0:00

I think it's time for a little trivia. At

0:03

me. Was

0:07

there a botnet made up

0:09

of 3 million internet connected toothbrushes

0:11

that were terrorizing the internet when

0:13

they weren't terrorizing plaque? That

0:17

sounds so far fetched that I can't imagine you just

0:19

made it up so I'm gonna go with true. It's

0:24

a double bluff. No,

0:27

but it sounded so far fetched that a lot of

0:29

people thought it was true. Question

0:31

number two. Was there an elaborate deep

0:33

fake theatrical production used to stage a

0:36

massive 200 million Hong Kong dollar corporate

0:38

heist? That sounds like a for sure.

0:41

Yeah, that definitely did happen. Question number

0:43

three. Is Craig Wright Satoshi

0:47

Nakamoto? No, the answer is no,

0:49

but true. That

0:51

is the trivia thing that you asked. I

0:55

have framed this all as trivia. Maybe

0:58

for legal reasons, but if he is Boise,

1:00

not making a great case and the stakes

1:02

of the case he should be making are

1:04

very high. No,

1:07

yes, maybe we've got a bunch of fascinating stuff

1:09

to talk about, but do you know the thing

1:11

I'm most excited to talk about Scott? I'm

1:14

excited to take all our listeners on a

1:16

tour of our homeland. It's the

1:19

hacked Canada tiny stories about Canada tour. Oh,

1:21

well, there's some big stories about Canada that

1:23

we're working on that we're coming out with

1:25

the future. Yeah. Yeah.

1:29

True North strong and hacked three stories from

1:31

the north and oppressed. Flipper

1:35

zero bad air Canada chatbot

1:38

weird and a strange identification

1:40

system proposed to visit column

1:43

adult sites. Who knows what's even

1:45

going on up here. The fog of war

1:47

is thick, but one thing is for certain. You're

1:49

listening to hack. I'm

2:05

working on my broadcast transitions. Did you enjoy that?

2:07

I did. That was

2:09

perfect. You like that? That was

2:11

good. Amazing. But the

2:13

question you kicked it all off with, my friend,

2:16

how you doing? I'm good. I'm good. I

2:18

just got back to a little week surfing

2:20

Nicaragua, which is why I was absent last

2:22

episode. Apologize and will be absent

2:24

actually, I believe in the next episode because you

2:26

did that interview along its way and

2:29

the internet in Nicaragua maybe isn't

2:32

broadcast quality per se. Well,

2:34

we're happy to have you back, man. Yeah, excited for a

2:36

few of the interviews and things we got coming up with

2:38

the show in the next few episodes. Finally

2:41

getting to the Scott's Crypto

2:43

Corner book review. I

2:46

believe we're going to be doing an episode

2:48

talking about Douglas's going

2:51

infinite and Zeke Fox's number

2:53

grow up. So that should

2:55

be a good one. Zeke is coming on

2:57

the show, which is exciting. We

3:00

haven't done the interview yet, but it's

3:02

coming up. But really, yeah, really

3:05

will not, will keep all my thoughts until

3:07

that episode. No, crypto doesn't.

3:10

I want a mild correction. I

3:12

think the newest name is this Scott

3:15

Crypto Rage Cage was the

3:17

most recent. It's the most recent. Bitcoin

3:21

is up to 73,000 after ... No,

3:23

you have egg on your face. Apparently,

3:28

the world has found new value for

3:31

it and has shot its price up.

3:33

So excited to hear any theories on

3:35

what that value is. Please

3:37

draw me a chat on Twitter

3:40

at Hack Podcast. I'm

3:42

excited to hear from you. Almost as

3:44

excited as we are to introduce some

3:48

of our newest patrons on Patreon. That's right. hackpodcast.com

3:51

redirects to our Patreon. And

3:53

boy, do we appreciate all the support. Absolutely.

3:57

You know who I support? Tell me. I'm

4:00

gonna do this in like four episodes. I'm gonna

4:02

make fucking four episodes. I'm

4:04

gonna do this. Daniel's son, my

4:07

favorite karate kid. Yeah. Daniel's

4:09

son, thank you so much. Smokey Oni, that's a phone one

4:11

to say. I'm glad I got that one. Smokey Oni, thank

4:13

you. And Brad,

4:16

everybody loves a Brad. It's all about

4:18

Brad. It's all about Brad. Noib, thanks

4:20

Noib. Really do appreciate

4:22

it. Andrew Naylor. Andrew Naylor. Nailed

4:25

it. Love it. Waksara. Nailed

4:27

it. Nailed it. Waksara,

4:30

thank you so much for your support. Topher the

4:32

gopher. Also known as just

4:34

Topher. Just Topher. Sorry if I had to do.

4:36

Just Topher. Again, too loose with

4:38

it. Ruru Day, thank you so much for

4:40

your support. And last but not least, Scott, take

4:43

it across the finish line. Hackle.

4:46

Hackle. Hackle. Thank

4:48

you everybody. It means a

4:50

lot to us. We haven't done a

4:52

Patreon shout out in a little bit, but

4:54

does mean the world to us. If you

4:56

wanna support the show, hackpodcast.com

4:58

redirects to our Patreon and it

5:01

means a lot. Definitely,

5:03

definitely. Merch

5:06

store.hackpodcast.com. That's

5:09

some stuff if you want it. If you don't want it,

5:11

totally understand. I'm not here

5:13

to pressure you. This is not a

5:15

high pressure. Maybe you don't

5:17

need a bucket hat, but you probably

5:19

do. Hey, visor season is coming soon.

5:22

It is March. Visors will

5:25

be needed by like May at the latest.

5:27

Yes, it's gay here now. You

5:30

can find all that stuff if you

5:33

just go to hackpodcast.com. I think hackpodcast.com/store

5:36

is where you can purchase that hat.

5:38

Nope. Mm. Storer,

5:42

store.hackpodcast.com. That's

5:44

why I keep you around. hackpodcast.com

5:46

goes to the Patreon. Store.hackpodcast goes

5:48

to the store. The logic tracks.

5:50

Subdomains, who knew? Who

5:53

knew? Who knew? It's

5:56

been weird up here in Canada, my friend. Spicy

6:00

times. Spicy times. The first

6:03

one I want to talk about, so chatbots.

6:06

Chatbots. So a Canadian guy named

6:09

Jake Moffat successfully sued Air Canada

6:11

after being misled by the airline's

6:14

chatbot policy about their bereavement travel

6:16

terms. So airlines have

6:18

policies to provide discounts for people

6:20

urgently flying because somebody died. These

6:23

are very important policies. During

6:26

his grandmother's death, Moffat books a

6:28

flight from Vancouver to Toronto and

6:31

goes looking for information on the website about

6:33

the bereavement rates where

6:35

he was, you know, purchasing his ticket. Speaks

6:38

with the chatbot on the website to find out

6:40

what the terms are and the chatbot inaccurately instructed

6:43

him to book his flight immediately and request a

6:45

refund within 90 days.

