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Today's guest has been involved in

0:57

making some of the most memorable

1:00

films of my lifetime, including The

1:02

Godfather, The Conversation, The English Patient,

1:05

but it's the opening scene of Apocalypse Now

1:07

that I will never be able to forget.

1:17

The remarkable slowed down passing helicopter

1:19

that sets up the mood for

1:21

the entire film. Welcome

1:24

Walter Murch to Great Lives. Nine

1:27

Oscar nominations and counting I believe,

1:29

three wins so far and I'm

1:31

going to embarrass you what

1:34

I think your genius consists in. We've

1:36

just listened to that wap

1:38

wap wap of the helicopter going

1:40

past. Genius to me is

1:43

thinking of something not only that no one

1:45

ever thought of before but that they never could have

1:47

thought of before. Not

1:49

the kind of thing where someone says, oh

1:51

yes of course what a good idea, but

1:53

something that just comes out of somewhere that

1:56

we don't have. Will you accept

1:58

this praise? I

2:00

don't accept it personally, but

2:03

yeah, that's the Arthur Schopenhauer's

2:05

quote. He says, talent can

2:07

hit a target no one else

2:09

can hit, genius hits a target

2:11

no one else can see. But

2:14

film is a collaborative medium.

2:16

That sound that you're quoting

2:18

was created by Richard Beggs.

2:21

I did the panning of it,

2:23

so it's a vastly collaborative art.

2:26

I think it's a film that's partly

2:28

responsible for your nomination today. Sam

2:31

Mendes's Jarhead set in the Middle

2:33

East. What's the link and whose

2:35

life have you picked? Yes,

2:37

I was the editor and one

2:39

of the mixtures of Jarhead, Sam

2:42

Mendes's film about the first Iraq

2:44

war back in the early 90s.

2:47

There was a clip from Apocalypse Now

2:50

in that film. That may have been the reason

2:52

that he wanted me to edit the film, I

2:54

don't know. But in the

2:56

course of working on the film, I

2:58

read up on the history of Middle

3:00

Eastern oil and that's where I

3:02

encountered our great lives person, Mohammad Masadeq,

3:05

Prime Minister of Iran from 1951 to

3:07

when he was deposed by a coup

3:14

staged by MI6 and the CIA in 1953,

3:16

along with cooperation from recalcitrant members

3:23

of the Iranian army. That's

3:26

where I discovered him. He was

3:29

an exact contemporary of Franklin

3:31

Delano Roosevelt, the President of the United States

3:33

in the 1930s and 40s, born in 1882.

3:35

And similarly, he was an aristocrat in the

3:43

same sense that Roosevelt was, but

3:45

an aristocrat who was predisposed to

3:48

help the little people. So

3:50

he was labeled a traitor to his

3:52

class and he waved

3:54

that flag proudly. Just briefly, you've

3:57

actually made a documentary, a coup.

4:01

53 about the whole thing. So you've become

4:03

quite an expert. Yes, it was my

4:05

own PhD on

4:07

the Middle East and one

4:10

of the contentious things that

4:12

were in play right after World War

4:14

two was resurgent

4:16

nationalism all across the board.

4:19

That's when India split

4:21

from the British Empire Iran

4:24

was never part of the British Empire

4:26

except in a very limited sense in

4:30

that its main mineral

4:32

wealth petroleum was almost

4:34

completely controlled by what

4:37

we know today as British petroleum,

4:39

but was then the Anglo Iranian

4:41

oil company and so

4:43

there was a movement in Iran to nationalize

4:46

their oil Mossadegh

4:48

was the man who actually

4:51

made that happen. It was not on

4:53

controversial the documentary as

4:55

I recall. Yes, the source of

4:57

that controversy ultimately

5:00

is the fact that the British government to

5:02

this day will not admit

5:04

or deny their involvement

5:06

in the coup and they convinced the

5:10

CIA in the United States to come

5:12

along because Mossadegh

5:14

had kicked the British out of Iran.

