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is Intercepted. I'm

1:06

Sharif Abdul-Qaduz, a contributing writer for

1:08

The Intercept, hosting Intercepted this week.

1:12

All eyes are in Rafah, the southernmost

1:14

city of Gaza. It's

1:17

now being bombed daily, and fears

1:19

are growing that Israel will soon launch a

1:21

ground invasion. Since Israel's

1:23

assault on Gaza began over four months

1:25

ago, they have steadily

1:27

pushed Palestinians further and further south

1:29

towards the Egyptian border. Amid

1:32

one of the most punishing bombing campaigns

1:34

in modern history, Israeli

1:36

troops first entered the northern section

1:38

of Gaza and encircled Gaza City.

1:42

After a week-long truce in November, troops

1:44

moved further south, taking Hanyunas

1:46

and other areas. Now,

1:50

over half of Gaza's population,

1:52

some 1.4 million people, are

1:55

crammed into Rafah with nowhere

1:57

left to go. campaign

2:00

has so far killed over 28,000 people,

2:03

with many thousands still missing and presumed

2:05

dead under the rubble. More

2:07

than 12,000 of the dead are children. Over 80% of the population has

2:12

been displaced and are facing a

2:14

humanitarian crisis of epic proportions. The

2:17

UN estimates that a quarter of the

2:20

population is suffering catastrophic famine. Gaza

2:22

now has the highest percentage of

2:24

people facing acute food insecurity ever

2:26

recorded, and the scale of

2:29

the destruction has rendered most of

2:31

the territory uninhabitable. Nevertheless,

2:33

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu

2:36

is vowing to continue the

2:38

assault and launch a full-scale

2:40

attack on Rafah, insisting

2:42

on what he calls a total

2:44

victory over Hamas. At

2:47

the start of the war, I outlined three

2:49

goals. Destroy Hamas, free

2:52

the hostages, and ensure that Gaza

2:54

doesn't pose a threat to Israel any time in

2:56

the future. Achieving

2:58

these goals will ensure Israel's security

3:01

and pave the way for additional historic

3:03

peace agreements with our Arab neighbors. But

3:06

peace and security require total

3:08

victory over Hamas. We

3:11

cannot accept anything else. Can

3:13

you imagine what will happen if

3:16

we don't have total victory? Negotiations

3:19

around the ceasefire continue, yet the

3:21

prospects so far appear dim. Egypt

3:24

fears an attack would force a mass

3:26

displacement of Palestinians fleeing the violence into

3:29

its territory. Egypt has

3:31

fortified the border with concrete walls and

3:33

barbed wire, and has deployed some 40

3:35

tanks and armored personnel carriers to the

3:38

area. On Monday,

3:40

President Biden discouraged Netanyahu against the

3:42

ground invasion of Rafah. The

3:45

major military operation of Rafah should

3:47

not proceed without a credible plan,

3:49

a credible plan for ensuring the

3:51

safety and support of more

3:53

than one million people sheltering there. Many

3:56

people there have been displaced multiple

3:59

times. fleeing the violence

4:01

to the north, and now they're

4:03

packed into Rafah, exposed and

4:05

vulnerable. They need to be

4:08

protected. No such warnings

4:10

have been issued before, and

4:12

yet U.S. official policy hasn't changed.

4:15

Unequivocal and all-out military, financial

4:17

and diplomatic support for Israel

4:19

remains. And the

4:22

killing and destruction continues on a

4:24

scale that the International Court of

4:26

Justice has deemed plausibly genocidal. On

4:29

Tuesday, South Africa urged the International

4:31

Court of Justice to use its

4:33

power to stop Israel's military offensive

4:36

in Rafah. To

4:38

take an in-depth look at where things

4:40

currently stand, and to examine the history

4:42

of Palestine and the prospects for the

4:44

future, we're joined today by

4:46

Tareb Bakaroni. He's the

4:49

president of the board of Ashabaka,

4:51

the Palestinian policy network, and

4:53

is a former senior analyst at the

4:55

International Crisis Group on Israel-Palestine. Tare

4:58

is the author of Hamas

5:00

Contained, The Rise and Pacification

5:02

of Palestinian Resistance. Tare,

5:05

welcome to Intercepted. Thank you for having me.

5:07

I want to start with the latest. Over

5:09

the weekend, Rafah was heavily

5:12

bombed ahead of what Israeli Prime

5:14

Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said is

5:16

a planned ground invasion. Rafah

5:19

is the southernmost part of

5:21

Gaza. It's where over half

5:23

of the entire population of Gaza has

5:26

been forcibly displaced to. Before

5:28

October 7th, there was less than 300,000 people there. Now

5:31

there's an additional 1.4 million

5:34

Palestinians, including some 600,000 children,

5:36

are packed into

5:38

this space. There's massive tent encampments

5:40

that are pushing right up to

5:42

the border with Egypt. There's

5:45

literally nowhere left to go. Can

5:48

you talk about what's happening now and

5:51

the implications of an Israeli ground invasion

5:53

in Tarefa? Well, it's really

5:56

important to understand this within the

5:58

context of population traffic. transfers and

6:00

what Palestinians have called the endless

6:02

ekba, which is the Israeli

6:05

effort to try to depopulate Palestine

6:08

and make sure that it can

6:10

maintain as an apartheid regime a

6:12

Jewish majority from the

6:14

river to the sea. So this is a broad

6:16

context in which we need to understand what's happening

6:19

in Raffa now. And this

6:21

is something that became quite

6:23

stark following October 7 when

6:26

there were plans that were

6:28

issued by various politicians within

6:30

the Israeli government, as well as

6:32

internationally, around the possibility of removing

6:35

the Palestinians out of the Gaza

6:37

Strip to make space for Israeli

6:39

attacks against Hamas and Israeli military

6:41

plans. And so this is what

6:44

we're seeing today is

6:46

the re-emergence of these initial plans that we

6:48

began to see in the first few weeks

6:50

after October As

6:52

you say, if there is a ground invasion

6:55

in Raffa, the possibility of a population

6:57

transfer happening under the fog of war

6:59

is quite high. So we're

7:02

back in a space where we can imagine

7:04

now hundreds of thousands,

7:06

if not millions, of Palestinians leaving

7:08

the Gaza Strip, which would make

7:11

the possibility of a population

7:13

transfer almost double what happened in the

7:15

nakbab in 1948 when

7:17

750,000 Palestinians were expelled or forced to flee. And

7:22

so in this situation

7:24

around Raffa, there's obviously been heightened tensions.

