0:00

We're old, driven by searching for something better.

0:02

But when it comes to hiring, the best

0:04

way to search for a candidate isn't to

0:07

search at all. Don't search but match with

0:09

indeed. If. You need to hire.

0:11

You need indeed, indeed, is your matching

0:14

and hiring platform with over three hundred

0:16

fifty million global monthly visitors according to

0:18

Indy data and a matching engine that

0:20

helps you find quality candidates fast. You

0:23

can ditch the busy work use Indeed

0:25

for scheduling, screening and messaging so you

0:27

can connect with candidates faster. And.

0:29

Indeed, Smashing Engine is constantly learning

0:32

from your preferences, so the more

0:34

use indeed, the better it gets.

0:36

Listeners of Mindscape will get a

0:39

seventy five dollars sponsor job credit

0:41

to get your jobs more visibility

0:43

at indeed.com/mindscape Just go to indeed.com/mindscape

0:45

right now and support our show

0:48

by saying you heard about Indeed

0:50

on this podcast That's indeed dot

0:52

com/Mindscape terms and conditions apply. Need

0:54

to Hire You? Need? Indeed! If

0:57

you travel, you know when it comes to love. See you

0:59

soon. Can't wait, the sky is no limit.

1:02

You know with your Delta Amex card, being oceans

1:05

apart means meeting an Aruba and booking a war

1:07

travel with your card means saving 15% on

1:09

Delta flights. You know kissing

1:12

under the bridge of size guarantees eternal

1:14

love because you're the long distance lovebirds.

1:16

It's why you're a Delta SkyMiles Platinum

1:19

American Express card member. If you

1:21

travel, you know. Take off 15 discount not

1:23

applicable to partner operated flights or taxes and fees.

1:25

For more terms apply visit go.amex.uno. Do.

1:28

You ever wonder where all your money went?

1:30

Like every single time you look at your

1:32

bank account. Honestly, It's probably

1:35

all those subscriptions I felt that

1:37

way to until I got Rocket

1:39

Money. Rocket Money helped me see

1:41

all the subscriptions I'm paying for

1:43

and it was eye opening. Between

1:45

streaming services, fitness apps, delivery services,

1:48

it all adds up so quickly.

1:50

Rocket Money as a personal finance

1:52

app that finds and cancels your

1:54

unwanted subscriptions, monitors you're spending and

1:56

help slow your belts. Rocket Money

1:58

has over five. We knew this

2:01

and has helped save it's members

2:03

an average of seven hundred twenty

2:05

dollars a year with over five

2:08

hundred million in cancel subscriptions. Stop

2:10

wasting money on things you don't

2:12

use. Cancel your unwanted descriptions by

2:15

going to Rocket Money That Com

2:17

last winter. If that's Rocket money.com/wondering

2:19

Rocket money.com/laundry. Hello!

2:22

Everyone welcome to the Mindscape Podcast. I'm

2:25

your host Sean Carroll. One of the

2:27

great things about having a podcast is

2:29

that I not the university in particular

2:31

I do not have departments. Are you

2:33

not have to worry about hiring people?

2:35

I can just talk to people that

2:37

ideas, whatever the ideas might be, as

2:40

long as I think that they're interesting.

2:42

So as a result of that, I

2:44

don't need to worry about which department

2:46

somebody sits in. You know that I'm

2:48

back now as a real professor at

2:50

Johns Hopkins when I was at. Caltech.

2:53

I was a research professor, which was

2:55

great for doing research, but you're sort

2:57

of less integrated into the wider university

2:59

life than I am now. So not

3:02

only my a professor now, but I

3:04

am both the professor in Philosophy and

3:06

physics, and I have attachments to other

3:09

parts of the university, in cetera. So

3:11

I'm thinking a lot about these issues

3:13

of how people fit in. and it's

3:16

so frustrating. So annoying to some people

3:18

might be brilliant scholars, but don't fit

3:20

easily into any one department. Here

3:23

at Mindscape, we don't need to

3:25

worry about that and today's guest

3:27

is a wonderful example. So hard

3:29

he dairy Farm is a philosopher.

3:31

She is in the Philosophy department

3:33

at Ohio State University, no doubt

3:35

about that. Her at work touches

3:37

as you here in the episode

3:39

on ideas put forward by people

3:41

like Kill and O'connor and Elizabeth

3:43

Anderson who are also both philosophers

3:45

were previous guests but it also

3:47

touches on ideas that are similar

3:49

to what her begin to his

3:51

talked about and. Heard was also difficult

3:53

to fit into a category, but if

3:56

anything, he'd be called an economist and

3:58

a lot of work so hard. Links

4:00

about his political science and Justice

4:02

You know, political kinds of philosophy.

4:05

You'll hear names like Hobbs and

4:07

Human come up in our conversation.

4:09

People like John Rawls and others

4:11

have thought a lot about what

4:14

is a Just Society. So the

4:16

specific angle that's a hard brings

4:18

to this is guess what? Complexity

4:21

Theory An even more so than

4:23

people like Killing O'connor Elizabeth Anderson.

4:25

She's not only think about society

4:28

and it's dynamics, but she's explicitly.

4:30

Doing so from the

4:32

lens of complex systems

4:35

research clearly. If

4:37

anything is going to be complex

4:39

in the world, all of society

4:42

is going to be pretty complex,

4:44

right? And there's a question you're

4:46

perfectly willing to ask God willing

4:48

to wonder about if you're complexity

4:51

theory skeptics, which is, do these

4:53

techniques that go under the rubric

4:55

of the complex systems research have

4:57

any specific applicability to the individual

5:00

fields, right? If society is complex,

5:02

if the economy is complex at

5:04

the Internet is complex, but also

5:06

if an organism is complex of

5:08

individual cell is complex or they're

5:11

really features that are com into

5:13

these that are worth thinking about

5:15

vs. just thinking about each individual

5:17

thing in it's own right. And

5:20

I think that the answer that

5:22

comes out of the conversation you're

5:24

about to listen to is that

5:26

there is something gained by thinking

5:29

about society as a complex system

5:31

that we can learn about from

5:33

thinking about complex systems in general.

5:35

So we'll think about. Phase

5:38

Transitions will think about game Theory

5:40

will think about networks and that

5:42

not only helps you analyze the

5:45

structure of society which may be

5:47

is a perfectly obvious thing. If

5:49

you think this thing might work,

5:51

the interesting thing is it helps

5:54

you philosophize about what a good

5:56

the society would be like. Thinking

5:58

about society as the complex system

6:01

as he has a high will

6:03

try to make the case for

6:05

anything that she's convinced me anyway.

6:07

Ah, makes you think about what

6:10

society should shoot for in a

6:12

different way. It's maybe in retrospect,

6:14

not surprising. The better you understand

6:17

something, the more likely you are

6:19

to have good ideas about how

6:21

to optimize that thing. So whatever

6:23

your personal values are thinking about

6:26

society accurately might suggest ways to

6:28

achieve those personal values. In the

6:30

organization of society and the specific fact

6:32

that society is a complex system will

6:34

as you will see, I want to

6:36

give it away, but as you will

6:38

see will make certain suggestions about that.

6:40

So so glad that I'm not the

6:42

university. I don't need to worry about

6:45

putting people into departments. I can just

6:47

talk to people because they're interesting. With

6:49

that, let's go. Higher

7:07

had our he fired welcome to the By a

7:09

podcast. Thank you for hands. So

7:12

you know, like I have to start

7:14

with a conversation that we had just

7:16

a little while ago. We were at

7:19

a workshop together and I asked you

7:21

if as a philosopher who is thinking

7:23

about society and and political questions, you

7:26

ever collaborate with political scientists and roughly

7:28

speaking you said yes And in those

7:30

collaboration your job is to run the

7:33

model, run the computer. My husband my

7:35

there's a guy that says it's a

7:37

made me laugh because. As.