5:16

So the British had no seat

5:19

of operation, so to speak so

5:21

the British convinced the Americans to supply

5:24

that seat of operation and and some

5:26

money. One thing we

5:28

know for sure about events is that

5:30

they were largely about oil as

5:32

you say the Anglo Iranian oil

5:34

company had built the biggest refinery

5:36

in the world at Abaddon. In 1951,

5:40

Mohammed Mossadegh nationalized the company

5:42

took its assets including the

5:44

refinery the British wanted their

5:47

refinery back the Americans

5:49

were frightened of a communist coup and

5:51

together they engineered a plot to get rid

5:54

of Mossadegh I think we can take all

5:56

that as a read. It's worth noting though

5:58

that the Americans in the British were

6:00

not the best of allies. Take a listen to

6:02

this. It's the British Ambassador to

6:05

Washington, Lord Franks, explaining why

6:07

the American Dean Acheson thought the

6:09

oil people were to blame. I

6:12

think Acheson believed that the

6:14

Anglo-Iranian oil company had its head in

6:16

the sand, and further that

6:18

its opinions had an undue influence

6:20

on the policies of the British

6:23

government. The leading case

6:25

that he had in mind in that judgment

6:28

was that the Anglo-Iranian

6:30

oil company, in the early stages

6:32

of the crisis, refused

6:35

to alter the 25

6:37

percent increase on royalties, which

6:39

had negotiated with the Iranian

6:41

government, when at the same

6:43

time the American company

6:45

in Saudi Arabia had negotiated a

6:48

50-50 deal which put

6:50

the offer of Anglo-Iranian out of

6:53

date in the Middle East. But

6:55

the Anglo-Iranian company did not change

6:57

its stance. This seemed to Acheson

6:59

incomprehensible and reprehensible. Yes,

7:02

I just would challenge you

7:04

on the fact of the

7:06

American relationship with Iran. The

7:10

Truman administration was very

7:12

favorably disposed to Mossadegh, and

7:15

they were, as this clip indicated,

7:17

very much in favor of Mossadegh's

7:20

position. The temperature

7:23

changed drastically when Eisenhower

7:25

was elected in 1952,

7:28

and he brought

7:30

the Dulles brothers as head of

7:32

the Foreign Service and head of

7:35

the CIA. These two

7:37

men had their knives out for Mossadegh

7:39

for personal and business reasons, as well

7:41

as geopolitical ones. But one

7:43

of the strategies of the

7:46

British government getting the Americans involved

7:49

was to press very hard

7:51

on the button of the communist

7:54

threat. These are big things

7:56

that resonate to this day. Also joining

7:58

us is Professor Ali Ann I'm sorry,

8:00

author of A New History of Iran

8:02

coming out in January. And

8:04

Ali, you're joining us from St Andrews

8:06

University. Is that right? That's

8:09

right. What do you think about what you've heard

8:11

so far? Well, you know, Mohammed

8:13

Masad there is one of the most

8:15

remarkable figures in 20th century Iranian history.

8:17

But like a lot of these sort

8:19

of larger than life figures, he

8:21

does accrue a certain amount of mythology to

8:23

his character. And there's a lot of emotion

8:26

attached really to the experiences, obviously, of the

8:28

oil nationalization period, which has sort of impacted

8:30

much wider in the modern history of Iran

8:33

that we need to sort of basically dissect

8:35

and interrogate. But for instance, well,

8:37

I mean, there's a number of things about

8:39

certain his background and what he wanted to

8:41

achieve the popularity, for instance, of nationalization at

8:43

the time. It's quite true that I think

8:46

the Anglia Iranian oil company was viewed by

8:48

all in sundry as a somewhat archaic

8:50

management at the time, even by the Foreign Office.

8:53

I mean, this is what's quite interesting is the

8:55

Foreign Office was tearing its hair

8:57

out of the way that Sir William Fraser, the

8:59

then chairman of Anglia Iranian was unwilling

9:01

to budge. But in the run-up to

9:04

the actual process of nationalization, they had

9:06

persuaded the company to offer a 50-50

9:08

deal. And this 50-50

9:10

deal had been then negotiated by the

9:12

then Prime Minister, a gentleman known as

9:15

Rasmara, who before he could actually place

9:17

this 50-50 deal in front

9:19

of the parliament was assassinated while he was

9:21

attending a memorial service in a mosque as

9:23

it happens. Now, this created a very febrile

9:25

atmosphere in Iran, of course, and there were

9:27

those who are agitating for nationalization, not necessarily

9:29

in parliament itself, because a number

9:32

of people sort of felt that actually, you know,

9:34

Iran wouldn't be able to handle a wholly nationalized

9:36

industry. And it was far better to come to

9:38

an arrangement with the British. What were its origins?