6:47

This is importantly not how Air Canada's

6:50

bereavement policy works. Jake

6:52

files the claim, gets denied, then

6:55

presents a screenshot of the chatbot's advice

6:58

and his refund request is rejected.

7:01

In this rejection, Air Canada argues two major points.

7:05

First is that while the chatbot provided incorrect

7:07

info, it also provided a

7:09

link to another page on their website

7:11

that on that page did contain the

7:13

correct information. So it was like

7:15

a truth and a lie situation. And

7:18

then they made a very weird abstract argument about

7:20

it being this sort of separate entity that was

7:22

not their responsibility. Both stances were

7:24

dismissed by the tribunal and

7:26

Moffat's sort of persistence in this led

7:28

to a ruling in his favor granting

7:30

him this partial refund and

7:32

additional damages. And

7:34

as of the time we're recording, I

7:36

checked this morning, the chatbot is disabled on

7:39

Air Canada's website. This is great. This

7:42

is, if this had come out any

7:45

other way, we'd be in for a world of

7:47

hurt with random AI chatbots

7:49

telling us random things that weren't actually available. It's

7:51

actually bright. So

7:54

I'm so happy that this small

7:56

lesson, I'm so happy that this person took it

7:58

to court. The two

8:00

or four thousand dollars or whatever he was fighting

8:02

for in regards to his ticket refund is probably

8:05

nothing compared to what his legal bill was. So

8:08

so kudos to you my friend the

8:11

world those your favorite least canadians do for

8:13

setting the precedent that these chatbots can't just

8:15

make stuff up yeah yeah for a bunch

8:18

of reasons there should be a penalty for

8:20

the race to replace customer service people with

8:23

chatbots that have no internal model of

8:25

the world. Like the idea

8:27

that a representative of the company can just tell

8:29

you incorrect stuff that you can then act on

8:31

that the company is not liable for is like

8:34

that's a. We can all

8:36

immediately say see why that's not a

8:38

great idea that's not what this technology

8:40

is for and the fact that it was

8:42

being used on our Canada's website this quickly

8:45

is pretty shocking to me to be honest.

8:47

What's also shocking that they

8:50

must have trained the chatbot on air

8:52

Canada's policies and procedures and that they

8:54

got it so wrong which is wild

8:56

to me. So I'm

8:58

not sure if that's indicative of just bad

9:00

training or whether it's indicative of them

9:03

not setting the right boundaries for what the chatbot

9:05

was allowed to do but it's just just just

9:07

bad stuff like it actually it reminds me of

9:09

the Watsonville Chevrolet and I think we chatted about

9:11

this in a previous episode but like one of

9:14

the first big chatbot headaches.

9:17

Was some Chevy dealer in some place

9:19

called Watsonville which I do not know

9:21

where it is. I'm going to assume

9:23

Kentucky or Wyoming the

9:27

anyway they put a chat GPT chatbot on their site

9:29

and it said powered by chat GPT and all the

9:31

rest of it and people just started training it to

9:33

say yes to everything and that and then to pair

9:35

it back that it was legally binding. So people started

9:38

like buying Chevy Tahoe's for a

9:40

dollar and like setting all

9:42

these I'm pretty sure the

9:44

people that were trolling it on the Internet weren't taking

9:46

them to court being like no you owe me

9:48

a Chevy Tahoe but that would be really funny

9:51

if they actually had taken into court. I feel

9:53

like what's happening here is there's some enterprising

9:56

folks out there that

9:58

realized very quickly. Hey, if

10:01

we show up to these companies and

10:03

saying, we figured out how to plug

10:05

the open AI chat

10:07

GPT API into a

10:09

chat bot, you can replace a lot of your

10:11

customer service people with this. It's

10:13

going to save you this much money and look at how good the results are.

10:17

And they've just been on a sales tour for the last

10:19

year and a half. And I'm

10:21

hoping these stories are sort of a

10:23

big megaphone blast into the world. Like

10:26

this is not an

10:28

appropriate application of this technology. That's

10:30

not what this should be for. Because

10:32

people will figure out, you

10:35

can compromise this thing with plain language, which means

10:37

if you just put it on the internet, you're

10:39

going to get a chat bot on your site

10:41

telling people, yeah, it's Chevy Tahoe Casa nickel. And

10:44

yeah, you can just request a refund on your on

10:46

your airplane ticket. It's like, it's not, it's

10:48

not a good idea. Yeah,

10:51

it's, I feel, maybe

10:54

this is my own bias against these AI

10:56

bots, but like, I feel like they become

10:58

really good at conversation. Like, like the, like

11:01

the old Turing test to be like, whether you can

11:03

identify it as a Turing test to come or what

11:05

the test is for AI. Yeah, Turing test. If it

11:08

Turing test, yeah, of like whether you can identify whether

11:10

it's human or an AI, I

11:13

feel like they're, they're crushing that thing. But

11:16

the part of them then

11:18

being trustworthy and having the right information,

11:21

I feel like they're not crushing as

11:23

much. So I'm

11:25

sure it's only a matter of time,

11:27

but I rarely have discussions with chat

11:30

GBT to get answers for

11:32

questions that I want answers to, right?

11:35

Where the answers are actually the answers.

11:37

I feel like whether or not chat

11:40

GBT can pass a blind

11:43

kind of conversational Turing test with someone is like,

11:45

yeah, probably in a lot of cases it can.

