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0:15

It's June the 9th, 1971. Late

0:20

at night, somewhere deep in rural

0:22

Panama, Father Hector Gallego,

0:25

a Roman Catholic priest, is woken

0:27

from his slumber.

0:29

As he peers through the gloom, he

0:32

discerns the gang of men looming over

0:34

him, and the unmistakable

0:36

outlines of the guns slung over their

0:39

shoulders. Within

0:41

moments, Gallego is being dragged out

0:43

of his hut. He's

0:45

hauled through the tropical trees, then

0:48

across a patch of scrubland to

0:50

where a helicopter is waiting. Hastily,

0:54

he's manhandled and sown in.

0:57

The chopper rises into the air. Gallego

1:03

looks up into the faces of his captives. One

1:06

of them, pockmarked with acne

1:09

scars, he recognizes at once.

1:11

It's Panama's

1:13

intelligence chief, Manuel

1:15

Noriega.

1:19

As the country's spymaster, Noriega

1:22

has a reputation for brutality. He's

1:25

less J. Edgar Hoover and more

1:27

Don Corleone. The armed

1:31

men accompanying him are soldiers of the National Guard,

1:33

Panama's military police force. They seized

1:35

power in a coup three years ago.

1:40

Since then, Father Gallego has been a thorn in the side of the military

1:42

junta.

1:45

His work with the local peasant cooperatives put a target on

1:47

his back.

1:52

Stealing a glance out of the window, Gallego

1:54

sees the twinkling lights of the shoreline below give way to

1:56

the inky darkness of the ocean.

1:59

The helicopter is heading

2:02

out over the Pacific. Suddenly,

2:06

someone opens the side door of the chopper,

2:10

and Gallego gets a blast of cold sea

2:12

air.

2:15

Exactly what happens next is

2:17

unclear. Even half a

2:19

century later, we

2:22

can't be sure who exactly gives the

2:24

priest the final shove that

2:26

sends him down to the sea below.

2:30

In subsequent years, rumors

2:33

will swirl as the troublesome

2:35

priest becomes a folk hero.

2:38

Somehow, it seems, he survives his fall from

2:40

the helicopter. Not only that,

2:43

but he also actually makes it back to land

2:47

before finally succumbing to his injuries.

2:51

Whatever the truth, in the coming

2:53

days, the U.S. Army's Southern

2:56

Command receives an alert on a wiretap placed

2:59

on Manuel Noriega's personal phone line.

3:03

They are able to eavesdrop on the intelligence chief

3:05

himself as he reflects on

3:07

the helicopter incident and

3:09

the headaches that night has since caused him. They

3:13

listen intently as he jokes with a colleague.

3:16

The Gallego refer has taught him a valuable lesson,

3:20

Noriega explains. If

3:22

you're going to throw a man from a helicopter, be

3:24

sure to kill him first.

3:30

For two decades, Manuel Noriega

3:32

left his indelible mark on Panama.

3:36

First as the country's brutal intelligence

3:38

chief and later as

3:40

its de facto military ruler.

3:43

To many, he was the ultimate Central American

3:45

dictator, a gangster turned

3:48

autocrat who was up to his neck in drug

3:50

trafficking, gun running and organized

3:52

crime. But in the Cold War,

3:55

he was also a key asset of the U.S. intelligence

3:58

services. his CIA-handless

4:01

intel on Castro's Cuba, and

4:03

provided arms to the Contras in Nicaragua.

4:07

Finally, though, Noriega and

4:09

the Americans parted ways in the mother

4:11

of all fallings out. And

4:13

when the CIA cut him loose, Noriega's

4:17

reputation as a Latin American bogeyman

4:19

was cemented. How

4:22

did an impoverished boy from

4:24

a relatively small country grow

4:26

up to play such a pivotal role in global

4:29

affairs?

4:29

Why does so much of the Noriega

4:32

story remain in the shadows? And

4:34

how much of what really happened on his

4:36

watch can we unveil?

4:42

From Noiser, this is

4:44

part one of the Noriega story.

4:47

And this is Real Dictators.

4:57

Getting to grips with

5:00

the Noriega story means engaging

5:02

with a complex web of contradictory

5:04

narratives, political spin, and outright

5:07

lies. Undoubtedly Noriega

5:10

was guilty of a great

5:20

many crimes. Among them it's pretty safe to say rape

5:22

and murder. Though,

5:23

like

5:27

Al Capone before him, it was lesser charges, drug trafficking,

5:29

racketeering, money laundering,

5:41

that ultimately brought him down. Experts

5:45

continue to debate where exactly Noriega

5:47

sits in the pantheon of dictators.

5:51

Michael Conniff is Professor Emeritus

5:53

at San Jose State University,

5:56

and the author of multiple books on Panama.

5:58

Noriega

6:01

was very definitely a dictator in the worst

6:03

sense. Atrocities, human

6:05

rights violations, torture, things

6:08

of that sort. Noriega was definitely not

6:11

an attractive figure. Martha

6:13

Duncan worked as a Panama analyst

6:15

in the US intelligence services. I

6:19

would not characterize Noriega on

6:21

the spectrum of Hitler. Hitler

6:24

did mass killings in

6:26

plain view. Noriega did it in

6:28

secret. And it wasn't mass.

6:31

So I would probably categorize him

6:33

more along the spectrum of a gangster,

6:35

a

6:36

thug.

6:38

There is so much secrecy around Noriega.

6:42

Basic facts are sometimes very hard to

6:44

establish. As

6:46

Panama's top intelligence officer,

6:48

he was a master of equivocation and misinformation.

6:53

Pinning anything on him personally is

6:55

like trying to catch a snake with your bare hands.

6:58

In fact, even the story about Father Gallego's

7:00

plunge from the helicopter is disputed.

7:04

Margaret Scranton is professor of political

7:07

science at the University of Arkansas

7:09

and author of the Noriega years.

7:12

It's

7:14

controversial whether or not there

7:16

was a helicopter. Did he

7:18

die? That's not in question.

7:21

He was killed. He was assassinated. Who

7:24

did it? I honestly do

7:26

not know. Noriega

7:29

himself sneered at the lack of hard evidence

7:31

proving his involvement in Gallego's murder.

