Episode Transcript
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0:00
How widespread should this be? How
0:02
often do we want to be subject to this? When
0:05
can we be comfortable that
0:07
our faces aren't being scanned, that we aren't
0:09
being identified? Welcome
0:11
to Politicology. I'm Ron Steslow, and
0:14
this is the second half of
0:16
my two-part conversation with Kashmir Hill
0:18
about her groundbreaking reporting on facial
0:20
recognition software and why
0:22
we might be living in the twilight of
0:25
anonymity. She focuses specifically
0:27
on one secretive startup at the center of
0:30
this technology, their view AI, which I was
0:32
somewhat surprised to learn had roots in the
0:34
MAGA movement. So if you missed part one
0:36
last week, I'd recommend starting there, because today
0:39
in part two, we pick up where we
0:41
left off and dive into technical
0:43
sweetness and the lack of ethical
0:45
considerations by the people building these
0:47
new technologies. We talk about
0:50
the different approaches to privacy laws in
0:52
the United States and Europe and how
0:54
companies are navigating this uneven terrain. Then
0:56
we get into the trend of
0:59
law enforcement agencies getting around constitutional
1:01
protections by buying information from private
1:03
companies. Then lastly, we
1:06
talk about the broader implications of facial
1:08
recognition and what the
1:10
future of privacy and anonymity
1:12
might look like in this age
1:14
of ubiquitous surveillance. This
1:17
was a fascinating discussion for me, so
1:19
I hope you enjoy it. Kashmir
1:22
Hill is a tech reporter at The
1:24
New York Times and the author of
1:26
Your Face Belongs to Us, a secretive
1:28
startup's quest to end privacy as
1:30
we know it. And
1:33
now here's part two of my discussion with Kashmir.
1:39
A little earlier, you mentioned we
1:43
can only trust the technology,
1:46
to the extent that we can trust the person who holds it.
1:50
This raises the term you introduced in
1:52
the book, or you surfaced in the
1:54
book, technical sweetness. A
1:56
couple of years ago, I talked with two...
2:00
Stanford professors who
2:02
were co-authors of System Error,
2:05
where big tech went wrong. And
2:07
one of the key takeaways from their book
2:09
was that tech companies by default ask
2:12
themselves whether
2:14
they can do something and how they can
2:17
do something, solve a technical problem without
2:19
any of the ethical deliberations that you
2:22
would want in the evolution of a
2:24
technology. So they don't ask themselves whether
2:26
they should. The
2:31
most radical form of this ideology, I think
2:33
we should note, considers all technical
2:35
progress virtuous in and of itself. But
2:38
I wonder if you can expand on that role
2:41
that technical sweetness is played in pushing this
2:43
tech forward and
2:46
how you think about the
2:49
degree to which ethics are
2:51
baked into the technology itself
2:55
without really philosophers or ethicists being
2:57
involved in the development. Yeah,
3:01
I mean, I often think of this
3:03
as the Jurassic Park problem. They
3:08
were so excited about making the dinosaurs,
3:10
they didn't think about whether they should
3:12
make the dinosaurs. And
3:15
I certainly encountered this. I was
3:17
going back for the book. I really wanted
3:19
to understand the kind of path of facial
3:21
recognition technology. And because I think technology in
3:23
and of itself is
3:25
not inherently interesting, it's
3:27
more people and how it
3:29
can affect people's lives. But
3:31
I was talking to these
3:34
early engineers who worked on it, made
3:37
breakthroughs in
3:39
the 80s and 90s, often
3:42
on the behalf not of the government,
3:45
but of private companies, like
3:47
a ratings company that wanted to put facial
3:50
recognition in TVs so it could know who
3:52
was sitting in front of them and watching
3:55
things that could better understand if this
3:58
should be advertising time. for
4:00
women or men or young people or old people. And
4:03
I would say, you know, you were working on this.
4:05
You made this critical breakthrough that kept driving facial
4:08
recognition forward to the point it was
4:10
today, to the point it is today
4:12
where it's incredibly powerful. And
4:14
I said, you know, were you thinking
4:16
about the implications of kind of
4:19
developing this technology, what it would mean
4:21
for our privacy, for anonymity? And
4:24
they said, no, not really. We just weren't
4:26
thinking about that. Like, it barely worked at
4:28
the time. It was hard to imagine it
4:30
ever working at the scale of
4:33
thousands or millions or billions
4:35
of people. We
4:38
just wanted to see if we could get computers to
4:40
see. And
4:43
so, yeah, so they're developing this. And
4:46
meanwhile, eventually, it gets so
4:48
powerful and
4:50
widely available. Like one thing that shocked
4:53
me about Clearview
4:55
AI is that Juan
4:57
Dontá, as I said, he made
4:59
Facebook quizzes, he made iPhone games.
5:02
He wasn't necessarily like a biometric
5:04
technology genius. And I
5:06
asked him, I mean, how did you go from he made
5:09
an app called Trump Hair that would put Donald
5:11
Trump's hair on people's
5:14
faces and photos. I said, how did you go from that to
5:17
building this, I mean, revolutionary,
5:21
earth-shattering technology
5:24
of facial recognition technology? And he
5:26
said, yeah, you know, I
5:29
went on Twitter and I started following machine
5:31
learning experts. I went on GitHub and I
5:33
looked up facial recognition and I
5:36
was just kind of staring at him. And
5:38
I start laughing and he starts laughing. And he
5:40
goes, I know, it sounds like I Googled flying
5:42
car and then I built one. But
5:47
he said, I was standing on the shoulders
5:49
of giants. And it's kind of
5:51
what we were talking about earlier. You know, Facebook
5:53
was developing this technology and the
5:56
thing about the people that are working on
5:58
this kind of AI machine learning. neural
6:00
networks is there was this culture
6:02
of sharing what you developed. And
6:04
so they would publish what they
6:06
were doing. It's kind of hard
6:08
to wrap your head around it. In
6:10
the book, I say it's as if
6:12
Coca-Cola decided to release the recipe for
6:15
what it had made for everyone else
6:17
to make themselves. But
6:19
he said, standing on the shoulders of giants, I
6:21
was using research that had
6:24
come before me. And
6:26
then it gets put in
6:28
the hand of this young guy who
6:31
is just trying to kind of make
6:34
it in the tech field. He
6:36
wants to be famous. He wants to make
6:39
an app that everybody uses. And
6:41
I asked him, I said, okay, well, you've created
6:43
Clearview AI. You've
6:46
done something that I would
6:48
later find out Facebook and Google had also
6:50
done, but decided not to release because they
6:52
did think it was too dangerous. They
6:54
didn't want to be the companies to put it out there, but
6:57
he did. I said, you've broken through this
6:59
taboo. As you
7:01
said, you're standing on the
7:03
shoulders of giants. There's a whole bunch of other people
7:05
that can stand on the shoulders with you. There's gonna
7:07
be other people who created this. Clearview
7:09
AI decided to only allow
7:11
police to use their
7:13
technology ultimately. But I said, other
7:16
companies are gonna release this publicly.