9:40

Well, the origins were in a concession that was

9:43

awarded to a Australian British entrepreneur

9:45

by the name of Knox Darcy,

9:47

who won his concession in 1901.

9:49

It took him seven years to

9:52

find oil that could be exploited.

9:55

He almost went bankrupt in the process of trying to do

9:57

it. I mean, I think a lot of the history of

9:59

the... Anglo-Persian, subsequently the Anglia

10:01

Iron Oil Company, is done

10:03

very much from the perspective of the 1950s.

10:06

And we don't really see just how difficult the

10:08

process was to begin with. I

10:11

should add here that this is the first

10:13

oil discovered in the Middle East. Yes,

10:15

I mean, there was obviously, it depends on how

10:18

we categorise the Middle East, because obviously there was

10:20

oil being exploited out of Baku in the Caucasus

10:22

and these areas. But certainly that's true.

10:24

It was one of the first major investments. And then

10:26

of course, in the run up to the First World

10:28

War, the British government under the guidance of

10:31

Winston Churchill, who was first Lord of the

10:33

Admiralty, decided to take what was known as

10:35

a golden chair. But it's very important to

10:37

recognise what this golden chair meant. I mean,

10:39

there were some fairly strict restrictions on what

10:41

the government could and could not do vis-a-vis

10:43

the company. It was really an attempt by

10:45

the government to ensure that the company couldn't

10:47

be sold to foreign ownership. That was really

10:49

their sort of veto power. But otherwise, they

10:51

kept a very hands off, actually, attitude towards

10:53

the company itself. And I think it's one

10:55

of the, again, one of the myths that

10:57

I was talking about, that people assume it

10:59

to be a sort of a governmental, basically

11:01

an arm of the British government. That's the

11:03

way it was perceived. And its exponential growth,

11:06

I should say, was really at the end

11:08

of the 1930s throughout the 40s during the

11:10

Second World War. That's when it really grew

11:12

into something, a conglomerate, effectively.

11:16

Walter, you came here on

11:18

the bus from Primrose Hill,

11:20

the number 88, I think.

11:22

What is your connection

11:28

to Britain? My connection is my lovely

11:30

wife, Aggie, who I have been married

11:32

to for 58 years. I've

11:34

had a very strong connection with this

11:36

country. I've worked here as a film

11:39

editor a number of times on the

11:41

English patient. I directed a

11:43

film, Return to Oz, here at Elstree

11:45

Studios. And for the last five

11:48

years, I have been working

11:50

on Coup 53, this documentary

11:52

about the events of 70

11:56

years ago, almost exactly the coup that

11:58

brought down Mohammed Mohammed. And

12:01

you are now then the man on the

12:03

Clapham omnibus which the number 88 actually

12:05

is. That's it. I had no

12:07

idea you lived here actually. I

12:11

want to find out more about the

12:13

man himself, Mohammad Mafidekh. Where was he

12:15

born? What were the qualities that led

12:17

him to rise to become Prime Minister

12:20

of Iran? He remains to me

12:22

a little bit of a cipher. Let's find out

12:24

more. He was one of the first Iranians

12:27

to get a doctorate in

12:29

law from a European university

12:31

at Noh Chateau in Switzerland.

12:34

And he became a member of the

12:36

Majlis, the parliament in 1923 I think.

12:40

He was arrested by the Shah

12:44

in 1940 and spent

12:47

several years either in prison

12:49

or in home detention. He

12:52

was a dedicated political servant. He was

12:54

supposed to be and I believe was

12:56

incorruptible. He had private wealth

12:58

of his own. He was

13:01

definitely in favor of nationalization

13:03

because of the history of

13:05

the Iran deal with British

13:07

Petroleum. And so after

13:10

this assassination he was

13:12

elected almost on a dare. If

13:15

you're so smart why don't you take over?

