2:07

You know , I think there are certainly elements

2:09

where I have some hope . You know

2:11

, I do think that a large

2:14

number of our elected officials at

2:16

state , local and federal levels

2:18

, and even in both parties , do

2:20

want to be good civil servants and

2:23

kind of work on behalf of constituents

2:25

and care about democracy and democratic

2:27

norms . But I think

2:30

that what worries me the most

2:32

right now and I kind of alluded to this before is

2:35

not that parties care strongly

2:37

about kind of differences in

2:39

tax policy or health care

2:41

policy or how we engage

2:43

with Russia , China or

2:45

other countries , but it's that election

2:48

integrity , fairness and the rule

2:50

of law have become

2:52

such partisan questions .

2:59

Welcome to Deep Dive with me , s

3:01

C Fettig . We in

3:04

the United States are inundated with

3:06

narratives about our broken politics . Here's

3:09

one Partisanship within

3:11

the electorate and political elites is

3:13

at an all-time high , obstructing our ability

3:15

to pass meaningful legislation and

3:18

confront some of the most critical issues facing the

3:20

country . That Republicans and

3:22

Democrats have staked out immovable

3:24

policy positions so diametrically

3:27

opposed to each other that there's no longer

3:29

any room for compromise . Any

3:31

policy positions outside of those held within

3:33

our own partisan tent are

3:35

seen as existential threats and

3:37

compromise is viewed as disloyal . Here's

3:41

another Redistricting has

3:43

been so consumed by gerrymandering that

3:46

there is no longer any room for competition

3:48

in our elections , and it allows politicians

3:50

to manufacture majorities , in fact super

3:53

majorities , in state legislatures

3:55

and in the United States House that

3:57

aren't representative of their actual vote share

3:59

. This in turn leads

4:02

to tyranny of the minority . Parties

4:04

that haven't won a majority of votes are

4:06

passing extremely consequential legislation

4:08

and policy that runs counter

4:11

to majority preference . Here's

4:13

another the primary voter

4:15

in both parties is becoming both more

4:17

extreme and more influential

4:20

in our American politics , and the

4:22

demands of the primary voter produce extreme

4:24

general election candidates in both parties

4:27

, but particularly the Republican party

4:29

, and this in turn leads

4:31

to implementation of policies that are further

4:33

and further away from the preferences

4:35

of the majority of the electorate , and it's

4:38

creating chaos in our public policy

4:40

, both domestic and foreign . Here's

4:42

still another . These things

4:45

taken together feed into increased

4:47

polarization within our electorate , creating

4:50

enemies of our neighbors and promoting violence

4:52

in our political and social lives and

4:55

, ultimately , is killing our American

4:57

democracy . I

4:59

, as much as anyone else , have been overwhelmed

5:02

by these narratives over the past decade or so

5:04

, and it all seems plausible that

5:06

gerrymandering is undermining democracy

5:08

and fueling authoritarianism , that

5:11

partisanship and polarization are creating

5:13

unbridgeable divides between two parties

5:15

that each represent roughly half

5:17

the country and full disclosure . I've

5:20

bought into it , but I'm open

5:22

to the fact that maybe I'm just caught up in a story

5:24

that facially makes sense , seems

5:26

completely reasonable , but isn't

5:29

necessarily supported by evidence or research

5:31

. So today I'm talking to Dr

5:33

Laurel Harbridge-Yong, associate

5:35

professor of political science at Northwestern

5:37

University . Her research

5:39

focuses on partisan conflict and polarization

5:42

and the state of bipartisanship in American

5:44

politics . Our

5:47

conversation today , aimed at helping to understand

5:49

the true influence of these things on our

5:51

politics and our democracy , is

5:53

informed by her research and her two most

5:55

recent books In 2015,

5:58

. her book i Bipartisanship , ead Policy

6:00

Agreement and Agenda Setting in the House of Representatives

6:02

and in 202

6:05

, ejecting Compromise: Legislators'

6:07

Fear of Primary Voters . With coauthors

6:10

Sarah E Anderson and Daniel

6:12

M Butler . If you like

6:14

this episode or any episode , give

6:16

it a like on your favorite podcast platform and

6:18

or subscribe to the podcast on YouTube . And

6:21

, as always , if you have any thoughts , questions or comments

6:23

, please feel free to email deepdivewithshawn

6:26

a gmail . com . Let's

6:29

do a deep dive , d

6:36

H Y . hanks for being here . How are you ?

6:39

I'm doing well . Thank you , appreciate the invitation

6:41

.

6:41

Absolutely . I'm excited to have you here . So we're going

6:43

to talk about three concepts that I think

6:45

are directly

6:47

impacting the tone of our politics and our

6:50

governing these days . So bipartisanship , polarization

6:52

, redistricting , and I couldn't

6:55

imagine somebody more

6:57

appropriate to have that conversation

7:00

with . So I'm excited to have you here . Thank you so

7:02

much . So let's start with bipartisanship

7:05

. I mean we can . These things are all somewhat interrelated

7:07

and as much as they are , we can talk

7:10

about that , but to me it seems

7:12

like we're living through a time in which bipartisanship

7:15

is a dirty word

7:17

or something that we shouldn't

7:19

be striving for , at least in our politics , and

7:22

this seems to stand in

7:24

contrast to our historical

7:26

understanding of bipartisanship

7:29

as something that we should strive for

7:31

, that it's a moderating and unifying influence

7:33

on our politics and the legislative process

7:36

. But it seems like today that

7:38

legislators and politicians

7:40

in pursuit of bipartisanship are

7:43

more often than not vilified from within their own

7:45

party and increasingly targeted

7:47

in their primary by more quote

7:50

unquote party purists . So , drawing

7:52

directly from the title of your book

7:54

, is bipartisanship dead ?

