0:05

On this episode of Newtsworld. Overnight

0:08

last Saturday, Iran launched its

0:10

first direct attack on Israeli soil,

0:13

firing hundreds of missiles and drones

0:15

at multiple targets. I

0:17

wanted to discuss the escalating tensions

0:19

in the Middle East. So I'm really pleased to welcome

0:22

my guests, Adam Weinstein,

0:24

Deputy director of the Middle East Program

0:26

at the Quincy Institute for Responsible

0:29

state Craft. Adam,

0:51

welcome, and thank you for joining me on Newtsworld.

0:54

Thanks for having me speaker Gimlish.

0:56

So I want to start just with an overview of what

0:59

just happened. Iran launched

1:01

nearly three hundred and fifty attack

1:03

drones and missiles against Israel

1:05

on April thirteenth. Now

1:08

part of the cause of that was

1:11

that on April first, Israel

1:13

launched an air strike that killed a top Iranian

1:15

general, Brigadier General Muhammad

1:17

Reza Zahidi, the commander

1:19

of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard

1:22

Corps Kuds Force in Syria

1:24

and Lebanon. The Kuds Force is

1:26

the militant arm that

1:29

carries out terrorism and

1:31

supports the various proxies around

1:33

the region. The Israelis

1:35

believed that this general was

1:37

the key Iranian military official

1:40

in charge of relations with Hesbelah and Lebanon

1:43

and the pro Iranian militias in

1:45

Syria, and they believe the Israelis

1:48

that he was in fact responsible

1:51

for organizing and training and preparing

1:53

for the October seventh attack. So

1:56

from their standpoint, he was a very high

1:58

value target. And the fact is he's

2:00

the most senior IRGC officer

2:03

killed since the assassination. Of

2:06

course, i'm solemoni by the US

2:08

and January of twenty twenty. From

2:10

your perspective, explain

2:12

for our listeners what is the cause

2:15

of the Iranian Israeli on

2:17

ending hostility.

2:19

In one sense, the cause is that the Iranian

2:22

regime has made hostility

2:25

towards Israel and support for this

2:27

general support for a Palestinian state a

2:31

cornerstone of their foreign policy and their

2:33

legitimacy is somewhat rooted in that. So

2:36

it's very difficult for them to move away from

2:38

that. And I think there is genuine ideological

2:41

support within the elites of the regime

2:44

so far as challenging Israel. They see

2:46

that as their place in the

2:48

world. Iran views itself as

2:50

a regional power, and one of the ways

2:52

it asserts itself is by challenging

2:54

Israel. Now, of course, neither

2:57

side has really done much to

2:59

de escalate those tensions.

3:01

When I hear the members of the Iranian

3:03

parliament chant death

3:06

to Israel and death to America,

3:09

and I see Ayatola Hamani

3:11

go on national television, which

3:14

he did about two months ago to assure

3:16

the Iranian people the death to

3:18

America is not a slogan, it's a policy.

3:22

From your perspective, how should I take that?

3:24

How should I interpret it?

3:26

I think there's a propaganda element to it.

3:28

At the end of the day, Remember that the Supreme

3:30

Leader allowed the Iran nuclear deal to go

3:32

through, which was with the United

3:34

States, and of course it was the Trump administration

3:37

that left that deal. I think death

3:39

to America has become a slogan. Of course,

3:41

it's an offensive slogan. I find it offensive,

3:44

but I don't think it is a

3:46

policy. I think the policy is challenging

3:49

America in the Middle East and

3:52

Iran asserting itself as the regional

3:54

hedgemon in the Middle East, or at least attempting

3:56

to do so. I think that's the real policy. At

3:59

the end of the day, the Iranian

4:02

government knows that it can't challenge the United

4:04

States head on, nor can it really challenge

4:06

Israel head on. And you saw that in the beginning

4:09

of this crisis. After October seventh,

4:11

the Iranians actually took a relatively

4:13

restrained position. Hezbollah

4:16

did not challenge Israel, despite

4:18

the fact that Israel was conducting strikes

4:21

deep inside Lebanese territory. So I

4:23

think at the end of the day, the

4:26

regime is pragmatic, but it

4:28

requires these slogans because

4:30

it bases its legitimacy on

4:33

this revolutionary fervor and the idea

4:35

that Iran is the regional

4:38

hedgemon and Iran can influence

4:40

these other states.

