amazon. Amanda and Matt, thank

1:18

you so much for joining me. Thanks

1:19

for having me. Thank you. Great to be here.

1:22

Amanda, let me start with you. Can you talk a little bit

1:24

about what is in this

1:26

Amazon lawsuit? And were

1:29

there elements of it that pleasantly surprised

1:31

you or that you were disappointed in? What is

1:34

the FTC taking on when they're taking

1:36

on Amazon this time?

1:37

Right. So I was

1:40

really, really pleased with the complaint.

1:43

This is something

1:45

that the situation with Amazon

1:48

and the anti-competitive conduct that

1:51

the company has been engaged in, and in particular,

1:53

with respect to third-party sellers

1:56

and companies that rely

1:58

on the platform.

1:59

for their entire economic livelihood is something

2:02

that the company will absolutely need it to be held accountable

2:05

for. The other really important

2:07

thing here that is very center

2:10

in the component is the

2:12

effect of the anti-competitive pandas,

2:14

not just on these other businesses, which

2:17

is critical and is important, but

2:19

also the effect on consumers. And

2:22

so while it seems like

2:25

Amazon is offering the lowest

2:27

prices to consumers, in a

2:30

sense, you have basically the invisible

2:33

hand of Amazon that is setting

2:35

prices at an

2:37

artificially high level because

2:40

they don't allow sellers to

2:42

offer their products on any computing

2:45

per sense for a

2:47

lower price.

2:48

And if they do so, they

2:51

get punished. I saw something in the complaint

2:53

about the buy button and the kind of exploitation

2:55

of that. So what does it look like? How

2:58

does Amazon kind of discipline third

3:00

party sellers? So

3:01

this used to be in black and white

3:04

in the context. You need to agree

3:07

that if you wanted to sell on Amazon,

3:09

you had to agree not to offer a lower price

3:12

elsewhere. The way that Amazon

3:14

enforces its pricing

3:16

power, if they know, is

3:19

if you're an Amazon seller

3:21

and they find

3:23

Amazon trash, sell the prices on

3:26

other retailers and other channels,

3:29

if they find that your

3:31

product is available for a lower price,

3:34

somewhere else, they do with

3:36

called Gailbox Suppression.

3:39

And that's what you're talking about with the baby's kitten.

3:42

And so then every day when maybe

3:45

not every day, but for people who shop

3:47

on Amazon regularly, when

3:50

you search for a product, there will come up

3:52

a featured offer. And

3:55

if you are not that featured offer or

3:57

showing up high on the list.

3:59

of searching those, you

4:02

basically don't exist. And

4:05

so the connection here is that if

4:07

Amazon signs that you have

4:09

offered your product or your product is available

4:11

for a lower post elsewhere,

4:14

you cannot get the buy

4:16

box.

4:17

And it's almost like you don't exist. And

4:21

so you're punished for offering a lower

4:23

price to consumers.

4:24

I wanna come back in a second to how this also hurts consumers.

4:27

But Matt, can you talk a little bit about how

4:29

the Google trial has been unfolding and how the

4:33

fight against Google fits into this

4:36

overall framework?

4:37

Yeah, so we're in a really interesting

4:39

moment. There's a basic view, I think,

4:42

since the financial crisis of 2008 that

4:45

we have too big to fail

4:47

institutions that exist sort of across the economy.

4:49

And these are not just in the banking system, but they're

4:52

in everything from seeds and chemicals to

4:54

airlines to search engines to online shopping.

4:57

The terms and conditions by which we buy and sell

4:59

things are set by a small number of

5:01

people in corporate headquarters. And

5:04

there are multiple important antitrust

5:06

suits that are happening as a result of that.

5:08

One of them is just filed the suite, the Amazon suit, which

5:10

is largely about how Amazon surreptitiously

5:12

inflates prices in ways that consumers don't necessarily

5:15

see but are very real nonetheless.

5:18

But there are also a number of

5:20

cases against Google which

5:22

is the gateway to the internet and how Google manipulates

5:25

and controls our access to

5:28

the web to serve itself. So

5:31

that case was not filed this week.

5:34

That case was filed in 2020, actually under the

5:36

Trump administration. The investigation

5:38

started in 2019 and

5:40

it is now actually in trial. So I think we're

5:43

in the third week or fourth week of trial where

5:45

the government is trying to prove that Google

5:48

is a monopoly, that it has 90, 95% of the search

5:50

markets, search

5:53

ads market, and that it is illegally maintaining

5:55

that monopoly by thwarting rivals that

5:57

wanna come into the market and offer...

5:59

a different search engine

6:02

or arrival service. And

6:05

the case, I mean, interest

6:08

cases are weird because you have a judge and the judge

6:10

is the, they make all the procedural determinations,

6:13

but they also decide usually their

6:15

bench trials, which means that you don't have a jury. Not

6:17

always the case, but usually it's the case.

