0:00

it becomes increasingly an issue

0:02

for some Christian groups within

0:04

the country , and especially those that are more politically

0:06

active in the Republican Party . So

0:08

you have them beginning to say

0:10

wait a second , if you're a

0:13

good Christian , you've got to support a

0:15

Jewish state in Palestine . That really

0:17

means supporting the state of Israel and

0:19

of course there are plenty of Christians who

0:21

have all kinds of different

0:24

opinions about this . But

0:26

if you look at how it is that

0:28

those Christian leaders , associated

0:31

especially with the Republican Party and

0:33

especially with the right wing of the Republican Party

0:35

, talk , israel and

0:38

pro-Israel sentiment become larger

0:40

and larger and larger . And

0:42

it's not just pro-Israel sentiment , but

0:44

it's actually sentiments that are very sympathetic

0:46

to the arguments of the Israeli right that

0:48

say not only should Israel exist

0:51

, but Israel should have complete control

0:53

of biblical territory of Israel

0:55

and there's no room for a Palestinian state

0:57

government .

1:04

Gaza is a narrow coastal territory

1:06

of about two million people , overwhelmingly

1:08

Palestinians , sandwiched between

1:10

Israel and Egypt . It's

1:13

governed in limited fashion by Hamas

1:15

, an anti-Israeli Islamist group

1:17

. On October 7th of 2023

1:20

, hamas launched a devastating

1:22

attack from Gaza on

1:24

Israel . On that day alone

1:26

, over 1,200 lives were lost

1:28

and more than 240 hostages

1:31

were taken . Israel responded

1:33

with military force , plunging the region

1:35

into chaos . Since October

1:37

7th , it's estimated that over 11,000

1:40

Palestinians have been killed , and

1:42

of those , about 4,600

1:44

have been children . I grew

1:47

up with the Middle East being at the forefront

1:49

of American foreign policy across

1:51

numerous presidencies , all working

1:53

towards some lasting peace in the region , and

1:55

especially between Israelis and Palestinians

1:58

. But , in all honesty , I'm not really

2:00

familiar with the root of the conflict and

2:02

how it's evolved and

2:05

, as a result , how to place the events of October

2:08

7th into some context that helps

2:10

me understand how critical this situation may

2:12

continue to be and if peace is ever

2:14

a viable solution in the region . And

2:17

, judging from how I hear most other people talk about

2:19

the conflict , they don't really know either , but

2:21

they all seem to have an opinion . So today

2:24

I'm talking to Dr Nathan Brown , professor

2:26

at George Washington University and

2:28

leading scholar on the Middle East . Dr

2:31

Brown is a former Guggenheim fellow and

2:33

Carnegie scholar who has served as

2:35

an advisor to the committee drafting the Palestinian

2:37

Constitution and currently serves

2:40

on the board of trustees at the American University

2:42

in Cairo . We talk about the history

2:44

of conflict in the Middle East region , particularly

2:46

the Palestinian-Israeli conflict , how

2:49

it's evolved , what happened on October

2:51

7th , what it means for the possibility

2:53

of any lasting peace in the region and

2:56

how the American response is so critical

2:58

to how this all plays out . If

3:00

you liked this episode , or any episode , please

3:02

give it a like on your favorite podcast platform

3:05

and or subscribe to the podcast on

3:07

YouTube . And , as always , if you have any thoughts

3:09

, questions or comments , please

3:11

feel free to email me at deepdivewithSeanatgmailcom

3:15

. Let's do a deep dive . Dr

3:23

Brown , thanks for being here . How are you Good

3:26

? Thanks for having me . Let's start

3:28

here , which I think is maybe

3:30

going back in time a bit , because

3:32

the events of October 7th

3:34

didn't happen in some kind of a vacuum

3:37

. There's some history to it . I

3:39

think to most people and I include myself

3:41

as one of them average news

3:43

consumers or maybe people that are kind of ancillarily

3:46

interested in historical events the

3:48

Arab-Israeli conflict begins

3:50

post-World War I , and that would

3:52

be with the Declaration of Israel as a state in 1948

3:56

. But to my limited

3:58

understanding , the history is really much more complex

4:00

and has roots much further back in time , and

4:02

so I guess I'm wondering if it's possible for you to

4:05

give an overview of this conflict that does maybe

4:07

a bit more justice to the actual history than

4:09

just Israel was created , and the Arab

4:11

world is perhaps angry about it .

