2:00

important and what that means

2:02

for the current moment. And

2:04

for this podcast, how the so-called

2:06

global North or the

2:08

rich countries can better manage relations

2:11

with the South. What

2:13

might a reboot look like? Well,

2:16

I sat down with a really smart thinker

2:19

on this topic. Roger Mohan

2:21

is a columnist for Foreign Policy

2:23

based in New Delhi. I've known

2:25

him for years. He's a highly

2:27

regarded thinker and analyst of Indian

2:29

foreign policy, but also the broader

2:31

shifts in politics across the global

2:33

South. Roger Mohan is

2:35

also a senior fellow at the

2:37

Asia Society Policy Institute. Global

2:40

Reboot is a partnership between Foreign Policy

2:42

and the Doha Forum. This

2:45

is episode seven of season

2:47

three. Let's dive in. Roger

2:53

Mohan, welcome to Global Reboot. Thank you,

2:55

Robbie, for having me. So

2:58

there's a whole debate over whether

3:00

the term global South is a

3:02

useful term or not, but

3:04

I want to sidestep that for now because

3:06

it's in frequent use and it's the phrase

3:08

we're here to discuss today. So

3:11

let me ask you this. Why

3:13

is the so-called global South being

3:15

discussed as much as it is?

3:18

Why is it important? I would

3:20

say there are two immediate triggers for

3:22

the sudden resurgence of the concept. The

3:25

concept has been around for a long

3:27

time and been dormant in the recent

3:29

decades in the academy rather than in

3:32

the political public discourse. But I think

3:34

the COVID-19 pandemic, the effect of that

3:36

on a large number of developing countries

3:38

and then the war in Ukraine, which

3:40

added to the devastation around the world

3:42

on energy, food and fuel. I think

3:46

this together kind of magnified

3:48

the resentments within the developing world

3:51

against the West. And

3:54

in the West, there was a huge

3:56

surprise that these countries, so-called

3:59

non-Western countries, were not really

4:01

supporting the Western position on Russian

4:03

invasion of Ukraine. So I

4:05

think these two factors came together to suddenly see,

4:07

oh my God, there is a world out there

4:10

which is different, which is taking

4:12

positions not aligned with ours.

4:14

So that's how I think I would

4:16

say last two years, it's really caught

4:18

on political imagination everywhere.

4:21

And that's partly because the global

4:23

South itself is not homogenous. You

4:25

know, it's this vast, vast part

4:27

of the world where

4:29

obviously different countries have different positions.

4:31

So on Ukraine, for example, China

4:34

right before Russia's invasion declared

4:37

itself as a no-limits

4:39

partner with Russia. Let's say the

4:42

Indian position was quite different because

4:44

India, even though it saw itself

4:46

or sees itself as

4:49

an old friend of the Soviet

4:51

Union, now Russia, it's still sort

4:53

of acting on what it sees

4:55

as its immediate strategic interest. So

4:58

this isn't monolithic. But as

5:00

you say, partly because of the pandemic, each

5:03

of these countries feel like they're being put

5:05

in a place where

5:07

their needs are sometimes seen as

5:10

subservient as those of the

5:12

West. Is that fair to say? Yeah,

5:15

absolutely. I mean, I would say during

5:17

the pandemic, I mean, the reluctance of

5:19

countries that are producing vaccines to actually

5:21

supply them, a lot of

5:23

vaccines are being wasted in the countries which could

5:25

afford them rather than being delivered

5:27

to countries that needed them. And

5:30

the economic impact of COVID and

5:32

the lack of support, that magnified

5:34

it. And then you have conservatives

5:36

like President Trump, he called them

5:38

shithole countries, if you recall. There

5:41

is this sense that look, we don't care for this

5:44

part of the world. But on the liberal side

5:46

as well in the West, there is a

5:48

deep condescension that has taken hold since the

5:51

end of the Cold War. Because

5:53

during the Cold War, you needed a lot of

5:55

these countries. So there were people who were willing

5:57

to engage them for whatever reasons for strategic and

6:00

other purposes but after 91 the

6:02

sense you did not really need them it

6:05

was really up to these countries to measure

6:07

up to the standards of either Washington consensus

6:09

or the new human

6:11

rights standards. So it really

6:13

seemed that they are always

6:15

up there to be judged rather

6:18

than engaged as partners in any

6:20

meaningful sense but as you

6:22

rightly said there is deep differentiation within

6:24

the global south. A lot of countries

6:27

have made progress for example South Korea

6:29

that was once one of the less

6:31

developed countries today is part of the

6:33

OECD you have Chile which

6:35

is developed and above all China itself

6:37

today is the second largest economy. So

6:40

what it captures is about a non-Western

6:42

world or the rest but

6:45

it doesn't really cohere as a tool or

6:47

as a force that can change the world.

