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at burrow.com/ACAST. Hello,

0:36

my name's David Runciman and this is

0:39

Past, Present, Future. Today,

0:41

in our series about the ideas behind

0:43

American elections, we've reached 1936. It's

0:48

the first election in the ones I've been

0:50

discussing with the historian Gary Gerstle, in

0:52

which a president wins re-election, and

0:55

also the first in which it's

0:57

won by a landslide. Despite that,

0:59

this election was a contest of

1:01

really big ideas. Not

1:04

just the New Deal, but the role of the

1:06

Supreme Court, the nature of economic

1:08

freedom, and above all, the

1:10

future of American democracy. The

1:22

election that is the subject of today's episode

1:24

is a bit different from the ones that

1:26

we've talked about so far. First of all,

1:29

this one is a re-election. Franklin

1:31

Roosevelt re-elected in 1936,

1:35

having first won in 32. It's also

1:38

a landslide. He won overwhelmingly.

1:41

The vote share in this case

1:43

was over 60%, and his

1:46

opponent, Alf Landon, the Republican, only got

1:48

36.5% of the popular vote. In

1:52

the electoral college, the Republicans

1:54

got 8. Roosevelt

1:56

got 523. So, there are not many what-ifs here. This

2:00

is not an election where there's the thought

2:02

that the actual outcome could have gone another

2:05

way. We've chosen it to talk about because

2:07

it is absolutely crucial in

2:09

the history of American politics, American

2:12

society, and indeed American

2:14

political economy. And

2:16

all presidential elections are interesting in different

2:18

ways, and this is certainly one of

2:21

them. Gary,

2:23

one of the questions, it seems to me,

2:25

that's most fascinating about Roosevelt is that he

2:27

is known, of course, for the

2:29

New Deal, and various terms are associated with

2:32

his presidency, one of which is the first

2:34

hundred days. That was the first hundred days

2:36

in 1933 after he'd been elected,

2:38

where a whole raft of measures at the

2:40

absolute depths of the Great Depression,

2:42

a country in various

2:45

forms of despair, galvanized by

2:47

this extraordinary agenda that he

2:49

came into office with. But

2:52

he wasn't elected on. The platform that

2:54

he won on in 1932 was not

2:56

a New Deal platform. It was actually

2:59

quite conservative, among other things. Roosevelt,

3:02

when he was campaigning in 1932, didn't

3:04

talk about it much, but when pressed,

3:07

presented himself as a balanced budget candidate.

3:11

Sound public finances, not deficit

3:13

financing, not taking

3:15

emergency measures for emergency times, but

3:17

getting the ship estate back

3:19

on the rails. In 1936, he

3:23

is running as the New Deal

3:25

candidate. It's get the job done campaign.

3:28

Many campaigns are continuity versus

3:30

change. He's the continuity candidate,

3:32

having changed an awful lot

3:35

in those four years. How

3:37

would you characterize the biggest difference

3:39

between Roosevelt the candidate in 1936 and

3:42

Roosevelt the candidate in 1932? Roosevelt

3:46

in 1932 is, as you described him,

3:48

he's presenting a moderate face to the

3:50

electorate. He wants to balance the budget.

3:52

He does enunciate in that campaign that

3:54

he is going to give

3:57

the American people a New Deal, but

3:59

he... leaves the contents of that new deal

4:02

frustratingly vague. He's

4:05

using the weapons

4:07

that favored candidates often

4:10

use if they think they're going to win,

4:12

and Herbert Hoover had been entirely discredited by

4:14

the Great Depression, the worst depression in all

4:16

of American history. Don't

4:19

say what you're going to do. Just preserve

4:21

freedom of action. So there's not much he

4:23

has to say. And I should add, he

4:25

didn't even say anything during the long period

4:27

between winning the election and assuming office. So

4:29

it was five months back then, and the

4:32

American economy was still going down the plug

4:34

hole. And Hoover, who had

4:36

lost at that point, was desperate for

4:38

Roosevelt to do some things with him,

4:40

some bipartisan measures, something to signal to

4:42

the American people that they were in

4:44

it together. And Roosevelt refused to show

4:47

his hand until day one. It made

4:49

Hoover furious and bred in him an

4:51

enmity toward Roosevelt that would never die.

4:54

When Roosevelt does come into office, he

4:57

has the most stunning first hundred days

5:00

legislatively of

5:02

any president in American history, 15 major

5:04

pieces of legislation passed. Enormous

5:08

increase in executive power to look at

5:10

some of these pieces of legislation. Some

5:13

of them are major projects for

5:15

reconstructing the economy. And the

5:17

bill goes on for four or five pages, and

5:20

Congress is asked to sign off on them without

5:22

a lot of detail. And they agreed to do

5:24

so because the census, the economy

5:26

is in such a great state that urgent

5:29

executive action is needed immediately, and

5:31

Congress is willing to go along.

5:34

If we look more closely at the 15

5:36

pieces of legislation, they

5:38

have different motivations. And it

5:41

reflects the fact that Roosevelt

5:43

had not yet settled fully

5:46

on one program of political economy. Some

5:48

bills were directed at elite groups and

5:50

interests in American society. He wanted to

5:53

put the banks back on their feet.

5:55

He wanted to cartilize

5:58

American industry, which is... a

6:00

way of saying he was encouraging oligopoly,

6:02

encouraging them to get together, restrain production,

6:05

coordinate with each other, made a lot of

6:07

sense, but it was also increasing elite power.

