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1:08

A theory of justice by John Rawls has

1:10

been called the most influential book

1:12

in twentieth century political philosophy. Rolls,

1:16

nineteen twenty one to two thousand and two,

1:18

drew in his own experience in World

1:20

War II and saw the chance in its

1:22

aftermath to build a new society founded

1:24

on personal liberty and fair equality

1:27

of opportunity. And while

1:29

in that just society that could be inequality.

1:32

Rawls' radical idea was that those inequality

1:34

must be of the greatest advantage, not the richest

1:37

but to the worst of. With

1:39

me to discuss Rawls' theory of Justice

1:41

R Fabian Peter, professor of philosophy

1:44

at the University of Warwick, Martin O'Neil,

1:46

professor political philosophy at the University

1:48

York and Jonathan Wharf, the Alfred Lundlacher

1:51

professor of values and public policy at

1:53

the Patrik School of Governors, University

1:55

Oxford and Fair of Wolfstone College. Let's

1:58

start with you, Martin.

2:01

Can you give us some brief

2:03

notes about his background, his

2:06

news. Sure. So Rawls'

2:08

was born in nineteen twenty one in Baltimore,

2:11

Maryland to quite an affluent family,

2:13

his father was a quite a successful

2:16

lawyer. He was one of five boys.

2:18

And I spoke to the couple the

2:21

most notable incident of his

2:23

childhood was that two of his younger brothers

2:25

died in childhood from infections

2:27

that they'd actually contracted from Rawls'

2:30

himself. So it seems as if

2:32

he with this 4 of experience very

2:34

early in his life, he had this sense of

2:36

the sheer arbitrariness of of good or bad

2:39

luck and the way that so many features of our lives

2:41

really just come down to factors well

2:43

beyond our our control. He

2:45

then went on to Princeton where he studied,

2:48

he did an accelerated degree, given

2:50

the the US entry into World War two,

2:52

and he joined the US Army as a

2:54

private. So he didn't take the route that some of

2:56

his fellow principal men were doing of

2:58

looking for officer commissions. He he joined

3:01

up as a an ordinary soldier and

3:04

fought in the in the Pacific during

3:06

World War two in the Philippines and

3:08

in New Guinea and ended

3:10

up actually at one point on a

3:12

on a troop train going through Hiroshima

3:15

just after the bombing. The war,

3:17

I think, had a con Was he able to continue

3:19

studying wagers in the war? So he

3:21

he just finished his his principal

3:23

degree that had been accelerated. And

3:25

his plan actually after the war

3:27

was that he would enter the Episcapalian priesthood.

3:30

That's what he thought he was gonna do. But the experience

3:33

of the war completely changed his

3:35

life. He lost his faith over

3:37

the course of the war, both the,

3:39

I think, the sense that the

3:41

sheer difficulty of seeing that some of his friends and comrades

3:44

killed when he survived. think it was

3:46

very difficult for him, but also learning

3:48

of the the full evil of of the whole

3:50

course than the the evil of the Nazi regime.

3:52

I think made him him lose his

3:55

his faith that there was any divine plan

3:57

in history or that divine providence

3:59

was going to work its way in the world.

4:01

So I think by the end of the war,

4:03

rules had this very vivid sense that

4:06

the church wasn't going to be him and

4:08

instead he had to think about the project of

4:10

justice as something that human beings themselves

4:13

would have to make in the world. We could and

4:15

trust in in divine providence, but

4:17

instead it had to be something that people

4:19

together created.

4:21

Well, Rosa's working man in the USA.

4:23

Now here's a big one for you. Can you tell us the

4:25

four or five major political and

4:27

social events that were going on in

4:30

in your in your associates in the

4:31

USA. I'm sure you can do that. They

4:33

go the very very straightforward question.

4:35

So well, I mean, after the war,

4:37

so what Rawls' does he goes back on on the

4:40

thanks to the GI bill. He goes back

4:42

to the PHD apprintant. So that's one big

4:44

thing that's happening that you get Yeah.

4:46

The new means of society. All of the big things.

4:48

Well, so you get that experience. So

4:50

I spoke with the new deal you

4:52

get this period where the

4:54

US is heading towards a somewhat more

4:56

equal society where you get that

4:58

expansion of opportunity at

5:01

the time that he's teaching then through

5:03

the sixties. I guess that I don't know about

5:05

four or five issues,

5:08

but I suppose two things that loom very

5:10

large of the fit and war obviously is going

5:12

on in the background and also the civil rights

5:15

movement and issues around the treatment

5:17

of African Americans and the how

5:19

how the US can can become

5:22

a more inclusive society. That's all going

5:24

on in background at the time that Rawls' writing

5:26

in an academic register about

5:28

justice. Could it be described as turbulent

5:30

and con rather confused society that was

5:32

looking for a clear way

5:34

through? I think there's certainly a

5:36

a large amount of turbulent. I think also

5:38

underlying that sense of progress. There's

5:41

some sense of confidence. There's a thought that

5:43

in the wake of the the war and the wake of the

5:45

New Deal that this is a society that's actually facing

5:47

up to to some of its domestic problems

5:50

at least and and, you know, might be moving

5:52

towards becoming a more equal society.

5:54

And I that there's a kind of confidence at that stage

5:57

that maybe disappears later

5:58

on. Thank you. And Joe

6:00

will let's let's go through aspects

6:03

of his of his work now starting with utilitarianism.

6:07

What place did that have in the development of

6:09

his ideas? First of all, tell people what it

6:11

is, and then tell them what place it had in

6:13

his views. Utilatorism

6:15

is the theory really

6:18

systematized or introduced by Jeremy

6:20

Benthem. And the

6:23

thought from Benthem is

6:25

that the juicy of governments and you

6:27

as an individual is to

6:29

pursue the action that will

6:31

bring about the greatest happiness of the greatest

6:34

number. So that is the utilitarian slogan

6:36

society you should bring about the greatest happiness,

6:38

the greatest number. And

6:41

the way that is cashed out in a bit

6:43

more detail is that we

6:45

need to do a type of cost benefit analysis

6:48

of the good and the bad. In

6:50

fact, the happiness unhappiness or pleasure

6:53

and pain that any action will bring

6:55

about. And our duty as an

6:57

individual or as a society is

7:00

to bring about the state of affairs

7:02

that has the greatest balance of

7:05

pleasure over pain or happiness

7:07

over unhappy this. So it's

7:09

a maximizing view that says we

7:11

should, in sense, make society

7:13

as happy as

7:14

possible. And

7:16

On that basis, you can see it's very

7:18

appealing theory that you might think what

7:21

else should government do other than

7:23

how

7:23

do you measure this?

7:25

Well, that is question that every

7:27

great utilitarian has managed to duck rather

7:29

than address directly

7:30

to be part of the duckers. Well,

7:33

it's it's not my theory, so thank So

7:36

it is a very difficult question about how you

7:38

measure and it's very important because

7:40

if you're aggregating something and maximizing it,

7:42

you have to quantify it. And

7:45

this is problem that one has a

7:47

modern economics to some degree as

7:49

well, and they're a technical solution around

7:52

preference satisfaction and measuring the

7:54

gambles that people would take.

7:57

But for Banff and John

7:59

Stewart mill, they they really didn't address

8:01

that in any

8:02

detail. So just to just because the

8:04

start of this conversation about his I

8:06

might hear work. We've got utilityerrorism as

8:09

well and Rawls' it a pillar or a step. Whatever

8:11

it is. And the other is inch intuitionism.

8:15

Lot ofisms about this morning. What

8:18

what do you know about his view of intuitionism?

