0:00

Old is true to be self evident. That

0:02

all means concrete. There's a

0:04

number of congress I get to have a lot of really interesting

0:06

people in the

0:07

office. Experts on what they're talking about.

0:09

This is the podcast. For insights

0:10

into the issues.

0:11

China, bio terrorism, Medicare for

0:13

all. In-depth discussions,

0:16

breaking it down into simple terms. We

0:18

old

0:18

We hold We hold these shoes. We hold these

0:21

shoes. With Dan Crenshaw. We

0:22

don't wear a blanket. Now we

0:24

all remember, and I don't know how we forget

0:26

the images that came out of Afghanistan as the

0:28

government collapsed ahead of our withdrawal.

0:31

The chaos of the airport with against

0:33

clinging to US cargo planes, some falling

0:35

to their death, or a microcosm of

0:38

the larger withdrawal and even the way we manage

0:40

the war itself. Because the world

0:42

watched, others acted. They saw what was

0:44

happening. They knew that we were breaking tens of

0:46

thousands of promises we made to our Afghan

0:48

allies who fought beside us, enabled

0:51

us and assisted us. These men and

0:53

women couldn't just stand by and watch. They

0:55

got

0:55

involved,

0:56

but it wasn't that easy. couldn't just get Afghan's

0:58

out by sheer will they had to design and establish

1:01

networks. They basically had to build a plane

1:03

while they were flying it. They relied on

1:05

old contacts who might know someone to develop

1:07

a system to do what was right and try to

1:09

uphold the promises we made over

1:11

almost twenty years in Afghanistan. And

1:14

here today to tell us about that

1:16

effort is lieutenant colonel

1:18

retired Scott Mann who founded task

1:20

force pineapple, loose affiliation

1:22

of veterans and citizens who worked to exfiltrate

1:24

Africans and the US. And

1:27

the US citizens that were left. Scott is

1:29

a retired special forces lieutenant colonel, author

1:31

and business owner.

1:32

Scott, thanks for being on. Looking forward to hearing

1:34

from you. Thanks

1:35

for having me on congressmen. I appreciate it.

1:38

So there's

1:40

a lot of places we we could start kinda

1:44

wanna know how the the idea for for

1:46

Pineapple Express. Why is it called Pineapple

1:49

Express? I I this this this is question

1:51

I've always I personally always had.

1:53

Yeah. Yeah. So it was you

1:56

know, I'd love to tell you that if there was, like, some kind

1:58

of thought that went into the naming convention or something

2:00

like some of the task forces that you and I, sir, but

2:02

it wasn't. It wasn't that at all. In fact,

2:04

it was I could probably answer both

2:06

questions with the simple fact that it

2:09

was a friend who reached

2:11

out to me in a time of duress and

2:13

asked for help. That And

2:15

there was no plan. I'd been retired for

2:17

ten years. I'd moved away from the Afghanistan

2:20

peace and had, you know, moved on with my

2:22

life in a different direction. And so

2:24

there, you know, putting this thing together was

2:26

completely ad hoc. It was completely unexpected.

2:28

And and to be quite honest with you. It wasn't something

2:31

I wanted to do. I I

2:33

didn't like where things had gone in Afghanistan

2:35

and had left special forces for that

2:37

reason. So getting back involved

2:40

with it, certainly back involved

2:42

with the government on it again was the

2:44

last thing in my retirement plan.

2:46

But when we when Nasam

2:49

called a former Afghan commando

2:51

and it was just clear that nobody else was coming.

2:54

You know, you talk about your your your your

2:56

no plan b I mean, that was

2:58

it. That was very obvious that there was nobody

3:00

else coming. There was nobody else gonna do

3:02

anything. So it it

3:05

just became an at a local level to try

3:07

to help him with

3:09

some SF buddies. The name

3:11

Pineapple came about when he got

3:13

right up to the Edge of the

3:15

perimeter and the

3:17

Marines were about to toss him out and we had

3:20

one preliminary call to make and it was to a

3:22

diplomat on the inside

3:24

We told the story of Nasam in, like,

3:26

three minutes of how he had been shot through

3:28

the face alongside USSUSS

3:30

-- Mhmm. -- how he had gone to our Q course

3:33

and that he's about to get tossed, and the

3:35

dude just paused. And he

3:37

goes, you know, I was a green beret before I

3:39

was a diplomat. The word tell

3:41

your boy to say pineapple and they'll

3:43

let him stay in. That was a password that

3:45

he had passed on. So we're, like, screaming it down

3:47

to him to say it and that that became

3:49

the the naming convention for for what

3:51

we did from that point

3:52

on. That's that's a

3:55

much cooler back around to the name than

3:57

than I was expecting. I I

3:59

like

3:59

that. It it was it was a bona fide. That was

4:01

just ad hoc, just on the fly.

4:03

On

4:03

the fly. And and so that kind of that that

4:06

that exposes a little bit of, like, of what

4:08

it meant to quote get people out

4:10

of Afghanistan. So that was that's

4:12

what everybody was saying at the time just over

4:14

a year ago. Everybody's like, we're getting people

4:16

out. I don't think I I kinda

4:18

understood what that meant, but

4:20

But I I don't think the American people, just in general,

4:23

understood what it meant. They know that

4:26

nobody nobody knows how to visualize what

4:28

happens in Afghanistan or what kind of operations

4:31

we we did there, a lot of it's military

4:33

speak. And so I I do wanna eliminate

4:35

what that means to get people

4:37

out. And you know, is

4:39

it is it because I

4:41

think some people might think in their

4:42

heads, it's like special forces guys.

4:45

Popping

4:45

out of an airplane or a helicopter with,

4:48

like, navinson people that, you know,

4:50

they're one of some of our friends and,

4:52

like, literally getting them out. It's it's not

4:54

quite like that. Right? What so walk

4:56

us through, I kinda one how it

4:58

started started with with moments like this.

5:00

We're like, you still have their old phone

5:02

number. So -- Yeah.

5:03

-- you know, from from and and and you're getting all

5:05

these veterans together who still

5:08

have some of these contacts available

5:10

and, like, let's all get into one room, basically,

5:12

at an operation center and just start

5:14

making calls and see what we can make

5:16

happen. It really was. And and it's kinda

5:18

funny you you what you said is

5:20

because, like, when this first happened, I

5:22

had people coming up to

5:24

me going, dude, I'm

5:26

so proud of you for going back over there.

5:28

Like, I didn't go back over there. I'm

5:30

a fifty three year old retired storyteller.

5:33

Like, I'm not a number one draft pick for

5:35

personnel traction. You know? And and and

5:37

that's where I found myself and

5:39

the oldest was I kept asking

5:42

where the hell is

5:44

Soft. Like, why isn't soft

5:46

being unleashed on this? Like, there's no way

5:48

we're gonna leave our commandos and our Afghan

5:51

special forces, our partners.

5:53

In a large like this, there's no that's not what

5:55

we do. It's not gonna happen. And that's

5:57

what a lot of us in this in the veteran

6:00

community, at least a special ops community we're

6:02

saying to ourselves is there's just It's just

6:04

they've it hasn't manifested yet.

6:06

It's gonna happen. They're gonna be coming. So

6:08

how do we just keep this thing warm?

6:10

Until we can responsibly hand it over.

6:12

Because there's no way that

6:14

we're gonna, a, leave

6:16

the commandos on the battlefield to fend for

6:18

themselves and b, that

6:20

we should be the ones messing with

6:22

that. That's that's an uncle Sam's size

6:24

problem right there. Right. But

6:27

then Congressmen, what started to happen

6:29

was over, you

6:30

know, from really the fifteenth of August

6:32

when the collapse in Kabul happened,

6:35

It was all through the the lens of

6:37

Nasam, my friend, and

6:39

it became very clear. He is

6:41

he is screwed. He is on

6:43

his own whatever happens.

