0:00

That was a great dinner. So great. Wait, where'd

0:02

you park the car? Oh, the one I just sold to Carvana.

0:04

What? When did you do that? When you were still looking

0:06

at the menu. I went on carvana.com and all

0:08

I had to do was enter the license plate or VIN, answer

0:11

a few questions, and got a real offer in seconds.

0:13

They

0:13

picked up the car already? No, I parked around

0:15

the corner. But they are picking it up tomorrow and

0:17

paying me right on the spot. Oh, no wonder you

0:19

picked up the check. Yeah, about that. Thought

0:21

we were going halvesies. Sell your car to Carvana.

0:24

Visit carvana.com or download

0:26

the app to get a real offer in seconds.

0:30

It's Monday, the 7th of August, 2023.

0:33

I'm Miranda Mitra, The Economist's international

0:35

editor. Welcome

0:38

to Editor's Picks, where this week we'll be playing

0:40

you just one highlight

0:41

from our summer double issue of deeply reported

0:43

features. Cast

0:45

your mind back to April last year. We're

0:48

back with a new edition of The Economist. It's

0:51

a new edition of The Economist. It's a

0:53

new edition of The Economist. It's a new edition

0:56

of The Economist. Cast your mind back to April

0:58

last year. A month and a half

1:01

into the war in Ukraine, after a period

1:03

of intense Russian attacks on Ukrainian

1:05

territory, Russia's Black Sea fleet

1:07

came under attack itself.

1:08

The scourge of the Black Sea

1:12

now buried at the bottom of it. But

1:14

how the Moskva got there is still

1:17

disputed.

1:18

Ukraine says it hit the ship with cruise

1:20

missiles launched from the coast. Russia

1:23

would only admit there had been an explosion on

1:25

board and it then sank in bad

1:27

weather.

1:28

It was a humiliating incident for

1:30

Russia. The sinking of the Moskva,

1:33

Russia's flagship in the Black Sea, was

1:36

the biggest naval loss since the Second

1:38

World War. But how did

1:40

this advanced warship fall to Ukraine's virtually

1:43

non-existent navy? In

1:45

this long read from our sister magazine, 1843, we

1:49

reveal Ukraine's secret weapon.

1:58

On the day that Russia invaded Ukraine, Ukraine,

2:01

a flotilla of warships from the Russian

2:03

Black Sea fleet steamed out of its

2:05

base in Sevastopol in occupied

2:07

Crimea towards a small island 120

2:10

km, that's 75 miles, south of Odessa.

2:16

This solitary speck of land, known

2:18

as Snake Island, had strategic

2:20

value beyond its size.

2:22

If it were captured, the Russian navy

2:24

would dominate the west of the Black Sea

2:27

and threaten Ukraine's coast. Snake

2:29

Island housed a radar station and was garrisoned

2:32

by a few dozen Ukrainian marines

2:34

and border guards. No match for

2:36

Russian ships.

2:38

Russian jets screamed

2:41

overhead.

2:42

A patrol boat began shelling the island,

2:44

and smaller vessels full of Russian marines

2:47

approached the jetty.

2:48

The Ukrainian defenders knew they had

2:51

little hope of resisting. They

2:53

were armed only with rifles and a few

2:55

rocket-propelled grenades. Over

2:57

the horizon appeared the great shadowing

3:00

hulk of the Muskva, the Russian

3:02

flagship, 186 metres

3:04

long and bristling with missiles.

3:07

It demanded over the radio

3:09

that the garrison surrender.

3:11

Snake Island, I, a Russian

3:13

warship, repeat our offer. Lay

3:16

down your arms and surrender or you will

3:18

be bombed. Have you understood? Do you

3:21

copy?

3:22

On a recording of the exchange, one

3:25

Ukrainian border guard can be heard remarking

3:27

to another, well, that's it then. Or

3:30

should we reply that they should fuck off? Might

3:33

as well, said the second border guard.

3:35

The first then uttered the repost that would become

3:37

a clarion call of Ukrainian resistance.

3:40

Russian warship, go fuck

3:43

yourself. The Russians

3:45

stormed the island and all communications

3:47

with the defenders were lost. The

3:50

following day, a medical team set

3:52

off to the island to retrieve the bodies of the Ukrainian

3:55

soldiers, all of whom they presumed

3:57

were dead.