8:21

In the early sections of a theory of

8:23

justice, Rawls' sets up

8:25

this type of opposition between

8:27

utilitarianism and intuitionism. So

8:30

as we've seen, utilitarianism is

8:33

highly principal view. It gives you really

8:35

a decision procedure for

8:37

public policy, and it allows

8:40

different people to try to

8:42

calculate and come up with the same or different

8:44

results and give us type of principle

8:47

of public accountability. The

8:49

problem with you to serenism, though, is

8:51

that in Rawls'' phrase,

8:54

it ignores the separateness of persons.

8:57

That is If one person

8:59

suffers and another benefits more

9:02

than the other person suffers. If we can measure

9:04

this, then we should go ahead. So

9:06

it doesn't pay any

9:08

attention to individual rights.

9:11

And so if society

9:13

will maximize happiness in a way that

9:15

is detrimental to one group's interests,

9:17

that's just bad luck. So although

9:20

utilitarianism is very principled, it

9:22

can give us counterintuitive consequences.

9:25

And intuitionism is a mirror

9:27

image. So intuitionism

9:30

is the view, roughly speaking, that

9:33

you should do whatever seems right to you

9:35

that we all have moral

9:38

intuitions. We have judgments

9:40

about states

9:41

some of us are very balanced destructive

9:43

thoughts. Well, we do. So so

9:46

an intuitionist must say you've been brought up badly

9:48

if you have those

9:49

thoughts. No.

9:50

How do you that we have to rely on the intuitions

9:52

of those who know best, who turn out to

9:54

the people who've written the theory and

9:56

are from the finest Oxbridge colleges

9:59

on the whole So this is a problem with nutritionism.

10:01

And what we've got here, what Rawls' is done,

10:03

whether it's something

10:05

going on in its own mind or a

10:08

type of historical development is

10:10

replaying something that comes up time and time again

10:12

in public policy. Because on the one hand,

10:16

We want rules, we want

10:18

accountability, we want something

10:20

that is public and transparent. But

10:22

problem with any system of rules is that very

10:24

often it will give us judgments, outcomes we

10:26

don't like very much. In my

10:28

reading, rules and others may differ.

10:30

How what I see Rawls' is doing is trying to

10:33

get the advantages of both of these theories

10:35

and ignore, overcome the disadvantages.

10:38

So what he wants is a principle that

10:40

only ever gives the right answers

10:42

rather than the tab utility wherein principle

10:45

that will sometimes give us unjust outcomes.

10:47

Fermión, Peter, there's an element of

10:50

the social contract Rawls' approach.

10:52

Can you tell us what that is

10:54

and what part of it he was drawing

10:56

on, please? Yes. Of course. Indeed,

10:59

the social 4 contract edition, which was particularly

11:01

influential in the eighteenth century, played

11:04

a huge part in how Rawls' thought

11:06

about the principles of just this. So

11:08

as Joe and Martin explained,

11:11

Rawls' was trying

11:13

to figure out what a just society would

11:15

look like, and the way he thought about

11:17

this was, what are the principles of

11:20

justice that could govern

11:22

the basic structure or the basic

11:24

social solutions of a

11:26

society. So the

11:28

theory of justice, the book we're discussing starts

11:31

with this wonderful sentence saying

11:34

that justice is the first virtue

11:36

of social institutions. And

11:38

in thinking about the justice of social

11:40

institutions, we all thought that

11:42

it will help if we go back to these influential

11:45

eighteenth century social contract

11:47

thinkers, especially John

11:49

Locke, Jean Jacques, also anyone

11:52

will count. Now, these are very diverse

11:54

thinkers, as I'm sure you know better

11:56

than most, but what United

11:59

them in Rawls' and in views of

12:01

many is that they thought

12:03

about a just social contract,

12:06

a system of principles of justice that

12:09

define in just society that

12:11

define a system that everyone's

12:14

subscribed to would start from

12:16

a commitment to the equal freedom of

12:18

all citizens. So a just

12:20

society is one that all

12:23

citizens, all persons understood as

12:25

free and equal, could degree too.

12:27

They could sign up to that sort of society.

12:29

And Rawls' thought that that was an important

12:32

idea, and he built his justice on that

12:34

idea of what principles of

12:36

justice could, persons understood

12:38

as free and equal, all agreed to.

12:41

Now as I mentioned, this this kind of

12:43

thinking about the Just Society so peaked

12:46

in the eighteenth century. And then

12:48

with the ascent of utilitarianism that Joe

12:50

mentioned, It lost influence. It

12:52

lost influence in part because

12:54

Jeremy bentham, the influential utilitarian

12:57

thinker, ridiculed the idea, and

12:59

particularly he ridicule the idea of

13:02

people are somehow naturally equal and

13:04

equally free. That's how he ridiculed

13:06

the idea of natural rights. That's

13:08

how everyone would have equal rights. He called

13:10

that nonsense upon stilts. So

13:13

when Rolfs set out in the twentieth, I'm

13:15

sure he was to think about justice, he thought,

13:17

well, you did deteranism has

13:20

these advantages, but one big problem

13:22

is it doesn't actually give us

13:24

the right answers on justice. So

13:26

to make progress on thinking about what the society

13:29

looks like, we should go back to these earlier

13:31

thinkers. And start again

13:33

from this thought is if we all understand

13:36

each other as

13:36

equals, what could we all agree to?

13:38

Would it just society look like? So

13:41

what did he think if it's possible him

13:43

a brief about this. And if it is, it is. If it isn't,

13:45

it isn't. What what what what overall

13:47

was his

13:47

view? What's his theory of justice?

13:50

His theory of justice, he calls is justice

13:53

as fairness is a

13:55

theory that is based on two

13:57

main principles of justice. A

14:00

first principal, the principle of equal liberties

14:03

holds that, you know, just society, all

14:05

members of society enjoy

14:08

an equal set of basic rights and

14:10

live So that's the first principle. The

14:12

second principle of justice that he would that

14:14

he thought define the justice society is

14:17

the sort of principle. Everyone could three

14:19

two, like the first one, is

14:21

a principle of justice. It has

14:24

two components. One is a

14:26

principle of fair equality of opportunities such

14:28

as society would give everyone fair

14:31

opportunities. And the second part of the second

14:33

principle of justice is a different principle,

14:35

which says that a just society works

14:38

to the benefit of the least well off

14:40

in that

14:40

society. That's

14:41

the radical part. That's the radical part.

14:43

I mean, there the radical elements -- Yeah. -- because

14:45

even the first part, the first principle, the

14:47

principle of equal rights and liberties says

14:49

that of those rights and

14:51

liberties, one aspect is

14:54

the political rights and liberties. And

14:56

there he thought everyone should enjoy a fair

14:58

value, which is a very demanding idea

15:00

that is not enough Everyone has a right to

15:02

vote. Everyone should, in

15:04

fact, have an equal say in society,

15:07

be in a position to be an equal contributing

15:09

member to society. That's already very

15:11

radical, but then the difference principle

15:14

to thought that society should not work

15:16

to the advantage of already better

15:18

off, but benefit the worst off.