4:14

I actually think that sort of standard

4:16

story is not necessarily

4:18

a bad place to start . It's not because

4:20

there was no history prior to the

4:23

20th century , but because

4:25

that's really when we get

4:27

the conflict in its current

4:29

form , which is a conflict between

4:31

two national communities

4:33

. So Jews were certainly in

4:36

the world before 1948 . Palestinians

4:39

and Arabs certainly have historical

4:41

roots going back pretty far . But

4:45

in essence , what I would say is this is not

4:47

a post-World War two conflict . It was born

4:49

in the period really after the First

4:51

World War , when you have

4:53

a Jewish national movement

4:55

arise and there

4:58

are people in the territory

5:00

known as Palestine who

5:03

are increasingly uncomfortable

5:05

with that , and uncomfortable becomes

5:07

a mild understatement over time . So

5:11

the Jewish national movement , zionism

5:13

, was really about saying Jews

5:15

are people , jews are religion , jews

5:17

are all over the world , but

5:19

fundamentally Jews are

5:22

a national community , and

5:24

a national community , I mean , this is

5:26

the period of nationalism . National

5:29

communities need to have their own state . They need

5:31

to be able to build up not just

5:34

religious institutions , not just

5:36

have cultural production . They

5:38

really need some core territory to be able to express

5:40

themselves . And of course , this was at a time

5:42

when Jews are increasingly feeling unwelcome

5:45

in Europe . Most Jews

5:47

in Europe stay , or they go to

5:49

North America , they go to other places . But

5:51

this Zionist movement says we've got to go and recreate

5:54

the Jewish national home in Palestine and

5:57

there is a community there of

5:59

people that we call Palestinian

6:02

. Now the term Palestinian certainly would

6:04

have been known then , but that were

6:06

Arabic speaking , predominantly

6:09

Muslim with a large Christian minority . There

6:12

were actually Jews who were resident

6:14

in Palestine , who would have had Arabic as a

6:16

first language . But the British

6:18

get control of this territory

6:20

after World War I it

6:22

had been part of the Ottoman Empire before and that

6:25

the British get control of the territory with a mandate

6:27

from the League of Nations . And

6:30

the League of Nations basically said two

6:32

things Number one you

6:34

, great Britain , are responsible for

6:36

this territory , but you're responsible

6:39

in getting it ready for independence . And

6:42

the second thing that the League

6:44

of Nations mandates , that is , that

6:46

you are required to

6:49

facilitate the construction

6:51

of a Jewish national home in Palestine

6:53

. That's about four declarations . Declaration

6:56

of British policy during World War I then gets

6:58

written into the League of Nations mandate . So

7:00

they're supposed to do two things at once facilitate

7:03

Palestinian independence and

7:05

facilitate the construction of a Jewish

7:07

national home . Whatever that meant . Nobody

7:09

was quite clear what it meant to do

7:11

both those things at the same time . That

7:14

ultimately becomes impossible

7:16

because , with increasing Jewish

7:18

integration to Palestine , the

7:20

non-Jews in Palestine coalesce

7:22

against the idea of creation

7:25

of a Jewish national home and

7:27

you finally have the bridge mandate collapse

7:29

. In the post-World War II period , as you say

7:31

, the state of Israel is declared

7:34

on about two thirds of

7:36

that territory and the other third

7:38

is controlled by

7:40

surrounding Arab states , jordan and Egypt

7:43

. The core of the conflict is we see

7:45

it right now , and

7:47

over territory , this

7:49

territory , dispute between two

7:52

national movements a Palestinian national

7:54

movement and a Zionist

7:57

and a Jewish national movement . That really

7:59

is something that's born in the 20th century

8:01

.

8:02

Is it too reductive to say

8:04

that or to characterize this as being

8:06

primarily a territorial

8:09

issue or a geographic issue

8:11

? And the reason I ask is I guess , I wonder

8:13

, in another world , where there was some

8:15

piece of undeclared , uninhabited

8:18

land that was amenable to Jews

8:21

and that was Israel

8:23

was built out of that cloth and it didn't

8:25

intersect in any way with any other

8:27

type of National community , would

8:30

we have the same issue ?

8:32

Even with that inhabited ? No , I

8:34

don't think . I don't think you would have , but it wasn't

8:36

happening right and so yet that

8:38

that's really what it is . It

8:40

becomes a territorial conflict

8:43

when people begin to think about okay , how

8:45

are we going to square this circle , how are we

8:47

going to treat both of these peoples

8:50

? And they're increasingly seen themselves as people

8:52

fairly , and so the idea of Partition

8:55

comes up . It comes up as early as

8:57

the 1930s , like let's just divide

8:59

this territory , let's make it a territorial conflict

9:01

. That's the sort of thing where you can sit down

9:03

and negotiate borders and so on , and

9:05

it's a controversial idea . It's not accepted

9:07

by large portions of either

9:10

side , but that's when it becomes

9:12

seen , at least partly as a territorial

9:14

conflict .

9:16

So you mentioned Negotiating

9:18

borders , and I guess that brings me

9:20

to my next question , which is since

9:22

, essentially , its creation History

9:24

in this area is riddled with some

9:26

type of negotiated piece in the Middle East

9:28

. But if we take this in the context

9:30

, as you've just explained it , and then we consider

9:33

the events of October 7th , which I want to talk about in

9:35

a minute , generally , in hindsight , it does

9:37

appear as if these negotiations have

9:39

all been failures . They haven't amounted

9:41

to any type of long-standing

9:43

or enduring piece . So is it fair to characterize

9:46

the situation this way , or is there maybe some

9:48

more nuance that you know Isn't entirely

9:50

obvious to me or that I'm not

9:52

capturing ?

9:53

There's a little bit more nuance . But I think

9:55

a failure is Definitely

9:59

an appropriate term to use . If

10:01

what you mean by success is some kind

10:03

of negotiated peaceful settlement that is

10:05

acceptable to all parties

10:07

. That just hasn't happened . There

10:09

have been some long-term arrangements to be negotiated

10:12

. So , state of Israel , this glare in 1948

10:15

. There is at that point

10:17

a series of armistice agreements

10:19

negotiated between the new state of Israel

10:22

and the surrounding Arab states . So

10:24

this is not just a cease-fire , it's an armistice

10:26

. There are lines drawn up , there is

10:28

some kind of idea of starting

10:31

some kind of process for negotiating

10:33

some kind of more , something more

10:35

permanent even than an armistice

10:37

. Those go nowhere and it

10:40

kind of sits there for about 20 years or so

10:42

. That is to say , this was a situation

10:44

that didn't kind of press itself as

10:46

Critical or urgent . You know

10:48

it would be flirt , flare ups and sometimes , you know

10:50

, in 1956 it was an actual

10:53

war . But those periods aside

10:55

, the armistice basically seemed to

10:57

hold and there wasn't a lot

10:59

of pressing diplomatic attention to

11:01

Resolving it . If what again at

11:03

what we need by resolution is some kind of permanent

11:06

settlement acceptable to all parties , that's really

11:08

. It only happens in 1967

11:10

, when there's an Israeli Arab War

11:12

which winds up with Israel in control

11:15

of the entire territory of Palestine

11:17

, the West Bank and Gaza , which would

11:19

be , which are with those parts of Palestine

11:22

that they hadn't controlled at the end of

11:24

the 1948 war . There's something

11:26

control of all of this . This is when

11:28

you begin to get a UN Security

11:30

Council resolutions on the subject , when you

11:32

begin to get periodic high-level

11:34

diplomacy and the United States Intermittently

11:38

gets involved in trying to find

11:40

some kind of negotiated settlement , first

11:42

between Israel and the surrounding Arab states

11:44

, and then later on between Israel and

11:47

Palestinians .

11:48

And so then , october 7th last year

11:50

. So to someone like me , this

11:53

seems to have come out of nowhere , but I wonder

11:55

if perhaps this was

11:57

inevitable and maybe , maybe

12:00

the timing wasn't as predictable

12:02

, but to folks like , maybe

12:04

yourself , that this was Inevitable

12:07

, maybe on the margins , the scale

12:09

was a bit of a surprise . To that end , can

12:11

you help explain , maybe

12:13

, what happened on October

12:15

7th of last year and kind of the subsequent

12:17

events since , but in doing so , the

12:20

why of it and and and and how

12:22

we can understand these events in the context of the

12:24

history that you've just explained to us ?

