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I'm ravi ago on Foreign policies

1:44

editor in Chief. This is

1:46

F B lives. Welcome

1:51

to the show and wanted to take a

1:53

bigger picture view on the show this week.

1:55

We're often focus on the war in Ukraine

1:57

and conflict in the Middle East. But

2:00

meanwhile, the risk of something even

2:02

more dangerous, a great power conflict,

2:05

could actually be higher than it's been in

2:07

decades. Think about it. America

2:09

is in relative decline, China and

2:12

other countries are rising, the

2:14

post Bretton Woods order is being challenged, and

2:17

amid this, diplomacy has gotten weaker

2:19

and communication between militaries is declining.

2:22

The risk of a big mistake is high.

2:26

That's the theme of a new book,

2:28

The Return of Great Powers, Russia, China,

2:30

and the Next World War. The

2:33

author of that book, Jim Schutteau, argues

2:36

that 2024 could be another 1939. In

2:40

other words, there are many similarities between the

2:42

period we're in and the years leading up

2:44

to World War II. Now,

2:47

as I told him, there are many

2:49

differences between then and now, including the

2:51

fact that all those countries that were

2:53

then colonized now have a lot

2:55

more agency. They actually want

2:57

a new world order because they feel

3:00

the old one failed them. But

3:02

even so, Schutteau's point is that

3:04

any change could be incredibly violent,

3:07

and that's why he's raising the alarm. Jim

3:10

Schutteau is my guest on the show

3:13

this week. He's CNN's chief national security

3:15

analyst, and about a decade ago, he

3:17

also served in government as the chief

3:19

of staff at the U.S. Embassy in

3:21

China. Remember, if you

3:24

like this podcast, you can try

3:26

us on video live on foreignpolicy.com.

3:29

Subscribers get to ask questions too, and

3:31

you can do that as well. Use

3:33

the code FPLIVE for a discount. Okay,

3:36

let's dive in. Jim,

3:40

welcome to FPLIVE. Thanks so

3:42

much for having me. I appreciate it.

3:44

Our pleasure. So you start the book

3:46

with a pretty scary moment. We're

3:49

sitting in Bill Burns's office. This is the

3:51

director of the CIA, and he tells you,

3:54

we're playing without a net. In other words,

3:56

a lot can go wrong. The great powers built

3:58

a system of hotlines and treaties. treaties and

4:01

multilateral organizations that once functioned,

4:04

Bill Burns is telling you that doesn't exist anymore.

4:07

Yes, and it's one of the real dangers of this,

4:09

and it's one of the reasons that this

4:11

return of great power competition

4:14

is arguably more dangerous than

4:16

our last, truest experience of

4:19

that during the last Cold War, and that

4:21

a lot of the infrastructure built during the

4:23

last Cold War to avoid great

4:26

power conflict from getting hot, nuclear

4:29

arms treaties, hotlines, etc.

4:32

They either don't exist anymore, or

4:34

they have been whittled away over time,

4:36

or never existed, because the other piece

4:38

of this that's different, instead of having

4:40

the US and Russia two great powers,

4:43

you have three with China. And with

4:45

China, for instance, there are no nuclear

4:47

treaties yet, even as it vastly expands

4:49

its nuclear arsenal. There are

4:51

no treaties for cyberspace. There are

4:53

treaties for outer space, but those

4:55

are not successfully regulating

4:58

the emergence of space-based

5:00

weapons, as we saw

5:02

most recently with this US Intel assessment about

5:04

Russia wanting to put a nuke in space.

5:07

So you have, that is the net that

5:09

we don't have to Burns' words. And it's

5:12

one of the reasons that I'm

5:14

with this book, trying

5:16

to raise the alarm to some degree,

5:18

right? To acknowledge the raw great

5:20

power conflict that is going on

5:23

right now, and the

5:25

dangers that exist to escalating that

5:27

conflict. So I'm lingering

5:29

a bit on the title of your

5:31

book, the return part of the return

5:34

of great powers, because one

5:36

could argue that, you know, Russia, by

5:38

many metrics, whether it's GDP, whether

5:40

it's population size, so many

5:42

other things that you examine when you

5:45

think about a great power, it

5:48

wouldn't necessarily be defined as such. Well,

5:51

listen, Russia is not great in

5:53

economic terms, in

5:55

demographic terms. It does

5:57

though have the world's largest nuclear arsenal, which gives

6:00

Is it the capability to destroy the world

6:02

if we were to get to that? But

6:04

it also has an extremely large military,

6:07

which, notably, as we've seen in Ukraine,

6:09

the Russian leader is willing to use

6:12

to, in this case, redraw the

6:14

borders of Europe. And he's willing to not

6:17

just sacrifice many tens of thousands of

6:19

Russian soldiers and a lot

6:21

of equipment as well, but also kill

6:24

Ukrainian soldiers and deliberately

6:27

target Ukrainian civilians and burn

6:29

down Ukrainian cities and

6:32

civilian infrastructure. So it may

6:34

be a rotten great power,

6:36

but it certainly has the

6:38

tools to play in

6:41

a great power landscape on a number of

6:43

fields of play, if you want to call it

6:46

that, really battlefields. And not just nuclear, it has

6:48

a tremendous cyber capability. It has a

6:50

tremendous space weapons capability developed

6:52

over time. It has

6:55

highly capable submarines, which are really

6:57

the weapon of today and tomorrow

6:59

when it comes to the protection

7:01

of naval power as the age

7:03

of aircraft carriers, et cetera, has

7:06

probably peaked, probably past that

7:09

peak. So it has a lot

7:11

of great power, powers, even

7:13

with its severe weaknesses at home.