7:35

In his memoirs written in prison after his

7:37

dramatic fall from power,

7:39

he claims that he was smeared. There

7:42

were attempts to name me as being involved,

7:45

but it didn't work. He concludes

7:48

smugly. But

7:50

he never says explicitly that he didn't

7:52

do it. It's

7:54

just inconclusive. Noriega's

7:57

involvement is inconclusive. Now

7:59

that can be because... Noriega is a superior

8:01

chameleon. And part of the plan would

8:03

be a plausible deniability

8:06

and being able to distance yourself. I

8:08

don't think we're ever gonna know for sure, but

8:11

the suspicion is very, very strong.

8:14

The Gallego mystery just goes to show how

8:16

much of the Noriega story is

8:19

a battle between warring versions of

8:21

the truth. On

8:23

one side, we have a professional liar and

8:25

keeper of secrets. And on the

8:27

other, the combined efforts of the

8:30

United States intelligence services. The

8:33

man, even according to US intelligence

8:36

profiles, the man was incredibly

8:39

intelligent and in

8:41

a very strategic sense, which

8:43

I think comes from street

8:45

smarts, such a skillful

8:48

opponent. Angel

8:50

Ricardo Martinez Benoit is

8:53

an advisor to the Panamanian government and

8:55

the author of Manuel Noriega, Prisoner

8:58

of War.

9:00

It's very convenient to make

9:02

Noriega the scapegoat of everything.

9:05

So everything gets centralized

9:07

in his image. I'm

9:10

certain that he did a lot of bad

9:12

things, but I think the main problem

9:14

is that there has been a massive effort

9:17

to kind of take him outside

9:19

of the context and just be like, this

9:21

guy is the devil,

9:22

when I think it should be analyzed in

9:25

not only Panama's context, Central America

9:28

and the whole hemisphere and the whole world.

9:34

First things first,

9:36

Panama.

9:38

It's a thin strip of land linking

9:40

South and Central America.

9:43

Today, most people know it as a country

9:45

with a canal,

9:47

but for many years, it might more accurately

9:50

be described as a canal with a country.

9:52

In the early 1900s,

9:54

Panama is a province of Colombia. It

9:57

has had this status for the best part of a century.

10:01

Now, US President Theodore Roosevelt

10:03

spots an opportunity. He

10:06

wants to strike an agreement to build

10:08

an artificial waterway right through the province.

10:12

A 51-mile-long canal connecting

10:14

the Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific. But

10:18

the Colombian Senate has other ideas.

10:23

Panama came into being in 1903. It

10:25

had been a province of Colombia

10:28

throughout much of the 19th century. The

10:30

United States had written a treaty

10:32

with Colombia to build a Panama

10:35

Canal. And the Colombian Senate

10:37

denied that treaty. And so Theodore

10:40

Roosevelt, the US President, decided

10:42

to have Panama declare its independence.

10:45

Immediately,

10:45

the United States signed a treaty

10:48

with Panama to build

10:50

a Panama Canal, to maintain

10:52

it, to defend it. And

10:54

that went into effect even though it

10:56

was not signed by any Panamanians, it was signed

10:59

by a Frenchman who represented the interests

11:01

of the new Panama Canal Company.

11:04

The 1903 treaty also grants

11:06

the United States ownership of a strip of

11:08

land either side of the canal. In

11:12

total, over 500 square

11:14

miles of American territory effectively

11:16

cuts the new nation of Panama in half.

11:20

The local people must ask permission from the US

11:22

authorities if they want to cross

11:25

this canal zone to visit

11:27

relatives on the other side.

11:29

Panamanians would typically say, how

11:31

would you like 50 miles on

11:34

either side of the Mississippi River? But

11:37

for the United States,

11:38

the canal represents one of its most valuable

11:41

real estate investments.

11:44

Robin Harding

11:45

is Professor of International Relations at the

11:47

University of Miami and author

11:49

of the History of Panama.

11:59

America around Tierra de Fuego

12:02

and it was treacherous, it was expensive,

12:05

it was long. So there was certainly

12:07

an economic component to this, but

12:10

for Teddy Roosevelt, there

12:12

was also the strategic military

12:14

reason.

12:15

Teddy Roosevelt had famously said

12:18

that the Caribbean was a quote-unquote

12:20

American lake, which meant

12:22

that the United States needed to protect

12:25

its southern flank. We

12:27

need to be able to move our forces very

12:29

rapidly from the Pacific to the Atlantic

12:31

and vice versa. And so the canal

12:34

is going to service the economic,

12:36

growing economic needs of the United States,

12:39

as well as its military strategic needs.

12:42

It was critical from the standpoint of the

12:45

U.S. Navy to have a canal to be able to

12:47

move warships from the Pacific to the Atlantic

12:50

and have what authorities called a two-ocean

12:52

navy without having to have double

12:55

the number of warships.

12:57

That in itself made the canal

12:59

a major strategic asset

13:01

in terms of global projection of American

13:04

forests. It played a role in World War

13:06

I, but a huge role in

13:08

World War II since the United States

13:10

was fighting the war along with its allies

13:12

in both the Europe

13:14

and the Pacific.

13:15

By the time the Cold War takes shape,

13:18

the United States' foothold in Central America

13:21

takes on a new strategic significance. The

13:24

Cold War in Central America

13:26

manifests itself in fear of communism

13:29

on one level, as well as the

13:32

potential that if the Cold War

13:34

ever turned hot, the Panama

13:36

Canal would be an obvious target

13:39

for Soviet forces. So

13:41

the United States never, ever

13:44

wanted to give any type of control

13:47

or dominance to the Panamanians.

13:51

And later, Panama will

13:54

prove crucial,

13:55

both to drug traffickers funneling their product

13:57

north and to law-enforced

14:00

punishment, seeking to disrupt the narcotics

14:02

trade.

14:04

Throughout the twentieth century,

14:06

Panama will remain an anomaly,

14:09

supposedly an independent sovereign country,

14:11

but effectively a U.S. protectorate.

14:16

Up until the end of 1999,

14:19

Panama would exist in this

14:22

interesting netherworld, where they are

14:25

independent

14:26

on paper, they have their own government,

14:29

but at the same time, the

14:32

currency of Panama is the U.S.