6:46

One, the Taliban are gonna kill him because he's

6:48

been hunting Taliban for eleven

6:50

years. And and it was very clear that

6:52

retribution on our commandos was gonna

6:54

be swift. So Can I clarify for the

6:56

audience what commandos means? Is it commandos is

6:58

special unit within the Afghan army that

7:00

that mostly guys like us worked with

7:03

seals and and and and the green berets that those

7:05

were generally our partner

7:06

forces. That's

7:07

right. It it was our it was our most

7:09

elite partner force and and really the guys

7:11

that did the bulk of the fighting towards

7:13

the end of the war. And for that reason,

7:16

there was a very, very high

7:18

stake on their heads once the

7:20

city fell to the Taliban. So they

7:22

were on the run almost immediately, you

7:24

know, to to clarify by what

7:26

means getting people out. You're

7:28

talking about a very, very small contingent of

7:31

Africans who the minute the Taliban

7:33

went into the Ministry of Defense. They

7:35

had the home addresses of where these guys

7:37

lived and they started going there, you

7:39

know. So so retribution was

7:41

swift.

7:42

Oh, yeah. I bet. And so what we

7:44

did get his arm out and he, you know, he he

7:46

managed to get to the gates and well, now

7:48

what else did you guys do? So so a large part of it. And I

7:50

I know, like, You know, my my office

7:52

staff, I have some veterans or at

7:54

least at least one

7:56

veteran who was working on this extensively

7:58

at all hours in the night and

8:01

You know, the best we could do is really,

8:03

okay, we'd we'd get feedback

8:05

from mostly my own veteran network

8:07

that reached out. And they were like, who do

8:09

we call? And so we would we would all

8:11

we really had still was sort of the official

8:13

lines that state department took way too long

8:15

to set up and we would get

8:17

them and coordinate their

8:20

entry into certain gates at

8:23

cable airport. I also happen to have some seal friends

8:25

who were actually on the ground there. They

8:27

happen to be on on that particular

8:29

deployment. And

8:31

and we're dealing with this firsthand. So so we

8:33

had some contacts. But that was

8:35

just to get to the gates. I mean, there there

8:37

was there was other efforts that I think you guys were working

8:40

on too. Get if they couldn't get to

8:42

Kibool putting them through

8:44

what we call rat lines in the in the in the

8:46

special operations jargon, all

8:49

over the country and over borders. So

8:51

maybe talk about that. Yeah.

8:53

So, I mean, again, what started I

8:55

think it was across the board with a lot

8:57

of people who had friends that were in the

8:59

Afghan special ops or other

9:01

interpreters. Was to try to help one

9:03

person. And then once

9:05

we met some level of success on

9:07

that, what happened was in

9:09

in the signal chat rooms where most

9:11

people were operating, you

9:13

know, old friends of mine like Jay Redman,

9:16

you know, from the seals contacted

9:18

me and he's like, hey, I'm

9:20

working these cases, what are you working?

9:22

And then we started to

9:24

see the value

9:27

in opening the aperture and

9:30

widening that soda straw so that we

9:32

we built these rooms and signal where all

9:34

of these veterans started coming in there and they

9:36

started naming themselves Dunkirk,

9:38

sacred promise. Team America. I mean,

9:40

like, you know, and it was all, but it was

9:42

mostly volunteers that were

9:45

trying to to play a responsible role.

9:47

Here's the role that pretty much evolved. With

9:49

most of these groups, including ours,

9:52

was when it if you think about the the

9:54

the several thousand men and women that were on

9:56

the perimeter, facing out, looking

9:58

at this you know, sea of

10:00

humanity trying to hold up

10:02

certificates and babies and everything else

10:04

to get in. They didn't know who

10:06

these people were and they didn't they could

10:08

not distinguished for the most part, who who was

10:10

vetted and who wasn't. But these volunteer

10:12

groups, these veterans, we knew who

10:14

the the at risk people were. We

10:16

knew where they were. And there was

10:18

a level of preexisting trust

10:20

that we could move these

10:22

individuals to positions of

10:24

handover. And that was what

10:26

we focused on with pineapple. We

10:28

built kind of an underground

10:30

railroad, really, that

10:33

allowed us to take our commando partners,

10:35

our SF partners. And

10:37

we had a connection, congressman, on the

10:39

on the other side of the wire, with

10:41

a company commander in first sergeant from the second

10:43

airborne that we had met through just trying to help

10:45

a pregnant female and a four foot hole in

10:47

the fence. That's what it came down to.

10:50

And we put together kind of a link up

10:52

mechanism that started on the outskirts

10:54

of the crowd that just moved

10:56

these individuals up through the sewage

10:58

canal into that four foot hole

11:00

where bonaopedes were then exchanged.

11:02

They had a baseball card they were

11:04

looking at of the commando and his family.

11:07

They would verify it and they would pull them through that

11:09

hole. And then the eighty second guys had a

11:11

really good process to bypass

11:13

all the bureaucracy and get them on

11:15

a

11:15

plane. That was our mechanism that we called

11:17

the Bon Appel Express. Really?

11:18

And how many and how many people do you think you saved

11:21

moving through that? You know

11:23

how that goes. But I think it

11:25

was, you know, our best estimate was

11:27

somewhere between five hundred and seven

11:29

hundred and fifty people during

11:31

the initial collapse of the

11:33

airfield up until the

11:35

ISK explosion at Abigail.

11:38

And do you guys have, like, an

11:41

operation center that you were working out of? I

11:43

mean, that's part of

11:43

the the the the main

11:46

problem you you face is all of these veterans

11:48

doing all these different tasks. And and and and you

11:50

guys kind of brought them together. Was there was there,

11:52

like, an actual physical place

11:54

to work out of and and take those phone

11:56

calls? How are you guys doing this? It

11:58

was completely distributed, and I think that's one of the

12:00

things I was most proud of with our

12:02

our veteran populate. Well, first of all,

12:04

there were also a lot of active duty

12:06

guys from, like, the sales

12:08

teams and the SF guys

12:10

and Ranger regiment who were working in

12:12

their day rooms. They had set up,

12:14

you know, Ad hoc. So they

12:16

did have that. They had little

12:19

operation centers that were completely ad

12:21

hoc. Third group brought in cots. they

12:23

were actually rotating and hot bunking

12:25

through a I think it was like a day room,

12:27

you know, where they were but but

12:29

for guys like me, I mean, I live in

12:31

Tampa, I was I was

12:33

working on signal here in my

12:35

office where I teach leadership and then,

12:37

you know, at my house We had

12:39

a double amputee, Green Biret, who was

12:42

he's an executive at a sawmill, was

12:44

going into the break room you

12:47

know, would roll into the break room and was

12:49

working it there. And I I think that's one of the things one

12:51

of the reasons I wanted to write the book Pineapple

12:53

Express was that I didn't feel like

12:55

those stories of the

12:58

volunteers who were

13:00

working like sitting at a at a

13:02

breakfast table with their kids you

13:04

know, facilitating the the

13:06

the the movement of

13:08

a commando partner and his wife

13:10

as they were like getting beaten at a

13:12

checkpoint. know, and talking in

13:14

real time to a guy you had fought alongside

13:17

saying, Steve, they're beating my wife, should I

13:19

stay, or should I run? And you're sitting

13:21

there given that real time and your kid is sitting there eating

13:23

breakfast. So there

13:26

was no formal aspect to this at all.

13:28

It was a crap show. And I

13:30

think anything that has conveyed differently,

13:32

at least for us, would be disingenuous. We

13:34

we were out over our skis

13:36

from the time it started.

13:39

It's it's pretty amazing to think about

13:41

that. But you you said the book,

13:43

Pineapple Express, is that

13:44

out yet? is. It's Operation Pineapple

13:47

Express. It came out on the anniversary.

13:49

You know, and I wrote the whole thing.

13:51

IIII didn't want it to be like this one time

13:53

at band camp, like a memoir because it's

13:55

I mean, it's just not. I mean, it was

13:57

really I wrote it in third

13:59

person. And and what it does, congressman, is

14:01

it toggles between various

14:04

Afghan characters like

14:07

Hasina Sofi, the Ministry of

14:09

Women's Affairs. She was the most

14:11

wanted woman in Afghanistan after

14:13

Ghani's wife left, and and she

14:15

moved through our little network She's

14:17

go you know, the minister of women's affairs

14:19

is waiting through a sewage canal with

14:23

her family in tow and

14:25

she's terrified of soldiers because the Russians

14:27

had tried to kill her dad, and that's when

14:29

they went into Pakistan. And

14:31

so this hurt what what she's going through is

14:34

she's moving through this canal and

14:36

then ultimately comes across

14:38

this eighty second airborne first sergeant

14:40

who's like six foot

14:42

twenty and, you know, she's terrified

14:44

of soldiers. And he ends up pulling her, you

14:46

know, pulling her out. And she

14:48

said in in in her

14:50

interview with me, she said when I went

14:52

into that sewage, I

14:54

had four brothers. And when I came out, I had

14:56

five. And they they're still in touch today.

