Episode Transcript
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0:15
Pushkin from
0:19
Pushkin Industries. This is Deep Background,
0:22
the show where we explore the stories behind
0:24
the stories in the news. I'm Noah
0:27
Feldman. This week
0:29
we're going to look at North Korea, and in particular
0:32
the leader of North Korea, the fascinating
0:34
and eccentric Kim Jong Lun. Who
0:37
is Kim Jong Lun? We have
0:40
this tendency to think of him as a
0:42
kind of wild eyed, tyrant, ridiculous,
0:45
pot bellied, more or less a child
0:48
with an eccentric love of the Chicago
0:50
Bulls, a love that's led him straight into
0:52
the arms of the almost equally eccentric
0:55
Dennis Rodman. At the same time, we
0:57
also think of Kim Jong Lun as a dangerous guy.
1:00
Tortures his own citizens, killed
1:02
off his uncle, tortures Americans
1:04
who happened to find their way into North Korea,
1:07
and, perhaps most frighteningly, commands
1:09
a nuclear arsenal and increasingly
1:12
sophisticated missiles that have the
1:14
range to attack Japan and maybe even someday
1:17
the United States itself. Donald
1:19
Trump is also interested in Kim Jong Lun,
1:22
and in fact, it's hard to think of any other world
1:24
leader except possibly Vladimir Putin who's
1:26
gotten quite the amount of attention
1:28
that Donald Trump has given to Kim Jong
1:31
Un. On some level, Trump
1:33
treats Kim Jong Un like a dangerous
1:35
wild man. On the other hand, often
1:38
it sounds like our present has a lot of love
1:40
for Kim Jong Un. I just received a beautiful
1:43
letter from Kim Jong Un. I can't tell you
1:45
the letter, obviously, but it was a very her
1:47
still, very warm, very nice letter. I appreciate
1:49
it, and I'll say it again. I think
1:51
that North Korea has
1:54
tremendous potential. So
1:56
is Kim Jong un genuinely crazy?
1:59
Or is he crazy like a fox? Is
2:01
he so clever that he's managed actually
2:03
to play the president of the United States and
2:06
to use rational strategy to
2:08
gain control over his country, improve
2:10
the condition of his citizens, and advance
2:13
his interests on the world stage. These
2:15
are questions that Anna Fifield from The Washington
2:18
Post has been trying to make sense of in
2:20
her new book, The Great Successor
2:23
The Divinely Perfect Destiny of
2:25
Brilliant Comrade Kim Jong Un. To
2:28
understand the North Korean leader's rise to power, she
2:30
started by looking at his childhood. When
2:33
he was twelve years old, Kim
2:35
Jong Un moved to Berne, the capital
2:37
of Switzerland, where his older brother was already
2:40
studying at a private English
2:42
language school there. He joined him there.
2:45
And you know, he had traveled in
2:47
the outside world before. His mother had
2:49
taken him to Disneyland in Paris
2:51
and in Tokyo, you know, so he'd been
2:53
out in the world. But this is as Disneyland
2:55
as the world, true. Yeah,
2:58
maybe just as fake as Pyongyang, but a different
3:00
kind of fake. So
3:02
he moved there to Switzerland,
3:04
and this was a chance
3:06
for him to experience a little
3:08
bit of the world and kind of have more
3:11
freedom because ironically, you know, even
3:13
though he was this princeling
3:15
in North Korea, he was very isolated
3:18
there. He lived on these palatial
3:21
compounds. He didn't even
3:23
know his half siblings. He only had
3:25
his older brother and old
3:27
younger sister to play with. He
3:30
didn't go to school. He had tutors
3:34
exactly. He's like some you know, medici
3:36
from Yeah. So he when
3:39
he went to Switzerland, that was a chance for him
3:41
to have a little bit of normality. So
3:43
he went to school. He was
3:46
said to be the son of North Korean
3:48
diplomats. He went with his aunt
3:50
and uncle who they were posed as
3:53
his parents during that time. So,
3:55
yeah, he played basketball every
3:57
day after school, he sat
3:59
through classes. You know, he struggled to
4:01
learn German, but he did
4:04
eventually become conversant in it
4:06
and in English during that period,
4:09
and he was able to have something of
4:11
a normal life. And I actually
4:13
managed to track down his aunt and uncle
4:16
who looked after him during that period. They
4:19
defected to the United States in nineteen
4:21
ninety eight while they were looking after Kim Jong
4:23
un. You have a great theory about why they
4:25
did that. Tell us what that was. Yeah,
4:28
so when I met them, they
4:30
told me it was because partly
4:33
because they wanted to be a bridge between North
4:35
Korea and the United States, and
4:37
partly because that sounds so an
4:39
outside of that sounds absurd, and I take it you to
4:42
me, it also sounded absurd, and I didn't believe
4:44
it for a second. They
4:47
also said they were trying to get medical assistance
4:49
for Kim Jong UN's mother, who had been diagnosed
4:51
with breast cancer, And I think that's
4:54
really the truth. They saw that their linked
4:56
to the regime, there the reason that they
4:58
held this privileged status within the regime.
5:01
You know, had a terminal illness, so
5:03
mainly Kim Jong UN's mother. Kim Jong UN's mother
5:05
was not formally speaking married to Kim
5:07
Jong UN's father. No, she was a de facto
5:10
First Lady of North Korea and very powerful
5:12
within that regime. So I think
5:14
they saw that their privileged status
5:16
would not exist forever and they took
5:18
the opportunity to escape. So
5:20
they did, in the middle of the night, take
5:22
a taxi to the American embassy and
5:25
burn and ask for political
5:27
asylum, and they were granted it. So they've been living
5:29
here since nineteen ninety eight. Now
5:31
in your book, you protect their
5:34
identities, but you must
5:36
do an amazing job of sleuthing to turn
5:38
them up, and you do have some really
5:40
fascinating detail about what they're doing with
5:42
themselves. Yeah, that's right. So they
5:45
arrived in the United States, was very limited
5:47
English. They were
5:49
obviously the CIA wanted to talk to them
5:52
a lot at the beginning about what they
5:54
knew about the family and the regime. But
5:56
they quickly settled into life
5:58
in America. By
6:01
you know, they opened a dry cleaners, just like many
6:03
Korean immigrants to the United States,
6:06
and they quickly adapted to this life.
