0:00

The Eastern world, it is

0:03

exploding. Welcome to Geopolitics

0:05

Decanted. I'm Dimitrij Parevich, Chairman of

0:08

Silverado Policy Accelerator, a geopolitics think

0:10

tank in Washington, DC, and

0:12

a co-author of an upcoming book, World

0:15

on the Brink, How America Can Beat China in

0:17

the Race for the 21st Century, that

0:19

comes out on April 30th. Today's

0:22

podcast will be a little bit different, because

0:24

it will be a conversation about the book

0:26

with my co-author, Garrett Graff, an

0:28

accomplished and very prolific author of

0:30

numerous books on national security topics

0:32

and history, and who has another book

0:35

coming out in June as well, When the

0:37

Sea Came Alive, an oral history of

0:39

D-Day, which comes out right in time

0:41

for the 80th anniversary of that invasion.

0:44

At the end of the podcast, we'll also have a very

0:46

special treat for you, an excerpt from our

0:48

book, more specifically, The Prologue,

0:51

which describes a fictional but very

0:53

realistic scenario for Chinese invasion of

0:55

Taiwan. I spent a lot of

0:57

time working through how China might

0:59

orchestrate this extraordinarily difficult operation, perhaps

1:02

one of the most complex in the history of warfare. If

1:04

you spend any time on the island of Taiwan,

1:07

you get an immediate appreciation for the

1:09

enormous challenge the terrain would present to

1:11

China, from the stormy waters in the

1:13

Taiwan Strait, to the narrow and fire-controlled

1:16

beaches, to the rivers, mountains, tunnels, and

1:18

bridges that are all over this island.

1:20

It is truly a natural fortress, an

1:23

absolutely hellish place to invade. But

1:25

it could be done, and I think the

1:27

scenario in our book plausibly describes the more likely

1:29

way that it could potentially unfold. I

1:32

hope you find it interesting and educational. But

1:34

let's get on with the podcast. Garrett, welcome to

1:37

the show. Thanks so much for having

1:39

me, Dimitri. This will be fun. Yeah,

1:41

so it's been so much fun to

1:43

write this book with you. Really appreciate

1:45

the partnership on it, and let's get

1:47

into it and tell everyone what's in

1:49

this book. So, you

1:52

know, what's funny about this is that

1:54

this book started almost

1:56

exactly two years ago around

1:59

your... dining room table. And

2:02

I thought I would start off

2:04

by asking you to talk a

2:06

little bit about what

2:09

your hope was for the book and what the

2:11

motivation was to write it in the first place.

2:15

Yeah, so as I told you at the time, I was

2:19

very emotionally impacted

2:21

by Russia's invasion of

2:24

Ukraine. And in fact,

2:26

I had been focused on that war

2:29

for the preceding many months, and

2:31

was one of the first forecasters that

2:33

came out in December of the prior

2:35

year and said that I'm getting convinced

2:38

that President Putin is going to launch

2:40

this ruinous war before

2:42

the end of the winter. And

2:45

unfortunately, that did come to pass. And

2:47

you know, sometime later, I actually received

2:49

this incredible emotional email from

2:52

a Ukrainian immigrant to the

2:54

UK who had stumbled upon

2:56

my writings and my predictions,

2:59

and convinced his family to leave the

3:01

city of Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine. Right

3:04

before the war, February 15, he

3:06

said he had convinced them to finally flee

3:08

the country for what he described

3:10

to them as a vacation because they did not

3:12

believe the war would come. His parents, his

3:15

siblings, and he said, go to Turkey, I

3:17

bought your tickets, you'll come back in a

3:19

few weeks. They never came back. And

3:21

their neighborhood was shelled by Russian artillery was

3:24

on the outskirts of the city. And

3:26

a number of their neighbors, unfortunately,

3:29

perished. And, you

3:32

know, as I was looking at that whole situation,

3:34

and the reasons for

3:36

why I was convinced that Putin was going

3:38

to launch this war, it was

3:40

striking to me how many of those reasons, all

3:42

of them really, were also

3:44

applicable to the situation halfway around

3:46

the world in the Indo-Pacific. And

3:49

I was getting more and more convinced

3:51

of the prior years that we are on a

3:54

path to conflict with China. And

3:56

I thought that, you know, if I was able to do

3:58

some good, unfortunately, not as much. as much as

4:00

I could have or as much maybe

4:02

as it was possible to

4:05

warn about the threat of war

4:07

in Ukraine. Fortunately,

4:09

it was too late to deter it. Maybe

4:12

we can do some good with

4:14

ringing the alarm bells about this coming conflict,

4:17

which could be a thousand times

4:20

more impactful in terms

4:22

of life's loss, destruction of global

4:24

economy, impact to America's national security.

4:28

And fortunately, unlike with Ukraine, which

4:30

was eminent and literally a couple

4:32

of months out, with

4:34

this conflict, I think we have some years.

