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You Know that we will be speaking at Intelligent

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at Intelligent Speech 2023.

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Hello everyone. Welcome

2:50

to the history of Persia. I'm

2:52

Trevor Cully and this is

2:55

episode 106. It

2:58

came from beyond the seas.

3:03

Last time, we covered the life and

3:05

times of Philip II of Macedon. He

3:10

came to power in the middle of a war

3:12

when his brother died, making Philip

3:14

regent for an infant monarch.

3:17

Philip said, while I'm an adult

3:20

from the royal family, I'll just be king.

3:23

He made his nephew a prince and set out

3:25

to conquer everything in sight. He

3:28

conquered west to the Adriatic Sea,

3:31

secured his northern borders with east-central

3:34

Europe,

3:34

east into the Hellespont, and

3:37

south until all of Greece was

3:39

subservient to Macedon. He

3:43

was assassinated by his own bodyguard,

3:46

who was promptly killed while attempting to

3:48

flee, leaving the circumstances

3:50

mysterious to this day. Upon

3:53

Philip II's death, his

3:55

20-year-old son became king, Alexander

3:58

III of Macedon. Macedon. This

4:02

provided an opening for the Persian

4:04

forces sent on behalf of the great King

4:06

Darius III to defeat a Macedonian

4:09

invasion in Anatolia,

4:12

and send them

4:13

fleeing home while Alexander

4:15

consolidated his own power and

4:18

forced his subjects to stay within

4:20

the burgeoning Macedonian Empire.

4:23

Now the year is 334 BCE.

4:28

And we return to Persia,

4:30

where Darius III has successfully

4:32

consolidated his own power, as

4:34

seen in Episode 104. He

4:37

defeated rebels in Egypt and Babylonia.

4:40

His satraps ousted the Macedonian

4:43

invader and stabilized the

4:45

Northeastern frontier against Sokka

4:47

raids. Trade flowed

4:49

smoothly from the Nile to the Indus

4:52

once again and builders were hard at

4:54

work on expanding the funerary

4:56

project at Persepolis.

4:59

All was right with the world.

5:02

But

5:02

we are entering a new

5:05

epoch in Persian history. And

5:08

honestly, in world history. This

5:11

is still the History of

5:13

Persia podcast, and I do

5:16

want to keep our narrative framed in

5:18

the Persian perspective as much as

5:20

possible, until the

5:23

Achaemenids are well and truly gone.

5:26

But that will be increasingly hard

5:28

to do over the course of the next

5:30

eight episodes. As

5:34

always, our detailed narrative

5:36

sources come from the west and

5:38

they are uniformly concerned with one

5:41

thing. And in fact,

5:43

with one single person. Alexandros

5:46

Tasmegas Vasalaus Tu

5:49

Makadonu Kaites

5:51

Asies Apases Curio

5:55

Alexander the Great King

5:58

of Macedon

5:59

and Lord of all Asia.

6:03

For most of the next 20 or

6:06

so episodes, our

6:09

sources will primarily be a small

6:11

collection of Roman-era writers,

6:14

supplemented with the occasional contemporary

6:17

inscription or speech.

6:20

Despite his famous press corps,

6:22

more on that later, no

6:24

true primary sources for Alexander

6:27

III's life survive. Instead

6:31

we rely on Justin's

6:33

Epitome of the Philippic Histories of

6:35

Pompeius Trogus, a

6:38

summary of a 3rd century BCE

6:40

work written in the 2nd century

6:43

CE. Polyinus'

6:45

Stratagems of War, written

6:47

in the 2nd century CE, describing 900

6:50

major military leaders

6:53

in Greco-Roman history. 833 survive

6:57

today, including Alexander and

6:59

several big Persian figures we've already

7:01

discussed.

7:03

Arian's Anabasis of Alexander,

7:06

written in the 2nd century CE

7:09

and often considered the most thorough

7:11

and scholastic of these so-called

7:14

Alexandrian sources. Palsanias'

7:18

Description of Greece, a Roman summary

7:20

of Greek history, written in

7:22

the 2nd century

7:26

CE. Quintus Curtius Rufus' Histories

7:28

of Alexander the Great, a highly

7:30

dramatized account from the 1st century

7:33

CE, probably at

7:35

least based on style since we don't know

7:37

very much about the author. Plutarch's

7:41

Life of Alexander, written

7:44

in the 1st century CE as part

7:46

of his parallel lives which set

7:48

Alexander parallel to Julius

7:50

Caesar. And

7:53

Diodorus Siculus' Library

7:55

of History, written in the 1st century

7:58

BCE. Some

8:00

of these authors have been with us for ages

8:03

and will be with us well into the future.

8:06

Others, namely Arian and

8:08

Kurtius, wrote massive biographies

8:11

of Alexander that will pass

8:14

us by in just a few months.

8:17

And the first two books of Kurtius are

8:19

lost, meaning he's not even particularly

8:22

relevant today. There

8:25

is enough out there about

8:27

Alexander III of Macedon

8:29

to fill whole libraries

8:31

and multiple podcasts. And

8:35

several of those already exist. I

8:38

don't want to get that bogged down

8:40

on this show, but this

8:43

is by far the most detail we

8:45

have for the smallest period of time

8:47

at any point in the show. So

8:51

I do want to embrace it just a bit.

8:54

Fortunately, by volume, a

8:57

lot of that writing is analysis

8:59

of different authors' perspectives. I'm

9:02

going to keep that to a relative minimum

9:05

for this section of the show. There's

9:07

just too much to deal with all of it.

9:11

I will share things I find particularly

9:13

compelling or necessary, but I'm

9:15

not going to go through all of the different

9:18

ancient sources in detail every

9:20

single time. Instead,

9:22

I think it will be more useful

9:24

to discuss some of the modern interpretations

9:27

of events when that sort of thing comes

9:29

up.