7:27

Egypt specifically is quite worried

7:29

about what would happen if

7:31

those Palestinians are forced to

7:33

flee into Egypt, into the

7:36

Sinai Peninsula. And international leaders

7:38

and the American administration

7:40

have warned Israel that if it

7:42

takes that step, if it moves

7:44

in the direction of a ground

7:46

invasion, that it

7:48

would not be supported, that it

7:51

would be something that the politicians

7:53

here have warned Israel against. But

7:55

of course, that's not something that

7:57

should be taken at face value.

8:00

sense that the Biden administration is

8:02

obviously complicit in the Israeli operations

8:04

and the ongoing genocide. And so

8:06

any effort now to try to

8:09

suggest that they're trying to pull Israel

8:11

back is really something that should be

8:13

taken with a grain of salt. The

8:16

Israelis themselves have talked about

8:18

their desire to relocate the

8:20

Palestinians in Rafah to other

8:22

areas in the Gaza

8:25

Strip, but obviously these plans are

8:27

all impractical. They're not plans that

8:29

can actually either

8:31

mitigate the high level of death that

8:33

will happen if there's a ground invasion

8:36

or the possibility that Palestinians will

8:38

just flee in panic, as people

8:40

do during times of war. I

8:43

think it's really important to emphasize

8:45

when we're talking about Rafah, specifically

8:47

as you said, these are about

8:49

1.3 million people displaced from their

8:51

homes inside Gaza to Rafah, but

8:53

those are themselves people who had been displaced

8:55

from homes in what is now Israel. So

8:57

we're talking about 75

9:00

years of ongoing displacement and

9:02

again the possibility of one

9:04

more displacement out of historic

9:07

Palestine. I want to ask you about the

9:09

role of Egypt in a moment, but when

9:11

we talk about Gaza, it's often spoken about

9:14

as this separate territory that's

9:16

kind of on the periphery of

9:19

the land of historic Palestine. It's

9:22

this other place that is somehow different in

9:24

the Zionist project. Can

9:26

you talk a little bit about the history of

9:28

Gaza as a political geography in

9:31

Palestine and its history in relation

9:33

to Israeli settler colonialism? I

9:35

mean when we talk about the Gaza Strip

9:37

today, we're really talking about a colonial construct

9:39

because before 1948 and

9:42

before the establishment of the State of Israel,

9:44

Gaza as a city, which was

9:46

before October 7th, one of the biggest cities in the

9:49

Gaza Strip, but which has now effectively

9:51

been depopulated, was really an

9:53

extension of other cities in

9:55

historic Palestine. Al-Khali,

10:00

Al-Tabran. And so the idea that this

10:02

enclave that is now understood to be

10:05

the Gaza Strip is something that was

10:07

separate from the land of historic Palestine

10:09

was just, it's a historical, that's factually

10:11

untrue. What became the

10:14

Gaza Strip really happened through the

10:16

process of the establishment of the

10:18

state of Israel and Israeli settler

10:20

colonialism in the sense that it's

10:22

in the establishment of the state,

10:24

the majority of the

10:27

inhabitants of Palestine were ethnically

10:29

cleansed. And vast, vast numbers of

10:31

those ended up in what became the Gaza

10:33

Strip. So when we talk about the Gaza

10:35

Strip today with its 2.4 million

10:38

inhabitants, about two thirds of those,

10:40

60, 65% of those are refugees from

10:44

homes that are now in Israel. Now,

10:46

one of the misconceptions that people often

10:48

have when thinking about the Gaza Strip

10:51

is that, you know, the Gaza Strip

10:53

came under blockade because of Hamas's election

10:55

victory in 2006, and

10:57

then the movements capture of the Gaza Strip in 2007. But

11:01

in reality, the Gaza Strip has

11:03

been deemed a problematic

11:06

strip of land for successive Israeli governments

11:08

since 1948. So

11:11

we've had 12 wars waged by

11:13

Israel against the Gaza Strip since

11:15

1948. And we've had a

11:18

whole host of measures, targeted

11:20

assassinations, economic blockades, building

11:23

out collaborationist networks inside Gaza to try

11:25

to pacify the Gaza Strip, to try

11:27

to make sure that the desire of

11:30

the refugees in Gaza to return to

11:32

their homes is sort of killed. And

11:34

so when Hamas emerges as a power

11:36

that then takes over the Gaza Strip,

11:39

it becomes the perfect fig leaf for

11:41

Israel to justify the blockade. So we hear

11:43

the Gaza Strip's under blockade because of Hamas

11:45

as a security positioning, when in

11:47

reality, the Gaza Strip has effectively been

11:49

severed from the rest of historic Palestine

11:51

for demographic reasons to maintain Israel as

11:54

a Jewish majority state or a dilution

11:56

of Israel as a Jewish majority state.

11:59

So let's take a moment. step back, you know,

12:01

we're now four months into this

12:03

brutal assault, a genocidal attack on

12:05

Gaza. The level of

12:07

destruction that Israel has wrought on civilian

12:09

life in Gaza is proportionally

12:12

among the worst in the world

12:14

or in modern history. Nearly all

12:16

aspects of civilian life, homes, schools,

12:18

hospitals, bakeries, farmland, water,

12:20

sewage infrastructure, have effectively

12:23

been destroyed. Even

12:25

if this were to stop today,

12:28

there's not much left to go

12:30

back to. Gaza has effectively been

12:32

made unfit for human habitation, and

12:35

it's this hellscape where the bones

12:37

of the dead are inseparable from the rubble. What

12:40

does this mean for the future of this

12:42

territory? What does it mean for the future

12:45

of Palestine, that this level of destruction has

12:47

been brought to this area? I

12:49

mean, it shows us in very

12:51

extreme ways the logical

12:53

conclusion of Zionism. It shows in

12:56

very extreme ways how the

12:59

Zionist project thinks of Palestinian

13:01

inhabitants and Palestinian life, which

13:04

by the way is not exceptional to Zionism

13:06

as a settler colonial ideology.