3:58

As they approached, their rest rescue vessel was

4:00

hailed by a Russian ship and ordered to

4:02

stop. Soon, a dozen

4:05

members of the Russian special forces boarded

4:07

their boat and detained those on board.

4:09

A Russian officer pointed

4:11

over his shoulder at the dark grey outline

4:13

of the muskva in the distance. Do

4:16

you see her? he said. You see

4:18

how large she is? How powerful?

4:21

She can destroy not only Snake Island but

4:23

all of Ukraine.

4:25

Meanwhile, the Russian army advanced

4:27

from Crimea westwards along Ukraine's

4:30

southern coast.

4:31

Everyone expected that the Russian navy

4:33

would support it with an amphibious landing,

4:36

either in Mikhailayev, a naval base and

4:38

shipyard that was now on the front line, or,

4:41

the great prize, Odessa, which

4:43

housed the headquarters of the Ukrainian navy.

4:46

The navy mined possible landing zones.

4:49

In Odessa, volunteers filled sandbags

4:51

and strung bales of barbed wire to

4:53

defend the beaches.

4:55

Russian warships appeared so close that

4:57

people could see them on the horizon.

5:00

In Baryansk, farther to the east,

5:02

the Russians had captured a dozen Ukrainian

5:05

ships.

5:06

The Ukrainians didn't want to risk any

5:08

more falling into the hands of the enemy.

5:10

With a heavy heart, Alexei Neizhpapa,

5:13

the head of the Ukrainian navy, ordered

5:15

the scuttling in Mikhailayev harbor of his

5:17

two largest ships, including his

5:20

flagship.

5:21

This is a difficult decision for any commander,

5:23

he told me.

5:24

The Ukrainian navy was now reduced

5:27

to around three dozen vessels, mostly

5:29

patrol and supply boats.

5:32

Russian warships maneuvered close to

5:34

the coast, seeking to draw fire

5:36

in order to make the Ukrainians reveal their

5:39

artillery positions.

5:40

Then they retreated out of range and targeted

5:43

Ukrainian defences and command posts

5:45

with missiles.

5:46

The Moskva, the largest vessel of the

5:48

Russian attack force, provided air cover,

5:51

which allowed the other ships to operate unmolested.

5:54

Special shipping was throttled by the presence

5:57

of Russia's ships and mines.

5:59

the fifth largest exporter of wheat

6:02

in the world, was unable to transport

6:04

any grain.

6:06

Neizhpapa lost a number of officers

6:08

and men in those perilous days. Crucially,

6:11

though, radar installations, which allowed

6:14

the Ukrainians to identify the position of

6:16

Russian ships, escaped unharmed.

6:19

Neizhpapa realised that he had one

6:21

untested weapon that might drive the

6:23

Russian threat away from the coast.

6:26

We were counting on this being a factor of surprise

6:29

for the enemy, he said. I

6:31

was very worried that the enemy would know about

6:33

it.

6:34

After all, the enemy had a lot of agents

6:36

on the territory of Ukraine.

6:38

I was concerned about keeping it as secret

6:40

as possible,

6:41

and then, of course, using it.

6:44

The Muskva, launched in 1983

6:46

under the name Slava, was one of

6:49

three warships in her class to enter

6:51

service.

6:52

They were built in Mikhailayev in the last decade

6:54

of the Soviet Union and designed to

6:56

sink the ships of US Navy carrier

6:59

strike groups.

7:00

Its American equivalent has a wider array

7:03

of weapons, but the Slava class has

7:05

missiles with a greater range, rendering

7:07

her potentially more dangerous in a duel.

7:10

The Soviet Navy was proud of the Slava

7:12

class ships and sailors vied to

7:14

serve on them.

7:16

The cabins were comparatively large, and

7:18

there was a swimming pool in which the crew could

7:20

decompress during the months at sea.

7:24

The Soviet Black Sea Fleet, which

7:26

welcomed the Muskva, also employed

7:28

Neizhpapa's father, who served

7:31

as an officer on a rescue vessel.

7:33

Neizhpapa himself was born in 1975

7:36

and grew up in Sevastopol.

7:38

As a child, he drew pictures of warships

7:41

and dreamed of becoming a sailor too.

7:44

The Soviet Union was collapsing as Neizhpapa

7:46

entered adulthood.

7:48

He chose to stay in Sevastopol for naval

7:50

school, rather than go to St Petersburg

7:52

to study.