6:10

Adam L The

7:00

lead interest in American society put the banks together

7:02

and if we put the banks back together, the

7:05

rest of the economy will follow. Get industry

7:07

to work together. If we get an industry

7:10

to work together, the rest of the economy

7:12

will follow. We might consider this a supply

7:14

side version of political

7:16

economy and by that I mean work

7:19

on the suppliers, get their enterprises

7:21

in order and if they are on

7:23

a better keel then the rest of

7:25

the economy will recover. This

7:28

works for a time and also

7:30

the motion, the energy, the

7:32

declaration by Roosevelt that we have

7:34

nothing to fear but fear

7:37

itself brings hope

7:39

to the American people after four years of

7:42

a terrible depression and

7:44

makes people feel that there will be a

7:46

way for America to climb out of the

7:48

worst depression in its

7:51

history. So he gets a

7:53

lot of popular support. The economic measures seem

7:55

to be working for

7:57

a time but because the economic

8:00

There's certain crucial measures depend. So.

8:03

Heavily on the voluntary willingness of

8:05

industrialists to work with each other.

8:08

As long as there seems to be an economic

8:10

recovery under way, they're willing to do that. But

8:13

as soon as economic indicators point down again, by

8:15

Nineteen Thirty four. They say

8:17

we've had enough of this, were going to

8:19

go on way. We have to preserve our

8:21

own enterprises so they begin to abandon the

8:23

new deal on that has the effect of.

8:26

Angering. Ordinary Americans, farmers, workers

8:28

who after being question for

8:30

the first few years of

8:32

the New Deal. Suddenly.

8:35

Engage in protest that

8:37

quickly become. Very major.

8:40

And this is especially true for the

8:42

Labor movement. They. Haven't given

8:44

a little clause in a major pieces

8:47

industrial legislation. This was a national Industrial

8:49

Recovery act, mostly oriented to help big

8:51

corporations get back on their feet. But.

8:54

There's a little clause seven a that says

8:57

workers have a right to join unions and

8:59

and players have an obligation to bargain with

9:01

them. collectively. There

9:03

are no teeth in this little seven A.

9:05

There's no enforcement mechanism. Workers.

9:08

Take it seriously: the Head of the

9:10

United Mine Workers, Donna Lewis says: the

9:12

President wants you to join a union.

9:15

He was actually talking about himself, the

9:17

President of United Mine Workers, but he

9:19

just says the President meaning Franklin Roosevelt

9:21

wants you to join the union. This

9:23

has an enormous stimulating effect on workers.

9:26

They're joining unions and vast numbers employers

9:28

won't. Bargain with them in

9:30

any meaningful sense. And then.

9:32

The pattern of industrial relations

9:35

that head. So characterize American

9:37

history for the previous fifty years. The.

9:39

Resort to violence and confrontation

9:42

begins to reassert itself. And

9:44

America by ninety Thirty Four And

9:46

Thirty Five is on the cusp of

9:48

an earthquake, some political earthquake of

9:50

very great magnitude. That. Could

9:53

eventually eight in a revolution.

9:56

And Roosevelt. Begins to believe

9:58

at this moment. That.

10:00

He has to. Align his new

10:02

deal much more closely. With.

10:04

The poor with the working

10:07

class with ordinary Americans. And

10:09

that structures what many historians call

10:11

the second New Deal wasn't call

10:13

the second new Deal at the

10:15

time, but a set of pieces

10:17

of legislation much more oriented toward

10:19

ordinary working people. Helping

10:21

them. A version of Brian's

10:24

you start from the bottom and

10:26

you work prosperity. Through. To

10:28

the top. Rather, Than from the top

10:30

down and here are some of the signature

10:32

features of the new deal that will under.

10:35

Social. Security A Programmers Pensions

10:37

for the. Elderly

10:39

National Labor Relations Act Leveling

10:41

the feel between employers and

10:43

unions, obligating employers with federal

10:45

enforcement to bargain with them

10:47

collectively. A Very Progressive Wealth

10:49

Tax Act seventy five percent

10:52

on the highest wage earners

10:54

in the United States A

10:56

massive Jobs Program Works Progress

10:58

Administration. Five. Million jobs

11:00

created directly by the Federal government.

11:02

You are men employed by the

11:04

the Federal government. It's a decisive

11:07

turn. To. The last

11:09

of the political spectrum. And.

11:11

It firmly puts the new deal

11:13

on the side of the poor.

11:16

The. Working class and to certain extent

11:18

the middling orders of American society.

11:20

And this turn on Roosevelt's part

11:23

is what. Excites the voting public

11:25

and leads to is landslide victory nineteen

11:27

Thirty Six. If he had not turned

11:29

in this direction, I think the results

11:31

in Nineteen Thirty Six would have been

11:33

quite. Different. So he

11:35

is reading the political situation

11:38

clearly, intelligently, strategically, and he

11:40

makes. The. Right Call. Not

11:42

because he suddenly himself has

11:44

become a socialist or social

11:46

democrat. Even though the programs.

11:49

He's encouraging bring America a version of

11:51

social democracy. He feels he has to

11:53

turn in this direction in order to

11:55

survive politically. As he said last

11:58

time, thereby he bridge the gap. Had

12:00

opened up and seemed. In. Super Bowl

12:02

for the Democratic Party.

12:05

Between that rural, agrarian

12:07

southern tradition and. Working.

12:09

Men and now women in the cities

12:11

in the knows. He wins everywhere. not

12:14

quite everywhere, but almost everywhere He wins

12:16

in the South, he was in the

12:18

North. He wins in the Midwest. He

12:20

wins in the West for the first

12:22

time in it's history. Democratic.

12:25

Party which after all is the

12:27

party not just of the South

12:29

but the Confederate South and a

12:31

sense. Wins.

12:34

A significant number of black voters

12:36

to it side. So this is

12:38

just the beginnings of what is

12:40

going to be the extraordinary dramatic.

12:42

Upside Down slip of American Politics I

12:45

that over the course of the twentieth

12:47

century, the electoral math looks the same,

12:49

but with all the colors reversed to

12:51

states for them. Red States Red states

12:53

become blue states. But it's just the

12:55

beginning of that because. He.