13:08

All settler colonies perpetrate genocide

13:10

in order to create new realities on

13:13

the ground. The Zionist project is obviously

13:15

no exception to that, but what we

13:17

see in the Gaza Strip today is a

13:19

logical manifestation of that, that there can be

13:22

no Palestinian life

13:25

under Israeli apartheid. As

13:27

you say, if the ceasefire

13:29

started tomorrow and the genocidal

13:31

violence ended, there is no

13:33

way that these Palestinians are able to go back

13:35

to any kind of normal life. If we think

13:37

about the history of just the past 14 or

13:39

15 years, the blockade since 2007,

13:44

the UN had said that Gaza would

13:46

become uninhabitable by 2020. This

13:48

is a situation in which before

13:50

a current escalation, the

13:52

Gaza Strip was already placed on

13:54

life support that there would be

13:56

a drip feeding of food or

13:58

humanitarian assistance or food. fuel in

14:01

an effort to maintain Gaza just above

14:03

the brink of collapse, but

14:05

never allowed to grow or to

14:08

sustain the population there. And the population, I

14:10

should say, the vast majority of the population,

14:12

I believe about 80 percent, is below the

14:14

age of 18. So

14:16

we were talking about, or we are talking

14:18

about a population that's growing that

14:21

was placed in an open-air

14:23

prison indefinitely. So this is

14:25

fundamentally why this was always going to break

14:27

and why it broke the way it did

14:29

on October 7th. But with the

14:32

breaking of that balance, of trying to

14:34

sustain Gaza on the brink of collapse,

14:36

but not quite, when that

14:38

broke, for any Israeli political party,

14:40

but for the regime, for Israeli

14:42

apartheid, the next logical solution is

14:45

elimination. And this is what

14:47

we're seeing today. We're seeing genocidal violence. Now, the

14:49

genocide is obviously the killing of

14:51

tens of thousands of Palestinians, but

14:53

that's only part of the picture.

14:55

The actual picture is the making

14:57

of Palestinian life in that place

15:00

impossible. And so now, let's

15:03

say there's a ceasefire tomorrow. The

15:05

number of deaths that will

15:07

happen through starvation, through impoverishment,

15:09

through disease, through all

15:11

the ways in which human

15:14

life is vulnerable to the elements, that's

15:16

part and parcel of the Israeli approach

15:18

to killing only a portion of the

15:20

Palestinians who would have been killed

15:22

by the end of this, would have been killed

15:24

by military violence. Many of the

15:27

Palestinians would have been killed in secondary

15:29

ways, right? And so life

15:31

just becomes impossible. And for those

15:33

who cannot live there, then they

15:35

move out, quote, unquote, under their

15:37

own volition. So the idea of

15:39

transfer then happens without Israel

15:42

taking effective responsibility for it.

15:45

So this is why it's really important when we're

15:47

thinking about genocide, it's not just in the numbers

15:49

of those killed, but it's

15:51

in the erasure of Palestinianness and

15:53

Palestinian life in that space. Well,

15:56

let's talk about efforts for a ceasefire.

15:58

There are negotiations underway. Most

16:00

recently, Hamas responded to a US-backed

16:02

Israeli deal with a

16:05

three-stage ceasefire proposal that would involve

16:07

Israel withdrawing troops from Gaza, stopping

16:09

its aerial campaign, the

16:11

exchange of prisoners, and so on. Netanyahu

16:14

responded by calling this proposal delusional,

16:17

insisted on what he called a total

16:19

victory over Hamas, saying that was the

16:21

only solution to end the war. You've

16:24

closely followed Hamas in your book, Hamas

16:27

Contained, which provides some of the best research

16:29

and analysis on Hamas. I encourage everyone to read it.

16:32

Can you just give us kind of a thumbnail

16:34

sketch of who is making decisions within the movement?

16:37

You have the leadership within Gaza,

16:39

people like Yahya Senwar, you

16:41

have the head of the military wing, Hamad Tif, you

16:44

have the leadership in exile with people like

16:46

Ismail Hanayah and Khaled Meshal. Can

16:49

you just tell us what is the connection between those

16:51

within and those without and who these people

16:53

are? And

16:56

Netanyahu's supposed goal of trying to

16:58

destroy Hamas. So

17:01

historically, Hamas had always adopted what

17:03

it called a Shura approach. It's

17:05

a consultative approach in which the

17:07

different constituencies within the movement are

17:10

consulted on any major strategic decision.

17:12

And the different constituencies, meaning the

17:14

leadership inside-outside, the leadership in the West

17:16

Bank and the Gaza Strip, the

17:18

Palestinians from Hamas, from the

17:21

movement in Israeli prisons. And

17:23

the Shura approach was always a

17:25

time-consuming process, obviously because of security considerations

17:27

and because of where all of these

17:29

constituencies were. But the

17:32

movement itself was always and continues to

17:34

be very democratic in the sense that

17:36

even if there are differences in opinions

17:39

within the movement, once a

17:41

decision is made on the level of strategy,

17:43

that binds the different elements of the movement.