13:17

And he said I will. I'll put my

13:19

hat in the ring and he was elected. And

13:21

the Shah allowed him to be the Prime Minister.

13:23

Now this brings me to a question

13:26

I want to ask Ali. Mafidekh

13:28

is not really in the mould of a demotic

13:31

popular leader is he? He

13:33

sounds very different. I think that's undoubtedly true.

13:35

I mean he's a constitutionalist at heart. So

13:38

he's very much part of that establishment. What

13:41

he I think he succumbs to in some ways,

13:43

which is not unknown among the political class, is

13:45

that the populism that sort

13:47

of works itself up in the street I

13:49

think is something that he becomes a little

13:52

bit vulnerable to. And during his

13:54

period when his prime ministership 51 to 53, the

13:56

problem was that I think he became a member

13:58

of the government. a

14:00

little too intoxicated with the politics of the

14:02

street. The British tended to argue that he

14:04

was a bit of a demagogue. I mean

14:06

the comment they have about him is that

14:08

he's a demagogue in a windbag because he

14:10

liked to give fairly long speeches. But I

14:13

don't think he was ever really someone you

14:15

could describe as a populist in that sense.

14:17

I mean he wasn't comfortable with it. Where

14:19

were you born, Walter? I was born in

14:21

Manhattan in New York. My parents were Canadian

14:24

and I very early

14:26

on fell in love with the

14:28

tape recorder which was an intoxicating

14:30

device in the early 1950s. And

14:33

my father was a painter so I

14:36

lived in a kind of artistic community

14:38

and I found myself attracted

14:41

to motion pictures. My

14:43

nickname in the neighborhood was Walter

14:46

McBoyne-Boyne. That

14:49

Gerald McBoyne-Boyne was a cartoon character

14:51

of the time who spoke in

14:53

sound effects. He was not

14:55

able to speak words but he was

14:57

able to tell stories through sound. And

15:00

that was something that I would do already

15:03

long before I ever knew of the

15:05

existence of a tape recorder. We've all

15:07

heard of The Godfather and Apocalypse now

15:09

but tell us a bit more about

15:12

the documentary you mentioned that you

15:14

worked on. Yes, it's

15:17

controversial because as I said earlier

15:19

the British government has not to

15:21

this day admitted involvement in this coup of

15:23

1953. And when I met Taghi

15:29

Amorani, the director of the film

15:31

about that coup, I was

15:35

already predisposed to work on the

15:37

film which was only supposed to

15:39

take six or eight months. It

15:41

wound up taking five

15:43

years. As Alfred

15:45

Hitchcock said, a fiction film, the

15:48

director is God. On a documentary God

15:51

is the director. So you

15:53

can't plan in advance how long these

15:55

things are going to take. When did

15:57

Mossadegh seize control? of

16:00

the company in 1951. Did the Americans

16:02

know what was going on at the

16:04

time? I'm sure they did. Dean

16:07

Acheson was very much involved, trying

16:09

to quiet things down as much

16:11

as he could, but

16:13

then by the end of the summer

16:16

things had broken down. Ali, what was

16:18

the relationship between the Americans and Britain

16:20

in this case? The Americans, as both

16:22

of you have suggested, were slightly

16:25

suspicious of the British. I

16:28

can remember the 1950s.

