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0:57

Ah. Welcome to Intelligence Squared, where

1:01

great minds meet. I'm head of programming, Connor Boyle. Coming

1:03

up on the podcast, Annie Jacobson, the

1:06

investigative journalist and author whose books

1:08

tell factual stories about Warcraft and

1:10

the government's secrecy that surrounds it,

1:12

but they simultaneously read like unput

1:15

downable thrillers. It's not surprising then

1:17

that her Pulitzer-nominated work can

1:20

be found in both journalistic pieces and

1:22

fiction, including Tom Clancy's Jack Ryan

1:24

TV show Previous

1:27

books have covered topics ranging from the CIA

1:29

to Area 51 and the Second World War.

1:31

Her latest book is Nuclear War, A Scenario. And

1:35

recently she joined Josh Clancy, editor

1:37

of the news review at the Sunday Times, to

1:39

talk about it. Our guest today is Annie

1:42

Jacobson. I think, Annie, I first came across

1:44

your work. You wrote

1:46

a book about Area 51, didn't you? Yes, I

1:48

did. About 13, well, 13 or 14

1:50

years ago. And

1:53

it's fair to say you tend to... be

2:00

very interested in and work on what one

2:02

might say are the sort of the margins

2:04

of American defense life, be

2:07

it Area 51, you've looked at DARPA and sort

2:09

of some of the kind of SIOP stuff they

2:11

do. And now you've written a

2:13

book about nuclear war called

2:16

very simply nuclear war scenario. I

2:18

wouldn't recommend reading it just before

2:20

bed. It's

2:22

quite a tough alarming read.

2:25

And in it, you basically

2:27

outline what a

2:30

potential nuclear war might look like. You

2:32

pull no punches. This is obviously an

2:35

imaginary scenario, but it's based on very deep

2:37

reporting clearly. And you made that clear in

2:39

the book. You've spoken to all

2:41

sorts of people who have been responsible for

2:43

this scenario, this kind of doomsday planning over

2:46

many years. And the result is

2:49

a sort of terrifying but somehow

2:51

plausible scenario of what an

2:54

unfolding nuclear attack might look like. And in

2:56

the book, it has strike on America on

2:58

Washington DC from North Korea.

3:01

So it's a fascinating, it's very gripping

3:03

read, you've written in it in quite a kind of almost

3:06

like a thriller, although it's obviously all reached

3:08

in in reporting and facts, conceptual

3:11

facts, at least. But tell me, presumably, you've

3:13

been working on this for several years, we

3:15

are currently in a sort of state

3:18

of world affairs where I

3:20

don't think we're in the greater of

3:23

nuclear war, particularly today, but there is

3:25

certainly the the atmosphere around the debate

3:27

around nuclear war has changed. Since

3:30

Russia's invasion of Ukraine, we

3:33

now have a nuclear power involved in a

3:35

major war that is not always winning.

3:37

So when did you decide to write this book? And

3:40

I think more critically, why? So

3:43

as an investigative journalist, who

3:46

writes about war weapons, national

3:48

security and secrets, I

3:51

previously written six books on

3:54

military and intelligence programs, the

3:56

CIA, the Pentagon, DARPA,

3:58

Area 51. All

4:01

of these programs designed to

4:03

prevent nuclear World War

4:05

III. I can't tell

4:07

you how many of my sources have shared exactly

4:09

that with me, sort of with a sense of

4:12

pride saying, you know, we

4:14

prevented nuclear World War III. And

4:17

during the previous

4:19

administration's sort of

4:21

rhetoric, President Trump's rhetoric

4:23

around fire and

4:26

fury and the North Korean,

4:28

this idea of nuclear button

4:30

that came up with North

4:32

Korea. I began

4:35

to really think about my long

4:37

history of reporting on nuclear weapons

4:40

as a preventative means. And

4:43

I began to ask the question of

4:45

myself, what would happen if deterrence failed?

4:48

And then I took that exact

4:51

question to the highest

4:54

level national security

4:56

people that I could locate

4:58

to speak on the subject. And

5:00

what I found shocked me.

5:03

And that is the result of all that

5:05

reporting is nuclear war scenario. And

5:08

before we get into the scenario

5:10

that you outline and the reporting

5:12

you did, you're obviously

5:16

someone who's attracted to the kind of the

5:19

deep or the hidden side of defense

5:22

and of military capabilities and

5:25

the what if. And

5:28

what do you think it is that has drawn you to this

5:31

story and to these kinds of very

5:35

dark and little

5:37

known issues that sort of live almost

5:39

in the substrate of our society? I

5:42

myself am very curious and

5:44

I am always asking questions.