17:45

And you do see often, and we have

17:47

seen since October 7th, rogue elements

17:49

is too strong a word, but people

17:52

within Hamas saying certain things or putting

17:54

forward certain narratives that seem to

17:56

break from where the movement is at. But

17:59

by and large, it's not a decision. large, the movement and

18:02

the officials within the movement tend to

18:04

fall in line once a certain decision

18:06

is taken. Now, since October 7th, for

18:08

all the reasons that we can understand,

18:10

that approach has been a bit more

18:13

difficult to manage. A, because

18:15

of the need for urgent decisions to

18:17

be made, and B, because the majority

18:19

of Hamas's leadership in the Gaza Strip

18:21

is now underground and literally out

18:23

of reach. So that

18:25

has made some of the early

18:28

weeks after October 7th appear as

18:30

if there are divisions between the internal

18:32

and the external. I should say here

18:34

that I have no direct access or

18:36

contact with the movement since October 7th,

18:38

and so this is based on

18:41

my own historical analysis of

18:43

the movement. But I imagine now that

18:45

the leadership insights, as you say, Sinoir

18:47

and Hamad Tresf, are taking, in some

18:50

ways, a leadership position, and this whole

18:52

operation is, in some ways, an operation

18:54

driven by the leadership on the inside,

18:56

so in the Gaza Strip. But

18:59

I do think that the outside leaders,

19:01

so specifically the ones in Doha, are

19:03

obviously the ones who are interfacing with

19:06

the negotiators and putting forward the, as

19:08

you said, the counterproposal, the

19:11

three-phase counterproposal. I would

19:13

look at that document as a consensus

19:15

document. So I would look at that

19:17

proposal as a proposal that the

19:20

leadership, both inside and outside, would fall

19:22

behind if it is adopted. But

19:25

back to your point about the

19:27

Netanyahu position. So Netanyahu

19:29

has from the onset declared that

19:32

the only objective from the operation

19:34

in the Gaza Strip is the

19:36

decimation of Hamas. And from day

19:39

one, most analysts, including myself, said

19:41

that that was an impossible goal.

19:43

There's no way that Hamas, as

19:45

a movement, can be decimated, even

19:48

if it's organizationally weakened, the ideology

19:50

of the movement, which are political

19:52

demands that many Palestinians espouse, extend

19:55

far beyond the movement. So even

19:57

if Hamas is really weakened,

19:59

then it's not a decision. that political demand

20:01

would continue to exist and would take other

20:04

forms. So the idea that the summation is

20:06

sort of the objective is really a cover

20:09

for genocide over violence in Palestine. That's how

20:12

it should be understood. Now, that

20:15

position has received support from

20:17

international, mostly Western players, specifically

20:19

the US administration. Since

20:21

the ICJ decision, we've seen the US really

20:24

try to shift to try to say that

20:26

there needs to be more, less

20:29

targeting of civilians, more care in

20:31

protecting civilian life. And with

20:33

this proposal specifically, Secretary of State Blinken

20:36

came out and said, well, there's room

20:38

here to, there are some spaces here

20:40

to negotiate. Again, this should be seen

20:43

in the context of an American administration

20:45

that's increasingly nervous about how

20:48

evident it is that it's complicit in

20:50

genocide. Now it's

20:52

created a position where, after arming

20:54

and supporting Israeli genocide

20:57

for months, it's

20:59

coming to a position where it

21:01

really can't really control or manage what

21:04

the Israeli establishment is doing.

21:07

So Netanyahu's maximalist position is

21:09

obviously an impossible position. But

21:12

outside of that, it means

21:14

that there's just going to be a continuation

21:16

of the violence and the sort of a

21:18

rejection of any kind of ceasefire

21:20

at the moment. Well, there's

21:23

been revived talk of a two-state

21:25

solution. In the weeks and

21:27

months leading up to October 7, the US

21:29

have been trying to broker a deal to normalize

21:31

relations with Saudi Arabia. Those

21:33

talks were shelved after the Israeli

21:35

assault began. But they've

21:37

since resumed. And Saudi Arabia is insisting

21:39

that Israel end the war and

21:42

then put Palestinians' quote on a

21:44

path towards statehood. The Biden

21:46

administration says it's now actively pursuing

21:48

the establishment of an independent

21:50

Palestinian state after the war

21:52

in Gaza. Can you

21:55

talk about this revived push for a so-called

21:57

two-state solution and what it actually means in

21:59

the current political? context we're in? I

22:01

mean, the return to talks

22:03

around the two-state solution is

22:05

really like watching a three-decade

22:08

train wreck and fast-forward now.

22:10

It's trying to take all

22:12

the failures of the past three decades in

22:14

terms of creating a Palestinian state and

22:17

suddenly suggesting that now that's

22:19

a possibility that Palestinians should

22:21

jump on. I mean, we need

22:24

to go back once again to

22:26

the context. If we're talking about Israeli apartheid

22:28

and we're talking about Israel in an apartheid

22:30

state, any kind of

22:32

partitioning of Palestine is a

22:35

legitimation of apartheid. That's just

22:37

a form of demographic engineering. That's

22:39

a legitimation of expulsion of Palestinians.

22:41

That's a creation of effectively

22:43

a Bantustan, which is what's been created

22:45

now in the West Bank under an

22:48

illegitimate Palestinian authority. That's a central pillar

22:50

of Israeli apartheid today. So

22:52

when we're thinking about the two-state solution, that's

22:55

really what we're thinking about. We're

22:57

thinking about how do we make Israeli

22:59

apartheid tolerable and how do we

23:01

make it sustainable? You

23:04

can see it in the way that it's

23:06

being discussed because let's play the

23:08

game that the two-state solution is

23:10

something that's viable. The idea here

23:12

would be to create two sovereign

23:14

states, Palestine being a sovereign state

23:16

that's territorially contiguous with East Jerusalem

23:18

as its capital. Now

23:20

just that being on the

23:22

table, within minutes you already

23:24

see the reservations begin to

23:27

be articulated. So now that

23:29

state cannot quite be a state

23:31

with full sovereignty. It has to

23:33

be a demilitarized state. And

23:35

then it becomes a state that can't really

23:38

control its borders because obviously then if it's

23:40

open to the Arab world and there's an

23:42

influx of people coming into Palestine, Israel would

23:44

avoid security risks. So

23:46

immediately we're going from the idea

23:48

of statehood to the idea of

23:50

this entity whose borders and

23:52

military and security is controlled by Israel that's

23:55

allowed to call itself a state. So

23:57

it's really a repackaging of where we've been.

24:00

the past three decades and calling it

24:02

again a two-state solution. It's

24:04

very clear that there will never be a Palestinian

24:07

state on 67 or at least in

24:09

the way that's imagined when

24:12

the international community talks about the two-state

24:14

solution. And frankly, the clearest stakeholders

24:17

that make that assertion

24:20

are the Israeli politicians, are Netanyahu and

24:22

his ilk who come out and say

24:24

there will never be a Palestinian state.