15:20

That was

15:20

certainly also very radical. Well,

15:22

thank you for that. That's a very, very good

15:24

start Martin. Martin. So

15:26

let's take this. There's there's three Rawls'

15:29

-- Yeah. -- one and two in

15:31

two parts, so let's go in three. Can

15:33

you tell us, first of

15:34

all, about Liberty that about fair opportunity. What

15:36

his view of Liberty was? So

15:38

I think you got the easy question. Well

15:41

Fabienne has done a very good job

15:43

of introducing that Now I think one

15:45

thing to say to you, absolutely, right, that this is three

15:47

principles, rules of ways that you've got

15:50

two. But actually, given that the

15:52

second vied into two halves. It's much easier

15:54

to think of it as three. So

15:57

Rawls' says there should be, as Fabienne has said, the system

15:59

of equal basic liver things. And that's really

16:02

the kind of familiar liberal freedom

16:04

of expression, freedom of assembly,

16:06

freedom of movement, freedom to

16:08

rights. Well, I mean, maybe

16:11

not yet freedom from faith. There are things that

16:13

just the kind of the basic constitutional rights

16:15

that we'd have in the democratic society.

16:18

But to that Rawls' out this Rawls'

16:20

quite radical writer to

16:22

that idea. So he says it's not

16:24

enough simply if you think

16:26

about the various liberties that we have

16:28

as democratic citizens. It's not enough

16:31

that those are merely formal protections.

16:33

We need what he calls the fair value that

16:35

of the political liberties. So

16:38

what that means Rawls' is

16:40

that for people with a

16:42

similar motor ablation and similar

16:44

ability to intervene in the political

16:47

process. There should be roughly equal

16:49

prospects of getting to influence political

16:52

outcomes. So a political system

16:54

where the interests of the rich

16:57

or privileged gets much more

16:59

weight and the interests of others or

17:01

where certain groups get to, you know,

17:03

become members of parliament and other groups don't.

17:05

That's a society that fails to realize

17:08

the fair value of the political liberties. Even

17:10

if in formal terms, everyone has got the same

17:13

same rights. Now to move to the second

17:15

principle then, when Rawls' talks about this idea

17:17

of fair quality of opportunity, as

17:20

Fabian has said, that's also a surprisingly

17:22

radical idea because it not

17:24

merely the idea that all jobs

17:27

in the economy should be formally open

17:29

to everyone that there shouldn't be discrimination

17:32

on grounds of of rare a sort gender

17:34

or sexual orientation or or whatever it

17:36

it might be. It's the much stronger thought

17:39

that those who with similar motivation

17:43

and ability should have the same prospects of

17:46

success in the economic realm just

17:48

as the earlier principle wants to guarantee

17:50

a fair chance that success in in the in the

17:52

political realm. So those two

17:54

principles together really

17:57

visit your society where none

18:00

of the social facts about people's backgrounds,

18:02

their their social class, their

18:04

race. None of that would actually have

18:06

a material influence on their

18:08

chances of success, whether

18:10

in the political domain or whether in the

18:13

the economic

18:13

domain. Did

18:14

you work out in any way how this could be achievable.

18:16

Does it does it remain a sort of idealistic

18:19

boon? So he he does talk

18:21

about some of what would be involved

18:23

there. I suppose the two main things that

18:25

come up there. On the one

18:27

hand, he talked a little bit about the education

18:29

system. So what he

18:32

envisages there is it's an education system

18:34

that tries to act to overturn

18:37

background inequality. So

18:39

the thought would be that if you've got a society

18:42

where Some some groups

18:44

have advantages that others don't.

18:46

You try and design an education system that

18:48

actually targeted more resources at

18:50

those coming into it from relatively just

18:52

answered background to try to

18:54

equalize life chances. Another

18:56

big part of of that would then

18:59

be the tax system. So

19:01

Rawls', because he's so interested in these

19:04

two different kinds of fair quality of opportunity

19:06

in the political domain and the

19:08

economic domain. He's very worried about

19:10

the intergenerational transmission of advantage,

19:13

the way that well health in one generation

19:15

turns into unfair opportunities

19:18

in the next generation. And he thinks

19:20

that what we need to do is design a tax

19:22

them that tries to to fight against that.

19:24

So he endorses high

19:27

levels of inheritance taxation or

19:29

capital transfer taxation. He

19:31

thinks 4 what we need is a a fiscal

19:34

structure that stops this kind of build up of

19:36

of enormous wealth across generations that

19:38

turns into unfair levels of

19:41

advantage from generation to generation. Thank

19:43

you, Albert. Joe, what

19:46

do we know about the difference principle? Well,

19:49

one

19:49

thing I think we know

19:51

is that it is a highly

19:53

original principle. Rawls'

19:57

was a very modest man. And if you look through

19:59

a theory of justice, virtually every

20:01

idea he

20:02

has, he tries to find someone who had it before

20:04

four. So the the book is just peppered.

20:06

He

20:06

just wanted to show off. Yeah. He didn't want

20:08

to show off. He was a very modest man. But

20:11

he can't find anyone to pin the difference principle

20:13

on as far as I can see. There there are one or two

20:16

shadows 4 shadowings of

20:18

it. And maybe one way of using

20:20

it is that in the British

20:22

Labour Party in the nineteen 4,

20:26

there was 4 debate about equality.

20:30

And some

20:32

people wanted to complete equality

20:34

of income and off. But that lays

20:36

you open to an easy critique

20:38

that equality takes away

20:41

incentives. And so if we divide everything

20:43

who's going go to work. You know, who where

20:46

is the juice that run society

20:48

going come from? So

20:51

these simple theories of equality were not

20:53

really in favor. But the Labour Party

20:56

said inequality is

20:58

just viable as long as it works to everyone's

21:01

advance message. So it has to be

21:03

inequality for the sake of everyone. And

21:05

what I think did was just

21:08

we're still a

21:08

difference. We're on the difference principle. And the

21:10

qualities of income and wealth

21:14

are to be to the advantage of everyone. But

21:16

rawls, I think ratchets up a

21:18

notch and says it's not just that they've got to be

21:20

to the advantage of everyone. They've got to

21:23

make the worst off as well off as possible.

21:25

So if we'll try to judge the

21:28

justice of our society. We

21:31

should look to the income and wealth,

21:33

not of the worst off individual because that could

21:35

give us quite arbitrary results, but but identify

21:38

the worst off group, whoever

21:40

they may be, the lowest paid workers,

21:42

unemployed people, and

21:45

if we could improve their

21:47

position without making anyone else fall

21:49

below where those people were, then

21:52

our society is unjust. So

21:54

just as requires us to make the worst off

21:57

group as well off as possible.

22:00

And as far as I know, no society has

22:02

ever achieved anything. Even

22:04

close to that. So it's not just about redistribution,

22:07

it's not just about high tax, but

22:10

arranging a 4 society where there were

22:12

stuff can flourish as much

22:14

as is possible. What do you think

22:16

if it is an idea? Well,

22:18

it's a lovely idea. Yeah. I think I I'm

22:20

I'm

22:20

pushing do you think would be on that? Is it

22:22

achievable? Well, so I would love

22:24

to live in that society. There

22:26

are several ways in which might not

22:28

be achievable. One is whether it may -

22:31

it's not economically achievable.

22:34

And I don't see any reason to think that

22:37

it couldn't be achievable.

22:39

It may be not through tax

22:41

and transfer. Maybe we'd have to completely

22:43

reorganize society in his

22:45

later work, rawls use

22:47

the idea of a property owning

22:49

democracy. So the idea that we disperse

22:52

wealth. So it's not about redistribution. It's

22:54

allowing everyone on to live their own

22:56

lives to the best of their abilities. So

22:59

I think economically, it's

23:01

a feasible dear for as much as I know about it.

23:04

Politically, it hasn't got a chance.

23:07

And I think this goes back to

23:09

point Martin was making about

23:11

the fair value of political liberties because

23:14

for as long as we've got system which

23:16

allows wealthy people to spend a lot of money

23:18

getting elected, then we're not going

23:20

to have policies that

23:23

redistribute wealth in the way that Rawls' would

23:25

want want. Thank you. Fabienne,

23:28

BTEC. This is Thierry,

23:30

one of our biggest call there, appears

23:33

to go the original

23:34

position. Now can you tell about them.

