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0:00
Welcome to
0:02
the MoneyTree Investing Podcast.
0:04
Stock Market Wealth, Personal
0:06
Finance, Val you stops, invest
0:09
in your life. Hello,
0:11
smart money to your podcast listeners. Welcome to
0:13
this week show. My name is Kirk Chisholm, and I I'll
0:15
be your host. So
0:16
today, we have Annie Duke on the
0:18
show. How are you doing today, Annie?
0:20
I'm doing pretty well. How are you? Good.
0:22
Well, glad to have you in the show. I'm kind
0:24
of a fanboy for your books. I think they're just
0:27
really phenomenal at getting
0:29
to the heart of these mental model
0:31
concepts that I think are really hard for people
0:33
to grasp and you do it with such eloquent
0:35
stories. So maybe you could tell the
0:37
listeners a little bit about your back ground
0:39
and how you got to where you are now?
0:42
I started off my adult life as an academic.
0:45
I was studying cognitive
0:47
science at the University of Pennsylvania. I did five
0:49
years' worth of graduate work there with the
0:51
intention of becoming a professor. But
0:54
life had other plans for me. I got
0:56
sick in the last year of graduate school and actually
0:58
ended up in the hospital for couple of weeks.
1:01
And it happened to be right when I was supposed to go out
1:03
for my job talk, so it became clear
1:05
that I needed to take some time off in
1:07
order to heal up.
1:10
So took a leave of absence, you
1:12
know, it's planning to go back after a year
1:15
to sort of button everything up and go back out on
1:17
the job market. But was during that year
1:19
that I frankly just kind of needed money
1:21
because I didn't have my fellowship. I was taking
1:23
a lead from school, and so I didn't have an
1:25
income source. And I started playing poker during
1:27
that year. That well, this is fine. I'll do
1:29
this in the meantime in order to support myself.
1:32
And I ended up finding success pretty
1:34
quickly and kept going and did
1:36
it for eighteen years. To some people
1:38
know how kind of weird that was at the time
1:40
this was in the nineties before Poker
1:42
was on television or
1:45
on the Internet. And so at
1:47
that time, people really
1:49
kind of thought about it as, you know, what
1:51
I would generally go under, is it sin
1:53
or an addiction or that
1:55
category. So most of
1:58
my conversations when people heard I played poker
2:00
ended up somewhere in the gambler's anonymous.
2:03
Have you thought about getting more synonymous? And I would try
2:06
to explain it's like investing, but,
2:08
you know, it was just a very strange thing
2:10
to do. The reason why I got introduced to us
2:12
is because my brother was had already been playing for ten
2:14
years and, you know, supporting himself
2:17
with that endeavor. So anyway, I started
2:19
playing poker. I did pretty well at it. I
2:22
won a world championship and
2:24
the tournament champions and the NBC
2:26
national heads up champion. Chip, at some point,
2:28
I was the winning women in the history of the
2:30
game, not anymore. But then again, I did
2:32
retire in two thousand twelve, so there's been ten years
2:35
for people who'd be. In two
2:37
thousand two, when was about eight years into
2:39
when I was really playing poker exclusively
2:41
at that point. I got asked to come speak to a group
2:43
of options traders. About
2:46
how poker might inform their thinking
2:48
about risk. I gave a talk
2:50
about how your risk
2:52
attitudes get distorted by whether you're
2:54
winning or losing in a game,
2:57
which is more kind of emerging of the
2:59
sort of behavioral science, behavioral economics
3:01
with sort of what you see at a poker
3:04
table. And when I get
3:06
in that talk, I kind of remembered a few things. One
3:08
is I really love teaching. And so
3:10
I really got energized by that one to
3:12
get back to it. And the other is that also
3:14
love academics. You know, I had laughed
3:16
for a variety of reasons and found something else that
3:18
I was really good at. You know, but that
3:20
sort of diving into those types of conversations
3:23
was really fun for me. So started
3:25
developing a speaking career where I was
3:27
speaking on this sort of intersection between
3:29
cognitive psychology and
3:32
poker eventually started getting asked
3:34
to do some consulting with sort of trying
3:36
my hand at that to see what I would think about that.
3:38
And in two thousand twelve, I
3:40
retired from Poker in order to focus on
3:42
that full time. As well
3:45
as wanting to found this
3:47
nonprofit, the alliance for decision education
3:49
where we're trying to bring decision into
3:52
every K through twelve classroom. I did that in
3:54
two thousand fourteen. And then really
3:56
wanted to write this book thinking in bats, which
3:58
was essentially a book that was
4:00
sort of a compilation of the talks that I'd been
4:02
given that I really wanted to be
4:04
able to get out to the world in broader
4:06
form And I did that and
4:09
that got published in two thousand eighteen, and then
4:11
I followed it with how to decide and
4:13
now quit, which just came out in October
4:15
of twenty twenty two. So
4:18
just started really thinking about, like, writing in
4:20
that space, which I think was this way for me
4:22
to get back to academics
4:24
in a way that, like, I really loved and I really
4:26
enjoyed And now, I've come
4:28
full circle because I teach Executive Ed
4:30
at Wharton, so I'm back at the University of Pennsylvania.
4:33
I do research with Phil Teddlock and Bart Miller's
4:35
in psychology and also Marie Schweitzer, who's
4:37
ever at wharton, on a variety
4:39
of different sort of things under, you
4:41
know, judgment and decision making. The work
4:43
that I do specifically was felt teleconference in
4:45
forecasting, and I recently
4:48
enrolled as a graduate student
4:50
there to finish my PhD. You
4:52
obviously have a wide range of things that you've done.
4:54
And I wanted to touch on one of them you mentioned,
4:57
which you remember playing poker. And
5:00
what I wanted to ask is, at a high
5:02
level, like, how does Poker relate to
5:04
investing? To me in your books, it seems
5:06
you illustrated very well as to, you
5:08
know, why it's important, but maybe you can share that
5:10
with the
5:11
audience. Let me just start with this. Poker
5:13
is investing as trading. So
5:16
you're down the hand and you
5:19
have some model of the world. In this case,
5:21
you have a model of your opponents
5:23
at the table, and you
5:25
understand statistically what
5:28
the probability is that that hand is gonna
5:30
win on its own merits or
5:32
not given the number of people that are in the
5:34
hand or the number of people that are at the table.
5:36
And then you're figuring out things
5:39
about what's the probability? I could bluff
5:41
and still win so and so forth.
5:43
So what you're really doing is a forecast at that
5:45
time. It's very similar to
5:47
a thesis. I have this hand. I know certain
5:50
things about this hand. I have a model of my opponents.
5:52
And the question is if I invest the dollar here?
5:55
Do I feel like I'm getting a positive return?
5:57
And I'm thinking about what my expectations
6:00
are for what I might see in the future, which
6:02
would be akin to, like, fundamentals. You
6:04
know, there's also the interestingly enough, there's things
6:06
that have to do with the macro environment that you're in,
6:08
which would be broadly, is it like a loose game or
6:10
a tight game? Which is
6:12
a similar way to think about those things.
6:15
Yeah. So then you're making a forecast of
6:17
whether you think the hand is worth playing. You're
6:20
making predictions about how your opponents
6:22
are gonna behave. You're tracking
6:25
the new cards that get turned
6:27
face up, which is the influence of luck
6:29
on the outcome. And
6:32
then very much just like investing,
6:35
you either win or lose the hand But
6:37
on that one in duration, it's
6:39
not particularly informative. So
6:42
you have some of the same challenges in terms
6:44
of closing feedback loops that you have in
6:46
investing, which is
6:48
that over the long run,
6:50
your outcomes are gonna tell you a lot about
6:52
the quality of your decisions. But in
6:54
the short run, it's not. Alright, I
6:56
lost a hand, but why? Did I lose
6:58
it? Because I played poorly. Did I lose it? Because all
7:00
those judgments that I made were wrong. Did I overestimate
7:03
the chances I could bluff? Did I have poor
7:05
model of my opponent? Those kinds
7:07
of things that would be like a judgment issue.
7:10
Or was it just that I got bad luck? Because
7:12
there's volatility. And I think that
7:14
that creates this very unique problem
7:17
in poker that applies to investing as
7:19
well where you're making decisions
7:21
to put positions on, under
7:23
conditions of uncertainty, where,
7:25
you know, very little in comparison to all there
7:27
is to be known and the outcome in the invest
7:30
is gonna be heavily influenced by luck.
7:32
And if you win or lose on a particular
7:35
position, what does that mean?
7:37
I don't know. So I think that
7:40
how you think about poker
7:42
and how you approach that problem, what
7:44
are the weaknesses in human judgment
7:47
that that particular environment exposes,
7:50
what are the ways that you might address those weaknesses
7:53
in human judgment? So and so forth,
7:55
I think those actually pretty much directly
7:57
map on to investing. The difference
8:00
in investing is that you
8:02
have more time and you don't necessarily
8:05
have to make your decisions alone, which
8:07
makes it a little bit easier of a problem. But
8:10
nonetheless, still incredibly difficult.