7:16

You know, you've done a lot of

7:18

reporting on sort of undersea capabilities,

7:21

and I'm curious how you assess

7:23

Russia's capabilities on that

7:25

front vis-a-vis those of other countries, and

7:27

why that's important. Well, Latoya, I'm just

7:29

going to lean forward here because on

7:31

my desk I have some,

7:34

a little beaker

7:36

of water from under the Arctic, which

7:39

I got on a trip with the US

7:41

nuclear submarine during the ISEX exercises under the

7:44

Arctic. This was back in 2018. I

7:47

didn't go swimming, by the way. They took some of

7:49

that in the torpedo tube and gave

7:51

it a sort of a gift of a rite

7:53

of passage. But during

7:55

those exercises and since then got a

7:57

vision into what is a

8:00

I don't want to say new, but

8:02

a renewed cat and mouse game between US and

8:04

Russian naval submarine

8:06

power, particularly, well, in

8:09

the Arctic but not confined to

8:11

the Arctic because we certainly see

8:13

increased Russian submarine activity down through

8:16

the Atlantic and their technology

8:18

is great. US submarine

8:20

commanders will claim the US still has

8:22

the edge, but they're losing the edge

8:25

in terms of detecting Russian submarines. They're

8:27

quiet and therefore able to, at

8:29

times, and there have been instances, there's some of

8:31

which I recount in the book, where

8:34

they were able to get past the net of

8:37

US sensors, etc., which

8:39

is, of course, a danger, right,

8:41

because nuclear submarines are a

8:44

first-strike capability. You know, you get off the

8:46

coast of New York or anywhere really, and

8:48

you can launch with seconds and therefore no

8:51

chance to respond, not to say they're

8:53

going to do that or that's the US

8:55

assessment tomorrow, but it does give them enormous

8:57

power to do that. And, you know, post

9:00

collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia let

9:03

many branches of its armed forces rot,

9:07

but it kept its submarine forces

9:09

capable, I mean, not perfect, but

9:11

capable, and since then, particularly

9:13

in the last 10, 20 years, has

9:15

invested enormously in them and

9:19

introduced new both boomers, you know, ballistic

9:21

missile submarines and attack submarines that we

9:24

haven't seen before that are quieter and

9:26

more capable. So, again,

9:28

you know, I asked US submarine commanders all

9:30

the time, are they better than

9:32

us? And they'll say, no, no, we're

9:34

still better than them, but they're getting

9:36

closer, and it's an open competition. China

9:38

is behind, they're not as advanced, certainly,

9:40

particularly in nuclear-powered submarines, but getting

9:42

better and making an investment, and one

9:45

piece of this no-limits partnership,

9:48

as described by Russia and China, that we see, and

9:51

I talk about this in the book as well, is

9:53

a concern that as

9:56

China has helped Russia, Buying

9:58

its oil, for instance, As it's

10:00

European market disappeared providing a lot

10:03

of. Technology if

10:05

not explicitly military technology to Russia

10:07

in Ukraine. Still a lot of

10:09

technology to back it up at

10:11

that. The concern is that China's

10:14

quid pro quo will be. About

10:16

that submarine technology you have and

10:19

that would be riot be quite

10:21

a i'm quite a dangerous collaboration.

10:25

And you know part of the framing of

10:27

your Mckinsey and also how China wants to

10:29

control the global hard. I russia kind of

10:31

wants to blow it up. but. These.

10:34

Two countries, as he said, them aligned

10:36

and the moment. But they're also line

10:38

and part out of opposition to the

10:41

United States. and it's leadership of the

10:43

World Order and so. As.

10:45

Washington aired in some senses

10:47

in allowing these two countries

10:50

to to come closer together.

10:53

Will. Listen, you're You're right. That it's

10:55

you know it's It's largely a marriage

10:57

of convenience, right? that they seat a

10:59

shared strategic interest in undermining the Us.

11:02

And at a minimum undermining the

11:04

rules based international order. As

11:06

constructed today and has led by the

11:08

Us. Because they see in which it

11:10

acknowledges they they see it as one

11:12

that. Is. Fundamentally in the

11:14

service of America's interest in the

11:16

interests of it's allies, as opposed

11:18

to Russian or Chinese interest. Us.

11:21

Officials I speak to in the book, Secretary

11:23

Blanket and others. Make. The point

11:25

and this is not is not an

11:28

undue point that the frankly Russia and

11:30

China have benefited from that system as

11:32

well. Scientists economic rise certainly supported in

11:34

an enhanced by open shipping lanes in

11:37

Asia and and a trading relationship with

11:39

the U S and Rule of Law,

11:41

etc where it holds so. Still

11:44

though that they calculate

11:46

strategically. That. The current

11:49

one doesn't serve their interests and

11:51

hold them back in effect. so.

11:54

to the extent that they can together undermine

11:56

that system and we can the u s

11:58

that's great And they'll do that and we

12:00

see that more and more. Is

12:03

it a boundless? Partnership

12:06

a no limits partnership. There are limits.

12:08

There's no question even though they don't

12:10

say it. They have their own competition

12:12

out east territorially, etc Bill

12:15

Burns talks in the book about how You

12:18

know Russia better be careful about becoming

12:20

the junior partner in this relationship, right?

