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Dr. Anthony Fauci

Dr. Anthony Fauci

Released Tuesday, 8th June 2021
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Dr. Anthony Fauci

Dr. Anthony Fauci

Dr. Anthony Fauci

Dr. Anthony Fauci

Tuesday, 8th June 2021
Good episode? Give it some love!
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Episode Transcript

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0:00

Hi,

0:07

I'm Chelsea Clinton, and this is in fact

0:10

a podcast about why public health matters

0:13

after so much grief, fear, and uncertainty.

0:15

I know many people are eager to put COVID nineteen

0:17

behind us, but we're not out of the woods

0:20

yet, and there are so many lessons

0:22

that we must learn from this pandemic to

0:24

be better prepared for the next one. COVID

0:27

nineteen isn't the first pandemic that has swept the

0:29

globe. The nineteen eighteen flu pandemic

0:32

infected one third of the world's population,

0:34

and more recent history, the Obama

0:36

administration created a pandemic playbook

0:39

for how to address quote a high consequence

0:41

emerging disease threat anywhere in the world

0:44

because public health officials have long worried

0:46

that there could be another global pandemic.

0:49

So just how unprecedented has this last

0:52

year been, What have we learned from past

0:54

crises, what can we learn from this one?

0:56

And how prepared is our country and our

0:58

world for the next pandemic.

1:01

We're talking about all of this with someone who has become

1:04

for many the public base of our government's

1:06

response to COVID nineteen, Dr

1:08

Anthony Faucci, Dr

1:11

Fauci was appointed director of the National Institute

1:13

of Allergy and Infectious Diseases back in during

1:16

a hugely consequential moment in the HIV

1:18

AIDS pandemic. His research was crucial

1:21

to understanding how the virus works,

1:23

and he was one of the leading architects of the President's

1:26

Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief or pet FAR,

1:28

which has helped saved millions of lives

1:30

around the world. He's advised seven

1:32

presidents on how to prevent, diagnose, and

1:35

treat a long list of infectious diseases,

1:37

including HIV AIDS, respiratory

1:39

infections, diarrheal diseases, tuberculosis,

1:42

malaria, ebola, and zica. He's

1:44

been leading the U. S government's efforts to combat

1:46

this pandemic, working non stock with

1:48

his team and communicating consistently

1:51

and honestly with Americans every step

1:53

of the way. I was honored to welcome

1:55

to the podcast. So,

2:00

Dr Arouchy, it's become almost

2:02

a cliche to say this is an unprecedented

2:05

time, and I'm just curious, given that

2:08

you have lived through other

2:10

pandemics, worked in other pandemics,

2:12

how much of this feels unprecedented

2:14

and how much of it feels eerily

2:17

familiar. Well, Chelsea,

2:19

the only eerily familiar thing about it

2:22

is the unpredictable nature

2:24

of outbreaks where you're just

2:26

going along and then all of a sudden something

2:28

comes up. It could be subtle the

2:30

way HIV This month.

2:32

In the next few days where

2:35

commemorating the forty anniversary

2:38

of the realization that we were dealing with a new

2:40

syndrome. We didn't know what the microbe,

2:43

the pathogen was. We didn't even have a name

2:45

for it back in June and July. Having

2:49

had I guess I would call it the privilege in

2:51

some respects, but also the painful experience

2:54

of being involved in that from the very

2:56

first day, that's sort of snuck

2:58

up on you. It was level below

3:00

the radar screen. Then as we

3:03

learned more and more about it, we found out we

3:05

were dealing with just the tip of the iceberg

3:07

when we saw people who were very,

3:09

very sick, not knowing until

3:11

we had a test that we were dealing

3:13

with something where they were literally millions of people

3:16

infected. So the fact

3:18

that outbreaks are unpredictable,

3:21

they come in strange ways, that's

3:23

the common denominated the difference with this

3:26

that validates the statement it's

3:29

unprecedented is that when you're

3:31

dealing with something as explosive

3:33

as this, which has a

3:36

couple of characteristics that I

3:38

have often referred to, almost

3:41

ironically years ago, is

3:43

what is your worst nightmare? Dr Fauci.