14:58

They're still connected we did a Zoom

15:00

call with her and the paratroopers from

15:02

the White Devils. Yeah. And I gotta

15:04

tell you, man, I that for me

15:06

was the most astounding

15:08

thing was this

15:10

level, this depth of

15:12

relationship and connection that

15:15

was in place and that that that

15:17

sprung forward in in this really dark

15:19

period. It was astounding. Is there

15:21

you guys do a lot of tracking

15:23

of of the of the folks you got out

15:26

and and what happened to them

15:27

afterwards? We try, you know, we

15:30

there's some of that that goes on

15:32

for a lot of the guys because this

15:34

has really devastated the veteran community

15:36

that certainly those that were involved in

15:38

it. Mhmm. So helping

15:40

with resettlement is a is a really

15:42

good way to move through, I think, the moral

15:44

injury of it. For example, Nasam is right

15:46

here in Riverview with us. He

15:48

lives just down the road. He works in our nonprofit

15:51

with us. He just got a great job.

15:53

He's got his GED now. So,

15:55

you know, we we track that and and

15:57

we sponsor we sponsor his family.

16:00

But I will say for

16:02

others, Congressman. It's it's it's

16:04

it's not as good a story because

16:06

there was such an an influx

16:10

of refugees during that

16:12

period that most of the veterans

16:15

were facing towards Kabul.

16:18

And so they weren't looking what

16:20

came behind them. And and now we have

16:22

this other resettlement situation on our

16:24

hand. So it's not as coherent as I wish it

16:26

could be. Yeah. And

16:28

and, you know, I mean, you guys can't do

16:30

everything. Our government

16:33

has the resources to do this, and I'll

16:35

I'll get to that and kind of the policy of

16:37

can't understand. I I do wanna chat with you

16:39

about that after we sort of

16:41

eliminate what this operation was. Maybe one

16:43

of my last questions on it is,

16:46

I once our last soldier once

16:48

our last plane was out of there

16:51

that was that admission for you

16:53

guys? Or were you then looking for other ways

16:55

to get folks out.

16:57

And and and when we say, you know, our Afghan

16:59

partners, are we only referring to commandos?

17:01

Or you you're talking about interpreters

17:03

as well, whether they're US citizens involved

17:05

in pineapple express was just kinda I assume that it's

17:07

it's sort of the veteran community coming together and

17:09

it's like, look, these are the people we

17:12

know of. I mean, I I assume I assume that's what it is. I assume

17:14

it's like, now we only do

17:14

commandos. Right? Right? It's it's it's anybody

17:17

you can. Yeah.

17:18

I mean, I think if you took a poll during

17:21

that ninety six hour period of

17:23

what Africans would like to leave

17:25

Afghanistan. It would be pretty close to a hundred

17:27

percent. I mean, there was very few I

17:29

mean, And so what we were focused on, though,

17:32

primarily, were the Afghan special

17:34

operations partners because they're not

17:36

eligible for a special immigration VISA

17:38

because they technically didn't work for the US

17:40

government. They worked for, you know,

17:42

the the Afghan government. But

17:44

they were, in our assessment, completely

17:46

abandoned in a way that all

17:48

of their mechanisms for resistance and

17:51

everything was completely compromised. Yeah.

17:53

And and they were hunted almost

17:55

immediately. And so that was our

17:57

focus. Now, we also helped

18:00

interpreters. We helped like I

18:02

said, a lot of at risk women.

18:04

And it was kinda crazy the

18:06

way that different groups came together.

18:09

That would never ever work together.

18:11

And even when you and I were in

18:13

Afghanistan, would not groups that we would

18:15

not have worked with or even known

18:17

about. Because of the necessity and

18:19

the and the level of duress, they they started

18:21

to come together. But so, yes, we we

18:23

helped orphans and everybody, all the

18:25

groups were doing some version of that. But our

18:28

focus was primarily on

18:30

the Afghan special operations forces

18:32

who we knew who we could

18:35

vet and who we could responsibly

18:38

present to the paratroopers at that four foot hole

18:40

in the fence so that they they knew they were

18:42

pulling through highly vetted individuals

18:44

and their families.

18:44

Yeah. Yeah. And

18:47

and and and so once we again, once that

18:49

last plane left, was there any hope of getting

18:51

some of these guys out

18:52

anymore?

18:52

Yeah. So to that

18:53

question, when the when the bomb went

18:56

off, you know, it was it

18:59

was It was

18:59

catastrophic for obviously

19:02

the Africans and those thirteen service members that

19:04

lost their lives. And and but it

19:06

was also I think for the veteran

19:08

population, and not a lot of people talk

19:10

about this, but that had

19:12

really leaned

19:14

into this hard and and all of a sudden now, all of those

19:16

people that that we were trying to get out

19:18

couldn't, they were stuck. And and most of us knew

19:20

immediately that was it. There was

19:22

no more neo. There was no more

19:24

non combatant evacuation that was over.

19:26

Yeah. And then we all had to kind of

19:28

ask ourselves now what? Are we going

19:30

to stay in the staying for the long

19:33

game? There were a few of us who were

19:35

actually invited to the Pentagon by

19:37

General Milly. To try to do a

19:39

private public partnership, like, with

19:41

DOD and state, and and I and I

19:43

signed on to do it along with a a handful of

19:45

other volunteers. What I will tell you,

19:47

one year plus later, not

19:49

so much. What this has been

19:51

for a year has been

19:53

private groups of veterans

19:55

cashing in their, you know, their

19:57

checking accounts and their kid's savings funds to

19:59

pay for safe houses,

20:02

medical care, you know,

20:04

there's been

20:06

it's been an unbelievable

20:07

effort on the part of the

20:10

veteran population to sustain

20:13

because the way we felt Congressman was

20:15

we, you know, these people that were

20:17

on our manifest didn't get out

20:20

and now they're going to be hunted, they can't go home,

20:22

they really there's

20:24

no recourse for them at all, and

20:26

they're about to go through winter.

20:29

You know, so try telling,

20:31

you know, any of these individuals that had

20:33

served alongside these folks that, hey, you just need to

20:35

hang up the phone like we did what we

20:37

could. So what ended up happening was

20:40

mostly private efforts to

20:42

sustain these individuals through

20:44

the winter Some people got out, but

20:46

honestly, it's a trickle now.

20:48

Very few people are gonna get out.

20:50

And but these groups, we just

20:53

Adam, we just met with them here in my office. Twenty

20:55

volunteer groups called moral compass.

20:57

And what met on was actually

20:59

the mental health and moral injury.

21:02

Of our Afghan war population right now as a result

21:04

of this

21:04

thing, and it is not good. And

21:06

and, you know, if people wanna I mean,

21:08

no veterans should be mortgaging

21:11

their house or or refinancing their house to

21:13

to to do this. You know, there's

21:15

probably plenty of people who would donate

21:17

funds to it. I mean, where where could

21:19

people help?

21:20

Well, we like, for example, we have we started a

21:22

nonprofit on top of the nonprofit we already

21:24

had to work with veterans, and it's called 0PE

21:27

relief dot org. People can go there

21:30

and they can donate in one hundred percent of the proceeds

21:32

goes to Afghan's and

21:33

duress. But let's not forget. I

21:36

mean, I'm just gonna be pretty

21:38

candid.

21:40

As

21:40

soon as that bomb went off and we moved into

21:42

the Ukraine focus --

21:44

Mhmm. -- not too many

21:45

people cared about Afghanistan, and the

21:48

donor base went

21:50

to zero. Yeah.

21:51

Yeah. And it's not

21:54

surprising. I'm in politics. So I'm,

21:56

you

21:56

know, public relations constantly, so I'm

21:58

well aware.