6:09
They were working incredibly hard, their
6:11
three children went into American
6:13
schools and flourished. You know, they have all
6:16
gone on and graduated from good colleges
6:18
and are living normal kind of Korean
6:20
immigrant to American
6:23
dream lives. I mean, I can hardly imagine
6:25
a better cover for people
6:28
fleeing North Korea than mixing
6:30
in with the community and opening a small business and working
6:33
hard at it. Are they financially
6:36
in need of doing that, do you think? I mean, they're
6:39
working hard as part of their cover. They're working
6:41
hard because they're broken. The only money they have is the money they're
6:43
making from their drakening business. They're
6:45
not broke, They are comfortable. They
6:47
told me that they received two hundred thousand dollars
6:49
from the CIA at the beginning to buy
6:52
a house, and that they have not
6:54
received any assistance since them. I mean, that's
6:56
what they told me. That's all I have. But
6:58
you know, that's incredible. I mean that could be the government's certainly
7:00
a cheap yeah, well yeah, And but they
7:02
have worked very hard and they have lived
7:05
their own American dream. And presumably,
7:09
although you're not disclosing their their identities,
7:12
prisumably their identities are known to North
7:14
Korean intelligence or do you think they're genuinely
7:17
missed or skipped out by by North
7:19
Korean intelligence. I imagine the
7:21
North Koreans would know about them,
7:24
but I don't know. I don't know if they know where they
7:26
are. Yeah, I mean, and that was a big
7:28
part of the reason that I went to great lengths to preserve
7:30
their anonymity and not disclose exactly
7:33
where they are, because yes, I do not
7:35
want the North Koreans to find them the right and
7:37
I hope you didn't even write it down
7:39
in your notes on any electronic device. I did
7:41
not in my brain all over which they can
7:43
get into. So here's
7:46
young Kim Jong un. You describe how he first
7:48
went to the American school, and then after his aunt
7:50
and uncle left, he actually switched
7:52
to a public school, to a
7:55
German speaking Swiss publics
7:57
or state school. You say he
7:59
had been isolated before and this was his chance to interact
8:01
with other kids, But in your telling and from
8:03
the people you spoke to, it sounds like he was actually a
8:05
pretty lonely kid, even in
8:08
Switzerland. Yeah. I think
8:10
that he found it quite frustrating not to
8:12
be able to communicate. So when he went
8:14
into this German speaking school after
8:17
his aunt and uncle had defected, and you
8:19
know that was probably the coats. To avoid
8:21
having to explain why his parents suddenly
8:24
changed overnight. He went
8:26
into a like a reception class
8:28
where he was learning
8:31
German, learning his lessons in very easy German
8:33
at the beginning to adjust, and then he went into
8:36
a normal classroom there, but
8:38
he did seem to have some difficulties
8:41
fitting in. Some former classmates
8:44
described how he would lash out. He would
8:46
kick their shins or spit at them and things
8:48
in frustration. But then he did
8:51
have a couple of good friends who
8:53
he did invite back to his house, and
8:55
one of them, who was the son of Portuguese immigrants,
8:58
Kim Jong actually told him. He showed him
9:00
a picture of Kim Jong il and said this is my father,
9:03
and this kid laughed and said, yeah, right, your
9:05
father as the leader of North Korea, and
9:07
Kim Jong wan just let it go. And of
9:09
course this classmate Frand
9:12
discovered some years later that Kim
9:14
Jong Gond really was telling the truth. So
9:17
it's not a normal childhood by
9:19
any measure, even though it may have been comparatively
9:21
more normal than it was for Kim Jong
9:24
Gond. Where he lived at home in North Korea. Yeah,
9:26
nothing about his childhood was anywhere
9:28
And what his aunt told me was that
9:31
from that day, his eighth birthday,
9:34
when he was unveiled as the
9:36
future leader of North Korea, it had
9:38
just become impossible for him
9:40
to live a normal life. And some of
9:42
the kids who knew him in Switzerland said
9:45
they did find it kind of weird and surprising
9:47
that when he was out on the basketball
9:50
court after school there would often
9:52
be this little lineup of Korean
9:54
adults sitting in deck chairs, cheering
9:57
and clapping excessively for him whenever
9:59
he scored a point in the
10:01
game. Can I actually ask about the basketball because
10:03
that will turn out to be very important later
10:05
on. His obsession with the Chicago
10:08
Bulls in particular, who were the
10:10
greatest team playing basketball at the time that he
10:12
was a kid, turned out to be relevant to his later
10:14
career and will come to that. But
10:16
why basketball, first of all, any
10:19
sense of why this archetypally
10:21
American sport, which admittedly was globalizing
10:24
very much in this period of time, in part through
10:26
the avenue of the Bulls and their great star
10:29
Michael Jordan. But he thought on why
10:31
he became obsessed with basketball and the
10:33
other question I'm dying to know is was
10:35
he any good at it? It's not that easy
10:37
to play basketball, especially if you're a short
10:40
and slightly round child. I mean,
10:42
there's loving it and then there's loving to play at Those aren't
10:44
exactly the same thing. Yeah, right, So it's
10:46
a funny story how he became interested and
10:48
there. When he was a child, he was really
10:50
obsessed with machines like planes
10:53
and anything with an engine. Boys,
10:56
Yeah, exactly. He loved to make
10:59
model airplanes and fly them and things like that.