9:31

So,

9:32

the satraps of Western Anatolia

9:35

had never fully come off their military

9:37

footing after pushing back Parmenion

9:40

in the Macedonian invasion of 335. It

9:45

had barely been a year anyway, and

9:47

in that time, the Macedonian

9:50

army had already marched all

9:52

the way into Eastern Europe. Again,

9:56

they were keeping a weary eye on

9:58

the Hellespont as ships and troops were on the way. poured

10:01

into the Macedonian-occupied cities

10:03

of southeastern Europe. But

10:06

it can't have been clear if this was intended

10:08

for further conflict in Thrace and

10:10

Scythia or a renewed

10:13

invasion. Alexander

10:15

was talking a lot about an invasion

10:17

and making a lot of boastful

10:20

claims about getting vengeance on Susa

10:23

for the destruction of Athens

10:25

back during Xerxes invasion.

10:28

But it remained to be seen if this

10:30

king

10:31

could muster the support from

10:34

his supposed vassals to actually

10:36

enact those plans. It

10:39

became all too clear in April

10:41

of 334 when the Macedonian

10:44

fleet ferried 54,000 infantry

10:48

and cavalry across the Hellespont

10:51

and then deployed into the Aegean

10:53

with 120 ships crewed

10:55

by a further 38,000 Macedonians,

10:59

Thracians and Greeks from

11:01

across the young Western Empire. Generally

11:06

speaking, we tend to

11:08

trust the rough numbers given for

11:10

Alexander's forces because

11:13

even though the contemporary histories

11:15

are lost to us, they were not

11:18

to the Alexandrian source authors

11:20

that we do have and many

11:22

of them cite writings from people

11:25

and officers who participated

11:27

in this campaign. Alexander

11:30

is believed to have been the first

11:32

king in history to take a dedicated

11:35

team of writers with him into

11:37

war to record the

11:39

conflict in real time as a

11:42

way of rapidly building up his own

11:44

legend back in Greece.

11:47

The Anatolian satraps scrambled

11:50

to respond effectively to this unprecedented

11:53

threat. They had dealt

11:55

with Greek invaders before. Their

11:58

ancestors had even squared off against

12:01

the pseudo-empires of Athens

12:03

and Sparta during the 5th century.

12:06

These satraps and their own fathers had

12:09

fought and defeated the independent

12:11

Egyptian kingdom just a decade ago. But

12:14

in reality, the Persian

12:17

Empire had never faced a threat

12:19

like this. The

12:21

Achaemenids had only rarely faced

12:24

an invasion of any sort, and

12:27

certainly nothing on this scale. The

12:30

last time a Persian army had faced

12:33

a strong, centralized

12:35

kingdom with the sort of military experience

12:38

and imperial resources available

12:40

to Macedon was probably

12:43

Cambyses invasion of Egypt.

12:46

And even then, Egypt had just gone

12:48

through a change of kings.

12:50

More realistically,

12:52

the last enemy of this caliber Persia

12:55

had gone to war with

12:57

was Babylon.

12:59

When Cyrus the Great conquered it. And

13:02

the Babylonians barely put up a fight.

13:05

The last hard-fought comparison

13:08

was maybe the initial conquest

13:10

of Lydia,

13:11

or one of Cyrus' eastern campaigns.

13:15

And even then, we're talking about conflict

13:18

on a much smaller scale once

13:20

you go back before the Empire was

13:22

completely conquered. The

13:24

satraps quite simply could

13:27

not have known what to do here. The

13:30

usual tactics to use against Greek

13:32

invaders wouldn't work this time. For

13:35

the last century, ever since the Peloponnesian

13:38

War, the Persians had successfully

13:41

manipulated or outright joined

13:43

their invaders' rivals in Greece to

13:45

push out the enemy. Now

13:48

all of Greece was united under a

13:51

single king.

13:53

There were no more local rivalries

13:55

left to exploit.

13:58

Macedonian

14:01

Greeks made themselves available to

14:03

the Persians for hire as mercenaries,

14:06

and the satraps were forced to make

14:08

do. The Greco-Macedonian

14:11

invasion force crossed at the far

14:13

western end of the Hellespont, partly

14:16

because King Alexander himself wanted

14:18

to do some sightseeing. Upon

14:21

arriving in Anatolia, his

14:23

first major stop was not a battlefield,

14:27

or more accurately, not

14:29

a new one.

14:31

He went to Ilium, also

14:33

known as Troy, the supposed

14:36

site of the mythical Trojan

14:38

War, where his maternal

14:40

heroic ancestor Achilles earned

14:43

his place in Greek mythology. To

14:46

Alexander's troops, this set the

14:48

tone for their coming conflict. Philip

14:52

and Alexander had pushed their invasion

14:54

plans as long-delayed

14:56

reprisals against Persia for

14:59

their invasions of Greece 150 years earlier. I

15:04

guess just please ignore the near-constant

15:07

warfare between Greece and Persia featuring

15:09

multiple Greek invasions of the Eastern

15:11

Empire in that time.

15:14

But now,

15:16

Alexander also framed their expedition

15:18

as a new Trojan War,

15:21

with all of Greece marshalled against

15:23

the cruel and thieving Easterner.

15:26

Despite all of the imperfections

15:29

in the Achaemenid system at this time,

15:31

Alexander's movements had hardly been

15:33

a secret. He and his

15:36

father had both openly called for massive

15:38

invasion, and the western satraps

15:40

were as prepared as they could reasonably

15:42

be. A full royal

15:45

army would probably have been a better

15:47

response, but Darius III did not summon

15:50

his troops. As

15:53

great king, he could claim his subordinate's

15:55

successes as his own if the

15:57

satraps repelled the invaders. but

16:00

also distance himself from their failings.

16:04

This conflict was unprecedented,

16:06

and Darius' legitimacy still

16:09

rested on shaky foundations. Putting

16:12

himself in harm's way was still

16:14

out of the question, as he had no

16:17

remotely adult heir, and

16:19

his death would certainly mean all-out

16:22

civil war between the various cadet

16:24

branches of the royal family, on

16:27

top of the Macedonian invasion. Thus,

16:31

a Persian army gathered at

16:33

the city of Zilea, near

16:35

Mount Ida in northwestern Anatolia,

16:38

not far from Alexander's forces

16:41

at Troy. From

16:43

the Greek perspective, this was almost

16:45

too poetic. A

16:47

Zilean army had assisted Troy

16:50

against the Greeks in the famous epic

16:52

poem The Iliad. Arian

16:55

and Diodorus both describe

16:57

a war council of the satraps and

16:59

their high-ranking generals at Zilea,

17:02

which must have happened in some form,

17:05

but the details are necessarily

17:08

invented, as no Greek

17:10

source would have had access to the

17:12

details described after the fact,

17:15

let alone the detailed dialogue placed

17:17

into the mouths of the Persian high command.