21:58

Yeah. No.

21:59

The attention span of the of the public. Yeah. You you

22:01

get it more than most. And and the attention span

22:03

of the public's started to move away from

22:05

Ukraine too. Like, we we we are

22:07

we have an we're incapable of

22:10

of

22:10

focusing. And it's it's frustrating

22:13

guys, veterans who who do focus.

22:15

Right? His job it is to to

22:17

focus on particular problem set over a long period of

22:19

time. Can I share this with you real quick,

22:21

congressman? I mean, just to your to your point is

22:23

we interviewed a a guy named

22:25

George out of Fayetteville North Carolina.

22:27

He a fifth group guy fought in Vietnam.

22:29

He's eighty four years old,

22:31

and he is still pulling mounting yards

22:34

out and resettling them in

22:37

rural North Carolina. I've been doing it for

22:39

decades, you know. And

22:41

and it's it's almost the same thing,

22:43

though, the way that went down. With

22:45

his partner force and the modern

22:47

yards. And he and I asked him, I said, how

22:49

long are you gonna do this? And he

22:50

said, till I'm dead. You know, and

22:52

and and he is and he's not alone. There's a lot

22:55

of SF generation

22:58

of or excuse me,

23:00

Vietnam generation SF guys, they're doing the

23:02

exact same thing these veterans are doing and they've been doing

23:04

it for years and they're not gonna

23:05

stop. You know, that is that is kind

23:08

of a difference. It

23:10

seals in SF. We're we're all under so common. We all

23:12

have the same. Technically the same

23:14

mission sets. But but

23:16

but Greenbrier is definitely trained a lot

23:18

more through the for the kind of

23:20

unconventional warfare bywith

23:22

and through capability. This

23:24

this building up of a surrogate force. This

23:26

this a long term relationship building

23:28

with surrogate forces. Yeah. Great. It's it's

23:30

certainly a mission set within the seal teams, but we're a

23:32

lot more direct action maritime folks.

23:35

Right.

23:35

Right. And so explain to people what

23:38

that is. This by with

23:40

and through this unconventional warfare

23:42

in a bit maybe a better way than even I

23:44

can. Yeah, I know. I think it's a it's a

23:46

great question and and it there is a lot of confusion around

23:48

it, but, you know, the the

23:50

the charter for US Army Special

23:53

Forces who really draw their origins from

23:55

World War two with the officers strategic

23:57

services comes from

23:59

a period of time when in

24:01

World War two, the small groups

24:03

of advisers would parachute into Nazi

24:05

Japan, Europe, and they would work

24:07

with partisans. They would work with people in

24:10

France and other countries who were resisting or

24:12

willing to resist And Greenbrier, are these

24:14

individuals who would speak the language. They

24:16

had combat skills training, but they were

24:18

teachers, they were training, they were

24:20

advising. And that that that parlayed

24:22

into the establishment of US Army

24:24

Special Forces in the nineteen fifties and

24:26

really ever since then there have been -

24:28

it's only about six thousand five hundred of them

24:30

in the inventory, but their

24:32

whole focus is to

24:35

build capacity from

24:37

the inside out to stand up. What

24:39

I kind of tell people is, you know, every

24:41

as you said, every special operator is

24:44

different. But if I was gonna kinda give a modern characterization

24:46

of a green beret, it's a it's

24:48

like a combination of, you know, John

24:50

Wick, Lawrence of Arabia, and the Verizon

24:53

guy. You know, it's relationship

24:56

based connectors who have

24:58

lethality, but they don't lead with

25:00

that lethality as a general rule as

25:02

opposed to surgical strike forces, like

25:04

in the outfit that you ran with. And and

25:06

and what what you're gonna see typically a

25:08

Greenbrier do is to try to build

25:10

social capital or relationships

25:12

in low trust areas, and then

25:14

train those individuals, mobilize those

25:16

individuals, and then put them into

25:18

play at a, you

25:20

know, at at scale. And

25:22

so that's what we've been doing for years

25:24

and certainly what we did with our with our Afghan

25:25

partners, you know, over the twenty

25:27

year war. Yeah. And then, you know, there's a lot of

25:30

different different iterations and

25:32

versions of this. And,

25:35

again, seals, Marsock, Green Brick.

25:37

We're kind of all doing the same thing. We were interchangeable

25:39

according to SOCOM. As far

25:41

as which missions to to do, there's

25:43

maybe some preferential mission

25:47

tasking every once in a while. But --

25:49

Sure. -- you know, in Iraq, we were we

25:51

were partnered with a force could be different

25:53

force depending on where you were you were were stationed.

25:55

Sometimes it was military. Sometimes it was

25:57

actually police units. And,

26:00

you know, you help them with the And

26:02

even the court cases, you know, as that

26:04

war matured. And it just

26:07

went alongside them on a more of a direct

26:09

action capture mission. Afghanistan

26:11

was quite different, especially

26:14

by the time I deployed there in twenty twelve.

26:16

So we were doing the the VSO mission.

26:19

Which which obviously I'm sure you're familiar with. I

26:21

don't I don't know what your your history

26:23

is and special forces are when you got out,

26:25

but I'm I'm sure you're familiar with the DSO

26:27

mission and started around around

26:29

twenty ten, I believe. And the whole point of

26:31

this was was very much kind of this old

26:34

school green beret mission set where we're, like, we're

26:36

gonna live in the village and

26:38

we're we're going to establish those

26:41

relationships and and and try to,

26:44

you know, and and work with civil affairs,

26:46

we're we're working on projects, etcetera. Like, it

26:48

it I I suppose in a way, the

26:50

word nation building is like a super

26:52

bad connotation, and III get

26:54

I get I don't understand why, but I

26:57

also don't like oversimplifying things. This

26:59

stuff's complex. Sure.

27:01

But, you know, and then the we in the sealed things,

27:03

we have the commando mesh So we would travel

27:05

all over the province in Ganderhart, kinda

27:07

two different VSOs, and

27:09

seeing how, you know, how they were

27:11

doing so so they were a lot they were doing a lot

27:13

less of, like, patrolling out and

27:15

getting into gun fights. They might be

27:17

attacked every once in a while, but they weren't looking

27:20

for fights. That was our job.

27:22

And you know, it it worked out okay.

27:24

It's not sustainable though because as

27:26

soon as we left, you

27:28

know, it it that that that power vacuum is

27:30

not filled by the people want to fill it. And and and

27:32

thus the story of the Afghan war for

27:34

twenty years, basically. Yeah.

27:38

Though, I'll just let you respond. I didn't really ask you a question, but

27:40

No. It it well,

27:41

it's interesting when talking about DSO.

27:43

I on my third tour Sorry. I

27:45

didn't I didn't say what DSO even meant.

27:48

Village stability operations. So

27:50

that's -- Yeah. -- for people wondering. Yeah. Yeah.

27:52

Yeah. So, actually, when I went over

27:54

to Afghanistan and in

27:57

in twenty ten from my third

27:59

tour, my last tour, I was

28:01

one of the guys who helped stand up the

28:03

DSO mission. And so I'm very, very

28:05

familiar with it, with the methodology. And,

28:07

you know, really, congressman,

28:09

it was really based on it. I'm sure you know this.

28:11

It's remote area for an internal

28:13

defense was what what green berets and and other special

28:16

operators that were doing with the mounting

28:18

yards and other indigenous people in the

28:20

central highlands of Vietnam. And

28:22

there's actually a lot of precedent for this

28:25

approach in under governed at risk

28:27

areas as as a

28:29

component of,

28:31

you know, this kind of

28:33

work. And the the whole deal behind the

28:35

village stability thing was that

28:37

this was a long game

28:39

type thing and that most of

28:41

Afghanistan is an informal

28:43

civil society. It's it is remote.

28:45

It is, you know, it is

28:47

tribal. And building capacity

28:49

out there for locals to stand up on

28:51

their own over time. And you're talking about

28:53

a and we said this. This is a

28:55

multi decade endeavor. This is

28:57

you know, we've been in Columbia for fifty years

29:00

doing this kind of fit. This

29:02

is probably twice that.

29:03

Mhmm. Yeah. Exactly.