6:19

And so you're just guessing how this random

6:21

person is thinking about it. But

6:24

in terms of the actual evidence that the government

6:26

has put forward, it seems like

6:29

it's going pretty well. So the basic

6:31

claim from the government is that Google

6:34

has 90% of the search market, not

6:36

because they are the best product, but

6:39

because anywhere where you might access

6:41

a rival search engine, when you, most

6:44

people start to use a search engine

6:46

when they buy their phone or they buy a computer

6:48

and they launch their browser and they just search

6:50

for something. And then a search engine just pops

6:53

up that they start using and they don't think

6:55

about it. And that is what's called a default and

6:58

Google pays the

7:00

most important partner is Apple, but it

7:02

pays Samsung, Verizon, Mozilla,

7:05

like it owns Android, which is a lot of, a

7:07

lot of cell phones use the Android operating system.

7:09

It pays billions and billions of dollars to make sure

7:11

that it is the default search engine

7:14

at all of those places. And the goal

7:16

that Google has in doing that is to make

7:19

sure that rivals can't get

7:22

access to customers and can't

7:24

get access to the data that customers generate.

7:27

And that data is very important because you

7:30

know, that's what makes a search

7:32

engine better. And so there's all this evidence

7:34

coming out showing that Microsoft was

7:36

willing to pay a lot of money to get Bing

7:38

to be the default and Apple wouldn't

7:40

consider it. Or Apple was considering starting

7:43

its own search engine, but it was just making so

7:45

much money from Google that it decided that

7:47

Apple decided not to, or there are, there are startups.

7:50

There's a startup called branch, which made

7:52

a kind of a search, a search

7:54

product, but let you search your phone and all

7:56

your apps for stuff. And Samsung

7:58

wanted to embed branch. in its own phones

8:01

because they thought, oh, this is a neat product. And

8:04

it's not a direct rival of general

8:06

search, but it could kind of

8:08

get there. And Google

8:10

said to Samsung, you cannot embed

8:13

branch in your phone because

8:15

it's a violation of our contract, which says that

8:18

essentially Google is the exclusive provider

8:20

of search services. So this was called monopoly

8:23

maintenance, and it's illegal. And

8:25

then if the judge accepts

8:28

that Google is, you know, that this behavior

8:30

is intended to thwart competition. So

8:33

this is the biggest is very similar to what Microsoft

8:35

was doing in the 1990s. Microsoft was,

8:38

was, you know, that they were trying to destroy

8:40

a rival browser producer Netscape. They

8:42

were also trying to avoid and send

8:44

microsystems from putting middleware

8:47

tools into, into the market.

8:49

And the idea there was that Microsoft

8:51

knew that if you could, if you, if

8:54

the Netscape could put a browser on top

8:56

of an operating system, and ultimately, if

8:58

they were able to do that, they could displace Microsoft

9:01

windows and Microsoft didn't want to do what didn't

9:03

want that to happen. It was a monopoly maintenance case. And

9:05

Microsoft lost, lost

9:08

that case. But because what the judge

9:10

determined, and what an appeals court

9:12

upheld is that they were thwarting competition,

9:14

and that this was, this was unlawful.

9:17

And that's, that's basically the same thing that Google is doing here.

9:20

From a consumer perspective, it does just

9:22

kind of feel that Google

9:24

has gotten worse, just from search perspective,

9:27

like in the last couple of years. And

9:29

I don't have anything to back that up. Just my own

9:31

like, it just doesn't seem like it's getting

9:34

better. You know, we did, we actually did some polling

9:36

that is, that is like about 40% of the public does

9:38

think they've noticed there are more ads, it's gotten

9:40

worse. Like, most people, you

9:43

know, 50% of the public is like, no, you know,

9:45

we, Google's really good. But 40% is a substantial

9:47

number, right? Like there's a lot of people, a lot of people, you

9:49

know, it's higher than I would have thought. But

9:52

like, clearly, there's a market for a different search engine.

9:54

And actually, 60% of people said

9:56

in that poll, that if Apple

9:58

came out with a search engine, they would

9:59

try it, right? So there is demand

10:02

for something different. So Amanda,

10:05

what are the consumer implications that

10:07

you were talking about for Amazon's

10:10

behavior? Because a lot of people think, well, too

10:13

bad that they are destroying

10:15

all of these third-party sellers, but as long as prices

10:18

stay low and things are okay

10:20

for me, I'm not so concerned. But what

10:22

are you seeing on the consumer side?

10:25

Right. So first,

10:27

it's really important to

10:29

think about the fact that third-party sellers

10:33

are people. So I think of

10:35

the third-party sellers as somewhat

10:37

of

10:38

like a digital main street.

