0:07

Welcome to Mortality Matters, a podcast

0:07

about conceptual issues in the philosophy

0:12

of death and the meaning of life. I am your host Matthew Sternberg.

0:22

Would heaven really be a hell? Is oblivion better?

0:26

What should we hope for when

0:26

it comes to an immortal exist?

0:30

In this episode, I'm covering the

0:30

second half of chapter seven of

0:34

John Martin Fisher's book, death,

0:34

immortality and Meaning in Life.

0:38

In this second half of the chapter,

0:38

Fisher considers immortality from a

0:42

religious standpoint before specifying

0:42

where he stands on the issue.

0:46

Before considering different

0:46

conceptions of what the afterlife would

0:50

be or what a heaven would be like,

0:50

presuming there were such a thing.

0:54

First we have to think about

0:54

whether it's even possible.

0:57

So under all these religious conceptions

0:57

of an afterlife, they all hold the thought

1:02

that death is a transition of some kind.

1:05

It's right there in the name after life. This is to be contrasted with a secular

1:08

approach, which would hold that death.

1:12

Annihilates, the one who. When you die, you cease to exist.

1:16

So under all of these religious

1:16

notions, that is not true.

1:19

Death is a transition to

1:19

some other form of exist.

1:22

An afterlife, if you will, which

1:22

may not necessarily be good.

1:25

There may be a hell as well, or perhaps in

1:25

a reincarnation worldview, one's afterlife

1:31

is just yet another life with all of

1:31

its ordinary foibles and challenges.

1:36

Interestingly, Fisher does not focus

1:36

on reincarnation, and at least in

1:39

this part of the book, he focuses

1:39

it on other parts of the book.

1:42

So we're going to be looking at instead

1:42

different conceptions of the afterlife

1:46

of heaven in which heaven is some other.

1:49

Than the material world that we

1:49

all inhabit right now, which is not

1:53

to say that it must be ethereal or

1:53

immaterial in some form or another,

1:58

although that may be one option or one

1:58

way of thinking about an afterlife.

2:02

The important point is

2:02

that it's not this world.

2:05

It's some other world. So one problem that Fisher

2:06

doesn't consider, Probably for the

2:09

sake of brevity is whether upon

2:09

death, the thing that comes into

2:14

existence in the afterlife is you.

2:17

That is to say, what is really going

2:17

on in this so-called transition, right?

2:21

So in ordinary transitions, if

2:21

I transition from my house to

2:25

my car, that transition occurs

2:25

simply because I change my place.

2:29

I move myself and I walk down the stairs

2:29

and go into my garage and get in my car.

2:35

Turn on the car and drive away and exit

2:35

from the garage, and exit from the house.

2:39

That's a ordinary kind of transition

2:39

that we just think of as locomotion or

2:43

just change of location, uh, self-moving

2:43

change of location, and there may be

2:48

other forms of transition if you can

2:48

transition water into vapor by boiling

2:52

it, for instance, as a state of matter. and there may be other kinds

2:55

of transitions, but the kind of

2:57

transition that would have to occur

2:57

if death were a transition into some

3:02

other mode of existence would have

3:02

to be radically different than any

3:06

of those other kinds of changes. And this is true, even if

3:08

there were immaterial soul.

3:11

So what am I right? Am I a brain or am I a

3:13

animal as a human being?

3:18

What are. Well, if what we are is these immaterial

3:19

souls, which interact with our

3:24

meat bodies, if you will, you could

3:24

think of our bodies as like vehicles

3:28

that the soul inhabits in some way.

3:31

If that was one way of thinking about

3:31

it, then what death would do would just

3:34

decouple you from your fleshly existence

3:34

into some other form of existence, right?

3:40

It'd be like getting out of the car. So if the body is like a car,

3:42

Death would be like exiting

3:45

the car, perhaps involuntarily,

3:45

perhaps voluntarily with suicide.

3:49

Who knows? But the point is there's a decoupling, but

3:49

then you might wonder, well, what happens?

3:54

So if there was an immaterial soul,

3:54

and that's what we are, you still

3:58

have to answer the question as to

3:58

whether there's a physical location.

4:02

Of that soul. So Young Monk Kim has a great article on

4:03

the pairing problem in which he identifies

4:09

additional problems for substance dualism.

4:11

So substance dualism is the

4:11

soul theory of the mind.

4:14

What is the mind if not the soul?

4:17

And what the soul is, is an

4:17

immaterial substance of some kind.

4:22

It's different than material things

4:22

like rocks or chairs or grass

4:27

or even bodies, human bodies. And that is what the mind is made out of.

4:32

The mind has a kind of stuff to it.

4:35

It's not just an epiphenomenon or

4:35

some other kind of property that would

4:40

emerge from the operations of the

4:40

brain or the activity of the brain.

4:44

It's more than that. It's a thing, it's a substance

4:45

and it exists, and it's

4:49

paired with our meat bodies. So if that's how you think about the

4:51

relationship, The mind with the body.

4:55

Then you might conclude that heaven

4:55

is just the transmigration of

4:59

the soul into some other realm,

4:59

some perhaps supernatural realm.

5:05

But is that notion of a

5:05

transmigration, a mirror metaphor?

5:09

It wouldn't be if the soul had a location.

5:12

Perhaps the soul is two

5:12

inches behind the eyes.

5:14

Who knows where it is? It's not perceptible cuz it's immaterial.

5:18

The only things that can be perceived or

5:18

the only objects of perception that are

5:21

possible are material substances of some. So that's one way of thinking about it.

5:25

That's not day card's way of thinking about it. I think the most plausible

5:27

interpretation of day card's view

5:30

is that he thinks that there is a

5:30

soul, and that's what the mind is.

5:33

And it's immaterial, but

5:33

it doesn't have a location.

5:37

It has extension in time, but it

5:37

doesn't have extension in space.

5:40

Cuz well, you have one in the

5:40

same soul that persists over time.

5:43

So it's extended in time, but it's

5:43

not extended in space because, well,

5:46

it's not like a rock or a chair. It doesn't have a dimensions

5:48

like length or width.

5:51

but it also lacks location

5:51

under day card's view.

5:54

So regardless of whether the soul is

5:54

located or not, there's still this

5:59

mystery of the transition that death

5:59

would be, that there's something deeply

6:03

mysterious about the decoupling of soul

6:03

from body under the soul theory of our

6:07

own personal identity and of the mind. And that's perhaps the easiest way of

6:10

thinking about how there could be a

6:14

migration such that death would be a

6:14

transition to some sort of afterlife.

6:19

Now, there are more materialist ways

6:19

of thinking about an afterlife in which

6:23

suppose Jesus returns to earth and

6:23

everyone who is gone is resurrected.

6:28

Those have their own

6:28

problems, for instance.

6:31

If the stuff that composes me was later

6:31

used to compose other people, suppose

6:36

I'm cremated upon death and that filters

6:36

into the air and scatters about, and all

6:41

of the substance that used to compose

6:41

part of my body as now inhaled by a

6:46

million people via pollution of some kind.

6:48

And that becomes part of them then

6:48

presumably, if God were to come back

6:53

to Earth and reconstitute everyone,

6:53

he would have to disentangle the

6:57

parts that make up one person from

6:57

the parts that make up another.

7:00

You might also wonder about cannibalism

7:00

and cannibals as well, but perhaps.

7:04

They're evil people who don't

7:04

deserve redemption or something.

7:07

I'm not sure what the view would be,

7:07

but the thought is there could be some

7:10

entanglement issues because there's only

7:10

so much matter to go around and it's

7:13

distributed in different ways over time,

7:13

and there could be a problem there.