11:01
But his mother became very concerned that
11:03
he was so obsessive about this. You
11:05
know, he would ring he's making a
11:07
model ship. He would ring an
11:10
actual naval engineer from
11:12
the North Korean People's Army to ask a
11:14
question at three o'clock in the morning. You know,
11:16
this is his sense of entitlement, and
11:19
the admiral would answer the
11:21
phone. Can be hard to read those instructions.
11:24
And so his mother was concerned that
11:26
he was becoming too obsessive with
11:28
this, and she wanted to get him into sport. And
11:31
there is this Korean belief, you
11:33
know, South Korean, North Korea, to this day
11:35
that if you play basketball you'll grow
11:37
taller, and so his mother
11:40
channeled him into basketball. He
11:43
actually is a few inches taller than his father
11:45
was, so you know, who knows, maybe I worked a little, but
11:47
so she encouraged this, and
11:50
Kim Jong un just basically switched from
11:52
one obsession to the other. So he
11:55
you know, he had all the gear, all the spalleding,
11:58
you know, official NBA balls. He
12:00
used to sleep with his basketball also,
12:02
like a lot of American kids, right, absolutely, I slap
12:05
was mine, you know what I mean? You know that
12:07
very characteristic of a kid who just really loved was a
12:09
sport. Yeah, that's right. And so then he would go
12:11
out at every opportunity he had
12:13
a basketball hope at
12:15
his apartment building where he was, he
12:18
would go out to the nearby high school
12:20
and play with other kids every single day after
12:22
school. Joe may have been his only form of social
12:24
interaction that wasn't mediated through
12:26
language. Yeah, exactly, no lang. I mean he
12:28
was trying. Yeah, but you don't
12:31
really need to speak language. Pay basketball. It enables
12:33
you to communicate in some way through that. That's what you
12:35
know, the NBA would like us to think of that, and I think that is
12:37
sort of true. Yeah, And so I think he was not
12:39
exceptionally good or even very good at
12:41
that time. He did love it, okay, I think
12:44
he was Okay, he wasn't unspeakably bad.
12:46
No, he put in a lot of practice at
12:48
that time, and he really is a
12:50
really serious fan, as we
12:52
would come to see later. You know, the
12:54
very first time that Dennis Rodman went
12:57
to North Korea, he took
12:59
three Harlem Globetrotters with him because
13:02
his people thought, you know, the Harlem
13:04
Globetrotters with all their on court antics
13:06
would be very entertaining and very
13:09
accessible for North Korean people. Kim
13:11
Jongan hated it. He wanted a serious
13:14
game. So the next time Dennis
13:16
Rodman went, he took these retired
13:18
all stars because Kim jong n wanted
13:21
a real, proper game to play
13:23
there. So he is really serious about this, and he
13:25
does follow it very closely. Say
13:27
something about the weird way by
13:30
which Dennis Rodman, of all of the
13:32
players of the Chicago
13:34
Bulls from the era where Kim Jongan was a kid
13:36
and a fan, ended up being the person
13:38
you mentioned in the book that the CIA
13:41
actually thought of sending
13:43
Dennis Rodman in the first place. I don't
13:45
know how you came across that that's a fascinating thing. I had
13:47
never read that anywhere else before, but that it
13:49
didn't work, and yet Rodman still ended
13:51
up going. How did that happen? Yeah, that's
13:54
right. So I think when Kim Jongan took
13:56
over, American intelligence
13:58
agents and you know, administration officials
14:00
saw an opportunity to try to engage
14:02
this new leader. So
14:05
the first wink actually knew about it,
14:07
though, was when Vice Media
14:09
took Dennis Rodman. They had initially
14:11
tried to convince Michael Jordan, but
14:14
for some reason he was not so keen on going
14:16
to North Korea. They got Dennis Rodman instead.
14:18
But this was down on his luck
14:21
and needed the money, exactly happy to go.
14:24
But this idea did
14:26
not originate with Vice. First
14:28
of all, the CIA had talked about
14:31
taking a Chicago ball or sending a Chicago
14:33
bull to North Korea, and they had settled
14:35
on Dennis Rodman as well, and for whatever reason,
14:38
that didn't work out. But at the same
14:40
time and the last years of the Obama in
14:42
the middle years actually of the Obama administration,
14:45
outside experts were going into the Oval
14:48
office and one of them actually suggested
14:50
that they take advantage of the Chicago
14:53
Bull fascination and try
14:55
to, you know, make a bridge that way.
14:57
So it didn't go anywhere that Obama, very
14:59
excellent basketball player, did
15:01
not appeal to for a long time. Yeah,
15:03
yeah, but it did not appeal to him at
15:05
that time. It took Dennis Rodman and Vice
15:07
to make that happen. Once you brought up
15:10
Vice and Dennis Rodman, I just have to
15:12
ask you about the surreal scenes
15:14
that you describe in your book on
15:16
the trip that Vice put together
15:19
at which Rodman went. None
15:21
of it sounds like ordinary journalism.
15:24
None of it makes Kim Jong un sound
15:26
like an ordinary head of state.
15:29
Tell me about how that happened and
15:32
about the weirdness that ensued. Yeah,
15:35
so VISs did come up with this idea
15:37
to take a Chicago Bull. They
15:40
got Rodman, and the North Koreans responded
15:43
without really knowing that Vice
15:46
News wasn't your standard media organization
15:48
at their time, but they had told
15:50
their leader that Dennis Rodman wanted to go,
15:53
and he accepted and off they went.
15:56
And yes, there was the basketball side
15:58
of things, but also there
16:00
was a lot of partying that went on during
16:02
these trips. So it sounds like everybody
16:05
was drunk or drugged out of their minds. Yeah.