5:47

When someone says, okay, this is a dumb

5:49

question, I almost always butt in and say

5:51

there is no such thing as a dumb

5:53

question. I suppose

5:55

that my trajectory as a national security

5:57

person is very, very important.

6:00

security reporter has been, well,

6:02

it's been my own, I don't know if it's been unique,

6:04

but I know for certain that I'm

6:06

often up against what I perceive to

6:08

be sort of a status

6:11

quo in reporting, you know, ask this question,

6:13

not this question, don't touch upon that issue,

6:15

don't mention that issue. And that's just simply

6:17

not interesting to me. I want to know

6:19

what is unknowable. I'll

6:22

give you an example. I wrote a

6:24

book called Surprise Kill Vanish on the

6:26

CIA's paramilitary. And I

6:29

reported on Title 50, which is

6:31

what gives the CIA the

6:33

authority to basically do whatever

6:35

they want in a

6:37

certain lane of national security on

6:39

direct orders from the president. And

6:42

initially when I began reporting that, oh, Annie, don't report

6:44

on Title 50. Well, I did. And

6:47

now if I notice often

6:49

in regular mainstream sort of more

6:51

legacy press, you will see

6:53

people mentioning Title 50. And

6:56

I say to myself, goal achieved, you

6:59

know, bring the facts to the public

7:01

and then let people

7:04

begin to unearth what

7:06

I see as the more important,

7:09

you know, you called them the margins. I

7:11

just called them that which is hidden because

7:14

I always think that which is hidden

7:16

is far more interesting

7:18

than just regurgitating an opinion

7:21

about a set of facts that most people are

7:23

already well familiar with. And I certainly

7:26

do that in nuclear war. A lot

7:28

of people have asked me, how could

7:30

you bring this reporting? It

7:32

must be classified. And

7:34

you know, when you look at my list of

7:36

sources, which I on purpose put in the front

7:38

of the book, multiple secretaries of defense, Obama's

7:41

FEMA director, that would be the organization

7:43

in charge of taking care of the

7:46

people after a nuclear war, a

7:49

former director of strategic command.

7:51

That's who's in charge of

7:53

the nukes, a former nuclear

7:55

submarine force commander. You

7:57

see that I went.