7:16

But a materialist view of the afterlife,

7:16

however, is not exactly what we have

7:21

in mind because the point of this

7:21

discussion is to think about whether

7:24

immortality would be desirable. And under different religious conceptions

7:27

of what an afterlife would be like,

7:31

you might get different answers as to

7:31

whether those versions of heaven would

7:35

be worth wanting and how might they

7:35

respond to William's challenge that

7:39

immortality would be inevitably boring.

7:41

So if you have a immaterialist view of

7:41

an afterlife where heaven is some other

7:46

realm, One of the biggest challenges

7:46

to that is to explain not only how

7:53

death is a transition of some kind

7:53

or another, a transition into what?

7:58

A transition into heaven, but what's that like? Usually you find heaven being portrayed

8:00

in movies, for instance, as the actor in

8:05

some sort of cloudy realm or something. and you wonder, well, why is

8:08

the person portrayed at that

8:10

age instead of a different age? So your body's gone.

8:13

What would you look like? How would there be light to look?

8:17

Is this all arranged or

8:17

is it merely metaphorical?

8:20

As soon as one starts asking the most

8:20

basic of questions and wonders, what

8:23

is that even supposed to be like? Okay.

8:26

So that's the first challenge, is to

8:26

explain how death would be a transit.

8:30

And there are certain substantive

8:30

commitments to giving a full explanation

8:34

for that, which I illustrated by giving

8:34

one example of a sole theory of personal

8:38

identity, coupled with the substance

8:38

dualism view of the mind that you

8:41

think of the mind as what we are as our

8:41

minds, and what minds are our souls.

8:45

We don't have a soul. We are a soul. That would be one possible

8:47

answer to these questions.

8:51

So that would hopefully try to solve

8:51

the mystery of what death is, but at

8:54

the same time, it doesn't really solve

8:54

the mystery of death because there's

8:58

quite a lot of unanswered questions

8:58

about the location of the soul.

9:02

How does it trans migrate? Where does it go?

9:05

How does that even work? In fact, how is the soul even paired to

9:07

this body to begin with as opposed to some

9:11

other body, and presuming it was paired

9:11

to the right body and not the wrong body.

9:16

How does causal interaction work

9:16

between the body and the mind?

9:18

And that's a particularly thorny

9:18

problem in the philosophy of mind,

9:21

known as the mind body problem. So presuming for the moment that

9:23

all those questions have answers

9:25

and they could be solved, there's

9:25

still yet further mysteries.

9:29

For instance, there's a secondary problem. Personal identity.

9:32

So whatever it is that ensures that

9:32

you are the same person over time would

9:37

seem to have some kind of gap in the

9:37

transition that would need to occur

9:43

between our mortal existence as material

9:43

beings and our immortal existence

9:48

in heaven or hell for that matter. Things typically don't survive gaps

9:49

in existence, or at least whenever

9:54

there is a gap in one's exist. There needs to be some sort of

9:56

explanation as to why the one in the

9:59

same being survives throughout the gap.

10:03

Typically, we have a kind of continuity

10:03

both in our body as well as in our minds,

10:08

which grounds and ensures that we are

10:08

the same persisting thing over time.

10:13

In fact, John Martin Fisher endorses

10:13

bodily and psychological continuity

10:18

as sufficient for the preservation of

10:18

personal identity over time in the first

10:22

half of this chapter that I'm discussing. However, if death were a transition

10:24

to some form of immaterial existence,

10:30

that transition would, at least

10:30

at first blush, discontinuous,

10:33

it would seem to introduce a. Into our existence as one in the same

10:36

being such that one could intelligibly

10:41

ask whether the thing that appears in

10:41

heaven is the same thing that died as

10:46

opposed to some sort of duplicate being.

10:48

So even if there were a heaven,

10:48

what would guarantee that you

10:52

would be the one going there? Or if there were a hell, even

10:53

there is some being, being tortured

10:57

after you die that resembles you.

11:00

Perhaps it looks like

11:00

you, screams like you.

11:04

Is it? There was a discontinuity in your

11:05

transition that death would bring.

11:11

So let's make an analogy to Star Trek.

11:14

Suppose Captain Kirk gets on the

11:14

teleportation transporter booth

11:19

and tells Scotty to beam him down. The machine dematerializes him by removing

11:21

all of his parts and their arrangements.

11:26

It stores that information

11:26

and then reconstitutes.

11:30

A similar being to Kirk

11:30

on the planet below.

11:33

Well, it seems to me that this

11:33

kind of transporter device

11:36

is actually a death trap. It's a death machine that kills people

11:38

by dissembling their parts, and even

11:43

though it retains all of the information

11:43

necessary to create a duplicate

11:47

of him, the duplicate is not him. It's not one in the same person.

11:51

The transition that death would bring

11:51

would be a similar kind of death trap.

11:54

It would annihilate the one who die. Upon death, and then some sort of clone

11:56

or some duplicate being materializes,

12:02

except it's not material, it would be

12:02

in immaterial form existing in heaven.

12:07

Now, you might think that the soul

12:07

theory has a way to escape this problem

12:10

because the thought is, well, if there

12:10

is a mind that's immaterial and is a

12:14

soul, that soul doesn't have parts.

12:17

It's not like a bicycle, which could

12:17

be disassembled by taking off the

12:21

seats and the handles and the wheels,

12:21

and you could destroy a bicycle,

12:26

make the bicycle cease to exist by

12:26

dissembling all of its parts, and then

12:30

reconstituting the bicycle at another

12:30

time by reassembling all of its parts.

12:35

And that would be a gap in that bicycle's

12:35

existence and arguably, It may not be

12:39

the same bicycle over time due to this

12:39

gap, but that doesn't really matter.

12:44

It's a bicycle. It does matter when it comes to people,

12:45

so the soul doesn't have parts which can

12:49

be disassembled, but then there still

12:49

needs to be some sort of explanation

12:52

about how the transmigration would work. The soul is attached to a body somehow

12:54

that causes that body to move, and then

12:59

the soul somehow appears in heaven. It seems to suggest that the

13:00

soul has a location if the

13:03

soul doesn't have a location. Is every soul already in heaven?

13:07

Did the soul never leave

13:07

heaven to begin with?

13:09

And it's more or less operating

13:09

at a distance by manipulating

13:12

a meat body on earth. That could be one answer to the question.

13:15

I'm not really sure what religions

13:15

would have to say about this, or

13:18

I'm not a religious scholar or a

13:18

theologian, so I'm more or less

13:21

speaking out of ignorance here. I'm sure there's probably some sort

13:22

of explanation, but it seems to me

13:25

if the soul's not supposed to have a

13:25

location, at least in space, if not time,

13:30

then that might be one way of doing. You might say, well, the

13:32

soul never leaves heaven. It just is always there.

13:35

I'm not sure how the soul

13:35

would transmigrate from it.

13:38

Heaven. Pre bodily state before you were born

13:39

into, say you were evil during your

13:43

life, and then now you're going to hell. How does the soul transition

13:45

from heaven to hell?

13:47

If that was the case, I'm not exactly

13:47

sure how that's supposed to work.

13:50

More mysteries. I think in general when trying to give

13:51

explanations, it's a bad idea to give.

13:56

More mysteries in favor of less mysteries.

13:58

The idea is to hopefully make the

13:58

underlying phenomenon less mysterious

14:02

by giving better explanations, and if

14:02

the explanations being given are worse,

14:06

that's a reason to disbelieve it. That's not a reason to withhold judgment.