8:12
Well, you mentioned a few points I want to pull
8:14
out there. One was resulting, which
8:17
is determining whether your
8:19
success or failure was due to luck or
8:21
skill or something else. Can you
8:23
kind of expand on that topic? Because I think that's
8:25
something that is hard for people
8:28
to grasp because you see the winners and you just
8:30
say, oh, that was really a smart decision. Right.
8:33
So resulting in particular is something
8:35
called outcome bias. So I call it results
8:37
thing, the academic term is outcome bias.
8:40
And it's that we will
8:43
take the outcome and directly map
8:45
it on to the quality of the decision. So
8:48
if we're seeing another investor, we're
8:50
looking at a fund, and we see the fund
8:52
had a good year, we'll think it's a good fund.
8:54
And if we think the fund had bad year, we'll
8:56
think it's a bad fund. And you
8:59
can see that very directly, actually,
9:01
in the decisions of
9:04
allocators in terms of who they're allocating
9:06
their money to. And we know that this is an error that
9:09
occurs. We're the managers who
9:11
have a really good year the
9:14
allocators will stick to and often give
9:16
more money to. And the managers who
9:18
have kind of a bad year, they'll ditch.
9:21
And then we know what happens. Right? Like, that ends
9:23
up progressing back to the mean. Mainly
9:25
because, like, it's just kind of not enough data.
9:27
And that's where you start to get into this resulting
9:30
problem. Right? Which is just because someone
9:32
did well doesn't mean that they're super
9:34
smart. So I'll give you a very
9:36
simple example of this particular concept.
9:39
I think that anybody who was
9:41
managing an individual's money
9:44
between, say,
9:47
fall of twenty twenty one
9:49
and May of twenty twenty
9:51
two. I'm guessing that whoever's
9:53
portfolio there are managing did amazing.
9:56
But does that make them a good money manager?
9:59
Because we can see it's like, well, it depends. Right?
10:01
It depends. How did everybody else do?
10:04
Like, we kinda need to know what beta is. Like,
10:06
we need to know a whole bunch of other stuff. How
10:08
did they make their decisions? Were they asking
10:10
their uncle what to invest in? Like, what were
10:12
their thesis? Like, we don't know any of
10:14
that just because someone did really well.
10:16
It doesn't mean that they were making good decisions,
10:19
but we think it does. And
10:21
likewise, when someone is doing poorly,
10:24
we think it's because they made bad decisions. And
10:26
that is also not necessarily true.
10:29
So this is generally the resulting problem,
10:31
and it causes us to learn
10:34
very bad lessons from
10:36
the experience that's available to us. Because the
10:38
experience that's available to us is, like, people
10:41
do well or they do poorly. And
10:44
then how do we judge that? So that's kind
10:46
of what happens when we're, like, looking at other people.
10:48
What's interesting though is when we look at ourselves,
10:51
we actually engage in something called self
10:53
serving bias. And I'm sure that you've
10:55
heard this before, when someone
10:58
wins in a position, they made great
11:00
decisions. When someone
11:02
lost, like, what could I do?
11:04
The pandemic hit, or the
11:06
macro environment went south, or
11:09
you know, I got unlucky. There were things that
11:11
I couldn't possibly have foreseen. Like, all these
11:13
ways to sort of offload it off of yourself.
11:16
So we kind of have a twofold problem.
11:18
Right? As we're sort of examining the
11:20
things that are occurring in the world. We're doing this
11:23
kind of one to one course expendance between outcome
11:25
quality and decision quality, that's really bad.
11:27
But when we're thinking about ourselves and this is something
11:30
you say in poker a lot, we'll tend
11:32
to attribute the good stuff to our own skill
11:35
and the bad stuff to luck.
11:37
And neither of those patterns is correct,
11:40
all of it can occur. I can make
11:42
a bad decision, get a bad outcome. I can make a bad
11:44
decision, get a good outcome. I can make a
11:46
good decision, get good outcome. I can make a good decision
11:48
and get a bad
11:49
outcome. And in the short run, certainly the outcome
11:51
itself. Doesn't really tell us very much.
11:53
We see that a lot with the
11:55
financial advisory world where if the
11:57
market goes up, hey, I was a genius and
11:59
the market went down and
12:00
Oh, that was the market. There's nothing we could do.
12:02
You just gotta hold on. There's nothing we
12:05
could have done. I actually just had a discussion with
12:07
someone the other day where I was trying to get money
12:09
moved from place a to place b or telling them that they
12:11
need to move their money from place a to place
12:13
b. And they said to
12:15
me, this was just for purposes of
12:17
getting it to the person who was managing the
12:20
funds as opposed to a different place. The
12:22
person that was having a discussion with said, Well,
12:24
I don't wanna move it from there because that
12:26
money's been doing really well there. And
12:29
I was like, so is everybody else's?
12:31
I think this conversation was in the summer.
12:33
Before everything started crash or
12:35
the spring, whatever. I was like, end.
12:37
But it's that real desire to attribute
12:40
the good performance to something particular about that
12:42
person. And what I said is they may or
12:44
may not be good. That's actually not why I want you to
12:46
move the money. But the fact that they've done well
12:48
over the past few months is meaningless.
12:50
Every human being who just parked
12:53
their money in the S and P has
12:55
made a gazillion dollars. But then
12:57
the flip side is, every
13:00
person who's had their money parked in the S and
13:02
P recently has lost a good billion dollars.
13:04
Does that mean it was a bad decision? No,
13:06
not necessarily. It depends on what
13:08
your goals are and what your values are, and we need
13:10
to understand all of those things before we can figure
13:12
out. Just in the same sense, it would be silly
13:14
if I lost a hand of poker to you for you to
13:17
assume you're a better player than
13:18
me. Who knows? Maybe you are, but
13:20
we'd have to play a lot more.
13:22
Or I could just take my win and just hanging
13:24
over you forever. That's
13:26
that's that's that's that's that's totally
13:29
unfair. That's good. That's
13:32
a good segue into your new book about quitting.
13:34
So I haven't fully read the book,
13:37
but I flipped through the concepts, and I think
13:39
a lot of them were really interesting
13:42
in the fact that a lot of us look
13:44
at winners and,
13:47
you know, they say, oh, they're really resilient
13:49
and they gutted it out and they kept at
13:51
it and that's why they
13:52
won. Why did you decide to write this book,
13:54
quit? What was kind of the reason behind it?
13:56
Because was very frustrated about
13:59
somewhat what you just said. I was
14:01
frustrated about this kind of lore
14:04
that we have around grit. The
14:06
greatest of magical quality that
14:09
causes success in the
14:11
sense of, look, It's
14:14
totally true that somebody who has succeeded
14:16
stuck to it. I do not deny
14:18
that, but that does not mean if you stick
14:20
to it, you'll succeed. Those two things
14:22
do not mean the same thing. They aren't equally
14:25
true. One is true and the other is not.
14:27
Because one is you know, you know
14:29
the outcome, so you kind of know the person stuck
14:31
to it. And the other is, does
14:33
that mean you should stick to it? That's
14:36
the question that we need to ask ourselves And
14:39
the answer is, well, that's absurd.
14:42
You need to have grit as a quality to
14:44
get you to stick to things that are worthwhile. Even
14:46
when they're hard. But grit
14:49
for grit's sake gets you to stick to things
14:51
that aren't worthwhile just because you think
14:53
that like winners never quit. And
14:56
I think that we can all remember, like, the early
14:58
American idol where they were to the bad singer's
15:00
auditioning. And
15:03
you know, Simon Cowell would say, like, this
15:05
is not for you. You're not gonna become a professional
15:07
singer, and they will go out of the room and say
15:09
to the camera, like, he's wrong. I know if
15:11
I just stick to it, I'll succeed. And
15:14
we're all looking at the what? No.
15:16
That's not true. But what we hear
15:18
is, like, the stories of
15:20
the artist who went
15:22
to twenty different labels and
15:24
finally got their album deal,
15:27
and then they succeeded. Then we
15:29
hear these sort of survivor stories and
15:31
we forget about the thousands
15:34
of people trying to do the same
15:36
thing where time is
15:38
just wasting away. So
15:41
I just felt like someone needed to have conversation
15:43
with grit. Not with Angela Duckworth,
15:45
because Angela Duckworth, in large part, I think
15:47
agrees with me about this, that
15:49
it's not so much stick to it and you'll succeed.
15:51
It's try a bunch of stuff.
15:54
If something is working for you, if it's
15:56
worthwhile, if it's something you're really passionate
15:58
about, stick to that, but they literally
16:01
quit everything else. And
16:03
I think that we really forget about the quote
16:05
everything else part because if you're
16:07
gonna be successful, it's
16:09
relatively important actually not to stick to things
16:11
that aren't working. Because every minute that
16:14
you stick to something that's not working is
16:16
time and effort and attention and money. That
16:18
you could be turning towards something that
16:20
would be working. So that is actually
16:22
the road to success. In the simplest
16:25
sense, like, what if you only
16:27
held every single stock that you ever bought?