12:57

Is still strongest in the south. And

13:00

the South is still Jim

13:03

crow Dixie South. He still

13:05

needs the support of Southern

13:07

legislators to get his program

13:09

through Congress. There was a.

13:11

Real question. And. Nineteen Thirty

13:13

two days that he three not whether. The.

13:16

United States would collapse into revolution?

13:18

That where is possible but whether

13:20

would collapse into dictatorship? Was it

13:22

going to be possible for an

13:24

elected president to. Overcome

13:26

this depression without resorting to some

13:28

measures that in Europe had taken

13:31

hold people and see miscellany they'd

13:33

seen. Beginnings of

13:35

the Hitler era and there was a

13:37

thought that America, this is the what

13:39

direction of traveling the world stall him

13:41

with his five year plans. The world

13:43

is heading to the good Ship Democracies

13:46

had its time and Roosevelt was determined

13:48

not to be a dictator. But that

13:50

meant he had to get this stuff

13:52

through Congress. He couldn't do it by

13:54

exact back since Congress meant winning the

13:56

votes. Of. The south. so

13:59

given that there's a new divide here in a way,

14:01

you might say, here's a party that is starting to pick

14:03

up black votes, particularly in

14:05

the North, in the South, black voters weren't

14:07

allowed to vote. It

14:10

could be shifting to becoming a different kind of

14:12

party. And yet here's a president who, if he's

14:14

not going to be a dictator, needs

14:16

the representatives of the racist South that

14:19

was denying black voters the vote to

14:21

vote for him in Congress. So maybe we've conquered

14:24

the rural agrarian divide, but we've got a new

14:26

race divide opening up in this party. Yes,

14:29

absolutely. The Republican

14:31

Party was the party of Lincoln.

14:33

It was a party of emancipation. It

14:35

was a party that ended slavery. It

14:38

was a party of African Americans

14:40

within, for a few people,

14:42

living memory. Yes, there are still

14:44

African Americans alive in the 30s who

14:47

had been enslaved as

14:50

children in the American South.

14:52

And it's also interesting to note that one

14:55

of the public works programs of the New Deal

14:57

records interviews with many of these people, which

15:00

are available for listening courtesy of the Library

15:03

of Congress and has become an

15:05

incredibly important source for reconstructing the

15:09

life of the enslaved before the Civil

15:11

War, made possible by the New

15:13

Deal. That's an aside. In

15:16

1932, the results of the election

15:18

still indicate very strong black support

15:20

for the Republican Party. And

15:23

that changes significantly between 1932 and 1936. And

15:27

the way in which some people described it,

15:29

turning the portrait of Lincoln to the wall

15:31

in many black homes, there was a portrait

15:33

of Lincoln hanging up. Before

15:35

you could vote for Roosevelt, you had to pay your

15:38

respects to Lincoln. And so

15:40

don't vote for Roosevelt when he's looking at

15:42

you, turn the picture around. What

15:45

makes this so interesting is that Roosevelt was

15:47

not going to act on

15:49

civil rights legislation. He was not going

15:51

to end Jim Crow, America's system of

15:54

apartheid. He was not going

15:56

to enact a federal anti-lynching law, something

15:59

that African Americans... Guns desperately wanted

16:01

because munching was a form

16:03

of terror deployed with regularity

16:05

still the air, the clan,

16:07

and the south. Roosevelt.

16:10

Is not going to do that. Not because

16:12

he's not sympathetic. To these

16:15

concerns and his wife, Eleanor Roosevelt

16:17

is a tremendous supporter of racial

16:19

equality in the United States, but

16:22

he he says. If

16:24

I'm going to have any chance

16:26

of getting my legislative package through.

16:29

I. Need the support of white senators

16:31

and congressmen. Because. The

16:33

Democratic Party was the only functioning. Party

16:36

in the South. There. Was

16:38

no serious opposition and that meant

16:40

that senators and congressmen from the

16:42

South month selected tend to get

16:44

reelected. And reelected and reelected and

16:47

Congress work on seniority system And so

16:49

the heads of most of the major

16:51

committees in the Senate and the House.

16:53

Where. In the hands of white Southerners. Now

16:56

they had. Progressive. Elements to

16:58

their politics: A are in some

17:00

respects the heirs of the populists.

17:03

William. Jennings Bryan. Andrew. Jackson

17:05

they are willing to go along

17:07

with. Roosevelt. Ambitious projects

17:10

for reconstructing political economy. With.

17:13

One proviso. That. Roosevelt

17:15

will do nothing to interfere. With.

17:18

The grey hierarchies of the south.

17:21

He will not lift a finger.

17:24

To interfere. With.

17:26

Jim Crow. He's

17:28

been. Deeply. Criticized for this

17:30

position. but it's also the case that

17:32

if he had become a strong advocate

17:35

for racial equality, much of the New

17:37

Deal. Would have been. Doomed.

17:40

The. Historian Our cats Nelson has talked

17:42

about this southern white power forming

17:44

an iron cage that in case

17:46

the new deal. So.

17:49

While the new deal was very progressive

17:51

in so many ways, it did. Markedly.

17:54

Little to ameliorate the conditions

17:56

of African Americans. In.

17:58

The South. So the question. Dwyer African Americans

18:00

turning to the Party of Jackson and Jefferson

18:03

where they turn to the Jackson Jefferson Dinners

18:05

every year during the New Deal. This is

18:07

the high moment of the Democratic party. Why

18:09

are they turning to the Party of The

18:11

and Slavers. They. Are doing so through

18:13

a set of economic calculations. They.

18:16

Believe in the New Deal programs. They

18:18

believe, especially in Nineteen Thirty Four Thirty

18:20

Five that the programs being put in

18:22

place. Will benefit

18:24

blacks economically That the opportunity to

18:26

join unions, the opportunity to get

18:28

certain benefits will benefit them economically

18:30

so that even though they're not

18:32

getting racial justice. They.