17:20

Nevertheless, it is a who's

17:23

who of the Persian leadership in

17:25

Anatolia at the time. As

17:28

this was all happening in his territory,

17:31

satrap arsates of Hellespontine

17:33

Phrygia took the role of high commander

17:36

for the whole army. Memnon

17:38

of Rhodes was paired with an otherwise unknown

17:41

Persian noble named Omaris to

17:44

command the Greek mercenaries. Arsamese

17:47

of Cilicia was there with a cavalry

17:49

contingent, as was Spithrid Aedes

17:52

of Lydia. He the

17:54

otherwise unknown nobles Petenese

17:57

and Nifatis, and Rheomythra,

17:59

who may have been either

18:02

the same man who helped end the Great

18:04

Satrap's revolt, or that man's

18:06

grandson,

18:07

were put in charge of the Iranian cavalry

18:10

sent by Darius to reinforce the

18:12

defenders. Mithrobozines,

18:16

the sitting satrap of Cappadocia,

18:18

showed up, as did Arbupales,

18:21

apparently an illegitimate grandson

18:23

of Artaxerxes II, to

18:26

command the infantry. A

18:28

noble named Mithradates led

18:31

some local cavalry and is

18:33

identified as a son-in-law of

18:35

the Great King via an

18:38

unnamed royal woman who Darius

18:40

seems to have married after coming to power.

18:44

He was probably the current

18:46

ruler of the city of Kyus,

18:49

now a hereditary position of a

18:51

cadet branch from the Pharnakid family,

18:54

making him likely the third

18:56

Mithradates in a row from that

18:58

family, and just an early

19:01

example in what will eventually

19:03

be a very very long line

19:05

of rulers that share that name. This

19:08

is backed up by the fact that Mithradates'

19:11

father-in-law, named Pharnakis, and

19:13

brother-in-law, another Ariobarsanes,

19:16

were also leading local contingents

19:18

and share their names with other members

19:21

of the Pharnakid family.

19:23

In this war council,

19:25

Diodorus and Arian describe

19:27

how Memnon advocated against

19:30

facing Alexander directly in

19:32

favor of a scorched earth campaign

19:34

to starve the Macedonian army and

19:37

simply wait them out. It

19:40

is unlikely that this suggestion ever

19:42

happened. First of all,

19:45

the satraps were already under orders

19:47

to take Alexander head on as soon

19:49

as possible, and bring a swift

19:51

end to the invasion. It

19:54

is also a recurring trope in

19:56

Greek literature to portray a

19:58

Greek commander in Servis,

20:01

who offers a plan that would have been

20:03

successful in hindsight, but

20:06

was unrealistic at the time. Herodotus

20:09

used that one a lot back in the day, and

20:12

many modern historians suggest

20:14

that this anecdote was probably invented

20:17

by Diodorus, who was later

20:19

used as a source by Arian. While

20:22

the size of Alexander's force

20:25

is generally agreed on by modern

20:27

historians, estimates on

20:29

the Persian side are anything but.

20:32

Arian says that all of the Persian

20:35

infantry were Greek mercenaries, which

20:38

is impossible. But

20:40

it may reflect first-hand accounts of

20:42

the battle where the Persian infantry were

20:44

largely equipped as hoplites and peltasts,

20:48

rather than the traditional Iranian-style

20:50

light skirmishers. That

20:54

is entirely plausible, as

20:56

most of the local infantry would have

20:58

been drawn from Greek cities in Anatolia

21:01

and neighboring cultures which all had

21:04

a similar style of warfare.

21:07

Diodorus says that there were 110,000 Persian soldiers.

21:12

Justin says 600,000. These

21:16

figures are obviously ridiculous, but

21:19

modern estimates put the full size

21:21

of the Persian force anywhere between 14,000

21:23

and 40,000 total. Arian's

21:28

claim, setting aside the

21:30

ethnicity of specific units, that

21:32

there were 10,000 Persian

21:35

cavalry and 20,000 infantry is

21:37

taken as at least plausible.

21:41

From Troy,

21:43

Alexander and the Macedonian host

21:45

passed through a few more Greek cities in

21:49

all of which opened their doors, both

21:51

out of resentment for the Persians and fear

21:53

of the 40,000 strong host approaching

21:56

their gates. As

21:58

Alex advanced, so did the Persian army. did the Persians,

22:01

ultimately encountering one another between

22:04

the banks of the Granicus River, today

22:07

known as the Vigga, and

22:09

a nearby ridge. The

22:12

Persians stopped on the eastern side

22:14

to delay Alexander with a forced river

22:17

crossing, while they had time

22:19

to take up favorable positions. Regardless

22:23

of the exact size of the Persian army,

22:26

Alexander didn't even deploy his whole

22:28

force in this first engagement,

22:31

only taking 18,100 troops with him to the river. This

22:37

does induce me to lean toward

22:39

the middle to upper range of

22:41

modern estimates for the Persians, since

22:44

the ancient sources do all agree

22:47

that the Macedonians were outnumbered,

22:50

but even then it may be like

22:52

the Battle of Plataea 145 years earlier, where the outnumbering

22:57

is potentially added by Greek authors

23:00

for dramatic effect. Even

23:02

the events of the battle itself differ

23:05

drastically between authors. Plutarch

23:09

is most focused on the deeds of Alexander,

23:12

and Justin only offers an abbreviated

23:14

summary for anything. But

23:17

Arian and Diodorus describe the Battle

23:19

of the Granicus quite differently. Diodorus

23:23

says they encamped on opposite sides of the

23:25

river the night before, and the

23:27

Macedonians crossed at dawn. Arian

23:31

says they fought a battle as the Macedonians

23:33

tried to cross the river. Diodorus

23:36

gives the layout of the two armies as

23:39

very similar to the Battle of Cunaxa.

23:43

Arian describes a wall of Persian cavalry

23:45

guarding the river with infantry behind

23:48

them as Alexander's forces attempted

23:50

a crossing. Modern

23:53

historians sometimes favor Arian

23:55

based on where the river may have flowed

23:57

back then.