24:26

So this is being openly disclosed and

24:29

yet everyone is asked to pretend that the

24:31

Israelis don't really mean what they're saying and

24:33

they will be forced into a situation

24:36

of statehood when the Israeli political elite

24:38

is now driven by a separate movement

24:41

that has close to a million people

24:43

in the West Bank. And

24:45

when Gaza has been made uninhabitable,

24:47

the idea that either of those

24:49

things could then somehow produce a

24:52

Palestinian state is really

24:54

an effort to try to live

24:57

in illusions, to live in a

24:59

reality that just doesn't exist in

25:01

Palestine today. So instead of statehood,

25:03

I think what policymakers should be

25:05

focusing on are two things. One

25:08

is how do you bring accountability

25:10

against an apartheid regime? And

25:12

there's obviously measures that are happening in

25:14

the international community now and specifically with

25:17

South Africa's case of the ICJ. And

25:20

two, how do you allow the Palestinians

25:22

to have a representative leadership and a

25:25

legitimate leadership that can decide where they

25:27

want to go after they've experienced genocide?

25:30

So rather than trying to resuscitate a

25:32

defunct Palestinian authority, that question should really

25:34

be about how to support real

25:36

Palestinian legitimacy. Ryan

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26:50

turn to the role of Egypt and all of

26:52

this, which is involved in the negotiations around the

26:54

ceasefire. Egypt is the only country to share a

26:57

border crossing with Gaza. That's not controlled by Israel.

27:00

Since this assault began, it has

27:02

refused to open the border to

27:04

allow for a mass displacement of

27:06

Palestinians from Gaza into Northern Sinai,

27:09

which as you said, is a longstanding colonial

27:11

fantasy. President Adel

27:13

Fattah Hasisi has spoken in the

27:15

rhetoric of the Palestinian cause and

27:17

invoked Palestinian rights, saying

27:19

he won't allow for this displacement of

27:21

Palestinians from historic Palestine into Egypt. But

27:24

I think we have to remember this rhetoric rings

27:26

hollow. Egypt has been complicit in the siege of

27:28

Gaza for the past decade and a half, helping

27:31

to enforce the blockade, destroying tunnels that

27:33

provided a lifeline, coordinating very closely with

27:35

Israel on security and

27:37

heavily restricting the movement of people

27:39

and goods across the Rafah crossing.

27:42

And since October 7th, they've continued to

27:45

allow Israel to dictate the terms of

27:47

what crosses this border between Egypt and

27:49

Gaza. Now, with

27:52

this impending ground invasion of Rafah, they're

27:54

warning that any move

27:57

that would force a mass displacement of

27:59

Palestinians would jeopardize them. the 1979 peace

28:01

treaty with Israel. Netanyahu has

28:03

also said that Israel must

28:05

control the Philadelphia corridor, the 14-kilometer stretch

28:08

of land which runs along the

28:10

Egypt-Gaza border. What

28:12

is your assessment of Egypt's role in all of this,

28:14

and what would you like to see happen? Well,

28:17

what one would hope would have happened

28:19

by now is that Egypt would allow

28:22

for humanitarian aid to go into the

28:24

Gaza Strip. The fact, as you say,

28:26

that this is a sovereign border between

28:28

the Gaza Strip and

28:30

Egypt, a means that Egypt had

28:32

always, since October 7th, had the

28:34

ability to provide humanitarian aid into

28:37

the Gaza Strip. The fact that

28:39

it hasn't makes it

28:42

complicit in the suffering that's happening in

28:44

the Gaza Strip and shows that actually

28:46

any kind of movement across

28:48

that border is really controlled by Israel

28:50

and it decides how to maintain that

28:52

kind of blockade on Gaza. But

28:55

specifically in terms of Egyptian

28:57

worries around rahfah and around

28:59

population transfers. So there's

29:02

two things here to think about. The first is that

29:04

Egypt and especially the Sisi

29:06

regime is obviously has always

29:08

been worried about the Muslim Brotherhood

29:11

and worried about any

29:13

kind of domestic opposition,

29:16

specifically Islamist opposition to

29:18

its rule, and the influx

29:20

of hundreds of thousands,

29:23

possibly millions of Palestinians, many

29:25

of whom had been living

29:27

under Hamas's governance for years.

29:30

And Hamas, obviously, probably fighters

29:32

and officials and the influx

29:34

of those into Egypt and

29:36

the Sinai Peninsula presents a

29:38

security concern in this narrow

29:40

lens, in the lens of thinking

29:43

about specifically what

29:45

the Sisi regime perceives as an

29:47

Islamist threat in Egypt. So that's

29:50

one consideration for the political establishment.

29:52

And the other, of course, is just

29:55

the instability that that kind of Palestinian

29:57

refugee crisis would mean

30:00

for a country the majority of

30:02

whose population supports Palestine and supports

30:04

the Palestinian right to self-determination.

30:07

So this is a huge failure. It

30:10

would be perceived as a huge failure for the

30:13

Egyptians that they allowed for this to

30:15

happen and that it's happening on their

30:17

territory, that they then become the

30:19

host of a refugee

30:22

population at a time

30:24

when we understand historically that Israel will prevent

30:26

the return of any Palestinian refugees. So if

30:29

we look at Syria, if we look at

30:31

Lebanon, if we look at Jordan, we

30:33

can see what this population means years

30:35

and decades from now. So really this

30:37

is an existential issue for Egypt. However,

30:40

having said that, there's very little

30:42

faith that the Sisi regime will

30:44

work in any way

30:46

that's ethical or that's sort of beneficial

30:48

to the Palestinian struggle in solidarity or

30:51

in support or in any other way.