7:18
Like, what
7:20
you have created may end privacy and
7:22
anonymity as we know it. This might
7:24
be really widespread. It might be on
7:26
everyone's phones. How do you feel
7:28
to be the one that's pushing this out
7:30
into the world? And
7:34
he said, that's a really good question. I'll have
7:36
to think about it. And
7:38
so you have this long chain
7:40
of people that are all developing
7:42
this technology. And all along the
7:44
way, nobody is thinking about the
7:46
implications. They keep expecting someone else
7:48
to do it. They're the technologists.
7:50
They develop, they do
7:52
what's possible. They wanna solve this puzzle. They wanna
7:54
put it out into the world. And then they
7:56
figure there's someone else who will decide what the
7:58
rules are for this technology or what. the guardrails
8:00
will be, that's kind of not their
8:02
job. It
8:05
raises the big difference between Clearview and
8:08
other companies, which is
8:10
not their technical ability,
8:13
right? It's not the actual technology
8:16
beneath what they're offering. It's what they're willing to let people do with
8:18
it. So you mentioned Facebook and
8:20
Google to develop this and then decided not
8:22
to release it publicly. How have different companies
8:24
approached this question and arrived
8:27
at different conclusions? And
8:29
are we now having this conversation
8:32
on the eve of perhaps another
8:34
company taking an altogether different approach,
8:36
do you think? Yeah.
8:39
So right now, so Clearview
8:41
AI has this database of
8:43
40 billion photos only allowing
8:46
law enforcement to use it and
8:48
only in the US in part because there was
8:50
such a backlash. After
8:52
my initial report about Clearview and
8:55
privacy regulators in other countries said, okay,
8:57
this is illegal. You
8:59
are violating our privacy laws. You can't just
9:01
gather a whole bunch of people's photos without
9:04
their consent and subject it to biometric analysis.
9:07
But then there's another company called Pimize.
9:11
It's based, the corporate headquarters are
9:13
in the UAE. The
9:17
person who runs it is in the country
9:19
of Georgia and it's a
9:21
public faith search engine. Their
9:24
database is about 2 billion photos and
9:26
it's only from news sites. So it's
9:28
kind of the most public of photos.
9:31
But basically anyone can use it. Anyone
9:34
listening to this that they kind of want to
9:36
have a sense of how powerful facial recognition is
9:39
or see where their face is, you can go
9:41
to Pimize. You're supposed to
9:43
only upload your own face. It's supposed
9:45
to be a search engine for you to find out
9:47
where you appear on the internet. But
9:50
I have a subscription which allows me to see
9:52
where an image came from and the full image
9:56
and it's $30 per month and it lets me do
9:58
25 searches. a day and
10:01
there's no technical measure in place to make
10:03
sure I'm only searching one face,
10:05
my own face, 25 times a day. Yeah,
10:09
there's another public face search engine
10:11
similar to PIM eyes. Facebook
10:14
and Google still
10:16
haven't released this technology, but Facebook
10:19
now met up. Their chief
10:21
technology officer, Andrew Bosworth, has said,
10:24
I would love to put facial
10:26
recognition capabilities into their augmented
10:28
reality glasses so that you
10:30
could look at someone and know their name. He
10:33
said, who hasn't been to a cocktail party
10:35
where you run into somebody who you've
10:37
met before, you should know their
10:39
name, you can't remember. He said, we could just
10:42
give you their name. It would be so
10:44
easy, but we're worried about the kind of
10:46
legal regulatory environment for that.