10:40

So these people are like

10:42

your neighborhood,

10:43

neighborhood stationery store,

10:45

or various businesses,

10:48

your neighbors, your families. So

10:50

just because it's a link that shows up

10:52

on the page, on

10:54

Amazon, when you go to buy something,

10:56

doesn't mean that these aren't real people with

10:59

real

10:59

businesses and real employees that depend

11:01

on

11:01

them. Yeah.

11:04

And in 2016 or 2017, a friend of mine and

11:06

I launched a little tiny publishing house that we called

11:09

Strongarm Press to try to kind of fill a

11:11

void that we thought there was a room

11:13

for kind of progressive books that were kind

11:15

of short and punchy. And we were

11:20

doing biographies of Trump cabinet officials

11:22

and things like that. And we launched

11:25

a couple of best sellers. It was metrically

11:28

a success, but Amazon basically

11:30

walked away with all of the revenue

11:33

and the publishing house sort

11:35

of still exists, but not really because it's

11:38

just a volunteer effort at

11:40

this point because they

11:43

owned everything. They owned the kind of the

11:45

publishing entities, the tools, the

11:47

selling, the printing, the distribution,

11:50

and they just decided what they would take and they decided they

11:52

were going to take everything. So yes,

11:57

as a third party seller, I'll just

11:59

put my bias out.

11:59

out there that, yeah, I witnessed it firsthand.

12:02

But sorry, go ahead, Amanda. Yeah.

12:04

So, so 100% on that. And

12:06

that's another part of the case that we could talk about in

12:08

a little bit, which are the fees, the

12:10

increasing fees and extraction,

12:13

squeezing

12:13

of sellers

12:15

that's an anabonded.

12:16

But for consumers, let

12:18

me just give you an example. There

12:21

are a few examples that I've heard about firsthand

12:23

from third party sellers.

12:26

And so, in one example,

12:29

someone has a product,

12:32

they're selling it on Amazon. They're

12:35

also selling it at a major online

12:38

paint retailer. The pet

12:40

retailer

12:41

just has to be able

12:44

to see relationships with the business retailer.

12:47

We have been to Amazon since the

12:50

third party for lower cost

12:52

to purchase the baby. And

12:54

now start losing souls.

12:56

Well, thousands of dollars of souls,

12:59

right, every day. So what do

13:01

they say? They go back to the

13:03

pet retailer, the online store,

13:05

and they say, please, please,

13:07

this is my date. You have

13:10

to keep, basically, then you have to keep the

13:12

price of my product, hey, or

13:14

I can't hold all of them.

13:18

And so then, well,

13:21

so repeatedly these two decisions can go

13:23

in. But the online

13:25

pet store says,

13:27

well, not my bad one. And

13:30

the ultimate result is then

13:33

usually, or sometimes at least, the third party

13:35

seller has to actually

13:36

pull their product from

13:38

anywhere outside of Amazon

13:41

because they can't control the pricing

13:43

in these other replays. Because

13:46

of the fear that that product is going

13:48

to be offered for a lower price elsewhere and

13:50

then they're going to get punished by Amazon,

13:54

then it all becomes self-reinforcing.

13:56

And you see a

13:57

trend here that then you can only get

13:59

that product on Amazon. And that's,

14:02

that's under NSSR, the

14:06

ultimate price increase is,

14:09

is where you can't ask that

14:11

thing,

14:12

where a store shuts down or

14:14

a product is not available somewhere.

14:17

So that's

14:19

how, like, strained the situation is.

14:21

And so Matt, back in 2017,

14:23

I think it was Lena Kahn, who's now FTC

14:26

chair, published this kind of landmark

14:28

or published a law

14:31

review article about Amazon that became

14:33

something of a phenom. Now, just six

14:35

years later, here she is in

14:37

court against Amazon. What

14:39

is the relationship between the arguments that she

14:41

made there and in this case?

14:45

So that paper, she wrote, that paper was about

14:47

how Amazon acquired its market power. And

14:49

it did it through something called predatory pricing,

14:51

which is to say charged

14:53

below cost to drive its rivals out of

14:55

the market. That was used

14:57

to be illegal. What the

15:00

paper, Kahn's paper said is no

15:02

longer illegal. Therefore you have companies like

15:05

Amazon. Well, why would you charge lower

15:07

than like, why would you intentionally lose money to acquire

15:09

the market to, you know, obviously, because

15:11

later on in different ways, you're

15:13

going to raise prices

15:16

to

15:17

make the money back. Right. And

15:20

predatory pricing was made almost

15:22

unenforceable. And it's

15:25

still the Supreme Court made it almost unenforceable.