14:10

So there's quite a thorny

14:10

problem with the preservation and

14:15

persistence of one's identity. Let's put that problem aside for the

14:17

moment and just presume that yes, it is

14:22

possible to continue to be one in the

14:22

same person through the transition that

14:27

death is, and at least some people go to

14:27

heaven and continue there for eternity.

14:32

I wish to. The word live in heaven for

14:33

eternity cuz one isn't alive.

14:36

Right? Life was what happened on earth in

14:37

your material form of existence.

14:41

This is an immaterial form of existence. So more or less, you are continuing

14:43

to be one in the same person

14:46

forever, but you're not alive. So would that be boring?

14:49

I'm not exactly sure what Fisher's

14:49

view is of religion or of heaven.

14:56

He adopts a secular approach throughout

14:56

the whole book, which leads me to

14:59

believe, or at least suspect that

14:59

he's probably agnostic or atheist.

15:05

But there's a third category

15:05

of being anti theist, right?

15:07

So first off, you can either

15:07

think there is a God or not.

15:11

Just to answer the question,

15:11

is there a God yes or no?

15:14

It's a yes or no question. You're either a theist or an atheist.

15:17

There's a third category. You could say, well, I'm not

15:18

really sure we would describe such

15:21

people as agnostic, but of course

15:21

that answers a separate question.

15:24

It assesses whether one suspends judgment

15:24

about whether there is a God or not.

15:28

Not whether there is one. So one can believe that there is a

15:30

God, in which case one is a theist or

15:34

disbelieve, that there's a God that

15:34

is to say believe that there is no

15:36

God, in which case one is an atheist

15:36

or alternatively suspend judgment in

15:40

which case one is an agnostic, but some

15:40

atheists not only believe that there is

15:44

no God, but wish there was none as well.

15:47

That it would be a bad thing

15:47

where there to be a God.

15:50

So Christopher Hitchens would criticize

15:50

the notion of heaven, for instance,

15:53

by describing it as a celestial North

15:53

Korea, where you live in a perpetual

15:58

state of a lack of privacy, and he

15:58

saw that as somewhat tyrannical.

16:03

that God was a kind of tyrant

16:03

and he's happy that there is no

16:07

such being and he thinks there is

16:07

no such being for other reasons.

16:10

But in addition to that, he

16:10

thinks, oh, it's also good

16:13

that there is no such being. And in that sense he's an anti atheist.

16:16

He's not just an atheist cuz some

16:16

atheists may hope that there would

16:20

be a God or may find it disappointing

16:20

that there is no God and wish there.

16:25

. But unfortunately there isn't for

16:25

some reason or another probably having

16:28

to do with the existence of evil.

16:31

That the fact that bad things happen

16:31

to good people in ways that they

16:34

don't deserve beyond anyone's control

16:34

gives this reason to believe that

16:37

there is no God governing the world.

16:40

And in any event, a good God wouldn't

16:40

design the world this in this way.

16:43

And because any flaw in the creation

16:43

is a flaw in the creator, whatever

16:47

created the world cannot be perfect.

16:50

Where there a God, God

16:50

would have to be perfect.

16:53

This gives us reason to believe that there is no. So that's an argument for atheism.

16:57

Now, there's various responses to that,

16:57

various thess, which defend the existence

17:02

of God from these kinds of doubts. But in addition to those doubts, you

17:03

might also think that it's really good

17:07

that there's no God, because you might

17:07

take up Hitchen's view and thinks that

17:10

it would be a celestial in North Korea. But putting that aside and supposing

17:12

that the right conception of heaven

17:16

is not so tyrannical, you might think

17:16

that mortality would be preferable.

17:20

And I think this was Williams

17:20

view, Bernard Williams, that

17:23

it's better that we're mortal. because if we were immortal, our

17:25

lives would be less meaningful.

17:29

That death is what partly

17:29

gives meaning to our lives.

17:32

That would be horrible,

17:32

especially if there was no exit.

17:35

If there was no possibility of

17:35

annihilating oneself, if you were

17:39

more or less cursed or condemned

17:39

to being immortal and continuing to

17:43

exist in a conscious state forever.

17:46

Now, fishers already responded in

17:46

the first half of chapter seven

17:50

to various objections against

17:50

secular conceptions of immortality.

17:54

And it seems to me that all of those

17:54

same reasons apply to religious

17:58

conceptions of an afterlife. However, Fisher seems to have a

17:59

more attenuated view of heaven.

18:03

He thinks that it's a more restrictive

18:03

context than what exists on Earth with

18:07

fewer opportunities for certain kinds

18:07

of projects or interesting activities.

18:12

I'm not exactly sure which projects he

18:12

has in mind that people in heaven would

18:16

lack, perhaps the project of breaking the

18:16

world record in serial killing or evil.

18:22

But Fisher has already conceded

18:22

the point that what makes any good

18:27

thing, whether it's a pleasure or an

18:27

experience or an activity repeatable,

18:32

is that it's intrinsically valuable. So murdering a whole bunch of people and

18:34

breaking the world record and murder.

18:37

Is not intrinsically valuable. Furthermore, under the various

18:39

conceptions of heaven that he considers,

18:43

none of them seem to rule out any

18:43

of the compelling or interesting

18:48

inexhaustible projects that he considers

18:48

in the earlier part of the chapter.

18:52

Things like mathematics

18:52

or science, physics.

18:56

What would stop people in heaven

18:56

from considering physical theories?

19:00

They could do so with the benefit

19:00

of an omniscient, omnipotent.

19:05

They could have the complete theory

19:05

of physics all figured out simply by

19:09

testimony and asking God, and then

19:09

they could come to learn exactly

19:13

how the laws of nature works. With an infallible oracle, more

19:15

or less, who can inform them and

19:19

educate and instruct perfectly. So I'm not exactly sure

19:21

which opportunities would be

19:25

deprived of people in heaven. I mean, it seems to me the only

19:26

opportunities that would be deprived

19:30

for them would be the opportunities

19:30

to commit evil, but I don't see

19:32

why that would be a good thing. And in fact, the project to

19:34

achieve the world record in serial

19:38

killings, if you're gonna call

19:38

it a project at all, as an evil.

19:43

Is a self exhausting one. To use Fisher's own terminology.

19:46

It's a bit like climbing the tallest mountain. It can only be done once.

19:50

You can always climb the tallest

19:50

mountain many times, of course.

19:52

But to break the record,

19:52

you break the record once.

19:55

So it seems to me that. Any inexhaustible project

19:57

or repeatable good.

20:02

That is what makes an immortal life

20:02

worth continuing in a secular context

20:08

would also apply in a religious

20:08

context, in a religious conception

20:12

of the afterlife if it were real.

20:14

That's the big qualifier. If it were real, if that's

20:16

the way reality really.

20:20

Then heaven would have all the benefits

20:20

of secular immortality and then some,

20:25

because there are certain benefits that

20:25

presumptively you could have in heaven

20:29

that you would not have an immortal

20:29

life in a material life, for instance.

20:33

If there were other people, you would

20:33

be able to converse with all the people

20:36

who are already dead, all of the saints

20:36

who could have interesting thoughts

20:40

and opinions, and you can have all

20:40

sorts of interesting conversations

20:43

with the saints of the past. That would be very interesting.

20:45

I would love to have a lengthy

20:45

conversation with Thomas Aquinas.

20:48

So that's one benefit that would

20:48

be exclusive to a religious

20:50

conception of an afterlife. Probably the chief benefit and the

20:52

most obvious one is communion with God.

20:57

I'm not exactly sure what

20:57

that is supposed to be.