10:52
I think legal in some places like Illinois,
10:54
one of the few states has a really
10:57
strong law on this, but I
10:59
could imagine a world where maybe
11:02
Facebook did do that. I
11:04
don't think that they would just force it
11:07
on all of us as they have forced
11:09
certain things in the past. I could imagine
11:11
it being a kind of opt-in environment where
11:14
maybe the cashmere, maybe I'd
11:16
say, okay,
11:19
I'm a journalist, I'm pretty public. I'll just make
11:21
my face public. Anyone who sees
11:23
me on the street wearing Facebook's augmented reality
11:25
glasses can know who I am. They
11:27
can come up to me, give me their tips, tell
11:30
me great stories. Maybe somebody
11:32
else who's more private would say, okay,
11:34
I'll let my Facebook friends who I'm
11:36
connected to identify me or friends
11:38
of their friends, or maybe you mark your
11:40
face private. I can imagine a
11:42
world, this would be very American approach to
11:45
visual recognition, but where you
11:47
have privacy settings for your face like you do
11:49
for your Facebook profile. I've
11:53
asked this question, I've been
11:55
on book tour, and I've asked different
11:57
audiences, okay, if this existed, who here
11:59
would... often to having
12:01
their face recognized. And
12:04
in San Francisco, half of
12:06
the room raised their hands. In
12:08
New York, it was just a few. And
12:11
then I just got back from Italy
12:13
last week in both Milan and Turin,
12:16
nobody raised their hands. They shook
12:18
their heads, they're like, no, we
12:20
don't want that. But
12:23
a lot of the companies developing this
12:25
technology are in San Francisco where there's such a
12:27
different approach to what is wanted. So
12:30
I just thought that was really interesting. It's
12:32
interesting you mentioned that in Italy because I
12:35
think the Europeans maybe have a different relationship
12:37
with the idea of privacy or their own
12:39
data than we do in
12:41
the United States, right? Because they
12:43
led with GDPR which gives Europeans
12:47
very strong protections over their personal
12:49
data that we don't have in
12:51
the United States. I thought that
12:53
contrast was important. You
12:57
mentioned there was a story about a guy,
12:59
I think, who was a German
13:01
citizen who wrote to
13:04
Clearview and
13:07
asked for all of the data that they had on
13:09
him and they were required by EU law
13:11
to give it to him. What
13:14
protections do they have that we
13:16
don't in the United States? Yeah,
13:20
it's so different. And covering privacy for
13:22
10 years, it's just so striking the different approach
13:24
in Europe versus the US. The
13:27
simplistic version is that in the
13:30
US, we believe we have freedom
13:32
to things and in Europe, they
13:34
have freedom from things being
13:36
done to them. But Europe
13:38
just has a stronger right to privacy
13:41
that says that, for example, companies
13:43
can't use your data without your
13:45
consent and we have very little
13:48
of that in the US. And
13:51
so when it comes to facial recognition, it's
13:55
all these European countries and Australia
13:57
and Canada said that what clear view is clear?
14:00
whatever you AI did was illegal. And
14:02
so Clearview pulled out of those countries
14:04
and those countries, Italy, Greece,
14:06
France, the UK, said
14:09
delete our citizens from your database. But
14:11
Clearview said, how do we know if a
14:14
face is Italian or
14:16
it's American? We can't really
14:18
do that. But
14:22
individual European citizens could reach out
14:24
to Clearview and say, hey, I
14:26
wanna see my report, I wanna
14:28
be deleted. And so Mathias
14:30
Marks is one of those people that went
14:32
ahead and did that with Clearview, also with
14:34
that site Pimize. But then in order
14:36
to keep him out of the database, they
14:38
said, we're gonna have to keep your face so we
14:40
can block it from being
14:42
collected again because Clearview is collecting new images
14:45
all the time. They say they're collecting 75
14:47
million images per day. But
14:51
since the book was published, Clearview
14:53
says they're not respecting GDPR anymore.
14:55
They're not gonna do those opt-outs.
14:58
So they're just not complying with European law, which
15:00
is, this is where facial recognition
15:02
technology and AI in general is
15:05
complicated because it's all
15:07
operating on a global scale.
15:09
And so regulating it
15:11
is difficult. Whereas here in the
15:14
US, yeah, there's no real law that's applicable
15:16
to what Clearview AI is doing on the federal
15:18
level. And there's a few
15:20
states that have laws, Illinois being the
15:22
main one. So,
15:26
speaking of law, you read about the ACLU a bit and
15:31
there's a very, very interesting paradox
15:34
that you explain when you're writing about
15:36
the conversation within the ACLU after Clearview's
15:39
existence became public. You
15:41
write, Clearview was part of a
15:43
trend the organization was seeing. Private
15:45
vendors selling law enforcement agencies the
15:47
fruit of surveillance methods that
15:50
would likely be unconstitutional if deployed by
15:52
the government itself. And a little
15:54
later in that paragraph, police didn't need a warrant.
15:56
They just needed to pay for the intel. Can
15:59
you... explain the tension within
16:02
the ACLU, which has traditionally
16:04
sort of stood
16:06
up for the rights of citizens
16:08
against governments, right? And the
16:11
protections that we have constitutionally are designed
16:14
to protect us from the government,
16:16
not necessarily from private industry. Can
16:19
you explain that a little bit? Yeah.
16:23
So the ACLU is very
16:26
protective of our right to challenge
16:28
the government, to protect protest and
16:32
protecting us from some privacy
16:35
intrusions. And so when they saw Clearview
16:37
AI and what it
16:39
had created, they did
16:42
not like it. And they were worried, this is the tool. You
16:48
have people getting together for Black Lives
16:51
Matter protests, protesting against
16:53
police brutality, and the police
16:55
can just take a photo and know everyone who's
16:57
there. And that could be very chilling. At
17:00
the same time, what
17:03
Clearview AI did was collect
17:06
photos from the public internet, from
17:08
social media sites, but the photos
17:10
that were public. And so
17:12
Clearview AI said, we have
17:14
a first amendment right to do this. We
17:17
are not, you know,
17:19
hacking into anybody's Facebook account. People made
17:22
this public. We're just going on the
17:24
internet and we're collecting faces that anybody
17:26
can see. We're just like Google.
17:29
In the same way Google crawls the
17:31
internet so that you can Google
17:34
Cashmere Hill and see everywhere where
17:36
her name appears, now
17:38
we've just reorganized the internet by face.
17:41
And you're going to Google Cashmere Hill's
17:43
face and just see all the photos she's in
17:45
on the internet. There's nothing intrusive about this. We
17:48
have the right to do this. And so I
17:50
think the ACLU is very, ACLU
17:52
is also very protective of
17:54
the First Amendment and
17:57
people who have sometimes, you
17:59
know, Unpopular. Opinions:
18:02
A seamlessly protected Take a case
18:04
right to have parades and ads
18:06
public gatherings on. and so they
18:09
are a bit torn on this.
18:11
ah, but they ultimately came down
18:13
on the side of anonymity. Privacy
18:16
is is too important to the
18:18
way that we live and we
18:20
really need to chances. And they
18:22
did. so. In Illinois.