4:36

I don't think that China is

4:38

likely to launch a conflict before 2028, so

4:41

we have at least four years, six at the time

4:43

we started writing this book. And

4:46

it was important, A,

4:49

to tell the American public and really the

4:51

world of

4:53

why I'm convinced that

4:55

this conflict is on a

4:57

very dangerous trajectory, and

4:59

also, most importantly, to lay out a

5:02

great strategy for how do we deter

5:04

this conflict and make

5:06

sure it never happens. And

5:09

overall, how do we put it in the

5:11

context of America's grand strategy and

5:14

try to outline what all of

5:16

us, not just the 300 people

5:18

in the D.C. foreign policy community

5:21

that you and I talk to a lot, but

5:23

really average Americans out there and Europeans

5:25

and many others that I hope read

5:28

this book, can do to

5:30

try to reduce the chances of this

5:33

conflict because it's really up to all of us to

5:35

try to do this because this war,

5:38

boy, it really

5:40

could turn into World War III between

5:42

two nuclear powers. It's something

5:44

that no one on this planet should want to

5:46

see. So let

5:48

me, before we get

5:50

too deep into talking about China and

5:53

Taiwan, let me back up

5:56

for listeners here. not

6:00

all of whom know your history. One

6:04

of the things that really stands

6:06

out in your commentary and analysis

6:08

of Russia and Ukraine is

6:12

you're Russian. And

6:15

born in Russia, came to the United States

6:17

and have this great view

6:20

of sort of the both superpowers and

6:22

what makes them tick and think. You

6:26

also though, have been on the

6:28

front lines for

6:30

the last 15 years of

6:33

America's battle against China. And

6:36

I wonder if you could talk a

6:39

little bit about, you

6:41

know, the story of your work

6:43

in cybersecurity in many

6:46

ways parallels the arc

6:48

of America waking up to

6:51

the threat posed by China

6:54

to the global order. And

6:56

I wonder if you could talk a little bit about that

6:58

and talk a little bit about, you

7:00

know, Operation

7:03

Aurora and some of your work

7:05

there. You know, one of

7:07

the things I do like about the book, I'm

7:10

obviously biased as a co-author, but I

7:13

think you do a really good

7:15

job of laying out your personal

7:17

experience, both in

7:19

Russia and on the China issue

7:21

and how that's shaped your

7:23

view of, you know, this

7:26

sort of three superpowers and their struggle

7:28

of the 21st century. Yeah,

7:31

and I have to confess, I have you to blame

7:33

for that because you pushed me really hard to put

7:36

more of myself and my biography in that book, which

7:38

I was hesitant to do, but you

7:40

were absolutely right to do so. So

7:43

look, yes, I've always been passionate, by

7:45

the way, I should say about foreign

7:47

policy, national security, I studied in college

7:50

along with cybersecurity courses, but

7:52

then went into this technical cyber

7:54

career. And for

7:56

the first 10 years of my career,

8:00

Really, my hobbies and interests

8:02

in foreign policy did not

8:04

interface much with

8:06

my professional life. And

8:08

that all changed in January of 2010 when

8:11

I got a call from a company

8:14

called Google and

8:16

they wanted to cooperate with me, I

8:19

was at the time running global threat research

8:21

operations for a large cybersecurity company, on

8:24

an investigation of a hack into their

8:26

networks that they suspected was coming from

8:28

China. And that ultimately

8:30

led to broad investigation into dozens

8:33

of companies that have been compromised

8:35

in the same operation by

8:37

the Chinese government that I

8:39

ended up calling Operation Aurora. The reason I

8:41

named it Aurora, by the way, is with

8:43

a nod to history,

8:46

including Soviet history because Aurora is

8:48

the name of the battleship in

8:51

St. Petersburg that in 1917 fired

8:53

the shot that was a signal to

8:56

Lenin to launch the Bolshevik Revolution. It's

8:58

been called the shot heard around the world that changed

9:01

the course of the 20th century.

9:03

And I believe immediately

9:06

as I started looking at that

9:08

hack, that it was going

9:10

to change the industry forever. And

9:12

in fact, it did because it was the

9:14

first time really that anyone had encountered nation-state

9:17

actors, China in particular, in a

9:20

public sphere, breaking into

9:22

commercial entities for economic espionage

9:24

purposes. And

9:26

I immediately realized that this was likely to

9:28

lead to something bigger, that this

9:30

was likely to be occurring not

9:33

just at Google and a few other companies,

9:35

but probably in many other places. And indeed,

9:37

that led me to uncover more and more

9:39

operations, both from China and

9:42

later other nation-state actors led me to

9:44

co-found CrowdStrike a year later

9:46

in 2011. So

9:49

it changed my life and it changed really,

9:51

I think, the industry and

9:53

set me on a trajectory of doing

9:55

a lot of investigations into Chinese espionage

9:58

over the course of the next. decade or so and

10:01

seeing them break into virtually every company

10:03

on the planet that had intellectual property

10:06

that was an interest of Chinese companies

10:08

or Chinese state breaking into government networks.

10:11

And I sounded the alarm in those early days.

10:13

I called it the greatest transfer of wealth in

10:15

history. Something has been repeated by, at the time,

10:17

the director of the FBI, director

10:19

of the NSA. And look, you know, at

10:22

the time, I've called that this is a

10:24

national security threat that China is trying to

10:26

wage economic warfare against us. And for many

10:28

years, I couldn't get anyone in the government

10:30

to listen or pay attention to this. So

10:33

let's talk a little bit more

10:35

about this challenge that

10:37

China poses over the next

10:40

five to 10 years. Why

10:44

does Taiwan matter to that equation?

10:46

And why should the US care

10:48

about it? It's a

10:50

great question. So we've heard some

10:52

of the discussion of Taiwan in

10:55

this current presidential campaign cycle, but

10:57

it's been very reductionist, very simplistic.

10:59

Some people have said, well, Taiwan

11:01

matters to us only as long

11:03

as it keeps producing semiconductors, chips,

11:05

computer chips. And as long as

11:07

we achieve independence of Taiwan, it's

11:09

going to stop mattering to us.

11:12

Right. And that's run on two

11:14

counts. A, Taiwan mattered

11:16

to us long before chips were

11:18

even a thing. In fact, in

11:20

1950, General MacArthur, Douglas MacArthur

11:22

famously called it the unsinkable aircraft

11:25

carrier because it's of a strategic

11:27

position in Asia. And

11:29

two, it's also wrong because the

11:32

semiconductor issue is not going to

11:35

be solved anytime soon. And there's

11:37

no prospect of Taiwan not mattering

11:39

for semiconductor production for decades

11:42

to come. A lot of people

11:44

talk about the chips act that was passed

11:46

by Congress a couple of years ago that

11:49

gives $52 billion in grants

11:51

to industry. About 40 billion

11:53

of that is actually direct grants, another 12 billion or so

11:56

in research initiatives And

11:58

another 25 or so billion in. Fax

12:00

breaks to the semiconductor Me: factual

12:02

errors. But. Most don't appreciate

12:04

that. that's a drop in the pocket. For.

12:06

The chips industry i mean, a modern

12:09

fab these days could costs as much

12:11

as twenty billion dollars to build so

12:13

that sixty two billion or really forty

12:16

billion his noggin go long way. And

12:18

the goal of that ship Zoc is

12:20

actually to just stabilize. The.

12:23

Disappearance of the semiconductor industry

12:25

from Us source so. The.

12:28

The U S of course,

12:30

invented this critical industry. Then

12:32

we invented transistors. We invented

12:34

semiconductors and might and brought

12:36

a micro tracks industry. Over

12:38

last forty years, we've mostly

12:40

outsource the may factoring of

12:42

these ships to Asia to

12:44

Taiwan, to Korea, Singapore, Japan,

12:47

And other places and we are now

12:49

find ourselves in a situation where only

12:51

twelve percent of the world's ships are

12:53

i should produced in America and that's

12:55

been coming down for years now. And.

12:58

They attempt of the chips Zach this destabilize

13:00

it may be increase a little bit them

13:02

in some The most optimistic estimates are

13:04

that may if everything works perfectly with a

13:07

chip Zach will get to about twenty percent

13:09

of the world semiconductors be may fractured the

13:11

United States but as I can be any

13:13

sort of overwhelming numbers and certainly not going

13:16

to be sufficient to make ourselves and depend

13:18

of Taiwan But I want matters to us.

13:21

Way. More than than just as a

13:23

chip, produce a nation and matters to

13:25

us because of it's geographic location and

13:28

because of what it means to the

13:30

entire region. right? If you look at

13:32

China and we have this. Map.

13:35

And the book that we put in them. If.

13:37

You rotate the map and put

13:39

China at the top. Looking outward

13:41

at the Pacific Ocean, you can

13:44

see that China effectively contains, and

13:46

that's how they view themselves. By.

13:48

Us military bases and Us allies. It

13:51

starts from the east with a South

13:53

Korean peninsula. we're We have almost thirty

13:55

thousand troops stationed there and significant military

13:57

capabilities than on what to do. Japanese

14:00

islands where we also have military bases

14:02

there on to Taiwan. Is.

14:04

Viewed by China's really outposts of of

14:07

the Us and then onto the Philippines

14:09

where. Once. Again, after several

14:11

decades of absence we we have

14:13

military bases in Luzon. There were

14:16

were building up there so China

14:18

looks at. At the

14:20

World as. Being. Contained by

14:22

Us forces and Us.

14:24

allies and. As. It

14:26

once to it's ambitions have been a

14:29

global superpower of be able to project

14:31

is power both across it's region and

14:33

ultimately globally. It needs a break out

14:35

of this first island chain as is

14:38

often called. And. Taiwan sits at the

14:40

center of it. And I see there's

14:42

a historical element. To. To their

14:44

desire to take Taiwan. the they believe

14:46

we write a book quite wrongly that

14:48

time one has always belonged to China.