11:48

But the difference is that a company employs a

11:50

human being, they kind of become liable for a

11:53

lot of that human beings' actions. And it is

11:55

not established that a company is liable

11:57

for the actions of a chat bot. And

12:00

how you train a chatbot is

12:03

just fundamentally different than

12:05

a human being and also like

12:09

You can fire a human being you can get angry

12:11

at a human being there's penalties and incentives for a

12:13

human being that just don't exist For a chatbot. Yeah,

12:16

it can probably pass that test in a

12:18

lot of situations, but when it fails to

12:20

you got no move whatsoever

12:24

Well the like like customer service agent like

12:26

the word agent is actually like a

12:28

like a powerful term like that to

12:31

like So it's like

12:33

in a legal sense. It's a powerful term

12:35

Yeah, like an agent is essentially the spokesperson

12:37

for a company in that regard and once

12:39

you have a chatbot agent Like

12:42

you need to be held liable for what it says

12:44

if people are using the information that's providing to make

12:46

decisions Then you should be liable for the information is

12:48

providing. I I

12:50

100% agree. I have like

12:53

clawed back money from large corporations

12:56

I've clawed back money because a person from

12:58

the company on the phone on a recorded

13:01

call pulled me something I took action based

13:03

on that and Then

13:05

something about what they told me turned out to

13:07

be wrong and the call was recorded and we

13:09

were able to reconcile and I got The money

13:12

back like that's actually happened to me and it

13:14

concerned air travel weirdly enough To

13:16

this story. No, it wasn't with air cannon. But

13:19

anyway, it's like it matters It matters that there

13:21

is a an accountable person

13:23

because otherwise it's just this like if air

13:25

Canada had won this It means that companies

13:27

could just shrug off Basically

13:30

everything they tell their customers. Oh,

13:32

that was a chatbot. Sorry separate entity than

13:34

us Yeah, you know, what can you

13:36

do these things suck? Like and

13:39

why do you have I don't know why is it telling

13:41

people to do things? Yeah, totally I feel like we get

13:43

bang on this bang on this drum all day long but

13:45

I've had the same thing where I've had to go back

13:47

to recorded phone calls to get refunds on things and Yeah,

13:51

there's a reason why they record those calls and it's

13:53

pretty amazing mine was insurance related which was

13:55

even better Weird

13:59

that sounds like fun Yeah, cool tech don't use

14:01

it this way. Anyway, actually speaking of

14:03

cool tech, you shouldn't think about a

14:06

certain way. There's another story coming out

14:08

of Canada and concerns, a device that

14:10

I know holds a special place in

14:12

your heart, Scott, the Flipper Zero. Yeah,

14:15

yeah, I definitely don't own one, seeing as they're about

14:17

to be banned. Yeah, what else do I need to

14:19

say about that? Take that episode down about how you

14:21

bought and love yours. I

14:24

bought mine because I knew that they were probably going to

14:26

be banned at some point, and then now I'm- Literally. I

14:29

definitely don't have it. It's definitely not sitting right beside

14:31

me. No. I'm probably

14:34

not holding it at the present moment. Yeah,

14:37

the Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada

14:39

Agency has put forward a proposed ban

14:41

on the importation sale and use of,

14:45

amongst other devices, the Flipper

14:47

Zero. So let

14:49

me- I just need to go off a bit on this

14:51

because it's- this

14:53

thing is getting such a bad name for just being

14:55

configurable. You know what I'm saying? You

14:58

can do things on it, like

15:00

run a small Wi-Fi web

15:02

server, and therefore we should ban

15:04

it because that small web server

15:07

can expose a security hole in

15:09

Tesla's key system. It's like, well,

15:11

you know, I could buy a micro PC

15:14

off of AliExpress for like 80 bucks and

15:16

do the exact same thing. So- or a

15:18

Raspberry Pi or any number of

15:20

other things that has the ability to run a Wi-Fi

15:22

server. So why

15:24

is the Flipper Zero getting

15:27

a bad name? Just because it's kind of marketed

15:29

as a tool, and by kind of, I mean

15:31

it's- Exposally. Exposally. Yeah.

15:35

I'm not going to stand that edge off. It's pretty exclusively

15:38

marketed that way. That's not a good reason to get rid

15:40

of it. But it's- yeah,

15:42

it's like it's doing its job.

15:44

It's proved that there are security

15:46

vulnerabilities in certain car manufacturers' key

15:48

systems. It's like, great. Like, that's

15:51

good. Fix those problems. Don't

15:54

ban the device. Don't ban a security research

15:56

device if you're worried about the security of

15:58

other device. It's just- it's- extraordinarily backwards.

16:00

For anyone that doesn't know, a flipper

16:03

zero is, it is marketed

16:05

as like kind of a hacker tool.

16:07

But what it really is, is a

16:10

small beginner friendly device that lets you

16:12

interact with wireless signals. RFID, NFC, Wi-Fi,

16:14

as you mentioned, Bluetooth, standard radio. You

16:17

can do all sorts of fun little hackery projects

16:19

with it. You can change TV channels, you can

16:21

clone a hotel keycard, you can

16:23

read a PETS RFID chip. It's a little

16:26

wireless signal receiver. Yeah. Yeah, it's a extensible

16:29

platform that allows you

16:31

to pretty much do anything. There's an entire like circuit

16:33

interconnect on it where you can put in custom boards.

16:35

We did a whole episode about it. If you have

16:38

any interest in it and any interest in buying one

16:40

before they get banned, I recommend you move fastly or

16:43

quickly. We

16:45

did an episode about it. We had a

16:47

great Talking Sasquatch big youtuber on about it.

16:49

Go back a few months and give it

16:51

a listen. Great episode. But very cool little

16:54

devices. It's like a pre-made

16:57

micro computer to do this stuff. It's

16:59

not like my cell

17:02

phone is running Unix. So it's like I could just

17:04

do it on my cell phone. But

17:06

it's like this is just its own kind

17:08

of little pre-made cutesy toy device for it.

17:10

Yeah, kind of great and people have really

17:13

adopted it and the community is developed that

17:15

is extending it and I don't

17:17

know. Yeah, it's nice. I think it's

17:19

worth digging into where this is coming from. So

17:21

car thefts are admittedly a pretty

17:24

disproportionate problem in Canada. Just seems

17:26

to be a thing. Statistically disproportionate.

17:30

A lot of complicated reasons why that is. Despite

17:33

all of the versatility versatility that we've discussed,

17:36

the flipper zero does lack a lot of

17:38

the capabilities necessary

17:40

for actually bypassing modern

17:43

car anti-theft production protections.

17:45

Yeah. Signal amplification relay devices

17:47

are kind of widely understood. It's like what if

17:50

you're going to buy a thing to steal cars,

17:52

you're probably buying that flipper zero doesn't let you

17:54

do that. I was just gonna say rolling key

17:56

generators and stuff like that like that you can

17:59

buy a specific device. I can go on

18:01

the internet right now and buy a device that

18:03

is meant to hack rolling key like

18:05

automotive keys. I can buy

18:07

that right now and have it shipped to my house.

18:09

That's not banned. No. But

18:12

Flipper Zero's banned because in

18:15

some situations it can be used to run

18:17

a phishing or like a man in the

18:19

middle attack, et cetera, et cetera, and it

18:22

is what it is. In Canada, you

18:25

kind of think of the geography in Canada.

18:27

You drive up, not a lot of buyers

18:30

in Alaska. You can

18:32

drive down, but primarily the buyers for stolen

18:34

cars exported from Canada aren't in the United

18:36

States. You go through the

18:38

land borders, they're extraordinarily well protected. You can

18:41

get across in other parts. It's a massive

18:43

open border, but that's not where the buyers

18:45

for these cars are. The

18:48

buyers for these cars are

18:50

primarily across oceans, let's

18:52

just call it. Is that your political

18:54

wave? Yeah, they're across ocean. They go

18:56

into sea cans and then go on

18:58

shipping freighters that

19:01

then take them across oceans, notably the

19:03

Pacific Ocean. Funny thing

19:05

about sea cans, now that you mention it,

19:07

a lot of those in our port systems.