14:34

dollar. They do not have independent

14:36

economic policy

14:38

making decisions. And

14:41

on top of that, the United States

14:43

exercises the ability

14:45

to intervene when necessary.

14:55

Manuel Noriega is born in Panama

14:57

sometime in the mid-1930s.

15:00

Like so much else about him,

15:02

his exact date of birth remains a mystery.

15:05

His

15:06

father is a well-to-do lawyer.

15:08

His mother comes from a rather different

15:11

social class.

15:12

He was an illegitimate

15:15

child. The story is, his

15:17

father had had a relation

15:19

with the family he made,

15:22

and he was born of that relationship.

15:26

So he grew up as a person of mixed racial

15:28

heritage, partly Mestizo,

15:31

partly European,

15:33

certainly not accepted into well-to-do

15:35

families. The

15:37

boy spends his early years living with his mother

15:39

in a rural village called Yabiza,

15:42

not far from the Colombian border.

15:44

It's a verdant backwater.

15:47

Here, the ruins of a sixteenth century Spanish

15:49

fort are gradually being swallowed up by

15:51

the rainforest. jungle

16:01

and one road. It's an entire

16:03

province of jungle. You know, coming

16:05

from the farthest social

16:09

distance you could be from the

16:11

elites that had the power. But

16:14

then young Manuel's mother gets

16:16

sick with tuberculosis.

16:19

She's no longer able to take care of him.

16:22

And then when he was five or six

16:24

thereabouts, he was given up for adoption.

16:27

The father was probably not willing to raise

16:30

the child. So he was adopted and grew

16:33

up in poverty. And obviously

16:36

when do psychoanalysis, that was probably

16:38

not good for his psyche to be given up by his own

16:40

father.

16:45

By the age of five, both of Noriega's

16:47

parents are dead and he's living

16:50

with a godmother in a slum in Panama City.

16:54

Despite the family tragedy, he's

16:56

able to attend a decent high school

16:58

and he distinguishes himself academically.

17:02

Fellow students describe him as bookish and

17:04

neatly dressed.

17:06

But Manuel's teenage years are no walk

17:08

in the park. He

17:11

was also picked on

17:13

as a kid. One of his challenges

17:15

he faced was he got severe

17:17

acne

17:18

and ended up with a very scarred

17:21

acne face that from

17:23

then, even later in life

17:25

behind his back, people would call him para

17:27

de piña, pineapple face.

17:32

Poor and

17:33

facially scarred,

17:35

Noriega's prospects are limited.

17:38

But the young man is determined to claw

17:40

his way out of the slums. In 1958,

17:44

after failing to get into medical school, he

17:46

wins a scholarship to a military academy.

17:50

It's located 1500 miles away in Lima, the

17:53

capital city of Peru.

17:55

He wanted to be a doctor.

17:58

He couldn't do it. and that's

18:01

how he ends up going to the military school in

18:03

Chorillo in Peru. The

18:05

military officer class was

18:07

a way for people from lower middle class

18:09

origins to climb up the ladder

18:12

and become more acceptable. And that was

18:14

Noriega's entree into

18:16

middle class status as an officer. The

18:19

education that Noriega receives in Lima

18:22

was shaped not only his career prospects,

18:25

but his personality as well.

18:28

This was a military academy whose motto was, beat

18:31

them into submission and that will make them better soldiers.

18:34

So that most likely did

18:36

not positively affect Noriega's demeanor.

18:41

He would be deferential to

18:43

the ranks above and abusive to the ranks

18:45

below. You know, maybe

18:48

humiliating people, but

18:50

you know, maybe even more. At

18:53

some point during his training in Peru, the

18:56

young cadet attracts the attention of U.S.

18:58

intelligence.

19:01

The CIA would identify

19:03

potential upcoming stars

19:07

in Latin America who

19:09

would give them insights into

19:12

the organizations that were proximate

19:15

or important in the fight against global

19:17

communism.

19:18

In Noriega's case, he was

19:20

approached while he was still in Peru at

19:23

this military academy. He

19:25

was, one might say, hired as

19:27

a CIA asset, was

19:30

brought on to provide

19:32

information, not only about what was going

19:34

on at that time in Peru, but later once

19:37

he joined the National Guard in Panama.

19:39

And this arrangement was

19:42

not that unusual within the

19:44

context of the Cold War. Noriega

19:49

is the ideal intelligence asset. He

19:52

has no family loyalties,

19:54

no political affiliation,

19:56

and relatively modest career prospects.

19:58

Already he's

20:00

developed a reputation for cruelty and

20:03

sexual violence.

20:05

In 1960,

20:06

the cadet is arrested for raping and beating

20:09

up a local prostitute.

20:11

But neither the Military Academy or the CIA

20:14

sees this as a sackable offense. In

20:17

spycraft, when they're looking for

20:19

assets, they're always looking for weaknesses.

20:21

Somebody that could be bought,

20:24

whether it be through money,

20:27

through the desire for more power,

20:29

to raise their own stature in

20:32

society. These sort

20:34

of weaknesses are always,

20:36

whether it be the CIA, the OKGB,

20:40

MI6, whomever it is, they're

20:42

always looking for these people. For

20:44

Noriega, his weaknesses

20:47

were legendary, and

20:49

therefore he was an easy

20:52

purchase, one might say, for the CIA,

20:54

because I doubt Noriega really

20:56

cared if he was being manipulated. All

20:59

he cared about is he was being paid and the opportunities

21:01

this brought to him. Whether that's power

21:03

in money, power in women, power in drugs,

21:06

he really just was looking for

21:09

any way to bolster his

21:11

own stature in his own mind,

21:13

as well as

21:14

in the view of those around

21:16

him. After

21:21

four years of training in Peru,

21:23

Noriega returns to Panama.

21:26

Back home, he's commissioned as a junior officer

21:28

in the National Guard.

21:31

This military-cum-police force is

21:33

paid for in large part by the Americans.

21:36

Its remit is to

21:38

maintain law and order throughout the country. The

21:41

National Guard has also been known to do a bit of light

21:43

meddling in the Panamanian political process,

21:47

ensuring that candidates hostile to the

21:49

United States don't get elected.