8:00

straight to those in

8:02

the know and ask them

8:04

to take me up to the

8:06

razor's edge of what can be

8:08

known so that I can present

8:10

it to the public so that

8:12

the public can understand just how

8:15

crazy nuclear war would be. Did

8:17

I ever think when I began

8:19

reporting this book in the early

8:21

days of the pandemic that we

8:23

would be in a situation now

8:25

where nuclear armed nations are threatening

8:27

nuclear use? No, but it

8:29

makes me very grateful that I reported

8:32

this book when I did. Yeah, because

8:34

in a way, I mean, there's lots of ways to read this

8:36

book, but one way to read it is as

8:38

clearly as a warning that

8:41

you actually, it's one thing to know

8:43

that nuclear war would be awful. It's another thing to

8:45

actually read some of your descriptions in that

8:47

book. And,

8:52

you know, in many ways, the

8:54

starting point for this is Hiroshima

8:57

and Nagasaki. So, you know, the

9:00

one occasion in history where weapons

9:04

of this kind of this level of destruction

9:06

have been deployed. Did

9:10

you take, did you go to visit Hiroshima

9:12

and Nagasaki? Did you kind of immerse yourself

9:15

in that as a starting

9:17

point in the descriptions of what happened then

9:19

and how did that sort of act

9:22

in terms of as a kind of foundation

9:24

for your work here? You know, one of

9:26

the most shocking parts

9:28

about the effects of atomic

9:31

weapons at Hiroshima

9:33

and Nagasaki that I think

9:35

you're referring to, and you can really

9:37

nerd out on this if you go to the footnotes

9:39

of my book, the the

9:42

effects on people and

9:45

on things were

9:47

compiled by members of the

9:49

U.S. military in

9:51

the immediate aftermath of those atomic

9:53

weapons. The third degree burns

9:56

on people, the total

9:58

destruction of buildings. by

10:00

secondary fires. Radiation poisoning,

10:02

which at the time was completely

10:04

unknown and was just called disease

10:07

X. But again,

10:09

I just lightly touch upon

10:11

Hiroshima and Nagasaki from

10:14

a historical perspective in what's essentially the

10:16

section of the book that says how

10:18

we got here. And that is

10:20

the sort of prelude leading up to where

10:23

we are when this hypothetical scenario

10:25

would begin. But to your

10:27

point about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, how

10:30

horrifically gruesome that I know and

10:33

was able to relay these details

10:35

about what nuclear weapons do to

10:37

people and to things in

10:40

grotesque and appalling detail that

10:42

I'm glad horrified you. I

10:46

know them because they are sourced

10:48

from Defense Department documents, thick

10:51

tomes that are now called things

10:53

like the effects of nuclear weapons

10:55

and other very sterilized titles. I

10:58

footnote them in the book, but that

11:00

began as Army manual number

11:02

50 when scientists

11:06

began compiling these effects back

11:08

in 1945 in the aftermath

11:10

of the first and

11:14

only atomic bombs that have been

11:16

used in war thus far.

11:19

Yeah, it's one of the many

11:21

scary things in this book is you

11:24

describe the difference between

11:26

the kinds of weapons that were the bombs that were

11:28

dropped back in 1945 and the kind of bombs

11:31

that you're talking about that

11:34

exist today and could be exist today. I wanted you to

11:36

just describe to us the

11:38

difference in scale that we're talking about there.

11:41

So for readers who aren't familiar with

11:43

the difference between an atomic bomb and

11:46

a thermonuclear bomb, which by the way

11:48

is just about everyone on the planet

11:50

besides national security wonks

11:52

and is an important part of

11:54

this book, bringing this information in

11:56

layman's terms to the people. So

12:00

an atomic bomb, 15 kilotons

12:02

at Hiroshima, for example, when

12:05

you think about a thermonuclear

12:07

weapon, the power

12:10

and scale is almost unimaginable.

12:12

Here's the best way I can describe it. A

12:15

thermonuclear bomb has an

12:18

atomic bomb inside the

12:20

weapon, which is used

12:22

as a fuse. And

12:24

that description comes to

12:26

me directly from Richard Garwin,

12:28

now 93, who is the man who

12:31

drew the plans for

12:35

the first thermonuclear bomb. People

12:37

think, oh, Edward Teller is

12:39

the father of the thermonuclear

12:41

bomb. Yes, in theory, but

12:44

Teller couldn't figure out a

12:46

way to make his theory

12:48

actually explode with

12:50

the kind of power that the Defense Department

12:52

was looking for. It was a young Richard

12:54

Garwin, he was in his early 20s

12:57

at the time when he drew those

12:59

plans that actually worked. And Garwin

13:01

described to me that power, and I relay it

13:03

in the book, and it just

13:05

sort of makes your head spin. I mean,

13:08

the center point is 180

13:10

million degrees. That's five times hotter

13:12

than the center

13:17

of the sun. And so

13:19

I wonder if you might take us

13:21

through a very

13:23

short version of the strike that

13:25

you describe in the book. I

13:28

used to live in Washington, DC, which is where the

13:30

strike you imagine lands.

13:32

So it was particularly harrowing for me because

13:34

I was one of the people who would

13:37

have been radiated in this

13:40

imaginary scenario. But talk

13:42

us through what happens very

13:44

briefly in the book and how

13:48

the scenario might unfold. I wonder if

13:50

you could give us a quick pracy.

13:52

So the very short condensed scenario, and

13:55

there's quite a lot of technology

13:57

involved, goes like this. It's a

14:00

spring afternoon and

14:03

a ICBM

14:05

launch is detected coming

14:07

out of North Korea. And

14:10

the way it's detected is by a very

14:14

intense technological system in

14:16

space called SIBRS. It

14:19

stands for Space-Based Infrared

14:21

Satellite System. The Defense

14:23

Department sees the

14:25

launch within a fraction of

14:27

a second. And you begin

14:30

to understand just how fast all this

14:32

unfolds when you realize in a split

14:34

second that the Defense Department has spent

14:36

$8 trillion having a kind of Paul

14:39

Revere in space. And

14:41

so you have launch and then

14:43

within a matter of seconds that

14:45

information, that data is sent

14:48

down from space to different facilities

14:50

in the United States, all part

14:52

of this nuclear command and control system.

14:55

One of them is called the

14:57

Aerospace Data Facility in Colorado. Its

14:59

very existence was classified until

15:02

2008. You

15:04

have the Space Force involved. You

15:06

have NORAD. You have an immediate

15:08

alert in three nuclear command

15:11

bunkers across America.