6:49

And of course it is sort of the

6:51

term and the phrase and the grouping that

6:54

ends up getting discussed a lot in our

6:56

world and that's why we are here having

6:58

this discussion. But Raja there is

7:00

also a growing sense of the West's hypocrisy

7:03

isn't there? So you mentioned

7:05

condescension but there is

7:07

also frequent accusations of hypocrisy whether

7:10

it is climate change, whether the

7:12

West has emitted the most carbon historically

7:14

but is best positioned to navigate a

7:16

warming world and it won't meet its

7:18

commitments to help finance green initiatives in

7:21

the rest of the world or

7:23

whether it is the so-called global nots

7:25

control of the post Bretton Woods institutions

7:27

such as the World Bank and the

7:30

IMF which either have an American or

7:32

European running it or there is even

7:34

the UN's global agencies for example the

7:36

UNHCR which deals with refugees. So

7:38

America donates the most money so it

7:41

always gets to choose where

7:43

that money gets allocated to some

7:45

extent and there are criticisms that

7:47

America tends to favor refugee crises

7:49

in areas that it has interest

7:51

in. As I say all

7:53

of this and as I think about

7:55

it none of this is new exactly

7:57

right? So why does it seem to

7:59

be gay? gaining salience now

8:02

in the last few years. As

8:04

someone who takes the world as it is,

8:07

I'm not shocked by hypocrisy because hypocrisy

8:09

is part of life and I think

8:11

all states, it's not just the West.

8:14

China does its own hypocrisy, Russia does

8:16

it, India does it. There's no one

8:18

superior or inferior when it comes to

8:20

being hypocritical but that's why states operate

8:23

in the international system. But

8:25

my sense is why it has gained

8:27

traction today is of

8:29

the two immediate crises. And

8:32

second, I think the relative weight of the

8:34

West in the global economy

8:36

has shrunk and the sense that Russia

8:38

and China for different reasons, Russia is

8:41

not an economic power but China is,

8:44

that they're gaining ground and

8:46

that the West is being marginalized in

8:49

the various regional or other

8:51

geopolitical environments. And

8:53

in the non-Western world, I

8:55

mean I think the resentments have

8:58

gained ground and when the West now

9:00

comes to seek support on Ukraine, they're

9:03

saying, look, where were you all this time? Because

9:05

on the one hand, if you think of the developing

9:07

world is far more concerned about sovereignty, right? They're

9:11

the sovereignty champions and

9:13

here the Ukraine case was a clear violation

9:15

of sovereignty of a country.