16:30

They were also very suspicious of

16:32

British imperialism. Britain was an empire

16:35

in decline, and the Americans were definitely

16:37

not on the side of trying to

16:40

maintain the British Empire. How would you

16:42

characterize how the Americans saw what

16:44

the British were up to here? That's certainly

16:46

true that there was a huge amount of

16:48

friction between the British and the Americans, and

16:50

the Americans really were maneuvering to

16:53

replace the British as the dominant power in the

16:55

Middle East. I mean, that is basically what they

16:57

got up to in Egypt the year before with

16:59

the Egyptian officers who basically overthrew the

17:01

monarchy. I mean, you have to remember that

17:03

Iranian oil at this stage was the reason

17:05

why it was such a notable asset was

17:07

because it was the one area where oil

17:09

was being priced in pound sterling, rather

17:12

than dollars. This is one of the things

17:14

the Americans were quite keen to change. As

17:17

Walter says, Truman was, I

17:19

think, much more sympathetic to Mossad there, but from

17:21

the British perspective, they didn't see it quite in

17:23

that way. At time now

17:26

to hear from an actor on

17:28

the ground in the run-up to

17:30

the coup, an American intelligence officer

17:32

called Kermit Roosevelt, or Kim for

17:34

short, a grandson of Theodore Roosevelt,

17:36

the one-time US president. Here he

17:38

is talking about his life in

17:40

Iran at that time. Well,

17:43

I stayed up in the mountains most

17:46

of the time, and when we met

17:49

with people, we arranged

17:52

casual meetings in

17:54

the country. Various

17:57

people would drive

18:00

up in cars that we would recognize and

18:02

then we would follow them to a

18:04

deserted section of the road and then we'd have a

18:06

brief chat and then we'd separate. My

18:11

visits to the palace were always very

18:13

late at night. And the

18:16

century I went in in

18:18

a non-royal

18:21

car, which was

18:23

sent for me by the shard to pick me up. And

18:26

the first time I went in I hid

18:29

under a blanket in the back of the car, but

18:32

the century was obviously

18:34

under instructions just to let that car

18:36

in and not look at it. So

18:39

I didn't bother to hide

18:41

myself under a rug after the first time.

18:45

So basically the whole idea of the

18:47

coup planning that was being developed at the

18:49

time was based on the premise that the

18:51

shard had the power to dismiss his prime

18:53

minister. The shard was very reluctant to actually

18:55

do this and it took an enormous amount

18:57

of persuasion to finally get him to relent

18:59

and sign the decree dismissing Rosedek. So this

19:01

was the basis of the whole operation

19:04

that what the British and the

19:06

Americans had constructed for themselves was

19:08

basically a coup that was premised

19:10

on this, ironically this constitutional

19:13

premise that the shard could dismiss

19:15

his prime minister. Well, so what were we

19:17

British doing towards the

19:19

coup? Well, the British

19:22

were angling to

19:24

depose Mossadegh as soon as he

19:26

said that he wanted to nationalize

19:28

the oil. And

19:31

there were all kinds of efforts in the

19:33

summer of 1952 to replace Mossadegh. There

19:38

was an argument between himself and the Shah in

19:40

July of 1952. There

19:42

was another prime minister for a

19:44

few weeks, I believe. And

19:47

then there was a revolution on the streets.

19:49

People were killed. Mossadegh was put back in

19:51

power. And it was after

19:53

that that he kicked the British out

19:55

of Iran and ceased diplomatic relations. And

19:57

it was at this point that

20:00

the British realized that they needed

20:02

the help of the Americans. Kim

20:04

Roosevelt joined on board.

20:06

He didn't speak Iranian. He

20:09

didn't know all of the things

20:11

that the British knew very well because

20:13

they had been so deeply involved in

20:15

Iran by this point. I

20:17

think the Americans certainly play a much

20:19

more pivotal role than maybe some of them would

20:22

like to accept now because it's basically the Eisenhower

20:24

administration that gives the green light for the coup

20:26

to take place. I think one of the

20:28

things that also tends to get slightly sort of faded

20:30

out is the Iranian involvement in a lot of this.

20:33

You have to bear in mind that at this stage

20:35

the parliament had been closed. I mean basically, Mufti

20:38

D'Eve had taken the opportunity to dissolve the

20:40

Majlis and a lot of his allies at

20:42

the time were moving away from him. So

20:44

there was a lot of discontent. The atmosphere

20:46

was extremely febrile. And finally,

20:48

you know, when we understand

20:50

the Eisenhower administration took the decision to go,

20:53

it was quite late. I mean it was

20:55

probably in around April or May

20:57

that they decided that they were going to activate

21:00

this project. And of course, the British

21:02

involvement was important in terms of, as

21:04

I think Walter has quite rightly said, the expertise

21:06

that they held and the information that they had.