21:00

maybe it's another deep mystery that

21:00

can only be solved by experiencing it.

21:05

Doing that and being there. But Fisher cites various sources that

21:06

try to explain what communion with God

21:12

will be like in heaven as a kind of

21:12

dialogue or a kind of conversation with

21:17

the greatest possible conversationalist

21:17

or the most perfect of all beings.

21:21

It's a bit like trying to

21:21

understand infinity, by the way,

21:24

of making analogies to finite. The idea is the most that

21:26

could ever be thought of.

21:29

It's literally beyond. Our comprehension is individual,

21:30

finite material beings.

21:34

But to try to understand infinity,

21:34

we must at least make analogies and

21:37

just gesture and say, and so on. So think of like the natural numbers,

21:39

like there's infinitely many numbers.

21:42

They go from one to three,

21:42

four or five and so on.

21:45

There're the counting numbers. There's infinitely many of them.

21:48

What is it like to think of them? Well, you just have to say and so on.

21:51

You think about the finite cases

21:51

and extrapolate to an infinite

21:54

case by extension and hand wave.

21:58

So it's incomprehensible,

21:58

but just say and so on.

22:00

It's hand wavy, but that's

22:00

the most that can be said.

22:03

Okay, but would a conversation with

22:03

anyone be endlessly fascinating

22:08

and engaging in a way that. Be sufficient to avoid the

22:11

inevitable problem of boredom

22:15

that Williams identifies. So this is one problem that Williams

22:17

himself identifies in his article

22:21

on the McCropolis case that in order

22:21

for immortality to be desirable,

22:26

It's necessary that there be some

22:26

activity that's endlessly engaging that

22:31

would be inexhaustible in its value.

22:33

However, there is no

22:33

such thing says Williams.

22:36

So therefore, immortality would

22:36

eventually get boring and be insufficient

22:40

to bring meaning to our lives. and there would be no further reason

22:43

to continue to be alive or to continue

22:46

to exist as an immortal being. Now with heaven, you're not alive, but

22:48

you would continue to exist and you

22:51

might think of that as a kind of torture,

22:51

at least as a kind of deprivation.

22:54

It results in the absence of whatever

22:54

makes continued existence worth wanting.

22:58

However, there are some pretty

22:58

good candidates of endlessly

23:01

fascinating things, so Fisher.

23:04

Cites Kagan as being somewhat

23:04

skeptical about this quote.

23:08

A friend suggested that I should think

23:08

of God as being like an infinitely

23:11

fascinating and understanding friend

23:11

communing with God would be like

23:15

having an incredibly satisfying

23:15

conversation, one that you would

23:18

literally want to continue forever.

23:21

Well, I can say the words,

23:21

but when I try to imagine that

23:23

possibility and take it seriously,

23:23

I find that I just can't see it.

23:28

No friend that I've ever talked

23:28

with is one that I would actually

23:32

want to spend eternity talking. Quote, yes, of course, professor Kagan,

23:34

but everyone you've ever met has been a

23:38

finite and flawed individual human being.

23:41

God is neither of those things. It's what makes him think that

23:43

that's a good enough analogy

23:46

to understand the divine. The counter-argument that I'm giving

23:48

right now is that the source for the

23:52

boredom or the lack of satisfaction

23:52

in a conversation that has gone on

23:57

too long results from our imper.

23:59

Perfect. Results from our fude, from our flaws,

24:00

and coming up with interesting things to

24:05

say, or interesting ideas or interesting

24:05

new ways of thinking about things.

24:09

And those deficiencies would

24:09

not be present with God.

24:13

God is a perfect being. He has no such deficiency.

24:16

So there would be endless novelty

24:16

of thought in a conversation with

24:19

an abni, an omnipotent being,

24:19

especially if that being is also omni,

24:23

benevolent and loves you further.

24:26

Why must one only converse with God?

24:29

Is there not other options? So whatever the version of heaven

24:31

we're considering, if there were other

24:35

options, then you wouldn't need any one

24:35

activity to be endlessly fascinating.

24:40

And a defender of the value of an

24:40

immortal existence in heaven could avail

24:45

himself of all the same secular defenses

24:45

that Fisher gives in this article.

24:49

By cycling one's repeatable goods, whether

24:49

they be pleasures or relationships,

24:54

or any kind of good thing, you cycle.

24:57

So that no single thing

24:57

becomes too exhausting on one's

25:02

attention or time or self. And furthermore, if Heaven lacks

25:03

nothing of intrinsic value,

25:07

then any valuable project or

25:07

repeatable good would be available.

25:11

Heaven is supposed to be paradise, so

25:11

that means any ultimately good thing,

25:16

things that are good in themselves and

25:16

not merely for instrumental reason.

25:21

These should all be available. So the question is, well, what kind

25:22

of intrinsic good would be unavailable

25:27

in heaven and only available on

25:27

Earth, if any, if there were a heaven?

25:30

It doesn't seem like there would be

25:30

any, seems like any possible good that

25:34

you could experience in your mortal

25:34

existence as a material being on

25:37

earth would be finite and perhaps it

25:37

would be inexhaustible in repetition.

25:42

, but just by our mortality alone,

25:42

we only have so many years on earth

25:47

to enjoy the good things of life,

25:47

whatever those good things are.

25:50

But if there were a heaven,

25:50

there would be no end to the

25:52

possibilities of good things. The opportunity costs

25:54

would cease to exist.

25:57

There would be no scarcity of opportunity. It would be an inexhaustible

25:59

source of bounty, so to speak.

26:02

We're all good things and any

26:02

good things can be enjoyed to any.

26:06

At least in the right ways. But one of the advantages of the

26:07

gated community, so to speak, is

26:10

that the only people, there are

26:10

all good people, so nobody's around

26:13

to spoil your funds, so to speak. So I don't see how the monotony objection

26:15

lands at all against communion with God.

26:22

And even if it did, one can cycle

26:22

one's enjoyments of any good

26:26

thing, just as one would do in a

26:26

secular version of immortality.

26:30

Now, there's a couple of different

26:30

ways of thinking about how

26:32

communion with God is supposed to. One way is to think of it as a

26:34

endlessly fascinating conversation.

26:38

Another way is to think of it

26:38

instead as a kind of erotic union.

26:42

I'm not exactly sure what this is supposed to mean. Whatever it is, it's not intellectual.

26:47

So there is something about

26:47

conversation in which one mind speaks

26:51

to another mind, which is engaging

26:51

at an intellectual level in which you

26:57

exchange ideas through the medium of. Now in heaven.

27:00

I'm not sure if the medium

27:00

of language would exist.

27:03

Perhaps there would be direct

27:03

communication between minds in

27:08

a non-linguistic fashion, but

27:08

perhaps in a mental fashion.

27:10

I'm not sure how that would

27:10

work, or even if the mind is

27:12

capable of that kind of thing. But of course, that's our own finite

27:14

minds as fleshy meat creatures on earth.

27:18

Perhaps the minds of immaterial beings

27:18

in heaven work a little differe.

27:23

But perhaps there could be a way not

27:23

in which the mind speaks to another

27:27

mind, but in which the heart speaks

27:27

to another heart, so to speak.

27:30

Or at least of course, we wouldn't

27:30

have hearts as immaterial beings.

27:33

Hearts are organs, they're pieces of meat. Instead, there would be a kind of

27:35

non-intellectual, perhaps emotional, or

27:41

some other form of union that would exist

27:41

with God Fisher likens this to sexual.

27:48

Of course. I'm not sure. That's a really good analogy.