15:13

Cheyenne Mountain is of course famous for

15:16

movies. That's in Colorado. The

15:18

Pentagon, there's a bunker beneath the

15:20

Pentagon called the National

15:22

Military Command Center. And

15:25

there's a bunker in the middle of the

15:27

United States at STRATCOM. That's Strategic

15:29

Command, the organization in charge of

15:32

the nuclear weapons. And

15:34

that's in a bunker beneath Offit

15:36

Air Force Base in Nebraska. And

15:39

suddenly the system goes into effect.

15:41

Why? All of these

15:43

organizations must now prepare for two

15:45

things. One, they need

15:48

secondary confirmation, which will happen from

15:50

ground radar systems in a matter

15:52

of minutes. And two,

15:54

they have to prepare to brief

15:56

the president. And this is

15:59

where things really get heated because you

16:01

quickly learn that it's just a

16:03

matter of minutes, maybe five, maybe

16:06

six, when the President of the

16:08

United States is informed that

16:10

a nuclear missile is on the way. Why?

16:13

Because America has a policy called

16:15

launch on warning. It's exactly

16:18

like it sounds. We do

16:20

not wait to absorb a nuclear

16:22

blow to launch

16:24

a counterattack if someone dares

16:26

launch nuclear weapons at us.

16:28

That's the whole theory of

16:30

deterrence. We do not wait. We

16:33

launch before the nuclear weapon hits

16:36

the United States. That's

16:38

policy. And that policy,

16:40

while it may seem very

16:43

muscular and an inherent

16:46

part of deterrence, this idea, don't

16:48

you dare hit us, I

16:50

wanted to show what happens when

16:52

deterrence fails. And

16:54

then we really get going here in this scenario

16:57

once the President is briefed and once that secondary

16:59

confirmation comes in. This may sound like a stupid

17:01

question, but- There's no such thing as a stupid

17:03

question. There's no such thing, so I'll ask it.

17:06

How would they know that an incoming

17:08

missile was a nuclear weapon as opposed

17:11

to just a missile? How

17:14

would they be talking about exactly

17:16

what they were dealing with? I

17:18

have the President ask that exact question. When

17:23

you get to nerd out for a few brief seconds

17:25

here, and I explained to you, as it was explained

17:27

to me about missiles, we begin

17:29

to very quickly realize, oh, a

17:32

ballistic missile is

17:34

a missile that takes approximately 30

17:37

minutes to get from one side of the world to

17:39

the other. It's a

17:41

giant rocket with a nuclear

17:44

weapon in its nose cone.

17:46

That is what ballistic missiles

17:48

are designed for. They

17:51

occur in three phases of flight.

17:53

Again, this stuff has just been mapped

17:56

out by the Pentagon ad

17:58

infinitum, although most know

18:00

it, the first five minutes are what's called

18:02

boost phase. That's when you can see the

18:04

hot rocket exhaust coming out the back of

18:06

the rocket. The next 20

18:09

minutes are what is called

18:11

mid-course phase, and that's when

18:13

the missile, rather the warhead,

18:15

is just flying through space

18:17

about 500 miles

18:19

above the Earth. And

18:23

it continues on its trajectory all the

18:25

way until the remaining 100

18:29

seconds, where the warhead

18:31

enters terminal phase and

18:33

then detonates on its target. So

18:36

it's literally 24, 25, 30, 33 minutes from launch to

18:38

target. So you can imagine now how

18:44

that kind of a missile

18:47

is tracked in space, which

18:50

is what would indicate that it

18:52

is a ballistic missile en route

18:54

to the United States. Very specifically,

18:56

it's being tracked. But

18:58

to your question, how do we

19:00

know it's a nuclear weapon in

19:03

the nose cone? There is no answer. And

19:05

that's why I have the president ask that

19:07

in this scenario. And the answer is who

19:10

on Earth would be foolish enough to send

19:12

a ballistic missile at the United States if

19:15

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netsuite.com/squared netsuite.com/squared. Yeah

23:00

it would be a slightly risky prank wouldn't it?