3:45

People would ask me that five years ago,

3:47

ten years ago, fifteen years ago, and longer.

3:50

I would always say it was the emergence

3:52

of a new virus generally

3:55

jumping species from an animal host to

3:57

a human that had two character

4:00

ristics, one that

4:02

is extraordinarily efficient in

4:04

spreading from human to human, and

4:06

two that it has the capability

4:09

of a great degree of morbidity and mortality.

4:11

And when you put those two things together,

4:13

that's when you get my worst nightmare.

4:15

And that's exactly what we're experienced because

4:18

we have not had anything like this in

4:20

well over a hundred years, since

4:23

the historic influenza pandemic

4:25

of nineteen eighteen. So there is

4:27

a very strong true

4:30

element of this being unprecedented,

4:32

at least in over a hundred years,

4:35

you know, and Dr Patty, there's an adage

4:38

in public health that outbreaks are inevitable,

4:40

but epidemics aren't. Now,

4:42

with the benefit of both hindsight and

4:44

your decades of experience in

4:47

pandemics. What do you think we could

4:49

have done differently in

4:51

January or February to help

4:53

save American lives and save lives

4:56

across the globe. Yeah,

4:58

in some respects it is not

5:01

answerable, because you

5:03

could certainly have done things differently

5:05

if you knew things differently, So

5:08

you could say to yourself in this

5:10

country, what could we have done

5:13

if we knew back in January?

5:16

What we know right now is

5:18

the characteristics that I'm telling you. It's extraordinary

5:21

ability to efficiently

5:23

spread from human to human, the fact

5:26

that fifty to sixty percent of

5:28

the transmissions occur from someone

5:31

who is infected but has no symptoms

5:33

at all. We know anywhere from a third

5:36

of the people who get infected never develop

5:38

any significant symptoms at all that would

5:41

bring attention to any medical intervention.

5:43

So back then, if we

5:45

knew that we were dealing with in

5:48

this country something as

5:50

extraordinary as this in its ability

5:52

to spread, we would have done something

5:55

that likely would have not been

5:57

acceptable to the American public. When

6:00

we had the first case, and I think

6:02

it was January one, to

6:04

say Okay, it's here, and

6:06

then a few days later or

6:08

a week or two later, it became clear

6:11

that there was community spread. It just there,

6:13

which means someone infected

6:15

someone and you don't have the chain of

6:17

transmission locked in, you don't know

6:20

where the person got it from. That being the case,

6:22

that means it's spreading in society

6:24

beneath the radar screen. If we had

6:27

known its capability of spreading,

6:29

we could have said, let's shut the country down

6:32

right now to prevent it. I think

6:34

there would have been such extraordinary

6:36

pushback to say, well, wait a minute, what are

6:38

you talking about. We have one or two cases. You

6:40

want to shut the country down. That's crazy.

6:43

So when you asked me a question, what

6:45

could we have done differently, Well,

6:48

now that we have five and ninety

6:50

thousand deaths, you go back

6:53

and say, wow, look what this is

6:55

done. We maybe could

6:57

have prevented some of those had we shut

7:00

down earlier and prevented the spread.

7:03

But you know, if you look throughout the world,

7:05

Chelsea, even countries that

7:08

appear to have done well early

7:10

on, every country has gotten

7:12

hit really badly. Even some of

7:15

the Asian countries now that we

7:17

pointed to as models of

7:19

their response are now starting to

7:21

get into trouble, including places

7:23

like Taiwan and Singapore and Vietnam

7:26

and places like that, who seemed

7:28

to have done very well in the first waves.