30:53

And it will be driven by real

30:55

politic. It will be driven by security

30:58

considerations, the ones we talked about,

31:00

but also economic considerations as in how

31:02

big a paycheck will they be able

31:04

to get for allowing this

31:06

to happen. Now the position they've taken

31:08

is very clear that they will annul

31:11

or rescind the Camp David Treaty of

31:13

78, 79 if this goes through. However,

31:19

one of the things that I think

31:21

a lot about is what becomes permissible

31:23

under the fog of war. So

31:26

these states, even the US administration can say

31:28

they're against this. Egypt can say they're against

31:30

a population transfer. Israel can say they're not

31:33

really looking for a population transfer. They're looking

31:35

to move civilians out to Al-Mawasi

31:37

or other areas inside the Gaza Strip.

31:40

But under the fog of war and violence,

31:42

we all know what happens. And

31:45

so that gives a plausible deniability to all

31:47

these actors. They can then say they were

31:49

against this population transfer, but now they have

31:51

its effect complete and they have to deal with

31:53

their reality that's been created. So

31:55

I'm not sure whether I would take the

31:57

Egyptian government at face value and see that

32:00

they would resend the peace treaty.

32:02

I think that economic considerations

32:04

would probably play a big role

32:07

in what the final outcome of this looks

32:10

like. Since Hamas

32:12

was elected and then took control of the Gaza

32:14

Strip in 2007, we've seen successive Israeli

32:17

assaults in 2008 and 9, 2012, 2014, 2021, and

32:19

others. And they've always ended with

32:26

some sort of negotiation and a

32:29

revert to some kind of status

32:31

quo with some changes, what you

32:33

have deemed a violent equilibrium. That

32:36

doesn't seem to be a possibility this

32:38

time to go

32:41

back to what was before because of the

32:43

level of destruction and so forth. So

32:45

what could the future hold? Are we in just

32:48

kind of a war of attrition for a long

32:50

time? That

32:52

status quo seems to have been

32:54

broken. Absolutely. I think the status quo

32:56

is broken not only because of what

32:58

we just talked about, which is that

33:01

the Gaza Strip is now uninhabitable. And

33:03

I cannot quite conceive

33:05

of the level of reconstruction

33:08

that would be needed to

33:10

maintain any kind of quality

33:12

of life that's fit for human life in

33:14

the Gaza Strip, what that would entail and

33:16

the shift in politics and policy that would

33:19

enable that to happen. But the

33:21

reason that a return to that status

33:23

quo is quite difficult to imagine now

33:25

is also because of what's

33:27

happening inside Israel and inside the

33:30

Israeli polity. I think

33:32

October 7th shattered

33:34

the illusion that

33:36

there can be any kind of

33:38

security for Israelis as

33:41

long as apartheid persists. I

33:43

think it's very clear that the

33:45

idea that the Palestinians can be

33:48

indefinitely managed and pacified is

33:51

no longer possible. And I think that

33:53

the Israeli establishment understands that very well.

33:56

That's why it's not a

33:59

return to business. as usual, it's

34:01

rather genocide because that business

34:03

as usual, that status quo,

34:06

I think has been irreversibly

34:08

shattered. Now what does that

34:10

mean? Does that mean that we're going to

34:12

be living in interminable violence? I think that's

34:14

certainly a possibility. It is very

34:16

much a possibility that given

34:19

this awakening that's happening within

34:21

Israel, that Palestinians can't be placed

34:24

behind walls and forgotten, there

34:26

is a possibility of finishing what started

34:28

in 1948. We

34:31

see that in spectacular violence in the Gaza

34:34

Strip, I think where it's

34:36

more, it's clearer, it's perhaps in the West Bank

34:38

and with Palestinian citizens of Israel,

34:41

where there is violence,

34:43

intimidation, imprisonment, population transfers. You

34:45

know since October 7th, 17

34:48

villages in the West Bank have been depopulated. So

34:51

the colonization on

34:53

crack is evident throughout

34:56

historic Palestine. So that's certainly, this

34:58

interminable violence is certainly a possibility.

35:01

And then there's another possibility which is that

35:04

the international community wakes up

35:06

and recognizes that the only way

35:08

there can be real security

35:10

and justice in Palestine

35:13

is if the Palestinian demands

35:15

for liberation are actually

35:18

engaged with rather than

35:20

placated. So if there's

35:22

a real engagement with what the

35:24

sources of violence and injustice

35:27

are and if there's a real attempt

35:29

to bring accountability and to try to

35:31

dismantle apartheid, I think that's the only

35:33

way that we're going to get a

35:36

sustainable resolution. But

35:39

I have very little faith that this will

35:41

happen at least in the near to medium

35:43

term future because of two things.

35:46

One, I do think that the Israeli society

35:48

now does not

35:50

quite understand what's

35:53

happened since October 7th in the sense

35:55

that there's such censorship

35:57

and media blackout and control.

35:59

of the messaging. I think

36:02

that the Israeli society has

36:04

been allowed through Western impunity

36:07

to move in

36:10

a direction that's fascist and

36:12

right-wing. It's very difficult for them

36:14

to really grapple with an alternative

36:16

that isn't genocidal. So I think

36:18

post-October 7, there's no change

36:20

that's coming, I don't think, from within Israel. But

36:23

the second reason for that is because

36:25

the international community remains committed to policies

36:28

that have failed. It's quite shocking

36:30

to think of the level of

36:33

violence that's happened since October 7,

36:36

and the only policy recommendations that

36:38

the international policy actors can come

36:40

out with is a return to

36:42

what was before October 7. It

36:44

just shows the poverty and the

36:46

failure of the international community to

36:48

really understand the place and what's

36:50

happening. Well, let me

36:52

ask you about the U.S. response in

36:54

particular. President Biden on Sunday warned Prime

36:57

Minister Netanyahu that a ground offensive in

36:59

Rafah should not proceed without a plan

37:01

to protect the hundreds of thousands of

37:03

civilians there. In remarks a

37:05

few days before that, where he

37:07

had a gaffe where

37:09

he called Fathah Sisi,

37:12

the president of Mexico, but he

37:14

said Israel's response in Gaza was over

37:17

the top, which is a

37:19

meager expression, but perhaps the harshest

37:21

criticism to date that Biden has

37:23

given Israel over its brutal assault.

37:26

But there hasn't been any change in policy that

37:28

we've seen so far. And

37:31

the Biden administration has fully

37:33

vocally supported this military campaign.

37:36

They've increased military aid and funding.