12:22

More dependent on China than China is

12:24

on it which you know Russian leaders

12:28

By many accounts are aware of so they're

12:30

conscious of that too, but still

12:34

On balance, it's better for them. They calculate to

12:36

be working together against the US for as long

12:39

as that lasts, right? I mean the conditions can

12:41

change over time Well,

12:43

let's talk about one of the limits in this

12:45

no limits partnership So one of

12:47

the more dramatic parts of your book is

12:49

how the world escaped a

12:52

potential nuclear incident in 2022 Walk

12:55

us through that what happened? So this

12:57

is late summer early fall

12:59

2022 and there were a combination

13:02

of factors that led the US to assess

13:05

that Russia was Very

13:07

seriously considering a tactical nuclear strike

13:09

in Ukraine. So use of tactical

13:11

tactical or battlefield nuclear nuke Of

13:14

course much smaller than the nukes that can take down

13:16

cities, but still quite

13:18

devastating and devastating in other

13:20

senses in that you would break the seal

13:22

in effect on Nuclear warfare

13:24

many decades after Hiroshima and

13:27

Nagasaki. So the combination of Indicators

13:30

at the time were a few things one

13:33

Russia was losing ground in southern Ukraine They

13:35

they had they were losing her son and

13:37

lost her son, which was his biggest prize

13:40

territorially of the invasion To

13:42

date there were thousands of Russian soldiers

13:44

that were endangered of being surrounded as

13:46

they withdrew from that area and

13:49

the u.s. Assessment of Russia's Nuclear

13:52

doctrine which by the way

13:54

is imperfect because it's not entirely transparent

13:57

Was that Russia might under

13:59

those? circumstances feel a

14:01

military need or calculate a military need

14:03

to use a tactical nuke to head

14:06

off further losses because they would see

14:08

them as a threat

14:10

to the state, to

14:13

Russian territory, even though of course it was Ukrainian

14:15

territory, but they claimed that it was Russian territory.

14:18

That was one piece. At the

14:20

same time, Russian leaders started

14:22

to spread this

14:24

fiction that Ukraine was

14:27

planning a dirty bomb

14:29

attack in southern Ukraine, a

14:32

radiological attack, and you had Sergei Shoigu

14:34

calling up his counterparts saying this. They

14:36

sent a letter to the UN. Now

14:38

the US and its allies did not

14:40

believe this was true, but they

14:43

were concerned that this was a false flag

14:45

to either justify a Russian

14:47

nuclear strike or claim that it was

14:49

actually the Ukrainians that were responsible

14:52

if there was, say, a radiological attack of

14:54

some sort. In addition to

14:56

that, Russia, in

14:58

the weeks leading up, had been speaking very

15:01

openly about the, it had been

15:03

rattling the nuclear saber, which we'd heard them

15:05

do before, but they threw that into

15:07

the mix and said, okay,

15:09

we've got a problem. Plus,

15:11

finally, the final piece was intercepted

15:14

communications of Russian commanders talking about

15:16

this very possibility of moving

15:19

nukes into place and the possibility of a

15:21

nuclear strike. So that led

15:23

to, as one official senior US official

15:25

I spoke to, led to

15:27

them to prepare rigorously

15:30

for this possibility, and that included

15:32

US officials

15:35

meeting with or contacting their Russian

15:37

counterparts. Bill Burns went to Turkey

15:39

to meet Sergei Norishkin. Mark

15:42

Milley calls Gerasimov, Blinken

15:45

calls Lavrov, etc. to say basically,

15:48

we see all this, what are you

15:50

up to here and don't think about

15:52

a nuclear strike? The world's response would

15:54

be consequential. Allies

15:57

doing the same, but then the final piece, which you

15:59

were referencing, in your question is that the

16:01

US reached out to what Lincoln described

16:03

to me as unusual allies in

16:06

this case, and that is

16:08

China and India, allies in

16:10

this effort that they believe Russia would listen

16:12

to more. And in the US

16:14

assessment, and some of this is in the public

16:16

record, public statements by Xi

16:19

and Indian leaders at the time was

16:21

that they did get on board and

16:23

pushed Russia quite directly

16:25

not to do this. And you have public

16:28

statements from Xi when I believe Olaf Schultz

16:30

was visiting Beijing at the

16:32

time. You have public statements

16:34

from the Indian foreign minister at the

16:36

UN. You

16:38

even had a cancellation of a meeting in

16:40

India that was planned, all part of this

16:43

mix to say, don't

16:45

even think about it, which Lincoln

16:47

and others told me they believe

16:49

made a difference. They made a difference in

16:51

heading this off. Since then, it hasn't entirely

16:53

disappeared. They continue

16:56

to worry that in certain circumstances,

16:58

Russia might consider that. But

17:00

boy, it was close. It was close

17:02

by their account. And it's just a

17:05

reminder of how the

17:08

ingredients for escalation are there.

17:11

And it strikes me that of

17:13

all the levers that the United

17:15

States had to deter Russia, there

17:18

was obviously direct communications with

17:20

the Russians. But it seems like what

17:22

might have moved the needle in the

17:24

end the most was America's

17:27

ability to speak to India and China and

17:29

get them to exert some pressure. And of

17:31

course, as this is going

17:33

on, India and China are also ramping

17:35

up purchases of Russian oil. So in

17:39

India's case, for example, at the start of 2022, I

17:41

think India was getting just 1% of Russian

17:44

crude. And now it's upwards

17:46

of 50% of Russian

17:48

exports. India and China combined

17:51

take about 80% of Russian

17:53

exports of crude. How much of

17:55

this do you think is India and

17:58

China's gamesmanship? versus

18:01

any other sort of real fears

18:03

that Putin might have of, you

18:06

know, angering Xi Jinping and Modi. Well,

18:09

let's just say that India and China, by

18:11

doing that, are saving

18:13

the war in Ukraine for Russia, right?