18:35

Are increasing their economic opportunity.

18:37

So this marks. The. Beginning

18:40

of. Democratic. Party's

18:42

ability to convince not just. White.

18:44

Americans, But. Americans

18:46

have. Multiple. Races.

18:50

That it is the party. Of

18:52

the people, it is an incipient

18:54

form. The origins

18:56

of the Modern Democratic Party, which

18:58

defines itself not just in terms

19:00

of economic opportunity for the poor

19:02

and middling orders. But.

19:05

As. An institution

19:07

that pushes forward the rights

19:10

for all Americans regardless of

19:12

race. This is the moment

19:14

when. That. New Democratic

19:16

Party begins to be formed, but

19:18

it's important to recognize that only

19:21

exists. In.

19:23

An incipient form. It

19:25

is not yet a force to be reckoned with.

19:30

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20:31

feature of this election, and I'm not sure if this is

20:33

a general rule, it may not be a rule at all,

20:36

but there are certain elections, presidential

20:38

elections, where the result is

20:40

a foregone conclusion.

20:43

And I think this was one. There

20:46

was no way that a Republican candidate was going

20:48

to win this election past a certain point. You

20:51

can always hope, right? And there have

20:53

been others. For instance, later on, Lyndon

20:55

Johnson against Barry Goldwater in 1964. When

20:58

elections are really close, it

21:00

constrains the candidates in what they can

21:03

say, and it constrains the platforms. People

21:05

become very, very risk-averse in close elections,

21:07

because you lose 10,000 votes in Michigan,

21:09

you might lose the country. So don't

21:11

say anything that might frighten people. When

21:14

the election is not

21:16

close, it frees candidates, parties,

21:18

platforms up to

21:21

be a bit more ambitious in articulating a vision.

21:23

It was true of Goldwater, I think, in 1964,

21:25

and indeed Lyndon Johnson. And in a way, it's

21:27

true of this election too. One

21:30

distinctive feature of this election is that it

21:32

was quite philosophical, in the sense that an

21:34

argument was joined between the two sides, which

21:36

was not true in 1932, about

21:40

the nature of freedom. Roosevelt

21:43

articulated it, and the Republicans tried to articulate

21:45

it too. So they tried to explicitly

21:48

come up with an argument against the

21:51

New Deal, couched in the language of

21:53

economic freedom. And that is freedom

21:56

of the market from state

21:58

control, with an awareness. that

22:00

some of the things that Roosevelt was doing, economic

22:03

planning, could be couched as

22:05

one or two steps away from what Stalin

22:08

was doing, economic planning,

22:10

and that it's a slippery slope. And the slippery

22:12

slope arguments were going to become all the vogue

22:15

for those on the libertarian edge

22:17

of politics. The economist Friedrich

22:19

Hayek was going to become the champion of this

22:21

way of thinking. Landon

22:24

started to talk about what was wrong

22:26

with the New Deal by saying, I

22:28

quote, the price of economic planning is

22:30

economic freedom. So these two things oppose

22:32

each other. The more the government does

22:35

to control the economy,

22:37

industry, the labor market, free

22:40

bargaining, all of those things we talked about last

22:42

time that the Supreme Court was

22:44

defending and most of the political spectrum

22:46

was starting to oppose. Republicans

22:49

were coming back to that position. We

22:51

are going to stand up for individual

22:53

freedom against different kinds of

22:55

collectivism, which helps

22:59

push Roosevelt to articulate the

23:01

counter view, which is you

23:03

cannot simply define economic freedom

23:06

in terms of the absence

23:08

of government constraint or government

23:10

interference. Economic

23:12

freedom means something more than that. And it

23:14

starts to sound like an argument between what

23:17

were later, thanks to the

23:19

philosopher Isaiah Berlin, to come to

23:21

be known as the proponents of negative

23:23

liberty. That would be the Republican position

23:25

here and positive liberty, which

23:28

is something more than the absence of

23:30

constraint. Positive liberty means the

23:33

capacity to do things, not the

23:35

absence of things preventing you but

23:38

a positive capacity. And

23:41

Roosevelt, doesn't he start to articulate that? It's

23:43

completely different from 32 in that respect.

23:47

He does, and dare I say,

23:49

he anticipates Isaiah Berlin.

23:52

And here are some words from Roosevelt from

23:55

his acceptance

23:57

of the nomination in 9-1-1. 1936.

24:01

That very word freedom

24:03

in itself and of necessity suggests

24:06

freedom from some restraining

24:09

power. This is

24:11

freedom in its traditional sense. This is

24:13

liberalism in its classical sense. You free

24:15

the individual from constraining forces

24:18

in their lives. And

24:20

this idea of liberalism is deeply

24:22

embedded in the American revolutionary moment

24:25

of the 18th century and deeply embedded

24:27

as well in the Constitution of the

24:30

United States. Later in the

24:32

same speech, Roosevelt feels

24:34

compelled to offer

24:36

a different definition of freedom. He

24:39

says, an old English judge once

24:41

said, necessity's men

24:43

are not free men. Liberty

24:46

requires opportunity to make a living,

24:49

a living decent according to the standard of the time,

24:51

a living which gives man

24:53

not only enough to live by, but

24:56

something to live for. These

24:59

are my words now. Who is going to give

25:03

that necessities man something

25:06

to live for? It's going to

25:08

be the government. The

25:10

government is going to lift men and women out

25:13

of circumstances of necessity and

25:16

give them something to live for. Provide them

25:18

with education, provide them with a

25:20

minimum wage, provide them with an old age pension,

25:24

provide them with power at the workplace

25:26

so they can improve the circumstances of

25:28

their labor. Government is

25:30

required in Roosevelt's telling

25:33

to enable men and women

25:36

to be free. This is an articulation

25:38

of the concept of positive

25:40

liberty. You cannot be free. You

25:42

cannot have liberty unless

25:45

certain requirements of life have

25:48

been secured. This

25:50

becomes the philosophical foundation for

25:52

the New Deal. It

25:55

enables Roosevelt to execute

25:57

what I consider to be one of the

25:59

great terminological heists in

26:02

political history in the modern era. And

26:04

that is, he takes the word liberalism, which

26:07

had been defined in classical terms as freedom

26:10

from overbearing government,

26:12

and he imbues liberalism with his

26:15

message of positive

26:17

liberty. The United

26:19

States will not have liberalism unless

26:22

it has a strong government that

26:24

positions people to be free.