18:25
On because Illinois has this fairies
18:27
special law ah I'm unique law
18:29
passed in two thousand They wanted
18:31
a rare laws that move fast
18:33
and technology. Of the Biometric Information
18:36
Privacy Act. And it says at
18:38
a company to not collect. Some.
18:40
Buddies biometric information including their face
18:42
print. without consent where they face a.
18:44
Very big sign and so the
18:47
a seal. You decided to file
18:49
a class action in Illinois saying
18:51
that what Clear View did violated
18:53
this law. Clear View hired very
18:55
famous First Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams.
18:58
A long history of defending the first memory back
19:00
to the New York Times in their right to
19:02
publish. The Pentagon Papers and he made
19:04
that argument. He said hate, were you
19:06
know this is just public information were
19:08
basically like journalist gathering. What's on the public
19:11
internet and making it you know? we're organizing at
19:13
make a searchable. It did not end
19:15
up flying in Illinois. The judge said. Okay
19:18
yes you have the right to gather
19:20
the gather the photos and if you
19:22
want a human being to look through
19:24
them that finds you don't have the
19:27
right to create this code biometric algorithm
19:29
you know identifier ah and use that
19:31
to search them. And ultimately
19:33
the easily you include the
19:35
way I wound up settling
19:37
and. A clear view Agreed
19:39
to only. Sell. Their
19:42
database to law enforcement and not
19:44
to companies or private individuals. On
19:47
so he we haven't seen this kind of
19:49
go of the ways prim court, but there
19:51
is this question of. Said.
19:53
This company be allowed to do this and
19:55
I think of the government did This is.
19:58
The is the in the Us government's the. The
20:00
I I decided to start making a
20:02
database of face and is just great
20:04
from the internet. I think
20:06
people might have a problem with
20:09
that. They might say yeah that's
20:11
that's an unconstitutional search and seizure
20:13
on you know we don't that
20:15
you going through our private photos
20:17
that because clear view as doing
20:20
it and his government's is collecting
20:22
from there may have is an
20:24
end run around around. Those questions
20:26
were how how how big of
20:28
an impact is. This having on
20:31
the broader civil rights and privacy
20:33
rights landscape outside of Illinois, the
20:35
A hadn't go the supreme court
20:37
yet. probably because there isn't a
20:39
suitable vehicle. Ah yeah, hasn't
20:41
been. Yet. But I'm weird
20:43
as the debates and movie the
20:45
actors within the debate. how does
20:47
that landscape look right now. So
20:51
there's there's lawsuits all around.
20:53
The country there's that. There's in
20:55
Illinois. There's another one in California
20:57
which has a testy privacy law.
21:00
There's one in Vermont. foul by
21:02
the Vermont Attorney General violating a
21:04
data broker law on. Of
21:06
a query why? It really kind
21:09
of got. A big push
21:11
back. I mean, it seems like people
21:13
are pretty comfortable with the idea of.
21:16
On. Police. Searching.
21:20
This. This public s it's hit
21:22
a base to identify people to
21:24
solve crimes on. Ah,
21:27
even though there are some. Big.
21:29
Questions X that it displayed some is
21:31
kind of playing out with individual police
21:33
departments. I think this is really interesting.
21:35
Like the. Detroit Police Department. Has
21:38
been thinking a. Lot. About how do
21:40
we use face recognition technology and
21:42
is significant because Detroit is actually
21:44
place where they're spent three false
21:47
arrest based on face recognition searches
21:49
were they ran a surge of
21:51
somebody say gotta hit. on
21:53
they wound up confirming it with an
21:55
eyewitness were an eyewitness is set my
21:57
witness said yeah because that's the person
21:59
that was involved in that crime. But
22:03
there you can run into a real danger of
22:06
a bad feedback loop where you've gotten this computer
22:09
to go through millions of photos, find a person
22:11
who looks most like the person in the photo,
22:13
and then an eyewitness agrees with the computer even
22:15
though it's the wrong person. So, had two arrests.
22:20
I talk about one in the book,
22:22
Robert Williams, arrested for shoplifting, arrested
22:25
right before his birthday, held overnight, charged,
22:27
had to hire a lawyer. Another
22:29
man, Michael Oliver, arrested
22:32
for stealing a smartphone. And
22:34
then the most recent was Portia Woodruff, eight
22:36
months pregnant, arrested on Thursday morning,
22:38
getting her kids ready for school for
22:41
carjacking. That happened the month before by
22:43
a woman who was not visibly pregnant.
22:46
She was taken to jail, she ended up
22:48
in the hospital that night, she was so
22:51
stressed out, dehydrated, needed fluids. I
22:53
mean, this is just, when you have these
22:55
kinds of encounters, it's terrible. And
22:58
they're basically arrested for the crime of looking
23:00
like someone else. The jury police department says, we
23:03
don't want this to happen. This
23:05
was bad police work. This is not the
23:07
technology. This is that we didn't do
23:09
enough gathering of other evidence in these
23:11
cases. And we wanna do this right. They're
23:14
not using Clearview AI, in
23:17
part, I think, because they're worried about
23:19
the implications of searching through 40 billion
23:21
photos to identify somebody. It
23:25
increases the chance that you might make
23:27
a mistake. They're only using
23:29
it for serious crimes, like
23:31
murder, assaults, home invasions.
23:35
And they're no longer
23:37
doing arrest based on facial
23:40
recognition combined with eyewitnesses. And
23:43
so you're basically, at this point, it's like up
23:45
to individual police departments. So
23:47
it's really happening at the local level. There's
23:50
some cities that banned it, San
23:52
Francisco, Portland. Some
23:58
cities around Boston have... said we don't want
24:00
police using this yet, we really need to assess
24:03
the civil liberties here and
24:05
the possibility for algorithmic
24:07
bias. But yeah, I mean,
24:09
we are in the melting pot right now. And
24:12
it's, yeah, as you like
24:14
listeners as citizens, it's the time
24:17
to find out what is my
24:19
department doing and thinking about what you want to
24:21
happen because it is really like local
24:23
government here, city councils that are making
24:25
these big decisions. And
24:27
some places are kind of recording how often
24:30
they use facial recognition, some aren't.