7:39

A Physicist he talk to philosophers the

7:42

I often let people know it you're

7:44

talking if offers a super useful but

7:46

you don't go to them to calculate

7:49

a fireman diagram. So just as a

7:51

statistic of the teaser or an overview,

7:53

how do you end up being the

7:55

philosopher the people go to to run

7:58

their computer simulations are that. The

8:00

only question think you're first

8:02

starting Usa? I'm So the

8:05

short answer is that perhaps

8:07

because of the things that

8:09

you have mentioned in your

8:12

conversation with Killing or Connor

8:14

in another at the Syrup

8:16

this podcast Yes ah about

8:19

just so Stories. So. The

8:21

idea is side. We have

8:23

some assumptions about how society

8:26

works. Based on those assumptions

8:28

become up with some system

8:30

for how things can be

8:32

prevented from going the wrong,

8:34

how it can be maintained

8:37

in a stable functioning level

8:39

and then based on those

8:41

assumptions. the also make a

8:43

lot of prescriptions for what

8:46

should be done or how

8:48

can be make things more

8:50

up. To more more effective

8:52

and then a follows some normative

8:54

claims about what is just what

8:57

is moral that is fair, blah

8:59

blah by those assumptions. Sometimes our

9:02

fault is or assumptions that might

9:04

come from our intuitions about our

9:06

interactions at the local level and

9:09

and a small scale fight it

9:11

might not hold when you are

9:14

relying on those assumptions as like

9:16

a population levels are in the

9:18

population has like five times. The

9:21

size that. Philosophers.

9:23

Who have been theorizing this incident

9:26

but possibly imagine? Imagine rights and

9:28

I'm their modeling part comes in

9:30

to test out the ideas that

9:32

se start with those assumptions of

9:35

how these interactions work and then

9:37

expand the size with those intuition

9:39

still and he a reliable guide

9:41

for us to know what we

9:44

should do or how we should

9:46

like make things the way that

9:48

we won at them. or who

9:50

should be the person who ah.

9:53

Be prioritized their one things or

9:55

their needs. Ah, in what way?

9:58

Does actually great answer. Because it's

10:00

Maryland bread and success. The Great: A

10:02

matter of because is it. It parallels

10:04

very nicely what happens between philosophy in

10:06

physics because physicists as a as a

10:08

very often say just love to get

10:11

the right answer and the very happy

10:13

to get the right answer for the

10:15

wrong reasons. If it them the right

10:17

answer but then the problem with that

10:19

is the would you extrapolate beyond the

10:21

regime in which you know you get

10:23

the right answer? Your faulty reasoning comes

10:25

to bite you a little bit and

10:27

and base in some sense to oversimplify

10:29

you're. Saying same thing is true.

10:32

and in political theory. Now.

10:34

Absolutely. But also like when you

10:36

stated before like elaborate fight the

10:38

connections are your thing to the

10:40

twin foster see and says eggs

10:42

and i thinking about other kind

10:45

of on. And. Cake.

10:47

Sense that have applied physics in

10:49

a place that does the modeling

10:51

for philosophy or lights said like

10:53

not thinking about the as the

10:56

Chilean way out like most and

10:58

Wagner and like at the way

11:00

that's. Me moved

11:02

from analytic descriptions up the wall

11:04

to more like statistics Family says

11:06

I get I like loss. There

11:09

are details that you can just

11:11

dismiss and is just like not

11:13

a health fall and he can

11:15

take. Talk about averages. And they're

11:18

not only ah better, but also

11:20

and some sense. I give you

11:22

a better understanding of this like

11:24

and to logical structure of what

11:26

you're talking. About yes. I'm and

11:28

then. I think complexity as

11:31

another big step that the are making

11:33

that oh okay sell. It is true

11:35

that the solutions by not give us

11:38

everything added. Also true that like sometimes

11:40

just sticks or does averaging models are

11:42

the best way to cope out things

11:45

but sometimes you have this guy like

11:47

organized complexity is metal that likes you

11:49

can. I'm just like all the they

11:52

jumped in and say lie I talk

11:54

about the average and then I've gathered

11:56

everything that I won it and I

11:58

think like that. Exactly what I

12:01

do have thoughts and prayers are As

12:03

such all scientists like. Political.

12:06

Scientists yeah to distinguish these

12:08

and distinguished a tool that

12:11

they're using. To talk about each and. Will

12:14

that's also great answer I gotta say

12:16

because physicists or a little bit nervous

12:18

about complexity for exactly the reasons he

12:20

of the dimensions they they like things

12:23

where you could average things out your

12:25

of the they classic example being getting

12:27

fluid mechanics of a bunch of atoms

12:30

right and then you just get of

12:32

still a very simple explanation of the

12:34

and food mechanics been complex systems are

12:36

different so Wheatley talked about this alone

12:39

the podcast with let's Pretend we Have

12:41

and what is your Person all. Way

12:43

of thinking about what complexity is and why it's interesting.

12:45

Why do you have to start at the harness? Plus

12:48

serves their own. Going to be hard the never going

12:50

to get easy as we go. Ah,

12:52

no way that I'm thinking about

12:55

complexity as a kind of phenomena

12:57

that has some sort of stability

12:59

at the aggregate level. but that

13:01

stability is not dependent on like

13:03

stay homogenous components who have like

13:05

the same kind of direction, incentives,

13:08

property. However, you're thinking about itself

13:10

in their social world is like

13:12

if you're thinking individuals as rational

13:14

actors were like diverse incentives to

13:16

don't want to think of them

13:18

as rational actors, just think of

13:21

them as actors. Who hangs?

13:23

Ask for diverse like reasons

13:25

and diverse knees and diverse

13:27

situations by like at the

13:29

same time you see that

13:31

like some kind of stability

13:34

is emerging from this kind

13:36

of. Many.

13:38

Actor: Conditions.

13:42

That some of them are more

13:44

influential, some of them are Less

13:46

pay requires coordination among so many

13:48

different level. at Seoul different individuals

13:50

at so many different levels to

13:52

get that kind of stability and

13:54

with other you cannot have any

13:57

explanation whatsoever. You cannot just assume

13:59

that like this just a unit.

14:01

Find their ah public opinion. Political

14:03

opinion is just like occurs and

14:05

happens to off the late i

14:07

don't know I ah enough and

14:09

you see that a oscillates like

14:11

over time, sometimes in response to

14:14

external stimuli but sometimes endogenous. The

14:16

sometimes because people are like reorienting

14:18

their political views are connections. A

14:20

who they're talking to, who they

14:22

trusting and you see that kind

14:24

of oscillation of time. And if

14:26

you want to explain that kind

14:28

of thing, ah. It seems

14:31

like games going back to individuals

14:33

and the incentives is too much

14:35

information. Ah, people do things for

14:37

all sorts of this reason he

14:39

cannot take a survey of like

14:41

everyone. Why does it? Knowing what

14:43

they're doing by thinking of them

14:45

as their average of the public's

14:47

opinion is. Too. Little information

14:49

give lost a lot of South

14:51

Street. I'm thinking about complexity. ah

14:54

his first. A phenomenon and

14:56

wish you have many actors that

14:58

coordination among them is necessary to

15:00

generate some level of to those

15:02

but you don't have any central

15:04

organizer at is doing. The work

15:07

for you on. The.