16:30
That was your strategy. I buy a stock that
16:32
hold it forever. Because grid is amazing.
16:34
And if I stick to it, then I'll succeed. You
16:37
know, you're smiling because you can see that that's
16:39
completely absurd. Except that
16:41
literally that's the advice that we give people.
16:44
Just stick to it. Don't quit. If
16:46
you quit, it's a lack of character. And
16:49
I just thought someone should say that out
16:50
loud. Well, Wall Street loves that because
16:53
they want you to buy and they never want you to sell.
16:55
So they would love it if you had a portfolio
16:57
full stocks like
16:58
that. What Wall Street wants.
17:00
Right? Is well, not what Wall Street wants.
17:02
What an investor wants? Who is
17:04
not an active investor? Is
17:07
to index the S and P
17:09
five hundred. But here's the thing.
17:12
The S and P five hundred itself changes.
17:14
If you look at the companies that were in that index,
17:17
fifty years ago, they're different than the companies that
17:19
were there today. So anytime
17:22
that you quit something that, you know, that you stop something
17:24
that you started, that's quitting. So
17:26
when a company gets taken out of that index,
17:29
and a new company gets put in it, that's
17:31
a form of quitting. I'm quitting
17:33
this and putting this in. So,
17:36
you know, and that's true, obviously, like, if you
17:38
by an ETF, if you whatever. Like,
17:40
there's lots of coin happening in there. So
17:42
we can separate out this strategy of,
17:44
like, long hold, which fine
17:46
and understand
17:47
that, like, what you're holding still changes?
17:49
You know, there's a concept a few people
17:51
have talked about, which is a survivorship bias,
17:53
like what you're saying. Which is, you
17:55
know, we look at history and all we see are
17:58
the survivors. We don't see the
18:00
quitters. So we don't have a lot of information
18:02
to go back and look through that and say,
18:05
how is this a successful decision?
18:08
So how have you been able to kind of look
18:10
at that and make that
18:11
judgment? Because it's hard if you can't
18:13
find the data? And to analyze it's even
18:15
harder. Well, I mean, obviously, one thing
18:18
you can look at is base rates. Here's
18:20
a simple base rate. Like, of the people
18:22
who raise a seed round, how
18:24
many of those successfully raise
18:27
a series a. You can say, the
18:29
people who raise a seed round, how many of
18:31
those successfully raise a series
18:33
c? So then we can start to get a
18:35
sense of how many people are kind
18:37
of like getting shoved aside along
18:40
the way. Right? And we can start to see sort of the
18:42
negative space then, people that you don't
18:45
hear about. I read something on
18:47
Twitter or somebody saying it took me fourteen
18:49
months to raise my first round.
18:51
So what I tell you is don't ever give up.
18:54
So it's a very classic example of survivorship
18:57
bias. Right? Like, I stuck to it for fourteen
18:59
months, and then it worked out for me.
19:01
So therefore, that is what you should do
19:03
because apparently sticking it for fourteen
19:06
months works. But what I would want
19:08
to know as a decision maker is what's the average
19:10
time? To actually raise your round,
19:13
what are the things that you need to do in
19:15
order to kind of hit that mark? Right?
19:17
So, like, do you have someone who's coaching you
19:19
on the deck? For example, whenever you figure out
19:21
what those inputs are. And then
19:24
if I'm well beyond the average time, I should
19:26
take that signal that there's an appetite in the
19:28
market for it. And just because one
19:30
person did it doesn't mean
19:32
it's correct to do. Let me
19:34
try to give you a sense that might be clearer.
19:37
There are people who have been on top of
19:39
Mount Everest, and there's been a huge
19:41
blizzard that's rolled in. And they have
19:43
still submitted and they've lived. But
19:45
does that make it a good decision? If
19:47
you're in the middle of a snowstorm on
19:50
the top of Mount Everest, should you keep going to
19:52
the summit just because somebody happened to
19:54
somehow survived that situation. I
19:56
think you can see there very clearly the answer
19:58
is no. Of course you shouldn't.
20:01
The probability of death is too high. So
20:03
if we take somebody like a founder
20:05
who's pitching, and let's say the
20:07
average time to raise a series a is nine
20:09
months, whether a seed series, So
20:11
let's say that the average time to raise your first
20:13
round is nine months. I'm making that up, by
20:15
the way. I'm just making that number up. But
20:17
let's say that that were the case. You say
20:20
Okay, so what's the most
20:23
above nine months that I'm willing to do this,
20:25
assuming that I'm doing all the things I'm supposed
20:27
to do? And you can kind of set that
20:29
deadline for yourself and then say, if it's beyond
20:31
that point, then they signal that there is an appetite
20:33
in market for it. And
20:35
Here's the key. What else could I be
20:37
using this time for? I wanna
20:39
be an entrepreneur. I wanna develop
20:41
a world changing product that's gonna
20:43
create some sort of amazing unicorn.
20:46
I'm getting very strong signal from very
20:48
smart people that this is not the thing for
20:50
me to develop. And at some
20:52
point, you have to make the conclusion that
20:54
I'm wasting my own intellect on this
20:57
and that I should switch because maybe
20:59
I can switch and develop something else. Maybe
21:01
I can start something new that actually is going
21:04
have a higher probability of
21:06
working. So you could just kind of think about
21:08
it this way. If you knew you were gonna keep
21:10
going a year after that time,
21:12
trying to raise money for a startup
21:15
that you've gotten very strong signals from
21:17
the market is not worth it. Do you
21:19
think that that's a better use of that
21:21
year than taking that year to think
21:23
about another company you could start? And
21:25
another product? That you could
21:27
start taking the learnings from the last one
21:30
into this
21:31
one. And it seems to me pretty obvious
21:33
that the second is the better choice.
21:35
It's interesting as you kind of relate a few
21:38
concepts there. One of them is,
21:40
how do you know what's the best use of
21:42
your time versus stick
21:44
or quit. The question I would ask
21:46
is and I think this is really the
21:48
the important one is, what kind of
21:50
mental models can people use to determine
21:53
whether they should stick or
21:55
quit. Because know in my life, I've had
21:57
many examples that any rational
22:00
person would just look at and just say that's
22:02
silly. You've done this too long. And I've stuck
22:04
with it and been successful at it. But I've had
22:06
a feeling, you know, that, hey,
22:08
this is gonna work. I just have to stick with
22:10
it long enough. And I have other times I'm like, this
22:13
isn't gonna
22:13
work, and I'm gonna cut bait. So how
22:15
should people think about those? Look,
22:17
if we're completely objective, that would just be
22:19
expected value. Question. So
22:23
even in a case where you stuck to something and you thought
22:25
it would work, what you're saying is that I think the
22:27
thing I'm doing is positive, expected value.
22:29
Meaning, for every minute that I put into
22:31
this, I'm gonna get positive return on
22:33
that time spent. But that
22:35
does not mean that it wasn't right for you.
22:37
It wouldn't be right for you to quit because it's
22:40
expected value of the path that
22:42
you're on in comparison to other paths that
22:44
you might take. So one of the things that
22:46
we need to understand is that when we start something,
22:49
we tend to get really stuck in it. There's
22:51
a variety of reasons for that. There's a lot of
22:53
sort of cognitive debris, like cognitive
22:55
forces that make it very hard for us to walk
22:58
away from things. One of the most common
23:00
is the sunk cause fallacy, which makes
23:02
us think that, well, if I walk away, I'll waste
23:04
it all the time that I put into this already. And
23:06
I imagine that you have had that feeling under
23:09
those circumstances quite often. We
23:11
know that what we're trying to do is just get straight
23:13
to expected value, which is, and
23:15
continue doing this or I can take all that
23:17
time and I can put it into something else.
23:20
And do think that the thing that I'm switched
23:22
to is gonna have a higher expected value
23:24
than the thing that I'm doing? So
23:27
expected value in a very simple sense is
23:29
just like, if you're choosing between stock
23:31
a and stock b, you should choose the one that has the
23:33
highest return. Taking into consideration
23:36
your risk tolerance. And that's what you're trying
23:38
to do in terms of the paths that you've taken life. So
23:40
even the places where you stuck to it and worked
23:42
out, it still might have been better for you
23:44
to quit because it might have been
23:46
that you could have gone and taken all that time and energy
23:48
and put it into something else that had higher
23:51
expected return. But we're very
23:53
reluctant to quit things for a variety of reasons,
23:55
not the least of which is sunk cost, and not
23:57
the least of which is we try to get to certainty
23:59
that it's not gonna work out or will before
24:01
a willing walk away. Now, let
24:04
me just say that expected
24:06
value is not an easy way
24:08
to think about things. It's pretty abstract.