24:32
Yeah, it's
24:34
really in the early
24:36
days, but I think that it could kind of solidify
24:38
very quickly, which is why I wanted to write the
24:41
book now. Like, I think these are big questions that
24:43
we need to answer. So
24:46
what does the partisan landscape look like
24:49
on this issue? Is it actually still somehow bipartisan?
24:52
You mentioned that in the book at
24:54
a certain stage, this was one of
24:56
the issues that seemed to freak everybody
24:58
out in perhaps equal measure.
25:01
And so you had a lot of agreement across
25:03
party lines. Is that still the case? Yeah,
25:07
right now in terms of doing something
25:09
at the federal level, it seems to
25:11
be coming more from the left and
25:13
the Democrats in terms of bills that
25:15
have been floated. But
25:17
it is truly a bipartisan issue.
25:20
And I saw that over the years
25:22
as, as, as facial recognition was
25:24
kind of being debated in DC back
25:26
in 2001, when it was deployed for
25:29
the first time at the Super
25:31
Bowl in Tampa, it was called, it
25:33
was called the Snooper Bowl by the
25:35
press. Dick
25:37
Armey, very conservative
25:39
Republican teamed up with the ACLU to
25:41
put out a press release saying, Hey,
25:43
this shouldn't be happening. We shouldn't be
25:45
deploying facial recognition on crowds. That's an intrusion
25:48
on civil liberties. As recently as
25:50
2018, there was a hearing organized
25:53
by John Lewis, the late John Lewis, you know,
25:55
civil rights leader, Democrat leading
25:58
the Investigation
26:00
into Trump he paired up with Mark
26:02
Meadows and Jim Jordan to do
26:05
a hearing about facial recognition technology Very,
26:07
you know conservative on the right big
26:10
supporters of Trump and they said
26:12
we don't agree about much the three of
26:14
us But we agree that we need to
26:16
do something about facial recognition technology. It's too
26:18
great a threat to our civil liberties So
26:21
it does seem like they're there that something
26:24
should happen You know, this is a bipartisan issue and
26:26
yet for some reason on the federal level just
26:29
Not a lot of movement yet. There there
26:31
has not been much movement Yeah, I
26:33
wonder if that'll get invoked as we seem
26:36
to be moving forward toward something on social
26:38
media and And the
26:41
Hill seems to be abuzz about that. I just can't
26:43
imagine how they wouldn't
26:45
consider the entire landscape of data
26:47
and privacy rights and Sort
26:51
of as one big hole, which
26:53
is what how I think it should be considered
26:57
I mean that may be the challenge right
26:59
make maybe it's just too much. Yeah, so
27:01
much data to be regulated Yeah,
27:05
yeah, it does. It does raise a question of what the What
27:08
is the fundamental right we need to protect here? And
27:11
if you can come up with a principle that maybe you can You
27:14
know establish something that the courts can
27:16
then arbitrate individual cases
27:18
later on Okay,
27:21
I want to talk a little bit about this tension between security and
27:24
privacy Do
27:28
you think the debate can
27:31
be reframed such that the invasion
27:33
of privacy makes us less safe? You
27:37
know that that security and privacy are maybe not
27:39
mutually exclusive or zero-sum because I do think that's
27:41
the way we are sort of conditioned
27:44
to think about the trade-offs here between between
27:48
security and privacy or anonymity and
27:50
convenience is there a different way
27:52
of thinking about the relationship between
27:54
those things? So
27:56
I don't think it's Two
28:00
sides of a. Quiet and it's
28:02
us more of a spectrum right
28:04
on. There are some ways in
28:07
which it might make us more
28:09
secure. ah, I'm and yet we
28:11
lose freedom because of it and
28:14
ultimately at the less secure society.
28:16
On ah i me one way
28:19
it let's. Just talk about it personally
28:21
on how this could be used for
28:23
your own personal security. So. Let's say
28:25
you're a person going out.
28:28
To bar on Saturday night. Ah,
28:30
there's a bunch of people there
28:32
and you've got an app on
28:34
your phone or him eyes which
28:36
is browser based on your phone
28:38
and you're talking to somebody they're
28:40
telling you about themselves and you're
28:42
wondering. Is. This person who they say
28:44
they are see. Take a little photo and
28:47
you sir sir face and you find
28:49
out their name even google and you
28:51
get this information and thereby a lines
28:53
up of what they told you. It
28:55
may be feel more confident being with
28:57
that person. On on the flipside let's
29:00
say you're out a bar and are
29:02
some really creepy burst any staring at
29:04
you obsessively they keep talking. Trying to
29:06
talk to you do not want to touch them.
29:08
You're trying to avoid them. They take a picture
29:10
of your face now they know your name, they
29:12
company social media profile. Maybe they find out where
29:14
you live. On suits. Both things at
29:17
the same time, right? It could. Protect.
29:19
Your security or to be used to invade your.
29:21
Privacy and allow this person that you
29:23
never want to see again to now
29:25
figure out who you are and where
29:27
you left arm. So.