29:06

Look, it gets to a broader strategic discussion

29:08

about, like, what what were we doing there? We're

29:10

just endless wars and this

29:12

became a very obsessive slogan. This is obviously

29:14

one of my pet peeves I write about this

29:16

a lot. I debated a lot.

29:19

Yeah. Because look, I mean, what I point out to

29:22

people is, look, on day one, we

29:24

got attacked. On day two, we

29:26

all decided that we

29:28

would go. There was like one member of

29:30

Congress that said, no. Everybody

29:32

was on board. You said, let's go kick their ass.

29:35

Okay? Yeah. Alright? Like, that's

29:37

indisputable, but then but then people wanna kinda

29:39

change their minds. Okay? So day three is,

29:41

alright, we kicked their ass. Now what? Do we

29:43

-- Right. -- do we pull back and let them

29:45

reestablish themselves and and

29:47

potentially inflict another attack? Or

29:49

do we try to create a situation over there

29:52

where it's a hell of a lot less likely that we

29:54

have another nine eleven. And so the

29:56

the the nation chosen

29:58

under George Bush, we chose to stay there and

30:00

try to create a situation where we don't have another nine

30:02

eleven. Now, unfortunately, I

30:04

don't think everybody had ever

30:06

explained it. In the terms that I just

30:08

explained it. Right. And

30:10

and and so, therefore, we have this

30:12

just very dishonest and

30:14

impatient political station for years

30:16

and years and years. And

30:18

it ended up in this and

30:20

it's it's extremely frustrating

30:22

to to

30:22

veterans, I think.

30:24

It really is. And, you know, I I when I

30:26

wrote the book, congressman, I interviewed a

30:28

lot of veterans, and you

30:30

probably know quite a few of

30:33

I mean, you know, some pretty iconic NCOs

30:35

in particular, you know. And

30:37

what what really struck me

30:40

it was that on the other side of this

30:42

thing, and it wasn't just Afghan veterans,

30:44

by the way, either. It included Iraq

30:46

War veterans as well.

30:49

Was the level of

30:51

where these individuals are in terms

30:53

of how they view their leadership right now,

30:55

how they view how this thing was

30:57

handled in the context of their their

31:00

the youth that they gave to this war and

31:02

what they thought they were And

31:04

what actually happened. It's it's not good. I

31:06

mean, it is a it is it is

31:08

a level it is a level of

31:11

betrayal. In terms of the way this

31:13

went down. I've never seen it in my life.

31:15

Mhmm. And and and again, I know

31:17

it's a little bit anecdotal

31:20

But there are also studies coming out

31:22

right now that have got some, you know, some

31:24

very concerning numbers where like seventy

31:26

three percent of Afghan war veterans feel

31:28

about trip betrayed by what happened on this

31:30

thing. So I don't know

31:32

what that means long term, but I

31:34

do think that there is a

31:36

level of of

31:38

of of of veteran

31:40

disposition and health on this that we've gotta look

31:43

at. I'm really concerned about it. I think that

31:45

that what's gonna come out of this is we

31:47

haven't seen it

31:47

yet. That's why, you know,

31:50

after this happens, I don't you

31:52

know, we don't need any numbers to tell us that how people

31:54

are gonna

31:54

feel. Of course, that's gonna that's how they're gonna feel. And

31:56

one of the things that I said was, like,

31:58

look,

31:58

that it does

31:59

feel right now, like, like

32:02

it was all for nothing. Like like your

32:04

your friends you lost or maybe you lost

32:06

your some limbs or maybe you have

32:08

permanent

32:08

brain damage. You

32:09

feel like it was for nothing because of the the way

32:11

we left. And then, you know, literally

32:14

put it right back into the same situation

32:16

that it was in before

32:18

nine eleven. Right. But III always have to remind people,

32:21

it it still is not for nothing because, you

32:23

know, people like, what what do we get for twenty years

32:25

of war and trillions of dollars? Well, you

32:27

got no more nine elevens.

32:29

So Yeah. But that's that's not nothing.

32:31

That's that's that that is

32:33

significant. The war on terror was taking the fight

32:35

to the enemy and and people

32:37

like Tucker Carlson will sort of brush that

32:38

aside. Like, nah. So so so but

32:42

and Well, unfortunately, it

32:43

was a big this is become, like, the populist rights

32:45

favorite talking point. Yeah. Not not

32:48

even the left, but it's it's very frustrating.

32:50

But I'm, like, no. There was there was

32:52

still something to it. Like, we have to be honest

32:54

about the complexities of

32:55

this. Go ahead. Howard Bauchner: I agree. And I think

32:57

that the the capabilities that were

32:59

put in place as well, my personal my personal position on

33:01

this because I've continued to talk to the Afghan

33:04

commandos and and special ops and a lot of

33:06

folks who are still in country. And

33:09

what I would say to take your argument

33:11

a step further even is I think

33:13

that that perhaps the the greatest

33:16

contributions of our men and women at thought over

33:18

there for twenty years haven't been realized

33:20

yet. I think it it

33:22

it it might quite possibly manifest

33:24

and they follow on actions of

33:26

all of these commandos. Of the eight

33:28

million young people who went to school

33:30

of women who who

33:33

had twenty years of a of

33:35

a lived that is not what they're

33:37

experiencing right now, particularly

33:39

Josara and Tajig women.

33:42

So, you know, I don't it's kinda like T. E.

33:44

Lawrence said, nothing is written. And I don't

33:46

think that we've seen the end of this yet.

33:48

And I'm like you, I think certainly

33:50

the preemption of another nine

33:52

eleven over a twenty year span

33:55

But also, I think creating

33:57

a potential antibody to

34:00

violent extremism in that part of

34:02

the world that even despite our best

34:05

efforts of abandonment might still

34:06

happen. That's actually

34:07

that's not something I

34:10

had considered. That that is a

34:12

that's an excellent point, I think, to bring

34:14

forth. And it doesn't you know, none of

34:16

this none of this these points we're making

34:19

forgive some of the actions over

34:22

the years. And and maybe I wanna talk

34:23

about that

34:23

for a second because so the other

34:25

you know, I And again, I

34:27

think people are just mad and people are mad, they'll

34:30

blame as many other people as they can

34:31

fight. Again, I'm in politics to see it all

34:34

the time. Yeah.

34:34

Very very emotional. Like, guys, like, you mean, like, we're not I I'm

34:37

not an emotional person. And so, like, III

34:39

don't understand people's

34:42

emotions. Ups. But this is but I but I do observe

34:44

it very closely, and and that's that's that's

34:46

sort of what happens. And

34:50

people ask like, well, who should we blame? Should we hold

34:52

military accountable and the military leaders and

34:54

they lied to and all the military

34:56

industrial complex and nobody knows what they mean by that. But I was like, well,

34:59

you can hold you should hold Biden accountable.

35:01

He's literally the one person who

35:03

decided to do this. The

35:06

military told him not to do this, just to

35:08

be clear. But then people go back in

35:10

time a little

35:12

bit and make arguments about the general military

35:14

leadership over the years.

35:16

And and there's probably a little bit more

35:18

something to

35:20

that argument and and, you know, as far as what could have been done

35:22

better, was there a complacency

35:24

that set in? Was it this just says, hey, here's

35:26

my tour. I'm

35:28

gonna have some metrics that I look

35:30

at on an Excel document, and then I'm gonna express that in a PowerPoint,

35:32

and I will get my next star.

35:35

that kind of pressure and you certainly hear that

35:38

kind of thing definitely from our from

35:40

from

35:40

our, you know, lower ground troops that were there.

35:42

That's the sense they get curious

35:44

what your sense of that is and and how much of it is true. I

35:47

I I'm still inclined to blame

35:49

politicians more than anything else

35:52

because In the end, the military just follows orders.

35:54

And, you know, you you you can ask

35:56

you can say that the generals should have

35:59

should have revolted, should have should have given better advice.

36:01

I don't know. In the end, there

36:04

so so I am torn on that on that particular

36:05

subject. Here's what your

36:08

thoughts are. Well, I I it's a great question, and I hit this really

36:10

hard in my epilogue, and it was really the

36:12

only place that I came out of third person voice.