16:07
In fact, you know, one stage during
16:10
the course of the evening on that Vice trip,
16:13
Dennis Rodman had to tell the Vice entourage,
16:15
you know, the Vice team, to tone it down
16:18
a little. They were so out of control. And one of them
16:20
said to me, you know, we knew things were bad when Dennis
16:22
Rodman was telling us to cool it. Yeah.
16:25
There was a lot of drinking. There
16:27
was karaoke. Apparently Kim
16:29
Jong un sang some James Brown get
16:32
on up during this
16:34
evening. One of the people who
16:36
was on the Vice team was playing the saxophone.
16:39
Kim Jong UN's uncle, uncle
16:41
Jong Song Tech, the one he would later have
16:44
executed, was there that night,
16:48
and there were a lot of quite brazen
16:50
toasts. I mean, Dennis Rodman stood
16:52
up and said something about how
16:55
Kim Jong UN's father and grandfather
16:58
had done some screwed up
17:00
things. I'll paraphrase there. Can I
17:02
see what says in your book your
17:05
father and grandfather did some fucked up shit he
17:08
did, and everybody was holding
17:10
their breath. And to get away
17:12
with saying that to the
17:15
leader of North Korea and walk away
17:17
cleanly, what I don't know is
17:19
how the Korean translated translated
17:21
that sentence you purely one would hope, I would
17:23
hope. Yeah, although you were saying that Kim jonglen
17:26
can speak English. Yeah, he seems
17:28
to be able to understand some English. Who we've
17:30
seen him when he was talking to Donald Trump. He seemed to be nodding
17:32
and getting the jokes first. I don't know how his
17:34
curse words are and whether he got that, but
17:37
anyway, early in one's education to
17:39
speak English on the basketball Yeah, yeah, you're
17:42
right. But anyway, once it was translated,
17:44
he laughed and everybody breathed
17:46
aside of relief, and on they continued.
17:49
So I think you know the story is of that
17:51
trip, and as well the vice film that they
17:54
made out of it contributed to a kind
17:56
of deepening of the perception that Kim
17:58
jongn was not the kind of person who was going to be able
18:00
to consolidate power and then actually
18:03
govern as essentially
18:06
a monarch, because once you've got
18:08
not one, not too but three rounds of
18:10
succession, you can call it a dictatorship,
18:13
but it has monarchic components.
18:15
And you make a great point in the book that
18:17
there's an imagined bloodline that
18:19
takes all of the Kim
18:22
Jong's family and takes them
18:24
back to a mythical birth on
18:26
Mount Pectu, which is a kind of site
18:29
of kings. So it really really
18:31
is monarchic, and I
18:34
guess I want to turn now to this question of
18:36
how he actually pulled it off and
18:39
surprised everybody. So
18:41
let me start by asking you whether
18:43
you think that it's to do
18:46
with Kim jongon's own personal
18:48
qualities ultimately that have enabled
18:50
him to consolidate power, or whether
18:52
it's really a product of a recognition
18:55
in the senior echelons of the regime,
18:58
not so senior as to be executed or assassinated,
19:00
but just below that
19:02
that the monarchy works better
19:04
with a figurehead at the top of it, and they're better
19:06
off keeping him than they would be with the
19:09
uncertainty and disorder that would follow
19:11
his removal. Yeah,
19:13
I think he has shown a
19:15
natural aptitude for this. There is a reason
19:18
why he was the son who was chosen
19:20
as the successor. There
19:23
weren't so many choices, no, but there
19:25
were three, and the third son should
19:27
have been the last choice, right, but he
19:30
rose to the top. You know, he
19:33
very shrewdly used
19:35
that North Korean brains trust the
19:37
people who had been supporting his
19:39
grandfather and then his father. You
19:42
know, if we look at the man who
19:44
walked around the hearse at his father's
19:46
funeral with Kim Jong On at the front
19:48
of the car, those
19:50
people had been propping up
19:52
this regime forever they
19:54
were They were the regime, and
19:57
Kim Jong iarn had their
19:59
support. They helped in the transition
20:01
process. They made sure that power
20:04
remained with him, and once
20:06
they had served their purpose, he got
20:08
rid of because these were the powerful
20:11
people who had their own
20:13
potential factions and power
20:15
bases and could theoretically
20:17
pose a challenge to him. So
20:20
there was the head of the Korean People's
20:22
Army had helped
20:24
Kim Jong An, had helped his father. He
20:27
was disappeared and never seen again. And
20:30
then we had the propaganda chief, the
20:32
guy who was in charge of perpetuating
20:34
all of this mythology about the bloodline
20:36
and the exceptional gun skills.