7:56

So I think the question of

7:58

the book makes it seem like

8:00

there's an easy answer , but unfortunately

8:02

it's not so simple . So I guess

8:04

a couple of thoughts here . So first

8:07

I can give you kind of a snapshot of where I think bipartisanship

8:10

is at now and then I can kind of give my perspective

8:12

on maybe what's changed and what hasn't changed

8:14

over time . So first

8:17

, I think we still see a mix of

8:19

bipartisanship and partisanship within

8:21

the legislative process . So , as

8:24

I found in my research for my book , bipartisanship

8:27

really persists for the most part

8:29

from the 1970s up through more

8:31

recent decades in the early

8:33

stages of the legislative process . So the

8:35

bills that member sponsor and other members join

8:37

on as co-sponsors still

8:40

continue to have bipartisan coalitions

8:42

at roughly the same rates now as they

8:44

did in the past . There's been a little bit of a decline , but

8:47

nothing that looks like that kind of plummeting

8:49

of bipartisanship . When it comes to roll call

8:51

votes , there's also research

8:54

, both from by own work as well as research

8:56

by Jim Curry and Francis

8:58

Lee , that finds that among

9:00

the bills that become law , those

9:02

still continue to be bipartisan

9:05

for the most part . So most of the

9:07

bills that are enacted into law have

9:09

significant bipartisan support in

9:11

at least one chamber . So even as polarization

9:14

is grown , the parties , or the

9:16

majority party in particular , has not become

9:18

more successful at pushing through a partisan

9:20

agenda . So things like the Trump

9:22

tax cut or the Affordable Care Act

9:24

, which passed on pretty much party lines

9:26

, those are the exception , not the

9:28

rule . So most legislation is still

9:31

bipartisan . So basically we end up with this kind

9:33

of book ending that they're still bipartisanship

9:35

early in the legislative process and there's

9:37

still a fair amount of bipartisanship at the very end

9:39

point . But partisanship is much more

9:41

common at kind of that middle stage

9:44

of the kind of the votes that members

9:46

take . And part of this is because

9:48

votes are not just taken to

9:50

pass bills . Votes are

9:52

also taken for messaging

9:54

purposes . So it's a chance for

9:57

the parties to take a vote on something that

9:59

they know might be dead on arrival in the other

10:01

chamber , especially during divided

10:03

government right now . So the House

10:05

the Republicans might take votes on something

10:07

that they know isn't going to pass in

10:09

the Senate or be signed by the president , but

10:11

they're going to take it anyway so that they can

10:14

kind of have talking points to their base and

10:16

those will look like very partisan votes . Likewise

10:19

, with amendment votes and other things . They're designed

10:21

to kind of point out differences between

10:23

the two sides , and part of that is a response

10:26

to the kind of era that we're in that you mentioned

10:28

, this kind of pressure from the primary

10:30

electorate , pressure from the

10:32

base and the party activists who really

10:35

care about party purity , and I

10:37

do think that the creation of safe seats

10:39

over time is contributing to this

10:41

. But I also kind of want to caution

10:43

against saying that the

10:45

kind of old era was this kind

10:47

of golden era of bipartisanship

10:50

, because if we look back , so in

10:52

the 1950s the American Political

10:54

Science Association put together

10:56

a report that's still cited widely

10:58

today that actually criticized

11:01

the amount of bipartisanship that

11:03

was occurring at that point in time . So

11:05

they basically said that the

11:08

parties were tweedledy and tweedledum . There

11:10

wasn't really any difference between the two

11:12

parties . Voters didn't have much

11:14

choice when they elected a particular

11:16

party to the majority . It wasn't clear what

11:18

they were going to pursue as an agenda and how it would

11:20

be different than what the other party would pursue

11:23

. And so really there was a criticism of

11:25

kind of bipartisanship and they said

11:27

we really should have more programmatic

11:29

parties , parties that have a clear platform

11:31

, that have party discipline , to try to enact

11:34

that platform and then voters get a choice and

11:36

I think the part of kind of this ideal

11:38

version of democracy that they envisioned , you

11:40

know we can cycle back to in terms of how redistricting

11:43

and gerrymandering might limit how much

11:45

voters have a choice to kind of say

11:47

, you know , we like what this party did in

11:49

power or not . But I think from

11:52

the kind of their perspective , I think there's some value to

11:54

it . There is some some

11:56

value to thinking about kind of party

11:58

differences and choices and over time

12:00

obviously there's there's been a mix of bipartisanship

12:03

and partisanship and what parties have pursued . But

12:05

I think we do have this shift

12:07

that particularly the roll call voting that members take

12:09

has become increasingly partisan

12:11

, in large part because members are responding to

12:13

their primary electorate .

12:15

So I think this is fascinating because I think to

12:18

some degree , what you're saying runs counter

12:20

to whatever the dominant narrative is right

12:22

and , of course , what maybe doesn't

12:24

get enough attention is the number

12:26

of mundane pieces of legislation

12:28

that pass through Congress that

12:31

are bipartisan , largely

12:33

bipartisan . There's a handful of components

12:35

to this , but I'm thinking about this in the

12:37

context of state versus federal

12:39

legislating and if there's a difference there

12:41

. And then I think about this in the context of

12:44

the narrative about partisanship

12:46

and if it's maybe receiving a bit

12:48

more attention than given what

12:51

bipartisanship truly looks like it

12:53

actually deserves , or if there's something

12:55

about certain types of bills that

12:57

lend themselves to more partisanship

13:00

and others that lend lend themselves to

13:02

bipartisanship , and that all of this is just kind

13:04

of muddying the narrative .

13:07

Yeah . So I think you're

13:09

certainly right that it's kind of a complex

13:11

picture of figuring out what's the

13:13

story and what's the kind of data behind

13:16

it . So I think , in terms of

13:18

state versus federal , one

13:21

thing to think about is in

13:23

places that have one party

13:25

as a super majority , so that is

13:27

, one party holds the vast

13:30

majority of seats

13:32

it's going to be a lot easier for them

13:34

to pass things on a one party

13:37

book . So if you think about things

13:39

needing a majority to pass which is the case in

13:41

most legislatures if

13:43

one party has a bare majority

13:45

, they're going to need all of

13:47

their members in agreement . Nobody can defect

13:50

. In order to pass legislation

13:52

, you might also need unified government

13:54

in terms of the lower chamber , the upper chamber

13:56

and the governor , and if

13:58

it's a state that's more closely divided , that

14:01

both may not be possible to

14:03

have unified government in many years , and

14:05

also you'll have more closely contested

14:08

margins , and so you're going to have

14:10

to probably work across the aisle a bit more . In

14:13

contrast , if you have a case where

14:15

one party holds 70

14:17

out of 100 seats and they only need a

14:19

majority , they can easily pass

14:21

things on a single party line , even

14:24

while allowing some of their members to vote against

14:26

the party if it's kind of not in the constituent's

14:28

interest or something . So at the federal level

14:30

, for the most part we've seen relatively

14:33

tight margins in recent years

14:35

, I mean certainly in the Senate , but

14:37

in the House as well , as we see right now . You know

14:39

it really only at the beginning of the Obama

14:41

administration was there a filibuster

14:44

proof majority in the Senate , and so

14:46

that's where , again , institutional rules

14:48

matter there . So part of the

14:50

reason not the only reason , but part of the

14:52

reason that federal legislation is

14:55

kind of forced to be bipartisan in many

14:57

respects is the filibuster

14:59

in the Senate . So if

15:01

a minority of legislators can block legislation

15:04

, the only way to pass legislation is to

15:06

get 60 votes in the Senate , and

15:08

so unless it's a budget

15:10

reconciliation bill , which only

15:12

get it one bite at each budget

15:14

period , so each year everything else

15:17

is potentially filibustered , and

15:19

so you're likely going to end up with

15:21

, you know in the current Senate

15:23

, at least nine or 10 Republicans

15:26

supporting legislation that passes . So

15:29

you know that's an institutional

15:31

reason . And then I think there's also

15:33

the reason that when the parties

15:36

are putting together kind of big packages

15:38

of legislation , it becomes

15:40

a bit of a compromise in a law

15:42

role and major pieces

15:44

of legislation are going to have some

15:46

things that you know the Republicans

15:48

like , some things the Democrats like

15:50

, often things that the kind of extremes

15:52

of both of their parties don't like . But that

15:54

these pieces of kind of legislation , particularly

15:57

these ones , you know , when you hear about some of these

15:59

big things that have been crafted to avoid the debt

16:01

ceiling or the transportation

16:03

kind of inflation reduction act , you

16:05

know they combine a lot of different things that have

16:07

pieces that can get different members on board , even

16:10

if the party is a whole from the minority is not

16:12

on board .