7:31

You made a comment that resonates with

7:33

me is how do you prevent an outbreak

7:36

from becoming a pandemic? So I

7:38

don't think we're necessarily going

7:40

to be able to prevent the emergence

7:43

of new microbes. They've occurred

7:45

historically for as long as and

7:47

before history even recorded it. History

7:50

is full of them. But in answer to your

7:52

question, how do you prevent that

7:55

from becoming a pandemic? And that's

7:57

when we talk about lessons learned? What can

7:59

we learn having gone through

8:02

this where the United States

8:04

was ranked by public

8:07

health agencies as being

8:09

the best prepared country in the world for

8:11

a pandemic and we got hit

8:13

among the top three, with Brazil and

8:16

India as the three worst

8:18

in the sense of numbers of cases and

8:20

deaths and dr bout You do you think that

8:22

that is because we were prepared

8:25

for previous pandemics and not future

8:28

ones. I mean, were we ready to fight the last

8:30

war and not the next war? I

8:32

think it's partially that, not completely.

8:35

I think it was there were things that went wrong

8:38

early on, and that was the

8:40

issue with the testing that we didn't

8:42

have a good testing system for a considerable period

8:45

of time, and we were testing

8:47

only symptomatic people because

8:49

we're not fully aware that

8:51

asymptomatic spread was really,

8:53

really, very important. So those

8:56

are the things that I think could have been done differently.

8:58

And then, you know, I don't want to read litigate what

9:00

went on last year, but

9:03

there were things that I think could have been done better.

9:06

Although I live in New York now, I grew up in

9:08

Arkansas and then moved when I was twelve

9:11

to d C. And it is heartbreaking

9:13

to me Dr Facci that Arkansas,

9:16

Louisiana, Tennessee, Mississippi,

9:18

so much of the South

9:21

have vaccination rates that are

9:23

half of what we see in

9:25

the Northeast. Since you've had to communicate

9:28

now over so many decades, so many

9:30

different public health challenges

9:33

and also imperatives, how do

9:35

you think we rebuild trust in

9:37

science and especially trust in

9:39

in vaccines and vaccinations. That

9:42

is something that is not going to happen easily,

9:45

Chelsea. I think that we may have

9:47

to find ways, and that's

9:50

a complicated issue. As you will know, probably

9:52

better than I do, it's a complicated

9:55

issue of how you heal the

9:57

differences and the hostility.

10:00

I mean, I've been the object myself

10:03

of a phenomenal amount of hostility merely

10:05

because I'm promoting what a

10:07

really fundamental, simple public health principles

10:10

that seems astounding that that would

10:12

generate a considerable degree of

10:14

hostility, But it is. It is.

10:17

So I don't think the answer

10:19

is intensifying the hostility

10:21

and pointing figures. I think the approach

10:24

is to outreach to try and understand

10:26

each other better and realize that

10:28

we have differences. But those

10:30

differences should be the source of strength

10:33

in some respects and not the source of

10:36

chaos. So I

10:38

don't I don't know the answer to your question. It's

10:41

a seemingly simple question with a complicated

10:43

answer. We've got to reach out to people and

10:46

get them to understand that this is for

10:48

their own safety, their own health, and

10:50

also what I refer to as communal

10:53

responsibility, your responsibility

10:55

to society. Because there

10:58

is a thing called the chain of transmission

11:01

of an outbreak, and one of the

11:03

very interesting and I must say quite

11:05

unique aspects of

11:07

saws COVID two and COVID nineteen

11:11

is that the same virus that

11:13

has killed almost six hundred

11:15

thousand Americans makes

11:18

many many people have no symptoms at all. It

11:20

just doesn't bother them. I mean, there's the

11:23

people getting no symptoms at all. So

11:26

that is in many respects unprecedented

11:29

to have that situation. Usually,

11:32

when you have something as potentially deadly as

11:34

this, it makes just about everybody

11:36

a little bit sick. This is something where

11:39

there were people who were saying, why should

11:41

I get vaccinated? The chances

11:43

of my getting into trouble are

11:45

very very low, and they're correct. If

11:47

you look at the rate of hospitalizations

11:49

of young people, it's a non zero.

11:52

It's small compared to the rate

11:54

among elderly people and among people

11:56

with underlying conditions. But there are

11:58

a couple of things there that people don't fully understand.