23:59

Others

23:59

sometimes favored Diodorus based

24:02

on where the river has shifted today.

24:05

We don't have a firm geological timeline

24:08

to establish when the Granicus shifted

24:10

away from the ridge featured in Arian's

24:12

description of the battlefield. Other

24:15

modern historians try to reconcile

24:17

the two by rearranging the forces

24:20

into a more logical formation

24:22

than the dramatic version told in

24:24

any of our sources, or by

24:26

stretching the battle out over two days

24:29

to let both versions be true at once.

24:32

Peter Green, a prominent modern

24:35

biographer of Alexander, both

24:37

rearranged the formations and stretched

24:39

out the timeline. However

24:42

in 2013 he did partially

24:44

recant that view, saying

24:46

his argument was not as convincing as

24:49

he initially thought. Others

24:52

still throw out Diodorus altogether

24:54

because he separates the infantry and

24:56

cavalry, which runs contrary

24:59

to standard Macedonian tactics

25:01

in every other battle. Personally,

25:05

I think the idea that Alexander

25:07

crossed unopposed stretches

25:09

the imagination. The

25:11

whole point of the Persian army encamping

25:14

on the northern bank would

25:16

have been to create an obstacle

25:18

for the Macedonians. The

25:22

historians that throw out Diodorus

25:24

entirely also make a good point

25:26

that his description of this specific

25:29

battle just seems to map the

25:31

basics of other well-known battles

25:33

onto the Granicus, despite

25:35

having very little in common with Philip

25:38

II and Alexander's standard

25:40

military doctrine. However

25:43

that is also partly a consequence

25:45

of Diodorus' general writing style,

25:48

which always places events as

25:51

occurring one after the other rather

25:53

than multiple things happening simultaneously.

25:57

We ran into this while describing the Great

25:59

Revolt

25:59

as well.

26:01

Green also makes a valid, though

26:03

potentially unnecessary, point

26:06

that if Alexander attempted a second

26:08

crossing overnight, the Persian

26:10

cavalry would have reached the battlefield

26:13

first, thus explaining why they,

26:15

rather than the infantry which was better

26:18

suited to blocking a messy crossing

26:20

at a ford, would

26:22

form the Persian front line. However,

26:26

if we look at other recent Persian battles

26:28

described in some detail, such

26:31

as Artaxerxes II vs Cyrus

26:33

the Younger at Cunaxa, or

26:36

Dadamese vs the Loyalist forces

26:38

during the Great Revolt, I don't think

26:40

this explanation is even needed.

26:43

Persian armies were heavily cavalry-oriented

26:47

at all times, and

26:49

impressions to the contrary are often

26:51

based on the much earlier invasions

26:54

of Greece, a place where

26:56

the terrain itself countered Persian

26:58

cavalry tactics.

27:00

It would not be at all unusual

27:03

for the Persian cavalry to form the

27:05

front line regardless of which scenario

27:08

we follow.

27:09

So all of that said, I'm going to

27:11

broadly go with Arian's narrative,

27:14

which does seem like the one which

27:16

is most historically plausible. But

27:19

I'll implement some of the modern interpretations,

27:21

specifically accounting for the Persian infantry.

27:25

In what little description of the broader battle

27:28

he offers outside of praising Alexander

27:30

himself, Plutarch generally follows

27:33

the same narrative as Arian. Arian,

27:36

possibly misled by his own false

27:38

assertion that the Persian infantry

27:40

were all Greek mercenaries, places

27:43

the infantry up on the ridge behind

27:45

the Persian cavalry.

27:47

This would have been incredibly stupid,

27:51

as the infantry couldn't do anything

27:53

to engage the enemy from up there. Plutarch

27:57

places portions of the Persian infantry in

28:00

the front line, which is consistent

28:02

with other Persian tactics seen around

28:04

the same time, and then he has

28:07

the Greek mercenaries retreat to

28:09

the ridge. I'm going

28:11

to follow that aspect. Oh,

28:15

and honestly, I

28:16

do hate to do this to you because

28:19

generally speaking,

28:20

the specific commanders of various

28:23

individual units within an army aren't

28:25

necessary, they just become a deluge

28:28

of names, but it is actually

28:31

really important to start getting familiar

28:34

with the major names of Alexander's

28:36

officer corps.

28:38

So they formed up.

28:40

On the Macedonian side, Alexander

28:42

divided overall command between the

28:45

left and right wings of the army.

28:48

He personally took command of the right and

28:50

positioned himself with the Macedonian

28:52

cavalry and assigned Parmenion,

28:55

leader of the previous Macedonian invasion,

28:58

to command the subjected Greek and Thracian

29:01

cavalry units on the left. Parmenion's

29:04

son Philotas served as

29:07

Alexander's personal sub-commander,

29:09

taking direct control of the heavy

29:11

Hatairoi cavalry. The

29:14

Macedonian infantry made up the center,

29:17

with six phalanx of Pez

29:19

Hatairoi equipped in the new Macedonian

29:22

style, with towering Sarissa

29:24

pikes, tiny shields slung over their shoulders,

29:27

and light body armor. Each

29:30

phalanx had its own commander, but the ones

29:32

to know are Parmenion's son Perdicus,

29:36

on the right-most Macedonian phalanx,

29:39

Alexander's close friend Craterus

29:41

on the left-most phalanx,

29:43

and immediately

29:44

next to Craterus, another noble named

29:46

Melieger. On

29:49

the right end of the Macedonian infantry

29:52

block, Alexander's wing also

29:54

featured the Macedonian royal guard,

29:57

the Hippospists,

29:59

equipped as

29:59

traditional hoplites. Finally,

30:03

on the rightmost edge of the Macedonian

30:05

army, Alexander also had

30:07

a contingent of light infantry pauldromoi,

30:11

as well as archers under the command

30:14

of a Macedonian noble named Amentus.

30:17

The interesting thing about Alexander's

30:20

officer corps is that it features a pretty

30:23

even mix of young and ambitious

30:25

nobles who grew up in the same classes

30:27

and social circles as the king himself,

30:31

alongside elder veterans of

30:33

Philip II's many campaigns. They

30:36

were all in equally prominent positions

30:38

of command. This

30:41

is a hallmark of Alexander's

30:43

army. It both served

30:45

to train up the most talented men

30:48

of his own generation, and

30:50

made use of experienced veterans.