16:14

Let's talk a little bit about polarization . This

16:17

is another narrative , and the dominant

16:19

narrative being that we're experiencing

16:21

incredibly high polarization

16:24

, at the extremes , and I think it's important

16:26

to distinguish between polarization within

16:29

each of the parties and then polarization

16:31

within the electorate . I think it's

16:33

probably true that both of these have existed

16:35

, you know , to varying degrees and with varying

16:38

intensity , you know , since the

16:40

inception of the country , but it feels particularly

16:42

tense and again , this could just be the narrative , but

16:44

it feels particularly tense within

16:47

both the parties and then also

16:49

within the electorate today

16:51

. Is this true ? Is it unique

16:54

? And , if it is , is it bad

16:56

?

16:57

So I think that it is somewhat unique

17:00

in a couple of respects . So

17:02

I think that one of these is

17:05

that polarization among

17:07

our elites , so among our political parties and

17:09

our elected officials , encompasses

17:11

more issues now than at

17:13

other periods of high polarization or

17:15

history . So if you look at kind of

17:17

common vote based measures of polarization

17:20

, so one of these is a thing called the DW nominate

17:22

score . That's based on the roll call voting records

17:24

of members and it plots members

17:27

ideal points or their ideological location

17:29

. And if you look over time you see that

17:31

you know , back in the post civil war

17:33

era or kind of leading

17:36

up to World War Two , there were high

17:38

levels of polarization as well , and it was really

17:40

kind of the 1940s , 1950s

17:42

, 1960s that were the anomaly

17:44

in terms of low polarization . And

17:46

then we're back to high polarization again today

17:49

. But what's really different there is

17:51

that in the past it was really a

17:53

couple of key issues that divided the

17:55

parties and now it's so

17:57

many things . It's economic issues and

17:59

social issues , it's how we

18:01

engage with international relations

18:04

and so forth . So kind of the extent of issues

18:06

that are polarized I think is greater now than in the

18:08

past . I think that a second

18:11

change and this is on the side of the electorate

18:13

is that the public

18:15

is either polarized or

18:17

, at a very minimum , sorted . So by sorted

18:20

I mean that they may not take extreme

18:22

positions , but the people who self identify

18:24

as Democrats take left of center positions

18:26

and people who self identify as Democrats

18:29

take right of center positions . But that

18:31

, combined with this issue based or

18:33

ideological based polarization or sorting

18:35

, is also a rise of what we

18:37

call affective or social polarization

18:40

. And so this is the idea that

18:42

increasingly people view their partisanship

18:45

as a core part of their social identity

18:47

. They think about their

18:49

partisan group as the in group

18:51

and the opposing party as the out

18:53

group . They tend to have more animosity

18:55

toward the opposing party , and one

18:57

thing that's kind of changed over time and that reinforces

19:00

this is and this

19:02

is a work by Lillianna Mason is

19:04

that people's identities

19:06

are now overlap . So now not

19:09

many people have cross cutting cutting identities

19:11

between their party , their

19:13

religion , their sexual

19:15

orientation , their race

19:18

and so kind of . When all these orientations

19:21

are kind of reinforcing

19:23

, it makes it even more that you're

19:25

a strong in group to which you want to protect

19:27

, that you're kind of view the world through

19:29

the lens of what's going to kind of make my

19:32

in group look good and make the out group look bad

19:34

. And so you know , I think

19:36

that in this political environment

19:38

I do think that there

19:41

are kind of problematic

19:43

aspects of this level of polarization

19:45

. So I think it does

19:47

impact our ability to legislate

19:50

. You know , it doesn't make it impossible and , as

19:52

he said before , bipartisanship is possible

19:54

, but it raises the risk of gridlock

19:56

. So for our legislators , if

19:58

they have , you know , very far apart

20:00

preferences , in many cases

20:03

it may mean that gridlock

20:05

, so the absence of policy change

20:07

, is a better alternative for some

20:09

members than accepting a compromise on

20:11

policy or kind of accepting some sort of disagreement

20:14

. And sometimes this is because gridlock

20:16

is actually kind of current policies closer to what they

20:18

want . In other cases it's because

20:20

they want to kind of reject

20:22

that half loaf and kind of hold out for the whole

20:24

loaf , and I think their electorate or their primary

20:27

electorate would want them to . So

20:29

I think that it increases the likelihood

20:31

of gridlock . It also , I think

20:33

perhaps even more problematically , is

20:35

it decreases our ability to engage

20:38

in civil discourse . You know , I think we

20:40

see this both among our elites

20:42

and elected officials as well as among

20:44

the mass public , that

20:46

the way in which people talk about people

20:48

in the opposing party is increasingly

20:50

not that these are , you know

20:53

, civic minded individuals who are doing

20:55

their best to govern , and they may have

20:57

different ideas of what is the best

20:59

policy but they are , you know , committed

21:01

to the democratic ideal and to helping

21:03

constituents . But instead people

21:06

see both the policies as being dangerous

21:08

on the other party , but they see the people

21:10

as being dangerous as well . And

21:13

at the mass level we see this as

21:15

kind of stereotypes that people hold about

21:18

the other party and even

21:20

this kind of rising and concerning trend

21:22

of harassment , threats and violence

21:25

being directed at elected officials

21:27

and this kind of perspective

21:29

that people , again , because

21:31

they see these stereotypes , they kind of are

21:33

engaging motivated reasoning where when they

21:35

read a news story that kind of demonizes

21:38

the opposing side , they believe it , they

21:40

say yes , that matches my preexisting worldview

21:42

. I'm going to kind of take that in and buy it

21:44

.