24:10
There's all sorts of cognitive biases. They're
24:12
going to distort the way that we think about expected
24:15
value and cause us to come up with very bad equation.
24:18
So instead, what I like
24:20
people to do is use something
24:22
called kill criteria. So
24:25
kill criteria is basically this.
24:27
What are the conditions that I might see at some point
24:30
in the future? What are the signals that I could see at
24:32
some point in the future that would tell me that I ought
24:34
to walk away? Now, we
24:36
could think about, like, why are we thinking about
24:38
kill criteria in this way? So, why
24:40
is that kill criteria? Well, I
24:42
think that we have the intuition that when we start
24:45
something, which we're starting
24:47
under conditions of uncertainty and luck,
24:50
which means that we're going to discover new
24:52
information after the fact by definition
24:54
that when that new information is bad news,
24:56
we will stop doing what we're doing. So
24:59
if we're climbing a mountain and a blizzard
25:01
comes upon us, Obviously, we will
25:03
turn around. If we're running marathon
25:05
and we break our leg, obviously,
25:07
we're gonna stop running. If
25:10
we have a thesis about an
25:12
investment. And then the world tells
25:14
us that our thesis was bonkers.
25:17
That obviously we're going to get
25:19
off the trade. You know, I take a job.
25:21
I have also ideas about what the culture is gonna
25:24
be, how much I'm gonna enjoy the work, so and
25:26
so forth. And then I learned new information that
25:28
don't like it very much. So
25:30
I think that we all think that under those circumstances,
25:33
we'll walk away and quit. And the answer is
25:35
no, we won't. Actually, we will
25:37
escalate our commitment to the cause. We
25:39
will increase how much we're committed to the cause.
25:42
think one place you can see this on the world stage
25:44
right now very clearly is
25:46
the war in Ukraine where
25:48
Russia was supposed to come in and take Ukraine in
25:51
three days. And obviously,
25:53
they aren't winning. There's lots
25:55
of signals that they are not winning that war,
25:57
but I think we all know that Putin isn't going
25:59
anywhere. Not unless he absolutely has
26:01
to. And in fact, he is escalating
26:04
his commitment to the war. He is spending more
26:06
money. He is sending more missiles.
26:08
He is scripted three hundred thousand
26:11
more relatively untrained soldiers
26:13
to send into that war. So there's
26:16
a good case where we can see that kind of escalation
26:18
of commitment. Unless you think that's
26:20
just Putin, we can think about our response
26:22
to losing the Vietnam War, which was incredibly
26:24
similar. Alright. So as
26:27
goes war, does go you holding
26:29
a stock. Because I think we all know
26:31
it's like you buy a stock at fifty, it's trading
26:33
at forty, it's trading at forty because everything
26:35
you thought was gonna be true about the world is no
26:37
longer true. And what do you say when that happens?
26:40
Well, now it's really cheap. I gotta hold it to get
26:42
my money back. Okay.
26:44
So given that we know
26:46
that when we sort of, let's say,
26:48
come across those signals, when they unfold
26:51
in real time, we're not gonna particularly good
26:53
listeners. What we wanna do is actually
26:55
set a list of those signals in advance.
26:58
And then say, when I see those signals,
27:01
then I ought to walk away. So you could
27:03
imagine, for example, like, I had an
27:05
investment. It's three
27:08
months from now and the investment has gone quite
27:10
poorly. What exactly do I think? Like,
27:12
why do I think that that occurred? What
27:14
were the early signals that
27:16
I imagine I'll see that
27:19
would tell me that this
27:21
investment is not gonna turn out the way that
27:23
I had hoped. So you can set those out.
27:25
So I'll give you a simple example of a kill
27:27
criteria. So let's say that
27:30
a year ago, I decided
27:32
that I was gonna invest in Bitcoin.
27:35
And I had a thesis about why I
27:37
was investing in Bitcoin, which was
27:39
that I thought that it would be my opinion
27:41
was that it would be uncorrelated with inflation.
27:44
And it would be a hedge against
27:46
market caps. I'm buying it not because
27:48
of the technology or because of the philosophy or
27:51
anything like that. I'm saying, look, this is gonna
27:53
be a good hedge against chaos
27:55
and inflation. So I'm
27:58
not saying whether that was a good thesis
28:00
or a bad thesis. I don't have a strong opinion
28:02
on that. And if somebody told me that
28:04
was their thesis at the time, I would be like,
28:07
okay, I believe you, if that's
28:09
what you really believe. So now
28:11
you have that thesis. You would then write
28:13
down what the kill criteria are,
28:16
which is when should I get out of this? Right?
28:18
When should I quit? And those kill criteria
28:21
would be, in this case, very detailed,
28:23
like, if inflation goes up by this much and I
28:25
see whatever strength correlation
28:27
between Bitcoin's price, and inflation,
28:30
in this case, it will be negatively correlated.
28:33
Right? So I see inflation going up and Bitcoin
28:35
going down, where it's correlated to
28:37
a certain degree. Then I have to
28:39
sell. Likewise, if the stock
28:41
market goes down and bitcoin is going
28:43
down with it, and I see that consistently occurring
28:46
over some period of time, that
28:48
I must sell. So you're
28:50
being very specific about what those fill
28:52
in the blanks would be. And when
28:54
you see those, you would have to sell. So
28:56
that would be an example of a co criteria.
28:59
Otherwise, what happens and I've seen
29:01
this with people and myself where
29:03
they invested in, say, Bitcoin
29:06
for one reason. And then when
29:08
it goes down, they'll pivot.
29:11
They'll say, oh, no. Well, I'm investing it for the
29:13
tech. Right? Like, I believe in what it will
29:15
do in the future. Or sometimes
29:17
there's the lovely now it's really
29:19
cheap. Like, you're laughing, but how many
29:21
times you heard people say that? It's
29:23
hard not to. It's hard not to say yourself.
29:26
Right. Oh, now that's really cheap.
29:28
And that's what happens when we sort of leave it
29:30
to ourselves on the fly. Whereas
29:32
if we make these commitments in advance, we'd
29:35
like, look, this is what happens. And
29:37
and by the way, you can have it let's say
29:39
that your thesis assumes that the fundamentals are
29:41
gonna within certain band. Let's say, like, interest
29:43
rates are gonna sit within certain band.
29:46
You can basically set out, well, if if interest
29:48
rates go below that band, what will I
29:50
do? And if interest rates go above
29:52
the band, what will I do? So
29:54
sometimes the answer might be anytime they're
29:56
outside of the band would sell. Sometimes
29:59
it might be like, look, if I have an inflation
30:01
hedge on, if it goes above the band,
30:03
I assumed I would be doing pretty well.
30:05
And I would certainly hold them maybe even
30:08
increase. Right? If it's below
30:10
the band, maybe I would get off that hedge.
30:12
Depending on why I was thinking why I was
30:14
doing what I was doing. So these
30:16
kinds of things are incredibly important
30:19
for helping you to be better at decisions about
30:21
when you stop the things that you start.
30:24
I love that criteria because I think that's
30:26
important. It's why people do trade journals
30:28
and set out buy and sell criteria
30:31
before you even do a
30:32
trade. Trading's hard enough.
30:34
So interestingly enough, so with the people that
30:36
I've worked with, the journaling is amazing.
30:39
It tells you what the buy and sell criteria
30:41
are. Very clearly laid out
30:44
thesis. And I think that what people
30:46
do is they make the assumption that having done
30:48
that work, that because implied
30:51
in that work is what
30:53
the conditions would be in the future that might
30:55
make you increase your position,
30:58
hold it or decrease your position that
31:01
when that stuff occurs, that will happen.
31:03
But you actually do need to do an extra step
31:05
when you're doing a trade journal. You need to
31:07
not just think about what conditions
31:09
would I buy or sell? Like, what's my thesis, so
31:11
on so forth? But you do have to say,
31:14
what does this imply about what the future
31:16
is gonna look like? And if the future does
31:18
not look like that in these particular
31:20
ways, then this is what my
31:22
reaction to this will be. I
31:25
know it sounds like distinction without a difference.
31:27
I've said, this is my thesis. These are the
31:29
conditions under which I would buy. These are the conditions
31:32
under which I would sell in terms of when I'm gonna
31:34
put the trade on. So doesn't that
31:36
mean that I'll be paying attention to those
31:38
things in terms of taking the trade off? And the
31:40
answer is no. You won't. Not
31:42
unless you specifically list them
31:44
as kill criteria or exit criteria. You
31:47
need to write those things down. It's really
31:49
good if you share them with somebody else. And
31:52
say when I see this, then I'm gonna
31:54
exit. And you can see that with the Bitcoin
31:56
example, someone can have a very detailed
31:58
journal about their reason for buying or
32:00
shorting or whatever Bitcoin,
32:03
and they can have like a super detailed journal.