19:10

Yeah. A ton of those in

19:12

our ports. There's tons

19:14

of things you could do to prevent car theft.

19:16

You could invest more money in security in

19:19

our ports. You could create stricter

19:21

regulations about the anti-theft measures that go into

19:23

these cars that make them prohibitively difficult to

19:25

steal. We talked about that a ton in

19:28

the Kia Boys episode. There's a lot of

19:30

really cool meaningful actions you can take. Banning

19:33

a hacking gizmo is

19:35

just a regrettably performative gesture that,

19:37

if anything, is going to hold

19:39

back meaningful security research in a

19:41

country that is saying it is doing

19:44

this because there is a security

19:46

problem with cars. The only thing I

19:48

can think of, and maybe if

19:50

there's some bureaucrat at the GOA or GOC,

19:53

Government of Canada listening to this, is

19:56

there something that we just don't know

19:58

that's not reported in the news? Maybe

20:00

these things are being... being used to

20:02

deal Honda Civics everywhere, like their push

20:05

button, script kitty, car theft devices. Because,

20:08

yeah, I agree with you, it

20:10

does seem performative if it's just exposing

20:12

security flaws, and especially when

20:14

it comes to Tesla, because one of the things that

20:16

I keep referencing is that you can

20:19

kind of use them to trick people into generating

20:21

a spare key, and then

20:23

making the footboard zero, essentially a web

20:27

hotspot. Anyway, yeah,

20:29

unless there's something that we just don't know about

20:31

that's not being reported, because they just don't want

20:33

people to know about it and talk about how

20:35

easy it is to just, you know, steal Toyota

20:38

RAB4s or something, then

20:40

yeah, it does seem performative to me for

20:42

sure. Good times,

20:45

good times. Good

20:47

times. So here's one,

20:50

there was one last Canadian story. It

20:53

was kind of a ranty Canadian episode.

20:55

Do we, attack with it. There's

20:57

a bill currently in the committee in the House of

20:59

Commons here up in Canada that

21:02

would make it so if you want

21:04

to view adult content, you either have

21:06

to, so how do I get

21:09

into this? That's not the best way to do

21:11

this. Yeah, propose

21:13

send a bill trying to mandate age

21:15

verification on explosive websites. The

21:17

argument, I understand the argument, it

21:20

is to protect minors. However, the

21:22

bill importantly doesn't specify a method for

21:24

verifying users' ages. And

21:27

looking at sort of some of the available

21:29

systems in other jurisdictions, the two big things

21:31

that come up would be either a digital

21:33

identification system that you have to, you know,

21:36

plug in to access these sites or

21:38

a facial recognition software, which

21:40

has intuitively raised concerns

21:42

about anonymity and privacy on the

21:44

internet up here in Canada. I

21:49

don't think it, I think this

21:52

seems like people go into the grocery store

21:54

and getting all of the ingredients for a

21:56

ginormous catastrophic data breach and putting them in

21:58

the basket and walking them. up to the

22:00

self-service till. This like, what if

22:02

we had a giant database of identities

22:05

of people that visited a porno site?

22:08

Um, seems like the biggest target in the

22:10

world. I can imagine the episode two years

22:12

from now, where we talk about the data

22:14

breach. It just seems like such a bad

22:16

omen. I 100% agree with you. The

22:21

other thing, unless they figured out a way to really

22:23

like, I'm just taking it through right now to really

22:25

like multi-tier,

22:28

you know, unconnected key

22:30

systems with, I

22:33

don't know how they do it, but I agree

22:35

it would be, have be right, especially if it

22:37

was a government contract and built by government contractors,

22:40

probably be ripe for data breaches. I'm

22:43

sure that they would take their best crack. I

22:45

don't get the sense. I don't

22:47

really have a tinfoil hat about this one.

22:50

I don't think this, this is the first

22:52

step towards creating a digital identification system and

22:54

a social, I'm not, I'm not meaningfully worried

22:56

about this. I think this is starting from

22:58

a good instinct to try and keep minors

23:00

off of adult websites, which is a good

23:03

instinct. Um, but I just

23:05

think that this is a solution with the

23:07

actual solution, which is a technical one sort

23:10

of being shrugged off. And I think until you

23:12

can propose that in

23:15

a secure, meaningful way,

23:17

you shouldn't, this bill has to,

23:19

uh, to 10, you shouldn't be bringing this forward.

23:21

I got a, I got a bigger challenge for

23:23

you. And in regards to

23:25

the fact that adult content is just

23:27

everywhere on the internet now. So you

23:30

literally can't just, if

23:32

your concern is minor exposure

23:34

to adult content, then

23:36

you shouldn't just let minors on the internet because

23:38

I don't know when the

23:40

last time you were on a social

23:43

network was Reddit, Twitter

23:45

or X literally

23:47

any trending post on X is

23:50

immediately followed immediately by the top

23:52

reply, which is an only fans

23:54

person promoting their only fans with

23:57

explicit content. It's like,

23:59

it's there. marketing scheme, same thing on

24:01

Reddit. If something's trending, there's

24:03

only fans, people marketing themselves in

24:05

the comments. And it's

24:07

just like, there's porn everywhere. I

24:10

don't know. Unless, unless we

24:12

start doing, unless they're marrying

24:14

it to like image identification

24:16

technologies. So like your

24:20

web browser will then filter all that stuff

24:22

out if you haven't verified your ID, like,

24:25

which is probably a likely solution to that.

24:28

I just can't see how they're how, how

24:31

mandating identity and facial recognition

24:33

for explicitly adult content on the internet or our

24:35

tagged adult content on the internet is going to

24:37

help because it's just so much of it at

24:39

this point. Yeah. I

24:42

think you kind of drove past the solution there,

24:44

which is that like, this

24:46

is a hardware level problem.

24:48

Yeah. Software, local. Hardware

24:52

platform combination level. Yeah. The simplest

24:54

version of this is that like

24:57

most kids don't have, most 11 year olds don't have

24:59

a sufficient side hustle to purchase an iPhone. It's probably

25:02

being bought for them by a parent. And

25:05

when the parent gives it to them, they can put controls

25:08

on that device because they're handing

25:10

an internet connected device to a miner. Totally. If

25:13

you don't want that miner to see something,

25:15

that security should largely

25:17

be occurring at a hardware level. I think

25:19

there's tons of things that platforms can do

25:21

to strengthen that. And to keep miners from

25:23

seeing things they shouldn't be seeing and should

25:25

be. That would

25:27

be a great place for a well-intentioned law

25:30

passer to start looking at is, well, what can

25:32

we be asking these platforms to be doing? There's

25:37

some stickiness there, but that, those two

25:39

solutions, large platform and hardware level protection

25:41

seems like a way better approach to

25:43

this. Let me

25:45

turn on your, it

25:48

seems you've gone to an adult website, turn on your webcam.