4:42

We get two different reports, one that the substantial

4:46

popular unhappiness with

4:49

the regime, you know, things like women

4:51

refusing to wear headscarves. A couple

4:53

of years ago, there were serious demonstrations, but

4:55

the other that the regime basically is pretty solid

4:58

and probably actually represent it's a substantial

5:00

majority of the Iranian people. But what's

5:03

your analysis.

5:04

Well, of course I'm not inside Iran, but

5:07

I think both of those things are true. In fact,

5:09

right now, there's a crackdown on women

5:11

who aren't in the view of the regime aren't

5:13

wearing the hitjob properly. So look,

5:16

we can't get around it. It's an oppressive regime,

5:18

that's a fact. But there's also substantial

5:21

support for it from segments of Iranian

5:24

society. But it's also deeply

5:26

unpopular among a substantial portion

5:28

of Iranian society. We can throw out percentages,

5:31

but I don't know how accurate any

5:33

of that is in terms of the regime's

5:35

viability. I think the

5:39

reality is that its critics

5:42

are not willing to take the steps

5:45

necessary or able to take the steps

5:47

necessary that would overthrow the regime. So

5:49

for years we've heard people say

5:52

this regime is on its last legs. The Iranian

5:54

people are going to rise up. There's

5:56

a difference between being discontent

5:59

and unhappy with the regime versus

6:02

being willing to risk your life

6:04

and your livelihood to overthrow the regime.

6:07

And I think there's still a gap between the

6:10

Iranian people's unhappiness with the regime

6:13

and their willingness or ability to take the

6:15

steps necessary to overthrow the regime. So

6:18

whenever I hear folks say the regime is on his

6:20

last legs, I take that with a grain of salt.

6:22

From your perspective and your analysis the

6:25

capacity of the security

6:28

forces and the secret police, etc. And

6:30

the Revolutionary Guard as a military, this

6:33

is a relatively stable dictatorship

6:37

for now.

6:37

I think it's a relatively stable dictatorship.

6:39

I think the protesters in

6:41

Iran, especially the peaceful protesters

6:44

and many of the young people who risk their lives, some of

6:46

whom were executed for protesting, I

6:48

think they're brave, but right

6:51

now they're not able to meaningfully

6:53

challenge the security forces

6:56

that protect the regime.

6:58

So when you look at the attack

7:00

the other day and you see first

7:03

of all the sheer volume and the sophistication,

7:05

because they're firing weapons that arrive

7:08

at the same time but have to be fired in

7:11

a calibrated way, because the ballistic missiles

7:13

will arrive very quickly and the drones will

7:15

arrive after a couple of hours, And

7:18

they were able to coordinate

7:20

all of that pretty well. But in

7:23

the end, ninety nine percent of the drones

7:26

and missiles were intercepted, according

7:28

to both Israeli and American sources.

7:31

From the standpoint of the Iranians, was that a

7:34

success or a failure.

7:36

I think they think it's a success because

7:39

there was a theatric component to it, and

7:42

a messaging component. I mean, they launched

7:44

some of the missiles from the gravesite of the Iranian

7:46

general who the Israelis killed, and

7:48

I think it was necessary for them to respond.

7:51

But the Iranians don't actually want

7:54

in all out war with Israel because they know it would

7:56

be potentially devastating for them. From

7:59

the Israeli perspective, in one sense,

8:01

okay, well, they demonstrated that they

8:04

can defend themselves against Iran, although

8:06

with significant US help. On the other

8:08

hand, it is an embarrassment for the Israeli

8:10

state that Iran was willing

8:13

to cross this red line by launching

8:15

strikes from Iranian soil

8:18

into Israel. From Israel's perspective,

8:20

I think it would have been more acceptable had Iran

8:22

used one of its proxies like Hasbella. Instead,

8:25

they launched the strikes directly from Iranian

8:28

soil, and even though those didn't

8:30

result in much damage, it is an escalation,

8:33

and I suspect the Israeli state is going

8:35

to respond in some way. They're debating that right

8:37

now. I call it a success from the Iranian

8:40

perspective. Of course, from

8:42

a more rational point of view, this isn't a success

8:44

for either side because the region is destabilizing.

8:47

So you have President Biden

8:50

and his senior officials all

8:52

saying that Israel should claim that

8:55

they had won because the damage done was

8:57

trivial, and not strike back.