18:15

Because that is funding the war, the

18:17

economy, the Russian economy couldn't withstand this

18:19

if they didn't find other buyers for

18:21

its crew. So they, you know, if

18:24

Beijing has made a decision not to openly

18:26

send tanks or artillery shells to

18:29

Ukraine, they are sending money in

18:31

effect for Russia. And not

18:33

just for the war effort in Ukraine, but

18:35

for propping up Putin's leadership. And

18:38

it's, you know, they

18:40

might argue it's in their interest. I mean, my

18:42

understanding is they're getting it at a discount, right?

18:45

You know, cheap energy is a good thing for economic growth,

18:49

I suppose, but it has other costs.

18:51

So it's something of a, I mean,

18:54

they make their own calculations, right, in the midst of

18:56

this. And, you

18:58

know, might say, if we had one of them

19:00

on the call right now, they might say, well,

19:03

you know, we have not sent tanks and

19:05

artillery shells. And, you

19:08

know, we've urged all sides to come to an

19:10

agreement, blah, blah, blah. And China

19:12

has, you know, spoken about its own

19:14

peace plan for Ukraine, et cetera. Of

19:17

course, if you ask the Ukrainians that they don't

19:19

buy that either India or China is a fair

19:22

interlocutor on this, in part because of the

19:24

support that they're giving Russia. So we're giving

19:26

Russia for its effort in Ukraine. I'm

19:29

getting some great questions from people

19:31

who are listening in live on

19:34

this show. One of

19:36

them is Wes Clark, who I

19:38

think is former General

19:40

Wesley Clark, the former Supreme Allied Commander

19:42

of NATO. And he asks you, Jim,

19:45

where did Putin's red lines come

19:47

from? Was this from

19:50

CIA Director Bill Burns' meetings

19:53

in Moscow? Red lines,

19:55

I wonder, is he speaking

19:57

specifically about the, on the

19:59

nuclear? nuclear incident. I imagine that's

20:01

part of where he's going, yes. It's

20:04

interesting. I spoke to Burns, I spoke

20:06

to Milly about his conversations during that

20:08

time period about how what

20:11

Norishkin and Gorosimov came back

20:13

with. They certainly didn't admit

20:15

that Russia was planning a

20:17

nuclear attack. They

20:20

didn't though definitively say absolutely

20:22

not, or at least Burns and Milly, in

20:25

their telling to me, did not leave the room fully

20:29

confident that that was off the

20:31

table. Now both of them

20:33

acknowledged that that could be part of

20:35

an influence up, to sort of leave a

20:37

little bit of doubt in their minds, which

20:39

might serve their interest to keep

20:41

the US on its

20:45

uncertain footing. By the way, I did speak,

20:47

General Clark to folks in

20:49

Europe who had a different view of

20:52

this time. For

20:55

instance, I speak at great lengths to the Estonian

20:57

Prime Minister, Kaya Kalas, who does not minimize the

20:59

threat of a nuclear strike, including

21:02

during this period. But she makes the point,

21:04

as others have made, that we

21:07

can overestimate as well Russia's

21:09

nuclear threat, and that it's their

21:11

view that Russia exaggerates it

21:13

at times expressly to put us

21:16

off balance and get us scared so that, well,

21:19

do we really want to send this weapons system

21:21

in? And listen, there's a lot of criticism in

21:23

this book for the

21:26

sometimes stop and start US

21:29

support for Ukraine. We're going to send this weapons system,

21:31

but not right away, not this one. Well, maybe now

21:34

that kind of thing is not just

21:36

impacting Ukrainian military

21:39

operations on the ground, but also sending

21:41

a, and also playing the Russians

21:43

game for them, right? Get it, you know, self

21:46

deterring. So I've heard a lot

21:48

of that criticism as well. Listen,

21:50

you're a leader in the

21:52

situation room trying to support Ukraine

21:55

while avoiding escalation to war with Russia. That's

21:57

a tough thing for any of us on

21:59

this call. be a

22:01

tough road to navigate. But

22:04

there's certainly a lot of criticism of this book that

22:07

Western leaders have

22:09

been too timid at times in their support for

22:11

Ukraine. I hope that answers the question. And

22:17

you are listening to Foreign Policy

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23:41

So let's get to one of the other big analogies you

23:43

draw on this book. We've talked about the Cold War, but

23:45

1939, and

23:48

the lead up to World War II. Why

23:50

do you think this is a 1939 moment? I

23:53

don't make that comparison lightly. And I'm aware that 1939

23:56

has been brought up At

23:58

different times in our history. You know, if

24:01

you might have heard that around said

24:03

arms invasion of Kuwait, or comparisons of

24:05

him to Hitler, etc. A By the

24:07

way, I am not saying proven is

24:09

equivalent to Hitler. put this is not

24:11

carried out. The Holocaust. He

24:13

certainly has shown. No. Reluctance.

24:16

To kill civilians wholesale in Ukraine. but

24:18

it. but it's not on the scale

24:20

of the holocaust jokes that set that

24:22

aside for a moment. But in terms

24:24

of what Nineteen Thirty Nine was? a

24:26

revanchist leader in Europe. Redrawing

24:28

the borders of Europe by

24:31

force by force of arms

24:33

and. Testing Europe

24:35

to see how far they would let

24:37

him go. And as you know well

24:39

even a superficial weeding have a history

24:41

of the time was that there were

24:43

those in America and Europe was it

24:45

was. Just give him that peace and

24:47

given Sudan land all will be fine.

24:49

Or maybe maybe Poland's not our war

24:51

either and we know how far Hitler

24:53

push things. And you know what without

24:55

the Battle of Britain might have gone

24:58

all the way that the Uk as

25:00

well, Poodle has already shown his willingness

25:02

to redraw the borders of Europe by

25:04

force. In fact, Absorb the largest country

25:06

in Europe by population and land size by

25:08

force, Attempt to, and he's done it before.