15:09

Behalf Something that people call emergence

15:11

of the emergence of the stability,

15:13

that also constraints of behavior. Like

15:16

a good become a broken record with.

15:18

that was a great answer because very

15:20

different to visit your highlighting different aspect

15:22

of complexity than we talked about before.

15:25

This stability over time right? that reminds

15:27

me of or when Schrodinger years little

15:29

books. He knows where to go. The

15:32

physicists wrote this little book called what

15:34

is Life and he has a line

15:36

in there that answers the question where

15:38

he says life is something that keeps

15:41

on moving long effort should have stopped

15:43

and no one pays attention to that.

15:45

Line in the book where he actually answers

15:48

the question the title. but it is fascinating

15:50

to me. and as a physicists, I'm trying

15:52

to figure out where these come from. You

15:54

have the luxury of saying okay, we'll look

15:57

at society. They're they're they're you want to

15:59

Sort of. Use the tools of

16:01

complexity I guess the to think

16:03

about how that stability happens in

16:06

and a presumably I would might

16:08

change. he has it up perfectly

16:10

stable like our current amorphous. Harrys

16:12

last year and as as they they important

16:14

point to think about that likes Ah,

16:16

one way of thinking about stability as like

16:19

that kind of average kind of mentality that

16:21

is just like a stable. I don't know.

16:23

like slimy X, flash floods, gone, gone,

16:25

and like the kind of phenomenon that I'm

16:28

seeking to explain in the world is the

16:30

kind of phenomenon that is stable. So

16:32

I start from that assumption of a stability

16:34

and then I can. Bring.

16:36

In some function on death than

16:38

dishes or some other assumptions that

16:41

like make their individuals' perhaps a

16:43

function of that stability at the

16:45

social level, our their properties a

16:47

function of thoughts and then explain

16:49

a lot of things but then

16:51

you want to. Incorporate.

16:54

Change and what happens is that

16:56

the only way to conceptualize that

16:58

his thoughts he should burn everything

17:01

to the ground and starts as

17:03

crests to be able to have

17:05

changed rights and the avenues for

17:07

gradual change or even rapid change

17:10

that is not revolutionary in a

17:12

sense that it doesn't make us

17:14

completely unstable but help us to

17:17

go from one at Calabria Marv

17:19

relatively more stable state to the

17:21

other and another are just. Have

17:23

a stable situation that drifts over

17:26

or oscillates or have some other

17:28

kind of dynamic behavior by. It's

17:30

not like said and metaphysical Stone

17:32

to had. this is Ed and

17:34

I prioritize this metaphysically and explain

17:36

everything else based on this. the

17:38

bloody and you see that in

17:40

social theory and political science this

17:42

a lot and happens a lot

17:45

because like when you recognize that

17:47

there is some higher level stability

17:49

and you don't need to figure

17:51

out how individuals in fact it.

17:53

To generate this? Then when

17:55

you're trying to. Use

17:57

that to see rise have changed.

18:00

Happens, You end up saying

18:02

things that people don't want

18:04

to do like. The

18:06

Revolution Or. Make

18:09

it possible or and then afterwards in a

18:11

way that I guess. What?

18:14

Is in twenty twenty four? You got a

18:16

little bit better every day. When you're learning

18:18

a new language with babbel, that's exactly what's

18:20

happening. And a pebble can help you start

18:23

speaking a new language in just three weeks.

18:25

Imagine what do you could do in a

18:27

full year? Devil. Is the science

18:30

back language learning app that actually

18:32

works Pebbles Quick ten minute lessons

18:34

or hand crafted by over two

18:36

hundred language experts to help you

18:38

start speaking new language in as

18:40

little as three weeks. Will I

18:42

like about Babbel is it's practicality.

18:44

It's about talking to real people,

18:46

ordering food, asking directions you will

18:48

put a to use. And here's

18:50

a special limited time deal for

18:52

our listeners. Right now, get fifty

18:54

five percent off your Babbel subscriptions,

18:56

but only for our listeners at

18:58

Babbel. Dot Com/mindscape Get

19:00

fifty five percent off

19:03

at babbel.com/mindscape that's spelled

19:06

Babbel. com/Mindscape. Rules and

19:08

restrictions may apply. By.

19:12

Very okay. Good. So. That.

19:15

Brings in another aspect of your work which is

19:17

that you do want to make the world a

19:19

better place or these airlines about how to make

19:21

a world a better place right? So I just

19:23

hope the world becomes a better place in my

19:25

work is not going to help him long so

19:27

that is an important distinction but but is it's

19:30

nice because what you just said is you know.

19:32

The. The theory of teams aspect of

19:34

it is important that reminds us of,

19:37

you know, punctuated equilibrium in biology were

19:39

population is doing pretty well, but and

19:41

mutation comes along that makes and do

19:43

even better. and suddenly there's a pretty

19:45

rapid change. that's the kind of thing

19:48

I'm gonna. I'm gonna suggest and correct

19:50

me if I'm wrong. The complexity theory

19:52

is geared up to talk about and

19:54

maybe ways that other theories are not.

19:57

Absolutely. Ah, but I think and.

20:00

Provide the complexity theory

20:02

can help us think

20:04

about how punctuated equilibrium

20:06

happens. Sometimes

20:08

given that there and so

20:11

many other interrelated things that

20:13

like. Would keep. That

20:15

equilibrium they they stable. So

20:17

sometimes like this comes up

20:19

and discussions by economics people

20:21

talk about like norms change

20:23

in the same same sense

20:25

of punctuated equilibrium. So you

20:28

have like the practice of

20:30

foot binding. It started because

20:32

it's a king and night

20:34

on out somewhere. Like very

20:36

much liked one of his

20:38

dancers lighting her third in

20:40

a certain way and then

20:42

died like. Of became a

20:45

way for other women to make

20:47

themselves desirable for either the king

20:49

or the. People. Who are

20:52

close to D C Kings and

20:54

then it became like a form

20:56

of lox started to have like

20:58

a wife or partner or whatever

21:00

who are conquer buying who had

21:02

that properties and then incentivize women

21:04

to do that more and more

21:06

often to be able to like

21:08

Mary up that a lot of

21:10

like income inequality you are like

21:12

wealth gap or whatever feudal systems

21:15

are you know it's ah it

21:17

became like some a method for

21:19

people to marry their kid. Up

21:21

right So scared. like a stable

21:23

situation that likes apparent is stuck.

21:25

And because if they do this

21:27

while they're hurting their child, the

21:29

child cannot walk anymore. It's a

21:31

painful yeah. They use the i

21:34

don't know whether we see pictures

21:36

of a such horrendous. But

21:39

if they don't do that to

21:41

their child their child doesn't have

21:43

d possible to, daughter doesn't have

21:45

the possibility to marry and in

21:47

an environment and bitch there's no

21:49

other way for these women's. Sports

21:51

themselves. other than it's all you have

21:53

harm that child So like everyone has

21:55

incentive to keep things in place is

21:57

a like. Centuries, Past.

22:00

And. It's now

22:02

a practice said everyone does so you

22:05

don't even do this to may up

22:07

or down like a stable feature. Of

22:09

the left ear. Yeah, Yeah and then people

22:11

are realizing that this is a problematic

22:13

thing, like we shouldn't do this but

22:16

no one has the to deviate from

22:18

and. By. What happened is

22:20

that like a group of people

22:22

who are wealthier get together and

22:24

sign a pledge. sad day not

22:26

gonna let their child married to

22:29

a person who us on this

22:31

to their foot or ah would

22:33

not do that to their own

22:35

children. And any kind of

22:37

had a trickle effect like overnight to

22:39

a or if not of are now

22:41

have a short period of times and

22:43

bad practice A kind of stopped yeah

22:45

only stopped by. It was like a

22:48

negative view of. Those. Who do

22:50

to that? but like. this is the

22:52

situation in which the Aclu pm is

22:55

kind of separate or earth and decompose

22:57

of or from many other things. A.