32:05
But then when it is correlated with inflation,
32:08
are they selling? No, because they're already
32:10
in it. But if at the time
32:13
that you wrote down, like, why am I making
32:15
this trade? You also had a very specific
32:17
set of criteria that would tell you when you were to
32:19
exit. You're just much more likely to
32:21
be hit rationally in the face of that decision.
32:24
Trading's hard to begin with. You know, one
32:26
of the things I was thinking about before the interview
32:29
was you know, I'm from Boston. So
32:31
Tom Brady is kind of a staple up here and
32:33
you think about decisions like athletes
32:35
that are their identities tied
32:37
up with toughness. And here
32:39
you have somebody who's trying to
32:42
continue his career much longer
32:44
than maybe his family would have liked or
32:46
you can't read his mind, but I would
32:48
imagine with people like athletes where
32:50
being tough is a part of who you are,
32:53
it's really tough to know when to leave
32:55
at the
32:55
top. So what should people like that
32:57
do to think about quitting?
32:59
First of all, I just wanna say, like, some of this
33:01
is what your own values are. So,
33:04
Tom Brady may be okay with having
33:06
a terrible last season. I
33:08
don't know if he does or not.
33:11
What I do know is that the human tendency
33:13
is to wanna have that terrible season before
33:15
you leave because the
33:17
feeling of what if But what if I played
33:20
one more time? Maybe would have gotten a would
33:22
have been the seventh Super Bowl? Quite a few.
33:25
Six or seven. You know, that feeling
33:27
is so hard for us. In the same sense of,
33:29
like, if you sell a stock and then it goes up afterwards,
33:32
how painful is that? So in that
33:34
particular case, it's, like, particularly painful because we
33:36
can see happen, but even in the hypothetical
33:38
and the counterfactual, we're like, but maybe if
33:40
I played that last season, I could have got another
33:42
ring. Maybe that would have been the year that I
33:44
got another ring. I think that those
33:46
things are really hard, so we wanna sort
33:48
of butt up against the certainty that we have no
33:51
other choice. That's kind of for
33:53
ourselves. Richard Daylor said to me, like,
33:55
nobody wants to quit until it's no longer a
33:57
decision. So, like, when he has such a bad
33:59
season that the team doesn't even want him on it
34:01
anymore, well, then, okay, it's pretty easy to walk
34:03
away at that point because you're not wondering,
34:06
like, well, what if I had stayed? But the other
34:08
thing that you're getting out of that is other people aren't
34:10
wondering what if you had stayed. So we
34:12
can go to like a Barry Sanders type of
34:14
situation. How mad
34:16
are people at Barry Sanders? Like, still today?
34:19
They're like, what? Why?
34:21
Because for him, I don't
34:23
think that he wanted CTE. I know
34:25
that that was part of his decision making.
34:28
You know, he felt like his body was taking
34:30
a battering so and so forth. And so
34:32
he decided, like, look, I'm great. I'm just gonna
34:34
quit now when I'm great. Before I start,
34:36
like, the horrible decline and maybe I can't ever
34:38
walk again because I have two new replacements
34:40
that don't work very well. But people
34:43
are super mad. Because he did it,
34:45
again, it's an expected value equation.
34:47
And value is in there, not just in terms of, like,
34:49
money, but also what are your own values? Like, what am
34:51
I gonna get out of it? And what he determined was that
34:53
moment in time as he looked at what was
34:55
gonna happen over the future, that the cost
34:57
outweighed the benefits. And so he
35:00
quit. That's fine. Now, Tom
35:02
Brady may be okay with
35:04
playing until he sort of falls into
35:06
being somewhat mediocre. That may
35:08
be okay with him. I don't know. But I
35:10
know that the tendency is to do that thing
35:12
rather than the Barry Sanders thing.
35:14
And that more of us would be better off if we
35:16
kind of did the Barry Sanders thing. So
35:19
how do you actually get to that? Well, the way
35:21
that I kind of think about it is this use
35:23
of kilo criteria is very helpful for this because there's
35:25
some point at which, well, Tom
35:27
Brady decided to retire. Then
35:29
the question is, how do you think about whether you should
35:31
come back or not? Or you're
35:34
in a job and you have that thought, like, oh,
35:36
I'm not happy to maybe I should quit. Or
35:38
you're an employer. You're like, oh, I'm not happy with
35:40
this employee. Maybe I should let them go.
35:43
Or you're in a relationship, you're like, oh, I've really
35:45
got this nagging feeling. I'm unhappy. Maybe I
35:47
should leave. So we all have
35:49
those moments. Right? And the thing that we know is
35:51
that in those moments, we're not gonna make particularly
35:53
good decisions about whether we should stay or whether
35:55
we should go. So what you can do is in that
35:57
moment, you could say how long am I okay with status
35:59
quo. Let's say that you're thinking
36:02
about retiring from football and
36:04
you say, I feel like maybe
36:06
I need a little bit more information I leave,
36:08
I've got to think about how long am I okay with the
36:10
situation as I am in now, and maybe you say I want
36:12
to give it one more season. Okay, that's fine.
36:15
Then you say, what could I be seeing
36:17
and can be very specific, like in terms of
36:20
my stats, you know, my productivity on
36:22
the field? In terms of my
36:24
body. What are the things and you
36:26
could talk to a medical doctor? What are
36:28
the things that you could be seeing doctor that
36:30
would tell you that maybe I shouldn't be playing another
36:33
season after this. And you can write
36:35
those things down. You can think about things
36:37
that are subjective, like, what's my level
36:39
of happiness? What's my expectation for
36:41
how I should benchmark that? So you can
36:43
figure out whatever the set of things are
36:45
that would tell you either that this
36:48
is worth continuing or it's not worth continuing
36:50
anymore, and you can commit to that.
36:52
Because otherwise, what can happen is you're like,
36:54
oh, I'm gonna give it one more season and then it's
36:56
the end of the season. It's like tomorrow is always
36:58
tomorrow. Right? And you're like, oh, but then I'll give it
37:00
another season. I'll give it another and even though
37:02
you really hit those co criteria. So
37:05
you can do that with an employee as well.
37:07
How am we okay with having somebody who's performing?
37:10
Up to this level in the seat, what
37:13
are the things that I would expect to see in terms
37:15
of showing me that it's been turned around? What
37:18
are the things that I expect to see that would
37:20
tell me that this isn't worthwhile anymore?
37:22
So let's say you say can deal with this situation
37:24
for six more weeks before I initiate a search.
37:27
And you figure out, like, what are the signals that
37:29
would tell me that this employee is still not performing?
37:31
What are the signals that would tell me that they've turned
37:33
it around? What are the things that I need to do to help
37:35
them and support them? To see if they
37:38
can get there. Then you're just much more
37:40
likely to get to those decisions more
37:41
quickly, which is way better for everybody.
37:44
No. I couldn't agree
37:46
more. You just mentioned a lot of different
37:48
topics, relationships, employees.
37:51
Right. And it has a thing about decision making,
37:54
Kirk. It's everything.
37:56
Hard to when the emotions get involved. Well, and
37:58
this is what I'm trying to do. Let's get the emotion
38:00
out of it. Right? Because obviously in that moment when
38:02
you're like, I wanna quit. That's an emotional
38:04
moment for you. You're gonna be a good at making that
38:06
decision. In that moment, I don't think so.
38:09
So if you just step back and say, like, how long am
38:11
I okay with the status quo? You know,
38:13
maybe with a job that you have, it's another quarter.
38:16
I hope that you're hearing this concept of a
38:18
deadline. So you always wanna have a deadline
38:20
that's going along with these. I call it dates and
38:22
dates. What's the date and what's the state
38:24
of the world? So sometimes
38:26
the deadline is, like, I can't quit
38:28
until I have six months of runway. So
38:31
I'm gonna work to build up six months of
38:33
runway, and that's
38:35
my date. That's the stop time. And then
38:37
at that time, what are the things that tell me that
38:39
I should stick it out? What are the things that would tell me
38:41
that I ought to quit?
38:43
Great. Well, Annie, I really appreciate
38:45
you joining us in the show. My brain is full,
38:47
so you. Well,
38:50
I'm glad it filled your brains. Yes.
38:52
Thank you. There's so many mental models here
38:54
that you can use for investing, for life,
38:56
for pretty much really anything that
38:58
applies to your
38:59
life. So appreciate you sharing anywhere
39:01
can people find more about you and some of your
39:04
works The best place to find me is annaduke
39:06
dot com, which is my website. You can
39:08
find video, you can contact me there,
39:10
get old versions in my newsletter,
39:13
so and so forth. I'm on Twitter
39:15
for the moment at Andy Duke, but
39:18
you can also find me on the normal other
39:21
social channels, and I hope that people will check out
39:23
the alliance for decision education, which
39:25
is the nonprofit that I co founded to
39:27
bring decision education to every k through twelve
39:29
classroom. This
39:32
is a public service announcement. Hi.