14:51

That's actually not correctly. They believe it's

14:53

a destiny to take Taiwan because it

14:55

sort of unfinished business from the Chinese

14:58

Civil War when they didn't really defeat

15:00

the Nationalist because sink your second, his

15:02

two million Nationalist were able to flee.

15:05

Mainland. China in nineteen forty nine and

15:07

set up on Taiwan and establish a sort

15:09

of a counter to the mainland China. Still

15:12

call the Republic of China south

15:14

for many reasons including strategic once

15:16

they desire to take Taiwan. but

15:18

it's also why it matters to

15:20

the United States. And. I've had

15:22

conversations with senior officials in the region, including

15:24

Japan, for example, where they've told me that

15:26

if China takes tai one. It's

15:29

gonna immediately changed the entire dynamic of

15:31

that region where the Us will immediately

15:33

lose most of it's relevance. You'll be

15:36

pushed far into the Eastern Pacific and

15:38

everyone from Japan and other countries in

15:40

the region will have to com a

15:43

date. China. A. Sort of the

15:45

new sheriff in town that sets rules of

15:47

the game in many ways that you seen

15:49

this play out on the periphery of Russia,

15:51

right? So if you look at the Central

15:54

Asian States, if you look at states and

15:56

the caucuses like our media that are effectively

15:58

operating within Russia sphere, Influence. It's not

16:00

because they desire to do so, because

16:02

they have no choice, because they are

16:05

relatively weak powers compare to Russia, us

16:07

as far away and and cannot be

16:09

relied on so they have to accommodate.

16:11

Russia. And Russia's interests and you will

16:13

have the same dynamics play out. In.

16:16

The most important region of the world

16:18

arguably. we are fifty percent the world's

16:20

gdp, most of economic growth, most of

16:22

the world's supply chains, and a China

16:24

will dominate that reach. And if they

16:27

take Taiwan. A T

16:29

you mentioned as a new era answer. but

16:31

one of the things I've that was i

16:33

think interesting the research of this book was

16:36

hovering to understand. Taiwan's.

16:38

History that it has never.

16:41

Belonged. To China In

16:43

the way that I think the

16:45

president she's rhetoric makes it seem

16:47

like. Ah, You know they were

16:49

Unification of Taiwan. is this great piece of

16:51

unfinished with that had one of the things.

16:54

As you get into the history

16:56

of the island is that actually

16:59

the same government has never controlled

17:01

the island of Taiwan and mainland

17:04

China at the same time that

17:06

actually over. The. Course of

17:08

really two thousand years

17:11

Taiwan has been in

17:13

island is within the

17:15

but mostly of only

17:17

attempted conquest with chapters

17:20

of colonization by the

17:22

Portuguese, Spanish, Japanese, and

17:24

ultimately the Han Chinese.

17:27

But. That a young this sort

17:29

of idea that I think the many

17:31

people in the west wrongly have like

17:34

well Taiwan's always been a part of

17:36

China and it's only since nineteen forty

17:38

seven that it's broken apart. Actually it

17:40

is just.true and that a in a

17:43

one of the things that really striking.

17:46

In. The time when these. Ah,

17:49

Political Tradition in and you traveled to Taiwan as

17:51

part of the research for the Spot. Is.

17:55

Coming to understand just how

17:57

separate. The. Taiwanese.

18:00

political and cultural

18:03

background is from, you

18:06

know, mainland communist China.

18:09

Absolutely. And, you know, there's a

18:11

great story in the book

18:13

about an American expedition

18:16

that landed on Taiwan in

18:18

the 1800s and was slaughtered

18:20

by the natives on the island, who,

18:22

by the way, the native

18:25

people of Taiwan are not Han

18:27

Chinese. They're Pacific Islanders. And

18:29

even though now the Taiwanese

18:31

population is mostly Han Chinese, because in

18:33

part of the migrations from China over

18:35

the last couple of centuries, 70% of

18:38

the people in Taiwan actually trace

18:40

their bloodlines back to the indigenous

18:42

populations and the culture

18:45

of the indigenous population, their

18:47

cuisines are getting more

18:50

resurrected and being admired and

18:52

celebrated in Taiwan. But

18:55

in the 1800s, you had this American

18:57

expedition landing on the island, being

19:00

slaughtered by the natives and then complaining

19:02

to the Chinese emperor to

19:04

do something about this because nominally he

19:06

had power over the island. And the

19:08

Chinese emperor basic response to the American

19:11

president was deal with it yourself. I

19:13

don't fully control Taiwan. A remarkable response,

19:15

but only highlighting the fact that this

19:18

island was so uncontrollable for so many

19:20

years and never fully belonged to China.

19:24

So now, Dimitri, there

19:26

are a lot of books that get written and

19:29

a lot of books that have been written over

19:31

the last five years about the

19:33

threat from China, the new cold war,

19:35

the blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. One

19:39

of the things you really wanted to

19:41

do in shaping

19:43

this book and setting out to write it

19:46

was not just as

19:49

Dennis McDonough used to say, admire the

19:51

problem. Let's

19:53

state the problem. Let's point

19:56

it out. Let's be

19:58

honest and upfront about it. Actually

20:00

need a game plan to get to the other

20:02

side? I'm. A and I wonder

20:04

if you to talk both. About

20:07

the arc of what

20:09

you see Him the.

20:12

Chinese. Us relationship and then how

20:14

we get there because I think one

20:16

of the things that really striking in

20:18

the bucket in your world view is.

20:21

You. Know for all of the talk about

20:23

this being like the faithful century Or

20:25

you know, the next fifty years or

20:27

the next hundred years of superpower. You.

20:29

Know you really talk about this is really

20:31

something that's like really just the next decade

20:34

or two on and I wonder if he

20:36

could talk about the timeline that you see.

20:39

Why? That hi my matters and what the Us

20:41

needs to do to get to the other side. Yes

20:44

or at hi this is a grand strategy

20:46

pocket and maybe this is my background is

20:48

an entrepreneur I'm I'm tend to be very

20:50

impatient app to go with people that just

20:52

one I'd buy a problems and I want

20:54

to get to solutions and try to figure

20:57

out how to solve problems. Much of the

20:59

baucus is really focus on how do we

21:01

solve this problem. How do we

21:03

actually win this Cold War? And there's.

21:06

No. Question in my mind that were in

21:08

a Cold War. I believe that for many

21:10

years by you know it, It's been so

21:12

fast and to use research for the spot

21:14

because we got back into called Were One

21:17

history in the book as well and on

21:19

every level. This. Is just like

21:21

Cold War one with the Soviet

21:23

Union and I didn't full even

21:26

appreciate. The. The. Sheer

21:28

volume of similarities that translate. I

21:31

think it's worthwhile a sense to

21:33

just lists some of them, but

21:35

you have unquestionably a global competition

21:37

for supremacy the second place. Much

21:39

like that, you had to Cold

21:42

War One as we call it

21:44

because of are you in America?

21:46

You know how it between China

21:48

and the United States? Yeah, preparations

21:51

for war. both countries building up

21:53

their military's reorienting their strategies and.