25:50

It's like, that's a nice, you're going to create a giant

25:52

underground for something that a lot of people access. It's

25:55

not a good idea. Yeah, totally. If your intention

25:57

is to like, you know, know,

26:00

think the the adults porn industry,

26:02

the legitimate porn industry that has

26:04

rules and regulations and, you

26:07

know, brings structure and probably, I

26:10

don't know, I don't know the right words I'm looking

26:12

for here. But you know, better than the underground scene

26:14

in regards to a number of, you

26:16

know, rights and

26:18

non human trafficking things that

26:22

yeah, I think that any kind of system

26:25

like this, I do I do think

26:27

that that might be the solution, like

26:29

a good solid platform like iPhone, Microsoft,

26:31

OSX, you enable child accounts,

26:34

the computer or the browser has an extension

26:36

that auto identifies that all content and immediately

26:39

like removes it from the page. I think

26:42

that's the real solution here is

26:45

allowing parents to put the

26:47

boundaries on what their children are allowed to do on

26:49

the internet. Maybe there's an

26:51

issue there in the sense that maybe there's not so

26:53

many technically savvy parents, but I feel like as

26:56

the millennial generation and below becomes

27:00

the new parents, I feel like that's gonna

27:03

quickly change. I'm not sure how many

27:05

millennials exist besides my wife lover to

27:07

death. Yeah, that aren't

27:09

technically savvy. Wasn't

27:15

sure where that was going at the beginning. Yeah,

27:18

yeah, yeah. She's

27:20

a she's a power iPhone user. But the second

27:23

you put a computer in front of her, she's,

27:25

she doesn't love it. Say that

27:27

they're unwieldy. Yeah, put protective

27:30

barriers around the kids not necessarily around

27:32

the content if you don't want to

27:34

drive legitimate sex work underground. It's

27:36

just not Yeah, which is not a

27:38

good place for it to be. Yeah, agreed. Ah,

27:41

well, anyway, rage against the machine

27:43

has a bunch of Canadian stories.

27:47

Let's kick it over to some of

27:49

our fine sponsors. And then when we come back, we'll talk

27:51

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32:15

International news. So,

32:18

there's an interesting one. We don't

32:20

know the name of the company. It has not

32:22

been included in, based on

32:24

my research, a single piece of coverage about

32:27

this story. So, we're just going to call

32:29

it a large multinational company. An

32:32

employee at said large multinational company joins conference

32:35

call. This was a couple of weeks ago.

32:38

They got on the call and a

32:40

bunch of their coworkers are there. Camera's

32:42

on. And the result of

32:44

that call, the person is to go ahead

32:46

with a transfer of 200 million Hong

32:48

Kong dollars. It

32:51

turns out the entire call was a

32:53

deep fake theatrical production. Person

32:56

got looped into the call through a fishing scheme. Their

32:58

coworkers who were again on camera were

33:01

deep faked based on publicly available video

33:03

and photography. And the entire thing

33:05

was a scam to get them to go ahead and

33:07

transfer this money to the hackers who

33:10

took the money and ran. Case

33:12

is the first of its kind in Hong Kong involving

33:14

deep fake technology. No arrests have been made yet. The

33:16

cops are still looking into it. And

33:20

the story went wide because they were trying

33:22

to get outward that this technology has reached

33:24

a point where you can

33:26

be looking at a person on a Zoom call and

33:29

this is possible. Yeah. Yep,

33:35

had to come. Had to be, it was coming at some

33:37

point. The thing that surprised me

33:39

most is that it wasn't just one deep

33:41

fake person that they deep faked an entire

33:44

team of people. That to me

33:46

is crazy. Like

33:49

it's very sophisticated. Like I'd say

33:52

that this is, I

33:54

would say that if they're at that point

33:56

where they're like, you know what's gonna make this

33:58

more convincing if we bring six. colleagues

34:00

to the chat too. If

34:02

they're at that level of sophistication, I think

34:05

that we are in trouble and you're going

34:07

to hear more and more and more about

34:09

this. Yeah. There was a reason

34:11

I used a theatrical production because there's

34:13

something different to me about one person

34:15

doing this versus a whole bunch of

34:17

people getting together and casting parts and

34:19

figuring out who's going to say what

34:22

and scripted it all out and then

34:24

putting on their deep fake masks and

34:26

going into it. It's very theater kids

34:28

do cybercrime energy. I'm sure they're not.

34:30

I'm sure they're very dangerous hackers, but

34:33

it is just sort of a different tenor for these

34:36

types of corporate hacks. For context, $200

34:38

million, Hong Kong dollars is about $25

34:41

million US dollars. This is a large

34:44

corporate heist. It

34:46

was a fishing scheme and a

34:48

Zoom call. It's crazy. I

34:53

mentioned to you that while we were in Nicaragua,

34:56

my parents-in-law got defrauded.

34:59

Yeah. Somebody

35:02

was pretending to be my wife, same

35:05

name, set up their WhatsApp profile, messaged

35:08

her mother, gave

35:11

her some lie about how her phone had broken,

35:13

her touchscreen wasn't working, but she was somehow still

35:15

able to use WhatsApp. Her sim wasn't ready. She

35:17

couldn't call her, et cetera, et cetera. She

35:20

needed to pay some bills right away and needed her

35:23

to send some money on her behalf and she couldn't

35:25

do it because her phone was busted. Of course, loving

35:27

mother. Yeah, I'll help my daughter out.

35:30

Some brutal. Thought she was just being

35:33

independent, didn't want to call me to verify. Next

35:35

thing you know, $4,200 is on its way to Montenegro. Apparently,

35:39

the police attracted to Montenegro. We're

35:42

talking about a tiny WhatsApp call. As

35:48

far as checks and balances go, it would

35:50

have been pretty easy to see through it.

35:53

If she'd looked at the contacts phone number,

35:55

she would have noticed that the area code

35:57

was definitely not something that Michaela would have

35:59

or my wife would have. Yeah, anyway,

36:03

so you think about

36:05

that level of sophistication probably

36:08

being more successful than you would imagine.

36:11

Like it might seem like something that you would immediately

36:13

identify as fraud in the scam. Imagine

36:16

if you were looking at

36:19

your son on Zoom who

36:21

was saying, hey, mom, like I need

36:26

you to wire $6,000 to pay my rent to this

36:28

woman because my bank account's been hacked and I can't

36:30

have access to my money and I'll pay you back

36:32

in 12 days, etc. Imagine

36:37

what's about to start happening. Totally. Like

36:40

on a recreational level. Like the corporate

36:42

sophistication side will kick in and there'll

36:45

become tons of policies and checks and

36:47

balances. But if you start thinking about

36:49

applying this technology to everyday

36:51

people and boomers who love

36:53

their kids, that's

36:56

a billion dollar industry right there.