9:00

Do you think that's a sustainable position

9:02

inside Israeli society.

9:05

With foreign policy, there's always the right

9:07

answer, and then there's the answer

9:10

that takes into account domestic politics.

9:12

And I think what President

9:15

Biden is counseling that in Yahoo to do

9:17

is the right answer. I think they should call

9:20

it even and move on. I don't think it's in Israel's

9:22

interests to open up a new war with Iran or

9:25

to potentially open up a northern front with Hesbelah.

9:27

I don't think it's in the US interests, and

9:29

I think Biden should do everything in his power

9:31

to try to restrain that in Yahoo. But

9:34

I also think it is true

9:36

that at the end of the day, domestic politics

9:38

matter to political leaders and and

9:41

Yahoo wants to look strong, and

9:43

given the track record of Israel over the last

9:46

six months, I think it is highly

9:48

unlikely that Israel will not respond. I

9:51

mean, if I was analyzing this inside

9:53

the US government, I would say, Israel's

9:56

likely to respond, even though the Biden

9:58

administration is counseling it not too.

10:01

Isn't the pressure

10:03

of the Israeli public overwhelmingly

10:06

to hit back.

10:08

Yeah, I think there's some of that, and it's understandable

10:11

because you can imagine how Americans would feel

10:13

if ballistic missiles were flying over the skies

10:15

of the United States, even if all of them were and drones

10:18

even if all of them were intercepted. But I

10:20

also think it's incumbent on responsible

10:22

leaders to not simply follow

10:25

the anger and the sentiment of the general

10:27

public if following that will

10:29

lead to a bigger conflict. I mean, the reality

10:32

is that if a direct conflict is opened

10:34

up with Iran, or if a northern front is opened

10:36

up with Hezbalah, Israelis are going

10:39

to lose their lives. And I think it

10:41

would be foolish to simply

10:43

to respond in a way that ends

10:45

up risking Israeli lives. But again,

10:48

that's what Naanyah who might do. And nanya who

10:50

has his own political reasons to appear strong

10:52

right now, and he has his own political reasons

10:54

to confront Iran, and of course there's

10:57

folks in his Cabinet and in the Israeli

10:59

state who probably feel that right now

11:02

is the time for a confrontation. They're never going

11:04

to get a better chance to confront Iran than they

11:06

have right now. They might truly believe that.

11:26

It is interesting to me that, well, we all

11:28

focus on Netnya, who as the Prime Minister

11:30

and as this kind of world figure who's been around

11:33

for three decades. There

11:35

is a war cabinet, and apparently the

11:37

war cabinet has been having a really intense,

11:39

serious debate, although

11:42

the debate seems to be about how to react,

11:44

not whether to react. At least in the last

11:46

report I saw Nanya who hasn't

11:48

come down on either side yet. He literally is presiding

11:51

over a very serious debate

11:53

among people, most of whom have an

11:56

enormous amount of experience at

11:58

dealing with survival and is.

12:01

That's true?

12:01

And I don't think he's decided. I also think he's

12:03

experiencing immense pressure from the Biden

12:06

administration to restrain his response.

12:08

And we also have to remember that Israel

12:10

is experiencing a little bit of breathing room right

12:12

now. I mean, the focus is off of Gaza. Sympathy

12:15

has been restored, for Israel, foreign

12:17

ministries in Europe and the State Department in

12:19

the United States that a few days

12:22

prior to this attack by Iran,

12:24

we're issuing statements criticizing Israel.

12:27

Now they're issuing statements expressing sympathy

12:29

for Israel and ironclad partnership,

12:32

and so this is an opportunity for

12:34

Israel to think about what

12:36

to do next. They have toned down

12:39

the campaign in Gaza. It's not as kinnectic

12:41

as it was before. I would argue

12:43

that this is an opportunity for Israel to step

12:45

back, cut some of its losses and

12:48

think about a more sustainable approach

12:50

to Gaza, including a potential ceasefire.

12:53

But of course cooler heads may not prevail,

12:55

and they may see this as an opportunity instead

12:58

to confront Iran in view

13:01

set back the Iranian threat by

13:03

decades by perhaps engaging in

13:05

certain targeted strikes, including on their nuclear

13:08

facilities, and they may see that as the

13:10

way to make Israel safe for long term. I

13:12

would argue that that risks isolating

13:14

Israel even further on the world stage,

13:16

and it won't actually eliminate the threats

13:19

to Israel.