23:00

Like. Exist kind of in

23:02

isolation even though it's teeth into

23:04

the marriage market and income inequality

23:06

and sorts of the there's so

23:08

many other kind of a clear

23:10

when the states that there's the

23:12

Billie is not just because people

23:15

repeat them or they don't have

23:17

incentive to change or because they're

23:19

so into related to other social

23:21

norms and like social practices or

23:23

laws or whatever that likes even

23:25

if you changed them overnight other

23:27

social practices reproduce or recreate this

23:29

kind. Of phenomenon all over again.

23:32

I'm coding this from Elizabeth Anderson

23:34

who has this example of school

23:37

segregation that like in some measures

23:39

as it's in some parts of

23:41

the country, school segregation is worse

23:44

than what it was in nineteen

23:46

sixties. Not because the lot like

23:49

is generating guess but because the

23:51

law or like the practice of

23:53

doing that was inter related to

23:56

so many others like and. Pack.

23:58

Seen housing. How funding for

24:01

schools com about. Where

24:04

people live, had and like many many

24:06

other things. that and then when you

24:08

take the law out of the equation

24:11

or make it even illegal to do

24:13

that and put impose a coffin People

24:15

who won two like segregate schools. Other

24:17

factors recreate and reintroduce the the same

24:20

phenomenon Oliver a Gun. Rights.

24:22

Said that kind of punctuated equilibrium.

24:25

Is not gonna help us

24:27

completely understand. How

24:30

you can get out of the situation.

24:33

Face. Like punctuated by

24:35

like spend you take account

24:37

of those interactions at Interaction

24:39

it seems like. You.

24:42

Are if you think of like

24:44

a landscape of the choices people

24:46

make, it's like. Creating. A

24:48

path That a new paths in

24:51

that landscape that allow people to

24:53

come and use a path to

24:55

get an eloquent. Elizabeth Anderson of

24:57

course, another former Mindscape guest. I

24:59

do appreciate you names Zippy know

25:01

the former. Guess though? that's. Very.

25:04

Interesting because it's so. does the

25:06

backup use the word landscape that

25:08

food or you were That is

25:10

used sometimes by evolutionary biologists, although

25:12

I know that others worry about

25:14

it that they always worried people

25:16

were it's. And

25:19

the whole issue there is that for

25:21

the biological case for natural selection, it's

25:23

not teleological right? It's just the mutations

25:25

are random and if you are separated

25:28

by a barrier from or valley I

25:30

suppose the biologists would say from in

25:32

even better equilibrium it might be very

25:34

difficult to get their i think would

25:37

you're pointing at is the we Humans

25:39

are supposed to be better than that.

25:42

We can see that there's a

25:44

better state there, but there's still

25:47

a collective action problem, right? Like

25:49

baby. It would be better if we all went

25:51

there but if one of us goes there is

25:53

still bad what we do about that. Lovely

25:56

a question. So I think the collective

25:58

action found them as. Syria I

26:00

am. I agree that it relies

26:03

at least in it's traditional form.

26:05

it relies on very restricted assumptions

26:07

are in terms of self interest

26:09

rationality like perfect and from and

26:12

so for it's by even when

26:14

you drop those things are you

26:16

see that in biological systems could

26:18

don't have any of that the

26:21

you see similar kind of phenomena.

26:24

And at the same time you see

26:26

that. Groups.

26:29

Do have problems to ah act

26:31

collectively self if you just think

26:34

foul we're not all rational or

26:36

we have other altruistic motives. Still,

26:38

there should be some mechanism to

26:41

explain why we fail to do

26:43

things that even collectivity v realize

26:45

that they're beneficial so we know

26:47

that like this alternative is good

26:50

for us but like to have

26:52

trouble getting x ah and sometimes

26:54

that comes with like of an

26:57

assurance. I'm not sure that. If

26:59

I go everyone else will follow

27:01

and this is costly for me.

27:03

Fence Dislikes: If I don't do,

27:06

I don't mind my child's third.

27:08

ah I'm and everyone else keeps

27:10

doing what they're doing and age

27:12

passage more. My child has to

27:14

pay the price for this. So

27:16

ah if I want to be

27:19

self interested and better off doing

27:21

something that actually don't wanted to

27:23

name the signing my foot By

27:25

the way that we do it

27:27

in ways that doesn't. Require Like

27:29

you mentioned that the are better

27:32

than biological organisms. I think it's

27:34

partly true. Stay the same time

27:36

the complexity of the problem that

27:39

we're trying to solve as they

27:41

hire. So it had many variables

27:43

and these variables are highly interdependent

27:46

frames. So regardless of how smart

27:48

we are, it is possible. Nothing

27:50

on get it wrong and it's

27:52

possible bad Be Try to do

27:55

something and not everyone in the

27:57

society will follow generates like. Counter.

28:00

Man, two hours backlash your so

28:02

many other layers of complications that

28:04

can mess things up. By.

28:06

When you're looking at the history

28:08

of movements or changes that happen

28:10

and kind of rapid, the not

28:12

overnight necessarily. but like. Reasonably

28:15

fast paying like a decade or

28:17

so. You see that like public

28:20

opinion, people's practices are many things

28:22

relevant. it up. Change his dad

28:24

you generate Counts are public's. Okay,

28:28

You. Generate a environment in

28:30

which deviating from what's the

28:32

standard or the equilibrium or

28:35

the norm is less costly

28:37

for individuals. Ah

28:39

and does counter public's

28:42

you can experiment and

28:44

see whether this I'll

28:46

turn the way of

28:48

living. Has any

28:50

plausible the and does it work

28:52

or an eye on and then

28:54

if it works wall people around

28:56

you might be motivated. To. Follow.

28:59

And copy and on if you

29:01

have some other means to be

29:03

stabilized, that librium and or up

29:05

the society. And then if this

29:07

is working well it will bring

29:09

a lot of people and I'm

29:11

saying a lot of abstract things.

29:13

I'm I'm happy to break it

29:15

down by the decided to give

29:17

a general picture of what I'm

29:20

thinking. That it's great because.

29:22

They. Are we thinking here of

29:24

the existence of subcultures within a

29:26

diverse society are sort of giving

29:28

us ways to experiment. I know

29:30

that you know enough federal system

29:32

for a government that supposed to

29:34

be with states are supposed to

29:36

do right. Individual states experiment the

29:38

laboratories of democracy. It sometimes

29:41

works sometimes doesn't but you know whereof

29:43

loss for is here we're thinking about

29:45

what is what is conceivable in principle

29:47

so he that basically what you have

29:49

in mind the of examples. Kind.

29:52

Of died in a more. A.

29:55

No more informal way array.

29:57

Yeah, I know more so

30:00

that way because when you

30:02

create states, you are also

30:05

creating the on. An

30:08

outcome oriented. Ways

30:11

or like you're just changing

30:13

people's incentive when they are.

30:16

Packed spin that kind of collective

30:19

thinking, but sometimes these things these

30:21

kind of change when it comes

30:23

at the cultural love or like.

30:26

We. Want to change practices

30:28

that are ingrained in everyday

30:31

people's lives? Lot. You. Might

30:33

need barium put. The

30:35

highest they have enough seats.