21:55

Changing. up their forces to prepare for this

21:57

conflict you have an arms race going on both

22:00

a conventional one and a nuclear one because

22:02

China, as we now know, has been

22:04

revealed by the US intelligence community is increasing

22:07

dramatically. It's nuclear arsenal going from about

22:09

300 nuclear warheads to over 1,000 by

22:11

the end of the

22:13

decade, increasing number of missile silos, nuclear

22:15

armed submarines and the like. You

22:18

have a space race, both countries trying

22:20

to conquer that domain as much as

22:22

they can. You have economic warfare, both

22:25

in terms of trade wars, economic espionage

22:27

that's being waged by China against the

22:29

United States and so forth.

22:31

You have an ideological struggle. It's a

22:34

little bit different from the first one.

22:36

It's less ideological as in communism

22:38

versus capitalism, but it's more of

22:40

authoritarianism versus democracy, as President Biden

22:42

himself talks about, even though he

22:44

would not admit the framing of

22:46

the Cold War as we do.

22:49

You have a major regional flashpoint, Taiwan being

22:51

in this conflict, West Berlin

22:54

was the flashpoint that almost took us to

22:56

a war, including a nuclear war in the 1960s.

22:59

You have a scramble for military bases.

23:01

We're setting up bases in the Philippines.

23:04

We're increasing our presence in Taiwan

23:06

and Japan in that whole region,

23:09

while the Chinese are trying to do the

23:11

same, setting up bases in Pakistan, in Cambodia,

23:13

even as far away as Africa and Djibouti.

23:16

You have an espionage war. Much of the Cold

23:18

War was characterized by this secret

23:20

spy war. You have the same thing

23:22

happening now with China, both in cyberspace

23:25

and in the physical world. The

23:27

FBI director Christopher Ray often talks

23:29

about how this is the highest

23:32

level of espionage that the FBI has

23:34

ever encountered in terms of just pure

23:36

scale, and most of it is coming

23:38

from China. I also

23:40

make the case in the book that this

23:42

Cold War, actually just like

23:44

the first one, began much earlier than we

23:46

realized. Most people think that

23:48

Cold War began after World War II, somewhere in

23:50

1946, 47 timeframe, with

23:54

the Churchill speech in Missouri talking about

23:56

the Iron Curtain descending across

23:58

Europe, Eastern Europe. And

24:02

I actually make the case in the book that I think it started in

24:04

1920, when the hot war that most Americans

24:07

have forgotten about, but we are actually in

24:09

a conflict with Russia from 1918 to

24:12

1920, where we deployed troops in Siberia

24:14

and the Far East in support of

24:16

Western coalition to try to defeat the

24:19

Bolsheviks and support the white

24:21

forces in Russia in the Russian Civil War.

24:23

And as soon as that war ended, the

24:25

lessons that the Bolsheviks took

24:28

away from that is that the

24:31

United States and primarily the United Kingdom,

24:33

who they at the time viewed as

24:36

the number one threat, are determined to

24:38

snuff out communism and that they were

24:40

in this existential fight that had to

24:43

be waged covertly initially, but also building

24:45

up their military for an eventual conflict.

24:47

So they've been focused on that for

24:50

25, 6 years before we realized that we're in a cold

24:52

war. Similarly with

24:54

China, they've been focused on this

24:57

for a very long time, at least since

24:59

the 1970s. You could even make the case

25:01

even earlier. And we

25:03

just woke up to this in the

25:05

last maybe 10 years if we're being

25:07

generous. So on every level, this conflict

25:09

resembles the first one. And

25:12

again, thinking about what is the

25:14

grand strategy for actual victory, right?

25:16

George Cannon and his long telegram

25:18

after World War II that he

25:20

sent from Moscow articulated the

25:23

strategy that we then used to defeat the Soviet Union during

25:25

the Cold War. And his

25:28

great insight was that the Soviet Union

25:30

was fundamentally in a natural phenomena, that

25:32

the Soviet Union would one day collapse.

25:35

And if we just wait it out, if we

25:38

manage to deter war, we're going to win. Well,

25:40

with China, it's quite a bit different because China,

25:42

of course, has existed for 5,000 years,

25:45

likely will exist for another 5,000 years or longer. It's

25:48

not going anywhere. It's not going to collapse. And

25:52

defining what victory looks

25:55

like is one of the

25:57

things that we try to do in the book because,

25:59

as we argue, The American

26:01

superpower position in the century,

26:04

while not assured, is

26:06

still very likely to remain

26:11

if we manage to do a few

26:13

things right. And particularly if we defend

26:15

our innovation and if

26:17

we make sure that we

26:19

dominate the technologies that will define

26:21

the 21st century, and we argue in

26:23

the book that there are four critical

26:25

technologies to that winning of that

26:27

race. It is AI and

26:30

autonomy, kind of self explanatory as we

26:32

look at what's been happening over the last couple

26:34

of years in the advancements in that area. It's

26:37

biotech and synthetic biology, both in the

26:39

medical science of space, but also in

26:42

the creation of new materials that you might

26:44

see in the coming decades in that field.

26:47

It is the aerospace technologies that

26:50

will dominate the space industry. It

26:53

is the green tack, as we call it, the

26:56

energy technologies that will be the

26:58

future of energy as we transition

27:00

to this net zero carbon world.

27:03

And there are two critical components

27:06

that you need in the dominance of

27:08

all of those four things, which is

27:10

semiconductors and critical minerals,

27:12

rare earths and other critical minerals

27:14

like cobalt and nickel and many

27:16

others. So those are

27:18

the things that we need to absolutely

27:20

assure that we have resiliency in our

27:22

supply chain for in terms of the

27:24

components. And we are investing

27:27

in innovation and we're defending our innovation when

27:29

it comes to those technologies to make sure

27:31

that we stay far ahead of China. And

27:33

China, as we talked about, has

27:35

numerous problems. It has

27:38

enormous economic problems. We've talked about

27:40

this on this podcast before, but

27:43

they've reached the middle trap much

27:45

earlier than most other well-off countries.

27:48

And the growth is stagnating.