29:29
It is two things at the same
29:32
time On part of how are addressing
29:34
this right now is turned us as
29:36
were saying okay we're comfortable with clear
29:39
view way I am selling this to
29:41
police Ah. Where are we
29:43
trust? the police to use this
29:45
responsibly on and to do the
29:47
work that they're supposed to once
29:49
they identify somebody ah but it
29:51
can lead to insecurity if for
29:54
example is used irresponsibly like the
29:56
case as talked about where people
29:58
are falsely arrested where
30:00
police fall prey to automation bias
30:02
where the system tells them This
30:06
is your person and they put
30:08
too much trust in that and then they
30:10
see all other evidence as confirming that initial
30:13
Identification and they go and arrest somebody
30:16
who who shouldn't be arrested who should
30:18
be living his life be with his
30:20
family Not spending a night
30:22
in prison not hiring a lawyer To
30:25
defend him against charges that are completely
30:27
irresponsible. So Yeah, I
30:29
mean it can it can go it
30:32
can go so many different
30:35
ways that I think we need to think about
30:37
it on a deeper level of Okay,
30:40
this is a good cyst it
30:42
is out there How
30:44
widespread should this be? How often do we
30:46
want to be subject to this? When
30:49
can we be comfortable that
30:51
our faces aren't being scanned that we aren't
30:53
being identified? You include
30:55
a quote from Al Franken's former
30:57
staffer Alvaro Bedoya about what
31:00
the future could look like and he
31:02
says Do I want to
31:04
live in a society where people can be identified
31:06
secretly and at a distance by the government? I
31:09
do not and I think I'm not alone in that
31:12
and there are so many stories in the book about
31:16
people who were freaked out by facial
31:18
recognition being used on them during a
31:20
demo and As I
31:22
was reading I was thinking I would definitely be
31:24
freaked out myself if someone you know showed this
31:26
to me In
31:29
a demo, although the you know the marketer
31:31
in me would think oh my god, this
31:33
is so unbelievably powerful But
31:37
it really invokes. I think a much broader question
31:41
because You know any
31:43
resistance that we might have to
31:45
sacrificing our privacy or our anonymity and I
31:48
think those are two different things ultimately
31:51
has been quickly pacified by the Convenience
31:56
offered by these tools, but the
31:58
trade-off is usually You know,
32:00
obscured by a wall of legalese that we
32:02
just click accept very quickly on. And
32:05
as a species, I think we have proved fairly pliable
32:08
to the technology companies.
32:12
And the cost has been more broad than just privacy.
32:14
I mean, we touched on a little
32:16
bit earlier, but consider the mental health crisis that we are
32:18
now, I think, rightly outraged
32:21
about, and how indisputably
32:23
linked it is to the rise of social
32:25
media. You also
32:27
quote the science fiction writer William Gibson in
32:30
the book discussing that the future is already
32:32
here. It's just not that evenly distributed, which
32:34
I thought was brilliant
32:37
and true. And it made me think of all
32:39
of the other technologies beyond
32:42
facial recognition that you don't
32:44
discuss directly. But for
32:46
someone who pays close attention, their
32:49
facial recognition technology is one sort
32:52
of rising piece of
32:55
a very broad landscape of
32:57
technologies that are very
33:00
quickly eroding privacy
33:02
and anonymity. If you consider the
33:05
aggregation of DNA with sites like Ancestry and
33:08
23andMe with vast databases
33:11
of DNA records submitted
33:13
voluntarily by customers, you
33:16
have Voice Prints, which you did mention a few months ago. 404
33:18
Media, I think, broke a story about a
33:24
marketing firm, a data
33:26
firm in Georgia, announcing,
33:29
sort of broadcasting that your devices are listening
33:31
to you actively, and they're selling
33:33
that data to advertisers who want to advertise to
33:35
you the moment you are talking about a thing,
33:37
a product that you might be interested in. Then
33:41
you have... I have concerns
33:43
about that story. I'm very skeptical. Oh, are you
33:45
skeptical? Okay. Yeah, I
33:47
don't think they did enough digging on that
33:49
story. Nevertheless,
33:54
the list goes on. I mean, behavior... I'm looking
33:56
into it. I'll tell you that, Ron. Oh, perfect.
33:58
Okay. Behavioral fingerprinting,
34:01
which I'm sure you're aware of, right,
34:04
which is the unique signature that
34:08
you give off in the way that you move your
34:10
cursor around the web can
34:12
be used to identify you
34:15
or the keystrokes, the pattern
34:17
of your keystrokes. This
34:19
is offered, I think, by firms like Palantir. And
34:24
then obviously there's state-level hacking software
34:27
like Pegasus, which we've talked about before. And
34:33
oh yeah, and then there was that demonstration,
34:36
I think, that Tristan
34:38
Harris showed in a
34:41
presentation where these neural
34:43
nets, the large language models, can now use
34:45
Wi-Fi signals to identify body
34:48
images through
34:50
walls. And anybody's Wi-Fi
34:52
router can now be hijacked to see
34:55
what's going on inside their homes. So
34:58
I just want, I think, listeners to
35:00
think about the broader landscape of technologies
35:02
that are being used to de-anonymize
35:06
them and whether
35:09
there's anything, what they can do
35:11
to maybe
35:13
fight back or maybe secure their
35:17
own privacy, their own anonymity, or maybe there's a
35:19
different way they should be thinking about all these
35:21
technologies. But
35:24
you write in the book about minority report, right,
35:26
about the facial recognition of minority report. But
35:29
the one thing you didn't mention
35:31
about minority report was the precocks and the
35:33
ability to use all of this data to
35:35
predict what someone is going to do. And
35:38
I couldn't help think about
35:41
all of these tools, as I'm
35:43
reading your book, ultimately
35:46
being aggregated and centralized
35:50
to paint a
35:52
nearly perfect picture of an individual
35:54
and spit out highly
35:56
accurate predictions of whether
35:59
they would commit a crime. crime in the future or
36:01
fill in the blank of the ways you could use
36:04
this data to try and predict the future. That's
36:07
a lot to think about, but I
36:09
just am curious how
36:12
you think about all of this
36:14
because you cover it every day
36:16
and what do you do in
36:18
your day-to-day life to maybe
36:20
guard against the future that
36:22
is coming or that is here now, but it's just
36:25
not evenly distributed. Wow.
36:29
It's rare that somebody paints
36:32
a more dystopian version of
36:34
the world than I do. I do not mean to.
36:38
You just did. But
36:41
look, right, technologically,
36:44
that world is possible
36:47
where all of our faces are known, all
36:49
of our voices are known, all of our gates
36:51
are known. You can identify us by our walk.