21:45

It makes people kind of very angry and very

21:47

distrustful of the opposing side and

21:49

I think that that is problematic , not

21:51

not just for legislating but for our kind

21:53

of civic discourse more broadly , I

21:56

think often , at least for the lay person

21:58

and this might be true in academia

22:01

as well when we talk about what

22:03

we expect of our politics or a change

22:05

in tone , or politics are

22:07

governing today , that what

22:09

we often mean is a change in

22:12

the more modern era , and what gets

22:14

lost and I think what you've reminded , or the context

22:16

that you've put this in a couple of times is

22:18

that we have lived through periods

22:21

of time in which we

22:23

experienced high polarization , both within parties

22:25

but also within the electorate , that we've experienced

22:27

high periods of partisanship in

22:29

our history . So , in that context , then

22:31

, I wonder if the

22:34

narrative that we hear now , or the story

22:36

that's spun now , that the degree of partisanship

22:39

and the degree of polarization is

22:41

posing a threat to our democracy , an existential

22:43

threat to our democracy , is , outside

22:46

of context , overblown

22:49

, or do you think we have something to worry about

22:51

?

22:52

So I'm a little bit of two

22:55

minds here . I think that

22:57

I think , on the one hand , the degree of partisanship

22:59

and polarization well

23:01

high has not precluded

23:03

places of bipartisanship and compromise

23:06

from occurring , but it has made it harder

23:08

and in particular

23:10

, it has made gridlock more likely

23:12

. And I think we see this

23:14

on these kind of standoffs over the debt ceiling

23:17

and government funding

23:19

bills that there are perhaps real

23:22

consequences of this , and I think we saw even

23:24

on this last one , even though they made a deal , it

23:27

still impacted the credit rating of

23:29

the United States . And so I

23:31

think that there is a real consequence

23:33

of this kind of legislative

23:36

approach , of kind of rinksmanship

23:39

that might be coming with polarization

23:41

. I also think that and we can

23:43

talk more about primaries in a bit

23:45

if you'd like but I think that legislators' attention

23:47

to their primary electorate has

23:49

weakened the kind of degree of representation

23:52

that we see in our democratic politics

23:55

. So legislators are being

23:57

more responsive to a very small fraction

23:59

of their electorate . If they're responding to their primary

24:01

electorate , then they would

24:03

be if they respond to their general electorate . So

24:06

there are a lot of people whose voice is not

24:08

being reflected by what their elected officials

24:10

are doing in terms of policy

24:12

or approach , and I think that

24:14

the kind of way

24:17

in which our civic discourse has been

24:19

damaged through polarization are

24:21

concerning Some of what I see as

24:23

the biggest threats right now in terms of our

24:25

inability to agree on kind

24:27

of issues of election integrity

24:30

or democratic norms

24:32

. I don't think that those have to

24:34

come with polarization . I think we can have polarization

24:37

without that . But I think that those

24:40

types of concerns I think really are existential

24:42

threats and kind of concerns

24:44

about the state of our democracy . That if we

24:46

cannot agree that January 6th

24:48

was something that was inappropriate and

24:50

a threat to democracy and that

24:52

we see as something that's a partisan story , that's

24:55

a real problem . If people disagree

24:58

on what the appropriate tax rate is , I don't

25:00

think that that's the same type of problem .

25:03

So you mentioned the primary voter and this is something that

25:05

I wanted to talk about because , again

25:08

, there's this conventional wisdom and it might be

25:10

situated solely in the modern era

25:12

, but the conventional wisdom

25:15

is that politicians

25:17

, when running for office , the first

25:19

stage gate they go through

25:21

is the primary voter and then the

25:23

general voter , and that politicians

25:26

, or at least candidates running for office

25:28

, have to appease or appeal

25:31

to the primary voter . And

25:33

then the conventional wisdom is that they tack

25:35

to the center to appeal to the

25:37

general election voter . But

25:40

that that's changing that a lot

25:42

of analysis and research

25:44

today seems to suggest that

25:47

there's an increasing influence of

25:49

the primary voter on the candidate pool

25:52

and a lot of this attention is focused

25:54

on the primary Republican voter

25:56

, on the Republican candidate

25:58

. So I have two questions here . I'm wondering how this

26:00

has influenced , I guess , politics

26:02

Generally . But is it true

26:04

that this is primarily

26:06

a Republican party issue , or are

26:09

we seeing the same thing on the Democratic side ?