12:01

You're not completely exempt, because a

12:03

lot of young people wind up getting into

12:05

trouble statistically, not

12:08

nearly as many as the elderly

12:10

and those with underlying conditions.

12:12

But there's another aspect of it. Let's

12:14

say you get infected and

12:17

you don't get any symptoms

12:19

at all, and you could say that, see, I

12:21

got infected, big deal, what's

12:23

the difference. The difference is

12:26

that it is conceivable and maybe likely

12:28

that even though you've got no symptoms,

12:31

that you would inadvertently and

12:33

innocently I'll use that word pass

12:36

it on to someone else who would

12:38

then pass it on to someone else who

12:40

would then get a serious consequence.

12:43

So there is a degree that have to consider

12:46

of what is my societal responsibility

12:48

of not being part of

12:50

the chain of transmission as

12:53

opposed to being a dead end

12:55

for the virus. So do you want to be a

12:57

dead end for the virus or do you

12:59

want to be situation where you're part

13:01

of the transmission chain which would

13:03

get other people in trouble. But that's tough

13:06

to get that concept. I mean,

13:08

Dr pot I never thought I would say I wanted to be a dead

13:10

end, but yes here I am very

13:12

happy to be fully vaccinated in a In

13:14

a dead end, we'll

13:19

be right back to stay with us. I

13:32

don't want to ask about preparedness

13:34

because I think

13:37

probably a lot of people are now

13:39

as we are vaccinating the country.

13:42

I know a lot of people want to put COVID in

13:44

the rear view mirror, leave it in, not

13:47

worry about it again. But we know

13:49

that the virus is not done

13:51

with us until we have everyone vaccinated

13:53

and we know we need to learn lessons from

13:55

this to help better prepare us going

13:58

forward. So what less since do you

14:00

think we need to learn, And how do you think

14:03

your work at the NIH has to adapt.

14:05

How do you think the Biden administration has

14:07

to adapt? What concrete

14:09

things have to happen to ensure we are

14:12

better prepared for the inevitable next time?

14:15

Okay, so two components to my answer

14:17

to Chelsea. The first is that when

14:19

you're dealing with a global pandemic, you have

14:21

to have a global response. We're

14:24

not going to be safe on this planet

14:27

until the pandemic is

14:29

controlled globally, so right away

14:32

it is not necessarily

14:34

a lesson, but almost a mandate

14:37

that we really need to help the

14:39

rest of the world, as as a rich country,

14:42

get this under control, because if

14:44

there's still viral dynamics

14:46

somewhere, even if we get this on

14:48

the very good control here, there's

14:51

always the danger of the generation of variance,

14:53

which then would make our protection

14:56

somewhat tenuous even with the

14:58

vaccines. That's the first thing when

15:01

you look at the future, what lessons learned

15:03

for the future, we need to also

15:06

prepare in a global way. There

15:08

was a thing called the Global Health Security

15:10

Network or the Global Health Security

15:12

Agenda, where you have interconnectivity

15:15

among countries of the world, good

15:18

modern up to date communications,

15:21

sharing of re agents, sharing

15:23

of of specimens,

15:26

continued good collaboration and communication,

15:29

building up in the local areas,

15:32

the public health infrastructure that

15:34

would allow them to respond and

15:36

quench something when it breaks

15:38

out in any given country, because

15:40

outbreaks generally don't

15:43

start spontaneously

15:45

in twenty five countries. They

15:47

generally start as a jumping of

15:49

species, usually not always from

15:51

an animal reservoir to a human and then it

15:53

spreads to the rest of the world. That doesn't

15:55

mean that you've got to blame the country where

15:58

it happens. It just so happens,

16:00

but you've got to have those countries prepared

16:03

to be able to contain it. So that's

16:05

the thing with preparedness. The other thing from

16:08

a scientific standpoint is

16:10

that we are very fortunate that

16:13

we have made decades and decades

16:15

of investment in basic and

16:17

clinical biomedical research, which

16:19

has allowed us to do something

16:22

that's unprecedented, to get a

16:24

vaccine in which a virus

16:26

was first identified in January

16:28

of and then in December

16:31

of that same year, eleven months later

16:33

to be putting vaccine into people's arms.