26:27

And that becomes what liberalism in America is.

26:30

Adamus To the confusion of

26:32

Europeans, who often are baffled by

26:34

the idea that liberal means, for

26:37

want of a better phrase, left-wing. Paul

26:39

Understandable bafflement of

26:41

Europeans. What Roosevelt has engaged in is

26:43

what in Europe would be called a

26:45

form of social democracy. It's not as

26:47

fully developed in America as in Europe,

26:50

but it's following similar

26:53

principles. And liberalism

26:56

in America becomes a kind of synonym

26:59

for social democracy. It's putting people in

27:01

a position to enjoy

27:04

and make the most of their freedom.

27:06

And for that, a strong federal

27:09

state looking after both the individual

27:11

and common good becomes

27:15

absolutely essential. And that is what is at

27:17

the heart of the New Deal. Adamus

27:19

I want to give you one counterfactual here. This

27:22

was not an election where third parties

27:24

played a major role. And

27:26

those populist currents

27:29

that we've been talking about, most of them

27:31

were swept up by Roosevelt and what he

27:33

did. And there was a streak

27:35

of populism too, a form of populism in some

27:37

of the opposition to the New Deal, particularly when

27:40

it was anchored in various kinds of racist

27:43

ideas. And there was a lot of conspiracy

27:45

theorizing going on here on the right as

27:47

well as the left. This is the era

27:49

of mass communication through radio. Roosevelt mastered it,

27:52

but so did Father Cokland, the conspiracy

27:55

theory monger, suspicion of

27:57

government of the New Deal, of the...

27:59

The kind of people who were

28:02

putting this together, including among others,

28:04

Jews, were still rife in America.

28:06

So it's not like populism

28:09

has gone away or Roosevelt has neutralized

28:11

it. But there was

28:13

a significant figure in American politics

28:15

who might have played a role in this

28:17

election if he hadn't been assassinated a year

28:19

earlier. Huey Long from

28:21

Louisiana, one of those fascinating, terrifying

28:24

figures for the American politics, throws

28:26

up from time to time. He was

28:28

a populist for sure. He

28:30

was absolutely a man of the

28:33

South. But he was

28:36

contemplating a run for president, initially

28:39

maybe a quixotic attempt to seize the

28:41

democratic nomination, but then use that as

28:43

a platform to launch a third party

28:45

bid. And to position himself against

28:48

Roosevelt, I think,

28:51

as a more explicitly racist candidate,

28:53

but at the same time a champion

28:55

of the white poor,

28:58

the Southern white poor. And

29:00

he advocated some policies that went a lot

29:02

further than Roosevelt. Part of his

29:04

program was called the Share Our Wealth program,

29:06

and it was just straightforwardly redistributive.

29:10

One of its platforms was, we will just

29:12

give everyone automatically, as

29:14

long as they're white, a

29:16

basic wage. It was universal

29:19

basic income. Many

29:21

decades before that became a fashionable idea again.

29:25

I don't know whether Roosevelt saw

29:27

Long as a threat. I think there was some

29:29

anxiety in the Democratic Party about what this man

29:31

could do. The

29:33

counterfactual is, had he not been

29:35

assassinated, could this have been

29:38

different? So say there had been a third

29:40

party headed by Huey Long running

29:44

in the 36 election, coming

29:46

out of Louisiana based in the South,

29:49

offering really

29:51

populist messages, both on race

29:53

and also on redistribution. Could

29:56

it have undercut what Roosevelt was doing? I

30:00

don't think so, although I will

30:02

say the rival Roosevelt most feared

30:05

was Huey Long, not

30:08

Alf Landon or anyone in the Republican Party. He

30:12

understood that there was populist and labor thunder

30:14

on the left. I doubt

30:16

whether Huey Long would have started a

30:18

third party. He was so embedded in

30:20

the Democratic Party. So

30:22

I had trouble imagining him starting a

30:25

third party, and it would have been

30:27

very difficult, given Roosevelt's popularity, for

30:29

him to successfully challenge Roosevelt

30:32

from the nomination in 1936. The

30:36

only thing that could have allowed that

30:38

to happen is if Roosevelt had become

30:40

dogmatic, if he had insisted that the

30:42

policies of the early years

30:45

of the New Deal were the ones that he was going

30:47

to follow through with. Instead,

30:50

he pivots to the left, and he's

30:52

pivoting to the left so he can

30:54

steal Huey Long's thunder, so he can

30:56

steal the labor movement's thunder, so he

30:58

can steal the left thunder.

31:00

He clearly positions himself considerably further

31:03

to the left in 1935 than

31:05

he had ever been in his

31:07

previous 20 years of public

31:09

service. So

31:11

it's his experimental nature, his flexibility,

31:14

his shrewdness as a politician that

31:17

allows him to pivot

31:19

in this way and reclaim

31:22

what in 1935 was the

31:25

sweet spot in American politics. We

31:28

can contrast him with Hoover in

31:31

this regard, who

31:33

stands out in the 30s for

31:36

his inflexibility, for his dogmatism,

31:39

for responding to this

31:42

enormous economic crisis through certitude,

31:46

through frigidity, unable

31:48

to think improvisationally,

31:51

falling back on dogma.