25:10

He sliced off a big piece of Georgia

25:13

in two thousand and eight two pieces of

25:15

Ukraine, and twenty fourteen other attempts to. In

25:18

of the A To and cyber attack and

25:20

Estonian two thousand and Seven to Subjugate A

25:22

now try to slice off a piece of

25:25

of Moldova you have you know that there's

25:27

a lot a precedent for what he's willing

25:29

to do. And there's also a lot a

25:31

precedent for. Letting. Him take a

25:34

slice and assume that will be the

25:36

last piece or hope that that will

25:38

be the last piece which is repeatedly.

25:41

Belied by. Facts.

25:44

And and and the events

25:46

that followed Geico last cheap.

25:48

Frequently. Quotes turtle on this and

25:50

the crocodiles sale and appeasers. The want

25:52

to feed the crocodile hopes he or

25:54

she will be it's last meal and

25:56

she and and and many of our

25:59

Eastern Europe Europe's. The face facing partners

26:01

especially believe that that precedent is true

26:03

and I think the record shows that.

26:05

so that's why. I. Feel you

26:07

have the ingredients and not just in Europe

26:10

by the way, because if you look at

26:12

China's calculations piece of the taiwan that they're

26:14

quite similar. Now. And

26:16

will come to town and and a

26:18

bit and one bet that just to

26:20

push back the hedge. And so Nineteen

26:22

Thirty Nine and was a dramatically different

26:24

world. Rights A large parts of the

26:27

world were colonized. Many of those nations

26:29

gave hundreds of thousands of soldiers to

26:31

the war effort. and in a sense,

26:33

that's what made it a truly World

26:35

war. But in Twenty Twenty Four and

26:37

we were riffing on this earlier, all

26:39

of those countries are now independent. They

26:41

have agency. they may not even once,

26:43

so cause great powers to have that

26:45

much. Sway a tall they might not

26:47

one great powers to be great in

26:50

In in that sense of nineteen Thirty

26:52

nine am. what's your sense of have?

26:54

That difference plays out in terms of

26:56

Twenty Twenty Four being. Nineteen.

26:58

Thirty Nine. Well. For one,

27:00

it wasn't a world war immediately. And

27:02

eighty thirty nine, right? It expanded from

27:05

their that that was. So it started

27:07

with Poland. I'm not saying that that

27:09

all the dominoes fall. The

27:11

same number of dominoes fall in the wake

27:13

of something like this. but I but I

27:15

believe the ingredients are there. The dangers of

27:18

their me that the most obvious Damen though

27:20

would be Taiwan and and for this this

27:22

book I didn't that not need a single

27:24

person. Official Soldier

27:27

commander. Politician.

27:29

In the Us, Europe or Asia who

27:31

did not make a direct connection between

27:34

events in Ukraine and events Taiwan. In

27:36

terms of. The of principally.

27:39

How see? Jinping is watching this looking at.

27:41

For. The military lessons of Ukraine for

27:43

Taiwan, but also for the geopolitical

27:45

lessons. Will the world, Will Europe?

27:47

Will the U S. Allow

27:51

it to happen. Would are the costs

27:53

economically? Diplomatically, How long are those costs

27:55

imposed? When does the West. Exhaust

27:58

itself and just get bored. The

28:00

current like all of which you can see

28:02

happening right before our eyes right now. So.

28:05

If. Not identical. many of the same

28:07

ingredients are. I would argue and I

28:09

think I've I've a whole chapter on

28:11

this where you have what? While the

28:13

world is not a world of colonies

28:16

today, you'd you do have a world

28:18

of alliances. It is are growing by

28:20

the way. You. Have

28:22

countries in Europe making military cooperation agreements

28:24

with countries in Asia that they would

28:26

not have in the past because they

28:28

calculate the Chinese as much a threat

28:31

to them in Europe as they are

28:33

to these countries in Asia. You have

28:35

the office agreement where Australia. After.

28:37

Years of. Doing. It's best

28:39

to engage economically and diplomatically with China

28:42

after China frankly, push the limits too

28:44

far in terms of interference said. You

28:46

know what? We're. Throwing in

28:48

our lot with with the U in the

28:50

Uk and we need these nuclear submarines, etc.

28:52

So I mean that even a world war

28:54

One in comparison, right? entangling alliances as if

28:56

you look at the. The

28:59

run up to World War One, The And By the

29:01

way and and I'll. I'll cut

29:03

it off after this. Could I talk in

29:05

his book about. This moment in

29:07

Nineteen Sixty Two during the Cuban Missile

29:09

Crisis when J F K. Deliberately.

29:12

Had every member of his cabinet read the

29:14

guns of August that the run up the

29:16

Barbara Tuchman story about the run up to

29:18

World War One which. By. Happenstance maybe

29:21

the Grace of God had been published

29:23

earlier and Nineteen Sixty Two and the

29:25

reason he did as he and he

29:27

said as much to Rfk. He.

29:29

Said I don't want someone to write a

29:31

book the Missiles of Nineteen Sixty Two about

29:34

decisions I've made here where others a I

29:36

don't wanna I don't want to send in

29:38

the conflict as we saw in World War

29:40

One of the point being. In.

29:43

A historical there. there are many

29:45

historical precedents. hear about when. Great.

29:48

Power wars were avoided only narrowly.