7:54

Neizhpapa means don't eat bread

7:56

in Cossack dialect.

7:58

The name identified him as

7:59

Ukrainian at a time when national identities

8:02

were re-emerging.

8:04

Ukraine became independent in 1991

8:07

and Neizhpapa was certain where his loyalties

8:09

lay.

8:10

"'I realised that I did not want to serve Russia,'

8:13

he said."

8:15

During Neizhpapa's first year at

8:17

naval school, Russians and Ukrainians

8:19

studied together. But when the cadets

8:21

were required to take an oath of allegiance, those

8:24

who chose Russia left for training in St

8:26

Petersburg.

8:27

A messy process of disentangling naval

8:30

assets also began after Ukrainian

8:32

independence.

8:33

Russia and Ukraine divided

8:35

the Soviet Black Sea fleet between them.

8:38

Russia got 80% of the ships, Ukraine 20%.

8:42

The two countries continued to share naval

8:45

bases and there were even cases of brothers

8:47

serving on different sides.

8:50

Relations between the cohabiting fleets

8:52

shifted according to the politics of the day,

8:55

becoming more strained in the aftermath

8:57

of Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004

9:00

and warmer when Viktor Yanukovych,

9:02

a pro-Russian president, came to power

9:04

in 2010.

9:06

There were tensions over money, salaries

9:08

in the Russian navy were much higher and

9:11

sometimes with the local authorities.

9:13

The Ukrainian police would let off Ukrainians

9:15

for traffic violations but fine the

9:17

Russians.

9:19

In 2012, Neizhpapa, by then a

9:21

captain, was invited on board the Moskva,

9:24

which had become the flagship of the Russian Black

9:26

Sea fleet.

9:27

He remembers the imposing size

9:29

of the vessel, its foredeck canted

9:31

upwards to attack.

9:33

It was armed with 16 huge

9:35

missile launchers, as large as aircraft

9:38

fuselages.

9:40

The command tower was flanked with the

9:42

domes, curved dishes and antennae

9:44

of several radar systems and the

9:46

deck swooped towards a helicopter

9:49

pad overhanging the stern.

9:51

When he stepped aboard, Neizhpapa felt

9:54

pride in tradition and also a

9:56

certain power in the cruiser.

9:59

that within a couple of years my naval

10:02

forces would sink it.

10:05

On April 13th, 2022,

10:07

Neijpapa received information that

10:09

the Muscva had been located 115 km

10:12

off the coast.

10:14

The vice-admiral is tall and imposing

10:17

with steel, close-cut hair and

10:19

bright blue eyes that seem to reflect some

10:21

distant sunny sea.

10:23

Mild-mannered but military correct,

10:25

he would not be drawn on how the Ukrainians

10:28

found the Muscva.

10:29

I can't answer your question in much detail, but

10:32

I can tell you that it was identified specifically

10:34

by the Ukrainian naval forces," he

10:36

said.

10:38

It's difficult to find warships at sea,

10:41

not least because they are designed to hide.

10:44

A ship can go quiet, turning off

10:46

communications equipment so broadcasts cannot

10:48

be intercepted, or use camouflage

10:50

to make it difficult to see from above.

10:53

Satellites can spot a ship only when

10:55

their orbit passes overhead, and most

10:58

of them cannot penetrate cloud cover.

11:00

Even when skies are clear, large

11:02

warships are mere mites of grey on

11:04

a vast grey ocean.

11:07

Most radar is limited to a range

11:09

of 20-30 km.

11:12

It can transmit and receive electromagnetic

11:14

pulses from objects only in its direct

11:16

line of sight.

11:18

Anything below the horizon remains invisible,

11:20

in the radar's so-called shadow.

11:23

The Muscva remained on the other side of

11:25

Snake Island, over 100 km away.

11:29

Neizhpapa and other naval sources

11:31

were understandably reluctant to furnish

11:34

details on when and how they

11:36

found the Muscva.

11:38

According to their version of the story, low

11:40

cloud cover that day meant that radar pulses

11:42

were reflected in such a way that extended

11:45

their reach far beyond their normal range.

11:48

The warship was found by two radar

11:50

stations on the coast, an insider told

11:52

us. We were so lucky.