23:04

You know reading your book at

23:07

times you always have to sort of

23:09

pinch yourself to think that we've created

23:11

these weapons and it can shock

23:14

you sometimes even though it's something we've

23:17

all grown up with but one

23:19

thing that also took me

23:21

aback was I think

23:24

on some level we

23:26

all like to think that there's a

23:28

defense system in place. You know there have

23:31

been various defense systems over the years there was

23:33

Star Wars under Reagan and and

23:36

various others you know and we do see rocket

23:38

defense systems say in Israel they use the Iron

23:40

Dome defense system to shoot down rockets so perhaps

23:44

in the back of my mind I like

23:46

to think that somewhere deep in a bunker

23:48

somewhere in you know the middle of America

23:50

there are things that

23:52

can shoot down missiles. In

23:55

Theory. That's true, but as you outline in your

23:58

book, we're very, very bad at it.. That

24:00

way, and so. The likelihood is

24:02

that America wouldn't be able to

24:04

see down. Incoming. Missiles. That

24:06

right? You

24:08

know you're not alone in that sort

24:10

of preconception. I was at a dinner

24:13

party one up in the early days

24:15

of reporting this book where I mentioned

24:17

when I was working on and someone

24:19

who wasn't more knowledgeable then you know,

24:21

not said needs the effect of oh

24:23

and don't be silly, we have an

24:25

interceptor missile system for that we would

24:27

shoot that. That's just like. The Iron

24:29

Dome. And of course, as I learned

24:32

in my reporting, that's complete fantasy. In

24:35

as much that we have

24:37

a total of. Forty Four

24:39

interceptor missiles. And

24:42

when you consider that the

24:44

United States has one thousand,

24:46

seven hundred and seven the

24:48

weapons nuclear weapons that are

24:50

ready for launch and Russia

24:53

has approximately the same number

24:55

essentially ready for launch with

24:57

a couple thousand more and

24:59

reserve, you realize that Forty

25:01

four missiles against more than

25:04

a thousand of them is

25:06

not a great ratio. Even

25:08

one nuclear missile coming in

25:10

is gonna. Run into problems. Or

25:13

rather the interceptor system is gonna

25:15

run into problems trying to take

25:17

out one nuclear missile as I

25:19

describe in my book because it's

25:21

success rate hovers around sixty percent

25:23

and you know in a very

25:25

short amount of time I take

25:27

the reader through it. Actually what

25:29

happens? the interceptor missile is essentially

25:31

kind of like and the not

25:33

a mini I see the Am.

25:35

it's a rockets and it fires

25:37

up off it's launch pad either

25:39

in Santa Barbara here in California.

25:42

Or in Alaska up at Fort

25:44

Greely and it's going into space

25:47

to try to now shoot down

25:49

this incoming warhead. One of them

25:51

skillings something like Mark Twenty. The

25:54

other one's going to mock fourteen

25:56

inside the interceptor missile. Is it

25:58

something called a. How

26:01

atmospheric. Kill vehicle

26:03

is. Oh, it's a

26:05

tiny mechanism that is going

26:08

to essentially try to strike

26:10

the incoming nuclear warhead in

26:12

space at these incredible speeds.

26:15

Someone in the did. Someone

26:18

in the Us Defense Department described it

26:20

as trying to hit a bullet with

26:22

a bullet. And that's why

26:24

the success rate is so low. Another

26:27

general explains me. That are

26:29

interceptor missiles Asked. A fire,

26:31

you know, fast after one another.

26:33

They don't have what's. Called. Look

26:35

wait, look technology Or look see

26:38

look. Technology. And so

26:40

who's ever at the helm

26:42

as to make a decision

26:44

very quickly how many of

26:46

these forty four nuclear missiles

26:48

they're going to waste on

26:50

one incoming warhead to try

26:53

and stop it? In my

26:55

scenario, I have four interceptors

26:57

try and take it out.

26:59

they all sale and that,

27:01

by the way, was not

27:03

red flagged for inaccuracy by.

27:06

General who read the book for me kind

27:08

of fact checking on and so you get

27:11

the sense of just how. Precarious. this

27:13

idea is that our interceptors

27:15

would be able to stop

27:17

and incoming nuclear weapon. Is.

27:20

One of the messages of your but that we

27:22

should be more. Scared. Or.

27:25

A least more. Aware. Of.

27:27

Just how much does the

27:30

level of apocalyptic damage that

27:32

is? Only a few presses of about

27:34

that away. And. I guess

27:36

at a party circus. and did you. Finish

27:38

this book. I'm more or less worried

27:41

about yourself. You know,

27:43

maybe that's the most important question to

27:45

ask? Great is what? What? What do

27:47

we take away from this book I

27:49

know for me is it goes like

27:51

this In a when I was in high

27:53

school in Nineteen Eighty Three, there was

27:55

a television program a fictional story of

27:57

was called the Day Asked. Was a mini

27:59

series. And it

28:01

showed what war. Nuclear

28:03

War between the United States and

28:06

Russia. Soviet Russia. Would look

28:08

like and it was so controversial

28:10

that was so terrified. A B

28:13

C news producers or A B

28:15

C television producers rather were encouraged

28:18

not to era. After

28:20

it aired and some

28:23

one hundred million Americans

28:25

watched it. One

28:27

of those. Americans was President

28:30

Ronald Reagan. And

28:32

he wrote in his memoirs

28:34

that he became depressed after

28:37

he saw. but then he

28:39

took action. He called up

28:41

Gorbachev, and ultimately just a

28:44

few years later, they had

28:46

a nuclear reduction treaty. That

28:48

treaty is what is responsible

28:51

for reducing what was at

28:53

one point in the Nineteen

28:55

eighties. Seventy Thousand Nuclear Weapons.