16:35

That's

16:38

efficacious. If we were having this

16:40

conversation ten years ago, you

16:42

would have told me I was completely crazy

16:45

thinking that that would happen. It usually

16:48

takes years and years. And the speed

16:51

was not because we were reckless in

16:53

doing things and cutting corners. The

16:55

speed was related to the

16:57

extraordinary amount of in u

17:00

stament that was made of the previous decades

17:02

in clinical and basic research.

17:05

So there are another component of lessons

17:08

learned. We need to continue to

17:10

make the investments

17:12

in research that will allow us to

17:14

have the scientific component

17:16

of the response be optimal. And

17:19

fortunately for us, that's what happened

17:21

with regard to the vaccines. Dr

17:24

P. You you mentioned earlier the Global Health

17:26

Security Agenda, which while

17:29

it had antecedents over

17:31

many years, really got

17:33

codified in the aftermath of a Bola

17:36

and of the United States saying what has happened

17:38

in Western Africa is clearly

17:41

a tragedy for people there, but it is a

17:44

danger to us here too, and

17:46

we do need to have more robust

17:48

public health architecture everywhere.

17:52

And then that wasn't a priority

17:54

for the Trump administration, but it

17:57

wasn't really a priority for the world. I

17:59

do admittedly have a little bit of

18:01

a concern that once we are through COVID

18:04

nineteen, I worry we might lose

18:06

focus on the need to build robust

18:10

global architecture

18:12

to help protect public health everywhere. Well,

18:15

Chelsea, I definitely share your concern,

18:17

and the reason I do is from my experience

18:20

in that corporate memory

18:22

for things that I've been very very

18:24

difficult in the sense of responding

18:26

and preparing is often short

18:29

lived, and when you put this behind

18:31

us, we will be dealing with

18:34

problems that are real and present.

18:37

Yet it's difficult to get people

18:39

to understand that the

18:41

threat of an outbreak is perpetually

18:44

a real and present danger. So

18:46

what we've got to do as a globe,

18:48

as as a planet, as a community

18:50

of nations is to just make

18:53

sure we tell ourselves that when

18:55

we get this under control, that

18:57

we've got to say never again and

19:00

need it, and never again means

19:02

to really put the effort into

19:04

the kind of preparation that

19:06

will require considerable

19:08

resources. And even though

19:11

it's tough to convince people to

19:13

give resources to something that isn't

19:16

happening. Now, we've got to

19:18

call back the memory of two

19:20

thousand nine one

19:24

because as we started off in the beginning of

19:26

this podcast, the fact is that

19:29

this is really what happened to

19:31

us. It just came out of nowhere,

19:33

and it just immobilized

19:36

us for such an extraordinary

19:38

period of time. And we're in our second year

19:40

now. The economy has

19:43

been wrecked by this for sure, not

19:45

only here in the United States. Thank goodness,

19:47

we're recovering now, but it's still

19:50

a lot of people out of work. I think

19:52

those kinds of memories should

19:54

spur us on to make sure

19:56

we are adequately prepared next time

19:58

around. Well, and hope we will spur us

20:00

on. Returning to a comment that you

20:02

made earlier that I am in vigorous agreement with

20:05

that we have responsibility to help

20:07

vaccinate the world. And while I

20:09

certainly appreciate President Biden's

20:11

commitment to donate seventy million doses

20:14

by July four, we know we can't effectively

20:16

donate our way out of this. So

20:19

I am curious Dr about you if we think

20:21

about the architecture that

20:24

we really need to help protect public health globally.