30:38

So you can. I just like ask them

30:40

to vote and tell you are they works

30:42

or not. So you gone

30:44

this far. We've gone this far

30:46

without actually saying the words game

30:48

theory, but it sounds like they're

30:50

behind something. That they are you.

30:52

As we mentioned Killing O'connor and

30:55

she was. She definitely a uses

30:57

game theory her gynt as was

30:59

also in the podcast and and

31:01

he does it. So when we're

31:03

talking about these Aqua Libya, these

31:05

interactions a. Is it useful

31:07

to and do we use game theory

31:09

to model them? Absolutely.

31:12

Because there are.

31:15

Seeing. Here is bad and

31:17

we are talking about.

31:20

And a lot of interactions

31:22

and the way that people

31:24

need to cooperate with each

31:26

other in order to achieve

31:28

certain goals or have some

31:30

up Com and I and

31:32

games. He is a very

31:35

helpful way to formalize and

31:37

simplified those interactions in a

31:39

way that the can see

31:41

at the is how these

31:43

dynamics ten work. By.

31:47

Game. You find an innocent so

31:49

like you're thinking that like wall

31:51

when you're talking about let's say

31:53

discrimination or group based disadvantages live.

31:55

You're talking about that like you're

31:58

observing that like in it. Just

32:00

and way. People.

32:03

Are getting the short end of

32:05

the stick in their shoot social

32:07

interactions or this some like accumulation

32:10

of to sad. Now clustering of

32:12

this advantage or clustering have some

32:14

social problems that otherwise these things

32:16

don't have similar issue mechanisms to

32:19

be clustered around the same group

32:21

of people. And

32:24

when you. Were. You one to

32:26

think about? How is it even possible

32:28

to. Be. Ending up

32:30

in this kind of situations, game

32:32

theory is a very useful way

32:35

of. Thinking about the

32:37

basics. Do

32:39

want me to save more

32:41

about what kind of game

32:43

basis those. I do. I do. but

32:45

I think that the know everyone has heard

32:47

the phrase game theories and people know the

32:49

prisoner's dilemma is the a be. Some people

32:51

might even know nash equilibria are and things

32:53

like that but yet as to make a

32:55

little bit more specific example be great. So.

32:59

Ah, a game like a

33:01

prisoner's Dilemma is composed of

33:03

some main components. Ah, Wine

33:06

is the players who are

33:08

interacting and for better or

33:10

worse the often talk about

33:12

two players and I think

33:15

it's so. That's. A

33:17

problem of Sicily? Yes, yeah,

33:19

but like ah, it does

33:22

the job done for at

33:24

least a. Big. Costs

33:26

of problems That ah. it's

33:29

helpful to maintain it so

33:31

statue players coming to a

33:33

table. Ah, and they have

33:36

strategies. That. They can choose or

33:38

they can. They have

33:40

choices. let's say I'm for how

33:42

they want to interact with the

33:44

other person another plus. And there's

33:46

some outcomes that come. Out

33:49

as those decisions. But.

33:51

Each. Of them might not know what

33:54

is the decision that the other

33:56

person is going to make. Rates

33:58

are so a classic example. Two

34:01

prisoner prisoners who

34:03

are ah in

34:05

jail by. The

34:08

police doesn't know whether they actually have

34:10

committed something or not so they're playing

34:12

a trick under had like a few

34:14

com bad to each of them. If

34:17

you com and tell me what you

34:19

guys have done I'll let you go.

34:21

By. The other cars and will stay

34:23

here and. Pay. The price by

34:25

going to jail for a longer time

34:27

so they giving both of these. Actors.

34:31

And incentive to.

34:34

Be mean or tell on the

34:36

other person's to gain some personal.

34:39

Benefit. Of Rights. Ah, I'm so

34:41

each of them have the choice to

34:43

defects. And or to

34:45

tell. On the other

34:48

person and ah gained advantage

34:50

of. Being. Free and not

34:52

worrying about their crimes committed or

34:54

to both cooperate. So if they

34:56

both stay quiet, the police doesn't

34:58

have actually any evidence by maybe

35:01

because they just want to keep

35:03

them in jail because they don't

35:05

have any suspects. say they'll get

35:07

a baby short time. Ah, and

35:10

they can be released. So what

35:12

does games trying to show as

35:14

that? it is possible for us

35:16

to stay in or be in

35:18

a situation that the structure of.

35:21

The world. Or or the

35:23

word had structured our choices

35:25

such that there's a tension

35:27

between what is good for

35:29

us. It's the could cooperate

35:31

with each other. Compared.

35:34

To what is good for

35:36

us as the new what

35:38

as the a decision that

35:40

the other person is going

35:42

to make and what's the

35:44

effect of does not knowing

35:46

the other person's gonna sell

35:48

each of them have the

35:50

incentive to ah defects because

35:52

even though they won't benefit

35:54

from. Being. Completely clean and

35:57

the police not knowing what they've

35:59

done. But they're preventing themselves from

36:01

paying the cost for the other person

36:04

show. Going. To jail for

36:06

ten years instead of going to jail for six

36:08

months. So both

36:10

of them got a defect, even though they

36:12

both had the option to stay in jail

36:14

only for am I right. This

36:17

episode Mindscape is sponsored by Better Help

36:19

You know, a lot of us spend

36:21

our lives wishing that we had more

36:23

time to do things, but the question

36:25

is time for exactly what? Even if

36:27

your time with unlimited how would you

36:29

use it? the best way to squeeze

36:31

that special thing and do your schedule

36:33

is to know what's important to you

36:35

and to make it a priority and

36:37

therapy can help you find out what

36:39

matters to you so that you can

36:41

do more of it. If you've given

36:44

any thought to starting therapy, think about

36:46

giving Better Help a try. It's entirely

36:48

online and Better Health is designed

36:50

to be convenient, flexible, and suited

36:52

to your schedule. All he has

36:55

to do is fill out a

36:57

brief questionnaire to get messed with

36:59

a licensed therapist, and you can

37:02

switch therapist at any time for

37:04

no additional charge to learn to

37:06

make time for what makes you

37:08

happy with betterhelp, Visit betterhelp.com/mindscape today

37:11

to get ten percent off your

37:13

first month. That's Better Health help.com/mindscape.

37:17

So. They're They're collectively best off if they

37:19

both cooperate, but individually, they're both better

37:21

off if a defect. So, sadly, they're

37:23

gonna end up defecting in the world.

37:26

Yeah, terrible, terrible place. And

37:28

when you like going back to the

37:30

conversation about the collective action problems, a

37:32

collective action from the similar dynamic like

37:35

with an people. Rank.

37:37

All. Of them have this worry

37:39

that like they might. Like.

37:42

Do something that comments them to

37:44

this strategy or destroys by if

37:47

other people don't follow suit they

37:49

gonna be the. People. Who

37:51

gonna pay the price for it? And

37:54

the price guy behind and as

37:56

price can be high enough Babbel

37:58

incentivize only everyone are enough people

38:01

to not follow suit. Sale on

38:03

those who are worried about collective

38:05

action problem say like it's practically

38:08

impossible for this group of people

38:10

yell to achieve any collective good

38:12

on. The physicist in

38:14

me wants to think of this like

38:17

statistical mechanics or I and imagine a

38:19

huge number of people constantly bumping into

38:21

each other with their strategies at some

38:24

temperature. Which means that their strategies can

38:26

change over time and things like that,

38:28

and maybe there different equilibria depending on

38:31

the strength of the coupling and the

38:33

temperature and stuff like that. There.

38:35

Must be people doing exactly that? No.

38:38

Yes, yes, cells. And I

38:40

don't consider myself a physicist.