20:39
At the age of five, he also
20:41
disappeared from view, never seen again. Uncle
20:44
Jong Song Tech, who was close
20:46
to his older Kim Jongn's older
20:48
half brother Kim Jong nam, and who
20:50
had been very much in charge
20:52
of economic relations with China and
20:54
appears to have been kind of a reformist minded
20:57
person, very charismatic,
20:59
gregarious character. I've heard so many
21:01
stories about his drinking and his karaoke skills
21:04
and things. He had a really sizeable
21:07
power base. He is. He
21:10
doesn't just disappear from view. He
21:12
is hauled out of a politbureau
21:14
meeting very publicly. There's this long
21:17
dire tribe against him of like
21:19
Shakespearean kind of rhetoric,
21:22
calling him a thrice cursed treacherous
21:25
being, and then he has executed
21:28
a few days later. If
21:30
you are somebody powerful in that regime
21:32
and you see all of these other people humiliated
21:37
and executed in this way, you
21:39
are going to think twice about questioning this guy
21:41
and challenging this guy. So partly
21:43
it's through this fear and
21:47
Kim Jong uns showing that nobody is
21:49
safe, not even his own family members, that
21:51
he's been able to look after this
21:53
regime. But the other part of
21:55
it is that he has made sure that
21:58
the people around him, the people who keep him
22:00
in power, have become rich under
22:03
him. They are living a life much
22:06
better than ever before. They
22:08
have been able to use their positions
22:11
in a very corrupt way to earn a lot
22:13
of money on the side through business
22:15
dealings and you know,
22:17
making money during their travels. So
22:20
those people are living a better
22:22
life than ever before. So through
22:25
you, through loyalty, developing
22:27
this loyalty and keeping everybody fearful,
22:30
he's managed to keep it together. So you're
22:32
describing what sounds to me like a two track
22:34
strategy. The first track is
22:38
rely on the people who think they need you to
22:41
get into power and to consolidate your power,
22:43
and then one by one knock them
22:45
off. You call that the Richard the third strategy,
22:47
as long as you're being Shakespearean, Yeah, and
22:50
the good thing about that strategy is you knock off your
22:52
potential opponents. The risky thing
22:54
about that strategy, see Richard the third is
22:56
that you've knocked off your potential opponents, and
22:59
there's the danger that you won't have a base once
23:01
you've done that. And then that leads to the second
23:04
strategy that you're describing, which is actually
23:06
to improve the status of the
23:08
people who you are relying the
23:10
new people, as it were, the ones who were rising
23:12
by virtue of your position and who therefore
23:14
will owe what they have to you in particular,
23:17
and not to your father. How
23:20
has Kim Jong un gotten that
23:22
new rising class of elites to
23:25
be so much better off than they were
23:27
in the past. Yeah, he's allowed
23:29
a lot or tolerated a lot more kind of
23:32
market based activity. So
23:34
there's now a lot of trading that happens
23:36
between China and North Korea.
23:38
And if you are senior in the
23:40
regime and involved in any kind of
23:42
trade whatsoever, and so many
23:44
people are, Like all of these huge apartment
23:47
towers in North Korea
23:50
have been built, a lot of it through
23:52
military labor, but Chinese money
23:54
and Chinese investments, So they are selling
23:56
these contracts to Chinese
23:59
investors and taking
24:01
a cut on the side. So these people
24:03
have been able to earn
24:06
a lot of money. People
24:08
who are sent to or to earn money for
24:10
Kim Jong earn, and he has a whole special
24:13
unit setting up just to filling his coffers.
24:16
They have also been able
24:18
to enrich themselves on the
24:20
side. So because these people
24:22
have been allowed to be corrupt and
24:24
making their money, yeah, they
24:27
have more reason than ever
24:29
to be loyal to Kim Jong ear And they had this new
24:31
band of loyal people who would not enjoy
24:34
this privileged position. And these riches
24:37
if they were to defect to South Korea and drive
24:39
a taxi. So from what you're describing,
24:41
it sounds like he's created a one percent
24:44
via corruption. And to do that, there has
24:46
to be a part from which you can steal,
24:49
and the part is trade. Increased
24:51
economic activity and increased trade more
24:53
than existed previously. And
24:55
in your account, by allowing that relatively
24:58
small tranche of people to
25:00
get a bit of the pie as it comes into him,
25:02
I mean he may get the line share of it, but allowing
25:05
them to scrape off a certain amount and make
25:07
real money, he's built an elite
25:09
class that is loyal
25:12
to him in a way that looks
25:14
a bit like the model that
25:16
the senior ranks of the Chinese Communist
25:18
Party followed, not in the last
25:20
decade, but in two or three decades
25:23
before then, when China was just beginning
25:25
its market opening, when of
25:27
course, party senior party officials became
25:29
tremendously rich and created
25:31
an elite that then consolidated itself
25:33
and supported the government.
25:35
Do you think he's copying China
25:37
in that regard In some
25:40
respects, yes, but in some respects
25:42
no. I mean, I think he would like
25:45
some economic development and
25:48
that sense that life is getting
25:50
better, but he can't
25:52
have even Chinese style reform
25:55
and opening like even that is too risky
25:57
for him because the difference
25:59
there is that there is
26:01
a kind of jockeying for power within
26:04
the Chinese Communist Party. You
26:06
know, they not every leader
26:08
has been called Mao in China, right, There
26:10
is a competition,
26:13
and Kim Jong un cannot have that
26:15
kind of competition within the
26:17
ranks of North Korea because
26:20
it would be very hard for him
26:22
to say, or would have been very hard for him to
26:24
say that a twenty seven year old
26:26
marshall who's never spent a day in the military
26:29
and has no political experience is the best
26:31
guy for the job. But he could allow competition
26:33
for the second rank, as it were. I mean, if
26:35
he's treated more or less as a monarch, he
26:38
could allow among the elites some
26:40
jockeying for power in his regime by
26:43
do you do a good job, do you bring in money, do
26:45
you show loyalty to me? I mean, maybe he is
26:47
and there has been some changes there people. You
26:50
know, in the Communist Party ranks, people do rise
26:52
and fall there, and so we have seen a number of
26:54
people disappear from the Politburo people rising,
26:57
so he has tried to make his
26:59
own. Every place has politics, I mean, even
27:01
an authoritary and dictatorship has parted. North Korea
27:03
has hawks and doves, you know they do.
27:05
There is this, you know, he has to
27:07
manage that. Let's talk
27:10
now about his expansion of
27:12
market reforms more broadly, to
27:14
reach a larger and larger segment
27:16
of the population through gradual
27:18
marketization. That seems to
27:20
be in a way both the most brilliant
27:23
and also the most high risk aspect
27:25
of his policy, the attempt to sort of improve
27:27
the standards of living not just of a one percent but
27:30
of a growing entrepreneurial class. You're
27:33
in a country in North Korea where historically entrepreneurship
27:36
was completely prohibited and punished,
27:38
and if people did it on the sly, they
27:40
were very limited in what they could get away with. And
27:43
now there's been a gradual
27:45
but very meaningful opening of
27:48
entrepreneurial opportunities. Is
27:50
it working, Yes, it is
27:52
working to an extent. This
27:55
trend started after the famine at
27:57
the end of the nineteen nineties. Out of necessity,
28:00
people were like literally starving. Today,
28:02
the whole generation was malnourished and a shorter exactly
28:05
exactly. He brand damaged. Yeah, so that
28:08
was lerated at the time out of necessity,
28:11
but Kim jongn has allowed that to
28:13
expand under quite constrained
28:15
circumstances though. So now
28:17
there are markets. There are more than four hundred
28:19
and fifty marketplaces around
28:21
the country, more than double the number than when
28:23
he took over. Every major
28:25
city in town has one at least one,
28:28
and this has become the life. Kind of marketplaces
28:30
are you describing, Well, this is a thing that they've
28:32
become, you know, quite institutionalized.
