0:03

What do vernal pools, psychedelics,

0:05

and spacetime have in common?

0:08

They're all featured on Scientific

0:10

American's new podcast, Science Quickly,

0:12

which quenches your curiosity in

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under 10 minutes. Find

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it wherever you get your

0:19

podcasts or head over to

0:21

scientificamerican.com/podcasts. Today

0:29

we've got Why We Should Question Everything, an interview

0:32

with Michael DelaRocca. It took place at our London

0:34

How the Light Gets in Festival in 2023. This

0:37

is the philosophy festival produced twice a year by the team

0:39

here at the IAI. So

0:42

Margarita, what did you think about this interview? I

0:44

thought it was a really good

0:46

interview. Michael DelaRocca has a really

0:48

interesting theory that builds on Spinoza

0:50

and really unpacks how language

0:53

is essentially a rollata, what

0:56

he defines as like an infinite

0:58

set of relations that describes reality.

1:01

It's quite innovative and I would say quite

1:03

radical. So a

1:05

great interview if you're interested

1:07

in Quine or Saussure or

1:10

indeed language. Great. Before

1:13

we hand over to Simon, don't forget to

1:15

subscribe, leave a review on your platform of

1:17

choice, and visit iai.tv

1:19

for hundreds more podcasts, videos, and

1:21

articles from the world's leading thinkers.

1:24

A lot of philosophers today really are

1:27

subservient to common sense and to our intuitions.

1:29

And those are different things perhaps, but for

1:31

our purposes they're pretty much the same that people

1:33

feel that we must respect common

1:36

sense beliefs, we must respect our intuitions,

1:39

and a philosophical system has to try

1:41

to accommodate intuitions as much as possible,

1:43

try to accommodate common sense as much

1:45

as possible. But I think that's kind

1:47

of really a bankrupt

1:49

methodology. I think that in terms of

1:51

how one should do philosophy, if one

1:53

is really being guided only by one's

1:56

intuitions or by common sense, then one

1:58

is not really doing it. doing one's

2:00

job as a philosopher because this is

2:02

the methodology of relying on intuitions or

2:05

common sense is inherently

2:07

conservative, I think. It's

2:09

also too much guided

2:12

by our psychology and

2:14

it's ultimately arbitrary. So I think it's really

2:16

not a great way to do philosophy. You

2:18

know, that may be true that we're guided

2:20

in our psychology, maybe our psychologists are

2:23

going to twist our perception

2:25

of reality. But ultimately, you want

2:28

to get at truth and philosophy wants to

2:30

get at truth. So is there a reason

2:32

to think that you've criticized this view for

2:35

being unduly conservative, but maybe the conservative tracks

2:37

the truth in a way that this sort

2:39

of radical methodology does not? Maybe

2:42

so, right? But I think that this kind of, we

2:45

don't know in advance what's going to track the

2:47

truth and we shouldn't close off, we shouldn't constrain

2:49

ourselves from the very beginning, which is methodology

2:52

of common sense relies upon. And so

2:54

really, I'm going to go against a lot of common

2:56

sense views and do so, I think, because

2:59

I think there's a good reason to do so.

3:01

I think that should be the methodology that philosophy

3:03

should be guided for, to follow the reasons where

3:05

they lead. And even if it goes, even those

3:07

reasons lead to a place that's far from common

3:09

sense. Philosophy is

3:12

nothing, if not has

3:14

potential to be radical. And I think that

3:16

that's a kind of a birthright for philosophy

3:19

that it should at least be open to

3:21

kinds of radical changes in views. I

3:24

think this is largely true of

3:26

contemporary and recent analytical philosophy. It's

3:28

really extremely conservative and it

3:30

really is going to

3:32

be too much guided by common sense and

3:35

never really will get to these kinds of

3:37

radical results, which at least should be a

3:39

possibility that should philosophers should not forswear at

3:41

the beginning. So, tell me more

3:43

about these radical results in the book you call it, this

3:45

sort of radical monism. Can you explain sort of

3:47

the view more in detail? So this kind of

3:49

radical monism is the view that there are no

3:52

distinctions. And that's what I mean by monism. There

3:54

are no distinctions. And

3:56

I get to that view because I think

3:58

that there is no... way

4:00

to explain relations

4:03

of distinction. In general,

4:05

for me, relations are not explicable.