11:55

But Chris Carlson, a retired captain

11:57

in the US Navy and one of the designers

11:59

of the

11:59

naval war game Harpoon 5,

12:02

which is used to train armed forces around

12:04

the world, believes that other methods

12:07

were employed.

12:09

I have a hard time attributing it to just

12:11

plain old luck, he told me.

12:13

He suggested that even if a coastal

12:15

radar station managed to ping the Muskva,

12:18

the information relayed by the Echo over

12:20

such a distance would have been insufficient

12:22

to identify the ship or target

12:25

it effectively.

12:26

Carlsen pointed out that in 2021

12:29

Ukraine had announced that its advanced

12:32

over-the-horizon radar system, called

12:34

the Mineral-U, had completed

12:36

factory testing.

12:37

It's possible that the Navy rushed it into

12:40

active service, even though the Ukrainians,

12:42

given the need for wartime secrecy, have

12:44

never admitted that they possess this capability.

12:47

Naishpoppas said that this was not

12:49

the first time the Ukrainians had spotted the

12:52

Muskva and other warships.

12:54

The Ukrainians had also deployed Bayraktars –

12:57

Turkish-made drones that became cult icons

12:59

in the early months of the war – against

13:01

the Russian fleet for observation, distraction

13:04

and attack.

13:06

It's possible that a drone may have spotted

13:08

the Muskva.

13:09

In private, Western military sources

13:12

have hinted that the Ukrainians had more

13:14

help in locating the Muskva than they like

13:16

to admit.

13:17

American military sources have confirmed

13:19

that they were asked to verify Ukraine's

13:21

sighting of the Muskva, which they probably

13:24

did through a maritime surveillance aircraft.

13:26

It was clear, however, from the predictable

13:29

changes of position made by the Muskva,

13:31

that her crew believed she was invisible.

13:35

We'll rejoin the story in a moment, but

13:37

first, just a reminder that if you subscribed

13:40

to The Economist, you can hear all of

13:42

our special summer long reads from 1843 magazine and

13:45

more. Get your first month of digital

13:47

content for free, if you're not already a subscriber,

13:51

by heading to economist.com slash podcast

13:53

offer. The link is in the show notes.

13:57

This is Editor's Picks from The Economist. This

14:00

week, the hunting of the Moskva warship.

14:04

The Ukrainian navy went into the

14:07

war with a depleted force. After

14:10

the illegal annexation of Crimea

14:12

in 2014, Russia

14:14

seized much of the Ukrainian fleet,

14:17

including 12 of the 17 ships moored in Sevastopol

14:21

at the time. Training

14:23

schools, artillery batteries and munitions

14:26

stores were claimed by the Russians. A

14:29

cohort of Ukrainian naval officers,

14:32

including three admirals, defected.

14:36

Neizhpapa, who was at home in

14:38

Sevastopol, was recalled to Odessa.

14:41

He made it across the new de facto

14:44

border, crammed into a car with his

14:46

wife, two sons, the Ukrainian

14:49

navy's head of military communications,

14:51

and all the belongings they could fit.

14:54

As they crossed to safety, Neizhpapa

14:57

had a feeling that I had been in

14:59

captivity and was free at

15:01

home. The Russians

15:04

began to modernise their newly strengthened

15:06

Black Sea fleet. The

15:09

Moskva was upgraded and

15:11

ship-to-ship Vulcan missiles installed.

15:14

These had a range of over 500 kilometres,

15:18

which allowed them to target cities too.

15:21

The Ukrainian fleet had been reduced

15:23

to a handful of ships,

15:25

one frigate and a few dozen smaller

15:28

craft.

15:29

The war in Donbass between

15:31

the Ukrainian army and Russian-backed

15:34

separatists stagnated

15:36

into a stalemate and sucked up

15:38

much of the armed forces' attention and

15:40

resources. When

15:42

Neizhpapa was made commander of the

15:45

navy in 2020 by President

15:47

Volodymyr Zelensky, who had

15:49

been elected the previous year, there

15:52

was no money or time to build

15:54

new ships. Neizhpapa

15:57

decided that what he needed most

15:59

of all

15:59

radar systems for surveillance,

16:02

minefields for coastal defence

16:05

and long-range missiles, which

16:07

Ukraine had also lost in Crimea.