23:36

Indeed. So the original position is

23:38

one of the many sort of long

23:40

lasting ideas that we find in

23:42

the theory of just this. The theory

23:44

of justice Rawls' pressure drug, I

23:47

would say, of novel ideas,

23:49

ideas that have caught on

23:51

and influence philosophy a great deal.

23:54

The original position is one of them.

23:56

It's a thought experiment that helps

23:58

us to illustrate the

24:00

social contract approach to thinking

24:03

about just society. So

24:05

as I explained earlier, the social contract

24:07

approach that world stakes what

24:09

is the set of principles that persons

24:12

understood as 4 and equal can

24:14

agree to? Now what's this sort

24:16

of agreement that we're talking about here?

24:19

The problem is if we think about

24:21

the agreement starting from

24:23

everyone's actual position in

24:25

society tea. They might be

24:27

biased towards their privilege.

24:29

That's one problem. Or the

24:31

better off might try to buy

24:33

off the worse off to an an overall

24:36

agreement that ends up benefiting the

24:38

better off. So we can't really

24:41

take our actual starting points because

24:43

that there's too much in quality baked

24:45

in the actual society as we

24:47

know it. So the original position

24:49

is a thought experiment that helps us illustrate

24:52

What would an agreement look

24:54

like if it was reached from a starting

24:56

point of equality? And the

24:58

way in which World's South Experiment

25:00

works he thinks we

25:02

can imagine

25:04

ourselves in a position of equality.

25:07

If we imagine that we're thinking about

25:10

the justice society from behind a

25:12

veil of ignorance. This veil

25:14

of ignorance led through

25:16

information about our society

25:19

general, how it works, how the

25:21

economy works, what social dynamics

25:23

are, but it doesn't through any

25:25

information about who we are in that

25:27

society. Hold

25:28

on. So we're all behind

25:30

this bail. That's Right. Everybody. Everybody.

25:33

A set of representatives. Up to charge

25:35

with finding

25:36

justice. Yep. So how does the

25:38

thing Right? Do we take off the vial

25:40

though? Can you just take this

25:42

out? Quick. Like, on a basic

25:44

step forward. Okay. Good. So

25:47

in the first instance, it helps us a straight

25:49

position of equality. So if

25:51

you don't know whether you're rich or poor,

25:54

whether you're what your gender

25:56

identity is, what your races,

25:59

Ben Ward hoped, you'd

26:01

be more inclined to think

26:04

about what justice requires in

26:06

a way that's not biased by your current

26:09

position and that will be helpful in reaching

26:11

an overall agreement. However,

26:13

of course, Being behind

26:15

this veil of ignorance is not helpful

26:17

if we're trying to make these principles

26:19

of justice that we just heard about more concrete.

26:22

So the way in which we'll about it is

26:24

that there's a 4 stage sequence. The

26:26

first stage is what would adjust

26:28

society even look like? That

26:30

deliberation happens behind the veil of

26:33

ignorance. But when we then try to

26:35

make it more concrete than workout

26:37

principles that can be implemented in society,

26:39

this veil is gradually lifted under

26:42

the end at the stage of making laws,

26:44

all information is available. But

26:46

the thought is still the deliberation about

26:48

what should our laws be like.

26:50

It's constrained by an idea of justice

26:53

reached in a deliberative process where

26:55

we're less influenced by our own ideally

26:57

not influenced by our bias

27:00

is or thinking about our

27:02

advantages given our actual positions

27:04

in society.

27:05

Thank you. March, do you want to take that

27:07

one? Yes. So I suppose

27:09

one way thinking about how the vagal

27:11

ignorance functions. It it's

27:13

a sort of radicalization of

27:16

the the social contract relation. It's thinking

27:18

not not what you and would agree to

27:21

if, you know, if you've got some threat advantage

27:24

over me, if I'm sort of worried about what you

27:26

can do to me. If we could strip away anything

27:28

that makes an agreement unfair. So

27:30

the fact that we have different starting points and

27:32

we can get abstract away from all of

27:34

that and then think, well, what would we agree

27:36

to in general terms about the construction

27:39

of our society. That's a way of capturing

27:41

through an idea of of of

27:43

choice or bargaining under conditions of

27:46

of ignorance. It's a way of capturing an idea

27:48

of of impartiality. And

27:50

so if you like,

27:52

it's a kind of the original position behind the

27:54

valobigner. It's something it's something

27:57

that we could enter any of us at any

27:59

time. It's a thought experiment. It's a

28:01

way of trying to give some sort

28:03

of Joe was talking earlier about the

28:05

the ambition and rules for some sort of going

28:07

beyond mere intuitionism. What

28:09

the original position does is it gives you

28:11

a kind of imaginative mechanism

28:14

for turning what might be sort of in Kuwait

28:17

moral intuitions and

28:19

and sort of bundling them towards a definite

28:22

set of a definite procedure

28:24

for getting a set of principles for 4

28:26

how society ought to be governed. And that

28:28

in a way that that takes away all the

28:30

kind of the impure of real world

28:32

agreement that that often

28:34

reflect, as Fabienne was saying, background inequality.

28:36

Joe? So there's one thing we're all says

28:39

I think which helps bring the idea to

28:41

life. And he says imagine

28:44

how you would design society if

28:46

you knew that your enemy was going to assign

28:48

you your place in it. And

28:51

then if I remember correctly, he says

28:53

immediately after that. But we shouldn't reason from false

28:55

premises. So, no, this is

28:57

just a type of heuristic. But the the

28:59

idea is if it's rather

29:01

sweet to think you have an enemy, but assume

29:03

you have an enemy, and that person was assigning

29:05

you a place, you would want to make

29:07

the worst place in society as good as possible.

29:10

And and this Rawls'' idea. If you're

29:12

looking at this in completely partial

29:14

way, not knowing where you're going to end up in society,

29:17

then you would design a just society, he

29:19

thinks. I I mean, to to put it bit

29:22

simply terms. If if you're dividing

29:24

a birthday cake among some children, you

29:27

don't want someone to be choosing the slice

29:29

that they've cut. Right? So

29:31

if you get one child to cut the cake and the other

29:34

child to choose which slice they get,

29:36

that's a way of it. They're gonna cut the missing click

29:38

as possible. And Rawls', it it's

29:40

just that that very simple thought

29:42

about how if you don't get to choose

29:45

which place you occupier in society loyalty.

29:47

But you are choosing what the distribution

29:49

of those places look like. You're going to be as fair

29:51

as possible.

29:52

Yeah. Can I come back to you, Joe?

29:56

What's a distinction between justice and

29:58

fairness? Well, I'm glad you asked

30:00

that question because the

30:02

Rawls' describe his views, justice is fair

30:05

us. And it has left people

30:07

scratching their heads and particularly

30:09

translators. Because in many languages,

30:11

they're actually isn't a distinction as

30:14

far as I know between

30:16

justice and fairness. But

30:18

in the English language, there is difference between

30:21

these terms And the one way

30:23

of thinking about is think about the

30:26

infant school. So

30:28

children in

30:31

their infancy have a very strong

30:33

sense of fairness. Things no. That's

30:35

or rather unfair. Say that's

30:37

unfair. So a four year old might say

30:39

that's unfair. But if the

30:41

same four year old said, if that's unjust,

30:44

we'd be a bit surprised. I think there

30:46

there is a parent or high court

30:48

judge or a philosopher. And so,

30:51

justice seems to have a type

30:53

of depth to us and maybe

30:55

formalism that fairness doesn't.