27:51

I think a better way of describing the

27:51

thought here is that there's a kind of

27:55

non-intellectual union of souls in a way

27:55

in which emotions or things that are,

28:02

feelings are related that may not have

28:02

a linguistic or propositional structure.

28:07

They may not be articulable

28:07

or intelligible as a thought,

28:11

which could be communicated

28:11

with a possibility of language.

28:14

Instead, they would be a, a non-linguistic

28:14

feeling or an emotion or other forums

28:20

of communion where information or

28:20

feelings like that can be conveyed.

28:27

, and that's what it would be like

28:27

to be in communion with God.

28:30

Now, of course, that's a little bit different. Instead of thinking of a kind of

28:32

conversation of the heart, you

28:36

instead are talking about a kind of

28:36

merging, which is a different notion

28:40

of what Union with God would be like. So under this conception, One would merge

28:42

with God in a kind of ecstatic union.

28:47

Now, the ecstasy, presumably is describing

28:47

the perfection of a certain feeling.

28:52

Now, typically that's

28:52

described as pleasure.

28:54

Pleasure is a kind of perfection of

28:54

our feelings, but that perhaps may

28:58

be the wrong word to describe the

28:58

perfection of feeling that union with

29:02

God would consist in if it were taking

29:02

the form of a kind of merging with God.

29:06

Now, of course, there's an

29:06

objection against this, which

29:09

has to do with personal identity. So how could one retain one's

29:11

individuality as a persisting, everlasting

29:17

eternal being in heaven and yet merge

29:17

with some other entity like God?

29:24

Wouldn't you cease to

29:24

exist in the merging?

29:27

Wouldn't you just become like a

29:27

part of a larger whole or some other

29:31

inseparable form of existence that

29:31

would cause you to cease to exist?

29:36

And I think the thought here is that

29:36

you would still retain your identity,

29:39

but there would be a feeling of

29:39

dissolution of the self where you would

29:43

no longer have a sense of self in your

29:43

own experiential content about the

29:47

boundaries of what individuates you

29:47

from some further being, but instead

29:51

you would be a kind of ineffable.

29:54

Where you couldn't quite experience in

29:54

the content of your experience, your own

29:58

individuality, and yet Metaly speaking,

29:58

you would retain your individual identity.

30:04

So there would still be a subject

30:04

of experience, which would be

30:07

yourself, and yet you would have

30:07

no content of a sense of self in

30:12

your ecstatic union with a divine. I think that's the thought here in this

30:14

third conception of what union with

30:19

God would be like, which is decisively

30:19

different than denying that there

30:23

is any such thing as a self, which

30:23

is a common thought in the Buddhist

30:26

tradition, but also among humans. There is still a self, but the

30:29

sense of self is what is dissolved.

30:33

The reason that matters is because,

30:33

well, if you just cease to exist,

30:37

you wouldn't be living forever. Now, would you? You would go into heaven, you would have

30:39

union with God, and you would cease to.

30:43

And that's not everlasting

30:43

life, so to speak.

30:46

That's no different than just

30:46

being annihilated by death.

30:49

Instead of being annihilated by death,

30:49

you're being annihilated by union with.

30:52

That reminds me a little bit of the

30:52

ending of the end of Evangelian, but

30:56

it's a different story because it's,

30:56

everything's very materialistic in the

30:59

sense that what happens to the characters

30:59

at the end of that story is they have a

31:03

material existence and they all dissolve

31:03

and f form a kind of larger unity into

31:10

this larger angelic like being, which then

31:10

gets reversed and everyone gets rein Carn.

31:16

I'm not sure they're the same people after that. I'm not sure how anyone could survive

31:17

being dissolved into liquid, then

31:21

becoming part of some gigantic creature.

31:24

Let's go back to whether union

31:24

with God be endlessly fascinating.

31:29

Here's the thing, if the union was some

31:29

kind of intellectual conversation, even

31:33

in that form of heaven, if that's what

31:33

Heaven is like in conversation, we learn

31:37

things from other people, and I think

31:37

Fisher would agree with me that knowledge

31:41

has a kind of non-instrumental value. It's not only as good as it is

31:43

useful knowledge has a kind of

31:47

intrinsic value where it's good

31:47

in and of itself, if that's.

31:51

. And it's also true that there's a God

31:51

who's Abni that we're conversing with.

31:56

Well, there would be endless novel. Endless new information we could learn.

32:00

It might be somewhat similar to

32:00

an idealized form of the internet

32:03

if there were an internet and

32:03

we could just look up anything.

32:06

Of course, I'm speaking on the internet

32:06

right now, but the current internet

32:10

we have is filled with misinformation.

32:12

It's filled with nasty trolls and

32:12

people who are mean for no reason.

32:17

And you know, there's all. Flaws in our fallen world, so to speak.

32:22

And even though we've developed this kind

32:22

of network where we can converse with

32:26

one another as these quasi intellectual

32:26

beings, we do so for malicious reasons

32:32

and and malicious intent, and we spread

32:32

lies and gossip and misinformation.

32:36

None of that would be the case. So it would be similar to

32:37

like an idealized form of the

32:40

internet where you could ask any

32:40

question and get a good answer.

32:42

That's true. And not only true, but true for the

32:43

right reasons, and you'd be able to

32:47

query anything you want, presumably. And at the very minimum in

32:49

learning from God through some

32:53

sort of immaterial conversation

32:53

that would be endlessly novel.

32:58

And we would come to learn whatever

32:58

we would want to learn, presumably

33:02

for the right reasons every time. And that could be an endless process.

33:06

If there's infinitely many objects

33:06

of knowledge, there's infinitely many

33:09

facts or other kinds of things to

33:09

learn, and that would be endlessly

33:13

fascinating and interesting as a process

33:13

and not depletable, we wouldn't be

33:18

running out of new facts to learn. At the very minimum, Fisher

33:20

already conceded that philosophy

33:24

and mathematics are inexhaustible

33:24

and unfinishable project.

33:29

Both of which we could learn from. The greatest conceivable being

33:31

who would be the best philosopher

33:34

and the best mathematician. That would be God.

33:37

That sounds pretty awesome to me. So unless Fisher has some special reason

33:38

to think that there would be something

33:43

tyrannical or especially horrible about

33:43

heaven, so far in the argument, there

33:49

doesn't seem to be anything particularly. Bad about it.

33:53

And further, all of the benefits

33:53

that we would be able to have in a

33:56

secularized version of immortality

33:56

would also be available and

34:01

enjoyable to those in heaven. Provided heaven were even

34:03

possible and were real.

34:06

So if anything, a religious version of

34:06

the afterlife is a much more preferable

34:11

version of immortality than a secular one.

34:14

And Fisher so far has given us no reason to. That a secular version of

34:17

immortality is more preferable to a

34:20

religious version of the afterlife. The only problem, perhaps, is that the

34:21

religious version of an afterlife might

34:26

be impossible for some of the reasons I

34:26

mentioned earlier about the preservation

34:30

of personal identity, how death would

34:30

be a transition instead of just the

34:34

termination of ourselves and so on.

34:37

And of course if there was no God to

34:37

secure that there would be an afterlife,

34:40

well then there would be no reason to

34:40

believe that there would be one, cuz

34:43

God would be presiding over heaven. But if there were no God, what

34:45

reason would there be to believe

34:49

that there's even a heaven to go to? It would be at best wishful

34:51

thinking, but nevertheless wishful.

34:54

So in the last part of the chapter,

34:54

Fisher tries to articulate his version

35:00

of what he calls immortality realism.

35:03

If you recall from his earlier

35:03

definitions, he called people who

35:06

thought that immortality was just

35:06

impossible in any form, whatever.