12:26

I'm sure it has a very complex

12:29

background . It was deeply

12:31

shocking and it is , I think , an important

12:33

transition point . But it doesn't come out of

12:35

nowhere as you suggest . So

12:38

in the mid 1990s

12:40

the Israeli and Palestinian

12:42

leadership finally began to try to come to

12:44

terms with each other as national

12:47

communities . So the Israeli leadership under

12:49

Yusuf Rabin was in prime

12:51

minister , palestinian leadership

12:53

, head of the PLO , palestinian liberation organization

12:56

, yasser Harfa , essentially say we're

12:58

going to recognize each other as a legitimate

13:01

and we will sit down and negotiate

13:03

Some kind of final

13:05

agreement between the two of us . While we

13:07

are doing that , palestinians

13:09

in the West Bank and Gaza will be allowed some

13:11

measure of autonomy and be allowed to manage

13:13

their own affairs . And the problem

13:16

was that the first part of that was

13:18

just got nowhere . Any kind of Israeli

13:21

, palestinian agreement , peace settlement

13:23

just didn't happen . The negotiations

13:26

were basically still born . The

13:28

second part of that , palestinian autonomy

13:30

, in the meantime was Imperfectly

13:33

implemented . But you do have this creation

13:35

called the Palestinian Authority that

13:37

is supposed to be governing Palestinian from

13:40

the West Bank and Gaza when the first

13:42

part of that process , the peace process between

13:44

Israel and Palestine , is collapsed in

13:46

and there's violence who is referred

13:48

to as the Palestinian uprising of

13:50

of 2000 , subsequent

13:52

years happened . The conflict

13:54

enters a new phase in in

13:57

that 2006

13:59

you have an attempt

14:02

to sort of reconfigure things

14:04

on the Palestinian side with

14:06

new Palestinian elections , which

14:08

the Americans , the international community are very

14:11

supportive of saying look , if we can get a strong Palestinian

14:13

leadership out of this , then we will be

14:15

able to kind of resume negotiations with

14:17

Israel and those elections , for

14:20

a variety of reasons , produce a

14:22

majority In palace , in parliament

14:24

, read by Hamas , this Islamic

14:27

movement , which says we reject this

14:29

entire negotiation process . And that was

14:31

a problem . The Israelis reacted

14:33

and the Americans reacted saying essentially

14:35

, this is unacceptable and

14:38

the there was an attempt essentially

14:40

to bring pressure on the Palestinian

14:43

political system to get rid

14:45

of Hamas and it wound up not

14:47

with getting rid of Hamas but with essentially

14:50

an intra-Palestinian civil war , with

14:53

one half of it having control of the West

14:55

Bank that's run by Fata , when

14:57

the Palestinian political action is

14:59

head by Mahmoud Amaraz and

15:02

Hamas is in control of Gaza . So

15:04

that's a situation that exists . From

15:06

2007 forwards . Hamas

15:09

has always said we're not about running Gaza

15:11

. We didn't start , you know , the Islamic

15:14

resistance movement , which is the full name of Hamas

15:16

in Arabic , the Islamic resistance movement

15:18

. We didn't start Hamas in order to

15:20

become Municipal administrators

15:23

in the Gaza Strip , and so they

15:25

were always looking for some way to break

15:27

out of this , to maintain their hold in

15:29

Gaza . Not be thrown out of

15:31

Gaza that's kind of a total in Palestinian

15:33

politics but somehow

15:35

move things forward . Their periodic

15:37

outbursts of rocket fire from

15:40

Gaza Israel , israel respond

15:42

extremely harshly , periodic rounds

15:44

of fighting . When I first heard

15:46

the news on October 6th , I

15:49

thought what I thought was this is a replay of that

15:51

. This is another attempt

15:54

by Hamas essentially to let people

15:56

know we're still here . For

15:58

whatever reason , mass

16:00

chose a much more ambitious

16:03

set of attacks , one

16:05

that resulted in 1200 Israeli

16:07

casualties along the

16:10

the border of Gaza , and so

16:12

the idea that Hamas was trying to

16:15

break out of this , that Hamas was saying

16:17

the status quo , is unacceptable . There's the fact

16:19

that Hamas was trying to upset the

16:21

apple cart . None of that was news

16:23

. The extent of success

16:25

that they had and the number of

16:27

casualties Was deeply

16:30

shocking . I think it was probably a surprise to

16:32

the Hamas leadership itself , but

16:34

it was also one that Generated

16:36

an extremely strong reaction

16:38

in Israeli society , an interpretation

16:41

that said basically okay , we

16:43

thought we had some kind of modus the bendy

16:45

. Now we discovered that really

16:48

a lot of Israelis reacting this way Hamas

16:50

wants us dead . That's their agenda

16:52

. There's no compromise , there's no

16:55

living with this group . We have to destroy

16:57

it , and so that's how this , these

16:59

October attacks , really became a C

17:02

change . A conflict that had

17:04

been bitter and violent

17:06

, but sort of carry it out within

17:08

some kind of constraints . Suddenly

17:10

all constraints were off .

17:12

I You've touched on this , I

17:14

think inherent in your response

17:16

, but we hear often about a two-state

17:19

solution . What I know is that

17:21

it's not a viable

17:23

solution for Israelis or for

17:25

Israel , and it's

17:28

something that Palestinians

17:30

desperately want . And , primarily

17:32

, I don't know if this is the reason . Gaza

17:35

is often referred to as like an open-air

17:37

prison and , as you kind of

17:39

mentioned , you know it's more of like a municipal

17:41

administration than it is any type

17:43

of autonomous governing situation

17:46

. I would assume that a two-state solution

17:48

would solve that problem . Can

17:50

you help me understand why it's not a viable option

17:52

for Israel ?