39:34
My name is Kirk. I'm with the government and I'm here
39:37
to help. Doesn't that sound reassuring?
39:39
Well, let's talk about how they're helping.
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The government needs your help to make our money worthless
39:44
again. PPP loans, student loan
39:46
forgiveness, helicopter money. Let's
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keep the party going until our money is totally
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worthless. Don't think it can happen?
39:54
Sure can. Just ask Zimbabwe, Venezuela,
39:58
Greece, Germany, Hungary,
40:01
Greece, Yugoslavia, that
40:03
I mentioned, Greece, as a loyal
40:05
listener to the show, I want to reward
40:07
you with a gift. I want
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to give you free money. I'm
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40:35
I wanna get into the panel portion of the show
40:37
here where we have our Vrayon Barb Freeburn. Hey,
40:39
Barb.
40:40
Hi. So happy to be here.
40:43
Glad to have you here. Also, we have a ring
40:45
on Megan Gorman. Hey, Megan.
40:46
Hey, Kirk. How are you doing today?
40:48
Doing great. Well, let's just dive right in. So
40:50
Meghan, what were some of your thoughts here from
40:52
the interview? Listening to the interview
40:54
made me wanna buy her book and actually did.
40:57
I thought she was fascinating. And
41:00
she was really, really good at
41:02
laying out some of the hardest
41:04
challenges we deal with in working
41:07
with clients. And specifically, I
41:09
would say in terms of things
41:11
like factoring in luck
41:13
versus skill, I think that
41:16
particularly in very good markets,
41:18
people overestimate skill
41:21
and underestimate luck. And I thought she laid
41:23
that out really really well with decision
41:25
making. So for me,
41:28
it was a lot of confirmation of
41:30
what I experienced in working
41:32
with clients. And I really just
41:34
thought she added a thoughtful approach.
41:37
And the other thing that I just did a takeaway and
41:39
this I probably probably won't talk about, but What
41:41
I also found fascinating about her is she's
41:43
had, like, five careers. And
41:45
I liked that about her because I think that that
41:48
is much more normal
41:49
today. So that was my takeaways.
41:51
Yeah. I think the luck for skill that's one
41:53
of my favorite concepts I like to teach, you
41:55
know, is a different screen luck for skill and
41:57
the fact that we always blame ourselves
42:00
for the skill, and we blame luck
42:02
for the bad luck, but the good luck is
42:04
skill. So so that's
42:06
one of my favorites. It happens all the time with clients
42:08
over the years. So, Barb, what about you? What were some
42:11
of your takeaways?
42:12
I liked so much that she
42:15
laid out the way to make decisions in
42:18
a statistical strategy.
42:21
So she made things that are kind
42:23
of back of the napkin decisions.
42:26
She gave a framework for which
42:29
we can make decisions. So
42:31
expected value means
42:33
what are the likely outcomes that
42:35
something is gonna happen. So you can
42:37
actually quantify it. Not
42:40
perfectly, of course, but
42:42
you can look at it more scientifically
42:46
than you normally would. And then
42:48
I also loved the kill concept.
42:50
When I used to be a stock picker, I
42:53
would automatically write
42:55
down after I have to analyze the
42:57
stock pick and bought it, I would
42:59
write down the reasons to settle.
43:02
And I go back and review it.
43:04
And I trained myself to
43:07
sell the losers when they looked like
43:09
they were meeting criteria.
43:12
And I think that's a really good
43:14
strategy for anyone who is buying
43:16
stocks or mutual funds.
43:18
Let's dig in little bit, Barb. I think this is
43:20
one of those areas that you could
43:22
go crazy thinking about it, but you put down
43:24
reasons to sell. So how do you think
43:26
about it when you're, you know, buying a position?
43:28
What does that look like for you?
43:31
I was a fundamental investor and
43:33
I still am and I still use fundamental
43:36
strategies. And what that means
43:38
is you use ratios,
43:41
sales measures, earnings
43:43
measures, price earnings ratio,
43:45
cash flow, all different sorts
43:47
of ratios. You compare them,
43:50
decide if they equate
43:52
to creating an
43:54
investment that is a
43:56
fairly valued investment, an
43:59
undervalued or an overvalued.
44:02
And then you also look at the
44:04
analyst reports, you look at
44:06
the annual reports to
44:08
see what are the growth prospects. So
44:10
if the company's doing well, what do
44:12
they have projected in the future that's
44:15
going to enable them to continue
44:17
to grow? So that's the
44:19
type of information that I used to
44:21
buy. Typically, I won't
44:24
buy a stock that is way overvalued.
44:27
It might be a great company, but
44:29
if the price is too high, I
44:31
have a lower likelihood of getting
44:33
my money back or getting a good return.
44:36
So that's what I do on the buyout, but
44:39
my thesis don't always work out.
44:41
As is the case with any
44:44
sort of investor. Sometimes
44:46
you're wrong. And so after
44:48
I've made that buy, after I've laid
44:50
out the reasons I have bought the stock,
44:52
and I write those down. And
44:55
I do that with mutual funds as well
44:57
because I'm constantly analyzing whether
45:00
I've got the best EPS in my portfolio
45:02
or not. So I have
45:05
reasons to sell. Let's say they don't
45:07
meet their growth metrics. Let's
45:09
say the competitive environment gets
45:11
too tough or let's
45:14
say that there's something
45:17
that I anticipate that could
45:20
happen, that could go wrong, that could
45:22
cause the company to do
45:24
poorly That might
45:26
be a reason to sell. And typically
45:29
when a stock drops in value, I
45:31
do not wait for it to come back to
45:33
even. That is like one
45:35
of the most typical biases for
45:38
investors. If they have a loss, they think,
45:40
well, I'll sell it, but only if it goes
45:42
back to even. What I do is
45:44
I look at that stock and I say, when
45:46
I buy this today based on the
45:48
information I have, and if the
45:50
answer is
45:51
no, then I will sell it and take the
45:53
loss. That's a good philosophy,
45:55
I think, having that kill criteria. Are you
45:57
mainly focused on the fundamentals for the
45:59
kill criteria? Are you also looking at
46:01
other things like price and I
46:04
guess comparable
46:05
opportunities? Howard Bauchner: Yes,
46:07
I look at all of those things. Because
46:10
fundamentals are only one part of the picture.
46:12
You have to look at the
46:14
drivers of the growth. I mean,
46:16
that's the biggest thing. And then you have to look
46:19
at the market environment. What's
46:21
going on? I mean, look
46:23
at AOL. You know, we all
46:25
thought AOL was amazing. Look
46:27
at the beta max if you wanna
46:30
date yourself. That was incredible
46:33
technology. So
46:35
you have to look at so
46:37
many different factors and you have to
46:40
try and be scientific look, we can't
46:42
be scientific. We never
46:44
have all the information. So
46:46
you do the best you can with the information
46:49
you have, and then you don't be afraid to sell.
46:51
Don't be afraid to take a loss. You're gonna
46:53
take losses sometimes. And
46:55
typically, if you use sound
46:57
principles that you have laid out in
47:00
advance, your investment winners
47:02
will trump your losers.
47:05
Yeah. That's great advice. So Megan,
47:07
getting back to you, when you're working with clients,
47:09
how do you handle the kill criteria
47:12
that we're talking about with clients?
47:14
I think in all of this, you
47:17
to control the controllables. There
47:20
are so many factors to
47:22
investing that are beyond your control,
47:24
things like I talked about in terms of luck.
47:27
And it's sort of funny in watching clients
47:29
over the years. I have some clients
47:31
who have amazing timing and
47:33
then I have other clients that consistently have
47:36
bad timing. So what you're trying
47:38
to really do and Barb, I think, laid
47:40
this out quite well, is create
47:42
a repeatable and disciplined process.
47:45
And even like when I work with clients,
47:48
our meetings have a repeatable and
47:50
disciplined agenda. It's
47:52
very clear how I walk clients through
47:54
things. And that's how we want them
47:56
to be looking at their portfolios. Because
47:59
their portfolios, it's too easy
48:02
to make a short term decision on
48:04
something just because of a short
48:06
term blip in performance. So
48:09
a lot of the work we have to do is focusing
48:11
on what is our long term goals
48:13
what are we trying to achieve? Why is
48:15
investing? Real investing as dull
48:18
as watching paint dry? You know,
48:20
and really focusing on Okay.
48:22
Here is the due diligence process that
48:25
allowed us to go into this holding,
48:27
and this is the due diligence process that
48:29
would allow us to judge if this is
48:31
a holding to keep or get rid of,
48:33
just like Barb walked us through.
48:36
And I will tell you that the
48:38
people who do the best with this
48:40
are the ones who don't get very emotional.