36:58

Yeah. I remember about

37:00

a year ago we did an episode on pig butchering

37:02

scams, which are basically what happened

37:04

to your in-laws and that sucks and I hope

37:06

they're kind of okay. Yep. And

37:09

so much of that is about exploiting

37:13

the emotional vulnerability that emerges when

37:15

a person is concerned about a

37:17

loved one. Totally. You

37:20

need that emotional hook. And it

37:22

is bizarre to say, but there

37:25

are emotional vulnerabilities in a corporate

37:27

context. The desire

37:29

of a person to not

37:31

mess up in front of their peers,

37:33

to not suffer embarrassment in a potentially

37:35

ruthless corporate culture. It's

37:38

not the same as concern about a loved

37:40

one, but it is the same kind of

37:42

identification of an emotional vulnerability and

37:45

setting up a lot of work

37:47

to exploit that emotional vulnerability to

37:49

catastrophic ends. It's the

37:51

same basic kind of like the

37:53

social engineering is conspicuously similar. I'm

37:56

just keep running through this in my head. Like

38:00

if you got a FaceTime call from your mother. Totally.

38:05

And she's like, your father's in the hospital and

38:07

blah, blah, blah, I need you to do this,

38:09

blah, blah, but like can you, like, eh, eh.

38:11

Yeah. It's just, it's

38:13

gonna be insane unless

38:16

they can figure out how to stop that stuff. Because

38:19

like, we were talking with

38:22

our in-laws about how like there needs to be

38:24

a, like if anybody's asking for money, if you're

38:26

about to send money, you have to at least

38:28

speak to somebody on the phone. Which is still

38:30

very fakeable. But

38:33

imagine if you had a FaceTime call and you could

38:35

see your daughter and she was like, or your mother

38:37

or your son or whatever, somebody in your family and

38:39

they were just like, yeah, I need this thing, blah,

38:41

blah, can you help me? Of

38:44

course. It's gonna be,

38:46

yeah, I don't know. I'm

38:48

hoping this is another thing that's gonna

38:50

need a technological solution. Like WhatsApp phone

38:52

calls. Like it seems to me like

38:56

every messaging service that I have

38:58

an account on, I get flooded

39:00

with garbage, including

39:03

like PlayStation network. Like

39:05

I'm constantly getting scams from everywhere

39:08

and just deleting and banning and

39:10

blocking and reporting. Pretty

39:12

much every time I log into a messaging service, I have to

39:14

report and block at least one account. So

39:18

they're gonna need to get better at identifying that

39:20

stuff. And that's probably gonna be an AI solution,

39:23

I would assume that they're gonna need,

39:25

just like we dealt with email spam, we're gonna

39:27

have to start dealing with messenger spam. It's

39:30

tough because like so much, so many of

39:32

the genuinely good

39:35

solutions that center around, okay,

39:38

if someone calls you with an urgent reason that you

39:40

need to send money, hang up

39:42

and call the person back. Yeah, totally.

39:44

Don't hit reply but call the phone number.

39:46

Like these really basic things, but those

39:48

aren't, that's

39:51

not really how we interact. Your

39:54

coworker calls you up on Zoom, your family member

39:56

calls you up. Sorry, just one second, let me

39:58

hang up on you and call you back. It's

40:00

a really unintuitive thing to do.

40:03

It's smart, it's good personal security,

40:05

but it is not intuitive

40:08

to how we communicate with the people that we

40:10

know in our lives. So if a person can

40:12

get past that filter where you

40:15

think you're talking to the person you think

40:17

you're talking about, those kinds

40:19

of personal security policies, call

40:21

them, are really, really hard

40:24

to lean on. And

40:26

I think that software level stuff to

40:28

sort of back you up a little

40:31

bit. You're like, hey, this person's

40:35

video looks a little weird. Hey, we've

40:37

done a little bit of work to figure out that

40:39

we think this phone number is being spoofed. I

40:42

don't know what those technical solutions are, but we

40:44

got to give people a little bit of backup

40:46

in these situations because the

40:49

thing that we ask them to do is really

40:51

unintuitive socially, I guess you

40:53

could say. The other issue is, and we talked about

40:55

this in the Pig Butcher one, the supplies here, these

40:57

people got away with $25 million in one hack. And

41:01

it's like, can you imagine what the

41:03

global market value for scanning is? Just

41:05

given how many people are employed and

41:07

are human trafficked and are, et cetera,

41:09

et cetera, across the globe to

41:12

become scammers and to execute scams?

41:15

It's got to be billions of dollars.

41:18

Organized crime. Yeah,

41:21

I don't know. But humans,

41:24

expecting humans to be smart enough to identify it, I

41:26

don't think is going to be the answer here. We've

41:28

had that problem with passwords since

41:32

passwords existed. Go

41:34

listen to a problem with passwords. I think it was like episode

41:36

three. Yeah, I really wanted to. But

41:40

yeah, so I think that the technical platforms and

41:42

the solutions, they're going to need to do something.

41:45

Actually, I think we have that contact

41:47

at Interpol. If we're going to have a conversation with

41:49

them about something, I think scamming would be an amazing

41:51

episode. Yeah. Talk about

41:53

the global size and scale of scamming. For sure.

41:56

There's a story that we're going to be looking into relatively soon

41:58

and concerns. For lack

42:00

of a better term, the Chinese mob and a

42:02

200,000 person scam factory operation that

42:06

has been likened by experts to modern day

42:08

slavery. It gives you a pretty

42:12

gnarly sense of the scale

42:14

of what is behind a lot of these

42:16

things. We really don't know who's making these

42:18

calls. In a lot of cases, it doesn't

42:20

look like what you think it looks like.

42:23

Yeah. Speaking of weird pop culture scammy

42:25

references, they're making their way into Hollywood

42:28

cinema now. In a recent

42:30

episode of True Detective, one of

42:32

the police officers, I don't know if you saw the new

42:34

episode. Did our new series season, didn't you?

42:38

I did, yeah. Yes. I

42:41

don't remember what you're talking about. One

42:43

of the police officers in Alaska, it was

42:46

Alaska, right? Yeah, Alaska. He was

42:48

sending money and stuff and paid for a

42:50

plane ticket and all those things for some

42:52

woman that he was WhatsApp-ing with. She

42:55

never showed up. He'd send her

42:57

money. I was like, oh. Someone's

42:59

catching up on this trend. They're

43:01

into the love scams and things. It

43:04

was just good to see in pop culture and make it

43:06

a little bit more known to people that

43:09

these are going on. It's

43:11

so common that if you want to make a

43:13

character seem relatable, you have them fall for a

43:15

giant internet grip. Exactly. With

43:17

a five-figure penalty. Yeah.