17:54

Well , yeah , I would say it's a

17:56

bit more complicated than that

17:58

. So the idea of territorial partition , essentially

18:01

you have a Jewish entity , the

18:03

national entity and the Palestinian

18:05

national entity . That goes back to the 1930s

18:09

, when the idea is first proposed . And

18:11

you know there are all

18:13

kinds of questions okay , where are you going to draw the line

18:16

? And what happens with Palestinians

18:18

who live within the Jewish national entity

18:20

, and this sort of thing , and it's unpopular

18:23

. First , from a Palestinian point of view

18:25

, they're saying wait a second , we're at the parliament

18:27

30th , we're the vast majority in this country

18:29

. By all means , you know , jews are welcome

18:31

to stay here , but those who are already

18:33

here ? But we can't

18:36

be dividing this place

18:38

in half . We're at this point , you know , 80

18:40

, 90% of the population , and so

18:42

it was rejected on that side in 1948

18:45

, actually , when the British mandate ended

18:47

. The British said we can't handle this situation anymore

18:50

, we're pulling out . And the United Nations set

18:52

up a special committee on Palestine which

18:54

recommended partition . And

18:56

once again the Palestinian

18:58

leadership said hold on a second . This isn't

19:00

fair . This isn't the way to do

19:03

it . We can have a single state that is

19:05

home for everybody . The partition

19:07

plan divides us incredibly unfairly

19:10

. We reject the plan . And so

19:12

up until really

19:14

the 1970s

19:16

, the bulk of the Palestinian national movement

19:18

said forget about partition . We need

19:20

a Palestinian state which

19:23

includes Christians , jews , muslims

19:26

, palestinians , israelis , everybody

19:28

. In the 1970s Palestinian

19:30

national leadership began to think well

19:32

, maybe the best we can get is partition

19:34

. And not until 1988

19:37

do they formally declare

19:39

what they call a palatination . A palatination

19:41

, a declaration of independence which recognizes

19:44

the United Nations partition plan from

19:46

1948 . They say this

19:48

was unfair . But look

19:50

, we'll accept it . And then it

19:53

becomes kind of a question from the Palestinian point

19:55

of view of negotiating a two-state outcome

19:57

with Israel . Where are you going to draw the line

19:59

? Who's going to have which kinds of rights

20:01

? What about Palestinians who've been forced out

20:03

of this territory , refugees and Lebanon

20:05

surrounding countries ? Do they get to come back ? Those

20:08

are the sorts of things we'll have to negotiate . But

20:10

fundamentally we accept a two-state solution

20:12

. Israeli leadership didn't sign on at that

20:14

point . They said , beginning

20:16

in the 1990s okay , we'll

20:19

recognize Palestinians as a national

20:21

community . You have the Oslo

20:23

Accord , there's some agreement between Yitzhakar

20:25

Biman and Yasser Arafat . They said

20:27

we'll recognize you as a national community

20:29

, we'll recognize each other . But the Israelis

20:32

held out . They said we're

20:34

not agreeing to a Palestinian state . Maybe

20:36

as part of negotiation we'll

20:38

agree to that . And so you had

20:41

the Palestinians at this point pressing

20:43

much stronger for a Palestinian

20:45

state and pressing for a two-state solution

20:48

, and the Israelis won't endorse

20:50

it . The Americans won't endorse it . My

20:52

favorite example here is in 1998

20:55

, hillary Clinton , which she was first lady , said

20:57

in a public address made some reference to a Palestinian

21:00

state being an outcome of the negotiation process

21:02

. The White House spokesman says the next day

21:04

she doesn't speak for the White House , and

21:07

she was living in the White House but she didn't speak for it . And

21:09

so the idea of a Palestinian state and

21:11

two-state solution was unspeakable

21:14

from the Israeli and the American side . Then

21:16

people thought that it might be a possible

21:19

outcome , but they said essentially that's a reward

21:21

to hold out for the Palestinians . It's something

21:23

that will come only if they give concessions , all

21:25

kinds of concessions . So not

21:28

until the 2000s does there

21:30

become as much stronger international

21:32

consensus for Palestinian state . Bill

21:34

Clinton mentioned the idea at the very

21:37

, very final date of his presidency

21:39

. George Bush picks it up

21:41

, and that's when you have the phrase

21:44

two-state solution , enter the international

21:46

ex-Akharis . Well , of course everybody knows

21:48

what the solution is . There needs to be a two-state solution

21:51

and now let's negotiate the details . That's

21:53

really only that . That kind

21:56

of thinking is really only about two

21:58

decades old , a little bit more than two decades

22:00

old . And the problem was that

22:03

, although the idea then gets accepted

22:05

diplomatically internationally

22:07

, you've got problems on both sides

22:09

Israeli and Palestinian side where people are turning

22:12

away from it . On the Israeli side he said wait

22:14

a second . You know , we agreed

22:16

to the construction of Palestinian authority and

22:19

that's not even a state . And look how many , how

22:21

much problems are causing us with the anti-farm

22:23

or the election of Hamas . Forget this

22:25

. We're not , we're not so sold on the idea

22:27

of a two-state solution

22:29

. So you have Israelis turning their backs on

22:32

it and you have an Israeli right wing that's

22:34

growing more powerful saying hold

22:36

on a second , that territory

22:38

that's allocated for a Palestinian state , that's

22:40

part of our historic homeland . As Jews

22:43

we can't give that up . So

22:45

you have the Israeli population

22:47

sort of slowly swinging against

22:49

it . Now the Palestinian side

22:52

. They're saying hey , we agreed

22:54

to this peace process , we agreed

22:56

to go along , and it's not delivering a Palestinian

22:58

state . It's not that we're against

23:00

a two-state solution , but we've

23:02

got to wake up and smell the coffee . It's not

23:04

happening and talk about a two-state

23:07

solution and this international

23:09

, all these international conferences , is just

23:11

a way to mask the reality on the ground

23:13

, which is taking us step

23:15

by step , every single day , in the wrong

23:17

direction for us . And then , of course , with

23:19

the split between West Bank and Gaza

23:21

, between Fatah and Hamas in 2007

23:24

, you even have a split national

23:26

leadership on the Palestinian side . So

23:29

the two-state solution , which is

23:31

, as I say , something that becomes almost

23:33

every single international diplomat , begins

23:36

to endorse it about 20 years ago . It

23:38

begins to increasingly

23:41

seem like for

23:43

people on the ground , like this isn't happening

23:46

, this isn't happening anytime soon . It may

23:48

never be happening . All the trends of pointing in

23:50

a different direction . So international

23:52

diplomacy was talking one

23:54

way , while facts on the ground were moving

23:56

the other direction .