9:18

That's why the hypocrisy question comes in. I

9:20

think that the West does

9:22

its own interventions. Post

9:25

1991, didn't think much of sovereignty

9:28

but when the boot is on

9:30

your foot, I mean then you begin to raise

9:33

the question. So I think that's where the

9:35

hypocrisy argument comes in. But the sense

9:37

is in the end, the change

9:40

I think is many countries in the global

9:42

South today have the agency to make a

9:44

difference. When you're to your point on sovereignty,

9:46

US President Joe Biden at

9:48

the start of Russia's invasion of

9:51

Ukraine often depicted that fight as

9:53

a grand, part of

9:55

a grand battle between democracies and

9:58

autocracies, but it was only much. later,

10:00

several months later, that America

10:02

began to describe what

10:05

was happening in Europe as an

10:07

issue of sovereignty, about borders, about

10:09

the integrity of rules and borders,

10:11

which was in a sense nodding

10:13

to the point you're making

10:16

that the rest of the world

10:18

can appreciate distinctions over

10:20

sovereignty much more than

10:23

it can do so about

10:25

democracy, which make it black

10:27

and white as much as you want, but for much of

10:30

the world, democracy is a

10:32

spectrum. Absolutely. I

10:34

mean, I think what is impressive is the

10:37

corrections we've seen in the Biden

10:39

administration's position because the

10:41

democracy versus autocracy, even from its acceptance

10:44

speech in November 2020,

10:46

you see that theme running. But then

10:48

of course, this is a very familiar American

10:50

theme. During the Cold War,

10:52

the US was willing to adapt this

10:55

notion to the real world in the

10:57

competition with Soviet Union and China and

10:59

Asia. But post 1991,

11:01

the sense that the West did not

11:03

face any threat. So

11:06

you could take this position that the

11:08

West was so strong, it really didn't

11:10

need to bother about sovereignty, whether it

11:12

is the global economic institutions or the

11:14

human rights organizations, the sense that you

11:17

could tell the developing countries what to

11:19

do. But I think reality, thanks to

11:21

Xi Jinping and President Putin, there

11:23

is a pressure now to come to deal with

11:25

the reality as it is. So

11:28

as we're discussing the growing

11:30

salience of the global South,

11:33

how much of this has to do

11:35

with the rise of China? I

11:37

would say quite a bit in a way

11:39

that the Chinese are trying to use the

11:41

concept to mobilize and

11:44

build anti-Western platforms. The

11:46

Russians too are partners in this. For

11:49

example, the BRICS forum or

11:51

the SEO forum were

11:54

designed as look, the West is out to get

11:56

you. We are here, we

11:58

will defend the sovereignty. entities and

12:00

the interests of the developing countries.

12:03

And just to explain, BRICS is

12:05

Brazil, Russia, India, China, SEO is

12:07

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Yes, and

12:09

we saw recently both of them

12:11

have been expanding to draw more

12:13

countries into the forums. But

12:16

I think the fact is for China and Russia,

12:18

the Global South is an instrument. I

12:20

don't think any day both of

12:22

them would love to do a deal with

12:24

the United States. But

12:26

to increase the leverage vis-a-vis

12:28

Washington, they're willing to use

12:31

this strategy to be able to

12:33

bargain better with the United States. And

12:36

as we continue to discuss the Global

12:39

South and acknowledge that it's not a

12:41

monolith, it's not homogenous, we've

12:43

discussed briefly China's role within

12:46

this and Russia's. What

12:48

about other countries? So you

12:50

have India, which now increasingly

12:52

sees itself as

12:54

a leader within the Global South.

12:57

But there are other countries as well that have

12:59

large populations and have growing roles,

13:02

Indonesia, Brazil, for example.

13:04

Absolutely. India, which has

13:06

lasted 30 years, the focus was on

13:09

adapting to the Washington Consensus on the

13:11

economic front, improving relations with

13:13

the US and other Western countries. But

13:16

today, India is also seeking greater influence in

13:19

the non-Western world. But the difference for India

13:21

is unlike in the past, India is not

13:23

seeing the Global South as a trade union

13:25

against the West. For it, the main competition

13:27

is with China for influence in this part

13:30

of the world. And that's why India also

13:32

says we want to be a bridge between

13:34

the North and the South. So

13:36

India is taking a slightly more complex position

13:38

because India is not anti-Western anymore. Its

13:41

principle contradiction is with China. From

13:44

the range of other middle powers, I mean, you are

13:46

right to point to them. I mean, whether

13:49

it's Nigeria, Egypt, Indonesia,

13:51

Brazil, many of them

13:53

see that their international system does

13:55

not give them the kind

13:57

of respect and weight in the international institution.

14:00

So, they all have a stake in making

14:02

greater demands on the international system.

14:05

To some extent the West has already brought them

14:07

in for example the G7 became the G20, but

14:11

the sense of not being part

14:13

of the architecture that

14:15

is real and as they look to the

14:17

next 25 years, it is these countries

14:19

that are going to bring in more

14:21

GDP to the global economy. We

14:24

are at an inflection point. Then

14:26

the old Western institutions are

14:28

flexible enough, adaptable enough to be

14:31

able to accommodate the emerging powers.

14:34

Not all of them are friendly, but some of them are. So

14:37

I would say that is why the

14:39

challenges and to that extent the Biden

14:41

administration is talking about reaching

14:43

out to these countries and finding ways to

14:45

accommodate them. But the struggle will be hard

14:47

because for the West means ceding power, rejigging

14:50

the hierarchy. For example, India

14:53

is today a bigger economy than many

14:56

of the G7 countries. So

14:58

in a sense you have to change the

15:00

picking order in the international system, but that

15:02

is always wrenching. It is. As

15:05

I listen to you describe the world, it strikes

15:07

me that so much of the

15:10

way in which we are describing the choices

15:12

of countries, these choices

15:14

are built around strategic interests.