4:09

And this comes out of an explanatory demand, which

4:11

I think is very natural. In

4:13

the case of relations, we do think,

4:15

I think, even the ordinary view of

4:18

my opponents is that relations

4:20

must be explained. Relations are explained

4:22

in terms of the things

4:24

that are related. Relations are grounded in their

4:26

elata. And so if there's going to

4:29

be a relation, it has to be explained

4:32

by it to be grounded

4:34

in its elata. And I use

4:37

that kind of explanation or demand to show that

4:40

those kinds of explanations themselves are

4:42

not forthcoming, that relations cannot be

4:44

explained. And so because it's an

4:46

explanatory demand, for relations to be

4:49

real, they must be explained. Because

4:51

they can't be explained, it turns

4:53

out that relations are not real.

4:55

And thus, in particular, relations of

4:57

distinction between one thing and another are

5:00

not real. And so we quickly get

5:02

to the view that there are no distinctions

5:04

at all. You draw

5:06

this link between there's an

5:09

explanatory demand and the relation needs to be explained for

5:11

it to be real. Why is that the case? Can

5:13

you tell me more about what's driving that? So

5:15

I think that what's in

5:18

general is behind that is a general

5:20

version of what philosophers call the principle

5:22

of sufficient reason. For each fact, there's

5:24

a sufficient reason for that fact. There's

5:26

an explanation for that fact. So there's

5:29

this explanatory demand in general holds. But

5:31

in order to generate this argument for

5:33

the lack of distinctions, I don't need

5:36

a full blown commitment to the principle

5:38

of sufficient reason. All

5:40

that I need is just the intuitive

5:42

claim that relations

5:44

must be grounded. Relations have to be

5:47

explained. Even if facts in general don't

5:49

have to be explained, relations have to

5:51

be explained. There cannot be, as I

5:53

put it, free floating relations. Relations are

5:55

just hovering there. They

5:58

have to be grounded in something. That makes

6:00

them real if they're going to be real at all Yeah,

6:02

and can we you know make this more more concrete and

6:05

give an example? So, you know a relation might be like

6:07

the friendship between you me, you know

6:09

And what about that is

6:11

on it? So you're saying the rest of friendship is

6:13

grounded by you and me right the

6:15

relation front doesn't exist in the abstract Yes,

6:19

so there's a relation in you and

6:21

me. Okay, you exist Let's

6:23

say assume I exist let's say and

6:25

there's a relation between us That

6:28

relation or that relational fact must

6:30

be grounded in you and me

6:33

But it's also in must be

6:35

explained in that way, but it also

6:37

must be explained in terms of the

6:41

Part another relation so that

6:43

this a relation between you and me

6:45

and it's grounded in the sense in

6:47

a grounding relation To you

6:49

and it stands in a grounding relation to

6:52

me So that relation between you and me

6:54

is grounded not only in you not only

6:56

in me but also in the relation of

6:59

grounding between you and the relation and that

7:01

relation is Itself in need of

7:03

being grounded and that's going to generate another

7:05

relation and so on so the being infinite

7:08

regressive relations Once you

7:10

try to explain any given relation So

7:12

that kind of regressive relations is what's

7:14

called Bradley's regress in some version and

7:17

I have another version of that

7:19

regressive in my book That

7:21

kind of infinite regressive relations is vicious

7:23

And so it precludes it from being

7:25

the case that that any given relations

7:28

is explained And

7:30

also they there's also can

7:32

be if you don't like the vicious

7:34

regress There's also vicious circularity here whenever

7:36

we get into business of trying to

7:38

explain relations We quickly get into these

7:40

regresses or these circles that undermine any

7:42

hope of explanation, right? so

7:45

so If we

7:47

really follow this view to where it leads it's

7:49

this really radical view where distinctions and differentiation are

7:51

Unreal and all that there is is just undifferentiated

7:53

being if we apply that to language It would

7:56

mean that these work the words that

7:58

were saying right don't have differentiated distinctions That's right.

8:01

How is it that we're able to communicate right now

8:03

and understand each other intelligently? We seem to be communicating

8:05

right now, right? And that's a

8:07

wonderful thing. But on

8:10

this view that meanings

8:13

are individuated, the typical view is

8:15

that there are distinct nuggets of

8:17

meaning in language and given each

8:19

word has his own chunk of

8:21

meaning, another word has his own

8:24

meaning, etc. And these are

8:26

distinct from one another. But

8:28

if relations in general are unintelligible,

8:31

then I apply this in the case of philosophy of language.

8:34

And so individuated meanings are

8:36

unintelligible as well, right?