37:38

They've even bypassed Congress to send

37:40

munitions to Israel. They vetoed calls

37:42

for a ceasefire. The U.N. Security

37:45

Council. Are you surprised

37:47

by the Biden administration's response to

37:49

this or is it just business

37:52

as usual from the U.S.? It's

37:54

not necessarily business as usual. There are

37:57

two things that might explain this. in

38:01

tone, but I have to make

38:03

clear from the beginning that I don't believe

38:05

the shift in tone represents a shift in

38:07

policy. I think that the Biden administration is

38:10

still actively complicit in genocide. There's just no

38:12

two ways about it. Diplomatically,

38:14

militarily, financially, it's enabling Israel to

38:17

do what it's doing. But

38:19

there's two reasons for this shift in tone. The

38:21

first is that the Biden

38:23

administration, I think, is becoming increasingly

38:26

aware of how

38:28

evident its complicity is and

38:31

what kind of exposure this might

38:34

mean for the administration. So I'm

38:36

thinking specifically of the ICJ trial,

38:38

but not only the case brought

38:41

against the Biden administration in federal

38:43

court in the U.S. by the

38:45

Center for Constitutional Rights in California

38:47

is making a case that the

38:50

Biden administration is complicit in

38:52

genocide, and the judge was

38:55

unable to proceed with the case, but

38:57

made it quite clear that from the

38:59

legal standpoint, they believe that

39:01

there is a plausible case for the U.S.

39:03

being complicit in genocide. So now we have

39:06

an American administration, a

39:08

Democratic American administration actively

39:11

facing charges of genocide at

39:13

a time when its base

39:16

very clearly is not aligned with where

39:19

the Democratic Party is at, and there's

39:21

a level of disruption that's happening on

39:23

the grassroots here that's considerable. So I

39:26

think there's that element, that there's a

39:28

clear maybe four-month delayed

39:30

sense of shame that they're

39:32

openly dehumanizing Palestinians, calling into

39:34

question the numbers of Palestinian

39:36

skills, showing no empathy for

39:38

the fact that there's a genocide

39:41

happening, actively being complicit in

39:43

the genocide. I think now the tone shift

39:45

is trying to weigh that out a bit.

39:48

But the second, and I believe

39:50

maybe more important reason, is

39:52

the election. They're worried

39:55

about losing Michigan, and the reality

39:57

is that this is a very

39:59

important is something that is a

40:01

very clear possibility,

40:03

obviously because Michigan has a

40:05

very strong Arab demographic

40:08

base and they are appalled

40:10

by what the Biden administration

40:13

is doing. And there's

40:15

all these efforts now to try

40:17

to present it as if the

40:19

Biden administration or even the Democratic

40:22

Party really cares about Palestinians or

40:24

Arab issues or has not taken

40:27

the despicable route it's taken since

40:29

October 7th. So both of

40:31

these are, I think, are just politics.

40:33

They're really just trying to put

40:37

a cleaner face or a more

40:40

civil veneer on the fact that they're

40:42

genocidal. And

40:44

what about the media's coverage of what's happening

40:46

in Gaza in this country? We've

40:49

seen a lot of criticism of newspapers like

40:51

The New York Times but other outlets as

40:53

well. You've been

40:55

following and thinking about and writing about

40:57

Palestine for many years now. There's

41:01

always been some sort of bias in

41:03

the media in the United States that

41:05

many people criticize these larger outlets of

41:07

bias towards Israel in the way, in

41:09

the language they use, in

41:12

their coverage. What have you seen this

41:14

time? I mean, part of

41:16

the reason that I think there's been such

41:18

a shift, at least on the grassroots here,

41:21

is because many people have

41:23

access to media that isn't

41:25

the mainstream media. I

41:27

really think that this is probably the

41:30

first genocide to be livestreamed

41:32

on social media and on

41:34

our iPhones. And so people

41:36

have access to information that isn't The

41:39

New York Times and the other sort of,

41:41

you know, The Washington Post, CNN, MSNBC. Because

41:45

the level of complicity and

41:47

silencing that happens in

41:49

the mainstream media, specifically on Palestine,

41:52

is quite unbelievable. I mean,

41:54

and we saw that from day one, from

41:57

Muslim anchors being removed from...

42:00

their platforms to the

42:03

numbers of op-eds that were being

42:05

penned by Palestinians as versus non-Palestinian

42:08

to the fact that many of

42:10

the points that Israeli propaganda has

42:12

Baraam makes are regurgitated

42:14

completely uncritically by the mainstream media

42:16

but also by the mainstream policy.

42:19

I mean obviously President Biden himself

42:21

fell into those Islamophobic and

42:24

Orientalist tropes at the

42:26

beginning. So the structural

42:29

silencing of Palestinians is

42:32

very difficult to witness

42:35

actually, specifically in

42:37

American media, and I think social media

42:39

has been a very important corrective.

42:42

It's a very important corrective to

42:44

the kind of racism and bias

42:46

that mainstream media has here. I

42:49

just want to turn quickly again to the

42:52

West Bank, which you mentioned. Because

42:54

of the focus on Gaza, a lot of

42:57

what's happening in the West Bank hasn't received

42:59

as much coverage, but the level of colonial

43:01

violence and dispossession has accelerated dramatically

43:03

over the past few months. 380

43:06

or at least 380 Palestinians have been

43:08

killed in attacks by armed

43:11

settlers as well as soldiers. Nearly

43:13

7,000 have been arrested and

43:15

are held without charge in

43:18

so-called administrative detention. Of

43:20

course, this was happening before October 7th, but

43:22

now it's on a different scale. And

43:25

you have these raids also into places like

43:28

Jenin with Israeli soldiers going

43:30

undercover just as doctors to assassinate

43:32

a wounded patient in

43:34

a hospital. What's

43:36

your assessment of what's taking place in the West Bank

43:38

as well and in 48? I

43:42

think there's a real expansion and

43:44

strengthening of settler violence

43:46

against Palestinians for a

43:49

number of reasons, dispossession being first

43:52

and foremost, but also intimidation,

43:54

terrorizing, inflicting real violence.