36:14

And and because I there there are some

36:16

things that I feel pretty strongly

36:18

about it. III tend to agree that the

36:20

political decision that was made by this

36:22

administration to to leave the way we

36:23

did. They own it. And and they're gonna

36:26

own it not just for for the for the

36:28

for the impact on

36:30

our veterans and and

36:31

and and and the afghans, but

36:33

also I think what's

36:36

gonna happen if we

36:38

allow Afghanistan to continue to

36:40

evolve and reemerge as

36:42

a playground for not just AQ, but I think you're to

36:44

see ISIS right now

36:46

reemerging there. So that

36:49

is not written either. You

36:51

know, is what was made possible in terms

36:54

of the global projection of a two

36:56

point o violent extremist

36:58

capability that we're seeing right

37:00

now. Is is is manifesting.

37:02

So we

37:03

got ninety eight people on the terrorist watch

37:06

list coming across our southern border just this year. And

37:08

that's just the ones we

37:09

track. That's right. And and and and, you

37:11

know, there's Osama Bin Laden's

37:14

son is in Afghanistan right now. Gee, I wonder

37:16

why. I mean, like, what could he I

37:18

mean, just hanging out. I mean, those

37:20

kinds of and we're not talking about it. There's reporting

37:22

that ISIS Main has moved their headquarters

37:26

from Syria to Afghanistan. I

37:28

mean, there's and this is all coming from

37:30

commandos, SF guys, like -- Yeah. --

37:32

guys on the ground. So

37:34

I think that's that's one thing that I really believe there

37:36

needs to be accountability. I personally

37:38

hope as a veteran and

37:40

a

37:40

citizen, that

37:42

we see more public hearings on this. So there will be there

37:44

will

37:44

be a lot on what

37:47

happened in Afghanistan because that

37:49

to your point, you know, there's

37:52

multiple administrations and multiple

37:54

senior leaders. This needs to be

37:56

unpacked if we're gonna continue to prosecute

37:58

cute wars through partners

38:00

through surrogates. We've got to kind of

38:02

get to this because we're getting

38:04

this multi

38:06

generational systemic abandonment

38:09

reputation going all the way back to

38:11

the mountain yards, and it's getting to a point where

38:13

a young green beret or a young seal is gonna go

38:15

into a low trust area to

38:17

try to build a relationship, and they're not gonna have any

38:19

social capital to use.

38:22

Exactly. So so the and then the final thing

38:24

I would say is I am

38:26

pretty hard in the epilogue on

38:28

senior military officers

38:30

in relation to the

38:31

abandonment. And particularly, I'm hard on the

38:33

special forces community because I

38:36

feel like there's no reason

38:38

that we shouldn't have had

38:40

at least a couple of twelve man

38:42

ODAs on the ground in the final

38:44

months leading up to this that would have at

38:46

least helped our

38:50

residual

38:50

forces survive and resist. And

38:53

we didn't do that. And and and that's our

38:56

job. That's what we're supposed to be the best in the

38:58

world at. Now I know we can talk all the policy

39:00

reasons and being told to sit down

39:02

in color, but We didn't do

39:04

that on nine twelve, two thousand and

39:06

one when we wanted to get in the game

39:08

and do

39:08

UW. We found a way to get in.

39:10

So anyway, that's where I stand on it.

39:12

Yeah. And that's the thing. It's and in the end, I don't even know the answer because I I

39:14

don't know if they tried and were shot down

39:16

by the White House, you know, I

39:19

I just don't know. I don't know. Because because the thing is is the previous

39:22

administration was also very keen on getting out

39:23

too. I the

39:25

Trump has just talked out of

39:27

it every day. And, you know, to his credit, he I think he listened

39:29

to people and they're like, oh, this will happen if you do this

39:31

and you're not gonna like the political

39:34

results. And he's like, okay, fine. We

39:36

won't do Biden

39:38

had a completely different different take on it.

39:40

And, you know, in the end, I don't know. And

39:42

hindsight is a bit twenty twenty

39:46

on this. You know, and and it's just and and I don't even know what

39:48

the right answer is on our twenty year

39:50

strategy. You know, it's III

39:54

do think in the future we have to decide. We're either we're either going to

39:56

punish. Like, is that the question? Are you

39:58

punishing your enemy? Or are you gonna create

40:00

an insurance policy that ensures that the

40:02

enemy

40:03

doesn't come back? Back. And our general our general

40:05

strategy over the last twenty years is try to create an insurance strategy,

40:07

but that insurance strategy is, again, we have

40:09

a short attention span in this country. We're

40:11

very impatient. We're already

40:14

impatient with Ukraine even though they're kicking ass, which is like I mean,

40:16

it's it it kinda blows my mind.

40:18

It's like talking about a good investment,

40:20

but, like, our public is is

40:23

that's really not fair. It's a very loud minority

40:26

of our public that's that's

40:28

increasingly frustrated and impatient,

40:30

and we're not even losing anyone.

40:33

Right. So so this is the American way to

40:35

an extent, and it is politically

40:38

difficult. Multiple presidents,

40:41

Obama, Trump, but promise to get us out of

40:43

these of these conflicts. And I just don't

40:45

think it's an honest

40:46

conversation. I think this stuff's just

40:48

complicated and should have been should have been expressed as such? Well,

40:50

to your point,

40:51

I mean, if we're going to go and build

40:54

an antibody, to

40:56

either either a near peer or violent

40:59

extremist or both, then we

41:01

have to have the

41:04

intellectual honesty from the policy

41:06

level all through the generals down

41:08

to the guys that have to do

41:10

it. We have to have the intellectual

41:12

honesty to talk about what

41:14

that means. What does it mean to go and do that? Because that is a long

41:16

term endeavor. It is the long game.

41:18

It requires, frankly, the

41:20

responsible coordination in

41:22

which is almost

41:24

laughable to me of multiple

41:26

administrations to keep that going over

41:28

the spectrum of engagement.

41:30

And, you know, we need to set it

41:32

up that policy level for it to happen. If every time we go into

41:34

a place like this and we say that we wanna

41:36

build capacity, but yet every task

41:40

force commander fractures

41:42

the Taliban. And, you know, this

41:44

thing is expected to be wrapped up

41:46

by each administration's in game. Then

41:49

we're just setting or not only are we setting ourselves up for failure, but we're setting

41:51

ourselves up for this kind of wholesale

41:53

abandonment and this kind of damage

41:55

to our veteran pop population

41:57

who did what they were supposed to do. And

42:00

and that's where I would really like to

42:02

see, not blame, but accountability.

42:04

Like, what are we doing to address these

42:06

systemic issues and get better

42:08

at it as a

42:08

nation. I I don't know. I think I think we

42:11

owe our veterans that. Yeah.

42:12

And and and it's a hard it's

42:14

hard to write a playbook for for

42:16

what that that antibody mission looks like

42:19

because it's very different in Iraq than than

42:21

Afghanistan. Iraq is easier in many ways,

42:23

just geographically. It's just puregeographics.

42:25

It's just easier. A lot of

42:28

sectarian issues, of course.

42:30

But but but but times twenty or a

42:32

hundred in Afghanistan as far as tribal -- For

42:34

sure. -- sectarianism. Iraq being a much

42:36

more modern place. So that we did kind of have Iraq

42:38

sort of buttoned up by the by the time

42:41

of my last deployment in

42:43

in twenty ten. And, you know, it didn't

42:45

mean that it was safe enough to leave.

42:48

Obviously, that was a that was a foolish decision, and and

42:50

anyone could have told you all the bad guys are waiting

42:52

in Syria. Just to pummel

42:54

the the country again.

42:56

But, you know, the the

42:58

capacity building had worked. Right? You

43:00

had created

43:02

a a stable ally,

43:04

which which is not a bad thing to have

43:06

in a country next door to Iran. You know,

43:08

should we have gone to Iraq in the first

43:10

place? That's a different question.

43:12

Einstein's twenty twenty. I I, you know,

43:14

I I'm I am much more

43:16

sympathetic to people who are

43:18

who are against that. Than I ended the

43:20

people who were against Afghanistan. Two very,

43:22

very different reasons for going in. But in the

43:24

end, we were in. And so the question

43:26

is, what do you

43:28

do? But Afghanistan is seeing a very different kind of region, very very

43:30

mountainous, very rural. And it

43:32

felt like you were going back into the

43:35

biblical ages every time I spent

43:37

the night in some kind of random village out out in

43:39

the middle of nowhere. Yeah.