29:50

nineteen Sixty Two or not, and

29:52

I think we can learn lessons

29:54

from from both those moments. Yeah

29:57

to vie Lee said the warning

29:59

and and and interest exercise. I'm

30:01

another subscriber question. This one's from

30:03

William Duncan. Nice, a long time

30:05

diplomat. He's now the Us Ambassador

30:07

to El Salvador. So he says

30:09

of your World War Two analogy

30:12

that you to Germany could be

30:14

Russia today in some senses are

30:16

but. Why then is the

30:18

world? More are seemingly more worried

30:20

about China and he goes on

30:22

to ask what type of conditions

30:25

Beijing might look for to start

30:27

a great Power concept. Will.

30:29

Try to for one is a it's and

30:31

economic the behemoth writer. It's it's. Not.

30:34

Him in both by more recent estimates,

30:36

not gonna as. Sort. Of suit

30:39

past the U S. but but reach

30:41

a relative parity in size or Russia

30:43

is a fraction depending on how you

30:45

measure. It may be the size of

30:48

New Jersey's economy, right? So it's not

30:50

so. China has the economic might, if

30:52

not the nuclear arsenal to date to

30:54

be a more credible, long term competitor.

30:56

That's the primary reason, but it's also.

30:59

Vastly expanding in every

31:01

field of play, It's

31:03

cyber warfare capabilities are

31:05

significant. It space warfare

31:07

capabilities are significant. It's

31:09

A I capabilities. rapidly

31:11

progressing, It.

31:13

Has an enormous economy, Which

31:16

can then back the development in. And it's got

31:18

a navy bigger than the U S and and

31:20

so on, so all those pieces make it a

31:22

more formidable long term competitor. But

31:25

both of them dangerous in their own

31:27

way. right? them? It's it's I'm not

31:29

alone in in. Describing

31:31

China's the bigger, long term threat, that's

31:34

generally the view you'll hear from until

31:36

officials, military officials, etc. But that doesn't

31:38

mean Russia can't cause a whole heck

31:40

of lot of trouble in the meantime.

31:42

And arguably. Mighty. Me

31:45

more dangerous in some way because it's

31:47

not as invested. In. The international

31:49

system as China is China's economy

31:51

still very much dependent on Us

31:53

China trade which remains pretty robust

31:55

right? in a way that Russia

31:58

is not so it it would

32:00

be more damaging for China. To.

32:02

Dive in and say, Invade Taiwan

32:04

then for Russia because Russia with Russia

32:07

lost all of it's energy customers in

32:09

Europe wasn't which is not insignificant but

32:11

it was able to replace that. China

32:13

would be lot harder So. Yeah.

32:16

The one hand, more capable, on the

32:18

other hand, more invested in there for.

32:20

A job. A riskier back

32:22

for for China critically. now is it's

32:25

it's economy slowed down. To

32:28

your quite unique among reporters in that

32:30

you actually served in government you I

32:32

Chief of Staff India, Us embassy in

32:34

China had a very interesting time in

32:36

the twenty tens I think right before

32:38

choosing thing came to power. you have

32:40

the highest levels of security clearance. Looking

32:42

back now it's you think the United

32:44

States made a mistake and it's China

32:46

policy the Twenty tens or didn't get

32:48

his. Absence of

32:51

them. Out. There. Have been

32:53

like to add a might say this

32:55

in this book. I said it in

32:57

the shadow were that the U S

32:59

grossly underestimated. China's.

33:02

Aggressiveness and it's advance towards aggressiveness. And I

33:04

had him and I describe interactions I had

33:06

during my time as Chief of staff at

33:08

the Embassy. Wanna give an example at that

33:11

time was when China first got this so

33:13

aircraft carrier member they brought they bought the

33:15

whole from from Ukraine as fate would have

33:17

it but I remember there was a view.

33:20

In. The in the embassy the time. This is just

33:22

a. It's. A showcase. Military.

33:25

Asset China has no intent tension for

33:27

a blue water navy really doesn't want

33:29

to go beyond the first island chain,

33:31

etc. When. In fact, that was

33:34

a sign. And and look where we are

33:36

today. Three hundred fifty some odd ships and

33:38

bases in Djibouti and this support in in

33:40

Sri Lanka and and activities in the Arctic

33:43

So I think it was a read a

33:45

strong misread. Of China's

33:47

military intentions, there was it a deep

33:49

miss reed of China's intentions. In the

33:52

South China Sea. the U S basically

33:54

got snowed by China. You remember me?

33:56

This was in the rose garden. Of.

34:00

The said that. She. Promised

34:02

not to militarize as islands. Well.

34:04

China militarized those islands right in there

34:06

now. Are unsinkable aircraft carriers

34:08

in the South China Sea. That was

34:10

a major misread, and even in my

34:12

last book, folks who involved in those

34:14

decisions spoke a lot to the. The.

34:16

Late Ash Carter in that book they

34:19

come to a say that we in

34:21

his words that we mirrored in a

34:23

we looked at the China and Russia

34:25

as for too long. As

34:28

countries that wanted what we wanted when in reality

34:30

they did. you know the status quo to them

34:32

was not acceptable. Salvaging I am. I want to

34:34

go. I want to go on a lady to

34:37

hear so. If America got things

34:39

wrong, why Why do you think that

34:41

was the case and what needs to

34:43

change? I mean, it's one thing to

34:46

misread, that is it a misreading, Because

34:48

America doesn't have the right intelligence? Is

34:50

it because there aren't enough Chinese language

34:52

analysts like what? What's driving this? I'm

34:55

what needs to change. The way officials

34:57

involved described it to me was it

34:59

was day. It was this mirroring phenomenon.

35:01

They looked at. They. Looked

35:04

at the the situation and even

35:06

when there was. A

35:08

great deal of contradictory information like efforts

35:10

in the South China Sea or the

35:12

Georgia invasion or even public statements, right?