15:28

This case is six years later and

15:31

Amazon is now a monopoly and

15:34

they are raising prices. And so

15:36

this case is not about how Amazon

15:39

acquired its monopoly. This case is about how

15:41

Amazon is maintaining and

15:43

then exploiting its monopoly. So

15:47

one way to understand it is Amazon Prime is

15:49

essentially a scam. Right.

15:51

That's, you know, you don't see that. But

15:54

what is going on here is that like most

15:57

of the 60 percent of the products sold on Amazon,

15:59

when you click on the. Amazon, you want to buy something sold

16:01

by, you know, a third party, right? And

16:03

then Amazon charges those third parties that

16:05

about 50% of their revenue to list

16:08

on Amazon for their logistics and everything

16:10

like that to sell on Amazon, you have to pay one out of every $2.

16:12

And then, and

16:16

then Amazon takes that money and

16:18

pays for quote, unquote, free shipping. They

16:20

also pay for Amazon, you know, the

16:23

Amazon Prime, like video services, Twitch,

16:25

audio, like, oh, that's about 130, $140 billion that they're charging to. And

16:30

then Amazon, like, you know, they're like, okay, well,

16:32

if you have to charge, you know, 10 bucks on Amazon, but you know,

16:34

you could charge six bucks elsewhere. Why isn't the

16:36

web full of ads being like, buy cheaper on, you

16:39

know, Walmart or buy cheaper direct or

16:41

for this widget you want? Well,

16:56

the reason is because Amazon, as Amanda was saying,

16:58

has these anti discounting measures and it says if you

17:01

can sell on Amazon for our high price,

17:04

which includes quote unquote, free shipping, although nothing

17:06

really is free, there's no such things as free lunch, or

17:10

you can sell off of

17:12

Amazon. And if you sell off of Amazon,

17:14

that's 60, 70, 80% of the customers are never gonna, they're not

17:16

gonna see you. Because most people shop on Amazon, they're not

17:18

gonna see you. Because

17:21

most people shop on Amazon. So that's,

17:24

that's essentially the argument of this case.

17:26

The paper from from Khan

17:29

said it was about predatory pricing,

17:31

predatory pricing is not an element here. However,

17:34

the paper also talked about this

17:36

thing called vertical integration, which is basically a company,

17:39

owning a bunch of different lines of business, and then

17:41

integrating them in a way that disadvantages

17:44

rivals. And it is something that is going on here. Because

17:46

the way that Amazon raises its prices is

17:49

by doing things like saying, all right,

17:51

if you want to get access to Amazon

17:54

customers, you have to use our logistics

17:56

service fulfillment by Amazon and that costs

17:58

a bunch of money. Oh, and by the way, You

18:00

also have to advertise on Amazon and they

18:02

get about 30 billion dollars through advertising

18:05

And so what the net effect is as

18:07

a consumer, you know You you put batteries

18:09

into Amazon and most of the links that you see

18:12

are sponsored links Although you can't really

18:14

tell because sponsored is written in really or

18:16

really small font and those are often more expensive

18:18

or worse quality But from the

18:21

from the the perspective of the seller, you know as

18:23

you put it all the revenue or all

18:26

the margin is being taken by Amazon and That

18:28

is a function of vertical integration. So so

18:31

it is in part drawn from

18:34

Khan's paper It's mostly

18:36

the kind of new things that Amazon

18:38

has been doing to exploit the

18:40

monopoly that that that Khan Described

18:43

how they acquired so I don't know if that

18:45

makes sense But it's you know But I

18:47

think there's also there's also one other

18:50

element here when you're talking about like that paper

18:52

and the relationship to the case You

18:55

know Lena Khan is very important person, right?

18:57

She's the chair of the felt trade Commission but

19:00

the Federal Trade Commission and 17 states

19:02

brought this case This is not

19:04

like Lena Khan wrote a complaint and

19:06

brought the case. This is it. This is three commissioners

19:09

Alvaro badoya Becca Kelly slaughter

19:12

and Lena Khan voted out this complaint which was

19:14

written by probably Dozens

19:16

of people who were involved in the investigation And

19:19

then there were 17 state attorneys general and

19:22

all their staff and they all had to agree

19:24

on a case to bring And so that's what

19:26

this is. This is not about one person.

19:28

This is about an argument

19:32

How we run our society and should

19:34

it be run should pricing in terms and

19:36

and worker salaries and all the rest of it be set

19:39

By a small group of people in Seattle

19:42

over the whole online retail sector and then

19:44

you know Google for search and

19:46

Walmart and airlines and ticket master

19:48

and so on and so forth or should it be

19:50

done through a competitive open market

19:53

and Public rules and that's so

19:55

that that's the relationship the paper and then

19:57

kind of behind that the ideological debate over

19:59

that paper is the case.