8:38

So this comes up in a view of

8:40

the American philosopher, great philosopher, Quine

8:42

has his view, this kind of

8:44

radical holism, radical holist

8:47

view that according to him,

8:49

there are no determinant meanings.

8:53

No word has a determinant meaning all

8:55

its own, given the holism of meaning.

8:58

And I want to take that holism even more

9:00

generally and say there's no determinant

9:02

meanings. If there's going to be meaning

9:04

at all, meaning resides in

9:07

the whole of language, not

9:09

in any discrete individual linguistic

9:11

items. So I'm not denying

9:13

that there's meaning, but meaning is not

9:15

in individual words, rather meaning is in language

9:18

as a whole. This

9:20

says I'm not denying in terms of

9:24

the topic of being that there is being,

9:26

but what I'm denying is a distinction among

9:28

individual beings, just as I'm denying

9:30

in philosophy of language, a distinction between

9:32

the meanings of individual words. In

9:35

your own words, in the book, you say philosophy is

9:37

in the business of explaining things, right? And so it

9:39

seems like language does have distinct meanings. Isn't

9:42

that something that needs to be explained in the

9:44

view? This picture of

9:46

seeing language is undifferentiated. On

9:48

that view, it's hard to understand how

9:50

it is that we're having an intelligible conversation. Right.

9:53

So two things here. One is

9:55

that I think that, again, it does seem that we're

9:57

communicating in some sense with using it in the book.

10:00

individually meaning. But that's a

10:02

verdict of common sense and relying on the

10:04

method of intuitions there. So again, I began

10:06

by saying that I'm not going to be bound

10:08

by this method of common sense or method

10:10

of intuitions because it's far too conservative for

10:12

philosophy. So you're quite right in a way to

10:14

bring up the fact, hey, it seems that we're

10:16

communicating. That's just another intuition that you have.

10:19

And we have to question that and see

10:21

where it leads. And the other

10:23

thing to mention here is that my view is

10:25

ultimately going to be a skeptical view. I'm

10:27

denying the coherence of the

10:29

concept of individually meaning. I'm denying the

10:32

coherence of the concept of distinction. So these

10:34

are ordinary concepts to which are very much

10:36

committed. But this is a skeptical view that

10:38

I'm promoting here in this vein. And I

10:40

just can answer to what extent is there

10:43

really a skepticism about philosophy or

10:45

the possibility of doing philosophy rather than a

10:48

positive metaphysical conclusion about reality, sort of oneness

10:50

or wholeness. On the one hand, you say

10:52

philosophers are obligated to try to explain everything.

10:54

But again, you're also saying that this view

10:56

type in some sense, that explanation sort of

10:59

doesn't really work in the end. So Michael,

11:01

is philosophy impossible? Well, it's

11:03

a great question. And it's

11:05

my job. I get money to behave

11:07

to be a philosopher. But I maybe

11:10

floss myself out of business here if

11:13

philosophy is not possible. And I think the

11:16

question, the skepticism here, is the skepticism about

11:18

the possibility of doing philosophy. To

11:20

the extent that philosophy depends

11:22

upon relations of distinction, which

11:25

are unintelligible, it may not be possible

11:28

to do philosophy. So that's a view that

11:30

I think we always have to keep

11:33

that possibility alive here, because it may

11:35

not be possible to do philosophy in

11:37

the terms in which we ordinarily think

11:39

it can be done, if that presupposes

11:41

distinctions, if that presupposes individuated

11:44

nuggets of meaning which are

11:46

unintelligible. Right. And so going

11:48

forward, we've been

11:51

talking a lot about the nature of

11:53

reality and metaphysics and sort of basic

11:55

ontology. But just switching gears here to

11:57

seeing how the view applies to ethics and morality.

12:00

It really seems like you

12:03

need differentiating meaning to make sense of

12:05

that. There's a difference between right

12:07

and wrong in between you and me and

12:10

in different ethical or

12:12

moral agents. So

12:14

how does the view work from reality ethics? It seems

12:16

like it just self-under money on its face. This

12:20

is a great challenge. And this is why in

12:22

the book, the Permitating

12:24

the Sandbook, I didn't directly

12:26

discuss topics of ethics because I knew that would

12:28

be the most controversial part of it. And that's

12:30

what I'm working on now to try to extend

12:32

the view into ethics. So what are the implications

12:34

for my radical monist view?