35:14

Going back to put in that the

35:16

Munich Security Conference in two thousand and

35:18

Seven when you lay this all out

35:20

or siege and paying and the Chinese

35:23

Military in their plans for military expansion,

35:25

it was public. It was there for

35:27

us to see and listen to, but

35:29

we didn't want to see it. To.

35:31

Some degree in again. don't trust me on

35:33

that. Trust. The folks I quote the

35:36

i do with it a bit in this book.

35:38

I dealt with it more in the shadow or

35:40

where they said they mirror. They saw what they

35:42

wanted to see when it came to Russia China.

35:44

Now you can criticize It's always know it's it's

35:46

easy to Monday morning quarterback. In.

35:48

Their shoes You can understand the motivation to find

35:50

a path forward and to engage in. By the

35:52

way, the U S wasn't alone in this. Germany.

35:56

Through. Nearly twenty years, America's leadership,

35:58

if it's policy, was. It went with

36:00

Russia. We could find a way we we

36:02

have a partnership or lived shared experience in

36:04

the East and all that and that blew

36:06

up in their faces. Into their credit they

36:08

reversed right? But. You. Know. Not.

36:11

Until a couple of years ago. so the

36:13

U S was not alone in that miscalculation.

36:15

You can understand the motivation for it. You

36:17

don't want to go in guns blazing and

36:19

imagine that These guys. In. L were

36:21

bound for war and and the truth is

36:23

today, we don't. Want.

36:25

To do that either, right? to some

36:28

degree. Been in it. You.

36:30

Want to find ways to talk and

36:32

to set limits because. Momentum.

36:34

Towards War can be a very powerful

36:36

force. Mates. And you

36:38

know in some senses American policy towards

36:40

China has dramatically changed since the years

36:43

when you and government I'm curious whether

36:45

you think that change is adequate or

36:47

her has gone to find me. For

36:49

example, you quote that punjab sad that

36:51

in your book he won't work for

36:53

the Trump White House and of course

36:55

has a very hawkish send says what

36:58

China once from the was ah what's

37:00

your sense of that where where we

37:02

now? Why would say that you know

37:04

it's it's a rare bipartisan issue, right?

37:06

Hawkishness on China and. He did look

37:08

at that, it just the makeup of

37:10

the house committee right? The way democratic

37:12

and Republican lawmakers on activity speak about

37:15

China's pretty much in lock step right?

37:17

And it's way the kind of American

37:19

public sees that mourn or of at

37:21

it's if you look at Biden and

37:23

Trump's trade policy of a China lot

37:25

a lot of sanctions rival some tariffs

37:27

to, there's there's a there's a lot

37:30

of overlap on that issue the you

37:32

don't see elsewhere. So. I

37:34

think that the the view has

37:36

definitely shifted right and done in

37:39

that direction. You. Know that

37:41

the danger is you don't watch. It.

37:44

On a shift to aggressively in that direction Rikers,

37:46

You don't wanna go out on. Conflicts.

37:49

Right. You know the biden. This talked about

37:51

this a lot for years. You know the

37:53

worst wars, the war you don't want, right?

37:56

You can set the circumstances that that he

37:58

put you on a path to that. So

38:00

I do believe it has changed. But I

38:02

also think that we as as a country

38:05

as as I, our lawmakers, thinkers like we

38:07

have on this call think tanks, journalists that

38:09

we don't want to get caught in situation

38:11

where we talk about this purely an incendiary

38:14

terms Because you can. You can talk your

38:16

way into conflict to and on and and

38:18

on the good side. No

38:20

one I spoke with. You know that

38:22

there's no Us or European Intel assessment

38:25

that either Russia or China wants great

38:27

power war with us. That they see

38:29

the damaging consequences of that. They're willing

38:31

to push the limits. God knows we

38:33

see that. but they don't want that

38:36

either. I've

38:38

had him act as a you cover

38:40

us politics a lot more than I

38:42

do. I'm thankful for that bomb craters.

38:45

How what would transfer time? Ah mean

38:47

for the world What it? What is

38:49

a Trump two point? Oh Foreign policy.

38:52

It is. You know this is for this election

38:54

in the Fall. Whatever your politics, there is a

38:56

hard. Definitive. Choice for how

38:59

you want the U S to operate in the

39:01

world. Ah how you want to

39:03

to. Behave. With

39:05

regards to it's alliances,

39:08

it's allies. Biden.

39:10

Represents what was until recently

39:12

a bipartisan few faithful to

39:15

alliances Nato, Japan, South Korea,

39:17

etc. Viewing

39:20

Russia and China. For. What

39:22

they are which is countries that. See

39:25

it at in their interest to undermine

39:27

the U S right and to stand

39:29

up to that, Not shoot at them,

39:31

but stand up to that steadfastly. That's

39:33

the Biden view that would have been

39:35

quite similar under of. George. W.

39:37

Bush or Hw Bush Administration

39:39

and so on. Trump. And

39:42

his again, don't trust me I speak

39:44

to several of his former senior advisers

39:46

in the book Kelly Bolton Pot Injure

39:48

Plus you have is public statements. Either.

39:51

Is not fully committed to America's

39:54

alliances or might very well take

39:56

the Us out of them in

39:58

a second term. Or.

40:01

If he can take them out of

40:03

them because of congressional legislation. Effectively new

40:05

to that, because if the Commander in

40:07

Chief won't abide by Article five, than

40:09

that Nato means nothing. He.