21:52

It's at the National Guard barracks in Colon

21:55

in 1962, where Noriega

21:57

meets a man who will change the course of his

21:59

life.

22:01

a charismatic young major called

22:03

Omar Torrijos.

22:06

Torrijos is a man with a vision for the future

22:08

of the National Guard,

22:10

and perhaps even for Panama itself. But

22:13

to hear Noriega tell it,

22:15

Torrijos might as well be the dashing hero

22:17

of Italian novella.

22:20

He was tall, with a prominent

22:22

brow and flashing eyes, Noriega

22:25

recalls,

22:26

in the memoir written from his prison cell

22:28

three decades later.

22:30

He seemed to energize the room.

22:34

Torrijos too sees something special

22:36

in Noriega.

22:38

He offers the young man a job on the spot,

22:41

taking him on as a kind of protege. Torrijos

22:44

was probably already also thinking of building

22:47

his own power base. And you know, you have

22:49

a man like that, young, just came

22:51

out of a foreign military academy, good

22:54

education. I guess he said, I need this

22:56

guy working with me, whatever, just keep him by my

22:58

side, you never know. For

23:00

second Lieutenant

23:02

Noriega,

23:03

it's the best possible career move.

23:06

Under Torrijos' mentorship,

23:09

Noriega gradually progresses from lieutenant

23:11

to captain,

23:12

and eventually to major. He's

23:14

also encouraged to develop his skills

23:17

in the area of military intelligence.

23:20

There was, and there still is to

23:22

this day, a phenomenon that's

23:25

called patronism in Spanish, they call it

23:27

patronismo, which simply means

23:29

that you rise up through your society

23:32

by helping and

23:35

being subservient to someone who has power

23:37

above you in the hopes that they are going

23:39

to drag you along, they're going to pull you

23:41

up as they rise through the ranks as well.

23:45

He is a pretty mediocre

23:47

officer until Torrijos starts sending

23:50

him to intelligence courses

23:53

in the school of the Americas. That's

23:55

when he kind of finds his

23:58

calling. This

24:01

School of the Americas is located

24:03

within the Panama Canal Zone.

24:06

It offers specialist training to recruits

24:08

from all over Latin America.

24:11

These courses are taught by US Army personnel.

24:14

Topics include counter-insurgency

24:16

operations, jungle warfare,

24:19

intelligence and counterintelligence. Decades

24:23

later, some of the school's controversial teaching

24:25

material will be declassified by the Pentagon.

24:29

The ensuing scandal will ultimately

24:31

contribute to the institution being shut

24:34

down. One

24:36

CIA interrogation manual used

24:38

at the school during the 1960s details

24:41

coercive techniques, including

24:44

sleep deprivation, starvation, hypnosis,

24:48

drugs, threats of death

24:50

and inflicting physical pain.

24:54

There's no such thing as a one-size-fits-all

24:56

torture chamber. If

24:59

a coercive technique is to be used, the

25:01

manual concludes, it should

25:03

be chosen for its effect upon the individual

25:06

and carefully selected to match his

25:08

personality.

25:11

As ever, Noriega proves an

25:13

apt pupil. Finally,

25:16

the medical school reject seems

25:18

to have found his metier. He

25:20

had a very, very special

25:23

type of intelligence. He

25:25

was very analytic, was

25:27

someone that when you were talking to him, you could

25:29

feel that he was studying

25:31

you, you know, from top to

25:34

bottom. And you can see that

25:36

he was paying attention to even the slightest

25:38

detail, which I think makes sense considering

25:40

that he was such a talented spy and such a talented

25:43

intelligence officer.

25:45

Noriega was able to

25:47

do many of the things that

25:50

Torijos didn't want to be associated with. In

25:52

fact, Noriega

25:54

was called by Torijos his gangster.

25:57

He would call him Mi Gangster. because

26:01

Noriega would do all

26:03

the dirty work. In many

26:05

ways, they were polar opposites,

26:07

but they were also complementary. They

26:10

helped each other to accomplish their mutual

26:12

goals.

26:17

Like the CIA before him,

26:19

Omar Torrijos sees Noriega

26:21

as a useful asset,

26:23

but in cultivating this smart, morally

26:25

questionable young man, he's

26:28

helping to create a monster.

26:31

More than once, he's forced to step in when

26:33

Noriega's impulsive behavior gets him

26:35

into trouble. Militaries

26:38

have certainly been known for

26:41

taking advantage of their power, especially

26:43

power that doesn't have oversight.

26:46

He did commit rape on a number

26:48

of occasions, including a

26:50

13-year-old girl, but the

26:53

laws and the culture of that time

26:56

were not consistent with him

26:58

being punished for these violations

27:01

of women. One might say, this

27:03

is part of the good old boys' club. People,

27:06

when they have privileges and are not

27:08

sanctioned for this kind of behavior, tend

27:10

to repeat this kind of behavior.

27:11

And so the military

27:14

was not going to sanction him. In fact, Torrijos

27:16

protected him. And

27:19

so once you're socialized into

27:21

what you can get away with, the

27:22

behavior is going to continue.

27:28

Torrijos and Noriega continue their steady

27:30

rise through the ranks of the National Guard.

27:33

Meanwhile, the

27:34

political situation in Panama is beginning

27:37

to heat up.

27:40

Since the country's inception, a wealthy

27:42

minority has always held the reins of power.

27:46

Now, though, a new nationalist

27:48

movement is beginning to sweep the land, emphasizing

27:51

the rights of ordinary Panamanians over

27:53

those of the United States. Their

27:56

anger finds an obvious target in

27:59

the canal zone.

28:00

The 500 square mile US owned

28:03

enclave

28:03

that splits the country right there in the middle.

28:07

The little humiliations of daily life

28:09

were what mattered. You know, there's a lot of

28:12

friction. But remember that Panama

28:14

City is on the wrong side of the canal. So

28:17

if you want to go to the countryside, you have to cross the

28:19

American territory.

28:21

So all those little things were

28:23

a daily part of these people's lives. Angel

28:27

Ricardo Martinez Benoit remembers

28:29

visiting the zone as a child with

28:31

some of his mother's friends. My

28:34

mom died when I was eight or nine.