26:11

Yeah . So I guess first just to kind of walk

26:13

through the logic which I think you started alluding to

26:16

, but maybe I could kind of flush out a little bit more in

26:18

terms of how we've been thinking about it . Some of my research

26:20

with co-authors is that

26:22

if a legislator

26:24

thinks that the median voter in

26:26

their primary electorate disagrees

26:28

with the median voter in the general electorate

26:31

, they have to decide which

26:33

of those electors they want to be responsive

26:35

to . Basically , are they going to side with the

26:37

majority of voters in the primary and against

26:39

the majority of the general electorate or vice versa

26:41

? And on many issues they may be able to

26:43

appease vote that they don't disagree . So

26:45

you kind of have this coincidental representation

26:47

. But on those issues where they disagree

26:50

, legislators have a choice to

26:52

make and in work that I've been

26:54

doing with Sarah Anderson and Dan Butler , we've

26:57

argued that there are two key reasons that

26:59

legislators are going to have an incentive to side

27:01

with the primary . The first is

27:04

that the primary electorate

27:06

is going to be more unified on average

27:08

in its position and this means

27:10

that if you think about an issue as just

27:12

being binary , that you can either support or oppose

27:15

an issue . The primary electorate in

27:17

part because they share a party

27:19

. They share kind of similar ideologies and preferences

27:22

means that you're probably not

27:24

going to have something where the primary electorate

27:26

has only like 52%

27:28

favors an issue and 48%

27:31

oppose it . Instead , you're likely to be in

27:33

a scenario where 80% of the primary

27:35

electorate favors the issue and 20%

27:37

opposes it . So if the legislator

27:40

goes against the median voter

27:42

or the majority of the primary electorate , they're

27:44

going to go against a lot more of

27:46

the electorate . By contrast , the

27:48

general electorate because it's going to combine

27:50

Democrats , republicans and independents

27:53

is going to tend to be more closely

27:55

split . So even if you go against the

27:57

majority , you might be in a scenario

27:59

where you go against 52%

28:02

of the electorate but you're still siding with 48%

28:04

of the electorate . Second

28:06

reason is what we refer to as the primary premium

28:09

, basically the idea that the primary electorate

28:11

is going to be more responsive to

28:14

a legislator's issue positions or roll

28:16

call voting record than the general electorate

28:18

, and the logic again is pretty intuitive

28:20

. So in the general electorate people are voting

28:22

on the basis of party . We

28:26

know that in both the presidential as well as congressional elections

28:28

it's upwards of 90 plus percent of Democrats

28:30

vote for the Democratic candidate , 90 plus percent

28:33

of Republicans vote for the Republican candidate . So

28:35

the legislators actual roll call record isn't

28:38

gonna matter that much , like , yes , there are some

28:40

of those close marginal races

28:43

, but for the most part it's not gonna make a big

28:45

difference , but in a primary it could

28:47

, and so legislators

28:49

again , then it gives that incentive

28:51

to side with the primary electorate

28:53

. So one thing I would just add

28:55

is that that becomes kind of probably more

28:58

magnified or more relevant when

29:00

legislators represent safe

29:02

seats . So one of the trends over time

29:04

and kind of one of things that's contributed or kind of been part

29:06

and parcel of our polarization , is

29:09

that there are more safe seats in Congress

29:11

now . So by that I mean seats

29:13

that one party is likely to win

29:15

by a large margin . So

29:18

we don't have a lot of seats where the members

29:20

the normal kind of presidential vote in the

29:22

district is 48 to 52

29:24

percent . Instead it's members who represent

29:26

a district that typically votes Democratic 75%

29:29

of the time or typically votes Republican

29:32

70% of the time , something like that . And

29:34

so again it makes it you care less about

29:36

the general electorate and more about the primary

29:39

. All of that logic that I just explained

29:41

. I think it does hold on both the Democratic

29:44

and on the Republican side , and

29:46

I think that in both parties there are also

29:48

wings of the party and kind of groups

29:50

in the base or kind of the activist

29:53

class who want to push out

29:55

those who they see as insufficiently

29:57

committed to the kind of ideology

29:59

or position of the party . The waves

30:01

that we've seen have been a little bit different . You know

30:03

. I think the first one that got a lot of attention on the Republican

30:06

side was the Tea Party Movement , which

30:08

was really focused on conservatism

30:11

, particularly on economic issues . Then

30:13

we saw not quite

30:15

parallel , but a kind of similar move on

30:18

the Democratic side with more progressive

30:20

candidates , with Alexandria

30:22

Ocasio-Cortez and others , defeating

30:25

Democrats that they saw as

30:27

insufficiently liberal , and

30:29

this included both social issues like

30:31

abortion , including Marie Newman's challenge

30:33

to Dan Lipinski here in Illinois , where I am

30:35

as well as economic

30:38

issues . And then more recently

30:40

on the Republican side we've seen

30:43

it both in terms of conservatism but

30:45

also in terms of Trump loyalty , and

30:47

I think that's kind of something that's fundamentally different

30:49

than what we've seen on the Democratic side

30:52

is there has not been a similar leader

30:54

loyalty story that we've seen

30:57

there . But I think you know , certainly that was what we

30:59

saw with the primary challenge

31:01

against Liz Cheney and other

31:03

Democrats who are sorry , other Republicans

31:05

who had supported the impeachment

31:07

against President Trump . Liz

31:10

Cheney there's no debating that

31:12

she is a fiercely conservative

31:14

individual in terms of a traditional

31:16

left-right spectrum , but

31:19

she was not seen as sufficiently loyal to Trump

31:21

and therefore she was

31:23

attacked and beaten in the

31:26

primary election . In terms

31:28

of kind of where the parties have ended

31:30

up . So , given that they both have some of these dynamics

31:32

of kind of pressures to purge

31:35

the moderates and replace them with more committed

31:38

partisans or ideologues , it

31:40

does seem that there's been some

31:42

evidence that Republican

31:44

primary electorates have

31:46

ended up choosing the

31:48

more extreme candidates more often

31:51

than the Democratic candidates . But

31:53

I think it's still a bit early to say whether

31:55

this is something systematic or whether this was

31:57

the result of just a couple of election cycles

32:00

. But , for instance , in 2022

32:02

, there were 14 congressional

32:04

incumbents who lost in primaries

32:06

and on the Republican side

32:08

, the kind of people who

32:11

lost or kind of even had

32:13

contested primaries , it was overwhelmingly

32:15

the kind of very conservative

32:17

or pro-Trump candidate who won

32:20

, but on the Democratic side

32:22

it's been a bit more split . So

32:25

in contested primaries there's been

32:27

a mix of victories for

32:29

the moderate candidates or kind of mainstream

32:31

candidates , I should say , as well as victories

32:34

for the more progressive wing of the party . So

32:37

you both saw , for instance

32:39

, on the kind of Senate side you saw progressive

32:41

candidates like Mandela Barnes in Wisconsin

32:44

win . But you also saw Tim

32:46

Ryan in the Senate primary in Ohio

32:48

who was the more kind of mainstream candidate

32:50

won , and in several of the house

32:53

races . In one case

32:55

actually there were two incumbents against each other , with Sean

32:57

Casten against Marie Newman here in Illinois

32:59

. Casten beat out Newman , so he

33:01

was the more mainstream candidate , she was the more progressive

33:04

and so there hasn't been a kind of clear

33:07

win for the progressives within

33:09

those primaries . And one

33:11

possibility is that Democratic

33:14

voters recognize that

33:16

moderation might be part of electability

33:18

. So come general elections

33:21

Democratic voters might see

33:23

that if they wanna win that

33:25

seat they have a better chance with the more

33:27

mainstream candidate and they prioritize that

33:29

. But I don't think we quite know enough

33:31

to kind of know there's really something

33:33

systematic going on there . But there might be

33:35

a little bit of a Democrat Republican difference there

33:37

.

33:38

I think what seems to be sucking

33:41

a lot of the oxygen out of the room when it comes to

33:43

the state of democracy in

33:45

the United States is the idea

33:47

that we're potentially facing

33:49

civil war , that the division

33:52

in the United States is between liberals

33:54

and conservatives and there's no real space

33:56

between four things like

33:58

bipartisanship or compromise

34:01

. But I wonder if that

34:03

is actually a symptom of something else

34:05

that might be happening that is maybe less

34:08

existential , and that is

34:10

that we're seeing more of a realignment

34:13

within the Republican Party itself

34:16

than we are so

34:18

much at the aggregate

34:20

national level across

34:23

both parties and all voters .

34:26

I mean . So I do think that we

34:28

are seeing a change within

34:30

the Republican Party where

34:32

I think and there was elements

34:34

of this before , you see , with Scott

34:37

Walker's rise in Wisconsin , but I think

34:39

that 2016 and

34:41

Trump kind of accelerated this and kind

34:43

of brought it to the front . Is

34:46

that and we see this in terms of the realignment that , like , high

34:49

education voters are now kind of seen as

34:51

more democratic ? So you have this kind of oddity where

34:53

high income voters are Republican but high

34:55

education voters are Democratic . Is

34:57

this kind of the Republican Party

34:59

, instead of being predominantly the focused

35:02

on economic interests and what's

35:04

good for business , what's good for the upper class

35:06

, has kind of really brought

35:08

more centrally into the party the

35:11

kind of white working class

35:13

and those who kind of feel racial

35:15

resentment , those who feel kind of left

35:18

behind or kind of really frankly

35:20

criticized and insulted by

35:22

the message of some Democrats

35:25

or the Democratic Party in terms of how

35:28

they have talked about them or kind

35:30

of approached them in terms of our politics . And

35:32

I think that that was an element

35:34

of the Republican Party that maybe was there

35:36

in some kind of nascent form before

35:38

Trump , but really was kind of

35:40

brought centrally into the party by

35:42

Trump and it now

35:45

is kind of part of the base that legislators

35:47

are focused on and are responding

35:49

to .