16:10

The Looch Design

16:12

Bureau in Kiev, a state-owned

16:15

munitions developer since Soviet

16:17

times, had begun work on

16:19

the Neptune, a subsonic shorter-ship

16:22

missile system shortly after

16:24

the loss of Crimea. Based

16:27

on an old Soviet design, the

16:29

Neptune would have a range of over 200

16:31

kilometres. It

16:33

was ready to be tested around the time Nejpapa

16:36

assumed command. A technical

16:39

expert involved in the design, who

16:41

didn't want to be identified, showed

16:44

me a video on his phone of one of the

16:46

first live-fire tests. An

16:49

old rusty tanker had been towed

16:51

out to sea as a target, and a

16:53

small crowd of engineers and naval officers

16:56

gathered in a field close to the launcher

16:58

to await the results.

17:00

When the news came that the tanker

17:03

had been successfully hit, they

17:05

clapped and hugged each other.

17:08

Yet the government dragged its feet on funding

17:10

production, and it took an intervention

17:13

by Zelensky himself for manufacturing

17:15

to begin. I

17:18

was in this meeting, said the technical

17:20

expert. He was intelligent.

17:22

He understood that we had only three

17:25

or four operationally effective ships

17:27

in the Ukrainian navy, and that it

17:29

was not enough to protect the coastline.

17:32

Production

17:34

began in early 2021. The

17:37

first battery, comprising two

17:39

command vehicles and four launch

17:42

vehicles, each able to transport

17:44

and fire four missiles, had

17:46

been built in time to join the

17:48

annual military parade in Kiev

17:51

on August 24, Ukrainian

17:53

Independence Day. That

17:56

December, Nejpapa announced that six batteries

17:59

were in the air, and the batteries would be deployed

18:01

to the southern coast the following spring.

18:05

On the morning of February 24,

18:09

2022, the technical expert woke to the sound of,

18:11

shooting everywhere, helicopter

18:14

attacks everywhere. Russia

18:16

had invaded, and the Neptune batteries

18:18

were still parked near Kiev. They

18:21

were in jeopardy from seizure by Russian

18:23

soldiers. The

18:25

technical expert's superiors told

18:27

him to transport the missile systems

18:30

to the south of the country.

18:31

It took three days for the

18:34

launch vehicles to reach the coast.

18:36

We were worried because they

18:38

were very visibly military vehicles,

18:41

said the expert. The missiles

18:43

themselves were sent later, hidden

18:45

in trucks.

18:48

The Neptunes were first fired in March 2022

18:51

at Russian landing craft.

18:53

In April, they probably targeted

18:56

a Russian frigate called the Admiral

18:58

Essen.

18:59

That month, she was retired from

19:01

service for a few weeks, suggesting

19:04

that the damage sustained was slight,

19:06

and at smaller ships, threatening Mikhail

19:08

Lajev. A number

19:10

of sources suggested the Neptunes were

19:13

not wholly successful. The

19:15

system was untested in combat,

19:18

and there were teething problems, with the

19:20

radar, with parts failing, with

19:23

the software for identifying targets.

19:26

The technical expert told us that the missiles

19:28

had been launched from the west of Odessa

19:31

at a high altitude, which would

19:33

have made them more easily detectable

19:36

by Russian radar. We

19:38

don't know exactly what happened, he

19:40

said, but it seems the missiles

19:42

were intercepted. Players

19:45

were dispatched to fix the problems. Once

19:49

the location of the Moskvaar had been

19:51

confirmed on April 13, Nejpapa

19:55

ordered two Neptune missiles to be

19:57

fired at it.

19:59

expert showed me a video on his

20:02

phone of what he claimed was the

20:04

launch of the missiles that day. The

20:07

launcher truck was parked in a thin line

20:09

of trees with bare branches. At

20:12

ignition, the cap of the launching

20:14

tube, which looks like the lid of

20:16

a rubbish bin, was dispelled from

20:19

the barrel and crashed into a field of

20:21

green spring wheat. A

20:23

fiery roar and a trail of black

20:25

smoke followed. Then the second

20:28

missile was launched.

20:30

Silence reigned in Neijpapa's

20:33

command centre.

20:34

The Neptune, which is five

20:36

metres long, flies at 900 kilometres

20:39

per hour and is designed to skim

20:42

10 metres above the surface of the sea in

20:45

order to avoid detection. Neijpapa

20:48

watched the clock tick through the six

20:50

minutes that it was supposed to take to

20:53

reach the target. For

20:55

a long time, nothing seemed to happen. Then

20:59

Russian radio channels erupted

21:01

in chatter.