30:58

So fairness is, for

31:00

rawls, largely a procedural

31:03

matter. So as

31:05

I understand it, I think by justice

31:07

as fairness, he simply means that the way

31:09

that we get to adjust outcome is

31:12

through fair procedures. And the

31:14

original position is a way

31:16

in of ignorance is a way of having a fair procedure.

31:18

And if we get the procedure

31:20

right, then we will get a just outcome at

31:22

the other end. You're nodding away.

31:26

Yes. So the idea of procedural justice

31:28

is an essential contribution of

31:30

Rawls', and it links back to what we said earlier

31:32

about his focus was being on the justice

31:35

of the basic structure of society that is

31:37

the set of society's basic institutions

31:39

because we could also think about justice as

31:42

the justice of person. Right? What is a just

31:44

person? Or we could think about justice

31:46

as what do we or we to

31:48

each other individually, but both

31:51

thought these were all questions

31:53

that we can't really resolve at the social

31:55

level, but we can make progress in

31:57

thinking about justice. If we focus

32:00

on if we adopt a procedural

32:02

idea of justice where we get

32:04

the basic institutions of society right,

32:07

have them being governed by some

32:10

small set of principles of

32:11

justice, and then whatever outcome results

32:13

is And the original

32:15

mean, criticisms of the theory. The

32:17

theory of of the Bay of England. Sorry.

32:19

There are a few I'm

32:22

gonna start, you know, maybe perhaps just mentioned

32:24

some. So one influential set

32:26

of criticisms against the original

32:29

position and the bail of ignorance

32:31

came from a set of social philosophers, which

32:33

were known as the communitarians at the

32:36

time. So

32:38

the issue they had with

32:40

Rawls' is thought experiment moment was

32:43

that one feature of

32:45

the original position, as Rose described

32:47

it, is he thought of people behind the veil

32:49

of ignorance as mutually disinterested. And

32:52

he did that because he thought, well, one of

32:54

the circumstances of justice is

32:56

that we are not all maximally

32:59

altruistic. So it'd be misleading

33:01

to think about a theory of justice that could

33:04

actually be implemented if we imagine

33:06

that we're all moral saints. We all concerned

33:08

about each other and all trying to do the best

33:11

for each other. He thought the problem of

33:13

justice is one that we're not like

33:15

that. But we're not enemies either.

33:17

Right? But so he thought assuming

33:19

the the people behind the veil of ignorance

33:21

is, mutually, this interest is a good starting

33:24

point. But these social philosophers, these

33:26

community herion thought that this is

33:28

a misleading characterization of

33:30

persons, as persons we are inherently

33:32

social beings. We are

33:36

born throughout connections with others, and

33:38

we live good lives throughout

33:40

connections with others. So

33:42

mutual interestness which they

33:44

thought boils

33:47

down to us just being self interested

33:50

in atomistic beings is

33:52

the wrong starting point for thinking about justice.

33:54

I think that's sort of misconstrual of

33:56

rules. He did not think of

33:58

us as optimistic self interested

34:01

being. And the sort of process of rational

34:03

justification he was interested in

34:05

was not one where we tried to satisfy

34:07

our self

34:08

interest. He was very much one that's driven

34:10

by our sense of justice. Jerry,

34:13

aren't you coming? I wanted to mention

34:16

more recent criticism of

34:18

the valid ignorance. Which

34:20

is that it has, in a way, too much

34:22

ignorance. We talked before

34:24

about the political events going on at

34:27

the time Rawls' was writing one of them

34:29

is a civil rights movement. And

34:32

recently, rawls has come under a lot of criticism

34:35

for not really having a discussion

34:37

of racial justice. In the United States.

34:40

And I suppose

34:42

as an undergraduate student

34:44

in this country, I never noticed this,

34:46

but now when it's brought to your attention,

34:49

it's rather staggering that

34:51

he he writes as if one

34:53

of the greatest transformations in in

34:56

his society hadn't

34:58

taken place. And

35:00

one way in which this criticism has been made in

35:02

recent years was from the Jamaican

35:05

philosopher who worked in North America Charles

35:07

Mills. And one way of

35:09

putting it is that Mills thinks we

35:11

need to know some facts about

35:14

history in order to come up with the

35:16

right theory of justice. And

35:18

one way of trying to explain this is,

35:20

say, suppose American society tomorrow

35:23

implemented rawls as principles a justice.

35:26

Would it be a justice society? And

35:29

Mill says, well, no, it wouldn't. Because

35:31

if we're all we're doing is making the

35:34

worst off as well off as possible, and

35:36

racial minorities are the

35:39

worst off. They will still be the

35:41

worst off after the transformation.

35:44

That is the all water won't

35:46

be changed. It will just be the absolute position

35:48

of the people at the bottom. And

35:51

so Rawls' think that it's

35:53

necessary to have more

35:55

knowledge in the original position so

35:57

that steps can be taken to redress historical

36:00

injustice.

36:04

One rejoined to the interesting

36:06

challenge from Rawls' comes from

36:08

an African American philosopher, Tommy

36:10

Shelby, the same name as the

36:12

character in pinky blinders,

36:15

but a different person. And

36:17

Shelby, says, well, look, bear in mind.

36:19

So talks about the lexical priority of

36:21

his principles. So first of all, equal basic liberties

36:23

then pair quality of opportunity than the difference

36:26

principle. Now think of the work that would be

36:28

done by fair quality of opportunity

36:30

or fair value of the political liberties. That

36:32

says, try to get rid of whatever

36:34

the the the influence of whatever

36:36

background conditions it might be that

36:38

stopping people from having a fair set of

36:40

opportunities within that entity. Now

36:43

Rawls' there talks about people

36:45

having the same opportunities regardless of their

36:47

social class of origin. But

36:49

class there is a placeholder Rawls'

36:51

4 what everywhere exist in that society that's

36:54

structuring people's opportunities. So

36:56

a society that was marked

36:58

by race social injustice as

37:00

actually existing societies are, that look

37:03

to implement Rawls' principles,

37:05

would first of all look to to

37:07

address those those existing injustices.

37:09

And that's all mandated there in in the theory.

37:12

The reason that Rawls' doesn't want to build

37:14

that in to the the version

37:17

of of the theory in the book one might think is because

37:19

this is a work of philosophy that's aspiring to

37:21

a certain sorts of generality. As

37:23

soon as one would then think about its application,

37:25

then, of course, the relevant historical and

37:28

sociological facts would would come

37:30

in. So I think that there's it it's a really

37:32

interesting issue, but there's certainly two two different

37:34

kinds of views

37:35

that that one might have. Sure. I mean, you wanted

37:37

to make comments on Whether there's a related set

37:39

of criticisms and Rawls' idea

37:41

of the Bay of ignorance faced from feminist

37:44

philosophers. And so

37:46

while agree with Martin that class

37:49

is a placeholder and

37:51

it is feminist philosophers who

37:53

have, like, some plus

37:56

years of race argued that the veil of ignorance

37:59

obscures too much. It shields us

38:01

from important experiences of

38:03

injustice. For example, ample

38:06

injustice in the family. Susan

38:08

Moller oaken, for example, argued

38:11

that one problem with the of justice

38:13

that it's completely unclear how

38:15

justice in the family is supposed

38:18

to figure, and that should be a

38:20

learned for us given that one source

38:22

of injustice comes within the family with

38:24

a very with very unequal

38:26

divisions of labor, women doing a

38:28

share of -- the maximum share of

38:31

unpaid labor, caring for children and

38:33

so on. Rawls' then responded

38:36

to that, to some extent, a long similar minds

38:38

that when it comes to problems of

38:40

gender justice, for example,

38:43

as they might arise in

38:45

patterns of fun really life, they

38:47

could be addressed by the theory of justice

38:49

and the sort of thinking of the veil of ignorance

38:52

could be helpful here because the thought if you

38:54

don't know whether you're gonna end up

38:56

as your children's father

38:58

or mother, what would you think

39:01

just society acquired, but

39:03

he also saw their limits. Both

39:05

thought, for example, that the principles of

39:07

justice are not designed to apply to

39:10

family life itself only to

39:12

the background condition conditions in which

39:14

people might then form their families

39:16

and conduct their family lives. And

39:18

so on feminist philosophy, so that's not good enough.