30:53

The Persian battle line is harder

30:56

to dissect because all of the different

30:58

interpretations of which units were

31:00

there and which were secretly infantry.

31:04

However, it does appear very similar

31:07

to the formations employed at Qunaxa,

31:10

with cavalry making up the bulk of the center

31:12

lines. As

31:15

overall commander, Arcytes took his

31:17

Paphlagonian cavalry to a position

31:19

opposite Alexander on the Persian

31:21

left, with the Cilician

31:24

cavalry and Memnon's Greek mercenaries

31:27

making up the leftmost end of

31:29

the line. Almost

31:31

at the exact center, Spithridates

31:33

of Lydia commanded an elite force

31:36

of horsemen, supposedly all from

31:38

various minor branches of

31:40

the Achaemenid royal family. Compared

31:43

to Qunaxa and the references

31:45

from Plutarch, this is a plausible

31:48

place to insert some infantry. Memnon

31:52

was leading cavalry, but we could plausibly

31:54

interpret this as similar to Qunaxa,

31:57

with a large hoplite infantry

31:59

component.

31:59

alongside a small cavalry

32:02

guard at the actual left flank.

32:05

Following that model, there may have

32:07

been some additional Persian infantry

32:10

on their right flank as well, but

32:12

the bulk of the infantry was still

32:14

behind the main lines. Alexander

32:18

made the first move. He

32:20

sent a squad of his Hittiroy to ride

32:23

hard for the Persians with the Paldramoy

32:25

and archers following behind them. The

32:29

horsemen would throw Memnon's line

32:31

into disarray, and the Paldramoy

32:33

could swarm into their formation and destabilize

32:36

the Persians immediately by creating

32:39

a melee on their left side. The

32:41

initial assault was repelled

32:44

by the Persians whose cavalry carried

32:46

javelins to attack the enemy at range

32:49

and occupied slightly higher ground

32:52

as the riverbank rapidly ascended

32:54

toward the ridge. As

32:57

the initial attack retreated, Alexander

32:59

himself prepared to lead his cavalry

33:01

for another wave. Most

33:04

of our sources are unduly

33:06

focused on Alexander and the clash

33:09

between the Persian left with the Macedonian

33:11

right. Diodorus

33:13

alone describes what was going on with

33:15

the other side of the battle.

33:18

A Persian cavalry charge.

33:21

Roughly two-thirds of the Persian line

33:23

appear to have gone full force at

33:25

Parmenion's cavalry on the

33:27

Macedonian left, forcing Alexander's

33:30

co-commander to go on the defensive

33:32

while Alexander personally went right

33:35

into the fray. This

33:37

may explain Diodorus's presentation

33:40

of an entirely separate infantry

33:42

battle. Plutarch says

33:44

that after Alexander and Parmenion

33:47

found themselves embroiled in largely

33:49

distinct cavalry engagements, the

33:52

Macedonian infantry pushed across

33:54

the river and engaged the Persian infantry

33:57

which was no longer guarded by the front

33:59

line.

33:59

cavalry force.

34:02

This layout of the battlefield also explains

34:04

how and why the Greek mercenaries

34:07

ended up on the ridge. They

34:09

were now swamped, on foot,

34:12

in the midst of thundering hooves, flying

34:14

javelins, and shattering Macedonian

34:17

zyston lances. They

34:19

just got out of the way. All

34:22

of the sources at this point shift focus

34:25

to Alexander's personal deeds in

34:27

the cavalry battle against the Persian

34:29

left. Either he

34:31

led his men diagonally across

34:33

the field to hit the Persian center,

34:36

or just went straight and hit the

34:38

Persian left.

34:40

Whichever it was, the third of the

34:42

Persian army that Alexander and Parmenion

34:45

weren't fighting folded up around

34:47

one of Alexander's flanks to attack

34:50

from the side, and the

34:52

Hetairoi ended up fighting with

34:54

all of them anyway. Every

34:57

source attributes a number of personal

34:59

encounters and impromptu duels

35:02

in the midst of the battle to Alexander.

35:06

On one hand, this is somewhat unrealistic

35:08

and over-aggrandizing. On

35:11

the other, every story of

35:13

Alexander demonstrates that he specifically

35:16

looked for the noblest opponent on

35:18

the field

35:19

to personally target.

35:22

He was actively seeking that sort

35:24

of mythical clash of famous heroes

35:27

in the real world. True

35:29

or not, the details described by

35:32

Arian actually highlight some of

35:34

the differences between Macedonian

35:36

and Persian cavalry tactics that

35:38

will go on to play a significant

35:40

role in the war. We

35:43

already saw how the Persian cavalry

35:45

were equipped with javelins, intended

35:48

for rapid harassing attacks

35:50

on the enemy with a sword

35:52

as a backup, probably

35:54

the curved blades known as a copus,

35:57

which were favored by cavalry at the time.

36:01

The Macedonians carried the same secondary

36:03

weapons, but the Hetairoi were equipped

36:05

with those long sturdy Zaistan

36:08

lances, intended for

36:10

charging in and goring their enemies

36:12

up close. Early

36:15

in the fighting, Alexander's own lance

36:17

broke and he called for a new one,

36:20

but the noble carrying it was busy

36:22

fighting some distance away, so

36:24

a different noble just handed one off.

36:28

Alexander picked out an impressive looking

36:30

Persian in the crowd who happened to

36:32

be Mithridates, possibly

36:35

the ruler of Kyus, and confirmed

36:37

to be brother-in-law of Darius III. The

36:42

Macedonian monarch rode him down

36:44

and stabbed Mithridates full in the

36:46

face. Seeing

36:48

this, Satrap's Mithridates

36:50

of Lydia and his brother Rosachis

36:53

both charged Alexander swords

36:56

drawn. In the Persian

36:58

style of missile-oriented cavalry,

37:01

once their javelins were spent, they

37:03

drew relatively short blades to

37:06

fight through any resulting melee. The

37:09

problem with this tactic when fighting

37:12

Macedonian lancers was

37:14

that a Zaistan had significantly

37:16

more reach, and this

37:19

time Alexander's was still intact.