43:42

It's very different than

43:44

Iraq. And And so, you know, there experts

43:46

look, you you can never actually tame the

43:48

countryside of Afghanistan. Cities are a

43:50

different

43:51

story. Mean, they have large buildings.

43:54

There's casinos. There's roads. Like, it is a it is a city.

43:56

Right. It's

43:57

city like people. Very,

44:00

very different kind of mentality. And and that's

44:02

sort of what we ended up on. We we sort

44:05

of ended up in this place

44:07

after many years where We

44:09

have very few tubes on the

44:12

ground. We've stabilized it at a low

44:14

boil and it

44:16

was sustainable. Not very low cost to us. Right. Why

44:18

we left is crazy. But it's

44:20

important that people understand how

44:22

that transition happen and kind of the

44:24

lessons learned. And the fact that it's just

44:26

different no matter where you go, because people

44:28

are -- Correct. -- people in this day and age are looking for

44:30

very simple answers. They're used to the

44:32

Internet that tells them, this is what you need to think

44:34

right now. And and

44:36

anything beyond that just frustrates people

44:38

and stuff's

44:40

complicated. It's very complicated. And when when I

44:42

wrote about the village stability program,

44:44

you know, one of the things that

44:46

I tried to capture on that

44:49

in my book game changers was this what

44:51

you just

44:51

hit on. And it's really important

44:54

is civil society in

44:56

Afghanistan for example. Because we may face

44:58

this again there or somewhere

45:00

else. You go one mile off the pavement in

45:02

any direction and you are in

45:04

what's called a status society. It

45:06

is a bottom up society. It

45:08

is where, you know, elders.

45:10

It's an honor based, shame

45:12

based society. And it is

45:14

a completely different set of

45:16

operating principles. It does not operate

45:18

in a top

45:20

down fashion. And then you get a

45:22

contract society, which looks more like the

45:24

government we know and understand. And

45:26

we tried to take

45:28

that contract

45:29

society mindset and planted

45:32

town

45:32

in the most remote rural status

45:34

society places on Earth. The

45:36

most tribal society most tribal

45:39

society on earth. And it was a square peg and a round

45:41

hole. Yeah. And we tried to do this for

45:43

and it wasn't until two

45:46

thousand ten that green

45:48

berets even started to figure this out.

45:50

You know? And so we spent a

45:52

decade, like you said, punishing

45:54

our enemy, but it

45:56

really wasn't until midway through the

45:58

war that we even made the

46:00

strategic pivot to look out in the rural

46:02

areas and go Oh, man. We should be working from the bottom up

46:04

also. Mhmm. And by then, it was

46:06

honestly I think it was

46:08

too late. But

46:10

we didn't stay with the program that long. But I

46:12

do think there's tremendous lessons learned

46:14

from that that we could

46:17

harvest and consider in our next

46:20

engagement. Right. Right. If you

46:21

the same with Iraq, I mean, geez, some huge

46:23

lessons about, you know, spelling

46:26

the entire bath party from the

46:28

government and again men -- Right. -- and

46:30

immediately creating, like, tens of

46:32

thousands of unemployed,

46:34

dangerous men.

46:34

Probably, could possibly go

46:35

on. We could possibly go

46:38

on. Yeah. And I get it, Sandy.

46:40

Similarly, you know, and and there

46:42

wasn't anything super

46:44

complex about village stability operations. It's like just

46:46

build relationships. Just go there. That's it. Build

46:48

relationship. Yeah. Let them let them see

46:50

that, like, you'll, you know, you'll

46:53

you'll give some medicine to their kids and, like,

46:55

we're we're we're not the bad guys. And our

46:57

friends are the Afghan government who

46:59

should eventually be the the the

47:01

governing force here within within reason, right, within their own culture.

47:03

Like, it Yeah. And so yeah. But,

47:05

yeah, like you said,

47:08

that ten years later. And and by, you know, it's important to note that by twenty

47:10

ten too, I mean, the Taliban had matured

47:12

their own fighting

47:13

tactics. And

47:15

so Absolutely. Very difficult to to deal with that. They've got

47:17

kinda shadow governance everywhere. They operate

47:20

in the shadows. They they

47:22

can move freely between,

47:24

you know, wherever we were working in

47:26

Pakistan became a very

47:28

difficult enemy to fight because

47:30

they've been a sort of they

47:32

adapted and regrouped over the course of many

47:34

years. And, yeah, it would've

47:36

taken many more years of DSO

47:38

to deal with that.

47:39

Oh, yeah. And and it's and it's not and it's not clear

47:41

that I totally

47:42

get it when guys are, like, okay, but, like, why?

47:44

You know? I mean, III

47:48

get that. And because we're we go outside of our

47:50

compound and our feet get blown off,

47:52

at least in certain

47:54

areas. And it's

47:56

hard for your ground soldiers to to see the point of that, which

47:58

which speaks to a lack of leadership

48:00

in the military about why why

48:03

are you doing what you're doing? There it

48:05

might actually matter quite a bit. I mean, I can

48:07

make the strategic arguments, but

48:10

you better make that very very clear to

48:12

the guys. Right. And, you know, I'm

48:14

not sure that happened. And so it's not

48:16

surprising that that anxiety filled

48:19

that void and and we changed tactics pretty

48:21

wildly just a few years

48:21

later. Oh. Well, that clarity is

48:23

that that

48:24

lack of clarity is definitely there now.

48:27

Yeah. You know? It's it's

48:30

that's wild. Yeah. What a

48:32

what what what's your take? Do you do

48:35

you guys do you guys have any

48:38

operations at all or anything

48:40

related

48:40

to Ukraine? A lot

48:43

of our folks in pineapples

48:45

have pivoted into the Crenshaw Some people

48:47

are in Ukraine, you know,

48:49

doing humanitarian work. I think there's

48:51

a there's a real,

48:54

you know, I I don't know,

48:56

congressman. I think there's something about the

48:58

generation of warfighters that you and I

49:00

come from that maybe

49:02

we're still figuring this out right now, but I was

49:04

just in here I said yesterday with twenty volunteer

49:06

groups. And we were talking about

49:08

this and and how, like, how

49:10

fast veterans jumped into the fray

49:13

in Afghanistan and pivoted even faster into

49:15

the Ukrainian effort to help with, you

49:17

know, with humanitarian things.

49:20

And there is, I believe,

49:22

a real deep. And I

49:24

think all veterans have this. I

49:26

just think it's very pronounced and

49:28

fresh with our generation of

49:30

spending, you know, twenty years

49:32

at war. Is there's

49:34

just this deep sense

49:36

of of personal

49:39

responsibility and and and and

49:42

higher purpose. That a lot of them have and trying to figure

49:44

out what to do with that

49:46

when you leave

49:46

the military is

49:47

not an easy

49:50

thing. No. That's correct. And I think that's what we're seeing

49:52

in a lot of these cases. I'm not

49:54

involved with Ukraine that much simply because

49:58

I I just I'm not I'm not

50:00

good enough to be that spread out. I

50:02

need to focus on one thing and this

50:05

case, and and my focus is

50:07

on

50:07

Afghanistan. Yeah. I mean, it's

50:10

I'm curious what

50:11

what your thoughts are and

50:13

try to put you on the spot there. But, yeah, I

50:15

I figure you have thoughts on

50:16

on general

50:17

Well, I do. Train more and

50:19

where where it's going. Real quick, I

50:21

would just say that I was just talking off camera that I think the

50:23

resistance in Ukraine is amazing. III

50:26

am founded at the

50:28

at the coherence and efficiency of

50:30

this resistance effort. I've never seen anything

50:32

like it. The whole of government, whole

50:35

of nation approach to this

50:37

from Zelensky all the

50:39

way down. The way that it's,

50:41

you know, it's clear that the

50:44

resistance operating

50:46

concept was in play

50:48

there, but the level of pre work

50:50

that's gone into this, I mean, just as a

50:52

UW guy, I I'm really

50:54

impressed. And and frankly, I think as you

50:56

said, I think the the return on

50:58

investment for this in terms of

51:00

what we're buttressing up against

51:02

and what we're pushing back on, to

51:04

me is a no brainer. It really

51:06

is. I guess I'm just a little

51:08

confused as to why we

51:10

can't put some measure of that kind of

51:12

support into the

51:14

Afghan resistance. Or to the Afghan commandos. Like, I

51:16

mean, is it just Ukraine where

51:18

we do this? Like and I can't really I can't

51:20

reconcile that in my brain.