39:21

So I think we these issues are

39:23

still, I think, today, unresolved, whether

39:25

it comes to race or gender. The the

39:27

thing your justice

39:28

struggles. Thank you very much. We're coming near

39:30

then, Martin. He's

39:32

been criticized heavily and constant and

39:35

yet he survived. Moment survived. He's

39:37

read the most read by

39:40

your students and alright. Why

39:43

does he continue you in a position

39:45

of such importance when he attracts so

39:47

much criticism?

39:49

That's a great question. I think it it's because

39:52

the project is so ambitious and

39:54

it's so well executed. The

39:56

level of of ambition is to give, you know, a

39:58

general account of what it would be for

40:00

human beings considered as free

40:03

and equal individuals to

40:05

live together under terms that they could

40:07

all accept. So it's an absolutely central

40:09

foundational question. And

40:11

it's one that he then approaches

40:14

with with enormous theoretical

40:17

firepower sophistication and

40:20

moral seriousness. And

40:22

he gives you both a method for thinking

40:24

about this problem, and he gives you an

40:26

account of of the content of of

40:29

an answer. His his two or three principles.

40:32

Now what that does really is

40:34

to set up a huge sort

40:36

of target for people thinking about

40:39

about those issues. So you might be convinced

40:41

by rules, in which case you'd have one

40:43

sort of reaction. Or there might be various

40:46

things in in that project that you that

40:48

you disagree with. But where you find yourself then

40:50

articulating that disagreement with

40:52

reference to Rawls'' rules' attempts

40:55

to do this. So I think it's

40:57

unsurprising given the

40:59

magnitude of the achievement. This really is

41:02

someone who's managed to write something that that

41:04

will be a classic in political philosophy

41:06

that's read for hundreds of years. III

41:09

would confidently bet. And

41:11

it creates then something to push

41:13

again, something to argue with, And

41:16

even if you disagree with it, engaging with

41:18

it, I think helps to to make your thinking

41:20

about matters of justice more

41:22

rich share and follow-up. So I would

41:24

agree with all of that. Just one additional

41:27

comment. So, Martin said there are two

41:29

parts that method

41:31

and the theory. I would suggest

41:34

as a third, which is an argument as

41:36

well. So that Rawls' says that

41:39

the way to think about justice is in

41:41

this new form of social

41:42

contract. If you do

41:44

that, you will get my theory

41:47

So

41:48

that is the argument, and then you can

41:50

separately assess the theory. So there

41:52

are people who disagree with method. There

41:54

are people who agree with the math say you would get

41:56

a different theory and there are people who don't care

41:58

about the method or the argument and

42:00

say let's just look at the theory. So

42:02

people completely different philosophical temperaments

42:05

that are drawn to the same thing. And

42:08

there's been nothing since anything like it.

42:10

So it has a level of ambition and

42:12

there was nothing before it since probably

42:15

John Stewart mill or Henry

42:17

Siggwick. So we go for decades

42:20

without the work of that

42:22

achievement. We might be waiting another

42:24

fifty

42:24

years, one hundred years for the

42:26

next one. So it really is a magnificent peace.

42:29

And it is characteristic of works

42:31

of philosophy that many more people disagree

42:33

with them than agree with them. I couldn't think

42:35

of a better ending. Thank you very much for that.

42:37

Thank you. And thank very much for Fabienne

42:40

Peter, Mr. Hugh Jervolf and Martin

42:42

O'Neill and our Studio engineer, Michael

42:45

Millam. Next week, the charts

42:47

discovered that electrical resistance

42:49

can disappear at very low temperatures

42:51

and why this matters super conductivity.

42:54

Thanks for listening. And the in

42:56

our time podcast gets some extra time

42:58

now with a few minutes of bonus material

43:01

from Melvin and his

43:02

guests. So can I stop by asking

43:04

you? How does he say we assess

43:06

moral claims? Here,

43:08

we have another one of Rawls' us

43:10

main innovations Rawls'. And that's

43:13

the idea of reflective equilibrium. It's

43:15

a hugely influential idea, but it's obviously

43:18

not a household name. So even when I

43:21

introduce the idea of reflective equilibrium to

43:23

my students, it's usually blank faces

43:25

at first. So what

43:28

is this? Why is reflective equilibrium important

43:30

for Rawls'? Well, it's a method

43:32

of justification. It's a method for

43:35

assessing who has a claim

43:37

when it comes to thinking about

43:39

the principles of a just society. Flowers

43:43

often think about justification in

43:46

ways connected to truth and knowledge.

43:49

So 4, when we ask whether you

43:51

should believe something, we might suggest

43:53

that, well, you're justified in believing this thing

43:55

as long as it's true or you have enough evidence

43:58

that it's true or something Rawls',

44:00

that's not the right way of thinking about justification

44:03

in the moral domain. So when it comes to thinking

44:05

about moral claims, he thought

44:07

that truth can divide us. He was

44:09

worried about people's religious commitments

44:12

that if they thought so if we ask them to think

44:14

about justice from within their

44:16

say religious understandings

44:19

of moral claims. We end up

44:21

fighting. We end up fighting about moral truth.

44:23

We end up thinking about religious truth,

44:25

and that goes back to what Martin

44:28

was saying earlier about his experiences of society.

44:31

So he device a different method

44:33

one that again sort of captures

44:35

the social contract idea that what justifies

44:38

a set of principles of justice is an agreement

44:41

between per understood as equal. So

44:43

what's the connection between agreement and justification?

44:46

That's the key question. And Rawls'

44:48

thought that we can think about justification,

44:51

not in relation to a search for truth,

44:53

but instead of achieving coherence

44:56

between our moral ideas at

44:59

different levels of generality. So

45:02

we might think that to use an example

45:05

from current society, the

45:07

current levels of poverty are

45:09

morally wrong. Like, that would be a particular

45:11

moral judgment, and we might feel quite strongly

45:13

about that. That might something don't easily want

45:16

to get give up. At

45:18

the more general level, we might think a

45:20

society should offer call

45:22

opportunities, or we might think that

45:24

a a society should be married or creating

45:26

a sort of mid level principles. And

45:28

then there's further level of abstractions of

45:30

general theories. Rawls' thought

45:32

that the right way of thinking about what is

45:34

this right set of principles, what

45:37

moral claims should count is

45:39

by trying to reach a coherence across

45:41

these judgments that we think are the

45:43

right ones at different levels of of

45:45

generality. In addition, he

45:48

thought reflective equilibrium isn't

45:50

just something we can achieve individually by

45:52

going back and forth without anything being

45:55

given, trying to create a consistent

45:58

model view. We can't just

46:00

do that individually. We also do this

46:02

in person least. So the way he

46:04

labeled this as a full reflective equilibrium.