38:43

Bad, there's an undergrad physicists

38:45

a high. Levels

38:48

of as fast as thinking

38:50

about this dynamic eyes and.

38:53

Of a similar picture at

38:55

that you described. By.

38:57

But this caviar that you're

38:59

not talking about? An ideal

39:01

gas, So individuals are not

39:03

doing what they think they

39:05

should do. Ah, independent of

39:07

their social connections or interaction

39:10

with the other cells. Instead

39:12

of an ideal gas, you

39:14

have a. Bunch. Of molecules

39:16

who are kind of tied to

39:18

one another, but not perfectly Cel

39:20

Every every one is. Has

39:23

some significant interaction with the one on the

39:25

right or left. So. When

39:27

you add this kind

39:29

of interdependence, ah day,

39:31

collective action problem. Changes.

39:34

It's structure because then there

39:37

are way. For. People to.

39:40

And problems because they have some

39:42

repeated into actions, because they have

39:44

someone amazing about each other. Or

39:48

because. Through. These interactions

39:50

they can come up

39:53

southwest some strategy that

39:55

they. Think. Of as

39:57

the norm, it's the salient option

39:59

now. They're going back

40:01

to our O'connor's episodes.

40:05

She talks about like dividing a pie

40:07

or you start but like append of

40:09

ice cream and things the mom who

40:11

is the say like. Giving.

40:13

Their children this rule that

40:16

if you. Both. Claim

40:18

the same amount or a claim less

40:20

than what is available. You can get

40:22

what you claim equal or less and

40:25

but if you play more than what's

40:27

and button at what is available as

40:29

it was my mom I have throw

40:31

away the I say. That.

40:35

Sells you but now they sit

40:37

and do that so when you

40:39

are getting.kind of option to buy

40:42

have like a choice of both

40:44

claiming half of the ice cream

40:46

tens or claiming less and what's

40:49

available to be cautious or if

40:51

they have some information about what

40:53

the other side finance claim claim

40:56

more on. but. Not.

40:58

High enough that there is no way

41:00

for every other person to get any

41:02

this on. And then they talk about

41:04

some actual every I'm Solutions. That

41:07

like either dividing and half

41:09

or dividing one dividing taking

41:11

much less, one taking much

41:14

more will become the evolutionary

41:16

stable. Are com of

41:18

social interactions that are kind of repeated

41:20

over time? Some of them i be

41:22

bit with the same people. Sometimes you

41:24

don't have to him and make that

41:26

assumption but just keep that interaction goal

41:28

and there's not a one shot prisoner's

41:30

dilemma. It's a. Prisoner's.

41:33

Dilemma to happen over time but a

41:35

game that I described not actually prisoner's

41:37

Dilemma is a coordination going by like

41:39

similar and often idea. ah. Bide.

41:43

My. Way to say

41:46

is that the difference

41:48

between blood prediction d

41:50

rom. Prison. And not

41:52

collective action problem. Is giving

41:55

does. It is very sad that by

41:57

all you guys can I do anything?

42:00

In a dime and day conclusion that

42:02

will look at the world we can

42:04

do things cel like you're missing as

42:06

like similar to the containers and you

42:08

made or some other countries I made

42:10

based on your example. Of. Thinking

42:12

Gov. An ideal gas in

42:14

which individuals are kind of acting

42:17

isolation campaign to an environment in

42:19

the interaction is dominant for the

42:21

interaction is the one that doing

42:23

things. Good and you can kind

42:26

of see. Where. Philosophical implications come

42:28

in here a little bit but again

42:30

as usual correct me if I'm wrong,

42:32

but it sounds like we can find

42:35

ourselves in situation where bad things happen

42:37

even if nobody used to blame us

42:39

as I as and maybe that changes

42:42

or philosophical view on how to either

42:44

think about or even deal with. That.

42:46

Situations. That's absolutely

42:49

true. Friend stands O'connor and

42:51

Bruner, and a lot of

42:53

other people use this kind

42:55

of a losing game theoretic

42:57

mechanism to explain how and

42:59

the same way that they

43:01

expect. ah, fair divisions to

43:03

become dominant strategy of a

43:05

population that trying to divide

43:07

their resources and go about

43:09

their tastes are. You can

43:11

see that unfair divisions and

43:13

become the dominant strategy wise

43:15

because you can have some

43:17

structural. Components As like Axelrod

43:20

to write, said Robert axle

43:22

an authentic book on abolition

43:24

of corporations and the idea

43:26

is died on. If you

43:28

have some, add a layer

43:30

of information about what your

43:32

opponent's gonna do, while you

43:34

can base your strategy. On.

43:37

That added information and that

43:40

can be sometimes group faced.

43:42

Ah membership That like I

43:45

treat everyone in my group

43:47

therapy but everyone outside of

43:50

my group. Ah. And

43:52

unfairly are like i wanna be greedy

43:54

to them and then you see that

43:57

like other kind of snake tree breakage

43:59

can like. Ah, Make us

44:01

and up flares. An

44:03

unstable or not as stable as com

44:05

that is not actually say are not.

44:09

Equal at least in terms of the

44:12

outcome it generates. So we do

44:14

have. Unlike the prisoner's dilemma were a

44:16

crucial features. The two prisoners can't talk

44:19

to each other right answer and so

44:21

was it One is. One.

44:23

Of the things that's interesting about the differences

44:25

between the. Physical. System

44:27

where the boar, the evolutionary

44:29

genetics and humans is that

44:32

we can anticipate and imagine

44:34

other possible futures. but another

44:36

one is we can. Talk.

44:38

To each other Mean it's how much is

44:41

that part of the models? When you're when

44:43

you're making these models that that people can

44:45

try to persuade each other to act in

44:47

a certain way that helps the collective. Good.

44:50

Very good point I think like whenever

44:52

you like Olufsen that in all these

44:54

conditions people actually to can talk to

44:57

each other but they don't have any

44:59

way to told each other accountable. As

45:01

the other percent lot. Rights.

45:04

So and then as you can talk

45:06

to each other parking is not gonna

45:08

do anything because I can come and

45:11

tell you that likes give me or

45:13

watch or give me I like something

45:15

like the relatively expensive and I promise

45:17

I'll bring it back to you tomorrow.

45:20

I fry Assad like attack and just

45:22

live and in the absence of any

45:24

other mechanisms that hop you think that

45:27

whether or not I am can actually

45:29

stick to my promise. It's the same

45:31

as no communication Gap has and I.

45:33

Am I give you some information

45:36

about the other person? but if

45:38

the information is not giving you

45:40

a way to hold that person

45:42

accountable off or that doesn't mean

45:44

anything. So yes he can add

45:46

adam as miscommunication as he won

45:48

by like it's still it's face

45:50

the same kind of dynamic. Rights

45:52

but we do interact more than one

45:54

says he. doesn't. that add some sure

45:57

application there. By like I think, what

45:59

does a lot. Work is lied

46:01

on that are serious. Actually

46:03

help us to see that

46:05

like sometimes s ah I'm

46:07

a complete rondo. ah and

46:09

I'm asking for your watch.

46:12

Their. Dynamic is made. Dyffryn. Competing.

46:14

To situation that's you. and I

46:17

both know Kale in a corner

46:19

and we both respect her and

46:21

I'm worried that if I don't

46:23

bring back your rights law that

46:25

gonna affect my relationship with Killing

46:27

to Ice and you know that

46:29

I hear about it as a

46:31

relationship and that is enough for

46:33

you to have some reinforced reinforcement

46:36

mechanism that will hold me accountable

46:38

right? And

46:40

that repeated interaction also is a

46:42

similar dynamic that if I don't.