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21:10

Amanda,

21:12

this isn't the first pressure that's been applied to

21:15

Amazon. How have they

21:18

adapted to the kind

21:21

of political efforts to investigate

21:23

them and rein them

21:24

in before?

21:26

Right. You're absolutely correct.

21:29

While I was at the Federal Trade Commission as

21:31

a self-attorney, I was on detail to

21:33

Congress, to the House Judiciary Committee.

21:36

I was a counsel due to me when

21:38

Lena Kahn was our counsel

21:41

on the subcommittee. And we worked with

21:44

Dave Bond,

21:44

who was the chief counsel, and several

21:47

other people on the committee to

21:49

conduct a digital market

21:52

investigation. And that was

21:54

focused on Amazon, Google,

21:57

Facebook,

21:57

and Apple.

21:59

So, so Amazon has

22:03

a focus of that investigation

22:05

and I have

22:07

to say they stood out as one of the

22:11

least cooperative companies of all four.

22:14

So they don't respond well to scrutiny.

22:16

They're not really cooperative. This

22:18

was alluded to in

22:21

the complaints as well that

22:23

it seems like the company

22:26

is very comfortable.

22:29

In the case of this is a committee investigation,

22:32

there was actually a perjury referral for

22:35

one of Amazon's executives that testified

22:38

before Congress

22:39

and misled Congress. What

22:42

was the upshot of that?

22:43

Is that still alive? So

22:46

once a perjury

22:48

referral does to the

22:51

Department of Justice and

22:53

it was also a bipartisan referral, then

22:56

it's up to the Department of Justice whether they want

22:58

to pursue it.

23:00

There is a fairly high standard

23:03

for proving perjury and

23:07

I don't have any insight into what happened after

23:10

we sent that over, but I

23:12

imagine. DOJ sucks.

23:15

Let's be honest, like DOJ skiddies. I

23:18

mean, no, I mean like it's

23:20

true. Like the government is not functional except for

23:22

the antitrust agencies. Like it's

23:24

embarrassing and why is there all this

23:26

fraud? Why is there all this corporate

23:29

crime? Like it's because I

23:31

love the antitrust, what the interest and forces are doing,

23:34

but like the rest of the government is not

23:36

functional. One of the things in this complaint is

23:38

they were lying to the FTC. They were lying to the FTC

23:40

a few years ago in a case

23:43

that FTC brought on Amazon Prime

23:45

and deceptive advertising. We

23:48

have a lawlessness problem in this country with regards

23:51

to large corporations and like we need

23:53

somebody to put some damn handcuffs on someone and

23:55

like the FTC can't do it. They have, they

23:58

don't

23:58

have criminal authority and they don't.

23:59

perjury complaints and the anti-trust division doesn't

24:02

handle criminal complaints on they

24:04

handle criminal interest complaints but not things like

24:06

perjury like we have a real problem with the rule of

24:08

law and I mean like I'm gonna I'm gonna you

24:10

know I'm the biggest cheerleader of like anti-trust

24:12

cases but we have a problem with other

24:14

areas of the department of justice in other parts of the

24:17

government I don't know if the judges would accept

24:19

a perjury claim like this I don't know if congress

24:21

would but but

24:24

but like

24:24

certainly Amazon executives would notice

24:27

if they actually got some damn handcuffs so

24:30

that I mean I don't mean I want to go on a rant

24:32

because like I'm really mad about this

24:34

but like we have a problem with the rule of law and like

24:36

it can't we have to we have to do more than

24:38

just what the FTC and DOJ are doing

24:41

the anti-trust division are doing well even even

24:43

in the case of Google that's

24:46

in trial right now you've

24:48

had this

24:49

remarkable kind

24:52

of bizarrely unfolding situation

24:54

where you do finally have the DOJ

24:56

taking on right major company at the same

24:58

time there's a there's a strange

25:01

amount of respect on display that that a typical

25:04

defendant would not get from a typical prosecutor

25:07

uh Google has been able to

25:09

muzzle most of this trial can you talk Mac

25:11

you talk a little bit about why we haven't heard a

25:13

lot about it yeah I mean Google has been saying

25:15

I mean you saw this you know Amanda can probably

25:17

talk about the redactions in the Amazon complaint but in Google

25:20

in the Google trial

25:21

you know there's a judge named Amit Mehta

25:23

right who is that's the judge who's over

25:26

over seeing it and he said

25:28

very explicitly like I'm just a judge

25:30

I'm not a business person and I'm going to defer to you guys

25:33

on talking to Google on what

25:35

kind of information is competitively sensitive and

25:38

make sure that I don't want to hurt your business which

25:40

is you know might sound reasonable if

25:43

you're just like a guy but if you're a judge that's

25:45

crazy like that's a real problem because these trials

25:47

are supposed to be a

25:49

public right Google gets

25:51

better privacy you know they get to

25:54

they they get more protection

25:57

from a judge over their just

26:00

normal business behavior

26:02

than like a sexual assault

26:05

victim would get in a court, right? Like

26:07

it's totally insane. They get to hide,

26:09

like everyone knows Apple

26:11

pays Google huge amounts of money

26:13

for the default search engine placement,

26:16

right? Whether it's 12 billion or 8 billion or 20 billion,

26:18

we don't know the exact number, but we know

26:20

there's a number. And like it's always

26:22

redacted. And that's totally insane. Like

26:24

that's crazy. We, why is that?