43:22

But you know what's not causing trouble,

43:24

Scott? Toothbrushes? Three

43:27

million of them. We'll

43:29

keep this one real quick because it's

43:32

more just a bizarre one. It's

43:35

sort of a one-said-the-other-said

43:37

thing between a Swiss newspaper and

43:39

a security firm. Argao

43:42

or Zetung, a Swiss newspaper,

43:44

publishes this very sensational

43:47

story about three million internet-connected

43:50

toothbrushes being hacked and used to

43:52

do cyber attacks, kind of a

43:54

DDoS story. And the

43:57

report claims that the attack caused a website to go

43:59

down for four hours. resulting in millions of dollars

44:01

in damages. And the story

44:03

was sourced from cybersecurity firm Fortinet

44:05

and was widely circulated and republished

44:07

by global news outlets. The story

44:09

goes very, very viral. It's

44:12

remarkable. Three million internet connected

44:15

toothbrushes. It paints this picture

44:17

of a very mundane technology being used

44:19

for very malicious purposes. Great

44:21

story. Unfortunately,

44:24

cybersecurity experts quickly challenged the

44:27

report foundationally

44:30

on a lack of evidence, but really just sort of

44:32

the implausibility of the whole thing. Marai

44:35

Botnet, which one of the

44:37

largest botnets ever at its peak infected 650,000 devices,

44:42

far fewer than the 3 million

44:44

toothbrushes claim. So

44:48

what happened here? A

44:50

lie went viral. That's

44:52

the story or falsehood rather. And

44:56

at this stage, it's kind of come down to

44:58

a disagreement between Fortinet and our gauras Zetun. Fortinet

45:02

issues a clarification stating that the

45:04

story was a result of a

45:06

misinterpretation and translation issues leading to

45:08

a mix up of a hypothetical

45:10

situation and an actual

45:13

situation. Fortinet

45:15

says we put out this hypothetical, this

45:17

Swiss newspaper, mistranslated it

45:20

and then published that to the world. Our

45:23

gauras Zetun, the Swiss newspaper,

45:25

responds maintaining that Fortinet provided

45:27

detailed information about the attack

45:29

and had reviewed the article

45:31

before publication. And

45:34

at this point, a lot of

45:37

people read this story about a 3

45:39

million toothbrush botnet did not read the

45:41

corrections and the responsibility for this giant

45:43

misinformation explosion is still

45:45

contested between the newspaper and Fortinet. But

45:49

what we did get out of it is a

45:51

whole bunch of memes, a whole bunch of fun

45:53

chatter about misinformation in the

45:56

cybersecurity space. So that was

45:58

fascinating to read just how quickly. a

46:00

mistranslation or a misrepresentation turned into

46:03

a viral story that burst out

46:05

into the world. The

46:07

thing that I'm Googling in

46:09

the background here is does somebody make an

46:12

internet connected toothbrush? Right? Like,

46:17

is that a real thing? Does it exist and

46:19

why? What's that? What

46:22

is it for? Why do you

46:24

need the... I love internet connected stuff. I

46:26

spend so much of my time on the

46:28

internet. Why do you need a toothbrush to

46:30

be internet connected? Yeah, apparently there is one.

46:34

Or multiple. So I am... Oh

46:36

yeah, sorry. Answer to that. Yes,

46:39

there are. There are internet connected toothbrushes. Crazy.

46:42

Bazaar. Crazy. I kind of

46:44

want to buy one. I'm reading about a toothbrush right now that

46:46

3D maps your teeth and tells you when you've

46:49

missed places. Like that sounds

46:51

amazing. Maybe when

46:53

I'm missing in my life. Oh no.

46:56

Is it internet connected toothbrush? Maybe that's

46:58

why I'll bring it all together. What

47:00

if this was... Oh dang. What if

47:02

this was a viral ad for internet connected toothbrushes? Oh

47:04

shit. Dude. Might

47:07

be onto something. I wouldn't... I

47:10

would be in a sense furious and in

47:12

another sense deeply impressed. Yeah, I'd

47:15

be mostly impressed. I

47:17

think I'd be mostly impressed. I think

47:19

I might buy that toothbrush. I'm gonna give you

47:21

a half as good at making toothbrushes as you

47:23

are promoting them sold. We just

47:25

unwillingly promoted a toothbrush that does 3D mapping

47:27

of your teeth and tells you when you

47:29

miss spots to like 100,000 people. Oh

47:32

no. So

47:36

if this was a marketing campaign, add

47:39

that to your KPI. Congratulations. You did

47:41

it. In

47:44

an attempt at covering a story about

47:46

misinformation in the tech and security space

47:48

we have inadvertently participated in. Oh man.

47:54

Last thing I want to talk with you about because this

47:56

goes back to an idea that we've wanted to make

47:58

something up for a long time. concerns the identity

48:01

of one Satoshi Nakamoto. This

48:04

past week, the Crypto Open Patent

48:07

Alliance and self-claimed

48:09

Satoshi Nakamoto, a man named Craig

48:12

Wright, will be presenting their closing

48:14

statements in a trial, in a

48:16

sense determining if Wright

48:19

is Satoshi. There's

48:22

been a really fascinating court

48:24

case to be following. The

48:27

justice in the trial, a guy named James Miller, has

48:29

not said whether or not a decision is going to

48:31

be coming out at the end of this. But

48:34

the outcome of this case that

48:36

COPPA, this patent alliance is bringing against

48:39

Wright, could have huge implications on a

48:41

bunch of other ongoing cases that center

48:43

around Wright's claim that he is the

48:45

creator of Bitcoin.

48:48

I'm not sure that anyone

48:51

listening to this requires a rundown of

48:53

who Satoshi Nakamoto is. What

48:55

do you think about that? I don't think so. I

48:57

think we could summarize it by saying Satoshi

48:59

Nakamoto was on internet forums and

49:02

is believed to be the creator

49:04

of blockchain and the

49:06

Bitcoin. The Bitcoin. The

49:09

interesting, to

49:13

me it seems, my opinion is, I'm trying to

49:15

think of very good ways to present this. This

49:18

is being done for clout. I

49:22

don't know how much of

49:24

the database writes, trademarks stuff,

49:27

patent issues there's going

49:29

to be. I'm not

49:32

sure what value he's

49:34

going to get out of it if he wins. Because

49:39

a lot of this stuff was

49:41

shared publicly. It's open source technology,

49:43

et cetera, et cetera. It's mostly

49:45

just being done for, hey, I'm

49:47

the guy. Seems like

49:49

to me. The other thing I will

49:52

say is that if

49:54

you are Satoshi Nakamoto

49:56

accessing the initial

49:58

wallets and blockchain pieces that

50:00

you use to create the

50:02

coin and accessing all of

50:04

the money, i.e. Bitcoin

50:08

that are sitting in Satoshi Nakamoto's accounts

50:10

should probably be the number one piece

50:12

of proof to prove that you're them.