20:27

While often the focus is on surveillance

20:30

and specimen collecting, testing,

20:32

what do you think it should be for vaccine

20:35

research and development, for example, or

20:38

the actual ability to manufacture and

20:40

to guarantee the quality of vaccines

20:43

in the next generation. I'm

20:45

with you on that, and that is

20:47

referring to building up the

20:49

capacity and the ability

20:52

to do technology transfer so

20:55

that when you have an outbreak, it isn't

20:57

only companies in Switzerland,

21:00

the United States and the UK, but

21:02

you have plants and companies

21:04

and technology and the knowledge

21:07

to do it in Senegal and

21:09

Ethiopia and South Africa and

21:11

Indonesia and Brazil and

21:13

Chile, so that when you have an outbreak,

21:16

you do have the capability. And

21:18

that is building up not only the

21:20

infrastructure of public health to do

21:23

surveillance and monitoring, but

21:25

also the ability to respond

21:28

at a global level. To

21:30

rely on donations is

21:32

a quick, immediate, partial

21:36

fix, but the real durable,

21:39

sustainable fix now in

21:41

the future is to allow other

21:43

countries that generally don't

21:45

have that capacity to be able

21:47

to make vaccine in a timely fashion

21:50

and not depend completely

21:52

on donations from the rich country.

21:54

The rich country should donate if they have

21:56

to, but the real ultimate solution

21:59

is to have a world where it's evenly

22:02

distributed, with his equity and opportunity

22:05

to make your own countermeshes. In

22:07

this case, it would be vaccines and

22:09

therapeutics. We're

22:14

taking a quick break, stay with us,

22:25

Dr pot You mentioned earlier that you've been under

22:28

quite a bit of personal attack for talking about

22:30

things that should be I would

22:32

argue like fairly non controversial,

22:34

like the importance of vaccines, of vaccinations.

22:36

And we know that so many of

22:38

our public health officials

22:41

have been under in noorminate

22:43

stress, working day after day

22:45

without rest to try to help protect

22:48

public health over the last year and a half.

22:50

And we know that many public health

22:52

officials have also received horrific

22:55

abuse, and that the mental health toll

22:57

has been really immense. What do

23:00

you think we need to do to try to help support

23:03

everyone who's really been on the front lines

23:05

to recover from this horrifically

23:08

stressful time is hopefully we recover

23:11

as a country. Yeah,

23:13

well, you're pointing out something

23:15

that I think everyone hopefully will

23:18

ultimately recognize is the extraordinary

23:20

courage and effort that has

23:22

been put in by our frontline health care workers.

23:25

I mean, they truly are the heroes and the heroines

23:28

of this the physical risk

23:30

that they took are taking to take care

23:33

of people. The physical and mental strain

23:35

of seeing people every

23:38

single day dying

23:40

right in front of you with very little that you can do,

23:42

particularly when you're dealing with people who

23:44

have underlying conditions in which when

23:46

they get hospitalized, there and very

23:48

very difficult straits. It's a reality.

23:51

We've lost close to five nine people

23:54

in this country. That's terrible for

23:56

the losses of those people and their families.

23:58

But what people don't a pre cate because I've

24:01

been there. I've been there, and I know what

24:03

what it means, the terrible

24:05

strain and stress when you're trying

24:07

your best to save someone's life and they

24:09

just lose. You lose them person after

24:12

person at the person. We've got

24:14

to pay attention to the stress

24:16

and probably a good degree of post traumatic

24:19

stress that those people have. So I think attention

24:21

to mental health issues is

24:24

something we really absolutely have a responsibility

24:26

to do for people who have given it everything

24:29

and yet have exhausted themselves in the process.

24:33

Your dr pot, I want to be respectful your time. I

24:35

also want to end on an optimistic

24:37

note. We spoke earlier about how

24:40

the COVID nineteen vaccines were

24:43

accelerated through just extraordinary

24:46

amounts of attention and investment

24:48

and collaboration really across the

24:50

globe, and so I just I'm

24:53

curious what else that is being

24:55

worked on currently at the n I H.

24:57

Do you think is close to a breakthrough and

24:59

that could similarly really

25:02

help save and protect a lot of

25:04

lives soon. Yeah,

25:06

and it's in multiple fields

25:08

of medicine, not just infectious disease.