31:55

Roosevelt was Hoover's opposite in that

31:57

regard. He was flexible, he was

31:59

experimental. He was often criticized for being

32:01

a waffler, moving in

32:04

different directions, not having core beliefs.

32:06

I don't share that view of

32:08

Roosevelt. But certainly flexibility,

32:10

adaptability, a recognition

32:13

of the unprecedented nature of this

32:16

crisis which required any skillful politician,

32:18

this was deeply in the thinking

32:20

of Roosevelt, to

32:22

be skillful at adaptation, moving in

32:25

different ideological directions. So

32:27

as to stay where the

32:29

center of political gravity was.

32:32

So I would say Huey Long quite

32:34

dramatically shifted political gravity to the left

32:36

on economic matters. Roosevelt

32:39

grasped that and tried to occupy the

32:41

space that Huey Long had found.

32:45

That contrast with Hoover, a man who

32:47

was president before Roosevelt, has always

32:49

struck me as a good illustration of one

32:52

of the illusions of democratic politics, which is

32:54

the thought that if you could get someone

32:56

from outside politics, someone who made

32:59

their name in business or in

33:02

Hoover's case both as an engineer, as a

33:04

businessman and also as an organizer, he organized

33:07

relief after the First World War. He's a

33:09

man of action, a pragmatist. You'll

33:11

get someone in office who will have

33:13

the flexibility, the pragmatism of

33:16

a kind of man of the world, someone who's

33:18

seen stuff outside of politics. Those people

33:20

often turn out to be the ones who

33:22

are like rabbits frozen in the headlights when

33:24

things go really badly. What

33:26

you want is an unscrupulous,

33:28

devious professional politician, even

33:30

one who has a clearly articulated

33:33

platform. Those are

33:35

the adaptable ones. I think

33:37

actually politics, including maybe American politics,

33:39

is littered with stories of

33:42

the outsider who's going to come in and work

33:44

this thing out from an outside

33:47

perspective, being paralyzed in Washington. It's

33:50

the career politicians. It's the insiders.

33:53

It's also the people who look like

33:55

they are politicians who will find it hard

33:57

to move because they are party men. who

34:00

are the flexible ones. I

34:03

think that is the definitive version of that

34:05

contrast. The great presidents

34:08

are the politicians. I would agree,

34:10

although the great politicians,

34:12

I would also say, have their

34:14

unscrupulousness tethered to some

34:17

core beliefs somewhere. And

34:19

I think Roosevelt had that tethering.

34:22

Hoover's a really interesting figure in this regard

34:24

because he was one of

34:26

the most accomplished men ever to hold

34:28

the presidency. Orphans in

34:30

Iowa, raised by foster

34:33

parents, got into Stanford, became

34:35

a mining engineer, headed up

34:37

mining ventures all over the world for

34:40

ten or fifteen years, organized

34:42

mass exodus of Americans

34:44

in London in

34:46

1914 when the war broke

34:49

out, get them back to America,

34:51

organized this extraordinary relief

34:53

project to save the European masses

34:55

from famine as a consequence of

34:57

World War I, full

34:59

of ideas as Secretary of Commerce,

35:02

imaginative in various ways as President,

35:04

1928 to 1932. What he had

35:06

never encountered

35:09

was a crisis of the

35:12

magnitude of the Great Depression, and he

35:14

became much more dogmatic as a result of that.

35:16

Part of it is that the

35:18

skills of private life are not automatically

35:20

transferable to public life. But

35:23

it's also the case that we don't

35:25

know how individuals are going to react to

35:28

an enormous crisis until the crisis hits.

35:31

And the Hoover of the

35:33

1930s is almost unrecognizable relative

35:36

to the Hoover of the 1920s or 19 teens.

35:40

He becomes dogmatic. He can't think

35:42

creatively. He's just

35:45

furious at Roosevelt for his apparent lack

35:47

of principles. He thinks

35:49

he's put America on the road to

35:51

dictatorship. He becomes

35:54

one of the most reviled figures in

35:57

American life in the 1930s. And unlike But

36:00

other presidents who were very unpopular during

36:02

their term in office and are later

36:05

able to escape a certain ignominy, George

36:07

W. Bush, is one of them. Hoover

36:10

never escapes. That's

36:12

what he's known for. Cold-hearted man,

36:16

unequal to the task that America

36:19

put in front of him. Adamus

36:21

After Roosevelt had won in 1936, there's another

36:25

irony here, which is this

36:27

is the election that he ran on

36:29

an explicit New Deal platform. Vote

36:31

for me and this is what you'll get more of this. Unlike

36:34

in 1932, where he had run on a

36:36

much more cautious hedged platform,

36:38

but then all guns blazing as soon

36:40

as he was in office. From

36:44

his reelection and from 1937

36:47

onwards, though he has this massive

36:50

landslide for this program,

36:53

it becomes much harder for him to get anything

36:55

done. And this is partly because he

36:57

has moved by this point to the left. Some

37:00

conservative Democrats in his own

37:02

party in Congress began

37:06

to make alliance with Republicans to

37:08

block what they saw as the more

37:10

extreme versions of what the New Deal

37:13

came to entail. So legislatively, it

37:15

became harder and harder to get this done. The

37:18

big barrier in the way of this kind of

37:20

political program, the Supreme Court, remained

37:23

there. He had, in his

37:25

frustration, suggested that what he

37:27

wanted to do was reform,

37:30

that means in the language of the

37:32

time, pack the Supreme Court with sympathetic

37:34

justices because there was no way round

37:36

it over it, under it. And

37:39

he failed in that. That turned out to be,

37:41

I think in the view of

37:43

most historians, a political step too far. The

37:46

second term for Roosevelt was much

37:48

more frustrating than the first

37:50

term. And historians, I think, disagree

37:52

about this, the extent to which actually there

37:55

was some hubris involved here. Some

37:58

of this was Roosevelt's own fault, including the

38:00

Supreme Court packing plan. And

38:03

there was relative failure compared to what he

38:05

achieved, particularly 34-35.