35:10

It's impossible for all forms of

35:10

immortality or it's undesirable,

35:15

even if it were possible. He called these people curmudgeon.

35:18

I think that's a overly prejudicial way

35:18

of describing many of these authors.

35:22

I think of it instead as

35:22

immortality pessimism in which

35:26

one thinks that immortality is

35:26

either impossible or undesirable.

35:31

From page 89, Fisher says, quote,

35:31

immortality, curmudgeons, contend that

35:36

basic facts about human character or

35:36

the nature of human life show that

35:40

immortality is either impossible, or

35:40

in any case would be undesirable and.

35:47

Furthermore from the same page,

35:47

immortality optimists deny that basic

35:52

facts about human character or the nature

35:52

of human life in themselves show that

35:57

immortality is impossible or undesirable.

36:00

And so what we have here are two

36:00

incompatible positions, which are

36:05

mutually exclusive and yet exhaustive

36:05

of all possible views on the subject.

36:10

So the immortality optimists deny what,

36:10

what I call the pessimists affirm name.

36:17

That human nature entails that immortality

36:17

is either impossible or undesirable.

36:21

The reason I make this point is because

36:21

there is no third or middle position.

36:26

And yet Fisher contends that he does adopt

36:26

a middle position because he rejects the

36:31

pessimistic view and yet also rejects

36:31

what he takes to be the optimistic view.

36:36

And yet he pulls a fast one on us. On page 1 35, he says, quote, optimists

36:38

also think that it is plausible

36:43

that we can achieve immortality

36:43

in the not too distant future.

36:46

Optimists are thus committed to the claim

36:46

that the prerequisites for immortality,

36:51

physical and social circumstances

36:51

that can sustain immortality.

36:54

Will or probably will continue

36:54

to exist in some form or another

36:57

and quote that is not true. He in no way builds that into

36:59

his definition on page 89.

37:04

Now, what he does do, to be fair

37:04

to Fisher, is he does discuss Ray

37:08

Kurtz while and Aubrey De Gray,

37:08

who are both unrealistically

37:12

optimistic about the prospects for

37:12

a kind of medicalized immortality.

37:17

That would exist in our lifetimes,

37:17

not in which there would be some

37:20

magic pill, which would just grant

37:20

us eternal youth immediately.

37:24

But rather that there would be a

37:24

sufficient rate of development in

37:27

the technology and therapies for

37:27

life extension that would keep a

37:31

pace with our aging, such that it

37:31

would be able to extend our life

37:35

expectancy by over one year per year.

37:38

So only now that we're in chapter seven,

37:38

and at the end of that chapter, does

37:42

Fisher add on an additional condit.

37:45

That optimist about immortality must

37:45

also think that the prerequisites for

37:50

immortality will continue to exist, which

37:50

is something that Fisher later denies,

37:54

or at least he's somewhat pessimistic

37:54

about the prospects for our society to

37:59

solve the problem of climate change. And of course if we ruin the planet,

38:01

even if we could continue to exist

38:05

ourselves, it would be undesirable

38:05

to live in a polluted hellhole.

38:10

So he says, quote on page 1 38, I

38:10

thus reject immortality optimism.

38:15

I do not think that it is likely that

38:15

the environmental and social conditions

38:19

required for continued desirable

38:19

life will be achieved and quote.

38:23

So he is pessimistic about that. But again, he doesn't build that

38:25

into the definition on page 89.

38:28

And so he plays a little fast

38:28

and loose with the definitions.

38:31

I would say that Fisher is an

38:31

optimist about immortality.

38:34

He does think it's desirable, and he

38:34

also thinks it's possible, but what

38:37

exactly we mean by possibility, is it

38:37

possible at this state of the world

38:42

as of 2023 or even at the time of the

38:42

writing, which I believe is 2018 or 2019?

38:48

Well, he has given us no reason to believe that it isn't. However, he does indicate some

38:50

additional challenges that would exist

38:54

due to the environmental conditions

38:54

that would obtain, or what are the

38:57

circumstances, what kind of immortality

38:57

scenario are we talking about?

39:00

So he describes three different possible scenarios. In one scenario, you yourself

39:03

are the only immortal.

39:06

This is the situation of Williams

39:06

McCropolis case where Elena

39:10

McCropolis is the only one who's. The second scenario is where

39:13

you have some, but not everyone.

39:16

Some, but not all people are immortal.

39:19

Scenario two, and in scenario three,

39:19

you have everyone being immortal,

39:23

presumably everyone who's presently alive. Now we're not given more details about

39:25

that, but presumptively, it would be a

39:29

medicalized form of immortality in which

39:29

there would be some sort of fountain

39:32

of youth that would reverse aging and

39:32

allow people to continue to live without

39:37

aging, and yet they could still die

39:37

from accidents or other kinds of cause.

39:42

Just not from aging or age related disease. All of these three scenarios, I think

39:44

are medicalized forms of immortality,

39:48

which is not really true immortality. These are all cases of indefinite

39:50

life extension in which

39:53

aging is cured and reversed. So in the first scenario, the

39:55

main problem is loneliness.

39:58

If you're the only immortal

39:58

being with kind of indefinite

40:01

life extension, then it. As if many of the things that

40:04

are good about life would be

40:07

devalued through repetition. So for instance, you might have

40:09

friends, family loving relationships,

40:13

but they would pass away and die and

40:13

deteriorate, but you would not, and

40:17

that would have a kind of lasting

40:17

impact of loneliness on you that

40:20

would diminish the value of your life. Now, I don't think it would diminish it to

40:21

the point where death is preferable, but

40:26

it's not the ideal form of immortality.

40:28

Ideally, your friends and loved

40:28

ones would continue to exist.

40:31

So this takes us to scenario two. Some, but not everyone has the advantage

40:34

of immortality, and this is if aging

40:39

were actually cured, if that were

40:39

actually possible, and there was some

40:43

sort of medicalized therapy which

40:43

could cure or even reverse aging.

40:48

This is actually the most plausible

40:48

scenario where it would trickle down

40:52

the economic ladder such that the

40:52

wealthy and the most privileged people

40:56

would be the first to gain access

40:56

to this, which would probably be the

40:59

the most expensive or super expensive

40:59

medical treatment that it's ever exist.

41:03

Certainly in the highest. So you might think there are

41:05

some considerations of social and

41:09

economic inequality, which would be

41:09

severe, especially if it's trickling

41:13

down into the rest of society. We're stunted, diminished, or

41:15

obstructed in some fashion over a

41:19

prolonged enough period of time. You might think this might

41:20

create a two-tiered society.

41:23

Where the super rich, immortal plutocrats

41:23

would rule over the rest of humanity

41:28

in some sort of dystopian future. Now, of course, I don't think having

41:30

plutocrats ruling over others is

41:34

justifiable, but I think that's

41:34

unjustifiable for other reasons.

41:37

It's not because they're

41:37

immortal, it's because they're

41:40

corrupting the political system. So the question you might ask

41:41

yourself is, okay, well if indefinite

41:45

life extension and this kind of

41:45

rejuvenation therapy, were a realistic

41:50

goal for the near term future. Should we cut funding or deny

41:52

funding for research on this project?

41:56

I don't think so. Even if it causes economic striation,

41:58

the problems of economic inequality

42:03

don't make death preferable. That would be a way of leveling down

42:04

where you say, oh, because some people

42:08

are privileged and are benefiting from

42:08

much longer lives, it's necessary that

42:13

we shorten their lives by denying them

42:13

and depriving them of the ability that

42:19

they would otherwise have to extend

42:19

their lives, even though there's no

42:23

force or fraud committed by mere life.