35:51

So you mentioned safe seats a

35:53

little bit ago , and I want to talk about this

35:55

because this is also

35:57

influencing the way we politic

35:59

, and one of the ways that

36:02

we get to safe seats is through the redistricting

36:04

process , and I'm interested in the role that it's

36:06

playing in our contemporary politics , and

36:08

so really quickly . Redistricting

36:10

is essentially the redrawing of

36:13

congressional boundaries on

36:15

a 10-year basis , although that can happen

36:17

on a different schedule on both sides

36:19

. Also , republicans and Democrats have been accused

36:22

of gerrymandering , which is redistricting

36:24

in such a way as to maximize

36:26

their own vote share while also minimizing

36:29

the vote share of the other party , and

36:32

our understanding is that this gerrymandering

36:34

creates an unfair environment , perhaps

36:36

safe seats in a way that dilutes the

36:38

power of voters in some areas and that , taken

36:41

in the aggregate , can give

36:43

extremely disproportionate power to

36:45

parties in the House and in state legislatures

36:47

that didn't really or actually win

36:49

votes commensurate to the seats gained . So I'm wondering

36:52

if this is as insidious as it's

36:54

purported to be and , functionally

36:57

, what form is it taking ?

36:59

Yeah . So I think I

37:01

guess I have two main points that I want to make

37:04

about gerrymandering . So first

37:06

is that redistricting and gerrymandering

37:08

is one of the go-to explanations

37:11

for polarization and in fact even

37:13

former President Obama has made

37:16

comments that allude to there being a strong

37:18

connection between redistricting

37:20

and polarization , and for that

37:22

claim I would say there's really not a lot

37:24

of evidence . So the first is the most obvious

37:26

one and I talk about this with my students is the Senate

37:29

. Senate polarization has tracked right alongside

37:31

the House and obviously there's no redistricting

37:33

or gerrymandering happening to state borders

37:36

. The other part of the evidence against

37:38

this one is that you have similar

37:40

kind of changes in polarization within

37:42

decades as you do at the periods of redistricting

37:45

every 10 years . You

37:47

also have similar levels of polarization in

37:49

places in the country that haven't changed

37:51

their borders that much within states versus those

37:53

that have . So as a link

37:56

directly between redistricting and

37:58

polarization , so via this kind of

38:00

creating safe seats , that's

38:02

a bit overblown in terms

38:04

of the story . But where I do think that

38:06

there is a concern about redistricting

38:09

and gerrymandering is about

38:11

how redistricting affects representation

38:14

, and so when we think

38:16

about redistricting and gerrymandering

38:19

the kind of real concern is that

38:21

it's making it harder for the electorate

38:23

to express their views in

38:26

a way that translates into

38:28

who wins seats . And

38:30

so , as you alluded to in your kind of opening

38:32

comments about redistricting , we can

38:34

think about redistricting

38:36

as being kind of a strategy that

38:38

happens in a couple of different ways . So

38:41

if redistricting is done by a state legislature

38:43

, as it is in the majority of US states

38:45

, if the majority , particularly if they

38:47

have a unified government , they

38:50

might be thinking about two different things . One

38:53

is how do they help their current incumbents

38:55

and this might be true also if you have divided

38:57

governments , so kind of a sweetheart deal or a

39:00

bipartisan gerrymander . So how

39:02

do you help your incumbents ? In this case

39:04

, you actually want to draw safe seats for them

39:06

. So a member would love to run in a

39:08

safe seat . It's a whole lot easier to run in the safe

39:10

seat than it is to run in a competitive seat

39:12

. However , that doesn't necessarily

39:15

help the party as a whole , and

39:17

so the second goal of a

39:19

party engaging in redistricting is

39:22

to create an advantage in terms

39:24

of the seats that they win relative

39:26

to the votes that they get . So

39:28

you can think about this as something called the seats votes

39:30

curve , or basically you could think about for

39:33

what fraction of votes do you get what

39:35

fraction of seats ? And in a place

39:37

with proportional representation this

39:39

would be the 45 degree line . If

39:41

you win 45% of the votes , you get 45%

39:44

of the seats . But in the US

39:46

, because of the structure of our

39:48

electoral system and the

39:50

single member simple plurality system we

39:53

have , it doesn't look like a

39:55

proportional representation system . So

39:57

you might win 25%

40:00

of the votes and get none of

40:02

the seats . Or you might win 75%

40:05

of the votes and get 100% of

40:07

the seats . But what redistricting

40:09

can do is it can systematically

40:12

bias it towards one party , and

40:15

they can do this by using

40:17

cracking and packing . If you want

40:19

to win more seats than

40:21

you do votes , what you might want

40:23

to do is pack your political

40:25

opponents into a couple of districts . So

40:28

let's say I'm the Republicans and I'm in control

40:30

of the legislature . I want to pack

40:33

all of those urban areas with Democratic

40:35

voters so that there are a couple

40:37

of districts that they win , but

40:39

they win with way more

40:42

votes than they would actually need to win those

40:44

seats . So those Democratic candidates

40:46

are going to win with 85% of

40:48

the vote . Let's say that

40:50

means that the surrounding areas are going

40:52

to be Republican-leading

40:54

and it might also take a few other areas of Democratic

40:57

strength and crack them . So you see this

40:59

in Austin , texas , that Austin

41:01

is broken up into several edges

41:03

of Republican-leading districts . So

41:06

what we end up with at an aggregate level across

41:08

the state is you're going to have a couple

41:10

of districts that the minority party

41:12

wins by a large margin and

41:14

then lots of seats that the majority party

41:17

wins by a smaller margin . So

41:19

you actually don't want to create those as really safe

41:21

seats . You want to create them as kind of

41:24

leaning toward one party enough

41:27

to kind of weather a kind of moderate

41:29

swing in the political tides , but

41:31

maybe where , let's say , 60%

41:34

of the vote is likely to go toward the

41:36

party in power . And

41:38

what this means in terms of then thinking about

41:40

representation and the kind of problem

41:42

there that I alluded to is

41:44

that it means that when voters

41:47

change their views about who they

41:49

want in power , they may not

41:51

actually be able to change who's

41:53

in power very much . So

41:55

in those districts that are packed

41:58

for the minority party , even if

42:00

the kind of Republicans who

42:02

live there , or even many of the Democrats , decide

42:04

that they're unhappy with the

42:06

Democrat in office , there's really no

42:09

chance that the Democrat is going to lose to a Republican

42:11

in those districts and then in many

42:13

of the other places that might be drawn to help the Republicans