38:09

Do you think there's hubris here? Let's

38:11

take the Supreme Court packing example.

38:14

Did he overreach? No,

38:17

I don't think he overreached. The

38:19

two major reforms of

38:21

1935, the National Labor Relations

38:23

Act, giving labor power, backing

38:26

it up with federal authority, the

38:29

Social Security Act, giving

38:31

pensions to elderly Americans, were

38:33

not clearly constitutional according to the way

38:35

in which the Constitution was being

38:38

interpreted. And he faced the

38:40

very real possibility that the Supreme Court

38:42

was going to declare both measures unconstitutional.

38:44

And things were coming to a head

38:48

in 1937, so

38:50

in the first year of his second

38:53

term. And this

38:55

is when he announces the court packing plan

38:58

for every justice 70 or

39:00

above. They obviously can't handle the workload, so

39:03

I'm going to appoint another justice for

39:06

every person on the court who's 70 or more. And

39:08

that was quite a lot of justices at

39:10

that point. That does enrage the public

39:12

or significant parts of the public, but

39:14

it's not the end of the story.

39:16

The United Auto Workers, one of the

39:18

most powerful and progressive American unions, occupies

39:21

several plants of General Motors, the most

39:23

powerful corporation in the world at that

39:26

point in time for

39:28

six weeks. Workers are

39:30

occupying the factories, preventing

39:33

production. Historically,

39:35

when that had happened in the past, either

39:37

the governor of the state in question, in

39:39

this case Michigan, or

39:42

the president of the United States had sent in

39:44

troops to evict the strikers, break the strikes, protect

39:47

corporate property. Roosevelt refuses

39:49

to send in the troops. Governor

39:51

Murphy of Michigan refuses to send

39:53

in the troops. And that

39:55

inclines General Motors to think we no longer

39:57

have the backing of the federal government, perhaps.

40:00

we do in fact need to compromise with

40:02

our workers and grant them certain

40:04

rights that they have been promised and guaranteed

40:06

by the National Labor Relations Act. This

40:09

is going on just as the

40:12

Supreme Court is deciding the

40:14

constitutionality of the Wagner Act

40:17

and of Social Security. Both those

40:19

decisions come in March 1937. At

40:22

the last moment, one justice who had

40:24

been opposed to sanctioning the

40:27

constitutionality of those two acts switches

40:30

his vote, giving Roosevelt a

40:32

5-4 majority, declaring these two

40:35

critical pieces of legislation constitutional.

40:39

If we imagine no sit-down

40:41

strike in General Motors for

40:44

six weeks and the country

40:46

being on edge and

40:48

facing the possibility of extreme action if

40:51

these core principles or programs

40:53

of the New Deal were not endorsed

40:55

by the Supreme Court. This is a

40:57

fraught time in America. This is

41:00

another near revolutionary moment.

41:02

The justices have this matter on their

41:05

minds. This was a

41:07

moment, I think, for Roosevelt to be aggressive

41:09

with the court and to put additional pressure on

41:12

them. Additional pressure being that he was

41:14

going to pack the Supreme Court with

41:16

additional justices that they didn't come through on

41:20

these crucial matters. I think the combination

41:22

of the militancy of the labor movement

41:25

and the threat from Roosevelt gets at least

41:27

one justice to change his mind. Owen

41:29

Roberts was the justice who

41:32

changed his mind. They only

41:34

needed one 5-4 decision. The

41:37

New Deal is declared constitutional in

41:40

March 1937. It

41:43

is true that because of the furor

41:46

about Roosevelt's court packing plan that it

41:48

made it much more difficult for

41:51

him to get any other program through Congress from 1937 to

41:56

In that very real sense, It

41:58

stalled the New Deal. On. The

42:00

other hand, he got crucial constitutional

42:03

sanctions for tube is most important

42:05

reforms, And more importantly, it seemed

42:07

to break the will of what

42:09

had been a conservative. Court.

42:11

And a constantly oppose progressive

42:14

movements. And. The populist era. And

42:17

progressive era and New Deal. Roseville.

42:20

Has eight appointments to the court

42:22

between nineteen Thirty Seven and Nineteen

42:24

Forty Three. And he literally is.

42:27

Able to. Remake.

42:29

The Court and a progressive direction.

42:31

This is gonna become the foundation

42:33

for the famous Warren Court liberal

42:35

Court of the Nineteen sixties. And

42:37

that court is. Deeply.

42:39

Deeply committed to authorizing

42:42

the Central state. To

42:44

enact a program of positive liberty

42:46

in the United States. So.

42:49

Even though Roosevelt was stymied in the

42:51

short term, he. Succeeds.

42:54

And institutionalizing his New

42:56

Deal program. For decades.

42:58

So. In that way I would say the

43:00

confrontation that occurs. And. Thirty

43:03

Six Thirty Seven. In

43:05

the long term. Breaks.

43:08

In his favor. Finally, as

43:10

he said legislatively, between ninety

43:12

those seven and nineteen forty,

43:14

he was. Blocked. Not entirely,

43:17

but it was much harder to

43:19

get legislation through Congress. Of.

43:21

Course, what changes in Nineteen Forty is

43:23

not only reelection by Nineteen Forty, the

43:26

world is at war again and before

43:28

long and Roosevelt's third time, United States

43:30

will be at war. And this will

43:32

be a war of a kind that

43:34

America has never fought before. So in

43:36

the First World War, America was a

43:39

participant. A late participants, it required a

43:41

national effort. An. Army More or

43:43

less had to be created and shipped overseas.

43:46

Liberty. Bonds had to be sold.