42:26

This would be the ultimate form

42:26

of jealousy where we're jealous

42:29

of people for extending their

42:29

lives merely for that fact.

42:34

And so we deprive them of this even

42:34

though they have caused no one else

42:39

any harm, just the mere fact that

42:39

they would be so privileged would be

42:43

sufficient reason to deprive them of that. That's not a virtuous thing to do.

42:46

That's quite a jealous thing to

42:46

do, and I don't see it as justifi.

42:51

, and this is even more so if this

42:51

technology really could trickle down

42:56

and be available for everyone, like cell

42:56

phones, it would be expensive, but it

43:01

wouldn't be so expensive so as to be

43:01

prohibitory for the least while off.

43:05

And like many causes of social and

43:05

economic inequality, the causal origins.

43:11

Lie in some other area such as warfare

43:11

or trade restrictions or other forms

43:17

of tyranny, you solve those other

43:17

problems of tyranny and there's

43:21

no problem that's intrinsically. Sourced in life extension itself.

43:26

Of course, you might think that life

43:26

extension technology would be particularly

43:30

problematic in a highly unideal society in

43:30

which there's dictators for life, right?

43:35

A dictator for life. All of a sudden, has his tenure

43:36

significantly increased and

43:40

might be harder to remove. But I don't think for that reason

43:42

alone, the research should be denied.

43:45

And if anything, I think there are

43:45

other solutions to solving that problem.

43:49

And furthermore, indefinite

43:49

life extension doesn't.

43:53

Immunize people from assassination

43:53

or from overthrow or from other

43:58

forms of ment or usurpation.

44:01

It only immunizes people from

44:01

age and age related diseases.

44:05

But I hope in an ideal world,

44:05

things could be resolved peacefully.

44:08

So because of certain societal or

44:08

economic problems with inequality,

44:13

Fisher then transitions to the

44:13

third scenario in which suppose that

44:17

this technology or this therapy or

44:17

mechanism for achieving indefinite life

44:22

extension, were available to everyone.

44:25

Suppose that it's. Like fluoride in the water or something,

44:26

it seeded into the air and, and all of

44:30

a sudden everyone on planet Earth is

44:30

immune to aging and age related diseases.

44:35

As a result of that, then there's

44:35

a significant problem with that.

44:39

If we continue to have children, you

44:39

might think that the world would be

44:43

completely overpopulated if no one

44:43

would ever die from natural cause.

44:48

If we're all immortal and we all

44:48

have kids, then not only would

44:52

the planet become intolerably

44:52

overcrowded, its resources would also

44:56

be disastrously depleted, says fisher.

44:58

Now you might think, oh, okay, well, we'll just kind of colonize other planets or something, but

45:00

that just seems too unrealistic.

45:04

Perhaps in Star Trek they have

45:04

all these planets that are within

45:09

travel distance somehow, cuz they

45:09

can somehow traverse faster than the

45:13

speed of light and those planets are

45:13

abundant and resources and more or

45:18

less colonization would be possible. That doesn't seem plausible from

45:20

what we know about the nearby

45:23

solar systems here and now. However, that doesn't necessarily

45:25

mean that overcrowding would be a.

45:30

Now Fisher's solution to this,

45:30

of course, like many simple

45:34

answers, is just to ban it. Just no more kids.

45:36

No one gets to have kids anymore,

45:36

we're just gonna ban birth.

45:39

And he thinks that this is the only

45:39

solution because the alternative would

45:43

be deeply unjust, that it would be deeply

45:43

unjust to have significant overpopulation

45:49

in which everyone would have meager

45:49

lives, perhaps just above baseline.

45:55

And yet, resources would be radically de.

45:58

The possibilities for living a good life

45:58

in that horrific dystopian future in

46:03

which maybe there's trillions of people,

46:03

he doesn't specify how many people,

46:07

how many people would it take in order

46:07

for the planet to be overpopulated?

46:10

I'm not exactly sure. He doesn't say, but he's worried about it.

46:14

Well, with technology levels circa

46:14

1200 more than a billion people.

46:20

Far in excess of the caring capacity

46:20

of the human species at that level of

46:23

technological and cultural development. Fortunately, that's not true with even

46:25

the 20th century level of technological

46:30

and cultural development, although many,

46:30

many people presently are starving.

46:35

I'm not entirely convinced that it's

46:35

the result of mere population alone

46:40

and not other factors, nor should I be

46:40

as pessimistic as fisher seems to be.

46:45

The possibilities for future development

46:45

to increase the caring capacity

46:50

through technological and cultural

46:50

means would also not be available.

46:54

Furthermore, I think Fisher

46:54

underestimates the current concerns

46:58

about under population that exist

46:58

across the globe, and as nations

47:02

develop significantly, their birth rate

47:02

precipitously drops off a cliff and

47:07

that many people in the developed world

47:07

are involuntarily childless and are

47:11

unable to have even enough children.

47:14

For replacement value for

47:14

themselves and their spouse.

47:17

If aging were cured, they wouldn't

47:17

need to replace themselves, but banning

47:22

children is an imposition on freedom.

47:24

Which needs some

47:24

explanation to justify this.

47:27

The mistake that Fisher makes

47:27

here is he's way too overconfident

47:30

about the inevitability of

47:30

overpopulation in an ageless society.

47:35

For one, he didn't roll out the

47:35

unnatural causes of death, not only

47:39

through disaster like hurricanes or

47:39

floods, but also through war and other.

47:45

Forums of death. John Davis does a statistical analysis

47:46

in his book on the pneumos, in

47:51

which he argues that indefinite life

47:51

extension technologies, even if they

47:56

were instantly available across the

47:56

globe, would not result in significant

48:00

overpopulation that would result in

48:00

the horrific kind of dystopia that

48:04

Fisher seems to have in mind here. I'm not entirely convinced

48:06

of Davis's model.

48:10

Maybe the truth is somewhere in between,

48:10

but I'm much more optimistic about

48:14

humanity's ability to kind of solve

48:14

these problems than as to warrant an

48:19

immediate kind of ban on birth once

48:19

the ageless medicine is delivered.

48:23

I'm not exactly sure what the

48:23

agent for delivery of this

48:27

treatment would hypothetically be.

48:29

If it's something that's just kind of

48:29

disseminated into the air or the water

48:33

one day, and then everyone is ageless,

48:33

that could be, I think, a lot more

48:36

disruptive than a gradual rollout,

48:36

like a vaccine program or something

48:41

that vaccinates you against aging,

48:41

and perhaps it may have subsidies or

48:45

be available for the least while off. I'm not entirely sure, but I

48:47

think just an immediate band of

48:50

birth would be way too heavy. Something I think more laissez

48:52

fair might be appropriate, or at

48:56

least something more hands off. Or if you're going to advocate for

48:57

something like, okay, it comes with

49:02

the price of a subsidy that you're

49:02

going to agree to not have children.

49:06

I'm not exactly sure how that

49:06

could even be implemented legally.

49:09

And even if we revise the laws, I

49:09

think ethically, I mean, how can you.

49:13

Ask people not to do that. But I think I'm optimistic that as people

49:14

get richer, they just have less kids on

49:18

their own because they have the pressing

49:18

needs of career and their own projects.

49:23

You know, having children is

49:23

difficult and even if everyone.

49:28

Were ageless and everyone had the

49:28

bodies of like 21 year olds forever.