15:17

Do values matter at all? So I think

15:19

it has never been easy to integrate

15:22

values into foreign policy because there are

15:24

always other interests that

15:26

you tend to trade off. But

15:29

post 1991, because of the absence

15:31

of threats, values can

15:33

be pursued without a reference to

15:35

interest. But now in the face

15:37

of competition from Russia and China and

15:40

the rise of the middle powers, the US has to

15:42

go back to the drawing board of better

15:45

balance between values and interests. I

15:47

think that is inevitable and you are

15:49

beginning to see some of that play out already. If

15:52

you remember, Biden administration took charge in January

15:54

2021. One of the

15:57

first things they said was, I will teach Mohammed bin

15:59

Salman a lesson. Then, once Russia

16:01

invaded Ukraine, the oil markets

16:03

were up in flames. US

16:06

needs MBS, Omar Madhbin Salman, who is the

16:08

Crown Prince and the Prime Minister of Saudi

16:10

Arabia. You need him to manage the global

16:12

oil markets. So, I think

16:14

US has adapted, trying to reach out, reconnect

16:17

to him. My sense is, states

16:19

in the end, interests will

16:22

become more important than values, how

16:25

much domestic constituencies would want it

16:27

otherwise. So that balancing

16:29

has already begun, I believe. You know, as

16:32

we talk about global north

16:34

versus global south, east

16:36

and west, there's an

16:38

argument that goes that what the

16:40

world really needs is a proper

16:42

multilateral system. So after

16:45

all, if there's another pandemic or

16:47

if aliens invade Earth, you need everyone

16:49

to cooperate and you need a big

16:52

global forum where countries can agree

16:54

on things. But then you

16:57

also need, within such a big multilateral

16:59

system, let's call it the UN or

17:01

something else like that, you

17:03

still need a big power that

17:05

uses its influence and values to

17:07

back it. Right? I mean, do you

17:09

agree with that? In the past, you

17:11

needed a strong hegemon to lay down

17:13

some broad rules on

17:16

the trading system, like the role that the US

17:18

played after the Second World War. But

17:21

today, I think what you have

17:23

is a situation where the classical

17:25

multilateralism of the kind that we

17:27

saw after the Second World War and reinforced

17:29

after the Cold War. Globalization,

17:31

for example, the US was the

17:34

great teacher on globalization, but today the

17:36

US had to back off because of

17:38

the domestic interests and considerations. The

17:41

same US which preached globalization is saying, look,

17:43

it has to be tempered. On

17:46

the security side, the US and China

17:48

are locked in a conflict. They

17:51

do not agree on many of

17:53

the issues, security issues facing the

17:55

world. So therefore, multilateralism is under

17:57

a deep crisis. You

17:59

are a central. essentially right when you say the problems

18:01

of the world are global, but

18:04

we still organized in a

18:06

world of nation states and within

18:08

them are the hegemony of the

18:10

US has been challenged. The

18:12

great powers do not agree either on

18:15

economic or security issues. So therefore, it

18:18

is going to be a period of transition to a

18:20

different order and that is what I

18:22

would think multilateralism for all its promise is

18:25

unlikely to deliver in the near term and

18:27

that would take us to a

18:29

more of like-minded coalitions working

18:31

together to set new

18:34

rules rather than hoping you

18:36

can get all the 180 countries into one

18:38

room even if it is led by

18:40

one country to agree to a set of

18:43

rules for example on climate change. And so

18:45

on exactly that point you wrote an essay

18:47

this year and it was titled The

18:49

New Nimble Minilateral

18:53

Not Big Multilateral Groups like the

18:55

UN but the rise of smaller

18:57

minilateral groupings like the Quad which

19:00

includes India, the US, Australia and

19:02

Japan or I2U2 which is

19:06

India, Israel, the United States and

19:08

the UAE or AUKUS

19:11

and minilateral by the way I should point out as

19:13

a term that was born in foreign policy in the

19:15

1990s. It was coined

19:17

by one of my predecessors Moises

19:20

Naim but Raja tell us why

19:23

are minilaterals becoming more important in

19:25

the way you describe them? Precisely

19:28

because the large multilateral

19:30

institutions are not working even

19:32

in a regional context for example five

19:35

years ago all of us believed ASEAN

19:38

and ASEAN led institutions

19:40

are the answer for Asia's

19:42

problems. But then

19:44