28:35
There are huge buildings built by the state.
28:37
The state rents out the stalls. They take
28:40
may make money from the rent. They tax
28:42
the sales in there, so the state is really
28:44
enriching itself. And what's being sold
28:46
everything, Yeah, everything. Able to visit one, I have
28:49
not been allowed to visit one, but I've seen a lot of secret
28:51
footage from inside these markets and talk
28:53
to people about them. You know, there's
28:55
the daily necessity, So a lot of people
28:57
are selling food. There's rice that's
28:59
coming in. You can buy electronics
29:03
from China. You can buy rice cookers, and you
29:05
can buy glittery cell phone cases.
29:07
You can buy if you have the money and more and more
29:09
people do. You can buy everything, So
29:11
this is a way that people are able
29:14
to earn their own living
29:16
independent of the state. This is a huge
29:18
change in North Korea. I mean, it's giving
29:20
up on the core notion of self
29:23
reliance through radical
29:26
Marxian and communism exactly exactly.
29:28
I mean, even though they stick to that in their propaganda,
29:30
it's not happening in effect anymore.
29:33
But there are still constraints and people do
29:35
have to be kind of very careful not to run a foul
29:38
of the system, like if you are seen to
29:40
be living too large or you know, it's
29:43
not so much the authorities, you
29:45
don't have to worry about the authorities. But in a bigger risk
29:47
is that is jealousy. You know, where
29:49
once people in North Korea were equally
29:52
poor, now there are more
29:54
and more middle class people. There's more conspicuous
29:57
consumption, you know, and if your neighbor
29:59
sees you living too good at life, they
30:01
might rat on you and try and make
30:03
up something about you or tell people
30:05
that you are corrupt and then us
30:09
necessary feature of all inequality.
30:11
But inequality has turned out to be, for a
30:13
better or worse, a necessary feature of
30:15
all relatively marketized economies. Yeah,
30:18
but when you're told every day that you live in a socialist
30:20
paradise and that the leader is, you know, taking
30:22
great care of you, that can be even
30:25
more hard to stomach. I think I'm sure that's true.
30:27
China pulled it off, though. I mean, there in China you
30:29
still have the rhetoric of state socialism
30:32
even as you've got increasingly marketized economy,
30:35
and you've got it vastly greater
30:37
inequality than previously existed. Yeah, I mean.
30:39
And the reason I say that it is working in North
30:41
Korea and that people are now much more entrepreneurial
30:44
and aspirational is because Kim
30:46
Jong un hasn't really had to do anything
30:49
to allow this improvement.
30:51
You know, people have been able to
30:53
trade and earn their way to a better
30:55
standard of living. You know, sometimes
30:58
life is a little bit better, you
31:00
know, better than horrible, you know, slightly less
31:02
horrible. Sometimes it's a lot better,
31:04
depending on how successful these people are. But
31:07
he has been able to take all of the
31:09
credit for this. He's been able to say that under
31:12
his great leadership, people's lives are improving
31:14
without having to do very much at all. The
31:17
next challenge for him is how he
31:19
sustains that improvement. Because
31:21
I mean, one of the fascinating things I discovered
31:24
when I went to Switzerland and I leafed
31:26
through the curriculum from the
31:29
time that Kim john Lund was at school and burn
31:31
and all students in Switzerland learn
31:34
about the French Revolution. They learn
31:36
about rising expectations and
31:38
how you know those expectations going
31:41
unmet can lead to revolution. And
31:44
I wonder if he remembers those
31:46
lessons and now if he is thinking
31:48
about how he sustains the
31:51
sense of things getting better. And that is
31:53
why I conclude that he needs to press
31:55
ahead with economic development.
31:58
He needs to try to attract foreign investment.
32:00
He really needs to get rid of those American
32:03
led sanctions and allow trade
32:05
and money to flow unfettered, because
32:08
you know it will run out of steam. You're
32:10
describing somebody who has the perfect
32:12
training, as it were, for his job. You
32:14
know, maybe growing up part of the time in Switzerland
32:17
didn't teach him to eliminate his enemies.
32:19
Maybe he had to learn that by watching The Godfather
32:21
or just by watching his father do it. And he managed to do
32:23
that. But the marketized
32:26
reforms, the gradual marketized reforms,
32:28
sound very much like what one would expect
32:31
from someone who grew up in the West, who
32:33
saw the capitalism was delivering much
32:36
greater standard of living than anyone
32:38
in North Korea was experiencing, and
32:41
when he came to power, decided to open
32:43
things up. Not politically by any stretch of the
32:45
imagination, but economically. I
32:47
mean, is that what you're saying, that's connecting the dots.
32:50
No. I think that his time in Switzerland
32:53
taught him that if
32:55
he lived in a democracy, he'd
32:57
be in nobody. He'd just be another
33:00
kid struggling to get by. He wouldn't
33:02
be loved and adored at
33:05
every turn. You know that the Swiss
33:08
or the Western liberal democratic
33:10
model was not for him. I think it
33:12
showed him that he needed
33:14
to keep his bizarre family
33:16
personality cult intact if he was
33:18
going to continue to enjoy this
33:21
very privileged position at the top. But
33:23
does it have to Can I just push back a moment? I mean, someone
33:26
is raised to be a prince, he's told from an
33:28
early age that his destiny is to become a prince.