49:33

They could have kids whenever they want. Perhaps there would be more accidental

49:35

pregnancy, but many people in developed

49:39

nations who are 21, are too busy with

49:39

school or they're too busy with just

49:43

life doing other things, enjoying

49:43

themselves before having a family.

49:46

A lot of teenage pregnancy results

49:46

from social pathology that in a

49:51

better world wouldn't even exist. So I think this fear of

49:53

overpopulation is unmerited.

49:57

And furthermore, I'm gonna add

49:57

an additional objection to this.

50:00

So Fisher seems to only count the

50:00

interests of people who are actually

50:05

alive right now, but Presum.

50:07

He is worried about global climate change.

50:10

He says as much in the text, and

50:10

so he must think that we have some

50:14

sort of duty to future generations

50:14

not to destroy the planet.

50:18

If that's true, those are merely

50:18

possible people according to Fisher.

50:22

Then, not just according to me, but

50:22

according to Fisher, we have to take

50:25

the interests of future people into

50:25

account, people who don't exist.

50:30

However, how is it fair to these

50:30

people to be denied existence With a

50:35

birth ban, we're gonna just ban birth.

50:37

No one can have kids anymore. Perhaps in Fisher's idealized

50:39

future, there would be a vaccine that

50:44

would immunize you against age and

50:44

would be like a fountain of youth.

50:48

You would be ageless in a 21

50:48

year old's body would reverse

50:52

whatever aging you currently had,

50:52

but it would make you sterile.

50:55

And Fisher thinks that's a worthy. What about the interests of

50:58

the people who don't exist?

51:00

Now, there are no such people, so

51:00

maybe they shouldn't have their

51:03

interests taken into account, but the

51:03

merely possible people of the future

51:08

are people whose interest fisher

51:08

very much cares about in philosophy.

51:13

This is sometimes called

51:13

the non identity problem.

51:15

And it's deeply problematic cuz it

51:15

seems like in order to have duties or

51:19

obligations to people, it seems like

51:19

they have to exist in order for us

51:23

to take their interest into account

51:23

visas, VR duties and obligations.

51:27

But if they don't exist, there

51:27

can be no relations without rela.

51:30

And so you can have no duties or

51:30

obligations to that which does not exist.

51:34

There's no relation of duty or

51:34

relation of obligation without

51:38

the relo that has to say. The object of the duty, the

51:40

one to whom your duty would be

51:43

owed to does not even exist. So that's deeply problematic,

51:45

and yet Fisher seems to care

51:48

deeply about the environment. So much so that he's also pessimistic

51:50

about the prospects for humanity.

51:54

To actually achieve it, but he thinks that

51:54

a immortality drug of some kind, if we

51:58

have an indefinite life extension therapy,

51:58

this would strongly incentivize us to

52:02

actually solve environmental problems. So it seems to me like Fisher

52:04

thinks that a lot of the reasons why

52:07

climate change is not taken seriously

52:07

is because we're overly selfish.

52:12

We're not gonna be around in

52:12

200 years, so it doesn't matter.

52:14

Screw it. We're gonna live for the moment. Enjoy the now pollute.

52:17

We're not gonna suffer. The consequences won't matter. But if we're immortal, then we

52:19

will suffer the consequences.

52:22

And so maybe we'll take climate change a

52:22

lot more seriously if we were immortal.

52:25

That may or may not be true, I'm not sure. But regardless, Fisher seems to

52:27

care about the interests of future

52:32

generations who don't yet exist. He takes their interest into account when

52:34

considering the problem of climate change.

52:39

, but for some reason he doesn't

52:39

take their interest into account.

52:42

When considering banning birth and

52:42

the problem of procreation so much

52:47

like how we can have a duty to future

52:47

generations who don't yet exist, can

52:51

we also have a duty to procreate? A duty to that is owed to bringing

52:54

into existence possible people.

52:58

Now, you might think that's

52:58

kind of absurd, right?

53:01

How can we owe a duty to people to

53:01

bring them into existence, to procreate?

53:05

I mean, wouldn't that result in

53:05

overpopulation of taken to the.

53:09

But if that's absurd, why is it not

53:09

also absurd to take the interest

53:12

of future people into account who

53:12

don't yet exist in the far future?

53:16

So there's a big question. There could be a radical

53:17

asymmetry between those two cases.

53:20

Perhaps. We do have duties to future

53:20

generations vis-a-vis climate change,

53:24

but we don't have duties to future

53:24

generations vis-a-vis procreation.

53:29

But intuitively, they seem symmetrical to me. So I don't see what the difference is.

53:32

I would have to be persuaded out

53:32

of it that there would be some

53:34

relevant asymmetry that would

53:34

validate solving climate change.

53:38

But would not validate procreation,

53:38

and I think if we have uncertainty

53:42

about this, we shouldn't be introducing

53:42

bands with this kind of uncertainty.

53:46

In fact, having children merely to

53:46

continue your family in the knowledge

53:50

that you're going to die is actually

53:50

somewhat selfish, but there are plenty

53:53

of other reasons to have children. Then merely the continuance

53:54

of your own d n A.

53:58

It would've been nice to. A larger discussion of

53:59

these issues in the book. Alright, so in this episode I

54:09

covered the second half of chapter

54:12

seven of Fisher's book, death and

54:12

Mortality and Meaning in Life.

54:15

And I started out by thinking about

54:15

various metaphysical issues with.

54:21

The nature of an

54:21

afterlife from the get-go.

54:23

How could death be a transition? A transition to what?

54:27

A transition to heaven, what implications

54:27

does that have for the nature of our minds

54:31

and what we are as individual things?

54:35

How would our personal

54:35

identity be preserved?

54:37

That is to say, how could we survive a

54:37

transition from a bodily form of existence

54:43

into an immaterial form of existence in

54:43

some afterlife, whether that's heaven or.

54:48

It seems like that would be a

54:48

gap in our existence that would

54:51

result in our annihilation. So those questions have to do with the

54:52

mere possibility of an afterlife or

54:56

an afterlife in which we would go to. I later discussed some of Fisher's reasons

54:58

for thinking about different conceptions

55:03

of heaven and different possible goods

55:03

which could be enjoyed exclusively to a

55:08

heaven, such as conversing with God and

55:08

what union with God would consistent.

55:13

And there's three different

55:13

conceptions of what that would be like.

55:16

Contrary to Fisher, it seems to me that

55:16

any reason to continue one's existence

55:21

as an immortal in a secular context

55:21

would also be available in a religious

55:26

context in a heaven, but then heaven

55:26

would have quite a lot more, which would

55:29

make continued existence preferable. So if anything, boredom would be less

55:31

of an issue in heaven than it would

55:34

ever be in a secular mode of existence.

55:37

Lastly, I discussed what. Calls himself as an immortality

55:40

realist and identified that

55:43

there's no middle position there. He's an optimist about immortality who

55:44

is not so optimistic as Aubrey de Gray

55:49

or Ray kw into thinking that immortality

55:49

is right around the corner or is

55:54

likely to be achieved in our lifetimes. And part of the reason for

55:56

that is he thinks that.

56:00

Eventually climate change is going

56:00

to make this planet miserable enough

56:04

to live in that it would not be

56:04

desirable to continue to exist in

56:09

an ageless, medically immortal life. So Fisher is kind of, I think, unduly

56:11

pessimistic about environmentalism

56:16

and about the possibilities

56:16

of global climate change.

56:19

Likewise, he's quite pessimistic

56:19

about the problem of overpopulation,

56:23

which I don't think is as problematic. Even if medical immortality were.

56:28

So, although Fisher calls himself an

56:28

immortality realist, he's really an

56:31

optimist, but not so optimistic as to be.