48:42
And I think that that's really interesting about
48:44
poker players is that they're very
48:46
good at checking their emotions at the
48:48
door. The group of clients that I
48:50
have that are constantly looking particularly
48:53
in this marketplace, they're panicking
48:55
and just making bad decisions and
48:57
you're trying to hold them in place. And
48:59
I'll give you quick example. I had
49:01
someone who had an opportunity
49:04
to exercise some stock options and
49:06
is now sitting in cash. And has been
49:08
worried about going into the market. And
49:11
one of the things that we have spent
49:13
time talking about is
49:15
that today, and this might sound crazy,
49:18
but today there's lower risk in the market
49:20
than there has been a year ago. And going
49:22
through data points that would make you
49:25
start to see that this entry into the market
49:27
is not a bad time to start
49:29
doing it. But this person,
49:32
this person I've worked with for years, has
49:34
consistently always let their emotions
49:36
overtake them. And even in going
49:38
through a disciplined process and looking at
49:40
data, they become too overwhelmed
49:43
to make a decision, which is why
49:45
I have had to express to them, I'm concerned about
49:47
meeting they're meeting their goals. So
49:50
I really, really encourage people to have
49:52
a discipline system, control the controllables,
49:55
But the things you can't control like the market,
49:57
don't look. Just let it go.
49:59
And that makes a big, big difference.
50:02
And I'll just say one thing about process.
50:04
And that is when you study some of
50:06
the best leaders, some of the best American
50:09
presidents and their leadership skills, A
50:11
lot of them are poker players. Eisenhower,
50:14
one of the best poker players out there
50:16
and consistently played not just when
50:18
he's in the military, but when he was leading World War
50:20
two and as a president. And I think it's
50:22
very telling that his decisions
50:24
were very firm. He was very clear.
50:26
And he stuck to strategy and you could make an
50:28
argument he had one of most successful presidencies.
50:31
So looking at the people who are able to cut
50:33
emotion off and stick to process is
50:35
really really key.
50:37
You mentioned one thing which is
50:39
we have lower risk today than last
50:41
year. Could you expand on
50:43
that? Because I think it's a great concept.
50:45
What has happened over
50:47
the past year is all the key
50:49
fundamentals about interest rates inflations
50:51
have flipped on their head and the market has reacted.
50:54
And by the way, if the market hadn't reacted
50:56
the way it had, I would be concerned. The
50:58
market should be down with all the key fundamentals
51:01
changing. But today, when
51:03
you look at the market, what
51:05
is interesting is, one, equities are
51:07
far more reasonably valued than they were a year
51:09
ago. Fixed income is paying income,
51:11
cash is paying yield. And so
51:13
today, if you go into the market,
51:16
could the market still go down? Yes,
51:18
completely. But it likely
51:21
won't go down as much as it would have gone down
51:23
if you went in a year ago. Meaning things
51:25
are more reasonably priced, the market has
51:27
digested the fed rate increases, the
51:29
market is digesting how we're managing
51:32
inflation. And so therefore, your
51:34
risk is lower of a great
51:36
drop. Doesn't mean it won't happen, but
51:38
again, you might not see a thirty percent
51:40
drop, you'd see a ten percent drop. So
51:42
it's about patience in this.
51:45
And so that's why think today entering
51:47
the market is not a bad point in time.
51:49
You probably get some things that are more of a deal.
51:52
And if you're really, really nervous,
51:55
what I've always found is that the
51:57
repeatable and disciplined process here is
51:59
dollar cost averaging. It's boring,
52:02
it's hokey, but it actually
52:04
works, and it helps you manage your
52:06
emotion as you try to enter the market.
52:09
And I don't know, Barb, looks like you want to say something
52:11
as I was speaking. So I'd love to hear your
52:13
point of
52:13
view. What are my thoughts like that,
52:17
you're like my husband who like
52:19
reads my mind and says,
52:21
what are you nervous about? I know
52:23
you're thinking about something now.
52:25
Meghan, you're amazing. You know me
52:28
too well. So, yes.
52:31
First of all, I wanted to talk about valuations.
52:34
Which is what does it mean
52:36
that the market is cheaper? We
52:38
use ratios to help us
52:41
determine if the price
52:43
of a market. Just one simple
52:45
value that I talk about all the time,
52:47
which is the price earnings ratio.
52:50
That is the
52:52
amount of money, you
52:55
will pay for one dollar
52:57
of earnings of a company. So
53:00
if the price earnings ratio was twenty
53:02
five, you're gonna pay twenty five dollars
53:04
for one dollar of earnings
53:06
of the company. If the price earnings
53:09
ratio is fifteen, you're gonna
53:11
pay fifteen dollars for one dollar
53:13
verdicts. I'd rather pay
53:15
fifteen than I would twenty
53:17
five for the same company,
53:19
for the same dollar of earnings. So
53:22
that's what Megan is talking about. That's
53:24
one of the metrics, not the only
53:26
metric but it's really
53:29
important and a lot of analysts
53:31
use that as a way to
53:34
determine If you're getting a bargain
53:36
or you're getting a fair price or
53:38
if you're overpay. So
53:40
that was one thing going through my mind,
53:42
the other is interest rate.
53:45
Now, many of us listening
53:48
may be over fifty. I
53:50
don't know. I'm not sure. Kirk
53:52
can probably tell me But if
53:54
you're getting up there in the second
53:57
half of your life, you
53:59
may want to be a little more conservative
54:01
with your investment portfolio which
54:03
means you may not wanna have as greatest
54:05
stock allocation. Now the past
54:08
ten years, I mean,
54:10
it was devastating for any
54:12
of us that had bonds or cash.
54:15
You couldn't even get one percent
54:18
yield on a money market account,
54:20
you get like point zero
54:22
one percent. Now,
54:25
oh my gosh, I just got a message from
54:27
my high yield cash account at my bank,
54:30
they're paying four percent So
54:33
now is a time that you
54:35
wanna say. K? The average
54:37
return on stocks over the
54:40
long term is eight to nine
54:42
ten percent. With that
54:44
return, you have a lot of risk
54:47
which means you may have drawdowns
54:49
of ten, twenty, thirty percent
54:51
in a year. The average
54:54
return on bonds over
54:56
long periods of time is about
54:58
five percent, but you typically
55:01
don't have those draw downs. So
55:04
if you're at the point where you're getting
55:06
a little sick and tired of that volatility,
55:09
you also want to preserve some
55:11
of your cash and not so
55:13
much grow at all, then
55:15
you wanna seriously be
55:17
looking at
55:19
bond type investments. Treasury
55:23
bonds, corporate bonds
55:25
that are paying higher yields. You can
55:27
lock in higher yields. And
55:29
you will smooth out the volatility
55:32
of your portfolio and lock
55:34
in a basic cushion of returns.
55:38
So that's what was going through
55:40
my mind. And the other thing I'll
55:42
say about it too with cash being where it's
55:44
at right now, everybody's got pretty
55:46
cheap money on their mortgages. What I
55:48
like about where cash is today, which to your
55:50
point, I'm seeing it yields between three and a
55:53
half to four and a half percent depending on
55:55
the type of money market or cash management
55:57
strategy, it's really great leveraging.
56:00
Why pay down mortgage debt? There's no reason
56:02
to. You can earn your interest
56:04
for the debt on cash, and
56:06
that's such a low risk investment.
56:09
So to some degree, For me
56:11
out there listening, the market we're in right now is pretty
56:13
exciting. There's a lot of opportunities
56:16
out there and a lot of the challenges
56:18
have started to work through the system. And
56:21
never forget when you look at eight
56:23
of the past nine recessions since
56:25
nineteen sixty, the
56:27
market halfway through the recession or so
56:29
has started to see through the recession
56:32
and start to return even when data
56:34
like unemployment continues to raise. The
56:36
one aberration just everybody knows is
56:38
the two thousand one recession, and that is
56:40
because at the tail end of it, there was a terror
56:42
attack, which basically through
56:44
everything into another challenge.
56:47
So I'm excited about this market
56:49
and the more I talk to clients, the
56:51
more we start going through data, think
56:53
it's really important to show people data to help
56:55
with that repeatable discipline
56:57
process. People are getting excited
56:59
about what's coming up ahead. I couldn't agree
57:01
more. I think there's definitely more opportunity
57:04
this year than last year. It's interesting.
57:06
You can actually look at assets again like
57:08
fixed income and say, hey.
57:11
Hey, wow. There's fixed income actually makes sense
57:13
right now as opposed to last year, which
57:15
as Barb said, think it was point one percent. think
57:17
that was if you're lucky. Someplace
57:20
actually charge your money. They put money with them.
57:22
But I did wanna get into cognitive biases.
57:25
I mean, we all live with these every single
57:27
day of our lives. And when it comes
57:29
to investing, these are extremely important.
57:32
If you don't understand how they apply, and
57:34
how you can combat them. It actually can
57:37
severely negatively impact your performance
57:39
in your portfolio. So, Barb, let's
57:41
start with you. What are some cognitive bias
57:44
or some of the favorite ones or maybe even
57:46
some of your white
57:46
whales, if you will, when it comes to cognitive biases?