ASEAN today is not in a position

19:46

to defend its own members when

19:49

it comes to China's territorial assertiveness

19:51

in the South China Sea. So

19:54

therefore what you have is the US and

19:56

others who are willing to defer to ASEAN

19:58

in the past Today saying look these guys

20:00

are not going to be able to do the

20:03

security stuff. Therefore, you

20:05

create separate institution the

20:07

quad which focuses on some of the

20:09

public goods and is also

20:11

willing to challenge the Chinese

20:14

attempt to change the technical

20:16

status quo in the region. But

20:19

there is a problem here because you creating a new

20:21

institution there is a lot of suspicion in

20:23

the ASEAN, the Association of South East

20:25

Asian Nations. So, I think there

20:27

is a lot of work to be done to reach out to

20:30

these countries and say look we are not trying to replace

20:32

the ASEAN because even if

20:34

ASEAN did not exist today we would have

20:36

to invent one. But we

20:38

also need to supplement its

20:40

efforts because the relative weight of

20:43

ASEAN vis-a-vis China has dramatically declined.

20:46

Therefore, what the quad offers is

20:48

a balancing structure in which actually

20:51

ASEAN can continue to do the

20:53

multilateral work. The

20:55

AUCUS for example that is

20:58

Australia, United States and

21:00

the United Kingdom they

21:02

have this high technology cooperation including our

21:04

nuclear submarines. So, this is the kind of

21:06

work ASEAN is not really equipped to do

21:09

of bringing in new technologies of strengthening

21:12

deterrence against China to make China hopefully

21:14

see and respect a rules based order

21:16

over the longer term. So, what you

21:18

have is Rabi there is a

21:20

multilateral structure that is nobody is going to dismantle

21:22

it. There is a spectrum

21:25

of institutions that are being created

21:27

to deal with the scale and

21:29

scope of the challenge that China

21:31

presents. So, this is global reboot

21:34

and we often discuss rebooting a

21:36

big issue. And I

21:38

want to talk about rebooting engagement

21:41

with the global south. What is a

21:43

better way for the west or for

21:45

the so-called global north to

21:47

engage with all these many countries

21:50

of the global south? And I ask

21:52

this question as we discuss

21:55

everything from hypocrisy

21:57

to condescension and

21:59

You know, all of these words

22:01

we've been using about how the Global South

22:03

often feels about

22:05

the so-called West. So what

22:07

is a better way for the West to

22:10

do business with the Global South, to treat

22:13

the Global South as an equal partner,

22:15

to conduct diplomacy with all of these

22:17

countries? I would say it's a twin

22:20

process. I mean, I would not put all

22:22

the responsibility on the West to change the

22:24

way it deals with the Global South. Because

22:27

the Global South itself, I think, they

22:30

have to work on their own individual

22:32

agency that they have. I

22:34

think almost 75 years after the Second World

22:36

War and decolonization, it's wrong on our part

22:38

to keep blaming the West. I mean, there

22:41

were a lot of problems in the colonial

22:43

period, but to keep hoping

22:45

that everything is because of the West,

22:48

I think is fundamentally avoiding our own responsibility

22:50

to some of the mess that we have

22:52

created in each of our own countries. So

22:54

therefore, we need to be

22:56

more pragmatic too. But on

22:58

the West, I would say, my advice is simply,

23:00

you know, follow your interests. That

23:03

is, if you see sovereignty is

23:05

important, please respect that

23:07

sovereignty in the developing countries. For example,

23:09

I mean, you see this critique, the

23:11

US is willing to look the other

23:13

way when something happens with Israel, but

23:16

is very super critical with

23:18

the other countries. So

23:21

while hypocrisy will be there, the important thing

23:23

is if the West says, look, these are

23:25

my interests, I'm willing

23:27

to negotiate on the basis of those

23:29

interests. Then I think you'll get a

23:31

different framework, whether it is on economic

23:34

issues, whether it is on climate related

23:36

issues, an interest based

23:38

approach rather than the sense, I

23:40

have the answer for all the

23:42

global problems. I have the

23:44

rule book. The question is, how do

23:47

the so-called Global South relate to

23:49

this? And for the Global South to say, please

23:51

give me more money, give me more money, that's

23:53

also not going to take us anywhere. We

23:55

got to say, look, what are we doing with our resources?