28:37

Since she worked with the Americans in the canal zone,

28:39

she had a lot of friends that were either American

28:42

or Panamanians that were married

28:44

to Americans. And when she was

28:46

sick or whatever, they would take me and my brother to the

28:48

actual canal zone, to like inside the bases

28:51

and all that. And it was a different world.

28:54

It was so different, you know, it was like

28:56

being in an American movie. These diners

28:59

and the bowling alleys, like those kind of things.

29:03

Intelligence analyst Martha Duncan

29:05

was actually born and raised inside the

29:08

canal zone,

29:09

making her a US citizen,

29:12

but also crucially a zonian,

29:15

as the 50,000 Americans living here

29:17

are known. I think

29:19

a very good way to describe where I grew up,

29:21

it's paradise. So everything

29:24

was maintained for you. You had

29:26

folks that came and cut the grass and

29:28

painted your houses and took

29:30

care of your plumbing.

29:32

We had our own police force, our

29:34

own fire department. We

29:37

had two high schools, one on the Pacific,

29:40

one on the Atlantic. All of our teachers

29:42

were from various parts of the

29:44

United States. Our

29:47

early life was full of sports,

29:50

team activity, community, beautiful

29:53

beaches and great

29:56

landscape. So

29:58

it was really a marvelous experience. marvelous

30:00

place to grow up. But

30:04

this unlikely slice of Americana hides

30:06

a darker side as well.

30:08

It's not just baseball and blueberry muffins

30:11

that have been introduced to Panama.

30:14

Early on, many of the administrators

30:16

and the people who had been sent to

30:19

work in the canal zone were from the

30:21

South, and they harbored racist

30:23

beliefs. They even imposed restrictions

30:26

against Panamanians who worked in the canal

30:28

zone with Jim Crow laws,

30:30

separate bathrooms, separate facilities

30:33

across the board. That begins to

30:35

fade as time goes on,

30:37

but there still was a two-tier

30:40

system. This world

30:43

existed in stark contrast

30:46

to what many Panamanians could have.

30:49

Panamanians that worked in the

30:51

canal zone would come in and say, hey, look

30:53

at this developed world. Why can't

30:56

we have this?

30:58

The growing tension is centered on the symbolic

31:00

question of whose flag gets to fly

31:03

in the zone,

31:04

the Panamanian banner

31:06

or the Stars and Stripes.

31:08

The National Guard, trained and funded

31:11

in large part by the United States, are

31:13

caught right in the middle. Panamanians

31:17

literally could see into the canal zone

31:19

and see an American flag flying, and

31:22

the question was raised, well, while

31:24

the United States may run this, this is still

31:27

supposed to be Panama. So why is

31:29

there not a Panamanian flag there

31:32

as well?

31:37

On May the 2nd, 1958, it

31:39

all kicks off. The

31:42

trouble starts when a group of students enter the

31:44

canal zone

31:45

and plant 70 Panamanian flags

31:47

in the ground.

31:49

When the local police force attempt to remove them,

31:52

a riot breaks out. The

31:54

National Guard are called in to restore order. In

31:58

the ensuing violence, none of the Panamanians are allowed to be killed. nine

32:00

demonstrators are killed. For

32:03

many of the National Guardsmen,

32:05

Panamanians themselves, this

32:07

is a wake-up call.

32:09

They vow never again to fire on

32:11

their fellow citizens. Eighteen

32:15

months later,

32:16

a group of high schoolers enter the zone

32:19

again and run a Panamanian banner

32:21

up the nearest flagpole. But this

32:23

time,

32:24

the National Guard remain in their barracks. It's

32:27

left to the American police force to disperse

32:29

the muting tear gas.

32:33

In September 1960, President

32:35

Eisenhower orders a compromise.

32:38

Within the zone, the Panamanian

32:40

flag will fly alongside the Star

32:43

Spangled Banner.

32:45

But the Zonians refuse to comply.

32:48

And President Kennedy, elected later

32:50

that year, is unable to resolve

32:52

the issue either.

32:55

For the Panamanian Nationalists, it's literally

32:57

the perfect banner under which to gather.

33:02

In 1964,

33:04

a third student protest erupts

33:06

in the Canal Zone.

33:07

And this one

33:09

will have lasting repercussions for the entire

33:11

country.

33:15

On January the 9th,

33:17

the American flag at Balboa High School

33:19

is taken down on the orders of the government

33:21

of the Canal Zone. The

33:23

Zonian students walk out of class and

33:26

raise another one themselves. Not

33:29

to be outdone, the Panamanian

33:31

students march on Balboa High, determined

33:34

to hoist their own banner alongside the American

33:36

one.

33:38

In the ensuing scuffle, the Panamanian

33:40

flag gets torn.

33:42

And then, all hell breaks

33:44

loose. The local police

33:46

once again resort to tear gas. But

33:49

this time, the protesters will not be driven

33:51

away. They begin throwing

33:53

rocks at the officers. Soon,

33:56

bullets are flying as well.

34:02

The riot makes the cover of Time magazine.

34:05

The front page shows students climbing

34:08

the Balboa flagpole, while smoke

34:10

billows from a burning vehicle. The

34:13

violence soon spills out of the canal zone.

34:16

The US Embassy in Panama City has hurriedly

34:18

evacuated, as riots as target

34:21

American-owned banks and businesses, causing $2

34:24

million worth of damage. With

34:27

the National Guard still declining to get involved,

34:30

the US Army attempts to put an end to the

34:32

disturbance. But

34:34

by the time the hostilities cease four days

34:37

later, dozens are dead. Among

34:40

them,

34:40

an 11-year-old girl shot by the soldiers,

34:44

and a six-month-old baby who died

34:46

after inhaling tear gas.

34:49

In Panama,

34:50

January 9, 1964 goes down in infamy,

34:54

as martyrs day.

34:56

The following week,

34:58

diplomatic relations with the United States

35:00

are formally severed.

35:04

Neither Omo Torrijos nor Manuel

35:07

Noriega plays a direct role in the flag

35:09

riots. But the problem

35:11

of the canal zone will be the cause that defines

35:14

Torrijos' political career. And

35:17

as his influence increases, so

35:19

too will that of his dubious disciple. In

35:23

time, the two men will ride the growing

35:25

wave of Panamanian nationalism,

35:27

all the way to power.