37:23

So Alexander rode hard at

37:25

Rosachis,

37:27

hard enough that before the Persian

37:29

was within swords' reach,

37:32

Alexander's lance was already punching

37:35

straight through the small metal scales

37:37

of Rosachis' armor. That

37:40

did present a problem for Alexander

37:42

though. His weapon was

37:44

now lodged in an enemy's torso, and

37:47

he hadn't noticed Spithridates

37:49

coming up behind him. The

37:52

Satrap of Lydia was all set to

37:54

end the war right there, and

37:57

then another Macedonian who had

37:59

also lost his lance, came in

38:02

from the side, and cleaved

38:04

the satrap's arm off at the shoulder.

38:07

This was Kletos the Black,

38:10

so called for the color of his hair.

38:13

While Alexander and his entourage

38:15

were engulfed in the melee, Parmenion's

38:18

side had forced their attackers

38:20

to turn and retreat,

38:23

allowing the bulk of the Macedonian

38:25

cavalry to sweep across the field

38:27

and reinforce Alexander. Now

38:30

considerably outmanned with several

38:33

dead commanders, the Persian left

38:35

flank dissolved, fleeing away

38:37

from the battlefield. The

38:39

King of Macedon chose not to

38:41

pursue, but claimed the battlefield,

38:44

the spoils of the Persian camp, and victory

38:47

in the first battle of the war. We

38:50

call it the Battle of the Granicus,

38:53

but we just as well could call

38:55

this the Massacre of the Satraps.

38:59

Many of the noted Persian governors and

39:01

dozens of royal relatives in

39:03

Spithridates' elite cavalry

39:06

were slain in the fighting, and

39:08

even more died in the aftermath.

39:12

Which I will deal with after

39:15

this short break.

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40:57

Once the fighting at the Granicus River

40:59

was done, it was time for

41:01

both sides to take stock of their

41:03

remaining forces and count up the dead.

41:07

But since the Persians had abandoned the

41:09

field, it was the

41:11

Macedonian army that was counting

41:13

the Persian dead as well. Many

41:17

nobles had lost their lives. Omares

41:20

was killed in the infantry fighting. Pharnaces,

41:23

Mithridates, and Rosyches were

41:25

all local leaders slain in the cavalry

41:28

battle. Most

41:30

importantly, the satraps Spithridates

41:33

of Lydia, Mithrabosanes

41:35

of Cappadocia, and Arsamese

41:38

of Cilicia were all

41:40

killed as well. Mithridates

41:44

at least appears to have had an heir ready

41:46

to take the reins and negotiate,

41:49

if he really was the ruler of Chius. But

41:51

the satraps? Killing

41:54

them effectively beheaded the government

41:56

of three major provinces in one

41:59

fell swoop.

41:59

swoop.

42:01

Even more nobles were captured or

42:03

surrendered rather than retreating to fight

42:05

another day. Notably

42:08

among them, Abistemenez,

42:10

a local level Persian leader from Cappadocia,

42:14

submitted and was appointed the

42:16

new Macedonian satrap

42:18

of his province. Only

42:21

three major Persian leaders from the

42:23

War Council made it out, and

42:26

any plans they might have formed to continue

42:28

the fight in northern Anatolia fell

42:31

apart quickly. When overwhelmed

42:34

by either shame or fear of

42:36

worse punishment from Darius III,

42:39

Arcytes committed suicide, further

42:43

eliminating the satrap of Hellespontine

42:45

Phrygia as well. That

42:48

left Memnon of Rhodes and

42:50

the Greek mercenaries, who quickly

42:52

realized that Sardis was too vulnerable

42:55

without its satrap or most

42:57

of its army, and they fled to Caria,

43:00

the only major province in the region

43:02

not to deploy troops at the Granicus,

43:05

likely because they were in charge of the

43:08

naval defense against the Macedonian

43:10

fleet. Rheomythres,

43:13

that one who was either very old

43:15

or the grandson of the participant

43:17

in the Great Satrap's revolt, also

43:20

made it out. He may

43:22

have followed Memnon initially, but

43:24

he was in command of the Medes and

43:27

Bactrians sent by the Great King.

43:30

So Rheomythres was tasked

43:32

with riding back to Parsa, with

43:35

the unenviable task of telling

43:37

Darius about the disaster. In

43:41

the process of finding and identifying

43:43

noble corpses on the battlefield

43:46

to assess political damage, the

43:48

Macedonians tallied a relatively

43:50

realistic number of Persian casualties.

43:54

At least, depending on the source.

43:57

About 5,000 Persian troops

43:59

probably fell. Well,

44:01

Macedon only lost 115.

44:05

It was a devastating blow

44:07

to the Persian military, administration,

44:10

and territory. And

44:12

it was only the beginning. Trophies

44:16

of war to dedicate at various temples,

44:18

prisoners of war enslaved by Macedon,

44:22

and reports of a great victory were

44:24

sent to Greece as Alexander

44:27

took most of the army south towards

44:29

Sardis. Parmenion

44:32

turned east and went to

44:34

Dasculeum with the remainder. In

44:37

both cases, the city's Persian

44:39

garrisons evacuated and

44:41

abandoned the satrapal capitals

44:43

to Alexander without a fight.

44:47

After Sardis, Alexander himself

44:50

proceeded to march through the Ionian Greek

44:52

territories where city after city

44:55

surrendered before him.

44:57

How could they not? Most

45:00

of their supposed Persian defenders

45:02

had just been slaughtered

45:04

or fled into the countryside. Those

45:07

that didn't surrender were

45:09

left to Lysimachus, one

45:11

of Philip II's old generals. This

45:14

further split the army, but

45:16

it allowed Alexander to move on

45:19

with the bulk of the Macedonian force

45:21

into new, fully fortified

45:23

territory in southern Anatolia.

45:27

And it also got the older Lysimachus

45:29

and Parmenion out of the young king's

45:32

hair. He

45:34

chafed under their more reserved

45:36

tactical decisions and cautious

45:39

military advice. Lysimachus

45:42

would deal with settling western

45:44

Anatolia on Alexander's behalf,

45:47

and after taking Dasculeum, Parmenion

45:50

would be in charge of driving through the Phrygians

45:53

and smaller tribal peoples of central

45:55

Anatolia to route out

45:58

any remaining Persian resistance.