23:58

So we're recording this . On February 13th

24:01

and overnight , the US Senate

24:03

approved an aid package

24:05

for both Israel and Ukraine , but

24:07

I don't know if you've been following this . The

24:09

leadership in the House , which is

24:11

Republican leadership , has essentially

24:14

said that it's pretty much dead

24:16

on arrival , and I think that's primarily

24:18

because of the Ukraine aid that's attached to

24:20

it . This is maybe a rough characterization

24:23

, but I am interested in how this

24:25

issue , this situation

24:27

between Israel and Palestine specifically

24:29

, has evolved into a left-right

24:31

issue , with the right being more

24:33

aligned with Israel and the left being

24:35

more aligned with Palestine .

24:38

This is something that's fairly new . It's

24:40

been growing for a few

24:42

years , I wouldn't say , but

24:44

historically it hasn't been a partisan

24:47

issue , or at least not a mature sense

24:49

. There have been times when

24:51

Republicans have been seen as

24:54

more pro-Arem , or at least

24:56

less a better view of Israel , than the time that Democrats

24:58

have been seen that way . But essentially

25:01

there's a lot of continuity in policy

25:03

between Democratic and Republican

25:06

administrations , and certainly when there was a viable

25:08

peace process , which I would say during

25:11

the first Bush and the Clinton

25:13

administrations , arguing in the second

25:15

Bush administration you even have continuity

25:17

of people . Some of the same people are involved

25:20

in this . But I think things

25:22

are happening in the United States

25:24

that are pushing in a different direction in

25:26

both the Republican and Democratic parties . In

25:29

the Republican Party , there's an

25:31

increasing sense that

25:33

this is not just an

25:36

issue for Jewish Americans

25:38

, about Jewish national rights , but it

25:40

becomes increasingly an issue

25:42

for some Christian groups within

25:44

the country , and especially those that are politically

25:46

active in the Republican Party . So

25:48

you have then beginning to say

25:50

wait a second . If you're a good

25:53

Christian , you've got to support a

25:55

Jewish state in Palestine . That really

25:57

means supporting the state of Israel , and

25:59

of course there are plenty of Christians who

26:01

have all kinds of different

26:03

opinions about this . But

26:06

if you look at how it is that

26:08

those Christian leaders , associated

26:11

especially with the Republican Party and

26:13

especially with the right wing of the Republican Party

26:15

, talk , israel and

26:17

pro-Israel sentiment become larger

26:20

and larger and larger , and

26:22

it's not just pro-Israel sentiment , but

26:24

it's actually sentiments that are very sympathetic

26:26

to the arguments of the Israeli right that

26:28

say not only should Israel exist

26:31

, but Israel should have complete control

26:33

of biblical territory of Israel

26:35

, so there's no room for a Palestinian

26:37

state in all this . So that's happening in the Republican

26:39

side , on the Democratic side . I

26:42

see there as being a real generational shift

26:44

. I sense this when I teach , when I talk

26:46

to people of various generations

26:48

, that younger people

26:51

on the left will

26:53

tend to see this much more as sort

26:55

of an issue of equity , of social

26:58

justice and so on . So

27:00

there's kind of a natural tendency

27:02

to say , okay , who's the oppressed and who's the

27:04

oppressor who got Palestinians who

27:06

are being denied national

27:09

rights , being denied human rights , and

27:11

we have an Israeli state that

27:14

is violating their human rights

27:16

, colonizing , exceeding their land and

27:18

so forth and so on . And these arguments

27:20

resonate in , especially in younger

27:22

progressive circles , and it's a problem

27:24

, I think , for the Democratic Party , because it got

27:27

essentially a split base an older

27:29

generation that looked at Israel

27:31

one way as being sort of an American

27:34

ally , as being

27:36

a hero , a small country that

27:38

managed to defend itself

27:41

, created out of the ashes of the Holocaust

27:43

, and so on . That resonates with an

27:45

older generation of people on the left , and

27:47

the younger generation that says hold on a

27:49

second , you know you're going to tell us a Black

27:51

Lives Matter , but Palestinian lives , don't ? We

27:54

see some continuity here

27:56

and that's something that becomes , I

27:58

think , more pronounced

28:01

, really , even just within the last four

28:03

or five years or so .

28:05

So I want to dig into a couple of things that you

28:07

talked about , and I don't quite know how

28:09

to separate out political ideology

28:11

in this , and maybe that's

28:13

the point , but there are three

28:16

areas of interest that are

28:18

at play in the region . There's

28:20

obviously more , but there are three that I want

28:22

to talk about , and one is the Israeli government

28:24

. There is American involvement

28:26

, and then the third is Arab world

28:28

interests in the region and how these

28:30

interplay and exacerbate

28:33

or maybe temper the situation

28:35

in the region . So let's start with Israel , though

28:37

. So Netanyahu's government , his current

28:39

government , is characterized as being

28:41

the most conservative , the most far right

28:44

government in Israel's history , and

28:46

you know he's , rightly or wrongly , taking

28:48

a lot of heat for the events of October

28:50

7th , both the events of that day and

28:52

Israel's response to it . The

28:55

opinion generally seems to be shifting against

28:57

him , not just in Israel , but globally , and

28:59

again , fairly or unfairly . I'm not taking

29:02

a side here , but I do wonder how Netanyahu's

29:04

government has influenced the

29:06

situation , for the good or the bad .

29:09

Well , yeah , this is a

29:11

government that is a

29:13

coalition , and it's a coalition

29:15

, I would say , between sort

29:17

of the traditional is really right , which

29:19

is nationalistic Israel

29:22

is hostile to the idea of territorial

29:25

compromise with the Palestinians , but willing

29:27

to count some

29:29

variation of it and then

29:31

what might be considered the far right

29:34

, but which is what I would call sort of the nationalist

29:36

religious camp , and this is

29:38

a group there's a couple

29:40

of political parties in it who

29:42

tend to be drawn much more

29:44

from Orthodox Jews , who see

29:47

this not just as a national

29:49

conflict between Israelis and Palestinians but

29:52

really focus on Zionism's

29:54

religious nature and say

29:56

, essentially , this is the territory

29:59

that was promised to us in the

30:01

Bible , this is Jewish land

30:03

and non-Jews are here

30:06

, but they're not going to

30:08

be full set of this fundamentally a

30:11

Jewish country and

30:13

it has to remain so , and any sort

30:15

of territorial compromises is

30:17

unacceptable and

30:19

that's been always there on the

30:21

far right of the Israeli political factor

30:24

. But they're now essential members of

30:26

this current growing coalition and

30:28

they certainly affect policy . When

30:31

the October crisis

30:33

happened , Netanyahu was able to widen

30:36

his cabinet slightly and bring in some

30:38

people a little bit more from the center , but

30:41

that far right , that national religious

30:43

camp is still very much in their

30:45

. They've got key ministries like finance

30:47

. They've got internal security ministry and

30:50

so they're certainly able to affect policy

30:52

to block revenue transfers

30:54

, to give essentially

30:56

some cover to

30:58

Jews in West Bank or Tak Palestinians

31:01

, and they're definitely affecting

31:04

policy . They make it very difficult

31:06

when it comes to any kind of pressure

31:09

to limit the scale of the fighting in Gaza

31:11

, to protect civilians

31:13

or that sort of thing . This

31:15

group can really try

31:18

to throw a monkey wrench in any

31:20

sort of diplomatic

31:23

efforts .