26:27

Why are these numbers just redacted? And so

26:29

the judge is deferential, but so

26:31

is the DOJ. The DOJ trial team

26:33

is like, well, you know, we don't

26:35

want to, like, they're not like

26:37

pushing particularly hard for public access to

26:40

these numbers. And this is something that has to change.

26:42

Fortunately, like a number of newspapers

26:44

have done stories we've been pushing for it. And

26:47

the judge is now actually, it's funny, the DOJ

26:49

and the judge are kind of blaming each other for like things

26:52

that are in closed session or hiding things. And

26:54

so they've actually started to hear the criticism and

26:57

the judge was like, look, the CEO

26:59

of Microsoft is testifying on Monday. I

27:01

want as much of it to be in public as possible. So

27:03

it's like, I don't want to allege

27:05

bad faith here. I think the judge and the DOJ

27:07

didn't know that people were actually really interested in

27:10

this, but we do have this problem with like this

27:12

excessive deference to corporate

27:14

secrecy was very different than it was 25 years

27:17

ago with Microsoft. When it was front page news every

27:19

day, the judge unsealed that just the

27:21

trial, but over 100 depositions,

27:24

which are like the extra interviews you do with industry

27:26

participants outside of a trial, you

27:28

know, there were 20 hours of videotaped

27:32

deposition of Bill Gates that were what

27:35

you can watch on YouTube, because the judge unsealed

27:37

it like these, the public record is super

27:39

important here. And we're not getting enough

27:41

of a public record in the Google trial. But

27:44

hopefully, well, because we haven't done a monopolization

27:46

case, a big monopolization case 25 years, but

27:48

hopefully, like, the exposure of

27:51

the fact that it is super secretive,

27:53

and like, that's crazy, because it is, you know, apparently,

27:56

Google does care about its own privacy. But

27:59

like, it's crazy. And I

28:01

think people in the judiciary are actually hearing

28:03

that, and they may be

28:06

open to making things more public going

28:08

forward.

28:09

Amanda, how's the Amazon case look on that

28:11

front? Yeah. So

28:13

if we looked at the complaint, there are unfortunately

28:16

a significant number of redactions. My

28:20

understanding is that the ECC is within

28:22

a complete organization

28:24

to at least some

28:26

of the

28:32

redactions within, so I think it's

28:34

a little bit of a stay tuned on

28:36

that. And then we'll also have

28:39

to see the goods, as

28:42

in if we go with it. And

28:44

going back to what Matt said about how it's

28:46

a little bit crazy that you do have this one

28:49

individual with so much power deciding

28:53

who can see what the members,

28:56

what's the public and the media has

28:58

access to in the

29:01

historic and

29:04

really

29:05

important trials.

29:08

But it is a little

29:10

bit concerning that these decisions

29:13

are left to the whim of a single

29:17

person, a judge in

29:19

this case. One thing

29:21

that I wanted to point out is something

29:23

that's interesting and maybe not to pay

29:26

them with these things, it'll be fascinating

29:28

that with Amazon, is

29:30

they are very protective of their

29:32

own confidential

29:33

information. While

29:36

it comes to

29:37

third parties, maybe smaller

29:39

businesses

29:41

who

29:42

are having no choice but to participate

29:44

in these cases because

29:46

they've been subpoenaed,

29:48

when it comes to those people,

29:51

Amazon wants

29:53

the names of those people and the details

29:55

of their business to be public. And so

29:57

isn't that double standard interesting?

29:59

Sorry, I just want to say there's a sort of a funny story

30:02

when it went about like funny.