46:44

Bring my wife go about watch back

46:46

to you tomorrow their next time I'm

46:49

asking you for something on what you

46:51

just not going to give it to

46:53

me And if that's the case this

46:55

worry about the future as a way

46:58

that you can. Use.

47:00

To hold me accountable and makes

47:02

me do what I promise. Cells

47:04

come and. Communication. Becomes.

47:07

Irrelevant again. Spotlight. But you are

47:09

adding by saying that people can

47:12

can communicate is not other and

47:14

anything other than just repeated interaction

47:16

or being embedded in a network

47:19

is doing that work. So that's

47:21

why people don't talk about. Communication.

47:24

As much and try to offload

47:26

the. I guess though I don't

47:29

I worry I wonder whether we're

47:31

not being fair to people are

47:33

mean we're being to fair to

47:35

them. They give them as to

47:37

rationally self interested whereas people might

47:40

take pride in being on his

47:42

store being trustworthy or something like

47:44

that right? By. Using other.

47:47

Yeah. I say down just

47:49

a hypothesis. And.long com

47:51

without. Some. Other

47:54

layers of. Information.

47:57

Or some other layers of. Good.

48:00

The information that that person not

48:02

gonna lie regardless of. Their.

48:04

Enough to situation. So let let's

48:06

be like super philosophical here. There's

48:08

different ways that philosophers have thought

48:10

about justice. Oh, you've done a

48:12

wonderful job laying the groundwork. Have

48:14

some complexity theory, game theory, network,

48:16

the Or even though we didn't

48:18

like, use that for that. was

48:20

involved in years saying that were

48:22

not an ideal gas re a

48:24

certain connections that exist in certain

48:26

wants to don't Ah, how's that

48:28

different than you know? I don't

48:30

know. Hobbes and Russo and Bark

48:32

or even your John Rawls. Or

48:34

whatever that the traditional theorists

48:36

of political justice. Why

48:39

I think it's similar in

48:41

many regards but it best

48:43

friend in important ways to

48:45

sell similar and offense bad

48:48

for instance ah ha then

48:50

resell and others one to

48:52

think about what keeps as

48:54

a coherent functioning society Rights

48:57

and even though maybe a

48:59

lot of us are altruistic

49:01

people but likely have enough

49:04

people who are not altruistic

49:06

and my be self interest.

49:08

There that can like ruin it for

49:10

everyone else writes ah and are thinking

49:12

about what are the conditions that they

49:15

can put in place at. Be.

49:17

Don't have to depend on everyone

49:19

being altruistic for the society to

49:21

work right. And someone like Hobbes

49:23

months to say that we have

49:25

to have a leviathan. And what

49:27

is that leviathan doing is? It's.

49:30

Making sure that whoever wants

49:32

to deviate. Has reason

49:34

to be scared of ceiling it

49:36

spreads that like as if I

49:39

say i promise to you that

49:41

I'll bring back your rights and

49:43

I don't. There's. A Leviathan,

49:45

An all. Powerful

49:48

saying suspect com Isaan hold me accountable

49:50

for me to jail A make you

49:52

pay the fine or were and if

49:54

that's the case and you know that

49:56

they've leviathan, insist And I know that

49:58

the Leviathan and. And I

50:01

don't have an incentive. To.

50:04

Not bring back your watch. Red.

50:06

Shift so. Doesn't. Matter whether

50:08

I'm an honest person or not

50:10

I am and ill, altruistic person

50:13

or not. Likes isn't as I

50:15

am a very self interested ourselves.

50:17

A self centered person is still

50:19

a society will work if you

50:21

have that kind of. Powerful,

50:24

Entities that people can depend

50:26

on to make sure that

50:28

deviating from what they agreed

50:31

on has it costs. right?

50:33

But at the same time when.

50:36

Someone. Like Fathers missing is

50:38

that law? That's not all

50:40

we need. First second: that.

50:44

That is too high of a

50:46

price to pay to make sure

50:48

that someone brings back my watch

50:50

to give. like all the power.

50:53

To like one entity who like

50:55

walks around and make sure that

50:58

everyone like sticks to their from

51:00

and and people like you more.

51:02

Others talk about culture. Or.

51:05

Other social practices and that help

51:07

us hold each other accountable or

51:09

like cooperate or do things that

51:11

we need to do together to

51:14

benefit from the fruits of that

51:16

cooperation. And

51:18

a losing game theory is a way to talk

51:20

about that. Kind of cultural

51:22

practices. If. You travel. You

51:25

know, when it comes to lousy. Soon to

51:27

we assign. You

51:29

know if you down to annex card been oceans

51:31

of high seems. And

51:33

looking towards have a with your cardinal

51:36

season system present on Delta flight. noticing

51:38

under the Bridge of Sighs selling Cds

51:40

Eternal love It is worth a long

51:42

distance Love. Is why your

51:44

adult the same Our Platinum American Express said

51:46

member. If you travel you know kids are

51:49

fifteen. Discount not applicable. A partner operates lights

51:51

the taxes and fees term. Supply visit dynamics

51:53

less you know, And. It's

51:55

interesting to me because he goes

51:57

back to the persistence and stability

52:00

in the new first brought up

52:02

and thinking about complex systems and

52:04

off so I am ask myself

52:07

questions about how. Non

52:09

equilibrium steady state systems require low entropy

52:11

energy rather my are free energy and

52:13

and they disobey to make it will

52:15

to more random place and in some

52:18

sense there's a parallel. Hear me it

52:20

sounds vaguely like it. I don't I

52:22

was there is there's some equivalent of

52:24

free energy. That. We need

52:27

here. There's some resource that

52:29

these stable structures require. Sound

52:32

like think about ah as

52:35

society in which everyone actually

52:37

follows the rules and like

52:39

they don't. They need some

52:41

higher level like our life.

52:44

Unless it's a very stable

52:46

society everyone follows, then I'm

52:48

fine. Pandemic. Happens.

52:50

I don't know something happens

52:52

that like and disturbs days

52:55

structure dynamics that they were

52:57

relying on. Pay like a

52:59

religious leads to keep things

53:01

together and they don't have

53:04

any alternative already existing their

53:06

rights law. This to say

53:08

not gonna last. You. Need

53:11

that kind of diversity

53:13

and variation and us

53:15

piled like an. Energy,

53:18

the around and stuff like

53:20

he stays stable and on

53:22

their side. Ah and like

53:25

if something happens like the

53:27

counterculture be talked about. sometimes

53:29

they generate change, fight a

53:31

lot of time they help

53:34

us remain stable. Ah, some

53:36

like norms are practices are

53:38

irrational to have in. Many.

53:41

Situations: I had this example that

53:43

I haven't ever thought about the

53:45

same. I know there may not

53:47

like I had s I had

53:49

a partner who are like air

53:51

porter like many years ago and

53:53

it was very annoying. I

53:57

have a hard it is person is yes I

53:59

like for many. Biden didn't do

54:01

it, even never be able to

54:03

find something he needs because yeah

54:05

so much stuff and a lot

54:07

A was expensive to move them

54:09

around his as expensive to like

54:11

keep on to them. there was

54:13

not much utility ah but like

54:15

been pandemic that. You. Can

54:17

go out and like by

54:19

whatever I didn't and like

54:21

bad the holdings. Ah. The regrowth

54:24

of the word. Good.

54:26

Legs he had like balls of

54:28

rubber bands. dive used to like

54:30

make messes. Comes to specify of.

54:32

I never thought I like having.menu rather

54:35

than would be even useful and we

54:37

could just him and give it to

54:39

others who didn't have robust and as.