36:54
They have our DNA. Every
36:58
glass and bit of hair you leave
37:00
behind can be traced back to you.
37:02
We could live in that world. I
37:06
hope we will choose not to. And
37:09
I have some optimism from
37:11
the past, and that is
37:13
that we are in a kind of similar
37:15
moment in the 1950s, 1960s, when there was
37:17
the development of small listening devices, bugs, and
37:20
wiretapping equipment.
37:27
And there was a national
37:29
panic about the
37:32
end of privacy in terms of
37:34
your conversations that any
37:37
phone call you make might be recorded
37:39
because there were private detectives that were
37:41
tapping lines all the time, hired by
37:43
husbands trying to prove that their wives
37:46
were cheating, proven fidelity. Richard
37:49
Nixon was recording every
37:52
single conversation in the White House. People
37:55
were in a panic that you couldn't have a
37:57
private conversation. And we passed away. asked
38:00
laws that made it illegal to
38:02
secretly record people, made
38:06
it illegal for you to
38:10
be wiretapped, and that the government needed to
38:12
get a warrant to wiretap you. And
38:15
so what you were talking about is this idea
38:17
of a company that secretly
38:19
is listening to us and giving
38:21
us ads based on what we say. If they were
38:23
doing that, that would be very illegal. That
38:25
would cost them a lot of money and
38:28
somebody would probably go to jail. We
38:30
did pass laws to prevent that. And it's part of
38:32
the reason why the surveillance cameras
38:34
that are all around this country, that
38:37
many of us are passing hundreds
38:39
of cameras every day in our workplaces,
38:41
on the streets, in grocery
38:43
stores, they're only recording our images
38:46
and not audio. They're not recording
38:49
our conversations because we decided we
38:51
didn't want to live in a world where
38:53
everything we said was recorded all the time.
38:58
Said we don't want that. And so we're
39:01
in that moment now. What do we
39:03
want the world to look like? Technologically,
39:06
it is possible to do these things. But
39:09
I think that we can restrain them through
39:11
norms, what we
39:14
do, what we want, and then very
39:16
importantly through laws, and then
39:18
also the technology companies themselves, what they
39:20
decide to send to
39:22
market, offer to us. So
39:26
yeah, in terms of what people
39:28
can do specifically about facial recognition
39:30
technology, get yourself a
39:32
very fashionable ski mask, that
39:35
you can wear around. Do those work then? Whenever
39:37
you're doing something very private. Yeah,
39:40
full color, yeah. Oh yeah, ski
39:42
mask. If you're going to dinner with your secret lover, you're
39:45
going to dinner with your secret lover, definitely both
39:47
wear ski masks. No one will think
39:49
that's strange around you. No,
39:51
but just
39:54
think about right now, think about
39:56
what you're putting on the public internet. I'm a mother, I
39:58
have two young children. I try
40:01
not to post photos of them to the public
40:03
internet. Sure. I still use Instagram. I have a
40:05
private account I text
40:07
photos to my loved ones But
40:09
I'm not putting photos out there for
40:11
all the world to see Photos
40:13
that will follow them for the rest of their lives Trying
40:16
to let them choose their
40:19
own kind of privacy I
40:22
I know this is gonna be this may be
40:25
surprising But I do think people should go to
40:27
PIM eyes and look up their faces and see
40:29
what's out there It's it's not gonna give you
40:31
a clear view level search But
40:33
at least will show you if your your face kind of
40:35
shows up on a news site If
40:37
your face easily leads somebody to your name or
40:40
two photos, you don't want them to see And
40:43
to PIM eyes at this point has an opt-out
40:45
system So if there are photos you don't like or
40:47
you don't want your face to be searchable You
40:50
can opt out of there. You can opt out of
40:52
their search so that doesn't show up for other people
40:55
But yeah, and then it's just you know Figuring
40:58
out what you want and kind of through
41:01
our democratic process letting lawmakers know,
41:03
you know What should they do
41:05
about facial recognition technology? Should they
41:07
do something like in Illinois where there's a
41:09
law that says companies can't use this information
41:12
without your consent? Should
41:14
there be more oversight over
41:16
how your police department using facial
41:18
recognition technology? I think
41:20
just being aware and kind of operating in this
41:22
world knowing that the power exists And
41:25
thinking about how you want the power
41:27
to manifest in your day-to-day life. It's
41:29
just a very important time To
41:33
be thinking about totally agree Kashmir
41:36
Hill Is there anything in the book or
41:39
otherwise that we didn't touch on that you that
41:41
you want to mention dig into? The only thing
41:44
is Madison Square Garden. I think crazy
41:46
example of I
41:48
feel like we should bring it up Yeah, this
41:50
is the it's why I mean this is the
41:52
venue I think that I was referring to in
41:55
the intro about People that
41:57
the lawyers being turned away at the door because they were
41:59
working on a You
42:01
can fill in the details, but it's
42:03
still happening, right? They're still able to do this? Yeah,
42:07
so Madison Square Garden put in facial
42:10
recognition systems for security reasons. I believe
42:12
they did it around the time of
42:14
the Emmys, and they may have been
42:16
using it in the Taylor Swift model,
42:18
where Taylor Swift has facial recognition
42:20
cameras that's been reported to identify
42:23
stalkers to be aware of them if
42:25
they're coming to her concert to keep them out. But
42:27
they're using it for security reasons. Somebody had a
42:29
fight at the venue, threw a beer bottle down
42:31
on the ice during a hockey game, they would
42:33
get on the band list. But
42:35
as I was finishing the book, I heard
42:37
about something wilder that was
42:39
happening. The
42:42
first case I heard of is a
42:44
mother who was taking her daughter's Girl
42:46
Scout troop to see the Rockettes at
42:48
Radio City Music Hall. And when
42:50
she got to the door, she
42:52
got pulled aside and they said,
42:54
you can't come in because
42:57
you're a lawyer and you work at a law
42:59
firm that has a suit against Madison Square Garden,
43:01
which owns Radio City Music Hall. And
43:03
you're not welcome here until that suit
43:06
is resolved or dropped. And
43:08
it turned out that
43:10
Madison Square Garden had about 90 law
43:12
firms on its band list. It had gone
43:14
to the firm's websites and
43:16
scraped the photos of the lawyers from
43:18
their own bio pages. And
43:21
they had thousands of lawyers on the band list
43:23
and they couldn't go to Rangers games or Knicks
43:25
games or Mariah
43:27
Carey concerts. Even if
43:29
they had a friend buy the ticket, it didn't matter, they could
43:31
be turned away at the door by face. And I
43:34
actually, I wanted to see this happen. So I bought
43:36
Rangers tickets for me and a personal injury attorney who
43:38
was on the list. And thousands
43:41
of people streaming into the garden, we go
43:43
to the door, put our bags on the
43:45
conveyor belt. By the time we picked them up, security
43:47
guard walked up to us, asked her for ID and
43:50
said, okay, sorry, you can't come in. And
43:52
she said, I'm not working on any case against the
43:55
garden. So he said, it doesn't matter, your whole
43:57
firm's banned until it's done. And
43:59
so Mean this was shocking to me.