33:31
He does then does prince like things, you
33:33
know, succeeding to power, killing off his enemies.
33:36
Eventually we haven't talked about it, but killing off his
33:39
own brother in this spectacular
33:41
airport assassination. These
33:43
are all things that are in the script for a
33:46
prince. It doesn't require, I don't think,
33:48
for us to explain this behavior to think
33:50
that, you know, he saw, he saw
33:52
that he couldn't have made it into democracy. I mean, it's just
33:54
natural. If this is your destiny, you
33:57
proceed along this destiny.
34:00
Yeah, I mean, I think the bottom line is
34:02
that, especially since so many people,
34:05
including the President of the United States, since
34:07
we're coming to him, I said that he's
34:10
a rational or crazy in some way.
34:12
I mean, the conclusion that I very much draw is
34:14
that he has not. He has acted perfectly
34:17
rationally and in a calculated
34:20
manner. With all of this, with the
34:22
brutal executions, with the gradual
34:25
opening on the economic side, and the tolerance
34:28
of markets, all of the stuff
34:31
exactly, It makes perfect sense if
34:33
you are a totalitarian leader
34:35
whose primary goal is staying
34:37
in power. So your
34:40
rationalist. Kim Jong un has
34:42
his great interlocutor today in
34:44
Donald Trump, whom you just mentioned, and
34:47
I want to ask you about their dance. They're
34:49
in some very complex and intricate dance where
34:52
they're close and they're far, and they're close and
34:54
they're far. How rationally
34:56
do you think Kim Jong un has acted
34:58
in that engagement and how successful
35:01
do you read his efforts as having been, I
35:03
mean very successful. I think he's
35:06
been in the driver's seat the entire time, and
35:08
he's really figured out how to play Trump.
35:10
I mean, he knows how to push the president's buttons.
35:13
You know, the North Koreans have as
35:16
you know, the Chinese and the Japanese, on the South
35:18
Koreens, everybody, they've devoted a lot of
35:20
energy to try to figure out Donald
35:22
Trump. You know, they were so mystified
35:24
by all these tweets at the beginning and what
35:26
did this mean. But the
35:28
North Koreans, the people on the
35:30
top of the regime, they have read the
35:33
Art of the Deal. I've heard about
35:35
instances where North Korean officials
35:37
have quoted Donald Trump's tweets.
35:39
They have an encyclopedic knowledge of everything he
35:42
said. They're officials who have
35:44
read Fire and Fury, Michael
35:46
Wolf's account of inside the White House. So they
35:48
have really studied how to deal
35:51
with him and what he responds to. So
35:54
after Kim Jong n, you know, completed
35:56
as he said, his nuclear and
35:58
missile program and
36:01
was ready to turn to diplomacy.
36:04
He figured out how to flatter the president.
36:06
You know, all of these like beautiful love letters
36:09
that Donald Trump talks about, enormous
36:11
physically enormous love letters, you point out right,
36:13
not just you know, flowery flattery,
36:16
but physically enormous, like comedic sized
36:19
envelopes. He's sent a million dollar check from
36:21
publishers bearing exactly, but
36:23
Donald Trump responds to it. He shows everybody
36:26
who goes into the Oval office these letters
36:28
because he's so proud of it, and it's enabled
36:30
Kim Jong on. You know, look at that first summit in
36:32
Singapore, they agreed to almost
36:35
nothing. It was so vague, but Donald
36:37
Trump walked out explaining
36:39
away the human rights abuses of North
36:42
Korea, saying that you know, there are a lot of rough
36:44
places out there, you know, dismissing
36:47
what happened to Otto Wambiera as a way. You
36:49
know that that's what how they got back to
36:51
talks and things. And that's the
36:53
American who died after being in a
36:55
comma exactly, a healthy young man who left
36:57
North Korea brain dead. Through
37:00
this flattery, Kim Jong n
37:03
has managed to win over Donald Trump,
37:05
and you know, the style worked
37:08
without Jong Leon ever having
37:10
to get to the substance. Kim Jongon certainly
37:12
seems to have captured a lot of Trump
37:14
mind share. I think immediately
37:17
of something that you reported for the first time
37:19
in your book, namely that Kim Jong
37:21
Nam, his older brother who was assassinated,
37:23
had actually been in contact with the CIA,
37:27
And shortly after you reported
37:29
that in your book, Donald
37:31
Trump went public with the statement
37:33
that if it were under his auspices, he would
37:35
never have allowed this connection to
37:37
take place. I saw the information
37:40
about the CIA with respect to his
37:43
brother or half brother, and
37:45
I would tell him that would not happen under
37:48
my auspices. So there you have
37:51
the President United States responding to your book
37:54
specifically in reference to Kim
37:56
Jong Leon. Why do you think he's doing that? Is he trying
37:58
to defend him his friendship,
38:00
as it were, from the idea that he would mess
38:03
with Kim Jongon's older brother by
38:05
via the CIA. I cannot
38:07
explain Donald Trump's thanking on that. That
38:10
may not be part of your job, but if you fueled it,
38:13
so you have to say, oh, yeah, no, no, I mean you could
38:15
hear the Champagne corks popping in Pyongyang.
38:17
Right, The CIA agents call North
38:19
Korea the hardest of the hard
38:22
tasks. Right. They true for journalists
38:24
too, isn't it. I mean, when
38:26
you're North Korea correspond There is like almost
38:29
zero human intelligence on North Korea,
38:31
like in vast contrast to almost every other autocratic
38:34
regime around. So the fact that the
38:36
CIA had managed to recruit
38:38
Kim Jong Nam, somebody who,
38:40
though he didn't have contact with
38:43
his brother, still had good
38:45
contacts at the top of the regime.