21:02

It was apparent that smaller ships

21:04

were hurrying towards the mosque bar. The

21:08

radio traffic was garbled and panicked.

21:11

Neijpapa inferred that the ship

21:13

had been hit.

21:15

It didn't take long for news to

21:17

spread. People started calling

21:20

me from all over Ukraine, Neijpapa

21:23

said. There was only one

21:25

question.

21:26

Did it sink or not?

21:28

I said, I

21:30

can't answer that.

21:31

Hours passed. I

21:33

was constantly asked the same thing.

21:36

I joked I wanted to get on a boat myself

21:38

and go and look. I said, do you

21:41

realise that this is a very big

21:43

ship? Even if it was hit by both

21:45

missiles, it wouldn't sink immediately.

21:48

Some hours

21:50

later, satellites spotted a

21:52

large red thermal image in

21:54

the middle of the sea. Officials

21:57

from NATO phoned Neijpapa,

21:59

he recalled.

21:59

to say that they saw something

22:02

burning beautifully.

22:05

The only publicly available film

22:07

taken of the mosque far after she was hit

22:10

is three seconds long.

22:12

The sea is calm, the

22:14

sky pale gray.

22:16

The full length of the ship is visible

22:18

as she lists sharply to one side

22:21

thick black smoke billowing from the

22:23

foredeck. Her life rafts

22:26

are gone, suggesting that surviving

22:28

crew members had been evacuated. The

22:31

camera falls away sharply as a voice

22:33

is heard saying in Russian, what the

22:35

fuck are you doing?

22:37

It's apparent from the film that the two Neptune

22:40

missiles struck the mosque far near

22:42

the foredeck on her port side,

22:45

just above the waterline. The

22:48

fire may have been caused by the missiles

22:50

themselves or fuel tanks or

22:52

ammunition magazines in that part of

22:54

the ship which ignited. We

22:57

may never know exactly what happened,

22:59

but the attack clearly caused the mosque

23:01

far to lose power and propulsion.

23:04

Sometime in the early hours of April

23:06

14th she rolled over

23:09

and sank.

23:11

Why had the mosque far, which had

23:13

capable radar and surface-to-air

23:15

missiles, failed to detect

23:18

and intercept the incoming Neptunes?

23:21

Carson, the naval expert, has

23:24

dug into the possible reasons. The

23:27

ship was in dry dock for repairs

23:29

several times over the past decade,

23:32

but upgrades to her weapons and operating

23:34

systems seem to have been delayed

23:37

or done piecemeal. A readiness

23:40

report, briefly posted online

23:42

in early 2022 before being removed from the

23:46

internet, showed that many systems

23:48

were broken or not fully functional.

23:50

All her major

23:52

weapons systems had gripes, said

23:55

Carson, on a podcast last

23:57

year.

23:57

Moreover, the mosque far's radio

23:59

radar and targeting tools were

24:02

not entirely automated and

24:04

relied heavily on well-trained operators.

24:08

But over half the ship's crew, which numbered 500,

24:11

were conscripts who served only a year.

24:15

In consequence, the sailors had

24:17

extremely limited training, which

24:19

would be considered woefully insufficient

24:21

by Western standards, said Carlson.

24:24

The Moskvaar was not properly prepared

24:27

to be doing combat operations.

24:29

This was yet another example of complacency

24:32

by the Russian armed forces that

24:34

has been evident throughout the war. Even

24:38

so, Carlson was astonished that none

24:40

of her radars appeared to have

24:42

spotted the incoming missiles.

24:44

Once the Neptune

24:46

struck, the crew seems, in

24:48

a panic, to have left watertight unsecured.

24:53

Studying a screenshot of the Moskvaar

24:55

on fire, Carlson observed

24:58

that, "... you can see smoke coming

25:00

out of the shutter doors for the torpedo

25:02

tubes. That tells me that

25:04

the smoke had a clear path, and

25:07

if the smoke had a clear path, so did

25:09

water and so did flame." The

25:12

Russians have never admitted that

25:14

Neptune missiles were responsible for

25:16

sinking the Moskvaar. They

25:18

claimed she suffered an accidental

25:21

fire at sea. But only a few

25:23

days later, they bombed a looch

25:26

design bureau facility in Kiev

25:28

in apparent retaliation. The

25:31

Russian authorities have also never been open

25:33

about the number of casualties, but

25:35

up to 250 sailors may have died.