35:35

By 1968, thanks to an injection

35:38

of funds from Washington,

35:40

the National Guard has grown to over 5,000 men.

35:44

And Lieutenant Colonel Omo Torrijos is

35:47

one of its leading lights.

35:49

Torrijos has a clear position on the Panama

35:51

Canal.

35:52

It belongs in the hands of the Panamanians.

35:56

But his vision for the country goes further. He

35:59

wants to bring

37:57

starts

38:00

to become more professional. And what

38:02

that creates is among the National

38:04

Guard, a sense of ability

38:07

and accomplishment, but also the

38:09

military kind of says, okay, the

38:11

civilians are so inept, the civilians

38:14

are so corrupt,

38:15

maybe we can do it better than they can.

38:18

They look out and they say, wait a minute, look

38:20

at this sharp contrast between the Panama

38:22

Canal Zone and everything that could happen, and

38:25

the poverty, the lack of education

38:27

exists outside of the Canal Zone. And

38:30

so this group of officers led

38:33

by Omarto Rijos basically

38:35

tried to right the wrongs of the past.

38:38

This kind of meddling by the military has been

38:40

a feature of Panamanian politics for generations.

38:43

We could call them an arbiter, an arbiter

38:46

of political power. So when

38:48

there was a sharp disagreement

38:50

between political rivals, the military

38:52

would step in and designate power

38:55

to one side or the other.

38:58

Matters come to a head

39:00

with the election of the populist politician, Arnolfo Arias.

39:04

Like Torijos, Arias

39:06

is a Panamanian

39:08

nationalist, but he also holds a longstanding

39:10

grudge against the National Guard.

39:15

Less than a fortnight after

39:16

taking office, he begins a reshuffle that

39:19

will decimate their command structure. A

39:22

number of senior guardsmen find themselves on the new

39:24

transfer list. Torijos,

39:28

currently serving as executive secretary

39:32

and based at the guards' headquarters in

39:34

Panama City, is ordered to leave the country

39:36

at once for a diplomatic post in El Salvador.

39:41

But before he vacates his office, Torijos meets

39:44

with

39:44

other guardsmen who've been

39:46

summarily dismissed from their positions.

39:49

Together they hatch a plan to seize power

39:52

and they will action it within a matter of hours.

39:56

That evening.

40:00

President Arias is out at the cinema with

40:02

his mistress. The plotters

40:05

choose this moment to strike.

40:08

On their orders,

40:09

guardsmen surround the presidential palace and

40:11

lock down the airport. They

40:13

seize control of TV and radio stations.

40:17

Once Arias realizes what's happening, he

40:20

jumps in his car and flees to the canal zone.

40:23

From there he catches a plane to Miami.

40:26

The whole coup is accomplished in a matter of

40:28

hours

40:29

and without a single casualty.

40:35

To begin with, Torijos is just

40:37

one of several senior guardsmen to assume

40:39

the reins of power.

40:41

Among these ringleaders, it's Major

40:43

Boris Martinez who commands the largest

40:46

number of troops.

40:48

But it's Torijos who stars in the

40:50

Ascendant. He soon becomes

40:52

the dominant figure in the new regime.

40:55

And lurking just behind him, offstage

40:58

for now, his

40:59

trusted confidant.

41:02

All the civilians were out and the military

41:04

came in in October of 1968, set up a sort

41:09

of a junta to run the country. And

41:11

within a year, Omar Torijos had

41:14

shouldered out Tienes and became

41:16

the sole military force within the government

41:18

and he gradually demoted or

41:21

shoved aside other military officers

41:23

who questioned his preeminence

41:25

in the military government.

41:27

Torijos promotes himself to

41:29

Brigadier General and commander

41:31

of the National Guard. By

41:34

now, the Americans have formally recognized Panama's

41:36

military government. But

41:38

Torijos' vision for wide-ranging

41:40

social reforms is causing

41:43

some concern internationally.

41:46

The Americans consider him to be a little

41:49

bit more left of center than they would like.

41:52

He was not a communist, but

41:54

the perception was that he

41:57

was a little bit to the left.

41:59

He's a leftist, a dangerous

42:02

leftist that can turn into communism

42:04

so quickly. So it's got

42:07

to be controlled. For

42:09

Panamanians, our country

42:11

needs economic and social

42:14

and political progress. If

42:16

that means we look like leftists

42:18

to you, we have a problem.

42:22

British diplomats offer another perspective

42:24

on the country's new leader.

42:26

Schrud, rather than intelligent,

42:29

a note from the Embassy reads. He

42:31

follows the Panamanian custom of womanizing,

42:34

drinks heavily,

42:36

and he is prone to find agreeable jobs

42:38

for old friends. Friends

42:41

like Noriega.

42:43

In October 1969, Tarikos promotes

42:46

his ally to Major

42:47

and gives him a prestigious new posting

42:49

as commander of a National Guard garrison.

42:53

It's a decision that will turn out very well

42:55

for both of them before the year is out.

42:58

Because within Panama and within

43:00

the military junta, there remain

43:02

those who are concerned about Tarikos' plans

43:04

for the country,

43:06

and he is about to receive a reality check.

43:12

In December 1969, the

43:14

commandant takes a trip to Mexico City.

43:17

There he pays a visit to a race course. A

43:20

Panamanian thoroughbred is competing in the prestigious

43:23

race of the Americas. From

43:26

his ringside seat, he relaxes

43:28

in the sun as the horses thunder along the

43:30

track in front of him.

43:34

With their boss unwinding far away,

43:38

some of Tarikos' co-conspirators from

43:40

a year earlier decide that this

43:42

is the moment to stage a second coup

43:44

of their own. They

43:46

seize the National Guard headquarters in Panama

43:49

City. That night, Tarikos

43:52

receives a phone call warning him not to return

43:54

to Panama. But

43:56

the veteran guardsman is not one to walk away

43:58

from a fight.

44:00

I'm not ready for a life in exile, he

44:02

tells his aide. I would rather

44:04

die over there in action than die from

44:06

sadness here in Mexico. Turicos

44:11

places a call to Noriega's barracks in the town

44:13

of David.

44:14

He tells him to prepare the landing strip there

44:17

for an unscheduled arrival.