38:47
He was still in close contact with senior
38:50
officials, that was a real
38:52
coup for them to have been able to get
38:54
any information from somebody
38:57
so senior and so well connected. So
39:00
for Donald Trump then to say that the
39:02
US would not try to gather this kind of intelligence
39:05
about a man who's threatening to
39:07
like send nuclear tipped missiles
39:10
to the Capitol or to the White House.
39:12
You know, can you imagine in
39:15
your account, Kim Jonguan is the dictator
39:17
who has everything. He's rational,
39:20
he's reforming, he's improving the standard
39:22
of living for his people. He need to do it more, but he's
39:24
doing it. And he's played the President
39:26
of the United States beautifully.
39:30
What's next for him, and
39:32
what's the succession plan beyond him if
39:34
any Yeah, I mean, I think now
39:36
he is getting into quite tricky
39:39
territory because the
39:41
economic side of it is challenging,
39:45
you know, to try to allow
39:48
more economic development without
39:50
allowing opening, without allowing more
39:52
damaging information coming into the country.
39:55
That's something that's going to be a real challenge
39:57
for him because as these
39:59
bags of rice and you know, solar
40:02
panels come across the border from North Korea,
40:04
so too do USB drives and SD
40:07
cards that contain movies
40:09
and dramas and music from the outside
40:12
world. Some opening is happening. You show that convincingly,
40:14
yes, So he has to balance that. But
40:17
he also has to try to balance
40:19
this diplomatic side. He's
40:22
managed so far to
40:24
string along Donald Trump. He also
40:26
has the South Korean president playing a
40:28
mediator role. But I think you know,
40:30
Kim Jong und does not want to go up his nuclear
40:32
weapons. There's no way he's going to feel secure
40:35
enough to do that anytime soon.
40:37
Just to push back on that, it would never be sensible
40:39
for him to give up his nuclear weapons. Giving them
40:42
up is an invitation to regime
40:44
change. Keeping them is a guaranteur of
40:46
regime such it would seem to me as
40:49
close to a truth of political
40:51
science as one could imagine that if
40:53
you've got nuclear weapons, you don't give
40:55
them up. Kim John was taking over in two
40:57
thousand and eleven as the Arab spring
41:00
was exploding. You know, he saw Mohamma
41:02
Gadaffi, who gave up his nuclear
41:05
capability and a deal with the United States,
41:07
dragged from a ditch, and you know that
41:10
must be burned in exactly,
41:12
burned in his brain. So now,
41:14
I mean, I think he does want to make
41:16
it look like he is willing to give up
41:19
something, and maybe he is willing to give up something,
41:21
some hardware. You know, all of
41:23
these missile launches and nuclear
41:26
tests have shown he has a lot of capability.
41:29
He's getting all the parts he needs. He can retain
41:32
the capability while looking like he's giving
41:34
up some ICBMs
41:36
and things there. So the
41:38
challenge for him now is to sustain
41:40
this, to make the US look like they
41:42
are getting something so that he can
41:44
get something in return. You know, he desperately
41:47
needs sanctions relief because
41:49
these sanctions have been hurting North Korea
41:51
like never before. How's
41:54
his health? His health is not great.
41:56
I mean look at him and the times he's been coming
41:58
out in Vladivostok in South
42:00
Korea in the DMZ there, he
42:03
is not a healthy man. He's a chain smoker.
42:05
He's struggling for breath, and this
42:08
is one of the most puzzling things to me, like, if
42:10
Kim Jong un is concerned about leading
42:12
for the rest of his natural life, he's
42:15
not doing much to take care of himself,
42:17
because if there's one thing that poses a risk to
42:19
him, it's his health. Thank
42:22
you very much, enam really super fascinating.
42:24
Thank you for that avenue and window into
42:26
the thought process of somebody who comes
42:28
across from your account as hitting
42:31
all the right notes. Thank you, No, it was my great
42:33
pleasure to be here. Talking
42:41
to Anna Fifield and reading her book really
42:43
made me deeply reconsider my instinct
42:46
to think of Kim Jong un as a bit of a
42:48
buffoon. She's made a
42:50
very convincing case to me that he's actually
42:52
deeply rational. That has major
42:54
consequences for how we think about our interactions
42:57
with North Korea going forward. A
42:59
rational actor is not to be addressed
43:02
by silly symbols like basketball
43:04
summits or oversized letters.
43:07
The fact that he uses those symbols doesn't
43:09
mean he takes them seriously. It just means
43:11
that he thinks that our president takes them seriously.
43:14
What we need to do if Kim Jong un is a
43:16
very careful, thoughtful dictatorial
43:18
leader is meet him
43:21
with the tools that influence the behavior
43:23
of dictators, that is strength
43:26
and incentives. Perhaps we
43:28
can give him the right set of interests
43:30
to encourage the development of his
43:32
own economy and gradually
43:35
slowly and cautiously lead
43:37
him towards some opening
43:40
so that the country that he runs
43:42
is no longer the brutal dictatorship that
43:44
it still remains to this day. Even
43:47
as we do that, though, we have to keep in mind
43:49
that he will be thinking about one thing, and one
43:51
thing only, the interests of Kim
43:53
Jong un. Deep
43:59
Background is brought to you by Pushkin Industries.
44:01
Our producer is Lydia Genecott, with engineering
44:03
by Jason Gambrell and Jason Rostkowski.
44:06
Our showrunner is Sophie mckibbon. Our
44:09
k is composed by Luis GERA special
44:11
thanks to the Pushkin Brass Malcolm Gladwell,
44:13
Jacob Weisberg and Mia Lobel. I'm
44:15
Noah Feldman. You can follow me on Twitter at
44:18
Noah R. Feldman. This is
44:20
deep background
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