23:59

What are we doing with our resources? societies, can we reduce

24:01

corruption, can we reform

24:03

ourselves? So I think there will

24:05

be need for movement on both

24:08

the ends. And Raja, some of

24:10

this is also about equity too,

24:12

right? So the global

24:15

south wants more and better

24:17

access to financing. We're

24:19

taping this discussion amid COP28,

24:21

the UN's climate summit where

24:23

financing is definitely a big

24:25

issue. And then there's also

24:27

the fact that countries in

24:29

debt crises, Sri Lanka

24:32

or in Egypt for example,

24:34

they access capital at much

24:36

higher interest rates. And

24:38

then when they turn to the IMF, they

24:41

usually only get help if they impose

24:43

very tough austerity measures. Meanwhile

24:46

rich western countries often have much

24:48

better access to capital. Is

24:50

that part of this equation as well of

24:53

things that the global south tends to

24:55

be unhappy about but wants better

24:58

terms of engagement from the

25:00

rich western countries or global

25:02

north? I think you

25:04

must also accept there was some responsibility

25:07

on the part of the developing countries too.

25:10

The notion that you can simply take what

25:12

the Chinese give you without asking too many

25:14

questions, without doing due diligence.

25:17

Many of the debt crisis in the

25:19

developing world are linked to the

25:21

kind of practices that China has adopted. In

25:24

the anti-western rhetoric, you're quite happy

25:26

to buy into the Chinese framework

25:29

which today has got a lot

25:31

more countries into trouble. And you

25:33

compare China to other lending practices.

25:36

I would say in some ways the IMF is better

25:38

than what you get from the Chinese. Today's Sri

25:40

Lanka is being rescued by a

25:42

joint effort of its friends working through

25:45

the IMF. Second,

25:47

the US itself is questioning some of

25:49

the elements of the Washington Consensus. We've

25:51

heard Jake Sullivan the US National Security

25:53

Advisor say, look it's not the White

25:55

House's job to open the financial markets

25:58

of the developing countries to global markets. interview

28:01

discussing the rise of the global south

28:03

as a term, as a phrase that

28:05

we use and deploy

28:07

to discuss a large part of

28:09

the world. But from what you're

28:12

saying, it seems to me that we

28:15

probably won't be using this phrase

28:17

for too long. Absolutely. Because we've

28:20

seen this happen before. So I

28:22

would say, if you think of

28:24

the encounter between the west and

28:27

the non-western world, going back to 400 years, and when

28:29

the non-western

28:31

world began to regain a

28:33

sense of itself, we

28:36

saw a series of political movements that

28:38

emerged at the dawn of the 20th

28:40

century, Pan-Asianism, Pan-Americanism,

28:42

Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism,

28:45

Pan-Islamism, the sense

28:47

of bringing people together to deal with

28:49

the dominance of the west. But

28:51

we saw in each of these cases,

28:54

conflicts within Asia, within Africa, within the

28:56

Islamic world prevented the idea

28:58

that these countries can come together to shatter

29:00

the dominance of the west. Similarly,

29:03

the idea of G77, the

29:05

non-aligned movement, the

29:07

so-called third world. But in all these

29:09

cases, the internal contradictions within

29:11

each of these groupings are so

29:13

severe, the capacity to actually

29:16

bargain with the collective

29:18

west or the north is really very, very,

29:20

very limited. And meanwhile,

29:23

we've seen some countries progress.

29:25

South Korea is one example. Even

29:28

China, for example, have benefited from

29:30

Western capital in collaboration with the

29:32

Western countries. So I think

29:34

those countries that are willing to seize

29:36

the agency that they have, use

29:39

the possibilities of the global market to lift

29:42

up their own people, that itself

29:44

will be a major contribution. I

29:46

would argue rather than thinking in

29:49

a trade union terms, to

29:51

be able to reform ourselves,

29:53

to be able to work with opportunities

29:56

that exist in the north, that

29:58

would be far more credible than. and simply resorting

30:00

to the slogans of the past, which

30:03

can't be pursued beyond a point. Raja

30:08

Mohan, we'll leave it there. Thank you very much.

30:11

Thank you, Ravi, for having me here. And

30:15

that was Raja Mohan, an Indian

30:17

academic and scholar and also a

30:20

columnist at Foreign Policy. Global

30:22

Reboot is a partnership between Foreign

30:24

Policy and the Doha Forum. Our

30:28

production staff includes Rosie Julen,

30:30

Ola Tunji, Osia Williams and

30:32

Dan Efron. Next

30:35

week, you will hear from Borghe Brende. He

30:37

is the former Minister of Foreign Affairs

30:40

of Norway. He's currently the President of

30:42

the World Economic Forum. And we're going

30:44

to build on today's discussion by

30:46

talking about how to get countries to

30:49

cooperate more. The

30:51

global order seems so fractured,

30:53

how do we reboot multilateralism?

30:57

Thanks for listening to Global Reboot. I'm

30:59

Ravi Agrawal. I will see you next time.