43:56

I think there's settler, there's

43:58

a real commitment. and

44:00

by ideological commitment by the

44:02

settler entity to or the

44:05

settlers writ large

44:07

to really wreak havoc throughout

44:09

the West Bank. And we've

44:11

seen that before October 7th

44:13

and obviously it's on a

44:15

more significant scale after

44:18

October 7th. And one

44:20

of the things that's been interesting to watch

44:22

in this space is the Biden administration, for

44:24

example, put out an executive order a few

44:26

days ago naming four

44:28

settlers and sanctioning them.

44:31

So, freezing their assets and saying

44:33

that they're sanctioning these settlers for

44:35

acts of terror and for the

44:37

violence that they've meted out against

44:39

Palestinians in the West Bank. And

44:42

some have seen this as an important

44:44

precedent, that this is a way to

44:46

begin engaging with the

44:49

sanctioning of the settler movement. But

44:52

part of the issue with

44:54

that approach with focusing on

44:56

settler violence in these sort

44:58

of individual cases is that

45:00

it forgets or emits

45:04

the structural reality of

45:07

settler violence, which

45:09

is that the leaders of the settler movement,

45:11

the leaders of the people who are committing

45:14

colonial violence against Palestinians in the West Bank

45:16

are sitting in the highest echelons of the

45:18

Israeli government. So the idea

45:21

that you can sanction four individuals

45:23

or numerous individuals while

45:25

dealing with the

45:27

Israeli government in full diplomatic,

45:29

military, legal, financial support is

45:33

attempting to separate 67

45:35

from Israel, as

45:37

if the apparatus of military rule

45:40

and colonization that's happening in the

45:42

West Bank, the settlement building the

45:44

violence, as if that's separate from

45:46

the Israeli government. And

45:48

that's an illusion. There's no separation. It's

45:50

a singular regime that's committing

45:53

different forms of violence against

45:55

Palestinians in different locations. This

45:58

is not what's happening. in

46:00

the West Bank is

46:03

not the result of an

46:05

act of individuals or groups.

46:07

This is state-sanctioned policy that's

46:09

being driven from the top

46:11

in the Israeli establishment onward.

46:14

And more than that,

46:16

it's not a right-wing ideology. So it's

46:18

not, which is something

46:20

that often you hear in liberal

46:23

circles, that if we resolve the

46:25

Netanyahu issue, then we're going to

46:27

have a more civilized Israeli regime

46:30

that can be dealt

46:32

with diplomatically. And the truth is that

46:34

the settlement enterprise is fundamentally

46:36

a labor enterprise, and

46:39

that there's no consensus within

46:41

Israel that actually limits the

46:43

kind of settlement, outgrowth,

46:45

or colonization of the West Bank.

46:50

It's misunderstanding how this regime has operated

46:52

since 48 and continues to do

46:54

so today. So I think

46:56

what's happening in the West Bank

46:59

shows actually the continuation of efforts

47:01

to colonize and expand the

47:04

Israeli state. And final question,

47:06

it's hard to talk about hope in

47:08

these dark times right now with what's

47:10

happening in Gaza, with what's happening in

47:12

the West Bank, with everything that's happening

47:14

across Palestine. But as

47:17

you mentioned, the status quo was

47:19

shattered, and we're in some new

47:22

paradigm. Is

47:24

there anything that gives you a glimmer

47:26

of hope? I think there are a

47:28

lot of things that give me hope. I mean, it's very, as

47:31

you say, it's really hard to talk

47:33

about hope when the violence is so

47:35

extreme. But the

47:38

reality is that the status quo or

47:40

the paradigm that we existed in before

47:42

October was a paradigm

47:45

in which no one was talking

47:47

about Palestine and Palestinians were dying constantly.

47:50

And now we're living in

47:52

a paradigm where we're actually

47:54

talking about the root causes

47:56

of suffering in Palestine, which

47:58

is colonization, genocide. of violence,

48:00

attempts at ethnic cleansing. These

48:03

are the problems that

48:05

Palestinians have been facing since before

48:07

48. Now, this is,

48:10

you know, we're having this conversation

48:12

on an American platform, talking about

48:14

ethnic cleansing and genocide, we're talking

48:16

about Zionism as a circular

48:18

colonial ideology. We're talking

48:20

about what Palestinians have been

48:22

saying and facing for decades.

48:25

So that rupture is really important.

48:27

And that rupture is the beginning

48:29

of a real shift in terms

48:32

of how we understand justice in

48:34

Palestine. But there's

48:36

also, you know, I've been

48:38

living in New York since October 7th, I don't normally

48:40

live in the city and the kind of organizing

48:44

work that's been happening has been

48:46

mind blowing. And to see

48:49

that support for Palestine is across

48:51

color lines, is multi-generational, but mostly

48:54

driven by the younger generation, gives

48:56

me a great degree of hope

48:58

because while, let's say

49:00

the Democratic Party here is still

49:03

aligned with a 70s outlook on

49:05

Zionism, the base of the Democratic Party

49:07

is progressive. And they understand what this

49:10

means. The realignment that will have to

49:12

happen in the American political

49:15

establishment is one that

49:17

is moving in the direction of justice for

49:19

Palestine. And these

49:21

changes, these paradigmatic ruptures are

49:23

very unsettling and they're

49:25

destabilizing and they will take time.

49:28

But I think the general trajectory we're

49:31

moving in is one that's very

49:33

hopeful. Now that's not to say that

49:36

justice is inevitable because I

49:38

do think that Palestinians are

49:40

facing an adversary that is

49:43

very powerful and extreme

49:46

in the tactics and the violence that they use.

49:49

But I do think that more than before October

49:51

7th, Palestinians have

49:54

a level

49:56

of understanding of international

49:58

solidarity and mobilization they

50:00

didn't see before. And I

50:02

think that's really important. Well,

50:05

Tareb Bakoni, thank you very much for joining us. Thanks

50:08

for having me. That was

50:10

Tareb Bakoni, the author of

50:12

Hamas Contained, The Rise and

50:14

Pacification of Palestinian Resistance. And

50:24

that does it for this episode of

50:26

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