44:01
I just didn't think I would see a use case
44:03
like this for another five or ten years kind of
44:06
weaponizing the technology against your enemies
44:10
But it was yeah, I mean it
44:12
was just it showed how the
44:14
technology really could usher in this new
44:17
era of discrimination where What
44:20
is invisible about you could become visible?
44:22
Let's say there's a list of people
44:24
with certain political viewpoints or
44:27
people who are VACs or anti-vax Or
44:30
they're journalists, you know, or
44:32
they work for the government. There's just all these ways that you
44:34
could be monitored or
44:36
have services denied to you based
44:39
on your face because you know being a
44:41
lawyer is not a protected glass it harkens all
44:43
the way back to the beginning with Juan Fonteut
44:45
and The convention
44:47
and wanting to ID, you know
44:50
The libtards or whoever right? And
44:54
Yeah, what really worries me about facial
44:56
recognition technology It just takes like all
44:58
these things that have happened on the internet the data
45:00
collection knowing you are
45:02
seeing what you're doing the kind
45:04
of polarization of I
45:07
know what you are. I know what you believe I hate you, you
45:09
know all that can just be
45:11
transferred to the real world because our face
45:13
would become a way to unlock the kind of
45:16
internet and what's knowable about us and That's that
45:18
is that is one thing I find very
45:20
chilling about that possible future Since
45:23
you mentioned protected class, how do you think
45:25
we'll need to reassess discrimination with this
45:28
much data at anyone's fingertips?
45:32
I mean, I think we might it's
45:34
either reassessing Discriminant like do we add
45:36
protected classes that you can't discriminate against
45:38
people based on their job? I don't
45:41
know or
45:43
do you Regulate
45:45
the means of discrimination the facial
45:47
recognition itself. So Madison Square Garden also
45:51
owns a theater in Chicago, which
45:53
is in Illinois and So
45:55
lawyers cannot be discriminated against
45:58
at the Chicago theater by
46:00
face because Madison Square Garden would
46:03
need their consent to use their
46:05
face prints. So they're still banned
46:07
from the Chicago theater, but
46:10
they can't be kept out by face. So if a friend buys
46:12
them a ticket, they can still get it in. They
46:15
need another way in. Okay.
46:21
This has been terrific. I really enjoyed
46:23
this. If people want the book, where's
46:25
the best place to go to get it? Also,
46:27
there's an audible version we should say read by
46:29
the author. It's fantastic. Yeah, I filmed it here
46:31
actually. Did you enjoy this conversation? Oh, did you?
46:34
Yeah. Oh, yeah. Yeah.
46:37
It's terrific. Yeah.
46:39
Where's the best place to send people and follow your
46:41
work more generally? Yeah, you can
46:43
get it all over the place. I mean,
46:45
I love Bookshop. I really appreciate Barnes and
46:47
Noble, where you can actually buy it in
46:49
person, Amazon, of course. But yeah,
46:52
the audio book was fun
46:54
to do. Was it? Yeah.
46:57
Yeah. I really
46:59
liked getting to read the book.
47:02
It was taxing. But
47:05
people seem to really enjoy hearing from the author.
47:07
They do. I do certainly. I always think the
47:09
book comes to... Whatever the book is, it comes
47:11
to life more when the author is reading it
47:14
than someone else. So kudos to you for doing
47:16
that. It's
47:18
a very entertaining listen also. Okay.
47:22
I think that's all we
47:24
got. So your Twitter handle also. Oh, yeah.
47:27
My X handle is Cash Hill. Your
47:29
X handle, sorry. Yeah,
47:33
I'm Cash Hill basically everywhere on the internet. And
47:35
then Cashmere Hill, of course. It's the New York Times.
47:38
Terrific. Or people can just take a picture
47:40
and Google in the search field.
47:42
Find you everywhere. Pem
47:44
eyes you. Okay. Cashmere, thanks
47:46
so much for being here. Thank you so much for
47:48
having me on. This was a great conversation. Thank
47:52
you to everyone at home and on the go for
47:55
listening. And make sure you're subscribed
47:57
so you get notified when the second part of
47:59
this conversation... and drops next week. If
48:01
you haven't yet, we'd appreciate it if you
48:04
could open up the Apple Podcasts app and
48:06
give us a five-star rating and review over
48:08
there. This helps us rise
48:10
in the rankings so that new
48:12
people can discover politicology organically. If
48:16
you have questions about anything we've talked
48:18
about, you can reach us as always
48:20
at podcast at politicology.com. We
48:23
do read everything you send us, whether it's
48:25
an episode idea, a guest recommendation,
48:27
or just a simple note about how the
48:29
show has impacted you, and we love hearing
48:31
from you. I'm Ron Steslow. I'll
48:34
see you in the next episode.
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