42:16

. It would take a really big political

42:18

wind for the Republicans to lose

42:20

those seats . So , as an example of

42:22

this and this draws on some work by Jonathan

42:25

Rodnitz-Stanford he's done

42:27

some work looking at Pennsylvania

42:29

. So this is a state

42:31

that has a heavily Republican gerrymander

42:33

, so Republicans are advantaged . And so

42:35

in 2012 , democrats

42:38

did very well in statewide elections

42:40

and won many of them . Obama won

42:42

reelection with 53% of

42:44

the vote in Pennsylvania . Democratic

42:47

candidates for the US House won

42:49

51% of the votes

42:51

that were cast statewide for House

42:53

candidates , but they only ended

42:55

up winning 28% of the seats

42:58

. So Democrats only held five

43:00

of 18 seats

43:02

in the US House

43:04

for Pennsylvania . So even though

43:06

those candidates won a majority of votes

43:08

, they had a very small

43:11

minority of the seats . The

43:14

example I just gave was one where

43:16

it would be a Republican gerrymander to help themselves

43:18

, but this is not uniquely a

43:20

Republican problem . So , for

43:22

instance , in the court cases that have gone forward here

43:24

Wisconsin , pennsylvania , north

43:26

Carolina are maps that were argued

43:29

favored the Republicans , but Maryland

43:31

and less on the court case , but here in Illinois

43:33

as well maps that are thought to favor the

43:35

Democrats . The difference

43:37

here between the two sides it's not

43:40

because one side , I think , is morally

43:42

better than the other when it comes to redistricting

43:44

. I think there are just two things that have made

43:46

it harder for Democrats to do this . One

43:49

is that Democratic voters

43:51

tend to be concentrated in urban

43:53

areas , which makes it very easy

43:56

for them to get packed

43:58

, and even in Democratic-leaning states they

44:00

end up packed because they're living close

44:02

together and it's compact , contiguous

44:05

. All those criteria is very districting . The

44:08

other is that nationwide

44:10

, more of the states that have moved

44:12

towards using independent commissions have tended

44:14

to be Democratic-leaning states . So places

44:16

like California , colorado

44:19

, others , and independent commissions

44:21

don't have the same incentive to help one party

44:24

over the other . So it's not

44:26

necessarily a story that this is

44:28

just a Republican tool . It's just that it's bring

44:30

perhaps a little bit easier for Republicans to use

44:32

.

44:33

A lot of the things that we've talked about high

44:36

levels of partisanship , increasing polarization

44:38

, the impact of redistricting

44:41

and gerrymandering on

44:43

our representation . These are often

44:45

foils for , and explanations

44:48

for increasing extremism

44:50

, both within the electorate but also within the

44:52

parties , and I think , as

44:54

you've mentioned pretty clearly , there's

44:56

some merit to this , and some of this is

44:59

also overblown or misunderstood , and

45:01

so I'm wondering is it fair to say

45:03

that the electorate and the elites within the parties

45:05

are becoming so , our politics are becoming

45:07

more extreme ? And , if so , is

45:10

it possible , in this complex

45:12

web , to bumper sticker

45:14

those things that are maybe

45:16

contributing the most to that ?

45:18

You know , it's certainly something that as

45:21

academics that we want to do . We want

45:23

to have kind of a hypothesis or

45:25

an explanation and then test that hypothesis

45:27

and say factor X is

45:29

the most important cause

45:31

or explanatory variable for this outcome

45:33

. But I think that polarization

45:36

has been one of those places where there

45:38

is no single explanation

45:41

. There are factors that I think

45:43

contribute and some that probably don't contribute

45:45

a lot , but there really is no

45:47

kind of go to kind of single

45:50

thing that if we just fixed X

45:52

it would fix our politics and

45:54

kind of . When we think about the current kind

45:56

of explanations that get a lot of attention , obviously

45:58

redistricting is one of them and I've already

46:00

talked about why that's not a great explanation

46:03

. Primary elections are

46:05

another explanation that we've alluded to as well

46:07

and I think here I

46:09

would argue that primary elections probably

46:12

contribute to , you know , a

46:14

feedback loop that reinforces our polarization

46:17

. But it's not necessarily

46:19

a great explanation for the original kind

46:21

of rise or cause of polarization , because

46:24

polarization in Congress has been rising since

46:26

the early 1970s and nothing

46:28

in the timing of primary

46:30

elections really fits that . It's

46:33

also the case that variation across the

46:35

US in open versus closed primaries

46:37

which might affect kind of who that median voter

46:39

in primary elections is doesn't

46:42

matter a lot , but some evidence . Maybe

46:44

the top two primaries or top

46:46

four , like Alaska just implemented , might

46:49

kind of have some moderating effect . But

46:52

in general primary elections can't really

46:54

be pinpointed for explaining the rise in polarization

46:56

, even if they contribute to this feedback . Another

46:59

explanation that people have gone to is money in

47:01

politics . So saying you

47:03

know , it's how our elections are funded

47:05

and it's kind of people at the extremes giving

47:07

money , you know . Again , there's

47:09

some evidence here , you know . So there's

47:12

research by LaRajen Shaffner that suggests

47:14

that at state legislatures when

47:17

more money comes from political parties

47:19

who have more of incentive to care about kind of

47:21

winning majorities , they actually

47:23

tend to give toward more moderate candidates and

47:25

therefore end up with lower polarization in

47:27

the legislature , versus when rules

47:30

mean that more money comes from individuals , you

47:33

end up with more polarized state legislatures

47:35

. However , again , it doesn't really

47:37

explain the rise in polarization

47:39

because the polarization of donations

47:42

actually occurs after much of the

47:44

recent congressional polarization I

47:46

think . In some research I think I saw that it

47:48

wasn't until the early 2000s that

47:51

donation patterns became

47:53

more highly polarized . So

47:55

again , there are a lot of factors that reinforce it , but

47:58

kind of the original impetus

48:00

for it . There's not kind of one explanation

48:03

for it .

48:05

So the reason I ask is and

48:07

I think the reason you know this is an interesting

48:09

question for researchers as well

48:11

is because if we can pinpoint it , then

48:14

, as you said , we can fix it , and

48:16

maybe the potential end result of

48:18

all of these problems with

48:20

our system is that , you know , democracy

48:22

crumbles , right . So then , if

48:25

we can't pinpoint it , then that's

48:27

scary right . And so in a lot of

48:29

ways , I guess I feel go with

48:31

me here , because this is elite , but I feel as if we've

48:33

passed , you know , the Rubicon and that democracy

48:35

, american democracy , is maybe irreparably

48:38

damaged . Are you comfortable

48:41

talking me off the ledge ?