45:59

inhabitants.

46:01

Alexander got to deal with

46:03

the more prestigious targets. Far

46:07

away in one of the royal capitals,

46:10

Darius III probably received

46:12

news of the defeat before the

46:14

Macedonians had even made

46:16

it out of Lydia.

46:19

The whole point of the royal road,

46:21

developed all the way back under Darius

46:23

the Great, was Sardis to Susa

46:26

in nine days, as Herodotus

46:28

put it.

46:30

The King of Kings would have moved

46:32

swiftly to respond.

46:34

This invasion obviously could not

46:37

be allowed to continue unopposed,

46:40

but this one battle had shattered

46:43

the regional armies.

46:45

Messengers began to race up

46:47

and down across the royal road

46:49

system. It was early

46:52

May 334 and

46:54

the Great King was probably in

46:56

residence at Babylon, though with

46:58

the recent conflict there, it's possible

47:01

that he was at one of the other residencies

47:03

in Parsa. Either

47:06

way, it was a good thing that

47:08

the city of Uruk had been retaken

47:10

two years earlier, because

47:13

the order went out for every landowner

47:15

in Babylonia to furnish their requisite

47:17

soldiers for the royal army.

47:21

As rich men negotiated their contracts

47:23

with tenants to serve in their place

47:26

and veterans dusted off their old equipment

47:28

to head down to Uruk,

47:30

the same message was spreading far

47:33

and wide. With the western

47:35

half of Anatolia either fallen

47:38

or falling, the satraps

47:40

of Greater Phrygia, Bithynia, and

47:42

Armenia would already have gone

47:45

into high alert before the order even

47:47

came, and would likely

47:49

have started gathering their forces for

47:51

the coming offensive at Vann, though

47:54

the former too could only contribute

47:57

so many men with Parmenion bearing

47:59

down on them.

47:59

them.

48:01

As with Babylon, recently

48:03

reoccupied Egypt was ordered

48:05

to muster as well, with

48:08

Satrap Sabakis leading them

48:10

north to Acre, where the

48:12

Egyptian forces would gather with the

48:14

others of the southern Levant and Syria.

48:18

Out east, Bessus and Histaspis

48:21

were directed to send soldiers

48:23

away from the steppe and even Indian

48:25

cavalry were summoned across the Hindu

48:27

Kush to follow the Bactrian contingent

48:30

on their way west. It

48:33

would take time for Darius and

48:35

his subordinates to draw up a plan

48:37

of action and summon a royal army

48:40

from across the whole empire to

48:42

march against this Macedonian incursion.

48:46

Every passing day was one more

48:49

that Alexander got to spend advancing.

48:52

He made it all the way from the Granicus

48:54

in the northeastern corner of the peninsula

48:57

to Miletus before facing any

49:00

meaningful resistance. Initially,

49:03

the commander of the Persian garrison had sent

49:06

a letter of surrender to Alexander.

49:08

But

49:09

between the time that letter was sent

49:12

and Alexander's arrival,

49:14

Memnon of Rhodes had made it into

49:16

the city and taken control of

49:18

the greatest of the Ionian settlements.

49:22

Now, Miletus, as always,

49:25

refused to be conquered.

49:27

The ever fortified, easily defended

49:30

city that had frustrated Darius the Great

49:32

in the Ionian revolt, Athens

49:35

in its counter offensive against the Achaemenids,

49:38

Sparta in its war against Athens,

49:41

Cyrus the Younger in his competition

49:43

against Tysipharnes, and Mausolus

49:45

during the Great Revolt, would

49:48

now resist Alexander.

49:51

It did prove difficult.

49:53

Arian reports that the Persian fleet

49:56

numbered 400 ships, though

49:59

if that's true, it includes support

50:01

ships and cargo transports. Still 300

50:05

warships was the Persian standard

50:07

in the Mediterranean,

50:09

roughly double the size of Macedon's

50:11

own navy.

50:13

Before parting ways, Parmenion

50:15

had urged Alexander to lure

50:17

the Persians into a favorable naval

50:20

battle, which would allow the Macedonians

50:22

to cripple Persia's ability to stage

50:25

a counterattack on Macedon

50:27

or Greece themselves. Yet,

50:31

for all his daring on land, Alexander

50:34

was reluctant to send his

50:36

men to face the veteran sailors

50:39

of Phoenicia, Cyprus, and Egypt.

50:42

They were simply outmatched.

50:45

Then came Miletus,

50:49

a city which could hold out indefinitely,

50:53

so long as the defenders controlled

50:55

their own harbor, which

50:57

by definition was a small

51:00

and enclosed area that

51:02

could also bottleneck the incoming

51:05

ships and nullify the disparity

51:07

in numbers. In

51:09

a twist of irony, Miletus's

51:12

resistance would prove more

51:14

disastrous for the Persian Empire as

51:16

a whole than if they had

51:18

simply thrown open the gates. As

51:22

Alexander's contingent of the Macedonian

51:25

army went south, ships

51:27

hurried back and forth between captured

51:30

ports and his European territory,

51:33

with Macedonian officers and plundered

51:35

gold in tow to finance the recruitment

51:38

of additional soldiers for reinforcing

51:41

the campaign. Several

51:43

thousand further Thracians and

51:45

mercenaries from the Peloponnese were

51:48

ferried across the Aegean.

51:50

The island of Lade, situated

51:53

right in the middle of the Malaysian harbor,

51:55

was occupied.

51:57

The Macedonians arrived three days

51:59

before the war. the Persian fleet reached Miletus.

52:03

They also had 6,000 fresh

52:05

troops in tow to garrison

52:07

the small island, and join

52:10

Alexander for the upcoming siege.

52:13

Miletus had grown over the years

52:16

of successive sieges, occupations,

52:18

and rebuilding efforts, such that

52:20

there was a lightly fortified alder

52:23

city with its own fortification

52:25

outside the old city walls.

52:30

Memnon ordered his troops to abandon

52:32

this outer position, allowing

52:34

Alexander to occupy and encamp

52:36

his army right up against the stronger

52:39

fortifications of the old city. This

52:42

did provide the defenders with

52:45

a more defensible position, but

52:47

it also allowed Alexander to completely

52:50

encircle the smaller circuit of

52:52

the old walls.

