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ISC StormCast for Friday, May 3rd, 2024

ISC StormCast for Friday, May 3rd, 2024

Released Friday, 3rd May 2024
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ISC StormCast for Friday, May 3rd, 2024

ISC StormCast for Friday, May 3rd, 2024

ISC StormCast for Friday, May 3rd, 2024

ISC StormCast for Friday, May 3rd, 2024

Friday, 3rd May 2024
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Episode Transcript

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0:00

Hello and welcome to the Friday May 3rd, 2020 4

0:02

edition of the Sans and its Storms and

0:07

Stormcast. My name is Johannes

0:09

Ulrich and I'm recording from

0:12

Jacksonville, Florida. When teaching web

0:14

application security, one of the things

0:16

that often comes up is simple

0:18

authentication bypasses and I do mention

0:21

things like a stupid cookie that

0:23

says user equals admin. You

0:26

would think this wouldn't work but well

0:28

that's exactly what I was writing about

0:30

today. It used

0:32

exactly this type of vulnerability

0:35

a cookie user equals admin

0:37

addition the vulnerability that is

0:40

likely being exploited here

0:42

uses a command injection vulnerability

0:44

where when you're trying to change

0:47

your password it will also

0:49

inject commands for you. Just

0:52

to clarify LBLink don't confuse

0:55

it with TP link. LBLink is

0:57

a Chinese OEM as far

0:59

as I can tell their

1:01

routers may be sold under

1:04

various trademarks Minga

1:07

WRAC 1200 apparently

1:10

same vulnerability so likely

1:12

same manufacturer and

1:14

same firmware. One problem with

1:16

sort of these routers that

1:19

are sold under different trade

1:21

names is that it

1:23

can be difficult to figure out

1:25

where to actually get firmware for

1:27

these devices before you buy any

1:29

kind of device like this always

1:31

try to find a manufacturer's website

1:34

check out if firmware is easily

1:37

available from the website and while

1:39

you're there also check if they

1:41

have any kind of end-of-life policy

1:43

to make sure you're not buying a device

1:45

that will no longer receive

1:47

any updates and

1:50

talking about routers and related

1:53

devices we do have an

1:55

update for Aruba OS that's

1:57

part of HP Enterprise

2:00

A number of different vulnerabilities are

2:02

being addressed here. Four of them

2:04

are buffer overflows with a critical

2:07

rating and the CVS score of 9.8.

2:11

At least it's not a weak

2:13

default password. And

2:16

if you're brave enough to

2:19

actually try to parse XML

2:21

in JavaScript using the NPM

2:23

library XML Crypto which is

2:26

the XML Crypto library available

2:28

in NPM, well it didn't

2:30

really do much to actually

2:32

verify the certificates

2:34

being included in

2:37

an XML message. So when

2:39

you're creating a signed or

2:41

encrypted XML message you have

2:43

the ability to include any

2:45

certificates in a key info

2:47

block. Of course you would expect

2:50

that the certificates are being verified

2:52

that they are signed with some

2:54

kind of trust anchor. Well XML

2:57

Crypto thought that this really just

2:59

for people who are sort of

3:02

non-trusting and think that users may

3:04

occasionally like slip in a bad

3:06

document. So they just skipped that

3:08

check and that way

3:10

it was possible to submit

3:13

fake signed XML documents by

3:15

just including the key that you

3:17

used to sign your fake document. This

3:20

issue has been fixed in version 4

3:22

through 6 of

3:24

this library. It's possible that you're

3:26

still using versions before

3:30

4. Basically that's the major version

3:32

of the library. In that case

3:34

well it's up to you to

3:36

actually check the key info certificates

3:39

before you trust the output of

3:41

XML Crypto. And

3:44

Lumen's black lotus lab did

3:47

find some compromised small office home

3:49

office routers that were infected with

3:51

malware that essentially placed the

3:53

good old machine in the middle attack. plenty

4:01

of ways to basically

4:03

make these we

4:05

do have strict transport security

4:08

we do have secure parameters

4:10

on cookies but of course

4:12

developers are stupid and are

4:15

not using these particular precautions

4:17

and that's exactly what Cuddlefish

4:19

that's what they're calling this

4:22

Malabar takes advantage of in

4:24

that it will intercept HTTP

4:27

connections try to then redirect

4:30

users to HTTP or

4:32

spoofed HTTP versions of

4:34

websites and then

4:36

steals credentials that way interestingly

4:38

it specifically goes after cloud

4:41

credentials like a cloud flare

4:43

auth keys AWS secret key

4:46

not sure if they're looking here

4:49

sort of for development sites that

4:51

may not use HTTPS properly it's

4:54

amazingly simple to actually

4:56

configure these services correctly if

4:58

you're using them in actual

5:00

cloud flare or AWS actually

5:03

in some cases it's almost

5:05

more work to not configure

5:07

these services correctly hey

5:10

but don't be afraid of additional

5:13

router vulnerabilities I just read another

5:15

paper where someone suggested to use

5:17

AI to fix home router vulnerabilities

5:19

not going to link to the

5:22

paper because it's just a waste

5:24

of time thanks for listening hope

5:26

this wasn't a waste of time

5:29

and talk to you again on

5:31

Monday bye

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