30:04

Ha ha, but more like funny with

30:07

WTF. Apple, which is essentially in

30:09

collusion with Google over over controlling the search

30:11

market. They actually pre briefed

30:14

reporters on what their executive

30:16

was going to say. And there's a bunch of stories,

30:18

you know, in one in the last couple of years, and while Strena wanted Bloomberg

30:21

wanted like, you know, here's what the Apple executive

30:23

is going to testify to. And then they demanded

30:25

that the testimony be sealed. Right

30:28

in close. So it was like it was like there were these articles about

30:30

what he was gonna say and then it was all closed session. I

30:33

mean, I may or may not have said that even. Yeah, I mean, it's

30:35

like, it's like, what like

30:37

this is clown show. And I think, I

30:39

think like what, what is exciting

30:42

about this moment is that,

30:44

you know, I talked to,

30:45

I talked to a bunch of judges now, and,

30:48

and they're new to this,

30:49

right? They're new to antitrust. They're

30:51

new to public interest in some

30:54

of these kind of corporate litigation, like I've been to

30:56

some antitrust trials. And, you

30:59

know, I've been to some that are like well attended and others that

31:01

aren't. And they're there, those judges

31:03

are surprised that there's public interest in

31:05

these, in these trials, and they they act

31:08

differently when they realize, oh, the

31:10

public is interested in this stuff. So they're

31:13

like, oh, this is something I should learn about, I shouldn't just

31:15

be like dismiss it because, you

31:17

know, I learned these stupid theories in the 80s,

31:19

and I'm going to dismiss these things now. So there's

31:22

it's, it's it's kind of like a cool moment to see, like this wave of populist

31:24

anger turned into legal arguments, you know, the, the people,

31:26

the, the people of truth. And,

31:28

and, you know, the, the,

31:31

the, the, the work that Amanda enslaved

31:34

did investigating in Congress.

31:37

You know, that's turned into these legal arguments, which

31:39

are now hitting the courts and the judges are

31:41

being kind of bad, but like, they

31:44

don't know any better. And now they're kind of like learning.

31:46

And so this is like, it

31:48

looks kind of annoying and conspiratorial,

31:52

but it's actually like, I think it's actually like a there's

31:54

a lot of positive movement in the,

31:56

in the, in the courts.

31:59

To finish, I'm curious

32:01

for both of your takes on this, and

32:03

maybe Matt, you could go first. If

32:06

you're the judge here and

32:08

you can issue a ruling, like what does ... We

32:10

could do both Google

32:12

and Amazon. What

32:14

should happen to these companies? What would be

32:16

proper antitrust policy? Well,

32:18

first of all, if I were the judge in the Google case, I

32:21

would sanction Google and sanction

32:23

their lawyers really hard for destroying

32:25

documents who said they could do ... Talk

32:27

about antitrust with the chat,

32:30

the auto delete on. That's the CEO

32:32

of Google said that. I would really

32:35

go hard and say, this is unlawful

32:38

behavior. When

32:42

there is a litigation hold, you cannot

32:45

shred documents. You just can't do it.

32:47

Whether you're shredding documents digitally or not,

32:49

no, not okay.

32:54

That's very important to do that.

32:57

Procedurally, that's what I would do. I would also try

32:59

to make things as public as possible. I would say,

33:01

unless there's a good reason, the data, everything

33:04

is public. If you cannot

33:06

show me direct harm that unveiling

33:10

this will cause, it's public, including

33:12

depositions. Maybe

33:15

not for smaller companies who could fear retaliation

33:18

from dominant firms, but there's

33:22

really no reason that Google and Apple have

33:25

to claim trade secrets on anything but

33:27

very, very, very specific stuff that

33:29

might be trade secrets. That's just the

33:31

way that things work. Your

33:34

dirty laundry, just because it's embarrassing,

33:36

doesn't stay private. If

33:40

you don't want to be exposed in a trial,

33:43

don't violate the antitrust laws. That's

33:45

pretty ... That seems like ...

33:47

Or don't come close to it. That's

33:50

what I ... In terms of the ruling, I think you

33:52

could imagine, I think the evidence from

33:57

the government has been fairly persuasive.

34:00

but you also have to think not just the

34:02

evidence from the government that they've presented, but you

34:04

have to really weigh the evidence that's been deleted,

34:07

right? And so you have to like assume

34:10

that there's a lot more there that you would never

34:12

get to hear because it was destroyed. So the

34:15

actual destruction of the evidence should

34:17

be a strong factor in not

34:19

only

34:20

like assuming bad

34:23

faith from the company and assuming

34:25

law breaking. Like it's a little

34:28

bit like the income tax violation for

34:32

Al Capone, right? Like

34:35

when you delete the evidence, that's pretty compelling

34:37

evidence that you were doing something wrong. So I would take

34:39

that strongly into account. And then the remedy,

34:43

then you have to have a separate trial for the remedy, but

34:46

the same problems are gonna emerge with that trial, which

34:48

is the evidence has been deleted. And the

34:51

thing is is there is another trial in Virginia

34:54

against Google where Google has been

34:57

screwing around the same way they have in DC, but

35:00

the judge in Virginia is

35:02

not having it. She's just like, oh, you made a

35:04

discovery error. Fuck you,

35:06

fix it. And so Google literally had to hire

35:09

a thousand contract attorneys, which

35:11

was pretty really expensive to go through

35:13

millions of documents because they

35:16

screwed up in discovery. And the judge is

35:18

not like trying to split the baby. She's just like, you

35:20

screwed up, you fix it. And that's

35:22

the way that you actually have to deal with these big corporations.