12:36

There are no distinctions for ethics. I

12:39

think the implications are

12:41

considerable. If there's a normative, non-normative

12:43

distinction, which is really what most

12:45

of moral philosophy depends on, I'm

12:48

rejecting the normative, non-normative distinction. It

12:51

doesn't mean that I'm rejecting a notion of

12:53

goodness. I'm rejecting all

12:55

kinds of notions, moral notions that

12:57

involve negativity or relations. If

12:59

there's a non-relational notion of goodness,

13:02

that can be maintained. What

13:04

cannot be maintained is the ordinary structure

13:08

of defining Kantian moral philosophy and other

13:10

forms of moral philosophy, structure of duties

13:13

and obligations and rights. All those things

13:15

ultimately don't make sense because rights and

13:17

duties and obligations are all specified in

13:19

terms of what one must not do.

13:22

And so presupposes distinctions, and that cannot

13:25

be made intelligible. But there can

13:27

be a purely positive notion of goodness.

13:30

That is what remains. And that can be what

13:35

remains of an ethical philosophy on this

13:37

view, according to which there is no

13:39

normative, non-normative distinction. Right. So

13:42

many philosophers nowadays, to make this

13:44

even more concrete, especially working in

13:47

metaphysics and analytic tradition, don't

13:50

see any implications for the researcher, for how they

13:52

live their lives. Is this a mistake that portrays

13:54

philosophy's origins in its love of wisdom? And are

13:56

there any lessons drawn from your own research that

13:58

inform how you live your This is

14:00

a question I get a lot because I

14:03

started out as a philosopher for many

14:05

years just doing things in my ivory

14:07

tower way in studying history of philosophy

14:09

and I love history of philosophy, I

14:11

still do history of philosophy, but doing

14:13

pure metaphysics with our regard to one's

14:15

life. But once I

14:18

started applying these kinds of radical,

14:20

rationalist arguments to lead to harmonious

14:22

conclusion, I saw that these

14:25

views did have applications for how one lives one's

14:28

life, especially now that I'm going into

14:30

moral implications of the view. So

14:32

yes, I think philosophy's calling and

14:34

its origins is based

14:36

on the question, how should one live one's life? And

14:39

that I think is something that these

14:41

kinds of metaphysical views, leading to undermining

14:44

of distinctions, can

14:46

have implications for how one lives one's

14:48

life because one has to embrace the

14:50

goodness, as it were, and deny negativity.

14:54

Ultimately, do you think morality is more important than metaphysics

14:56

in the end of the I think

14:58

there's no difference between morality and metaphysics. That's

15:02

what it has to be. There's no difference in

15:04

morality and metaphysics. So I think that philosophers who

15:06

tried to work just in metaphysics and not doing

15:08

moral philosophy, that's sort of just

15:10

a misguided point of view. Right.

15:12

In the end of the day, this view is you

15:15

have this nonrelational notion of being and goodness is a

15:17

part of that. So it really, we're

15:19

getting into sort of mystical territory. Do

15:22

you see yourself in that sort of mystical tradition that

15:25

begins with poor menities? I've made my piece

15:27

with that. Yes. I

15:30

used to resist the label of mysticism. But I'll

15:33

tell you a story. I gave a talk once and loved

15:36

these radical views. And someone came up to

15:38

me once and said, how does

15:40

your view differ from mysticism? And

15:42

I said, it doesn't. And I think

15:44

that I think that's not now I've embraced it. And

15:46

I think one of the things that's really interesting is

15:48

that I started out, I am

15:51

a rationalist, committed to

15:53

the principle of sufficient reason. Everything has

15:55

an explanation. But if you

15:57

take that principle of sufficient extreme, I think

15:59

you wind up in a territory

16:01

that's mystical territory. And you might think

16:03

that mysticism is incompatible with the principle

16:05

of sufficient reason. But I think it's

16:07

not. I think that if you take

16:10

this commitment to reason and rationality to

16:12

this extreme, then you're led to this

16:14

kind of mystical view where the distinctions

16:16

among things collapses, the distinction among concepts

16:18

collapses. And so this mystical view is

16:20

one that cannot be articulated in language,

16:24

as long as that language involves distinctions.

16:26

So this view cannot be articulated

16:28

in language. But it's something I got to,

16:31

this kind of non-conceptual view of

16:33

reality, as it were, through a

16:35

kind of rational argumentation. Thank

16:37

you so much. You're welcome. Thanks

16:40

for listening to Flosbee for Our Times. Don't

16:43

forget to subscribe, leave a review on your

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platform of choice, and visit Ii.tv for hundreds

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more podcast videos and articles from the world

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