27:50

They're facing just an absolute

27:52

population collapse this century where

27:54

they're going to go from

27:57

well over a billion people in populations that they have

27:59

to. to potentially as low as 500 million,

28:01

maybe 550 million by the end of the century. That

28:06

is a collapse unheard of in human

28:08

history. And obviously from

28:10

a geopolitical strategic perspective,

28:13

they are contained in that

28:15

region today through U.S. alliances,

28:17

through U.S. military bases. So

28:19

if we manage to maintain

28:21

that status quo and avoid

28:23

war and avoid them capturing

28:26

Taiwan and dominating Asia, which could lead

28:28

to them having a preeminent position on

28:31

the world stage as well, we

28:33

can absolutely win this Cold War. And

28:36

we talk about the military strategy, reforms

28:38

of defense industrial base, the

28:40

trade strategies, the technology strategies, sort

28:42

of looking at all aspects of

28:45

this Cold War II and outlining how do

28:47

we actually win it. Why

28:50

should the average

28:53

non-Washington policy insider

28:56

care about reading this book? Well,

28:58

A, if they care about

29:01

what I believe is the number one

29:03

threat in the world to our lifestyle,

29:05

to our well-being, to

29:07

American lives that could

29:09

potentially be lost in this conflict, which by

29:11

the way could exceed the

29:14

– at least on a daily count basis, the

29:16

number of lives we lost at any point during

29:19

World War II, right? You're an expert

29:21

on D-Day. The number of Americans we

29:23

lost on that day would be dwarfed

29:25

looking at just daily casualties by a

29:28

potential conflict with China, not to mention

29:30

that these are two nuclear powers and

29:33

keeping that conflict, A, contained to

29:35

that region and B, contained

29:37

to a conventional conflict versus a nuclear conflict would

29:39

be an enormous challenge in and of itself. So

29:42

this is, I believe, a train that's coming full

29:44

speed ahead at us, and

29:46

we have to do whatever it

29:48

takes to deter it. And

29:51

that job is not just for people in

29:53

the White House, people in the US military,

29:56

in the Pentagon. It is a job for all

29:58

of us because – The

30:00

challenge with deterrence, of course, is you

30:02

never know when you've had enough of

30:04

deterrence because at the end of the

30:06

day, you're doing something that can't be

30:08

measured, which is impacting the thinking and

30:11

the decision making of the other side of the

30:13

other party, right? And in

30:15

the nuclear space, this is why we

30:17

go all out and

30:19

make sure that we've done

30:21

absolutely everything possible so that

30:23

our adversaries know that we

30:25

can and will retaliate against

30:27

them in a devastating fashion

30:30

should they ever think about launching a nuclear

30:32

weapon at our country, right? That

30:34

is why we have invested sort

30:37

of in overkill capabilities, having land-based

30:39

intercontinental ballistic missiles in silos

30:42

across the United States, having

30:44

nuclear armed submarines, having bombers

30:47

with nuclear weapons loaded on

30:49

them. One

30:51

could argue that hundreds of missiles

30:53

is good enough. They're distributed across the United

30:56

States, but we say no, it's not enough.

30:58

Let's do everything possible even though it's going

31:00

to cost a lot to make

31:02

sure no one has even the slightest doubt

31:04

that our arsenal will survive a first strike

31:06

and we can retaliate. And

31:09

similarly, in this field, we have to

31:11

do everything possible in the economic sphere,

31:13

in the trade sphere, in the diplomatic

31:15

sphere, military, of course, to make sure

31:17

that China has every doubt in the

31:19

world that if they go for Taiwan,

31:22

that the consequences to them – that

31:25

China has no doubts, I should say, that

31:28

if they go for Taiwan, the consequences to

31:30

them will be absolutely devastating on every level.

31:33

And it's important to note that the stakes

31:35

for China here are absolutely huge. I

31:37

think Xi Jinping knows very well that if

31:39

he goes for Taiwan and he loses, that

31:42

will be the end of his rule

31:44

and likely the end of the Chinese

31:46

Communist Party rule over China. Unlike

31:49

Putin, who could survive losing

31:51

a war in Ukraine because the

31:54

goals that he is defining that

31:56

what he calls special military operation

31:58

are so nebulous. de-nautification,

32:01

who knows what that even means. I've

32:03

argued in the past that if he

32:05

wanted to look for a way out,

32:07

he could just declare mission accomplished, we've

32:09

achieved victory, and end that conflict. Well,

32:12

China can't do that. Their

32:14

goals are very clear, which is taking that

32:16

island. And if they go for

32:19

it and they lose, they'll immediately change the status

32:21

quo because I think the first thing that Taiwan

32:23

does in that scenario is declare independence. And

32:26

now you've forever changed the whole

32:28

nature of the standoff, where

32:30

Taiwan is on a very different trajectory,

32:33

and you've not been able to achieve

32:35

the one thing that you've said publicly,

32:37

as he has, is

32:39

essential to Chinese nations'

32:42

reemergence and revitalization. Last

32:47

question here, but it's actually my favorite part

32:49

of the book. Along

32:52

those lines, along the lines

32:55

of thinking about China's timeline,

32:57

thinking about Xi's thinking, you

33:01

have a very specific timeline

33:03

in the book. The book

33:05

opens on November

33:07

13th, 2028, with an

33:11

imagined chapter from the future,

33:13

a dispatch from the future

33:16

about China

33:18

launching an invasion of

33:21

Taiwan. Why

33:25

there, why

33:27

that date,

33:30

what's your argument for why that date might

33:32

actually end up mattering? Yeah,

33:35

so I don't actually think that

33:37

Xi Jinping has penciled the date certain yet.

33:40

I don't think the invasion is imminent. I

33:42

think we have years before he thinks

33:44

about ordering such an invasion.

33:47

But I do think the window opens

33:49

in late 2028 and

33:51

potentially closes, at least in his mind, in

33:54

2032, which could very well be the end of

33:56

his last term in office. He'll be

33:58

79 at that point. that he

34:00

could get another term in office. He

34:02

wants to do this. It's very clear on his

34:05

own watch so you can claim credit

34:08

for it, go down in Chinese history

34:10

if he succeeds as someone

34:13

who has eclipsed even the role

34:15

of Mao. He did the one thing

34:17

that Mao could never do, which is take Taiwan. So

34:20

I believe those four years, 28th of 32,

34:22

are incredibly dangerous. There's a lot of talk

34:24

in the media about 27, and it

34:26

all stems from the fact that the U.S. intelligence

34:28

community has assessed that he had

34:30

given the order for the PLA to be

34:32

ready to invade Taiwan by 27. I

34:36

think that's highly unlikely to happen in 27 for

34:38

a number of reasons, one of them being that

34:40

27 is a very busy calendar for Xi

34:43

Jinping. He's preparing for

34:45

his reelection in the Chinese Communist

34:47

Party as premier, which will take

34:49

place in the fall. It's a

34:52

lot of things to get done

34:54

and consolidate his power and

34:56

roll in the dice on an invasion does not seem very

34:58

smart. By the way, that's another reason why I think

35:00

he's given the order to be ready by 27 is because

35:02

politically he wants to be able to come

35:05

on that stage and announce

35:07

to the Communist Party membership that he

35:09

now has achieved the capability to

35:12

take Taiwan by force if they choose

35:14

to do so. So I don't

35:16

think that A, they'll be ready by 27

35:19

or that politically it makes sense. The

35:22

first part of 28 will also be

35:24

very busy for him assuming he gets

35:26

reelected in October and November of 27.

35:30

The next six to eight months on

35:33

the Chinese political calendar are very

35:35

busy with creating the

35:38

bureaucracy in some ways analogous

35:40

to what happens when a new president gets

35:42

inaugurated and it takes many, many months to

35:44

fill the critical roles in different departments of

35:46

the U.S. government. You have a

35:48

similar situation happening. In China,

35:51

you have sort of the new

35:53

ideological ideas that are being put together for the

35:55

next five years. So it's a very busy time.

35:57

I think too busy to launch an invasion. You

36:00

sort of get past that in late

36:02

summer and that's when you

36:04

can start thinking about an

36:06

invasion. 28 is a

36:08

very interesting year because in January of

36:10

that year, you're going to have elections

36:12

in Taiwan and in May inauguration of

36:14

a potentially new president in Taiwan. You

36:17

have the Summer Olympics taking place in

36:19

Los Angeles here in the United

36:21

States. So that'll be a big

36:23

distraction for the country that may

36:25

potentially give China some wiggle

36:28

room to do more preparations and

36:30

not have the world pay attention

36:32

as much. And then you have

36:34

the elections coming up in November of 2028, where it's now

36:36

very clear that the

36:41

next president, as we're sitting today, will

36:43

very likely be Joe Biden or Donald

36:45

Trump, the two nominees of their respective

36:47

parties. And both of them,

36:50

not to mention their age, but just

36:53

by term limits will not be running in 2028.