43:48

government financing changed did a lot

43:50

to change the country. Nothing

43:53

on the scale. Of. The Second

43:55

World War, which was a total

43:57

war and required government action. To

44:01

an extent that would have been unimaginable in any

44:03

version of the new deal. Government.

44:06

Spending. Government. Deficit

44:08

financing, Levels of taxation, Control of

44:10

the economy of the labor Market

44:12

of pricing Everything and not just

44:15

in the United States have the

44:17

confidence. The major competence in the

44:19

second audible Britain under Churchill was

44:21

nonetheless not that different from a

44:23

country that might have been under

44:25

a socialist prime minister. The.

44:28

New deal goes through. Three

44:31

phases will my say? The.

44:33

First term. From.

44:35

Almost nothing. something remarkable

44:38

happened the second term.

44:40

frustration. Counterintuitive.

44:43

Outcomes of what might or might not

44:45

have been overeat. And then.

44:48

The War phase. Where. It

44:50

becomes something. That

44:52

would have been unimaginable a decade before. This

44:55

isn't really a counterfactual good ending as

44:57

a version of history way. Say what

44:59

is the Second World War hadn't happened,

45:01

but it is ultimately war and itself

45:03

and true in. The. History

45:05

of democracies. It is war.

45:08

With. All of it's consequences

45:10

that allows for. A

45:13

transformation of the relationship

45:15

between government and the

45:17

citizenry. And in this

45:19

case, it was the war that

45:22

created the foundations of what came

45:24

in the late forties and fifties

45:26

and sixties through to the seventies

45:28

when something else happened. It's

45:32

new deal plus war that gives you.

45:34

The. Legacy of Results Presidencies Net You

45:36

can't do it without was. Mostly

45:39

agree with you. I would put it

45:41

a little differently. I don't think war

45:43

creates the foundation for. The. Postwar

45:45

political economy in the United States,

45:48

but it does secure the foundations

45:50

of that economy, which had been.

45:53

Played. In the nineteen thirties.

45:56

If. Roosevelt's actions. And Thirty

45:58

six And Thirty seven. Save.

46:01

New Deal Constitutionally. The.

46:05

War one could argue. Saves.

46:07

The New Deal and political economic terms.

46:10

That has to be pointed out that. The.

46:13

New deal did not affect. Robust.

46:15

Economic recovery. In the

46:18

nineteen thirties, there are moments of

46:20

recovery that it proved to be

46:22

temporary. Nineteen Thirty Four, Nineteen Thirty

46:24

Six, Thirty seven. Part.

46:26

Of the problem. That Roosevelt

46:28

was facing his his unwillingness

46:30

to embrace. Keynesian.

46:33

Economics. Fully

46:35

his second new deal with Thirty

46:37

five. Thirty Six is a form

46:39

of vernacular. Keynesian. As and

46:41

when the economy is depressed. You

46:44

spend money. This is

46:46

counterintuitive and very hard for rulers at this

46:48

time to understand because you're operating on the

46:50

principal, the household. If you lose your job,

46:52

things are bad. You. Kind your belt,

46:55

And. Keynes is arguing something profoundly counterintuitive. Know

46:57

you loosen your belt. This is the

46:59

moment for government to spend, to inject

47:01

money into the economy, to stimulate demand,

47:03

to put the economy on the road

47:05

to recovery. And then you tighten your

47:07

belt. During periods of prosperity, Roosevelt and

47:09

his New Deal as are doing this,

47:11

and Thirty Six. I don't think they

47:13

have read Keynes at this point, but

47:15

it's that's why I'm calling A in

47:17

the vernacular, But they're nervous about this,

47:19

are not comfortable, and as soon as

47:21

the economy begins to sell, recovering a

47:23

time too soon and they plans. America

47:26

into depression again and what

47:28

freeze them from that intuitive

47:30

way of thinking? Or

47:33

the imperatives of total war. And

47:35

so what war brings to America

47:37

is a full fledged implementation of

47:40

Keynesian principles and a level of

47:42

that the frankly would have been

47:44

unimaginable employees type would have been

47:47

unimaginable and that opens up. A

47:50

new way of thinking economically

47:52

and freeze democratic policymakers from

47:54

the constraints that they have

47:56

an operating under during the

47:58

Thirty, so the thirties are

48:00

transitional time. Without.

48:03

The war and what the imperatives

48:05

of war had demanded. The.

48:08

Keynesian principles may never have been

48:10

fully implemented. In the United

48:12

States. So in that sense, the

48:14

war is absolutely crucial to the

48:17

long term survival of the New

48:19

Deal. It saves the political economy.

48:22

Of. A New Deal by realizing the

48:24

full instruments of governing the economy

48:26

that the New Deal had hit

48:28

upon in the Nineteen thirties, but

48:30

for a variety of reasons. Implemented

48:33

only unevenly Result never became

48:35

a dictator, but in the

48:37

end it was the other

48:39

dictators that liberated his form

48:41

of politics to it's full

48:43

potential. Yes, If

48:49

you'd like to sign up to our

48:51

new free fortnightly newsletter, just click on

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the length you'll find in the show

48:55

description for this episode. Our

48:57

current issue is about American elections

49:00

will also be ten you soon

49:02

face and get a bonus of

49:04

said in the series about the

49:07

amazing mind blowing election of Nineteen

49:09

Sixty Eight. Meanwhile

49:12

or next episode on Thursday is

49:14

about the election of Nineteen Eighty

49:17

saw Ronald Reagan arrive in the

49:19

White House. is seem to signal

49:21

the end of New Deal politics.

49:25

So what did come next?

49:28

This has been past present, future brought

49:30

to you in partnership with the London

49:32

Review of Books. A

49:49

cast Powers. He

49:57

didn't. Have enough.

50:00

but most importantly, ourselves. I'm Paige DeSorbo.

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