21:09

But again, I think it's very important, you

21:11

know, the American relationship with the coup is

21:13

a somewhat mixed one because initially in the

21:15

aftermath of the coup they were very, very

21:17

keen to take all the credit for it

21:19

and then subsequently have tended to try and

21:21

sort of like pass the blame on wholesale

21:23

onto the British. So it's a much more

21:26

complex, I think, development

21:28

than, you know, the narrative we've

21:30

inherited tends to want to portray. What was

21:32

happening on the street, Walter?

21:35

Yes. The coup itself was begun on

21:37

August 15th, 1953. And

21:41

the initial attempt, which was the

21:43

plan, was to arrest

21:46

Mosaddegh that evening. And

21:49

he simply refused to be arrested. And

21:52

instead he ordered the arrest of the people

21:54

who were trying to arrest him. And the

21:56

next day all hell broke loose. And

21:59

the CIA... got cold

22:01

feet at that point and thought

22:03

they should negotiate with Mossadegh. It

22:06

was Norman Darveser who was leading the coup

22:08

for the British at this time, who knew

22:11

the street very well. He had

22:13

agents on the street. He was

22:16

operating by radio from Cyprus. He,

22:20

over that weekend, pushed several buttons

22:22

that caused newspapers to be burned

22:24

down and tanks

22:26

to be mobilized and

22:28

the temperature changed. So it's

22:31

arguable that if Darveser, acting for the

22:33

British, had not on his own initiative

22:35

done what he did, that

22:37

the coup would have been a blank and

22:40

would not have succeeded. The Shah

22:42

fled temporarily, didn't he, Ali? Yes,

22:45

he did. Well, I mean, as Walter

22:47

says, the initial attempts appeared to have

22:49

failed. The Shah got cold feet and

22:51

he disappeared off to Italy. My

22:54

understanding is that Colonel Roosevelt is the one who

22:56

has another go. He's the one man on the

22:58

ground. He claims that

23:01

he did, but I believe it was

23:03

Darveser who pulled the trigger. Well,

23:05

I'm going to differ with you a little bit

23:07

on Darveser's role. I think he's come out as

23:10

obviously important in your film. Woodhouse

23:12

was obviously the station chief. Woodhouse also talks

23:14

about the coup in 1982. These

23:17

are things that have been fairly well

23:19

described. It is a collective effort.