50:14

Just saying. Like

50:18

if you can sit down in court

50:21

and log into the origin wallet and

50:23

move some Bitcoin around I'm sure people

50:25

will then believe you. Yes,

50:28

it does seem like there would be a pretty

50:31

easy set of ways to prove that you're Satoshi

50:33

Nakamoto. So

50:36

to add a little bit to that, Craig

50:39

Wright, Australian computer scientist, has

50:41

claimed since 2016 that he

50:43

is Satoshi Nakamoto beyond

50:45

clout, which is certainly,

50:48

that's a reasonable supposition.

50:53

Wright is engaged in a series

50:55

of copyright events that

50:58

he has embarked upon with the presumption

51:02

that he is Nakamoto. He is

51:04

suing people as Nakamoto, the synonymous

51:06

creator of Bitcoin. This

51:10

lawsuit from COPPA against him is essentially

51:13

attempting to set a precedent that he

51:15

is not. They're

51:18

arguing this case,

51:21

they're trying to make the argument that he is not Satoshi

51:23

Nakamoto so that in future cases in the UK, high

51:26

court, he can't start from

51:28

that presumption. That's

51:30

really what this is interrogating. If

51:34

Wright wins those

51:37

other legal exchanges

51:39

he's in the middle of against Coinbase,

51:42

Crockin, a bunch of other cryptocurrency

51:45

platforms and Blockstream

51:48

is a real leg up if

51:50

he wins this one and it's a

51:52

real setback if he doesn't. His

51:56

case, I'm stammering because

51:58

we're talking about an active. relatively unfolding

52:00

court case concerning litigious

52:03

participants. But

52:06

the case he's made so far has been

52:08

interesting to say the least. He

52:10

had his sister on the stand who tells

52:13

a story from, I think he was 18 or 19 and she

52:16

saw him dressed up as a ninja. So

52:19

that when she heard the name Satoshi Nakamoto, she

52:21

put two and two together and thought surely that

52:23

must be my Australian brother, Craig Wright, because she

52:25

saw him in a ninja outfit one time. It

52:28

is a series of strange

52:31

anecdotal defenses

52:35

to this claim that he is Nakamoto that to me

52:37

from everyone around, I'm like, oh man, I feel like

52:39

there's a really short distance to you proving this and

52:41

it's just you crack it open those wallets and move

52:43

it some stuff around. But so

52:46

far that hasn't happened yet. Big, big news for

52:48

you, Jordan. When

52:50

I was a child, my brother and I

52:52

used to dress up as ninjas all the

52:54

time, actually. So new

52:58

announcement. I am

53:00

Satoshi Nakamoto. We're

53:02

on here first. We're on episode 87.

53:05

And my hope is that the way this podcast

53:08

is like, I don't want it and I really

53:10

enjoy making it. But my hope

53:12

is the way it ends is on episode 100. You

53:15

prove that after all of the

53:17

crypto shit talking, you were Satoshi

53:19

Nakamoto. That's the last episode we're

53:21

done. That would be the

53:23

perfect way for this to all wrap up. Could

53:27

you imagine? There's some untold backstories

53:30

here. Jordan

53:32

and I in our brief hack

53:34

was becoming a TV show period.

53:39

Pitched an entire idea called solving

53:41

Satoshi. Are seeking Satoshi?

53:43

It's all I want. We were solving

53:45

it. And we were going to make

53:47

an entire docudrama series about looking for

53:49

the real Satoshi Nakamoto. So we would

53:51

have met Craig, right? If we

53:54

had had the opportunity to make that show. And

53:56

since somebody else has made that show. That's

53:58

true. That's true. I would

54:01

honestly like I'm not. I

54:03

would honestly really love to interview Craig

54:06

Wright. I would be fascinated

54:08

to hear the story

54:10

from him because I'm not sitting in a

54:12

courtroom I'm not listening to. I mean, I'm

54:14

not reading transcripts. I'm reading secondary coverage. I

54:17

would love to understand, you

54:19

know, that argument and those claims. But it

54:21

has been a bizarre. I

54:23

think even people firmly in his

54:26

camp would agree this court case has been

54:28

extremely odd and maybe the

54:30

case was not made as well as it could have been. But

54:33

it is a fascinating one. He is

54:36

more than welcome to drop us a note. Love to have

54:38

him on the show. Love to chat about it. Maybe

54:40

we could dress up as ninjas and do a video

54:42

stream. Be great. Yeah,

54:49

I don't, I think it's an interesting.

54:53

The thing for me is that if you're going to build something

54:56

like blockchain and big

54:58

chances are you've

55:01

put an Easter egg in it somewhere like

55:03

no developers immune from putting an Easter egg

55:05

and things which we see all the time.

55:07

If you just Google, you know, any piece

55:10

of software and the term Easter egg, you'll

55:12

find Easter eggs laden

55:14

in pieces of software. I

55:17

can't remember which Microsoft product it was, but

55:19

it had an Microsoft flight simulator was an

55:21

Easter egg inside of it. So you could

55:23

like go into a special menu, push some

55:26

key command and boom, you were like in

55:28

Microsoft flight simulator, which to me is just

55:30

amazing. That rips. So

55:34

there has to be some fingerprints

55:36

on the software and Easter eggs

55:38

that only the creators would know

55:40

about. Granted, like we're fighting over

55:42

white papers and things like that,

55:44

which is less sophisticated and less

55:46

potential for that. But, but

55:49

yeah, I don't know, even wherever

55:52

the origin code is, having the original pieces

55:54

of code and the original proof of concept

55:56

for it, like that stuff has to exist.

55:58

And if you have that, then that would

56:00

probably strengthen your case too. So

56:04

yeah, it's an interesting claim.

56:06

I don't think that my

56:09

personal opinion is that I don't think that

56:11

we will ever have, even if somebody, even

56:13

if Craig Wright is Satoshi Nakamoto, I

56:16

don't think any court will ever rule that they

56:18

are as it will

56:21

likely be unprovable. So

56:24

unless some definitive evidence shows

56:26

up like you log into the Origin Wallet,

56:29

I don't think, I think

56:33

everybody's SOL. So.

56:37

Yeah. And as much as I

56:39

love crypto, I

56:43

would prefer it be open source. That's why you invented it.

56:45

I invented it. I invented it and gave it to the

56:47

people. You're all welcome. Congratulations

56:50

on your speculative gains. I

56:52

hope you enjoy all your free money that you've generated

56:54

out of nowhere. Well,

56:59

this was fun. We haven't done one of these in a minute. Thanks

57:02

for going on a tour of our

57:04

Canada Cyber Crime and Tech gripes with

57:07

us. That was a lot of fun.

57:10

Hong Kong heists. Thanks again for listening.

57:13

This was a fun one. And

57:16

yeah, we'll catch you in the next one. Take

57:18

care, everybody.