44:20

The Commandantes has hired a private plane

44:22

for a fee of $6,000, but there's a problem. This

44:26

Mexican pilot has no idea how

44:29

to get into Panama. Fortunately,

44:32

a legendary fighter pilot

44:34

volunteers to come along for the ride. Red

44:37

Grey is a World War II veteran

44:40

and one of the top flyers in Central America,

44:43

an ace for the Salvadorian Air Force. As

44:46

co-pilot, he will be responsible

44:49

for guiding them safely across the border. With

44:54

no radar, Red Grey can only

44:56

navigate by the lights of the cities below. But

44:59

somehow he manages to find the tiny airfield

45:02

in David. The

45:04

airstrip has no landing lights, but

45:07

Noriega has come up with a workaround. A

45:09

convoy of jeeps is lined up along the

45:11

runway. As soon as the plane

45:14

makes radio contact, he orders

45:16

all the vehicles to turn on their headlights. The

45:19

landing strip is bathed

45:20

in brilliant light. And

45:23

with a screech of burning rubber, the

45:25

little plane touches down safely. Tarikos

45:29

emerges to cheer us from the men on the ground.

45:35

At dawn the next day, Tarikos

45:37

and Noriega set off for Panama City, leading

45:40

a convoy of vehicles. With

45:42

every barracks they pass, more guardsmen

45:45

join the caravan, until a hundred

45:47

jeeps and trunks are travelling in formation.

45:51

They arrive in the capital to find the conspirators

45:53

already under armed guard. Their

45:56

attempted coup has collapsed in spectacular

45:58

fashion.

46:04

In a public show of magnuminity,

46:07

Torrijos decides to exile

46:09

rather than hang them.

46:12

The triumphant return of the General and

46:14

Noriega with him will go down

46:16

in legend. Even

46:19

today it's called the Day of Loyalty in

46:22

Panama. I think it's December 16, 1969. It's

46:25

the day that Torrijos comes back from

46:28

Mexico and a coup attempt fails.

46:31

And that's kind of the moment where the revolution,

46:34

the mystique of the revolution kind of gets

46:37

consolidated. And

46:40

right next to Torrijos is Noriega.

46:44

With the conspiracy put to bed, Torrijos

46:46

sets about consolidating power.

46:49

From now on, the General's staff

46:52

will be made up of younger loyalists,

46:54

and they will be watched closely by someone he

46:56

trusts,

46:58

someone who's just received their

47:00

fourth promotion in as many years.

47:04

The newly minted Lieutenant Colonel

47:06

Noriega

47:07

is put in charge of Panama's intelligence services

47:10

known as G2. For

47:13

a morally sketchy young man with a penchant

47:15

for secrets,

47:16

it's the perfect position. I

47:20

think his finest hour

47:22

professionally is the time when

47:24

he's Panama's chief of intelligence from 1970

47:28

until 1983,

47:29

more or less those 13 years,

47:32

which also are probably Panama's finest hour

47:35

in the international stage. There's

47:37

a reverence in Panama for all that generation.

47:40

Obviously, no one wants to talk about

47:42

Noriega. This society is not ready to

47:44

recognize the role that he played as Torrijos'

47:47

chief of intelligence.

47:49

Think of how small Panama is. If

47:51

you've got about 2 million people and a

47:53

good intelligence network, you can have

47:55

a pretty good sense of who's who, what's

47:58

what, who's doing what.

48:00

Torijos used to say that there were three

48:03

kinds of truth in the world. The

48:05

white truth was the one that everyone

48:07

knew. The gray truth was

48:09

the one that he and Noriega knew. And

48:11

the black truth was the one that only Noriega

48:14

knew.

48:15

It should be clear that Torijos was no angel.

48:18

They were both engaged in very

48:20

undemocratic, dirty business. It's

48:23

just that Torijos knew that he had

48:25

to keep his hands clean

48:28

for public consumption. Whereas

48:30

Noriega, if he was,

48:33

you know, the dark lord

48:35

of the underworld and got jobs

48:37

done for him, that's fine.

48:40

In Star Wars terms, he was the

48:42

Darth Vader to Torijos's

48:45

Emperor.

48:52

Noriega is now, as one CIA report

48:54

puts it,

48:55

probably the second most powerful man

48:57

in Panama. And the CIA

49:00

ought to know what they're talking about.

49:02

After all, he's one of their assets.

49:06

He was very well placed, obviously.

49:08

Panama is a strategic location. The

49:11

fact that he was close to Cuba, Nicaragua,

49:14

Salvador,

49:14

etc., etc., he

49:17

became a very good informant. He

49:20

was handling all the security

49:22

relations with the Americans. And at the

49:24

same time, he was being abridged

49:27

between the Americans and Cuba. You

49:29

know, remember, this is the 70s. Up

49:32

until 1985, he was actually getting paid $200,000

49:34

a year to be as an informant. What

49:39

was not known for some time that,

49:42

you know, he was already playing both sides.

49:47

Compared to many other dictatorships,

49:50

the regime in Panama is relatively restrained,

49:53

for now at least. Human

49:55

rights organizations count 34 political

49:58

murders over the course of Torijos.

49:59

those 13 years in power. They're

50:04

awful, they're wrong, but it's

50:06

relatively small. I

50:08

talked to one of the civilian

50:10

opponents who had been incarcerated

50:13

by the military, and she said,

50:15

you know, they make you fear torture

50:18

rather than torturing you. Now

50:20

that was not everybody's

50:21

experience. You know,

50:23

some truly were tortured, but

50:25

it's this, it's more psychological

50:28

than physical punishment. It's

50:30

the manipulation of fear.

50:35

With Noriega keeping a close eye on enemies

50:37

at home,

50:38

Tariqos is free to realize his grand

50:41

vision for Panama.

50:43

Much of his time is spent traveling the country, whether

50:45

by jeep,

50:46

helicopter, or plane,

50:48

sometimes even on horseback.

50:51

He spends his time hanging out with peasant workers

50:54

and other marginalized groups.

50:56

He convinces them that he will

50:58

be their champion.

51:01

Within a decade, the number of teachers

51:03

in Panama has doubled, and

51:05

the number of schools isn't far behind.