25:10

But one of the things that we're having a

25:12

lot of optimism now. You know, we've done spectacularly

25:15

well in the development of life saving

25:18

drugs for persons living with HIV,

25:20

to the point now if you're infected, you get

25:23

put on one pill that contains

25:25

three drugs and you can go essentially

25:28

lead to almost a normal lifespan. So

25:30

we've done well there. The thing that has been

25:32

the challenge is a vaccine for

25:35

HIV. But I believe some of the

25:37

technologies that have been

25:39

developed and shown to be highly

25:41

successful, like the MR and a vaccine

25:44

platform technology for COVID nineteen

25:47

is now being actively pursued in

25:49

the field of HIV and in other

25:51

areas of medicine, including can

25:53

serve and other infectious diseases.

25:56

That's what I think is perched for breakthroughs.

26:00

Also when the field of immunotherapy

26:02

for cancer. I mean, the more we learn about

26:04

how we can control the regulation of

26:07

the immune system, they're going to be cancers that have

26:09

been beyond the reach of cures

26:12

that likely will now for the first

26:14

time see that you can actually marshal

26:16

the immune system's response. Cancer

26:19

immunotherapy has been

26:21

in some areas quite successful,

26:23

but in some areas still very frustrating.

26:25

I think you're gonna see a lot of that frustration

26:28

turned to good results within a reasonable

26:30

period of time. So there's never

26:32

been a time more exciting

26:35

in the field of biomedical research then

26:38

now, and and that's the reason why

26:40

we are so grateful for the support

26:42

that we continue to get from the

26:45

Congress and from multiple administrations,

26:47

because it's certainly has

26:49

given us an extraordinary

26:51

tool for COVID nineteen.

26:53

If it were not for that, we would be in much

26:56

much more dire straits than we are right now with

26:58

regard to this pandemic. Dr

27:00

Facci, thank you so much for your

27:03

leadership and for your time today for

27:05

giving me kind of things to be optimistic

27:07

about, but also of course thanks to still worry

27:09

about and work on. So thank you so

27:11

very much. Thank you very much. Chelseae.

27:13

I appreciate you're having me on your show. Thank you.

27:18

Dr Anthony Facci is the director of the National

27:20

Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases

27:22

at the U S National Institutes of Health or

27:24

the n AGE. If you're not yet

27:26

vaccinated, go to vaccines dot gov

27:29

to find a vaccine site near you and

27:31

anyone can visit. We can do this dot

27:34

HHS dot gov to join in a month of action

27:36

to help get as many people vaccinated

27:38

as possible. And volunteers, even

27:41

if you're vaccinated, who take at least five actions

27:43

may be invited to the White House in July. And

27:46

as we reflect on what our country has been through,

27:48

let's keep listening to scientists and experts

27:50

like Dr Faucci and is Tea. Let's keep asking

27:53

hard and important questions so that we

27:55

can learn from what's worked and what hasn't

27:57

so we are better prepared for the inevitable

27:59

next time. And to any of our listeners who

28:01

have been on the front lines of this crisis as a nurse,

28:04

doctor, researcher, or anyone else

28:06

in the world of public health, thank you.

28:08

Our country owes you a huge debt of gratitude,

28:11

and I hope that you're taking care of your own health to physically

28:15

and mentally. In

28:18

Fact is brought to you by I Heart Radio.

28:20

We're produced by Erica Goodmanson, Lauren

28:23

Peterson, Cathy Russo, Julie

28:25

Subrian, and Justin Wright, with help

28:27

from the Hidden Light team of Barry Lurry, Sarah

28:30

Horowitz, Nikki Huggett, Emily

28:32

Young and Humanity, with additional

28:34

support from Lindsay Hoffman. Original

28:36

music is by Justin Wright. If

28:38

you liked this episode of In Fact, please

28:41

make sure to subscribe so you never miss an episode,

28:43

and tell your family and friends to do the same. If

28:46

you really want to help us out, leave us a review on

28:48

Apple Podcasts. Thanks again

28:50

for listening, and see you next week.

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