Philosopher David Enoch takes our ordinary ways of thinking about morality as providing significant support for the moral realist position. In his essay “Why I am an Objectivist About Ethics (and Why You Are Too)”, Enoch provides several related arguments for the claim that moral realism is true. 

Short of proving moral realism, Enoch’s arguments are designed to capture common presumptions we have about morality and the practice of morality in our lives. Indeed, he thinks that when we reflect on our moral disagreements with others, we commonly assume that there are truths that at least some time settle them. Moreover, when we deliberate about what to do morally, we again assume that there are at least sometimes correct solutions about what we should do. Finally, Enoch argues that morality appears resistant to counterfactual change, meaning that if we were different, hypothetically speaking, in even significant ways, what we take to be morally true would continue to remain so.  

I discuss Enoch’s arguments. We will see how he devised tests to help us see that we take in our common moral thinking—in our default moral thinking—realism to be true. If you are interested in this discussion, please listen. Thank you for listening!