46:07

That's a reflective equilibrium reached

46:10

by a set of people. So

46:12

if we agree across

46:14

people that a certain

46:17

set of principle justice is the right one.

46:19

That's a full reflect active equilibrium. That

46:22

defines which moral claims

46:24

we should honor in society.

46:27

I suppose one thing, it might

46:29

be useful mention is the degree

46:31

to which rules is or isn't a critic of capitalism.

46:34

And think this is something that that's perhaps

46:36

come to be better understood more recently.

46:39

In part because Rawls' Royce's view

46:42

over the course of his life actually seemed to harden

46:44

somewhat and become a bit more disappointed about

46:47

the direction of travel of world

46:49

he was in. So we we talked at

46:51

the outset about the context in the nineteen sixties

46:53

and seventies of the society that in some ways

46:56

was making strides towards greater quality

46:58

and where one might have seen Rawls' theory

47:01

as as just a call for for an acceleration

47:03

of tendencies that that were already be

47:05

there. But I think in in the world

47:08

that we've seen in the last forty years in

47:10

the the the neo liberal period,

47:12

if you like, we've we've moved further and further

47:14

away from something like a just society

47:16

by Rawls'' likes. And I think in

47:18

response to that, rules' own view

47:21

became more more explicitly

47:23

critical of capitalism. So as as Joe

47:25

mentioned earlier, he he

47:27

came to emphasize more the fact that

47:29

familiar kinds of redistributive

47:32

capitalist welfare states, even if they do

47:35

quite a good job of looking after the

47:37

the lease well off, aren't really getting as

47:39

close enough to adjust society. So

47:41

he talked on the one hand about what he called

47:43

property owning democracy, which would be a

47:45

kind of markets economy with

47:48

a a very broad distribution of

47:50

holdings of wealth and

47:52

capital. Or on the other hand, he also

47:54

talked about the idea of a liberal socialist

47:57

regime, which would be more of

47:59

a an economy with more public and collective

48:01

ownership. But but with the same kind

48:03

of protections of individual liver

48:06

tease that he thought were needed

48:08

for just society. So when

48:11

rules actually turn towards thinking about institutions

48:13

and thinking Rawls' existing sets of

48:15

of economic and political regimes.

48:18

He, interestingly, was

48:21

very critical both of sort of

48:23

Soviet style command economies, but

48:25

also of of his own

48:27

country, of the US, as a

48:29

kind of market society that that simply

48:31

wasn't doing enough to move towards

48:34

realization of of his principles. And

48:36

actually, given given various various

48:38

of its structural features, maybe couldn't do

48:40

enough to move towards just society.

48:43

So I think while Paul

48:45

Rawls'' ubiquitousness in

48:47

in academic discussions has

48:49

maybe made him like, quite a familiar intellectual

48:52

figure. I think it would be a mistake to

48:54

think of him as a theorist of the the status

48:56

quo. He's actually someone with quite a

48:58

radical critique of the kind of societies

49:01

we're in. And he's someone who's really pointing

49:03

towards a a very different kind of

49:05

economic settlement and a much more equal

49:07

kind of society than the ones that

49:09

we're in at the moment? Sure. Sure.

49:12

I agree with what has been said.

49:15

There's another question. Of course, about

49:17

Rawls'' influence on policy

49:19

outside the academy. And,

49:21

you know, whether rawls in ideas

49:24

have been taken up. And, of

49:26

course, in some we've gone in the other direction.

49:28

So when Rawls' was writing

49:31

in marginal tax rates in

49:33

the UK and the U. S. At some points

49:35

in the 90s, ninety

49:37

percent it's hard to reconstruct that

49:39

particularly for the U. S. But it

49:41

was true after the war. Marginal tax

49:43

rates were very high. They've come down and down and down.

49:46

So in some ways, it looks like the

49:48

legacy is the opposite of what

49:50

one would have hoped if one was

49:52

rules. But on the

49:54

other hand, I think there are ways in

49:56

which we can see it's either rules and influence

49:59

in public policy to some extent. Because

50:02

many many people have read a theory of justice

50:05

and have gone into public life

50:08

and gone into service or

50:10

similar roles around the world.

50:13

And I think there's a shift whether it's caused

50:15

by rules or just

50:17

more generally moving away

50:19

from a type of utilitarian maximization

50:23

approach. The idea that what we should do is is

50:25

create the greatest benefit but

50:27

rather think about how policies affect

50:29

the worst off. So in this country,

50:33

political parties right and left.

50:35

Want pay attention, special attention

50:37

to the people who are the least advantaged in

50:40

society. So I see this

50:42

as a slight shift in a Rawls'

50:44

direction. I mean, no one is saying we should make

50:46

the worst off as well off as possible. But

50:50

every party wants to improve the position of

50:52

the worst off even if it's not

50:54

cost effective in utilitarian

50:56

terms. I think we have seen a

50:58

small but significant movement

51:00

there. Well, I suppose one idea that

51:02

hasn't come up yet, but it was absolutely essential

51:05

in thinking, was the idea of democracy.

51:08

We talked about the social contract edition

51:10

and the the idea

51:12

of natural rights, but also,

51:15

in his thinking, especially also as his

51:17

thinking developed later on, thought

51:19

that all we need is a commitment

51:21

to democracy because of key

51:23

feature of democracy is that everyone

51:25

is seen as an equal. So that's we need.

51:27

We don't need more baggage here, theoretical

51:29

baggage in terms of who we are

51:31

as persons is enough that we

51:34

think of our society as committed to democracy

51:36

and to the idea of equality that comes with that.

51:39

Of course, that raises a difficult question today.

51:41

Are we still equally committed to democracy?

51:44

And if

51:44

not, how does that affect the

51:46

chances of sort of project that Rawls'

51:49

are pursued. So are we as

51:51

committed to democracy as Rawls'? Well, as

51:53

well, I think, you know, there there's a lot of

51:55

evidence now, particularly from the United States that

51:58

younger people are not so

52:00

concerned about democracy. And

52:03

given the qualities of the democracies they've

52:05

been experiencing, you can see why disillusion

52:08

may come in. I mean, the Rawls'

52:10

response will be to try to improve democracy

52:12

rather than to to move move

52:15

on. But democracy is very important for

52:17

Rawls', but but it does give a dilemma. There

52:20

was a type of criticism haven't talked

52:22

about that that Rawls' is

52:25

setting out his principles of justice for

52:28

the Just Society. So that raises

52:30

a question about what would democracy

52:33

be doing if rawls has already given us

52:35

the answers? So rawls has told us what

52:37

a just society is. So what are we

52:39

voting about? Now is it is democracy

52:41

just about the most efficient way of achieving

52:44

Rawls' as goals. Well, if so,

52:47

then that does seem rather boring.

52:49

So there was a line of criticism probably from

52:51

the nineteen seventies and eighties. I think

52:54

Benjamin Barber wrote a book called The Conquest

52:56

of Democracy. I think it was quite interesting

52:58

to say that, you know, the goal of the major

53:01

political philosophers is more or less to solve

53:03

problems once and for whereas there's

53:05

a more democratic and says, well, it's changing.

53:07

The issues are changing. Nothing is the

53:09

final answer to anything,

53:12

and so we constantly need to refresh politics.

53:15

So I think we've seen in some interpretations of

53:17

Rawls', both of those ideas, yes, you have a theory

53:19

and you have democracy. And I don't think

53:21

they sit brilliantly well

53:23

together. I've spoken a an

53:26

opposing view to to Joe's

53:28

worry there might be that that actually

53:30

the the importance of democracies.

53:33

They're right at the center of the whole Rawls' project.