13:20

Well, they were faced with a similar situation

13:24

with Iraq when they went in and took out the French

13:27

nuclear reactor that the Iraqis were

13:29

building. And at the time, even the

13:31

Reagan administration initially

13:33

condemned their attack, but it did

13:35

seem to eliminate the Iraqi

13:38

ability to generate a nuclear weapon

13:40

in the short run. And I think people

13:42

like Ntnia who clearly have that as a part of

13:44

their historic memory of what's

13:47

going on. But are you suggesting

13:49

I'm very curious beyond not hitting

13:52

Iran, would you accept

13:54

the Biden notion

13:56

that somehow rough of the big city that's still

13:58

left in southern Gaza, that

14:00

they should not go in and

14:02

they should find some way to

14:04

accommodate Hamas or how do you see

14:07

that part of the Israeli equation.

14:10

You know, it's a tough question, and of course

14:12

I haven't heard anyone, including

14:14

myself, offer a true solution in

14:16

how to deal with Hamas because

14:19

Hamas is a violent terrorist organization

14:21

and the reality is that a

14:24

ceasefire with Hamas is a risk

14:26

because historically Hamas has not adhered

14:29

to the ceasefires. But the current

14:32

game plan isn't working. I mean, we have

14:34

massive civilian casualties. Israel

14:36

Is isolated on the world stage. I would

14:39

argue that the Israeli government

14:41

needs to look at things from a long term

14:43

perspective. I think right

14:45

now they have significant

14:47

support in US Congress, But I

14:50

mean, do you really think that's going to hold true when

14:52

future generations millennials and gen.

14:54

Z take power.

14:55

I think Israel is right now destroying

14:58

its global image, destroying its

15:00

image in the United States in a way

15:02

that threatens.

15:03

Its long term support and long term stability.

15:06

So I think it would be foolish for the Israeli

15:08

government to prioritize short term threats

15:11

over its long term partnerships

15:14

and prestige in the world. And

15:16

so going into RAFA. While I acknowledge

15:19

it might kill more Hamas

15:21

foot soldiers and there's the potential to get

15:23

certain leaders, I don't think it's worth

15:25

it, even from the Israeli security

15:28

perspective. This has been the

15:30

calculation by the Israeli government

15:32

since October seventh. It makes

15:34

sense to destroy Hamas regardless

15:37

of the cost. So if there's even a

15:39

small chance of a senior Hamas commander

15:41

being an apartment complex, it makes sense to destroy

15:44

the apartment complex, even if you kill

15:46

four hundred civilians. In the process, because

15:49

at least they will have eliminated a Hamas commander.

15:52

I don't think that's good for Israel long term,

15:55

because I think what we're going to see

15:57

is support for Israel in the Internet

16:00

community eroding over

16:02

time. For many young Americans,

16:05

I think this war is the formative impression

16:07

that they have of Israel. They don't

16:09

remember Israel being kind of a

16:12

David and Goliath story in which

16:14

all of its neighbors had teamed up against

16:16

it and sought to destroy it, and Israel overcame

16:19

those kinds of hostilities with

16:21

the younger generations in Europe and the USC

16:24

is Israel is a strong military

16:26

with significant US support that is

16:29

engaging in war crimes in Gaza, and

16:32

I think that perception

16:34

is dangerous for Israel long term. I

16:37

wouldn't use the word to accommodate Hamas because

16:39

I think Hamas is a very dangerous

16:41

organization. I think it's difficult to truly

16:44

have long term diplomacy with Hamas.

16:47

I would argue that Israel needs to have long term

16:49

diplomacy with the Palestinian people in

16:52

a way that can potentially sideline Hamas

16:54

over time or force Hamas to

16:56

be more pragmatic.

16:58

How would you do that?

17:00

I would have done things differently from the beginning.

17:02

If I was in Netanyahu's war cabinet, I would

17:05

have had more targeted strikes. I would have focused

17:07

on Hamas leaders. I would have tried to send

17:09

a message to the Palestinian people that were

17:11

not against you, were against Hamas. Of course,

17:14

that's easy for me to say sitting in New York City.

17:16

I know that net and Yahoo had to keep his

17:19

coalition together. I know Netanyahu cares

17:21

about his political future, and I know that the

17:23

attacks on October seventh radicalized Israeli

17:26

society. And I can understand that because

17:28

I saw what nine to eleven did to US society.