52:55

Still,

52:55

Miletus was a difficult

52:57

target, and day after day

53:00

Alexander's men assaulted these

53:02

fortifications with no luck. After

53:05

several days of this, one of the leading

53:08

aristocrats of the city, Glaucipos,

53:11

came out to parlay with Alexander.

53:15

Alexander refused any negotiation.

53:18

He had them surrounded.

53:21

And as Artaxerxes III

53:23

had done its side on, Alexander

53:26

needed an example for the

53:28

consequences of resistance. Glaucipos

53:33

was sent back to his people, telling

53:36

them to be ready for a fight in the

53:38

morning.

53:39

Though Alexander probably relied

53:41

on simpler siege engines

53:44

like battering rams, towers, and

53:47

ladders during the initial attack, his men

53:49

would have started assembling more complex

53:52

siege engines during the battle as well.

53:55

This very well may have been some

53:58

of the Persian forces first serious

54:00

encounters

54:02

with the new titans of siege warfare.

54:06

The Catapult.

54:08

Supposedly an innovation

54:10

of Philip II's military operations.

54:14

Though considered very basic artillery

54:16

by long-term historical standards,

54:19

the whole concept of torsion- powered

54:22

siege weapons was still relatively

54:24

new at the time.

54:26

Just about a century old in

54:29

the Mediterranean world, and

54:31

an invention of the Sicilian

54:33

Greeks, meaning that it took some

54:36

time before they became common in

54:38

Aegean warfare. A few

54:40

examples are known from the Corinthian

54:43

War in Greece, but the Persians

54:45

were never huge fans of sieges

54:48

when they could be avoided. Even

54:50

if they were vaguely aware of Macedon's

54:53

strange new stone-throwing machines,

54:56

they probably were not familiar.

54:59

But stone after stone

55:01

and debris crashed

55:03

against the Malaysian walls

55:06

until a hole opened in

55:09

one of their sides,

55:11

and the Macedonians poured

55:13

through the gap.

55:15

As this was happening, the Persian

55:17

fleet, which had taken up one

55:19

of their favorite positions, was waiting

55:21

near Mikale, and

55:24

they were finally forced to move in. It

55:27

appears they were hoping to lure

55:29

the Macedonian fleet out into open

55:32

waters, but now

55:34

that Miletus was actively falling,

55:37

they tried to intervene. It

55:40

was an act of desperation and a

55:42

mistake, repeating the same

55:45

errors as their forefathers in the Battle

55:47

of Salome. Sailing

55:49

into a narrow harbor controlled

55:51

by the Greeks and immediately being

55:53

thrown into chaos as they lost

55:55

the ability to maneuver, with

55:58

so many ships crammed into water. one

56:00

place. The

56:02

Macedonian triremes swarmed

56:04

and crashed through many of their Persian

56:07

counterparts. Some

56:09

crews tried to abandon their warships

56:11

and flee into smaller boats, only

56:14

to be plunged beneath the sea

56:16

as the Macedonians simply

56:19

sailed over them. Those

56:22

that survived, some

56:24

desperately clinging to their own wicker

56:27

shields as life preservers,

56:29

took shelter on a craggy island

56:32

outside the harbor

56:33

with sheer cliffs, which

56:36

Alexander personally assaulted

56:38

and captured with the navy after

56:41

the garrison of Miletus had surrendered.

56:45

Most of the Persians defending the city were

56:47

killed and any survivors

56:49

were taken prisoner while the Macedonians

56:52

sacked the city.

56:54

The Persian ships that made it out intact

56:56

turned south to regroup at Micale,

57:00

but Alexander anticipated

57:02

this. While he

57:04

set out to mop up the nearby survivors,

57:07

he sent Philotas and the Hittairoi

57:10

to ride south and occupy

57:12

the beachhead at Micale. There

57:15

they wiped out the few Persian crews

57:18

unlucky enough to make landfall

57:20

before the Macedonians arrived. The

57:24

shattered remains of the Persian fleet

57:26

turned tail and went back to

57:28

open sea.

57:30

Memnon and his family somehow

57:33

managed to slip through the Macedonian

57:35

lines when it became clear that the

57:37

battle for Miletus was lost.

57:40

The Rhodian commander sent a report

57:43

of the defeat to Darius and

57:45

asked for more support in his efforts

57:48

to defend the Empire's west coast.

57:52

Darius complied,

57:53

instructing all of the coastal governors

57:55

that Memnon was now in full

57:58

control of the war effort on the island.

57:59

that front.

58:02

So the Rhodian moved south, taking

58:05

up a command center in Halicarnassus,

58:08

as the most heavily defended city in

58:10

the area.

58:12

With the Persian fleet largely broken,

58:15

Alexander elected to disband

58:17

his own navy as well, deciding

58:20

that there was no longer an immediate

58:22

naval threat,

58:24

and that he would simply nullify the ability

58:26

for Persia to reconstitute its

58:29

ships by capturing as many

58:31

coastal cities as he could as quickly

58:33

as possible.

58:35

This allowed him to bring most of the crews

58:38

into his land army as infantry,

58:41

and redirect his own ships to just

58:43

maintaining supply lines,

58:45

which were going to become increasingly

58:48

dependent on naval connections

58:50

as he moved further south. The

58:53

cities of northern Qaria put up

58:55

more resistance than their Ionian cousins

58:57

had, but not that

59:00

much more. Brief skirmishes

59:02

and sieges were fought outside

59:05

of Milasa and Mindos, and

59:08

Milasa fell quickly as the Macedonians

59:10

hammered down their gates.

59:13

Without a fleet, however, Mindos

59:15

was too close to Halicarnassus

59:18

to fall,

59:19

since it received a constant flow of

59:21

reinforcements and supplies from

59:23

Memnon. Instead

59:26

of wasting time on the smaller city,

59:29

Alexander just left Mindos behind

59:32

and moved on to Halicarnassus itself.

59:35

Once the Karian capital fell, the

59:38

other cities of the region would have no

59:40

choice but to give up. But

59:43

that is where we will pick up next

59:45

time,

59:46

with Alexander primed and ready

59:49

to complete the conquest of Anatolia,

59:52

and absorb the long contested

59:54

region into a Greek empire

59:56

in its entirety.

59:59

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