53:36

So it's a way of thinking about how do

53:38

you have a set of institutions for free and equal

53:40

people who are going to live together on terms that

53:42

they can all they can all agree

53:44

to. Now, it's gonna be absolutely foundational

53:46

to that, that's going to be a democratic society

53:49

where everyone gets to participate

53:51

in the development of

53:54

that society over time and to think together

53:56

about how it's going to to evolve. And

53:58

so the the kind of democratic protections that

54:00

are built into the first principle of that are very

54:02

sort of central to what rules is still

54:05

thing that's really sort of foundational to its project.

54:07

And I think I mean, in response to

54:09

to Joe's worry, and and, usually, the

54:12

the earrings now have been about you know,

54:14

are we at a point where there's there's a sort of decline

54:16

of confidence in in democracy? There's

54:19

a very interesting discussion of that by the

54:21

American philosopher Tamiel Sheffler from

54:23

New York University where he he has

54:25

a a paper where he talks about the

54:28

Rawls' diagnosis of Donald Trump.

54:30

And the thought there is, well,

54:33

if if liberal democracy looks like

54:35

it's in trouble, is that in some

54:37

way a kind of disprove

54:39

of our best theories of what

54:41

a a just liberal society

54:44

might look like. And Çöpler says, well,

54:46

no, it's really it's really the opposite. What

54:48

Rawls' else gives you is an account of

54:50

what a society in its

54:52

main institutions. I mean, Fabienne was

54:54

was emphasizing, you know, that the idea of basic

54:57

structure, the main institutions of

54:59

your society. What do they owe to the members of

55:01

that society? Well, what

55:03

they owe such Rawls' is something quite quite

55:05

close to his principles. And

55:08

that embodies the sort of attitude of reciprocity.

55:11

You look at your fellow citizens. You look at the

55:13

institutions you live under. And think, yeah,

55:15

I'm being treated here in a kind of reciprocal

55:17

way, and I can affirm my allegiance

55:20

to these institutions because they're realizing something

55:22

really valuable among me and my

55:24

fellow citizens. Now when

55:26

those institutions have broken down

55:28

to to the point where there's

55:30

runaway levels of inequality where

55:33

there's terrible inequality in regard

55:36

to who has political and who

55:38

doesn't. When you're so far away from

55:40

the main commitment to the theory, that

55:42

idea that you're actually living with

55:44

others under turn to let capacity is

55:46

gone. And it's unsurprising then

55:48

in a way that that would lead to a certain kind

55:50

of of disillusioned. So think there's

55:52

there's a a kind of democratic ambition

55:54

in Rawls' for for what's

55:57

valuable about having institutions that

55:59

embody that that idea of

56:01

of people as free and equal living under

56:03

fair and reciprocal terms. And

56:06

and Rawls' a lot of the the pathologies of

56:08

our current societies are

56:10

ones that that really start to happen

56:12

when you move so far away from that that

56:15

kind of ideal of of justice.

56:17

Yeah. Just to to the points

56:19

that Joanne Martin were making that

56:21

indeed Rawls' think that the conundrum

56:24

that Joe raised about

56:26

how is this idea that

56:28

justice is the result of an

56:30

agreement between people

56:32

on the one and well based on democracy really compatible

56:35

with democracy. It was after all democracy is there

56:37

to resolve some of our problems. Right? And I

56:39

would say, yes, the solution here is also to think

56:41

about the principles of justice and applying applying

56:43

to the basic structure of society, but that

56:45

still leaves quite a lot for democracy to decide

56:48

and indeed leaves us a need

56:50

of a vibrant democratic society

56:53

tackle these problems for all sorts of reasons.

56:55

So I do think that's the right

56:57

answer. The level that Rawls'

56:59

thinks of the Principles of Justice applying

57:02

to is as

57:04

if we're about to have a constitutional

57:07

consensus. So these principles

57:09

that are even deeper than the constitution.

57:12

So once we've got the principles, actually,

57:14

there's a lot of work to work out what our

57:16

day to day life would be

57:17

like.

57:17

Do you want to comment So one thing that

57:20

hasn't come up yet in terms of his legacy,

57:22

we were just talking about how

57:24

hugely influential roles the leader of justice

57:26

was within political philosophy and how to

57:28

some extent both became a victim of his own

57:31

success. Right? Because it's successful,

57:33

people pushed back against it. But there's

57:35

further think Rose was also incredibly

57:38

influential through his brilliant

57:40

students. And he this

57:42

influence wasn't just in political philosophy

57:45

even though some of his brilliant students

57:47

were in political philosophy, but others

57:49

were in moral philosophy. And

57:52

one thing that's really remarkable about

57:54

Rose's and students that so many of them

57:56

were women. That is remarkable

57:58

because philosophy is one of those fields

58:00

still now where there aren't a

58:02

lot of women, it's still a field, quite dummy

58:04

nated by men. But

58:07

Rawls' for how however he did

58:09

it managed to have exceptionally successful

58:12

student who were women. So

58:15

in political philosophy, philosophers who

58:17

went on to work sort

58:19

of broadly in the in tradition, but pursuing

58:21

agendas, very much their own were Elizabeth

58:23

Anderson, who worked on equality,

58:26

Michel, Moody Allen Adams, who

58:28

worked on political move women's,

58:30

social justice, including on race.

58:33

And then Jean Hampton, who

58:35

worked on the social contract edition, unfortunately,

58:38

she tried quite early.

58:40

But any moral philosophy, quite

58:43

a large number of rules of student

58:46

developed his sort of kantian ideas.

58:48

I mentioned, Cammed earlier as one of his influences.

58:51

And 4

58:53

like Christine Corsgaard, Barbara Hermann,

58:56

and Anora Neil who's

58:58

was a philosopher at Cambridge. I mean, she's

59:00

still a philosopher who's no longer active at

59:02

Cambridge. They all went on

59:04

to develop the Cancun aspects

59:06

of Rawls' work, again, put

59:09

forward their own mall theories

59:11

and had had a relieved of

59:13

invigorating effect on law of

59:15

philosophy and on banking ethics in particular.

59:18

You spoke to rules. What happened then? Yes.

59:21

And when I had the fortune of being supervised

59:24

by him in my doctoral work when I

59:26

was a visit student at Harvard.

59:28

I was in ninety four, ninety five, and he was

59:30

still active then. And so

59:33

one of the conversations we had concerned

59:35

the impact his theory of justice had

59:38

on American society. And

59:40

it was interesting how to

59:43

see how disappointed that he was. That

59:45

relates back to things both Joe and

59:47

Martin said earlier, not disappointed

59:50

in sort of germanic

59:52

sense why did people not take my fear

59:54

of justice more seriously? But rather,

59:57

he really dedicated his life to

59:59

try and come up with a team of assets that could

1:00:01

be implemented and they thought that precisely

1:00:04

because the initial commitments are so minimal,

1:00:06

all you need is be committed to a democracy

1:00:08

and look what follows, right, an attractive

1:00:10

set of principles of justice. And

1:00:12

yet society, if anything, had

1:00:15

moved further way

1:00:17

from the sort of tendency towards the quality

1:00:19

that we saw after the second world war when

1:00:21

Rawls' started thinking about these

1:00:23

issues. So that was major disappointment

1:00:25

to him, which was, yeah, sad.

1:00:27

Did

1:00:27

you make him think about demanding his theory?

1:00:30

I think it was more hope in the society, but somehow

1:00:32

men

1:00:35

Here's a producer, same as all straight.

1:00:37

Would anyone like to your coffee? Oh,

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1:00:42

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1:00:43

t's, Melvin. Two t's. Thank you very

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much. In our time with Melvin

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