35:25

Otherwise, they

35:27

have more information than everybody and they'll

35:29

just run circles around you. And Amanda,

35:32

when it comes to Amazon, if let's say Amazon does

35:34

get found guilty of this, what

35:36

should be the remedy?

35:38

That's a really good question and an important

35:40

one.

35:42

So if Amazon is, if the

35:44

conduct is found to violate antitrust

35:46

law,

35:47

you can either have a behavioral

35:50

remedy,

35:51

which basically says, Amazon,

35:55

you cannot have these person policies.

35:57

You cannot have these anti-discount. that

36:00

is, that's the very

36:02

minimum of what could be done.

36:09

In the other pain,

36:11

you can go further, the court does have the power to go much

36:13

further and actually

36:15

require like a best-deter. And so

36:18

there is actually just an inherent conflict

36:20

here as Annavon is going to run the first thing.

36:24

The town

36:24

also can see a lot

36:28

and false defense and

36:31

engaging in a way to ensure

36:33

a misconduct in a legal

36:36

context is

36:39

a system

36:40

of something. The

36:42

court is really likely to

36:44

get up to

36:47

order a break-up or a divestiture. But

36:50

I have to say, what's difficult is you

36:53

always end up with a prohibition on

36:55

the conduct.

36:57

If Annavon had a history of sort of safe

37:00

system, their anti-competitive

37:02

policy,

37:03

you also can think of it sort

37:05

of like a balloon. Like if Annavon has this

37:08

monopoly power and you sort of push

37:10

it and run for it, it's

37:13

going to just move somewhere else. They're

37:15

just going to find somewhere

37:16

else to

37:19

extract these monopoly rents and

37:21

to exercise this monopoly power that they have

37:24

in a way that's going to be harmful to

37:27

third-party sellers and consumers. So

37:29

I am someone

37:30

who probably not surprisingly

37:35

also thinks that we need compensation. So

37:39

regardless of what happens here, by the time

37:42

the remedy gets put into place, it's very important

37:43

that the case is brought, but

37:46

it will likely be ten years before

37:49

appeals are exhausted and there's actually

37:51

a remedy put into place. And so

37:53

I think we also need to really continue to post on

37:56

a legislative form.

37:57

Not that time, but that's particularly

37:59

important.

37:59

I think it's really

38:03

important to have a

38:05

dual track and be

38:08

pushing as hard as we can

38:10

on both sides to reduce these

38:12

critical problems with more

38:15

of this Amazon, Google,

38:17

Facebook, and Apple. We're

38:21

in a situation that we are

38:23

not seeing an anniversary,

38:25

or the first thing, and then we're in a situation where we're

38:27

not seeing a new opportunity to do this. So

38:30

for everyone who said, oh, we can't

38:33

change our laws and

38:35

we can't change our policies because

38:37

everything is working so great and we have the

38:40

best tech companies and the whole world and

38:42

we're the only ones who innovate. Well, look

38:44

around. That's

38:45

not true. That's not

38:47

the pieces.

38:50

We're trying to get our bodies coming

38:52

out of the way

38:55

to continue to build the most and

38:58

maintain our, maintain

39:00

any sense, so I'm going to wait there. Well, Amanda, thank

39:02

you. Matt, you've often got a last word.

39:05

Do you have any last words

39:07

you want to sum up on or you wrapped up? Yeah,

39:10

I mean, I think that, to

39:12

Amanda's point, I think we need, this has

39:15

been the most extraordinary month of antitrust

39:17

action in 50 years, right? The

39:20

DOJ has this Google trial. The

39:22

FTC brought a case

39:24

against Amazon. They

39:27

also brought a case against a

39:30

private equity healthcare roll-up in anesthesiologists

39:33

in Texas, which is upsetting everyone in private equity

39:35

and healthcare. They did something

39:37

important on pharmaceutical patents.

39:40

It's called the Orange Book, which is technocratic

39:42

but important. The DOJ brought

39:45

a huge case

39:47

on price fixing in the meat industry, right,

39:49

against poultry, pork,

39:52

and chicken. It's just the

39:54

amount of,

39:55

like,

39:56

the number of cases, the amount of activity

39:59

is just, I think,

41:59

Legal Review by David Brelo. Leonardo

42:02

Fireman transcribed this episode. Our

42:04

theme music was composed by Bart Warshaw. Roger

42:06

Hodge is the Intercept's editor-in-chief. And

42:09

I'm Ryan Grimm, DC Bureau Chief of the Intercept.

42:11

If you'd like to support our work, go to theintercept.com

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