40:13

According to Bolton and others, has very

40:15

little interest or understanding of the Us

40:17

Defense Alliance with South Korea with the

40:19

presence of troops there, and might feel

40:21

somewhat similar about Japan. He certainly has

40:23

no interest in depending Taiwan. Olden

40:26

tells the story in the book about how Trump

40:28

would sit at the. Desk. In

40:30

the Oval Office, hold up a sharpie and point to the

40:33

tip and say. See. That that's Taiwan.

40:35

See this desk. That's China. To

40:37

make the point, the Taiwan has

40:39

no chance against China. Therefore, we

40:41

have no business defending them. Are

40:43

no interest in defending himself under

40:45

Trump. No. Defense of

40:47

Taiwan and of Ukraine Aid. Ah,

40:51

If. Not a withdrawal from

40:53

Nato. A weakening. Neutering.

40:56

Of Nato, a reduction in

40:58

possible retreat from. Treaties.

41:01

With South Korea, Japan and then a

41:03

follow on phenomena that which I talk

41:05

about in the book which is that

41:07

a lot of those countries than make

41:09

and unreasonable decision to go nuclear because

41:11

they can no longer rely on. America's.

41:14

Defense umbrella including it's nuclear umbrella

41:16

and they look at Ukraine or

41:19

did Ukraine lack ah nuclear weapons

41:21

most for so it's a you

41:23

know on that issue. It's not

41:25

about marginal tax rates right? It

41:28

is a sharp one eighty and the

41:30

Us position in the world and that

41:32

with all the consequences that that brings

41:34

a make up, I make a case

41:37

in the bucket. You know we might

41:39

imagine that we can retreat behind the

41:41

ramparts, and those are other people's conflicts,

41:43

but we've all benefited from this boringly

41:45

labeled rules based international order in terms

41:47

of free trade or the lack of

41:50

great power, competition, relative respect for borders

41:52

of sovereignty, the ability to do business

41:54

in these countries, open foreign office's in

41:56

places that we didn't before. Send

41:58

our kids to. Semester abroad in

42:01

Eastern Europe? I mean all these ways

42:03

We I'm You know those things would

42:05

be. Potentially. Under threat so.

42:08

Real choice in the fall. And we

42:10

do Indeed, you know lot of how

42:12

we think about Trump and his foreign

42:14

policy is true. You know what his

42:17

gut instinct is and then we try

42:19

to set of decipher what that could

42:21

mean A a part of how I

42:23

think any human being farms a gut

42:25

instinct is true, what they read, ah

42:27

and who they listen to or with

42:29

a watch and Trump's tastes. I'm who

42:31

has his gear right now when it

42:34

comes to foreign policy, You suddenly many

42:36

former Trump officials. I'm guessing many of

42:38

them won't have a part to. Play

42:40

in a trunk two point. Oh

42:42

ah, White House. Who. The listening

42:44

to now. Goodness.

42:46

Well on Immigration policy, Stephen Miller. And if any of

42:49

you should really, we should all sit down and listen

42:51

to how Stephen Miller speaks about this country and what

42:53

his vision is of this country and who's welcome in

42:55

his not. It's pretty stark. I've had face to face

42:58

conversations with him. He. Got to

43:00

be comfortable that. And

43:02

all of us who. Are

43:04

descended from immigrants? The only question

43:06

is when those immigrants came? Should.

43:09

Understand. Exactly what they're talking about

43:11

on on your try to believe that

43:13

ice as he lighthouses name floated any

43:15

he by the way was one of

43:17

the architects of. Trump's. China

43:19

policy it in his first term. This

43:21

is bob light. Eyes are from like house

43:23

and he lit it. In. I met him

43:26

in Mature. A lot of people in this call have

43:28

to ah. To. Be frank terms

43:30

of trade issues, Not an enormous

43:32

shift from where. By.

43:35

The administration policy has been the national

43:37

security stuff. I do think would be

43:40

different because. Trump's view of

43:42

the alliance and eight a alliances

43:44

in Asia is is different. I

43:46

think in terms of information bubbles.

43:48

you know. Even. Fox News

43:50

apparently isn't right enough for Trump because you

43:52

see it in his posts on on some

43:54

issues or when they chat. When they do

43:56

challenge him. So. You.

43:59

Know I don't though. who would be his? Defense

44:02

Secretary, for instance. I don't know who

44:04

would accept that job from the kind

44:06

of Kelly Bolton category that did the

44:09

last time around of people talk about

44:11

Cash Patel. He's got quite aggressive views

44:13

on the user. Uniformed.

44:16

Military at home which would break norms.

44:18

With that have held for more than

44:20

a couple hundred years, We have to

44:22

be willing to accept that. So

44:25

we'll see, we'll see how many

44:27

is apparently making shortlists. And

44:30

will all be had. A comrade I have that I'm afraid

44:32

we have to leave it there. the gym shudder. Thank you

44:34

very much thanks for joining us as we can take so

44:36

much all of you could joining. It's nice to be in

44:39

touch. And

44:41

that was gym suitors, Cnn's Chief

44:43

National Security Analysts, and the authors

44:46

of The Return of Great Powers.

44:48

As always, if you want to

44:50

know who's coming up and future

44:53

episodes vastly live at Foreign policy.com

44:55

As P. Spring Magazine is about

44:57

to drop, it's all about India

45:00

elections. There begin later this month. I've

45:02

written the need as saying that issue

45:04

and so I'm going to take fewer

45:07

questions to the election on the range

45:09

of movie New Delhi's foreign policy and

45:11

what's the country's rise means to the

45:13

World Order had to our website to

45:16

send and questions with love to hear

45:18

from. Fp Live!

45:20

The podcast is produced by

45:22

Rosie choosing. The executive producer

45:25

has been is Donna Sure

45:27

I'm ravi everyone Phoenix.