51:22

It doesn't We have a twenty year

51:24

partner that we bailed on, but yet

51:26

we have this effort over

51:28

here where seems to be going well and we're

51:30

kinda doing the right

51:31

things. But can we walk into Uganda at the same time?

51:33

Well, I mean, it gets to this

51:35

broader political conversation about

51:38

the exhaust and Americans feel with any kind of isolation

51:40

is streak. Where and here's

51:42

what isolation have seen appears to

51:44

me to attach moral value to

51:48

non intervention. Like, simply for the sake

51:51

of non intervention. Now, it can be

51:53

a moral value if if

51:56

if if intervention is harming

51:58

our our national security as is

52:00

backfiring or is not in our national

52:02

interest, it's just

52:04

a waste. But you can't just apply but you can't just apply that

52:06

that reasoning to everything. I mean, because they

52:08

literally do, you know. And so it's

52:10

because it's because it's really hard to

52:12

look at a crane situation and say, we're, you know, we're not getting return

52:14

on investment. Like, you you gotta be really

52:16

just honest about what's happening there because it's

52:19

the numbers don't lie. The

52:21

actions don't lie. They keep saying we're

52:24

we're drawing ourselves into a war.

52:26

That would have happened by now, guys. Like,

52:28

Kevin, let's be honest. It just it would have happened

52:30

by now. You

52:32

know, it -- Right. -- doesn't mean you can't go too

52:34

far and you could do that, but there

52:36

we still no indication of that happening.

52:38

So the the arguments just fall flat. Then

52:40

And and that that that tendency by by

52:42

the isolation is where where I you

52:44

can't find one foreign policy there in

52:47

favor of. So again,

52:50

it's it's any intervention

52:52

is immoral in their in their

52:54

eyes. Any any meddling is

52:56

immoral, even if it is pretty

52:58

clearly direct positive

53:00

consequences for our national interest

53:02

such as, yeah, I

53:05

mean, creating resistance against the Taliban that

53:07

would therefore eliminate the the possibility

53:10

of another safe haven for

53:12

terrorist attacks. You know,

53:14

at at a fairly low cost. And

53:16

so there's just a totally different

53:17

mindset, Scott. Yeah.

53:19

I just think I was. I've never

53:21

with the whole isolationist thing in the times that we live

53:23

in, I've always found it to be a little bit

53:25

diluted in terms of, like, what

53:28

and just from a practical sense, for example, if if

53:30

you take even a little bit of

53:32

time as a layman to understand the

53:36

enduring narrative

53:38

of groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS.

53:40

If you just just look

53:42

at what they exist to do,

53:45

what their enduring charter is

53:47

and their level of persistence

53:49

and motivation to follow through on

53:51

that to strike our homeland. Not just

53:53

strike our homeland, but I mean,

53:55

look at the apocalyptic view of

53:58

Isis and what they want to to the

54:00

end of day's approach that

54:02

they want to usher in and it

54:04

is a relentless they've got all

54:06

the time in the world. And

54:08

to me, to sit there and look at

54:10

a place like Afghanistan where we

54:12

already have you know, a

54:14

precedent setting event

54:16

like nine eleven, where we know that

54:18

groups like this are going to use

54:20

that sanctuary to do that and now

54:22

we've got reporting coming off the battlefield to these

54:25

volunteer groups in droves. That

54:27

is telling us it

54:29

could be a worse disposition than pre nine

54:32

eleven. And and to

54:34

not consider that and that the enemy

54:37

has a vote and what comes to us and

54:39

just sticking to this. I I don't know. It

54:41

just in terms of what happened over the

54:43

last twenty years,

54:46

I can't I can't reconcile it. It's it's hard for me to to

54:48

swallow, and I get the moral implications

54:50

of it. But just from a

54:52

practicality

54:52

perspective, it's it to me, it's diluted.

54:55

And and it's naive. Yeah. It's probably the

54:58

it's naive. It's it's built upon

55:00

frustration and anything built upon an

55:02

emotion like

55:04

frustration is you know, it's not guaranteed to have a

55:06

a, you know, logical

55:08

framework associated with

55:10

it. And naivatives, I think the

55:12

best way to describe, that just that state

55:14

of mind because it and and it

55:16

wrongly assumes that we live in a very,

55:18

very large world. And we don't live in

55:20

a large world. This this war in Ukraine is a

55:22

twelve hour flight at most, maybe

55:24

maybe less -- Yeah. --

55:26

Afghanistan that

55:28

much further. So -- No. -- the the the world is small.

55:30

And and

55:32

you can choose to believe that or not, but but

55:34

it is a fact. And

55:38

Yeah. I tell people a time. You can write a fiction. You can write Go write a

55:40

nice fiction story about the world you

55:42

think is should be should be.

55:45

Right, where everybody sort of leaves each other

55:47

alone. We all manufacture our

55:50

own stuff and and there's limited

55:52

interaction, limited needs for interaction.

55:54

Go write that

55:55

fiction. It is a fiction. And, you know, some of

55:57

us have to choose to to to live in the

55:59

real world even if that disabuses

56:02

some of

56:03

of some convenient narratives that they like to

56:06

speculate. I think the isolationist

56:07

argument lost its metal when we stopped moving

56:09

in wooden

56:11

ships. Mhmm. That's basically right. That was

56:13

yeah. That's exactly what I was saying. It took six months or whatever

56:15

to

56:15

get to

56:16

across the Atlantic. Doesn't I mean, it's

56:18

not saying That made sense.

56:22

That kind

56:22

of made sense, you know. But I just don't think it's it's not

56:24

tenable. No, it's not. And it's it's

56:27

it's extreme. Like, because because I

56:29

don't think there's actually such thing as an

56:31

interventionist. Like, they would call me that. Right? They call me

56:33

all sorts of names. But but I'm not an

56:35

interventionist. I don't just I don't attach moral

56:37

value to intervention. I

56:40

simply ask questions, like, is this does this have some value for

56:42

us? You know? And then and then and then we answer

56:44

that question, we move accordingly.

56:47

Stuff's not that complicated. But I think

56:49

we beat that dead horse a little

56:51

bit. And I've I've I've I've run out of

56:53

time anyway. I gotta move on

56:56

to the We got another podcast recorded. Scott, this is a it had been

56:58

fascinating talking to you,

57:00

and I wanna thank you, you know, personally,

57:02

for for

57:02

help. I bet you I bet you guys

57:06

got people out that I personally worked with.

57:08

I I'm sure of it, congressman. And I I'm

57:10

I'm dear friends with Mike Waltz, and I

57:12

I really, really appreciate

57:16

I know that you moved a lot of stuff

57:18

around to make this happen and I just appreciated

57:20

it because it's given a voice to a lot

57:22

of our veteran population that's

57:25

that's hurting right now. I hope you get a chance to I

57:27

think I sent you the book. I hope you get a chance to to give it

57:29

a look when you get some time. I know you don't

57:31

have much

57:31

time. But it's it's great

57:34

meeting you.

57:34

No, Scott. That was amazing. Thank you for being on. Say say

57:36

the name of of your most recent book and

57:38

your your past book you wrote as well. So so the

57:40

audience can can get that if they want?

57:43

Yeah. So talk we were doing about

57:46

Afghanistan and VSO, if you're interested in

57:48

that game changers, I wrote this way back in

57:50

twenty fourteen, but it's going local to

57:52

defeat violent famous. And it's all

57:54

the lessons learned that went into this that were

57:56

really derived from the Vietnam

57:58

fight, and then manifested over in

58:00

Afghanistan, and

58:02

it just it's kind of a primer on how we approach that, the

58:04

mistakes we made, what we might learn. And

58:06

then my recent book

58:08

is operation