57:49
Well, the first one I talked
57:51
about before was anchoring, which is
57:54
I'm not gonna sell because I'm gonna wait for
57:56
my price to get back. I've talked about that.
57:58
The other one that is huge that
58:00
I have seen in play for the last few years
58:03
is called the herding bias, which
58:05
means if other people are doing it, I should
58:07
do it too. Which is
58:09
a recipe for disaster. Because
58:12
if you're following the crowd, you
58:14
are getting swept up into a frenzy
58:17
and you would typically end up buying
58:19
high. So be aware
58:22
of as many investors, including
58:24
Warren Buffett, have said, don't
58:26
be greedy. When others
58:29
are greedy, you wanna
58:31
be cautious. And when
58:33
other people are cautious, you
58:35
wanna be greedy. So as a
58:37
note to Meghan's client today,
58:40
now is absolutely the time
58:42
to get back in the market. You may
58:44
not hit the bottom but
58:46
you are certainly going to be better off than
58:48
if you wait for the readback. So
58:50
those are two biases. I'm going to
58:52
give you another one, which is called
58:55
the overconfidence bias, and
58:57
that wraps up in the discussion we had
58:59
at the beginning of the podcast, which is
59:02
are good investors lucky or
59:04
smart, and sometimes you
59:06
don't know the difference. Overconfidence
59:09
bias is when the S and P five
59:11
hundred is reaching twenty five
59:13
percent a year, and you think you are
59:15
the greatest investor ever.
59:18
First of all, it doesn't
59:21
take any skill to
59:23
invest in the S and P five hundred,
59:25
which by the way, I think it's a very good
59:27
barometer of how
59:30
to get good returns. It's a good investment.
59:32
The market has done very well. But
59:35
don't confuse the fact of
59:37
matching returns with an advancing market
59:40
with being a good investor. And
59:42
on the flip side, and Annie mentioned this
59:44
too, Sometimes you'll have a losing
59:47
investment and that doesn't mean you're a
59:49
bad
59:49
investor. So overconfidence
59:52
means that you know more than you do.
59:55
So I think those three are enough
59:57
to get you started. What's
59:59
interesting today is it's never been easier
1:00:01
to invest in the market. I always tell my team
1:00:03
when I was a kid you had to, like, look things
1:00:06
up in the newspaper. Like, it was a
1:00:08
much more complicated system. But part
1:00:10
of the challenge is with being so easy to
1:00:12
access the investment market is
1:00:14
it's way too easy to access information.
1:00:17
And then information bias is one
1:00:19
of the biggest challenges I find. Because
1:00:22
what happens we're all gonna get information
1:00:25
whether we're watching TikTok videos,
1:00:27
CNBC, Wall Street Journal.
1:00:29
But It's really how
1:00:32
you prioritize your evaluation of
1:00:34
them. And that's one of things that
1:00:36
really you have to work on,
1:00:39
which is which noise are you gonna tune
1:00:41
out and which noise are you gonna
1:00:43
focus on? So one of the things I would tell
1:00:45
anyone who's working with advisers Part
1:00:47
of the benefit of working
1:00:49
with an adviser is they
1:00:51
should be taking you through economic data
1:00:54
coming from the top tier economists
1:00:57
and explaining to you to give context. Because
1:01:00
at the end of the day, investing is a science.
1:01:02
And that data really
1:01:05
can sort of clear the air
1:01:07
and give you real perspective where
1:01:09
if you're listening to some TikTok
1:01:12
video or somebody on CNBC, you
1:01:14
have to remember the reason they're putting that information
1:01:16
out there is to get you to watch, to tune in,
1:01:18
to sensationalize. And so maybe
1:01:20
that data, while there are nuggets of truth
1:01:23
in it, shouldn't be overemphasized versus
1:01:26
economic data. That has
1:01:28
reasoning and data behind it
1:01:30
and the science of investing. So
1:01:33
really, really think about where
1:01:35
you're going to get your information and be
1:01:37
wary of information
1:01:38
bias. Hey, Megan.
1:01:40
I've gotta jump in here. Because
1:01:43
that is one of my pet peeves. There's
1:01:46
so many people out there. They're dynamic.
1:01:48
They're interesting. They're certainly more
1:01:51
glamorous than I am,
1:01:53
but maybe they got rid
1:01:55
of us hundred thousand dollars of debt
1:01:58
and so they think they're an expert in
1:02:00
invest state. What you
1:02:02
can do now to make sure you're
1:02:04
listening to people who are smart
1:02:07
is learn how to distinguish between
1:02:10
someone who has credentials,
1:02:15
experience, knowledge
1:02:18
in investing. Go to their LinkedIn
1:02:20
profile. What is their
1:02:22
college degree? Their master's degree.
1:02:25
And what are their certifications? Are
1:02:29
they skilled in
1:02:31
investing? Almost
1:02:33
any information that you'll get off
1:02:35
of your Fidelity, your Schwab,
1:02:37
your Vanguard websites
1:02:40
is really good information. You
1:02:43
can trust that information. If
1:02:45
you look at the Federal Reserve side,
1:02:48
you're gonna get good information. If
1:02:51
you look at the CFA site,
1:02:53
which is the certified chartered
1:02:55
financial analyst website, you're
1:02:58
going to get good information. So
1:03:00
make sure before you dive in and
1:03:03
follow somebody who got rid
1:03:05
of a bunch of dead and is really cute
1:03:07
on
1:03:07
TikTok, make sure
1:03:09
they know what they're talking about.
1:03:12
Totally agree. Well, as we kind of get ready to wrap
1:03:14
it up here, final thoughts from you, Megan.
1:03:16
I think her book I can't wait to read it.
1:03:18
I think that the point she lays out is really
1:03:21
important. But I think just to emphasize,
1:03:23
most people don't realize when they
1:03:25
look at the spectrum from skill to
1:03:28
just random luck, investing is sort
1:03:31
of in the middle there. It takes skill
1:03:33
but you have to have moments where things
1:03:36
do work in your favor. You know, you've invested
1:03:38
in a fund and it's a small
1:03:40
that fun, and small cap has a great year
1:03:42
and great run. And so as
1:03:44
a way to make sure that you're
1:03:46
running your portfolio the right way, focus
1:03:49
on a disciplined approach on
1:03:51
how you run it, how you make choices
1:03:53
in it, when you decide to buy,
1:03:55
when you decide to sell, and be
1:03:57
wary of information bias. Have
1:03:59
your key places that you turn
1:04:01
to for economic data and
1:04:04
stick with that. And remember, it's incredibly
1:04:07
boring to be a good investor. It is
1:04:09
not exciting. It is not mean stocks.
1:04:11
It is just boring. I'm
1:04:13
Megan Gorman. You can find me at forbes dot
1:04:15
com. Kirk, thanks for having me on.
1:04:17
Thanks
1:04:17
for coming on Megan. And Barb, final thoughts
1:04:20
from you. Diversification. Nobody
1:04:22
knows the future. Small
1:04:24
cap value, huge outperformer
1:04:27
this year. Yeah. I've had that in my
1:04:29
portfolio for decades. It's
1:04:31
done not much, but give
1:04:33
me a a couple points in dividends.
1:04:36
This year, it's gone through the roof. So
1:04:39
don't try and pick the right sector. Don't
1:04:42
try and pick the right asset. Have
1:04:44
a smartly diversified portfolio
1:04:47
that you have created with
1:04:50
a sane and
1:04:53
smart strategy. And
1:04:55
then just stick with that. If
1:04:57
you wanna play around, choose a small
1:04:59
percentage of your investable
1:05:01
assets, five percent, maybe go up
1:05:03
to ten percent. But most
1:05:05
of us do not give the time
1:05:08
or the discipline or the
1:05:10
knowledge to be active
1:05:12
traders. And if you do,
1:05:15
well, more power to you. But
1:05:17
in general, the data's pretty clear
1:05:21
that just sticking with
1:05:23
a diversified US
1:05:25
and global stocks bonds,
1:05:29
a little bit of cash, and
1:05:31
just keeping your asset allocation
1:05:34
in line with your risk tolerance and
1:05:36
your financial goals That will
1:05:38
take you a long way successful
1:05:40
investing. I'm Barb Friedberg.
1:05:43
You can find me on YouTube
1:05:45
at roboadvisor pro's and
1:05:47
at Barbara Freiberg Personal Finance.
1:05:51
Thanks for coming on, Barbara. And that's the show for
1:05:53
this week. Thank you again for joining us MoneyTree
1:05:55
Investing podcast. My name is Kirk Chisholm, Wealth
1:05:57
Manager of Innovative Advisor Group.
1:05:59
We don't just manage your wealth. We make your life
1:06:01
better. You can find more about me at
1:06:03
innovative wealth dot com, and of course, you can find
1:06:05
me every week here in the show. Please remember
1:06:08
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1:06:49
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