17:30

But I think that approach would

17:33

have been better than racking up over

17:35

thirty thousand civilian casualties. I

17:38

think there was immense sympathy

17:40

for Israel following October seventh, and

17:42

if I was in Israeli right now, I

17:44

would be livid with Netanyahu for

17:47

squandering that sympathy. And I

17:49

don't think that eliminating Hamas again

17:51

in the short term. It might reduce

17:54

risks in the next ten years, let's say,

17:56

but they're also engaging in

17:58

a way that I think to create an organization

18:01

worse than Hamas in the future. And the

18:04

Palestinian and Israeli societies are

18:06

mutually radicalizing one another right

18:08

now in a way that makes long term peace

18:11

unlikely.

18:11

In my view, you're really faced with two

18:15

incompatible realities

18:18

and no particular exit ramp, if

18:20

you will. The whole Middle East in that sense,

18:23

it seems to me, on the one hand,

18:25

is moving in the right direction. Egypt, Jordan,

18:29

uae, Kuwait, Saudi

18:31

Arabia. On the other hand, it's degenerating

18:34

rapidly. Whether it's the Huthis in

18:36

the South or Hesbaalah or the

18:38

chaos in Syria. It's

18:41

a very mixed bag. And in that context, we

18:43

have sort of gradually dribbled American

18:46

troops all over the place. Are those

18:48

troops peacekeepers

18:50

or are they actually hostages?

18:52

I think they used to be peacekeepers

18:55

and now they're hostages. I think.

18:58

US air power and US troops is critical

19:00

to defeating ISIS, and we saw

19:02

ISIS emerge in twenty thirteen after

19:05

US troops left in twenty eleven, and

19:08

they were able to take over Iraqi cities,

19:10

and then the US had to come back to Iraq in

19:13

twenty fourteen, and then because we could

19:16

not train an effective proxy in Syria, we

19:19

sent troops to Syria as well, special

19:21

operators. Right now there's eight hundred. It's

19:23

fluctuated between eight hundred and nine hundred.

19:26

Now the US troops in Syria are in direct

19:28

combat, whereas the US troops

19:30

in Iraq are in an advisory

19:33

mission. But of course they're still susceptible to

19:35

attacks from rockets and mortars

19:37

and so forth, and drones from

19:39

Iran aligned militias in Iraq. Do

19:42

those troops achieve something, Yes,

19:44

they do. They help the Iraqi

19:47

military and targeting of ISSIS cells,

19:49

They help maintain their capability. In

19:52

some sense, they help maintain US

19:54

influence in Iraq, and they act

19:56

as a mediator between different factions

19:58

within the Iraqi military, because the Iraqi military's

20:01

command structure is not like our military's

20:03

command structure. It's not a top down command

20:06

structure. Technically different units

20:08

report to the Prime Minister, but in reality

20:11

there's all kinds of different paramilitary

20:14

wings of the Iraqi security forces

20:16

that are more or less only accountable

20:18

to themselves, or they're accountable to Iran,

20:21

or a mix of both. And so I think having

20:23

the US military there has been

20:25

stabilizing in that sense,

20:28

but the risk is that US troops

20:30

are in contact. I mean, we thought we saw the three

20:32

US soldiers get killed at Tower twenty two in Jordan,

20:35

and that is a risk, and they are hostage

20:37

to this ebb and flow of hostilities

20:39

in the Middle East. Before October

20:42

seventh, folks in the Biden administration

20:44

thought the Middle East was yesterday's problem

20:46

and their focus was on Ukraine and East Asia. Well,

20:49

now we see it's not yesterday's problem, it's

20:51

today's problem. And I think the benefits

20:53

that we get out of having US troops in

20:55

Syria and Iraq are far outweighed

20:58

by the risks of them getting killed and

21:00

getting dragged into a greater

21:02

war. And also, I think we have a duty

21:05

to our US troops. You know, we could

21:07

say, okay, three US soldiers got killed, that's

21:09

a relatively low casualty rate given

21:12

how long we've been there. But at

21:14

the end of the day, I think we have a duty to those

21:17

US soldiers that they're not being killed in vain. And I

21:19

would argue they are being killed in vain.