28:58

Seventy thousand. That

29:00

number has now been reduced down

29:02

to twelve thousand Five hundred. And

29:05

so. When I consider

29:07

that I see that when

29:10

people get frightened in us

29:12

when people but like the

29:14

president get depressed and off

29:17

by the idea that the

29:19

world could and in nuclear

29:21

apocalypse even in error I

29:24

actually feel hopeful and and

29:26

someone who as a reporter

29:28

and also fundamentally as an

29:31

optimist believes the more attention

29:33

you can put on the

29:36

madness. That. Is the

29:38

potential of nuclear war? the

29:40

more progress can be made

29:42

toward communicating our way out

29:44

of this rabbit. Hole. And then

29:46

there's lots of novel and and

29:48

fancy words in this world. Back.

29:51

There atmospheric as a new one of just glance.

29:53

But. That. One lead

29:55

you just used. mad. It.

29:57

Is is that good in that sense of the absolute.

30:00

The Bull. This element mutually

30:02

assured destruction. The idea that.

30:04

We won't destroy you. Because.

30:06

We don't want you to destroy else. And

30:09

that. Equilibrium.

30:12

Has thus far. Have

30:14

kept the the life a me

30:16

seventy is. Ah sorry. eighty

30:18

has since we. Need

30:21

bonds with us. use an and you mentioned Reagan

30:23

and and it is him and Go which are

30:26

both told the while they set a new cable

30:28

Cannot be won. A must Never Be Fought is

30:30

probably the most famous of a quote. One.

30:32

Of about nuclear weapons. Are.

30:35

Mad still holds. A

30:37

Thankfully I'm. A

30:40

Do you still believe in me to

30:42

litter destruction? Do you think it still.

30:45

Is a. An. Equilibrium to live

30:48

by for the world. Or.

30:50

Do. You think we should be continuing to try

30:52

to disarm and and move towards up a post

30:55

me cliff each? I'm I'm not have a

30:57

list that guy's given how much ah geopolitical antagonism

30:59

there is in the world but what? What

31:01

are you said. He

31:04

now there are so many experts

31:06

in has been working on this

31:08

issue Whether it be nuclear non.

31:12

Diplomacy on. you know,

31:14

communication theory that systems

31:16

are set up in

31:18

place to have those

31:20

dialogues begin. The point

31:22

of my book? Me

31:24

as a National Security.

31:26

Reporter As a Storyteller As a

31:29

narrative storyteller is very much to

31:31

bring. This idea to readers

31:33

to listeners Jesus said the best

31:35

quote of off you know, a

31:38

nuclear war or not be one

31:40

and must never be thoughts And

31:42

so when I think about this

31:44

idea of deterrence because you asked

31:46

whether or not I believe in

31:49

it's it. As

31:51

a late. In the

31:53

book that is a. Theoretical.

31:57

Phenomenon Meaning it is just

31:59

and. The idea and yes

32:01

for decades is has help

32:04

but if you nerd out

32:06

on small groups within the

32:08

national. Security Command and Control

32:10

talking to one another. In

32:13

public forums as I do,

32:15

you can kind of get

32:17

a sense of how actually

32:19

a deep fear that deterrence

32:21

could sail exists. And I

32:23

sound that in the words

32:26

of Deputy Commander of Struck

32:28

Com General Thomas booze. yea

32:30

I quote him in the

32:32

book and you can see

32:34

him on you tube getting

32:37

this disc, giving this talk

32:39

to people within Strap Com

32:41

and he says. If

32:44

deterrence sales, it

32:46

all unravels. And

32:49

that unraveling is what I

32:51

describe in nuclear war scenario.

32:53

And that unraveling is what

32:56

I believe is invaluable for

32:58

people to think about people

33:00

to talk about. Because as

33:02

one of my sources said

33:04

to me when I said,

33:06

why doesn't the Congress do

33:09

more about this issue he

33:11

said to me, oh annie,

33:13

still be so naive. The

33:15

Us Congress only pays attention

33:17

to what people are talking

33:19

about. So.