31:24

This is maybe rank speculation , but

31:26

does this current conflict

31:28

doom Netanyahu's

31:31

leadership ?

31:32

People have said that and I think ultimately

31:34

it probably will , but it's not clear

31:37

. So in Israeli political terms

31:39

, there are people who could

31:41

never stand in Netanyahu and

31:44

the country might be divided 50-50

31:46

prior to the recent

31:48

outbreak and it would pretty much down the

31:50

middle on the pro versus anti

31:52

Netanyahu . His personality was really almost

31:54

the center of Israeli politics . What

31:57

happened we'll talk about some of what it did

31:59

was convince even some Israelis

32:02

who were kind of in the pro Netanyahu camp

32:04

. Hold on a second . This was an enormous

32:06

disaster . He's got to take responsibility

32:09

and that's never

32:11

been Netanyahu's strong suit . So

32:13

the idea that

32:16

his political career would be over

32:18

soon as the Israeli

32:21

response was deciding you don't throw

32:23

somebody over in the middle of warfare but

32:25

as soon as this is over , netanyahu's

32:27

got to go that began to spread and be accepted

32:29

pretty widely and certainly his standing in public

32:32

opinion polls has absolutely plummeted

32:34

and if there were to be

32:36

an election today , his party would lose

32:39

conceivably half of its seats

32:41

. He couldn't put together a

32:43

coalition today . No-transcript

32:47

. The war keeps going and there is

32:49

now a slightly

32:51

broader coalition that's keeping him as

32:53

prime minister . So it's

32:55

not clear that there's going to be any end to the war

32:57

anytime soon ? If you ask

33:00

me , is Netanyahu going to be prime minister

33:02

two years from now ? I would say probably

33:04

not , but it's no

33:07

longer looking as certain as it did

33:09

immediately after the October

33:11

attacks .

33:12

We talked a little bit about the political

33:14

situation related to Israel in the United States

33:18

and the evolving partisan divide

33:20

, but I am interested in the

33:23

not only American involvement but the

33:25

position that America or the United

33:27

States may end up taking , as

33:29

it relates to not just aid for Israel

33:32

but support generally for Israel , and

33:34

it does seem like both parties

33:36

right now are . I almost feel like

33:39

the best way to characterize this is chaos

33:41

. The Republican party is divided , there

33:44

are hardline Republican supporters

33:46

of Israel and there are hardline

33:48

nationalists on the right that

33:51

would rather be more conservative , with

33:53

at least the financing side of it , and

33:55

then , as we discussed , related to

33:57

the generational divide on the Democratic

33:59

side and support for Israel v Palestine

34:02

. And then you have President Biden , who

34:04

seems to be struggling

34:06

with landing

34:08

on a position , or at least that position

34:10

is evolving from what we understand

34:12

. You know he has a very public support

34:14

for Israel , but it seems as if , privately

34:17

, he's evolving a bit and frustrated

34:19

with Netanyahu and he's definitely

34:21

alluding to more sympathetic

34:24

position as it relates to Palestinians

34:26

. And I guess I'm wondering how much this

34:28

chaos in the United States could

34:31

have a tangible impact on

34:33

the tension in the region and where

34:35

you , given I suppose the history

34:37

and the current situation in the United States see

34:39

this going .

34:41

I think it has had a real effect . I mean

34:43

, the Biden administration

34:45

began with essentially

34:48

an unlimited and

34:50

unqualified public

34:52

support for Israel and

34:54

that was remarkable . It caused

34:57

discontent among some

34:59

younger members of the Democratic Party

35:01

and others , but it was absolutely

35:04

remarkable . You know , by personally

35:07

visiting Israel . You have the United

35:09

States publicly opposing and continuing

35:11

to publicly oppose calls for a ceasefire

35:14

. You have the Americans

35:16

saying things like you know , this

35:18

can't end with a mass storm

35:21

power and essentially endorsing some

35:23

of Israel's warings . I

35:25

think there was a little bit more nuance

35:27

in private and that may have grown

35:29

a little bit . There was an attempt , I

35:31

think , by the United States to persuade Israel not

35:34

to widen their conflict to Iran and

35:36

Lebanon and so on , and that was successful

35:38

. And there was an attempt to sort of gently pressure

35:40

Israel saying , okay , if you win

35:42

this war , then what are you going to do ? What are you

35:44

going to do on the day after ? But that was pretty gentle

35:47

and it was probably a lot more private

35:49

than in public as the war

35:51

has gone on , as

35:53

the extent that destruction

35:56

of lives and property in Gaza has

35:58

mounted and we

36:01

created a situation which something

36:03

like 80% of the population in Gaza

36:05

has been driven from their homes , they've

36:08

leveled schools and universities

36:10

and so on . This amount of destruction , and

36:13

as it goes on and on , and

36:15

as it's clear that the Israelis

36:17

will not articulate any

36:20

kind of vision for

36:22

any sort of post-war situation

36:24

that would be at all viable for Palestinians , there

36:27

is evidence of discomfort , but

36:29

we're also getting closer and closer to

36:31

the November election , and

36:33

so I think what the Biden administration has

36:35

done is essentially begin to

36:38

signal discontent a little bit

36:40

in public , but also through the leaking of context

36:42

, and you'll see this sometimes

36:44

. Biden is frustrated . He's used

36:47

a few obscenities to refer to Netanyahu

36:49

, and this gets leaked to the Israeli press

36:52

and so on . But I think

36:54

the real attempt is

36:56

, by a presidential

36:58

reelection campaign that is trying

37:01

to square this circle , of taking essentially

37:04

a pro-Israeli policy and trying

37:06

to sort of wink nudge , nudge

37:08

to opponents within

37:10

the democratic base saying , don't

37:13

worry , we're really pressured Israel behind

37:15

the scenes .