21:21

I don't actually understand what

21:24

a definable successful

21:27

mission looks like and you've

21:29

got a lot of troops there, But that

21:31

really understates the commitment

21:34

level because those troops have to have air power,

21:37

and that means either aircraft carriers or

21:39

basing rights, and without that air

21:41

power, you are not capable

21:43

of having those troops survive on their own. So

21:46

there's actually a much larger commitment

21:49

of American capability than

21:51

just the number of Special Forces or

21:53

Am I wrong? Is that not correct?

21:55

No, that's correct.

21:56

I think from the Pentagon's perspective and Sentcom's

21:58

perspective, David chi success,

22:00

I mean ISIS has not been able to revive

22:03

itself. There's no threat currently

22:05

of ISIS being able to take even smaller

22:07

towns, let alone major Iraqi

22:10

cities. They're able to keep an eye

22:13

on the Iranians and the land corridor

22:15

that exists from Iran through Iraq and Syria

22:18

into Lebanon, and so of

22:20

course there's benefits that come with that, But the

22:22

risk is US casualties.

22:24

The risk is these US troops.

22:26

Being used as pawns by these unaccountable

22:29

Iran backed militias in Iraq and Syria

22:32

and the US being dragged

22:34

into a bigger conflict. And I think that risk

22:37

outweighs the current benefits.

22:40

And I also think we owe

22:42

it to the American people not to keep US troops

22:44

deployed in combat zones indefinitely.

22:47

I mean, we can call it an advisory emission,

22:49

but it's a combat zone. If US troops

22:52

are being targeted by drones, that's

22:54

a combat zone. There's a big difference between

22:56

the experience of US troops in Iraq

22:59

and the experts of US troops in South Korea.

23:19

What would happen if we

23:22

simply withdrew our troops from Iraq

23:24

and Syria.

23:26

Well, I don't think we should simply withdraw them.

23:28

I think we need to have a plan. I've argued

23:30

this in a brief wrote I think we need to come

23:33

up with a plan that allows certain rotations

23:35

of training missions to continue.

23:37

I think we do need to continue to support

23:39

the Iraqi military. First of all,

23:41

if we withdrew from Iraq, we would

23:43

probably have to withdraw from Syria anyway, because

23:45

the troops in Syria rely, to

23:48

some extent on logistics from Iraq. The

23:51

reality is other powers would

23:53

begin to assert themselves. I mean, we would see

23:55

the Iran aligned militias assert

23:57

themselves more. Iran would claim it as a victory.

24:00

We would see perhaps hostilities

24:03

towards our Kurdish partners in the SDF and

24:05

Syria. We would see a rebalancing

24:07

of power in those areas. And of course, I

24:11

think that's what gives any US president pause

24:13

from withdrawing, because especially in an induction

24:15

year, because they don't want to be accused of

24:17

gifting Iraq to Iran. But what

24:20

I would step back and say is Iraq

24:23

is always going to be a greater vital

24:25

interest for Iran than it is for the United

24:27

States. And if you want evidence of that, we

24:29

only have twenty five hundred troops there. I

24:32

mean, that's the evidence. We don't truly

24:34

prioritize Iraq, or we would have more

24:36

than twenty five hundred troops. We don't truly

24:39

prioritize Syria, or we would have more than

24:41

eight hundred to nine hundred troops. What we're trying

24:43

to do is protect our

24:45

interests in Iraq and Syria with a very

24:48

low investment, and I

24:50

think we should just accept the reality that

24:53

we cannot alter conditions on the ground

24:56

with the investment we're willing to make, and so it

24:58

makes sense to leave and focus on on bigger issues.

25:01

So from that perspective, if we did leave, how would

25:03

that affect our ability

25:06

to work with Saudi Arabia.

25:08

You know, that's an interesting question.

25:09

I think Saudi Arabia has demonstrated

25:12

that it's not going to simply follow

25:14

the lead of the United States. It's going to engage

25:17

with China when it makes sense for Saudi Arabia.

25:19

It's going to engage with Iran when it makes sense for Saudi

25:21

Arabia. So I think I

25:23

don't think we need to maintain a

25:26

footprint in Iraq and Syria

25:29

simply to protect Israeli interests or Saudi

25:31

interests, or anyone else's interests.

25:32

If it's not in our interest.

25:33

I think there will still be ways to work with Saudi

25:36

Arabia even if we do reduce our footprint,

25:38

and I think Saudi Arabia has bigger concerns.