36:56

So you are by definition going to have a

36:58

new president that's going to be installed or winning

37:00

at least in November of 2028. So

37:04

you have a lot of distraction happening,

37:06

a lame duck presidency

37:08

in 2028 potentially. And

37:11

you could have a situation where it gives China

37:14

an opportunity to go. But I think it's going

37:16

to be very dependent on the circumstances, on

37:18

his own preparedness and his belief

37:21

that his forces are prepared, the

37:23

preparedness of the US military, of

37:25

the Taiwanese, Japanese, Australians, the

37:28

range of forces that he would be facing potentially

37:30

should he launch. But the other thing that we

37:32

do in this book, in

37:34

that prologue, is we outline a

37:36

very detailed scenario of how this

37:38

invasion would unfold. And

37:40

I spent a lot of time in

37:42

Taiwan and talking to their

37:45

military, talking to folks

37:47

that are spent from our military, they spend

37:49

time there. One of my good friends, Ivan

37:51

Kanapathy, who's been the US military

37:53

at the Chezio Taiwan, we

37:55

actually toured the island and looked at the different

37:58

potential landing sites. and the

38:00

terrain and you get the appreciation that

38:03

saving private ride in Chinese edition, this

38:05

is not going to be.

38:08

That is completely unrealistic, this idea of

38:10

storming the beaches. The terrain just doesn't

38:12

allow it. Taiwan Strait is

38:15

very treacherous waters. Half of

38:17

the year, you basically can't pass it

38:19

unless you're in a huge container ship.

38:21

You've got mountains, you've got rivers, you've

38:23

got tunnels. It is just a nightmare

38:25

of an island to try to take

38:27

over. In fact, the US itself in

38:30

World War II bypassed it and invaded

38:32

Okinawa instead because of the difficulties of

38:35

entrenched Chinese forces on Formosus. It was

38:37

called in the time. We

38:41

lay out the scenario of how could you actually

38:43

do it if you're China, spend a lot of

38:45

time thinking about it, war gaming it. I think

38:47

people will find it very, very interesting and intriguing.

38:50

In fact, I had dinner with General

38:52

Petraeus a couple of weeks ago who has

38:54

read the book. He's been very kind to

38:56

give an endorsing blurb of the book and

38:58

he said, Dimitri, that is one devilish scenario,

39:00

devilishly clever. We

39:03

know, by the way, that China is

39:05

thinking about this. One of the really

39:07

amazing things that we've seen in the

39:09

news headlines in the last couple of

39:11

weeks is a

39:13

report from some open

39:16

source satellite

39:19

researchers pointing out that

39:21

there is a Chinese military base, I think,

39:23

in the Mongolian desert

39:27

where the street layout that

39:29

has been recreated in the

39:31

desert precisely batches the streets

39:36

in and around

39:38

the Taiwanese presidential palace.

39:40

China is out

39:43

there looking at and thinking about

39:46

how it would assault the presidential

39:48

palace if it needed to or

39:50

wanted to someday. absolutely

40:00

striking to overlay that road network

40:02

that they've built on

40:04

that base in recent years with

40:06

the road networks in Taipei that

40:09

literally just encompasses that presidential palace

40:11

in Taipei that I visited on

40:14

my recent trip there. And

40:16

when you think about it, it's

40:19

one thing to prepare for war. It's

40:21

one thing to start thinking about how

40:23

do you attack Chinese, I mean, I'm

40:25

sorry, Taiwanese military bases if you're China.

40:28

It's another thing to prepare for

40:30

an invasion of the presidential palace

40:33

because that is not sort

40:35

of preparing for some potential conflict with

40:37

your neighbor where you might think, well,

40:39

maybe they'll attack us or whatever. You

40:41

are planning for a takeover of the

40:43

government, right? You're planning to orchestrate a

40:45

coup and stew your own government. That's the only

40:47

reason why you would plan to do

40:50

sort of a special forces mission on

40:52

the presidential palace. So clearly they are

40:54

thinking about it. Clearly they're working towards

40:56

this. It's still very difficult. And I

40:59

think the key message

41:01

in the book is that this is

41:03

not predetermined. Unlike Ukraine, we can

41:05

still do a lot to deter this conflict

41:07

and all of us really have

41:10

to do everything in our power to

41:12

do so. And we end the book

41:15

with Latin, as most

41:17

of our listeners undoubtedly know, the

41:19

Roman Senator, Cato

41:21

the Elder, about 2100 years

41:23

ago in the Roman

41:25

Senate would close out every speech

41:28

with the phrase Carthago de Landa

41:30

Est. Carthage must be

41:32

destroyed. And we

41:34

end the book with the Latin

41:36

phrase, Sinha de Teranda Sunt, China

41:39

must be deterred. And all of us should be

41:41

thinking every single day, how do we contribute

41:44

to that mission? The

41:47

book is Whirled on the Brink, How

41:49

America Can Beat China in the Race

41:51

for the 21st Century.

41:54

And as you said,

41:57

if you don't trust our word for it,

41:59

General De David Petraeus says, it's

42:02

an urgent, thought-provoking warning about one

42:04

of the biggest challenges facing America

42:06

today, a must-read on the

42:08

most important issue in the world. Out

42:12

April 30th from Public Affairs Press,

42:14

Dimitri, where can people get this

42:16

book? They

42:19

can get it in their favorite

42:21

bookstores, Amazon, Politics and Prose

42:23

if you live in DC, I'll be doing

42:25

a talk there with Jim Schudel from CNN

42:28

on April 30th, the week of the

42:30

release, and you'll find me and Garrett

42:32

around the country talking about this in

42:35

the coming months. And Garrett, I

42:37

really want to thank you for the

42:39

incredible collaboration on this book over the

42:41

last two years. You are an amazing

42:43

writer. It's my first book, and

42:45

I've learned so much from you in how

42:47

to write a book and how to

42:49

make it compelling and interesting. And

42:52

thanks so much for joining me on this podcast. It's been

42:55

a great conversation and a great process working with you. And

42:57

I learned a lot working through it, and

43:00

I think it's a fascinating look at the

43:02

next decade of America's

43:04

geopolitics. And now, please

43:06

enjoy this excerpt from the World

43:08

on the Brink audiobook narrated

43:11

by Will Collier. Prologue,

43:14

a dispatch from the future. November

43:17

13th, 2028. The

43:21

winter season in Taiwan, lasting

43:23

from November till March, is

43:25

great for surfers. It's

43:28

no Bali or Hawaii, as the

43:30

size of the waves and their consistency may vary.

43:33

But the Northeast Monsoon, which brings

43:35

the cold China coastal current water into

43:37

the Taiwan Strait, where it meets the

43:39

warm Kuroshio branch current coming from the

43:42

south, is known to form

43:44

some significant waves. The

43:46

Taiwan Strait is only about 100 meters

43:48

deep, shallow enough that during

43:50

ice ages and the time of glaciers,

43:53

the island of Taiwan was physically connected

43:55

to the Chinese mainland. But

43:57

even in the modern era, the 200-mile-long path passage,

44:00

which varies in width from about 100

44:02

nautical miles down to just 70 nautical

44:04

miles and is one of the most

44:06

vital shipping routes in the world, is

44:09

known for frequent storms, large

44:11

swells, and blinding fog, and

44:14

bedeviled by annual summer typhoons

44:16

from roughly May to October.