33:22

Yeah. We already held together as you

33:25

say bye bye and I did over

33:27

kept alive by this this concept of

33:29

the terence it would I suppose take.

33:33

What? we would think of as a

33:35

man further know someone who was somehow

33:37

outside of the the boundaries of accepted.

33:40

Political. Behavior. To

33:42

launch a strike so subtly

33:44

in on an unprovoked one?

33:48

I'm. Guessing. In

33:50

the book your protagonist the North

33:52

Korea. Ah, I'm guessing. Part.

33:55

Three he chose not to is perhaps the.

33:57

Most. Closely represent that. All

34:00

in the world today. But but you tell

34:02

me. But you know when you look at.

34:05

Vladimir. Putin. And.

34:08

Russia. Are. Made you look at.

34:10

The. Potential for. The. Us

34:12

and China Tip: You know, com

34:15

the blaze with Taiwan or. Other

34:18

territories I'm. Do. You

34:20

see, do you think we're in a world

34:22

where. There is a high a nuclear

34:24

threat at the moment and and where do you see

34:26

that? Threat. Coming from. I

34:29

think it's interesting. When.

34:31

He said about normative

34:33

behavior among nuclear armed

34:35

nice because you could

34:37

argue that Russia and

34:39

the United States has

34:41

then you know. Playing.

34:44

This game. For.

34:47

A long time for decades and even

34:49

China. The

34:51

reason why I choose new North

34:53

Korea to be the rogue actor

34:56

in this scenario is because that

34:58

is precisely how North Korea behave

35:00

and why it is so dangerous.

35:03

I'll give you an example that

35:05

surprised me when I learned. All

35:09

nuclear all Ballistic missile tests are

35:11

announced. The case of many people

35:13

know that part of the equation.

35:15

Yes, For example, when the war

35:18

in Ukraine began, the United States

35:20

publicly announced that it was not

35:22

going to test one of It's

35:24

I Cbm as had been planned

35:26

for over a year. Russia as

35:29

done the same. You know it's

35:31

a way of saying we're not

35:33

going to, you know, pull the

35:35

lens over to this dangerous area.

35:38

Right now. Something could go wrong

35:40

in terms of interpretation. I

35:44

was surprised to learn that

35:46

North Korea does not, and

35:49

now once it's missile tests,

35:52

Not, it's ballistic. Missile test at

35:54

all of this is incredibly

35:56

dangerous. They have launched

35:59

over one hundred the missiles

36:01

since January of Twenty Twenty

36:03

Two, Imagine the tension in

36:05

the Us Nuclear Command and

36:08

Control System at the Aerospace

36:10

Data Center in Colorado that

36:12

we spoke of earlier in

36:14

The individuals who are watching

36:17

those that Sivers system who

36:19

are watching those launches. Imagine

36:21

the tensions. The room for

36:23

error that must go on

36:25

every time North Korea launches

36:28

a Ballistic missile. And

36:30

you know, I do hope

36:32

that after people read this

36:35

books, they read the news

36:37

about North Korea behaving this

36:39

way differently and they realize

36:42

how potentially disastrous this kind

36:44

of. Rude. Behavior is you know

36:46

what? one thing that really supreme reading

36:48

the book was the. Ultimately,

36:51

they're always incredibly complex systems in place

36:53

that been very carefully planned out by

36:56

the best defense bones. In.

36:58

The world. But. When

37:00

it really comes down to it, there's a lot

37:02

of. Room. For

37:04

error. And. There is. Really?

37:06

Is going come down to a few

37:08

people. With. A very

37:10

short space of time under enormous pressure.

37:13

Fair. Adrenaline Shop Big. You know,

37:15

human emotions will be a play. I

37:17

mean you mentioned at one point that

37:19

basically. One. Supposes been briefed.

37:22

He has about six minutes. Oh.

37:25

She. Could be by then about

37:27

six minutes to make a decision. And.

37:32

Or say that there is effectively know.

37:35

There. Is no chain of command A is just the President.

37:37

to that point. And. Of and your

37:39

President your him as he doesn't talk to the

37:41

sound of the Joint Chiefs. And. Says

37:43

all what are you in those who do in and the terms of

37:45

all. Of us normally cool.