25:41

Were you surprised by the Saudi's cooperation

25:45

with Israel in repelling the Iranian

25:47

attack?

25:48

I don't know the veracity of all the reports.

25:50

I know the Jordanians intercepted drones. I

25:52

know there's reports the Saudis did.

25:54

It makes sense.

25:55

I mean, at the end of the day, Iran violated

25:57

the sovereign airspace of these countries. And

25:59

I don't think Jordan or Saudi

26:02

Arabia want to see a greater

26:05

conflict between Iran and Israel.

26:07

So in some sense, for them,

26:09

it makes sense to try to mitigate the damage

26:11

of these Iranian strikes on Israel, because of course,

26:14

if the damage had been greater, it would

26:16

be a foregone conclusion that there's

26:18

going to be a bigger war, and that's not in the interests

26:20

of these countries. All of these countries have an interest

26:23

in stability. They do not have an interest

26:25

in seeing a escalating conflict

26:27

between Iran and Israel. And of course

26:30

these aren't exactly countries that have a soft

26:32

spot for Iran.

26:34

The fear of Iran may be greater

26:36

than their fear of Israel.

26:38

I think that's absolutely true. Now these

26:40

countries, they are accountable to some degree

26:42

to public sentiment, and of course public

26:44

sentiment is going to be very

26:47

sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians.

26:50

But we have to remember neither Saudi

26:52

Arabia nor Jordan have

26:54

a soft spot for Hamas either. I mean, they

26:57

view Hamas as an ideological threat to

26:59

their own legitimates and if Hamas were

27:01

to truly succeed in their objective, they

27:03

view that as offering a blueprint for a

27:06

challenge to their own rule. They definitely

27:08

don't want to see Islamist movements that are modeled

27:11

to some degree after the Muslim Brotherhood

27:13

succeeding, because that is a threat

27:15

to their own rule.

27:17

Egypt and Jordan are as ruthlessly anti

27:19

Muslim Brotherhood as Israel

27:22

is anti Hamas. I mean, their secret

27:24

police make no bones about

27:27

going after people and blocking them and trying

27:29

to destroy those things. And I think

27:31

that's part of why they've been unwilling

27:33

to accept refugees from Gaza. They

27:36

think they would infect their political

27:38

process with people who are dedicated

27:41

to a very very different

27:43

structure of power.

27:44

I think that's some of it.

27:45

I also think they just don't want to deal with the problem

27:47

of having a protracted refugee population.

27:50

I mean, no country wants to deal with that.

27:52

Which gets you back, in a sense to how

27:54

big the dilemma is going to be in the next couple

27:56

of years as Israel tries to work

27:58

through do you get to a Gaza

28:01

that can be your neighbor. I think it's

28:03

a really difficult problem.

28:05

I think it is, and both sides have made mistakes.

28:08

I mean, I think it was shortsighted

28:10

for Israel to isolate Gaza

28:13

and have a blockade on Gaza the way it did. I think

28:15

it actually empowered Hamas in some ways. Of

28:17

course, Hamas is very difficult

28:19

to work with. It sometimes gets

28:21

forgotten that, in some sense, all

28:23

Hamas ever really had to do with, say we

28:26

agree to some kind of two state solution

28:28

in principle. It wouldn't even have to define

28:30

the borders. It wouldn't even have to get

28:32

into specifics. If it's simply said,

28:35

we agree to some kind

28:37

of two state solution in principle,

28:40

there could be a de escalation. But of course Hamas

28:42

is not going to do that.

28:43

Now.

28:43

That doesn't mean that the way Israel has approached

28:46

Palestinians is correct. I mean, look

28:48

at the way Israel has allowed settlers

28:50

to essentially murder and steal

28:53

from Palestinians in the West Bank. If you're a Palestinian,

28:56

what future do you see with Israel. It's

28:59

not so simple, as Ajamas is impossible

29:01

to work with and Gaza is an impossible

29:03

neighbor. I mean, even in the West Bank, where

29:06

you have a much easier Palestinian

29:08

leadership to work with. I understand there's problems

29:10

without leadership as well, but even in the

29:12

West Bank you see Israel

29:15

engaging in these kinds of expansionists maximalist

29:18

aims, and allowing settlers to

29:21

go unpunished for murder. So I

29:23

think a lot of Palestinians don't see an

29:25

off ramp either. They don't see a viable

29:27

future, and I think Israel has squandered an opportunity

29:31

to communicate to Palestinians there

29:33

is a future where there can be peace

29:35

with Israel. I don't think a young

29:37

Palestinian would be wrong in saying they don't see

29:40

that as a possibility.