44:19

Between the typhoons in the summer and

44:21

the stormy high-wave winter season, there

44:24

is no predictably perfect and easy

44:26

time to launch a large-scale amphibious

44:28

invasion of Taiwan, especially

44:30

with the strait registering about 150 days a year of

44:32

winds above 20 knots, rough seas

44:36

for amphibious ships and landing craft.

44:40

Any landing on Taiwan's windy, shallow,

44:42

and rocky beaches during that time

44:44

is fraught and risky. Which

44:47

is why, in the end, China decided

44:49

to forgo a beach landing and attempt

44:51

an air assault on the island's port

44:54

and airfield facilities, the

44:56

seizure of which would allow for

44:58

rapid arrival of follow-on troops and

45:00

logistical supplies to facilitate a successful

45:02

occupation. The

45:04

operations planners in the People's Liberation

45:07

Army, PLA, had had years to

45:09

deliberate their invasion strategy, adjusting

45:11

year after year as China's

45:13

own military capabilities grew and

45:15

advanced. In

45:17

the end, due to the unpredictability

45:19

of the rough Taiwan Strait waters

45:21

and the heavy fortifications the Taiwanese

45:23

had built up around potential beach

45:25

landing sites, the PLA came

45:28

up with an innovative invasion plan, the

45:30

opening stages of which they'd practiced repeatedly as

45:32

the late 2020s unfolded. For

45:36

several years, China had engaged

45:38

in full-scale military exercises, loading

45:41

up vast armadas of military and

45:43

civilian ships with tens of thousands

45:45

of troops, equipment, and materiel, and

45:48

heading toward Taiwan, always

45:50

stopping just short of the 12-nautical-mile

45:52

limit that marks the start of

45:54

the island's territorial waters. They

45:57

figured they could practice with some impunity because

45:59

they knew Taiwan could never afford

46:01

to respond aggressively. One

46:04

of the island's greatest defense dilemmas

46:06

had long been its inability to

46:08

respond to hostile provocations and threats

46:10

with force, lest it be

46:12

accused of instigating a conflict. U.S.

46:15

officials had warned Taiwanese leadership for

46:18

years that under no circumstances could

46:20

they fire the first shot. They

46:23

had to take the Chinese punch

46:25

before retaliating. Portraying China

46:27

as the aggressor would be a

46:29

critical step in building the international

46:31

case that Chinese leader Xi Jinping

46:33

was alone responsible for starting any

46:35

war. The

46:37

stakes couldn't have been higher. After

46:40

all, even if the Taiwanese fired

46:42

first at the PLA armada after

46:45

it crossed Taiwan's territorial boundary, Beijing

46:48

could still dispute the shooting as

46:50

unprovoked and claim that it occurred

46:52

in international waters. Muddying

46:54

the geopolitical waters such that

46:56

Taiwan risked losing key moral

46:58

and diplomatic support around the

47:00

world. Too many

47:03

countries wanted the excuse. They

47:05

would only be too eager to continue

47:07

trading with China, the world's second largest

47:09

economy, irrespective of the

47:12

conflict. If Taiwan was

47:14

to survive and rally the world to its

47:16

cause, it couldn't afford to

47:18

offer that excuse. The

47:20

final Chinese PLA plan counted on

47:23

precisely that Taiwanese restraint when China's

47:25

ships entered Taiwan's waters and closed

47:28

in on the vital northwestern coastal

47:30

port of Taipei, a

47:32

modern facility completed in 2012 that

47:34

boasted 4,500 feet

47:36

of so-called birth space, a substantial

47:38

amount of space available for cargo

47:41

offloading. There, the

47:43

PLA planned to leverage existing infrastructure

47:45

to rapidly unload hundreds of thousands

47:48

of troops and thousands of tanks,

47:51

armored vehicles, heavy engineering

47:53

equipment, weapons, munitions, and

47:56

the logistics supplies needed for the conquest of

47:58

the island. While

48:00

Taipei wasn't the largest port in Taiwan,

48:02

the rapid capture of its docks was

48:04

essential to the success of the operation

48:07

since other Taiwanese port facilities were too

48:09

far away from the capital city. That

48:12

distance and Taiwan's extensive array of

48:15

steep mountains and winding rivers made

48:17

the rapid transport of a large

48:19

PLA armored force from any other

48:21

port or beach to the capital

48:23

all but impossible. The

48:26

operational plan called for moving eight modern

48:28

Type 075 Yushan-class

48:30

amphibious assault ships, each

48:32

with more than 30,000 ton displacement,

48:35

right up to Taiwan's maritime border,

48:37

while being protected by PLA

48:40

Navy, PLAN, guided missile destroyers.

48:43

Xi Jinping's regime had rapidly constructed

48:45

the Yushan ships specifically with this

48:47

mission in mind. Each

48:50

was a highly capable delivery platform for

48:53

air assault operations, carrying a

48:55

mix of up to 28 attack and

48:57

heavy transport helicopters and 800 troops. In

49:01

the early morning hours, once the final order was

49:03

given, 200 Z-8 and Z-20 transport

49:06

helicopters, all backed up by Z-10

49:08

attack gunships, would take off from

49:10

the landing docks and head for

49:12

the Taipei port, as

49:14

well as the Taoyuan International Airport, 10

49:17

miles west, and the smaller

49:19

Taipei Songshan Airport, located right in the

49:21

center of the capital city, just three

49:24

miles north of the Zhongjiang government district.

49:27

The plan called for helicopters to make the

49:29

journey in 10 minutes. Ironically,

49:32

these aircraft were built based

49:34

on legally acquired Western technology.

49:36

The Z-8 came from an original French

49:38

licensed design, and the Z-20 from the

49:41

UH-60 Blackhawk, which America had sold to

49:43

China in the 1980s. The

49:46

Z-10 was built with Pratt &

49:48

Whitney engines and assisted by European Airbus

49:51

and Augusta Westland transmission and rotor installation

49:53

designs. The Helleborn

49:55

Brigades of the PLA Air

49:57

Force, PLA-AF Airborne Corps, China's

50:00

equivalent to the United States' 101st

50:02

Airborne Division, would assault, capture,

50:05

and secure the port and

50:07

airport facilities, in preparation for

50:09

follow-on forces with armored vehicles that would

50:11

land at the airfields on the Chinese

50:14

Y-20 and Russian-made IL-76 troop

50:17

transport planes. As

50:19

those transport planes descended, dozens

50:22

of large roll-on, roll-off, row

50:24

row, ferries, and vehicle transport

50:26

ships, all built with national

50:28

defense requirements and appropriated from

50:31

Chinese industry by the PLAN,

50:33

would rush into the captured port

50:35

and unload tens of thousands of

50:37

troops and hundreds of additional tanks

50:39

and infantry fighting vehicles. Anticipating

50:42

that the Taiwanese might manage to

50:44

destroy the port's infrastructure ahead of

50:46

the Chinese landing, the PLA has

50:49

spent years practicing rapid offloading of

50:51

these vessels in ports with minimal

50:53

cargo handling infrastructure, such as a

50:55

lack of pierside ramps or tugboat

50:57

support. Simultaneously,

50:59

PLA land-based missiles, rockets,

51:02

and bombers, along

51:04

with attack aircraft deployed from two

51:06

Chinese carriers positioned off Taiwan's eastern

51:08

coast, would pummel Taiwan's airbases in

51:10

an attempt to take the island's

51:12

relatively small air force out of

51:14

commission before it could get into

51:16

the fight. Firing

51:19

runways, fuel depots, and maintenance

51:21

infrastructure, and targeting the island's

51:23

prized fleet of F-16 fighter

51:25

jets. Mainland-based

51:28

precision-guided ballistic and cruise missiles,

51:30

such as DF-17 hypersonics, together

51:33

with long-range, truck-mounted PHL-16

51:35

multiple rocket launchers and

51:37

Kamikaze drones, would

51:40

all target stationary radars, fixed

51:42

weapons platforms, critical command, control,

51:44

communications nodes, naval facilities, energy

51:47

infrastructure, and TV and radio

51:49

transmission towers to sow chaos

51:52

and impede the highly centralized

51:54

decision-making of the Taiwanese military.