25:39

On November 4, 2022, more than six months after the sinking,

25:42

a court in Sevastopol declared 17 of

25:48

the missing dead.

25:50

Despite the reports of their heroic

25:53

deaths,

25:54

the defenders of Snake Island were

25:56

in fact alive. They

25:59

were taken care of. captive and held in prison

26:01

in Crimea before being transferred

26:04

to a prison in Belograd, a

26:06

city near the border with Ukraine. Conditions

26:09

were brutal. Temperatures

26:11

fell to minus 20 degrees Celsius,

26:14

yet the prisoners were housed in tents

26:16

for the first few days.

26:19

Frequently they were interrogated,

26:21

beaten and electrocuted.

26:24

They had no news of the outside

26:26

world, beyond the names of the cities

26:28

captured by the Russians, with which

26:31

the guards taunted them.

26:33

One day the prisoners overheard a news

26:35

report on the guards' radio, saying

26:38

that the Moskvaar was not floating

26:40

properly.

26:41

The expression puzzled them for

26:44

a while,

26:44

for they realised that it was a euphemism

26:47

for sunk. They began

26:49

to cheer. The Russians

26:51

increased our torture, said one of them,

26:54

who was later returned in a prisoner exchange,

26:57

but this was a great moment of

26:59

happiness.

27:01

The sinking of the Moskvaar was a turning

27:03

point in the war. Nej

27:05

Papa said that our fleet,

27:08

which was considered non-existent

27:10

a year ago, is now winning

27:12

against the larger force, thought

27:14

to be unbeatable.

27:16

NATO allies began to take

27:19

the Ukrainian navy seriously.

27:21

Ukraine has limited stocks

27:23

of Neptunes, but the Danes and

27:26

Americans are supplying harpoon missiles,

27:29

which are similar to the Neptune, but carry

27:31

a bigger warhead. Previously,

27:34

Nej Papa admitted, this kind

27:36

of weapon and support would have been

27:38

a dream.

27:41

Having destroyed the air defence umbrella

27:43

that the Moskvaar provided, the

27:45

Ukrainian navy was able to harass

27:48

the Russian navy in the west of the Black

27:50

Sea with drones and missiles,

27:53

damaging and sinking supply ships

27:55

and destroying air defences and radar

27:57

stations installed on gas plants.

27:59

platforms.

28:01

In June 2022, Ukraine

28:04

retook Snake Island, and

28:06

the Russian Black Sea fleet withdrew towards

28:09

Crimea, leaving the Ukrainian

28:11

coast safe from amphibious assault.

28:15

Turkey and the United Nations were able

28:17

to broker a deal to allow ships into

28:20

Ukrainian ports to export grain.

28:23

Now, said Neizhpapa, they

28:25

keep their ships outside of the range

28:27

of our cruise missiles. And

28:30

state-of-the-art frigates that are armed

28:32

up to the gunwales.

28:34

The Ukrainian coast has been secured.

28:38

Neizhpapa pointed out an area

28:40

of 25,000 square kilometres where

28:43

neither the Russians nor Ukrainians

28:46

can now operate freely. There's

28:49

a certain kind of status quo

28:51

that we need to take over, he

28:53

said. Neizhpapa

28:55

maintains that the only way to secure

28:58

peace in the Black Sea is to throw

29:00

the Russians out of Crimea. In

29:03

imperial times, all of the emperors

29:06

always said that whoever controls Crimea

29:08

controls the Black Sea. In

29:11

Soviet times they called Crimea the

29:13

aircraft carrier that cannot be sunk.

29:16

Nothing has changed since then. I

29:20

asked Neizhpapa what he missed

29:22

about his home. He

29:24

gazed upwards for a moment. Honestly,

29:28

I miss the sea near Crimea

29:30

the most.

29:32

It's not the same as here. It's

29:35

brighter, more transparent.

29:41

To understand the power of Ukraine's secret

29:43

weapon in greater detail, check out

29:45

the fully interactive online version of this

29:47

piece. The link to that is

29:49

in the show notes.

29:51

That's all from us. Thanks for listening to

29:53

Editor's Picks.

29:55

I'm Miranda Mitra, and in London, this

29:58

is The Economist. you