29:41

We just did a podcast

29:43

about two weeks ago with the people

29:46

who do the Gallop Worldwide survey,

29:49

and Israel was one of the top ten countries

29:51

for happiness and they

29:54

count the views of the twenty percent

29:56

of Israel that are Arab who fit

29:58

into that when we were talking about it,

30:00

and there's apparently zero

30:03

interest among Israeli Arabs in

30:07

joining the Palestinians. I mean that there's a

30:10

dramatically more acceptable

30:12

world. They're going to have to have some model

30:15

of rational behavior for

30:18

what they do in Gaza after the fight's

30:20

over, because they're going to have three million people

30:23

sitting there. It's not something you just kind

30:25

of ignore and turn into a huge refugee

30:27

camp, which is what had happened in the past

30:29

and leads to the kind of violence we

30:31

now have. So I think it's one of the great challenges

30:34

of statesmanship if you will, to try

30:37

to think through what are the steps

30:39

that gets you to a sustainable,

30:41

governable Gaza

30:44

and what are the steps that gets you to a

30:46

more acceptable less Bank than

30:48

the current problems. And I do think that means you

30:51

have to restrain the more aggressive

30:53

elements of Israeli society as

30:56

well as trying to find ways to

30:58

make life better or the

31:00

average Palestinian.

31:02

Well, there's nothing more demoralizing than

31:04

feeling that your house or

31:06

your life can be taken with impunity,

31:08

and that's what the Palestinians in the West Bank

31:10

have been subjected to by settlers. Settlers

31:13

who, by the way, don't contribute much to Israeli society

31:16

so far as Israel being one of

31:18

the happier countries in the world, including the Arab Israeli

31:20

population, I think a lot of that has to do with

31:22

the sense of community you see among those

31:24

subgroups in Israel. That is a future

31:27

that it could exist in the West Bank or Gaza, but

31:29

it's on the Israelis to extend civil

31:31

liberties and civil rights and to restrain,

31:34

as you said, the more radical elements of Israeli

31:37

society. What if the West Bank were

31:39

a model for Gaza. But if you're a Gaza and you

31:41

look at the West Bank, well, conditions might

31:43

be better. It's not an open air prison, there's more

31:45

freedom of mobility. It might be economically

31:48

a little bit better. But at the end of the day, if

31:50

a settler has a problem with you, they're

31:53

able to abuse you with absolute impunity.

31:55

So that's not a model either.

31:56

Right, so honorarily then I have to go to a

31:59

genuine rule of law and some

32:01

kind of genuinely impartial

32:04

system of justice. It's a huge problem,

32:07

you know, Adam. I'm really impressed with how much you've

32:09

worked on this, and I want to thank you for

32:11

joining me. I want to encourage our listeners

32:14

to visit the Quincy Institute website

32:16

at quincinstitute dot org. That's

32:19

QUI n c y I

32:21

nst dot org, where

32:24

they can read your latest report entitled Troops

32:27

in Peril the risk of keeping US troops

32:29

in Iraq and Syria, and I really appreciate

32:31

your taking the time to help educate

32:34

us today.

32:35

Thanks for having me speaker, Gingrich. I think all Americans

32:37

should support efforts towards the ceasefire,

32:40

regardless of where you fall on the political

32:42

spectrum, because that's what's in the US interest and

32:44

frankly, that's what's in Israel's long term interests.

32:47

Right Well, we will continue the dialogue and maybe

32:49

in the not too distant future you can

32:51

come back and brieface as the world keeps changing.

32:53

I appreciate you having me on.

33:00

Thank you to my guest, Adam Weinstein. You

33:02

can get a link to his Quincy Institute report

33:04

Troops in Peril on our show

33:07

page at newtsworld dot com. Newtsworld

33:09

is produced by Ginglish three sixty and iHeartMedia.

33:13

Our executive producer is Guernsey Sloan.

33:15

Our researcher is Rachel Peterson.

33:18

The artwork for the show was created

33:20

by Steve Penley. Special thanks

33:23

to the team at ginglishtree sixty. If

33:25

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33:44

I'm Newt Gingrich. This is Nutsworld