51:58

American-built Patriot air defense batteries. batteries,

52:00

as well as Taiwan's indigenously

52:02

developed Skybo systems, troop

52:04

barracks and anti-ship batteries,

52:07

were also high-priority targets.

52:10

Achieving the invasion's main political objective,

52:12

the rapid assault and capture of

52:14

key government installations in Taipei, including

52:17

the Presidential Office Building and the

52:19

Ministry of National Defense, relied

52:22

on assault forces delivered by dozens

52:24

of fast Type 726 Yu-Yi-class air-cushioned

52:27

landing craft, Elkac, racing up

52:30

the Tamsui River. The

52:32

wide but relatively shallow river snakes through

52:34

the mountains that separate the beaches on

52:37

Taiwan's western shore from the center of

52:39

the city and empties into the

52:41

strait in the Bali district, right next to the

52:43

port of Taipei. Its

52:45

tributaries pass near most of the key government

52:47

installations in the city. That

52:50

geography meant that the Elkac's, deployed from

52:52

the Ushan amphibious ships sitting at the

52:55

mouth of the Tamsui and powered by

52:57

large gas turbines and capable of achieving

52:59

speeds of 80 knots, could

53:01

deliver a battalion of Marines and

53:04

armored vehicles directly into the heart

53:06

of Taipei's government district in under

53:08

15 minutes. The

53:10

1-2 punch of the fast boats

53:12

advancing up the river while airborne

53:14

troops landed via rotor and fixed-winged

53:16

aviation at the Taipei-Songshan Airport would

53:18

allow the PLA to rapidly bring

53:20

the fight to Taiwan's seat of

53:22

government. While the

53:25

PLA and Marines captured Taipei's government

53:27

and communication centers, the

53:29

armored and infantry divisions would arrive on

53:31

the island's northwestern coast, unload at the

53:33

port and nearby airport on the other

53:35

side of the mountains from Taipei City

53:37

Center, and then drive

53:39

onto the highways that encircle Taiwan, racing

53:43

toward the key population centers and

53:45

military bases and hoping to overwhelm

53:47

defenses. Ting

53:49

exercised each element of the plan for years,

53:52

including simulated fast Elkac boat city assaults

53:54

on the Pearl River near Hong Kong.

53:57

Xi Jinping's military generals assured him that the

53:59

the plan would achieve a rapid conquest

54:01

of Taiwan before the rest of the

54:04

world, especially the United States, had a

54:06

chance to intervene to save the island.

54:09

Xi Jinping chose November 13, 2028,

54:13

as China's D-Day, loading up

54:15

his invasion fleet and issuing his

54:17

final ultimatum. With

54:20

little to show after years of

54:22

so-called gray zone tactics aimed at

54:24

non-violently forcing Taiwan to choose political

54:26

unification with the Chinese mainland, tactics

54:29

that ranged from constant economic

54:32

and military pressure to social

54:34

and traditional media influence campaigns

54:36

to bribing and blackmailing of

54:38

politicians, Xi had

54:41

finally concluded that only military

54:43

force would bring about achievement

54:45

of this long-desired objective. As

54:48

the 2020s progressed, Chinese military planners

54:50

had presented one alternative strategy after

54:53

another, including a last-chance

54:55

alternative to an all-out invasion, a

54:58

naval and air blockade aimed at isolating

55:00

the island, which was heavily

55:02

reliant on food and energy imports and

55:05

forcing its surrender without a fight. But

55:08

in meeting after meeting, presentation

55:10

after presentation, war game after

55:13

war game, the blockade

55:15

seemed unlikely to succeed. Xi

55:17

worried that America would undermine the

55:19

blockade with its formidable underwater and

55:22

surface naval fleet and air power.

55:25

He also worried about the economic effects,

55:27

how the rest of the world would

55:29

react to a prolonged confrontation across the

55:31

strait that would surely cause a humanitarian

55:33

disaster on the island and supply chain

55:36

disruptions beyond it, ripples that

55:38

would impact China itself. The

55:41

United States and its allies might even

55:43

launch a counter blockade of Chinese maritime

55:45

oil and gas imports, a

55:47

move that could paralyze China before its

55:49

own blockade took a decisive toll on

55:51

Taiwan. Any Chinese

55:54

naval blockade was also likely to

55:56

provoke Taiwan to take the one

55:58

step it had never yet formally

56:00

done, declaring full

56:02

independence and irrevocably changing the

56:04

geopolitical status quo. And

56:07

perhaps most crucially for Xi, the

56:10

approach of laying a prolonged siege

56:12

to the island ran counter to

56:14

his strong preference for resolving China's

56:16

Taiwan problem in a rapid and

56:18

decisive manner to rip

56:20

off the Band-Aid and present the

56:22

world with the fait accompli of

56:24

Chinese conquest and the long-awaited integration

56:27

of Taiwan into the People's Republic

56:29

of China. Thus,

56:31

after spending that summer and

56:33

fall in strategy sessions, briefings

56:35

and quiet loan contemplation at

56:37

Beidaiha, the Communist Party elite's

56:39

seaside retreat, and

56:41

in the party's Zhongnanhai compound in

56:43

Beijing, Xi had settled

56:45

on an invasion. As

56:48

he concluded, if he was to take

56:50

the step of mobilizing the military, risk

56:52

a conflict with America and cause

56:55

a potential global backlash, it

56:57

was best to go all the way and

56:59

try to end it as quickly as possible.

57:02

Victory, he'd been told by his

57:04

generals and military advisors, would be

57:07

swift and the Taiwanese resistance would

57:09

be quickly vanquished. They

57:12

had assured him that China's decades-long

57:14

investment in new military systems, weapons

57:16

and training would be decisive. It

57:20

wasn't even clear to Xi and the

57:22

Communist Party's Central Military Commission that the

57:24

Americans would ultimately choose to fight for

57:26

Taiwan once they saw the might of

57:28

the China invasion fleet, once

57:30

they calculated the price of the war in

57:32

tens of thousands of American lives. Even

57:35

if they did fight, the U.S. military

57:37

was far away, nearly 500 miles

57:40

away on Okinawa or 1,700 miles away in

57:42

Guam. We

57:46

can hold them at bay long enough

57:48

while our airborne assault units quickly secure

57:50

key critical infrastructure resources on the island,

57:52

and our landing force rapidly crosses the

57:54

strait and secures the rest of the

57:57

country to create a sense of fait

57:59

accompli. She's top military advisor had

58:01

promised in the final briefing the previous

58:03

week. She believed the

58:05

time for hesitancy was over. The

58:08

time to act was now. As

58:11

he saw it, victory would be his

58:14

and his place in history assured. His

58:17

ascent into the pantheon of Chinese

58:19

historical leaders would be unmatched.