37:17

And I don't want to overlook the

37:19

players here are not the United States , palestine

37:21

and Israel . This is much more of a

37:23

global issue , but particularly

37:27

for Arab neighbors

37:29

in the region , and I don't want to

37:31

overlook the impact that this

37:33

conflict has on them and also

37:35

their role in the

37:37

region . So I don't want to paint all

37:40

Arab countries with a broad brush , but I

37:42

do wonder if we can talk a little bit about some of the

37:44

bigger players in the region and how they've

37:46

been contributing to the present conflict or

37:48

not , and the role that they're playing now .

37:51

Sure . So there are some key

37:54

actors within the region , but you

37:56

almost have to distinguish between the policies

37:59

of states and their leaders and

38:01

sort of general opinion within the region

38:03

. General opinion within the region

38:05

, outside of Israel , within the Arab world , sees

38:08

this as I don't know . The terms used

38:10

are extremely strong . We

38:12

might refer to the United States very

38:14

often . You know war in Gaza , this is a war

38:16

on Gaza . This is genocidal

38:18

. This is Israel's attack , Israel's attempt

38:21

to eliminate the Palestinian people , and

38:23

so it's an extremely strong language

38:26

being used and the United States

38:28

is being seen as essentially

38:30

aiding and embedding and even

38:32

arming and supplying an Israeli

38:35

attack on an entire people . That's

38:37

how it's generally

38:39

seen within the region . There's

38:42

not a lot of dissent from that . At the

38:44

same time , you have states involved , that

38:46

who basically reoriented

38:49

themselves over the last generation

38:51

or so to say . Essentially , look

38:53

, we're states , we have interest

38:55

, yeah , we've got sympathies for the Palestinians

38:57

, but we're not going to make that the centerpiece

38:59

of all of our policy within the region

39:01

. Israel's a strong state . It's not going

39:04

away . Let's just work out some kind of modus

39:06

vendi that might be something

39:09

quiet or it might be actually

39:11

normal diplomatic relation . It's

39:13

difficult for those states

39:15

to move forward with

39:17

anything more on public wildest wars

39:20

going on , and so

39:22

they have kind

39:24

of found a position where they

39:27

say we're not going to break ties with

39:29

Israel over this , but we're not

39:31

going to move forward at all , or

39:33

states like Saudi Arabia that have not established

39:35

ties with Israel won't take the step of

39:37

doing so unless they get specific

39:40

things in return . And what they need to

39:42

hear from Israel is we're actually going

39:44

to sign on to a process

39:47

that leads to a two state solution , and

39:49

especially for Saudi Arabia . This

39:51

isn't just about Israel , it's also about the United States

39:53

. They're saying the United States , you want

39:55

us to accept Israel within the region

39:58

. Not only do you have to deliver something

40:00

from Israel , but you have to deliver something to us

40:02

. You have to give us a security guarantee

40:04

, and then we'll sign on to this American

40:07

view of the region .

40:09

You know , in a lot of ways , for

40:11

all of the intervention in a conflict

40:13

and here I'm talking across , you know , many countries

40:15

, across many decades it feels

40:18

as if we seem to consistently be

40:20

kind of just in the same place . Or maybe

40:22

worse , if we take into consideration

40:24

October 7th , and I guess it's

40:26

really difficult not to see this

40:28

as an unsolvable

40:31

issue , and by that

40:33

I'm talking about to some type of an

40:35

end that's agreeable maybe , if

40:37

not endorseable , to all

40:39

of the parties involved . When you think

40:41

about this , do you see this as something that has

40:43

a solution ?

40:45

It has a solution that you know way to get there . There

40:47

are all kinds of solutions and

40:49

I think a lot of the problem policy

40:52

thinking is that there's been a lot

40:54

of focus on the solution and a

40:56

lot of wishful thinking about how to get there . So

40:58

, two-state solution , israel

41:00

and Palestine living peacefully side by side Great

41:03

, how do you get there ? We're actually

41:05

moving farther apart from that . So you throw up

41:07

your hand and say , okay , you're not going to

41:09

have a two-state solution , let's have one state with

41:11

equal rights for everybody . Well , israelis

41:14

will say , especially the

41:16

Israeli . Jews will say wait a second , we've

41:18

got our own state right now . You want us

41:20

to dissolve in a state where we still become

41:23

the minority ? No thanks , how

41:25

do you get there ? So I think

41:27

, in terms of being

41:30

insoluble and fitter , no , but

41:32

in insoluble in practice , I think it is

41:34

At least for the next , I

41:36

would say the short to medium term . A

41:38

generation later , things will

41:41

look different . I mean , all sorts of things look different

41:43

. Germany

41:47

and France fought through rewards in 70 years

41:50

that became allies . Something

41:52

different is possible . I

41:54

didn't think , if you'd ask me in the 1970s

41:57

, when I was a kid , when will apartheid

41:59

end in South Africa and I'd say half

42:02

a century from now it ended . So

42:05

there are ways this might be different , but

42:07

in terms of becoming different

42:09

anytime soon or there being

42:11

any viable process that can

42:13

lead to some kind of peaceful

42:15

outcome , I don't see that as likely . Honestly

42:18

. I don't think it's likely in my lifetime

42:21

.

42:21

If we talk about just the present conflict

42:24

, have you given any thought to how you think

42:26

this might end ?

42:28

Yes , and my short answer is that

42:30

I'm not sure that it will . It

42:32

will not end with a bang

42:35

, but with a lot of whippery . So

42:37

when people talk to

42:39

immediately after the beginning

42:42

of the Israeli military campaign , they will say

42:44

what would happen the day after the conflict

42:46

. And I remember thinking at the time

42:48

I'm not sure there will be a clear day

42:50

after there's an Israeli military

42:52

campaign with a set

42:54

of articulated goals about eliminating

42:57

Hamas military capability and

42:59

eliminating its government that

43:01

are kind of open-ended . Also

43:04

, the kinds of security measures that Israel

43:06

has been openly talking about are

43:08

ones that remain in a permanent presence

43:10

in Gaza in some way , shape or form . They've

43:12

been creating buffer zones , they've been destroying

43:15

neighborhoods and towns and

43:17

villages , and they've been talking

43:19

about the same things like Israel

43:21

is . Only Israel could be responsible for its

43:23

own security in Gaza , which implies

43:25

some continuing level of military operations

43:28

and so on . So I think that what we're

43:30

looking at is a situation

43:32

in which , in the absence of

43:34

some kind of grand political

43:36

settlement , a grand diplomatic outcome

43:39

, the kinds that the United States is pursuing , what

43:41

you'll see instead is a situation

43:43

in which you have lower-level conflict

43:46

, continued Israeli sort

43:48

of occupation of less inhabited

43:51

areas in Gaza , a

43:53

rearrangement of Gaza population

43:55

, a prohibition on gossips

43:57

, doing much in terms of rebuilding

44:00

and a way in which

44:02

humanitarian aid is channeled in

44:04

through agencies in the Israelis

44:06

find acceptable , and this being essentially

44:09

the indefinite future . That's

44:11

what I think is a situation that we're

44:14

moving towards , that we're already in its halfway

44:16

towards .