37:49

Die. Think it was scary about this

37:51

is that the moment the that this system

37:53

is breached it does come down to a

37:55

few people acting in a very short space

37:58

of time with of nut. There's

38:00

and few. He

38:03

knows details down and get

38:05

a sense of how things

38:08

really might go down. I

38:10

interviewed to former Secretary of

38:12

Defense asking them those exact

38:14

questions and it was William

38:17

Perry who shared with me

38:19

this. Other element of

38:21

the scenario which then of course opened

38:23

up a bunch of doors in my

38:25

thinking and reporting which went like this

38:27

when when Perry realized that he said

38:30

if I put myself in those shoes

38:32

and I would be trying to advise

38:34

the President how to act, I would

38:36

also be thinking about whether or not

38:38

it would make sense for. Me to

38:41

leave. The Pentagon immediately to

38:43

try and save myself his

38:45

exact words. Because

38:48

while all of this is going

38:50

on, this idea of the President

38:52

making the decision to launch a

38:54

nuclear counter attacks you have a

38:56

separate lane that's concerned with the

38:59

continually of governments. And that's this

39:01

idea that the government has to

39:03

keep functioning even after a nuclear

39:05

war. And so to report those

39:08

scenarios and how that scenario runs

39:10

parallel to the nuclear scenario, I

39:12

was able to interview for example,

39:14

Obamas former Fema director who described

39:16

to me how he would be

39:19

taken off to a bunker and

39:21

what goes into effect behind all

39:23

that. And that's where you realize

39:25

there are so many wheel spinning,

39:28

so many incredibly important decisions that

39:30

need. To be they made

39:32

in seconds and minutes. The

39:35

room for error

39:37

magnifies as these

39:39

different decision trees

39:42

unfold. Well.

39:45

As. The. It's

39:47

it's it's an berg because as you

39:50

say it, you can't read and they

39:52

complacent about these things. But I do

39:54

think. it a funny

39:56

way there is cause for optimism in the father you roads

39:58

her on the father we are here talking

40:01

about this and, you

40:03

know, as you kind of alluded to earlier,

40:05

it's by taking it seriously that you hopefully

40:08

maintain our caution about

40:10

this issue. But do

40:13

you still feel optimistic

40:16

about avoiding the

40:18

kind of scenario that unfolds in

40:20

your book? I often think

40:23

about what Craig Fugate, who

40:25

was the FEMA director during

40:28

the Obama administration, told me

40:30

about trying to plan

40:32

for nuclear war. You know, he

40:34

said to me, Annie, as an agency,

40:36

we plan for asteroids. These

40:38

are what are called low-probability, high-consequence

40:41

events. And that's what

40:43

we've been talking about,

40:46

allegedly low-probability, but most

40:49

definitely high-consequence. But

40:51

what Fugate told me was that after

40:54

a nuclear war, there

40:56

would be very little FEMA could

40:58

do because everyone would be dead.

41:01

And he said, you know, what comes

41:03

down to then is hope

41:06

that you stalked Pedialyte and

41:08

try and self-survive. And

41:11

with that kind of a doomsday

41:13

prediction from an actual

41:16

government, highly placed government

41:18

official, I do agree

41:20

that it opens up the door for

41:22

all of us to realize this is

41:25

total madness and a

41:27

solution needs to be found. I'm intrigued

41:29

to know what, there's a Pedialyte in this

41:31

country, we call it Diarralyte, but I'm intrigued

41:33

to know what role that would play in

41:36

a post-apocalyptic world. Well,

41:40

what it actually is, because immediately I

41:42

went to Target and was reading the

41:44

contents of Pedialyte, it

41:46

replaces your electrolytes. Right.

41:50

But you know, it was a great detail

41:52

that he gave me because I can't stop

41:54

thinking about that, because you just do really

41:56

realize that things, sometimes an

41:59

object... visualized in

42:01

your brain says a lot

42:03

more to the human heart

42:05

than some kind of theoretical

42:08

conception, be it deterrence or

42:11

the nuclear triad. What it

42:13

really boils down to is

42:16

a bunch of human beings trying

42:18

not to wind up in

42:20

an absolutely apocalyptic type

42:22

scenario. And I think

42:25

with the full force of humanity behind

42:27

such ideas as

42:30

ending the madness, anything is possible.

42:32

We saw that from two former

42:34

presidents and I welcome some

42:36

kind of a change. All

42:39

right, well, I'll be going to stock up

42:41

on rehydration salts. But Annie, thank you for

42:43

that. It's a sobering but fascinating conversation. And

42:46

I really would recommend the book. You'll rip

42:48

through it because it is very gripping. Nuclear

42:50

War, a scenario, and it's available in bookshops

42:53

now. I'm Josh Dancy from The Stanley Times

42:55

and you've been listening to an Intelligence Squared

42:57

podcast. Some

43:36

people just know it's easy to get all things

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best price online.