51:09

The whole country was enthralled by him

51:11

and still is. And the whole of Latin America,

51:14

he still remembered as an incredible

51:16

leader and incredible politician.

51:19

Within just a few years, the

51:21

military usurper has reinvented himself

51:24

as the father of the nation. But

51:27

Tariqos' biggest promise to his people remains

51:30

unfulfilled.

51:31

The Canal Zone is still in American

51:34

hands.

51:36

With the election of Jimmy Carter to the White

51:38

House in 1976, Tariqos

51:40

spies an opportunity. The

51:43

new president has promised to put moral principles

51:46

at the heart of his foreign policy. And

51:48

the way Tariqos sees it,

51:50

ownership of the Canal Zone is very much

51:52

a matter of principle.

51:55

The Carter-Tariqos Treaties, signed

51:58

in September 1977. marked

52:00

the pinnacle of Turicos' career. They

52:03

set a date for the U.S. to finally relinquish

52:05

control of the canal zone.

52:08

December 31, 1999. Not

52:12

everyone in Panama, it must be said, is happy

52:14

with the outcome.

52:16

For the Zonians, it signals the

52:18

end of an era. And

52:20

there was a lot of sadness, because

52:23

we felt at the time that

52:25

President Carter was turning our

52:27

way of life, our piece of land,

52:30

over to Panama.

52:32

If you were born and raised in the canal zone,

52:34

you're called Izonian. And

52:36

anybody that was born after December 31st

52:39

of 1999 can no longer claim that. So

52:42

we are an extinct species. Turicos'

52:46

legacy is secure,

52:48

but there is one more thing he wants to accomplish

52:50

before he rides off into the sunset.

52:53

After a decade of military rule,

52:56

President Carter suggests,

52:58

isn't it high time Panama returned to democracy?

53:02

Turicos has grown to respect Carter during

53:04

the lengthy treaty negotiations.

53:07

And so, in 1978, he

53:09

announces his plans for the transition.

53:12

In six years' time, an election will

53:15

be held to choose a new president. He

53:18

intends to form a new political party to

53:20

continue the work he started.

53:23

But despite repeated calls to stand, Turicos

53:26

insists that he is done with politics.

53:29

He begins searching for a civilian candidate

53:32

to succeed him.

53:34

In the meantime, Turicos makes plans to

53:36

retire the senior staff of the National Guard.

53:39

Never again will a military hunter hold the reins

53:42

of power in Panama.

53:45

The likes of Manuel Noriega will soon

53:47

be out on their ears.

53:50

There was a plan to start

53:52

the process of democratization, which

53:55

would have been more open elections.

53:58

But of course, Omar Turicos did.

53:59

didn't live long enough to fulfill

54:02

his vision.

54:06

On July 30,

54:09

1981, Omar Torrijos boards a small twin

54:11

propeller plane.

54:13

He's about to make the twelve-minute flight from

54:15

a friend's beach house to his own

54:18

country pad in Coquilcito. It's

54:21

a stunning retreat nestled in the rainforest,

54:24

the perfect place to decompress.

54:27

About fifty-two years old,

54:29

Torrijos has shown little sign of slowing down.

54:32

Of late,

54:33

both Fidel Castro and Yugoslavia's

54:36

Marshal Tito

54:37

have warned him to cut back on unnecessary

54:40

air travel.

54:43

He was on a prop-driven

54:46

plane, and when he

54:48

takes off, the weather was actually

54:50

not ideal. Really

54:53

bad weather, fairly

54:57

light plane, cloudy

54:59

mountains. He was impulsive.

55:03

If he wanted to be somewhere, he wanted to be there. He

55:05

insisted that his pilot fuel up

55:07

the plane and fly to where he wanted to go. Probably

55:11

flying in a plane in

55:14

dangerous conditions would have been

55:17

satisfying to his machismo, to

55:19

his ego. You

55:20

know, we can do this, we can take care of this,

55:22

nothing's going to stop me.

55:25

Of course, ultimately hitting

55:27

a mountain at 500 miles an hour does

55:30

stop you, and it did. And

55:32

his end came very suddenly for

55:34

Panama.

55:37

My parents, they

55:39

remembered it, and they

55:42

always say that it was like someone

55:44

in the family had died for everyone. A

55:48

week later,

55:49

thousands of mourners line the streets of

55:51

Panama City.

55:53

A riderless horse leads

55:55

the funeral cottage from the Metropolitan Cathedral

55:58

to the headquarters of the National Guard.

56:01

That afternoon, in a

56:03

move rich with symbolism, the

56:05

General's casket is brought to Ancon Hill,

56:08

a vantage point within the canal zone that

56:11

is visible from all over the city. There,

56:14

at the foot of a giant flagpole, National

56:17

Guard officers in smart dress uniforms

56:20

lay their leader down on Panamanian

56:22

soil. But

56:27

even before Tariqos' body is

56:28

in the ground, the rumors start

56:30

circulating. Usually

56:34

when something like that happens, the obvious question

56:36

was, who benefits the most? And

56:38

it's clear who benefits the most. The

56:41

suspicion is that Noriega was behind

56:43

Tariqos' death. It

56:46

was a very real story behind the

56:48

scenes. Noriega had

56:50

been an up-and-coming guy, and

56:52

I kind of see that he was

56:55

starting to get greedy with power.

56:58

Why would you betray someone like

57:00

Tariqos, you know, who gave you

57:03

everything? And why would you do

57:05

that? To serve who?

57:07

I don't doubt that the

57:10

CIA might have had at least

57:12

an intention to kill him or to deal

57:14

with him in one way or another,

57:17

maybe,

57:18

but whether that actually translated

57:21

into an operation to

57:24

kill someone like Tariqos,

57:27

I don't know. Obviously,

57:29

conspiracy theories are bound in there still out

57:31

there. I believe it really was

57:33

just a plain accident due to careless

57:36

piloting and impulsive desires

57:39

on Tariqos' part.

57:41

Whatever the cause of the crash, Tariqos'

57:44

death leaves a power vacuum in Panama.

57:48

With his eyes on democratization, the

57:50

general never gave much thought to an immediate

57:53

military successor.

57:55

But after several months

57:57

of jockeying,

57:58

one man rises.

57:59

to the top.