48:44

Unfortunately not . You know

48:46

, I think there are certainly elements where

48:49

I have some hope . You know , I do

48:51

think that a large number

48:53

of our elected officials at state

48:56

, local and federal levels , and even

48:58

in both parties , do want to be good

49:00

civil servants and kind of

49:02

work on behalf of constituents and

49:04

care about democracy and democratic norms

49:07

. But I think that what

49:09

worries me the most right now and I kind

49:11

of alluded to this before is

49:13

not that parties care strongly

49:16

about kind of differences in

49:18

tax policy or healthcare policy

49:20

or how we engage with Russia

49:23

, China or other countries , but it's that

49:26

election integrity , fairness

49:28

and the rule of law have

49:30

become such partisan questions . And

49:33

, on the one hand , this isn't entirely new . You know

49:36

, debates about voter ID law have always

49:38

been about which side they advantage at the core

49:40

of it . But I think that what

49:42

we have seen since the Trump

49:44

administration , in particular , since the 2020

49:47

election , is that

49:49

things that should be shared to democratic

49:51

norms are now increasingly

49:54

viewed through the same partisan

49:56

lens that we interpret other things

49:58

through . And I think that when

50:00

our elected officials appear

50:03

more concerned about their

50:05

base and what their base believes

50:08

about the 2020

50:10

election or about the

50:12

former president's behavior in it than

50:15

they do about the democratic norms

50:17

or rule of law . I think that

50:19

that is a problem . By

50:21

no means are the Democrats angels

50:24

in all of this . Certainly , I think that they have

50:26

tried it in ways to

50:28

make their side look good and the other side look bad

50:30

, and are not just focused on

50:32

democratic norms directly

50:35

, but I think the current example

50:37

is just one where it's not

50:39

equivalent between the two sides that I

50:41

think we , even right after January 6

50:43

, Kevin McCarthy , Mitch McConnell

50:45

, others in those first days

50:48

they were willing to blame the former

50:50

president for his behavior and say

50:52

that he had no place in

50:55

office . I think it was . You know , I forget the exact words

50:57

that they choose , but

50:59

I feel like it's concerning

51:02

that their language

51:04

and other legislators shifted

51:07

after that and now , as we enter a new

51:09

primary election season , when Trump

51:11

is the front runner for his party , that

51:14

the elites within his party even

51:16

who expressed concern about how

51:19

he approached democracy , they're

51:21

not leading a charge to say

51:24

that this has to stop . And

51:27

so I think that we're a little bit between

51:29

a rock and a hard place where , on

51:31

the one hand , the Justice Department

51:34

and states who are pursuing

51:36

President Trump through the indictments if

51:39

they don't pursue him , then

51:41

it seems like elected officials are above

51:43

the law or former elected officials are above

51:45

the law and that's a problem for democracy

51:48

. But it's also a problem for democracy

51:50

if the kind of indictments

51:53

or investigations of him are seen as

51:56

partisan witch hunts and kind

51:58

of further erode trust in

52:00

our democracy and democratic

52:02

norms in the world of law . So I think you

52:05

know this is for me kind of perhaps

52:07

the biggest thing and then secondary to that is

52:09

how people feel about . Kind

52:11

of I think everyone at a core

52:14

believes that everyone who is eligible

52:16

to vote should have the chance to vote , but

52:18

I think that this isn't really reflected in the types of

52:20

support that the two different parties propose

52:23

and want . And so I think you

52:25

know , if you or others are interested in great work

52:27

on this , Jake Grumbach at

52:29

UC Berkeley has some really great

52:32

work in his recent book about how

52:34

polarization plus the nationalization

52:36

of politics has meant that US

52:38

states have both become laboratories for

52:40

policymaking but also

52:42

kind of what he calls laboratories for back , democratic

52:44

backsliding , as they've engaged

52:46

in these kind of coordinated efforts to change voting

52:49

rules and gauge and gerrymandering

52:51

and kind of push policies that are kind

52:53

of really driven by organized interests rather than the

52:55

voters themselves , and I think

52:57

that that also perhaps offers

53:00

a kind of sad view

53:02

on American democracy . But I think

53:04

for me it's really the state of where

53:06

we are , with the kind of democratic norms and

53:08

elections as well as concerning . But

53:11

I do you know , and I'll just reiterate this , as I said before

53:13

, I do think that both

53:16

sides have people

53:18

who truly want to make this country a better

53:20

place and truly value our democratic

53:22

institutions , and I think that

53:25

I just wish that they had more

53:27

electoral incentives to prioritize

53:30

that over their base .

53:33

All right , really quick final question . You ready for

53:35

it ?

53:36

Yes .

53:37

What's something interesting you've been reading , watching

53:39

, listening to or doing lately .

53:41

It's an excellent question and I thought

53:43

long and hard about this when you

53:45

reached out . And you

53:47

know , I have little kids a

53:50

four year old and a one and a half year old and

53:52

I have to say there's not been a lot of

53:54

reading , watching or listening

53:56

to things that don't involve them . So

53:59

I'll just say something really interesting is raising kids

54:01

.

54:02

You know you are not all of my friends that have kids

54:04

. That's the exact same response I

54:06

get . So I both you know , I

54:09

appreciate that and I'm excited for you

54:11

and sympathize .

54:13

Excellent .

54:15

Dr Harba Jung , thanks for being here . I really appreciate

54:17

the conversation .

54:18

Thank you so much . It was a great time .

54:25

Our democracy is in danger , but

54:27

perhaps we're giving too much weight to

54:30

some things and not enough to others

54:32

, or maybe a better way to think about

54:34

it is it's a soup that has elements

54:36

of increased polarization and partisanship

54:39

, as well as a more extreme party

54:41

voter and some of these other things

54:43

that Dr Harba Jung mentioned extreme

54:45

policy preferences that get a lot of attention

54:47

and a deterioration of shared

54:49

truths within the electorate that's translating

54:52

to chaos in our halls of government . Understanding

54:55

this is important because , as we discussed

54:57

in this episode , if we can determine

54:59

which elements are causing the problem

55:02

and to what degree , then

55:04

maybe we can engineer a solution . What

55:07

we do know is this All of

55:09

these things together are straining

55:11

our democracy , and it remains

55:13

to be seen just how resilient that democracy

55:15

is . But it is telling that

55:17

Dr Harba Jung , even while

55:19

diluting the power of some of the narratives we hear

55:22

the role of partisanship and gerrymandering

55:24

on our democracy despite that still

55:27

feels as if our democracy is in a unique

55:29

danger , and the next few years

55:31

will be especially important in determining

55:33

the strength of our democratic guardrails . All

55:36

right , check back soon for another episode

55:38

of Deep Dive . See you

55:41

next time

56:00

, folks .