23:22

There's no doubt about it. But I think

23:24

also Darveser in some ways was fairly annoyed

23:26

that Roosevelt took far too much credit for

23:28

it. Yes, that's true. He saw it. That's

23:31

true. But I don't think Roosevelt's role

23:33

was insignificant by any stretch of the

23:35

imagination. He

23:37

was in radio communication. Yes, with

23:40

the Rashidian brothers. Yes,

23:43

with other Iranian assets. My point

23:45

is that at the time when the

23:47

coup initially appeared to have failed, it

23:49

needed someone on the ground effectively to

23:51

kickstart it again. And I think in

23:53

that respect, Roosevelt is quite important. And

23:56

the coup succeeded. Mosaddegh in

23:58

the end decided to take the lead. that

24:00

he was weary of

24:02

the possibility of civil war and

24:05

simply stepped back. Is that right? I

24:09

don't think there would have been a possibility

24:12

of civil war at that stage. I think

24:14

the country in some ways was very exhausted

24:16

by what had gone on. In my own

24:18

view, Mossad there was extremely complacent actually in

24:20

the period around the coup. I mean as

24:23

Walter says, his dismissal of the initial arrest

24:25

and stuff, he was not a revolutionary. So

24:27

he didn't really, you know, for him it

24:29

was simply a question of dismissing these rather

24:32

impertinent people who came to dismiss him. I

24:34

don't think he understood entirely what the political

24:37

momentum at the time was. Yes, he also

24:39

I think misinterpreted the

24:41

political shift that had happened in

24:44

the United States that he

24:46

still in some way

24:48

imagined Truman as being president and

24:50

he didn't really take the measure

24:52

of the Dulles brothers and what

24:54

they were capable of. Both of

24:57

those brothers were involved with the

24:59

OSS during World War II

25:01

and were mainly responsible

25:03

for turning the CIA

25:05

from an academic institution

25:08

and in a sense militarized it to

25:10

take action. And the coup

25:12

in Iran was the first

25:15

off-campus exercise that

25:17

the CIA had done at that scale. What

25:19

happened when the Shah returned? Well, the Shah

25:22

basically in my view made a great miscalculation

25:24

because when he arrived he sort of returned

25:26

back and said, oh you know, my people

25:28

love me. He confused personal affection

25:31

with a desire by Iranians to sort of

25:33

rally around the monarchy as an institution. You

25:35

know, the Americans soon fell out of love

25:37

with him very, very quickly actually and

25:39

by the end of the 1950s actually they

25:41

didn't think he was really up to the

25:44

task of what they were expecting in terms

25:46

of a reforming monarch. In

25:48

the immediate aftermath of the coup of course

25:50

retribution is meted out to those certainly who

25:53

had asked for the establishment of a republic

25:55

and others and people who the Shah felt

25:57

had basically sought his overthrow. solitary

26:00

confinement for three years,

26:02

I believe, and then in house

26:05

arrest for the rest of his life, and he died in

26:07

1967. Has he in this

26:09

discussion lived up to your

26:13

expectations, Walter? You chose him as

26:15

a great life. Yes, I

26:17

mean, great life. He was man of

26:19

the year in 1951 or 52, Time magazine, because he influenced

26:21

world history

26:28

in a decisive way. That's

26:31

the definition of great. The arguments

26:34

on one side or the other

26:36

beside the point, but definitely world

26:38

history would have been very different

26:40

had Mossadegh not become Prime Minister

26:42

of Iran and nationalized oil. You

26:44

have to remember at this time

26:47

the only other country that had nationalized

26:49

oil was Mexico in 1938, so

26:52

the idea of a country owning

26:54

their own resources was a brand

26:56

new idea, and there was a

26:58

great deal of resistance to this from

27:01

the powers that be. Ali, a great life.

27:03

I think, you know, the great tragedy for

27:05

me of the whole episode really is that

27:07

Mossadegh was a constitutionalist, and he wanted the

27:09

Constitution to be properly

27:12

implemented, where the Shah would reign and

27:14

not rule, and you would have a

27:16

parliamentary sort of democracy. That was the

27:18

intention. I think for that to

27:21

have been achieved though, both

27:23

sides would have been required to

27:25

compromise, and really often by 1952

27:27

neither side was willing to

27:29

compromise, and the

27:31

imbalance of power meant

27:34

unlikely that Mossadegh was going to succeed in

27:36

that respect. Now I'm not one who thinks

27:38

that, you know, you can draw a straight

27:40

line from 1952 to 79. I think there's a

27:42

whole lot of other things that could have

27:44

happened and things could have changed, but certainly

27:46

there is a view, there's a sort of

27:48

a feeling of loss

27:50

among Iranians, many Iranians certainly in

27:52

the diaspora and elsewhere, that sort

27:55

of argue that had some sort

27:57

of arrangement been reached. himself,

28:01

you know, he was quite melancholy about it in some

28:03

ways. He gave a very interesting speech at the end

28:05

of 1951 where

28:07

he said, and I think on

28:09

this he's probably right, had the

28:11

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company made

28:13

their offer of 50-50

28:15

a little earlier, we might have

28:18

avoided this whole thing. My

28:21

thanks to Walter Murch and to

28:23

Professor Ali Ansari and St Andrews

28:25

as well. Goodbye. If

28:27

anyone is an artist in their soul,

28:29

it's Joni Mitchell. There are some artists

28:32

that change music forever. The mastery of

28:34

the guitar, the mastery of voice, the

28:36

mastery of language. That shape the musical

28:39

landscape for everyone who comes after. When

28:41

the dust settles, Joni Mitchell may stand

28:43

as the most important and influential female

28:46

recording artist of the late 20th century.

28:48

Legend is a music biography podcast

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from BBC Radio 4 that explores

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29:01

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29:03

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29:11

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29:17

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