44:17

All right , final question you ready for it ? Sure

44:19

, what's something interesting you've been reading

44:21

, watching , listening to or doing lately , oh

44:24

gosh .

44:25

Well , this is honestly

44:27

the most depressing time to follow this in

44:29

my professional career , so

44:31

some of the things I've been doing and

44:33

reading have been trying to distract myself

44:35

from it . But I think for those people who are interested

44:38

in following this , I think there's . You

44:40

know , these are lively societies

44:42

. It's just an awful time . Israeli

44:45

press is very accessible in

44:47

English . I mean , there's the aren'ts , there's

44:50

the post , there's times in Israel . There's

44:52

ways to follow kind of the Israeli debates

44:54

on this that are kind of a little bit like

44:56

breaking from a fire hose sometimes . On

44:58

the Palestinian side there's an awful

45:00

lot less that's accessible in English

45:02

. That's actually part

45:04

of the Palestinian problem . This is a havin' problem

45:06

articulating their selves , their positions

45:09

, in ways that international community can understand

45:11

. There's actually even an outfit in Beirut

45:13

, however , called the Zetunis

45:15

Center Z-E-I-T-O-N-T-O-U-N-E-H

45:20

. It's called the Zetunis Center , which is they're

45:23

actually the pro-Hamas think tank , so you want to find

45:25

out just what this conflict looks like

45:27

from a completely different point of view . That's

45:31

something that's real interesting to watch

45:33

as well . International

45:35

crisis groups give some great

45:37

sort of overall analytical reports

45:39

. For those people who've got time and don't

45:42

mind , 40-page documents with lots of

45:44

what notes of international crisis groups . Finally

45:46

, I would say , if it doesn't sound too

45:49

egotistical , there's a collection

45:51

that a colleague of mine with the Carnegie

45:53

Endowment and I have been trying

45:55

to put out . We're trying

45:57

to communicate from various points

45:59

of view . Just one of the relevant debates how

46:02

do people see this conflict ? We first

46:04

had a group of Israelis right in saying here's

46:06

the debates that are going on in Israel and then a group of Palestinians

46:09

saying here's the debates that are

46:11

going on . There's a couple more installments

46:13

on that , international

46:15

regional actors and so on . So

46:17

that's at the Carnegie Endowment wwwceiporg

46:23

. You can see that governance

46:26

and Gaza collection . So those would

46:28

be some things to read . But I'd also

46:30

say that anybody who is interested

46:32

in following this , you'll probably

46:34

wind up being a little bit discouraged

46:36

and dismayed . So have some

46:39

good distracting novel to turn to

46:41

when the reality is a little

46:43

bit too much .

46:44

Dr Brown , thanks for taking the time . I've

46:46

really appreciated the conversation , thank you

46:48

. I

46:55

want to close this episode with a plea

46:57

to our better angels . In

46:59

the contemporary world , where conflicts

47:01

such as the one in Gaza continue to arise

47:04

, the imperative of compassion for

47:06

all individuals , especially civilians caught

47:08

in conflict zones , cannot be overstated

47:10

. The essence of compassion lies

47:12

in the recognition of a shared humanity

47:15

, an acknowledgement that , regardless

47:17

of one's nationality or religion or

47:19

political beliefs , every person deserves

47:21

to live in safety , peace and dignity . The

47:23

conflict in Gaza , a symbol of longstanding

47:26

disputes and hostilities , underscores

47:28

the dire consequences that ensue when

47:30

compassion is overshadowed by animosity

47:33

and aggression . Civilians

47:35

in these conflict zones often bear the brunt of

47:37

the suffering they are subjected to , the horrors

47:39

of violence , displacement , loss

47:41

of loved ones and the destruction

47:43

of their homes and communities , and the

47:46

psychological and physical scars inflicted upon

47:48

these individuals can span generations

47:50

, perpetuating cycles of grief and

47:53

hostility and suffering Compassion

47:56

. Compassion means advocating for and

47:58

implementing policies that first protect

48:00

civilians , ensuring that they have

48:02

access to humanitarian aid and

48:04

supporting efforts to rebuild what has been

48:07

lost . It involves listening to the stories

48:09

of all of those who have suffered , acknowledging

48:12

their pain and taking concrete steps to

48:14

alleviate their suffering . Compassion

48:16

should prompt international actors and conflicting

48:19

parties to prioritize diplomatic solutions

48:21

and peace-building measures over

48:23

military interventions , recognizing

48:25

that true security and stability are

48:28

achieved not through dominance but

48:30

through justice and mutual understanding

48:32

. The conflict in Gaza is a poignant

48:35

reminder of the devastation that arises

48:37

from a lack of compassion . It

48:39

calls upon humanity to look beyond divisions

48:41

, beyond partisanship , which is

48:43

reductive and harmful , to

48:45

see the suffering of civilians in conflict zones

48:47

and to act with empathy and resolve

48:50

. In fostering compassion for all

48:52

people , we pave the way toward a more peaceful

48:54

, just and interconnected world

48:57

. With that , I'm going to urge

48:59

us all to consider the devastation and the

49:01

pain and the horror and the hopelessness

49:03

that innocents in Israel and Palestine

49:06

are enduring right now , and

49:08

to avoid painting with a broad brush that vilifies

49:10

entire groups and to the innocent

49:12

souls that have lost their lives . Godspeed

49:15

Alright . Check

49:17

back soon for another episode of

49:19

Deep Dive dressing rooms . Translation goes back

49:41

to transg言

49:43

.