54:41

Soon May. So basically you're

54:43

making an argument for diversity.

54:46

In some sense, it's not

54:48

just more old good to.

54:52

Be diverse in the. Cause.

54:55

Are being fair to people. But you

54:57

say if you wanna be the best

54:59

society and find the right solutions, sometimes

55:01

you might do something that might seem

55:03

to you to be sub optimal. He

55:05

oh you need to have a mix

55:07

strategy, game theory, But

55:10

at the same time if you

55:13

have this a closed society back

55:15

society is often have a lot

55:17

of conformity pressure so a closed

55:19

society over time makes everyone lox

55:22

the same because of the social

55:24

pressures and since but an open

55:26

society that like has an influx

55:28

of people who are coming from

55:31

different parts of the world different

55:33

cultures are better. base is like

55:35

a way to. Keep

55:38

this kind of stability and.

55:40

That's sometimes that is just like

55:42

the influx of information or different

55:45

ways of living. Some other times

55:47

is just like having actual people

55:49

who are coming. To. Generate

55:51

that kind of on. Diversity.

55:54

It's so you don't.

55:57

I get that kind of diversity over

55:59

at. The time at least in

56:01

a way that game theoretically the

56:04

can think about societies and maintain

56:06

your diversity unless you are very

56:08

intentional about like keeping things. Suppress.

56:14

It. Actually reminds me of the

56:16

Foot Binding example in the sense

56:18

that even have a strategy or

56:20

a normal customer whatever that was

56:22

optimal under some conditions that conditions

56:24

go away with. You're left with

56:27

the strategy. and if you don't

56:29

have this influx of other people,

56:31

maybe you forget how to justify

56:33

you. forget the reasons why are

56:36

you wearing it that way? Yeah,

56:38

Yeah, none. I really like the

56:40

analogy. Yes, And so and

56:42

so is it leads to and

56:44

we other let me ask you

56:46

this way is I can see

56:48

this in the terms of the

56:50

game theory, network theory, complexity picture

56:52

this, this interest in diversity and

56:54

and sort of constantly probing our

56:56

weaknesses. Said and cetera is that.

56:59

New and different in in this discussions

57:01

of society and how to set them

57:03

up is at an insight that we

57:05

got from thinking in these ways. I

57:09

think. And

57:11

my device? You mean like focusing on

57:13

complexity? Yeah. Okay said

57:15

the way. But I think complexity

57:18

distinguishes are thinking from the standpoint

57:20

of complexity distinguishes itself from other

57:22

viewpoints. His thoughts as he again

57:24

go back like to it you

57:27

can tell how much of a

57:29

fan of counting O'connor signed Carson

57:31

they got like carrots side and

57:33

they're an. Evolutionary.

57:36

Ways as talking about social norms is

57:38

like at the end of the day

57:40

trying to find some stable are com

57:42

bread. And

57:45

Circuses stability base. Kind

57:47

of explanations and that gives you

57:50

some insight of like how that

57:52

can be possible or our how

57:54

a. D

57:57

and. Complexity.

57:59

Ah, Crowds is helping eyes

58:01

to not take that stability

58:03

to be our end goal.

58:07

And think about how

58:09

change can happen. Not

58:11

only can happen, but it

58:13

happens all the time and

58:16

our ability to explain things

58:18

is not dependent on finding

58:20

some fixed features of the

58:22

world, right? so I don't

58:24

have to off load d

58:26

Robustness of the causal connections

58:29

I find in the world

58:31

on to on changing things.

58:33

And if I can do that, I

58:35

can show that how I can. Perhaps.

58:39

Guy third changes that are

58:41

already happening to other since

58:44

died are and a better.

58:47

Ah, help us to get to

58:49

a better outcome. Was out assuming

58:51

that I know what is this

58:53

better up? right? Yeah, And

58:55

A reminds me once again of Elizabeth

58:57

Anderson, who was the one who convinced

58:59

me for the first time in my

59:01

life that ideal theory was that the

59:03

best way to think about illegal justice

59:05

rather than I spoke to me as

59:07

a physicist. Maybe it always made sense.

59:09

Just think that the Perfect Society and

59:11

work to try to get in that

59:13

direction. And and she points out number

59:15

one, you know the Perfect Society as

59:17

a number Two conditions are changing A,

59:19

but it's much easier just to try

59:22

to improve a little bit. So adamant

59:24

about the local derivative. is a more stable thing

59:26

that as he about the final goal. Absolutely

59:28

yes. And if you want to improve

59:30

things and you aside that this assumption

59:32

that the problem that we're solving is

59:35

too complex for any of us or

59:37

for most of us or and then

59:39

for like I don't know an institution

59:42

that as and responsible for gathering from

59:44

a sense to have like a bird

59:46

I knew of this landscape to tell

59:49

us what is the better outcome or

59:51

what is the better color be an

59:53

ah. We. Want to know

59:55

how possibly the can make. Improvements.

59:58

Death. And the way. Think of that

1:00:00

about. that is to think about first

1:00:03

how knowledge is. Produced.

1:00:05

How these practices come to

1:00:07

existence. How are they generating

1:00:10

outcomes? Are are shop optimal?

1:00:12

Ah, in ways that the

1:00:14

evolutionary models help us to

1:00:16

understand, but also how we

1:00:19

can minimize the error in

1:00:21

finding day alternatives. So let's

1:00:23

go back to the landscape

1:00:26

kind of metaphors. Bad. Ah,

1:00:28

You see that in scientific

1:00:30

communities to say they're different

1:00:33

ways of. Exploring this unknown

1:00:35

and do rocket at the stomach

1:00:37

landscape and it has a lot

1:00:40

of local optima that makes you

1:00:42

think that's our we are We

1:00:44

found the best possible solutions and

1:00:46

that I don't know we have

1:00:49

Flow just or whatever they say

1:00:51

they were gets. When

1:00:54

you want people to explore

1:00:56

alternatives and find whether there

1:00:58

is a better way to

1:01:00

go about solving discretion or

1:01:02

knots and people model this.

1:01:04

As like air let's say a

1:01:06

group of scientists who have like

1:01:08

different kind of strategy. some of

1:01:10

them one to. Find.

1:01:13

What is or like? follow what

1:01:15

is the consensus and to stick

1:01:17

with age amongst them. Ah, one

1:01:19

to find what's the consensus and

1:01:22

do the opposite because like they

1:01:24

did they feel like it and

1:01:26

so of them don't care by

1:01:28

anyone else and just like focus

1:01:30

on their own work and they

1:01:33

want to be a good scientist

1:01:35

out. Like proves everything from the

1:01:37

basic axioms to. The conclusion

1:01:39

that they wanna drive I'm I'm

1:01:41

like they should. I like when

1:01:44

you have this kind of dynamic

1:01:46

and like let people kind of

1:01:48

follow or learn from each other's

1:01:50

exploring this epidemic landscape is not

1:01:52

something that you can plan and

1:01:55

tell people that like look the

1:01:57

strategies bad strategy is goods Even

1:01:59

though. Intuitively doing something that

1:02:01

the scientific community says all we

1:02:03

have consensus the where this and

1:02:05

do the opposite is. Not.

1:02:09

A promising blacks by like they

1:02:11

show that likes having people who

1:02:13

do that how up ice to.

1:02:16

Maximize. Their ability to reach

1:02:18

out and like find what is

1:02:20

the better on equilibrium. The or

1:02:22

what are the better answers are

1:02:25

better outcomes. And

1:02:27

a structure of who is talking

1:02:29

to, who. Is. Another important

1:02:31

way to think about us at

1:02:33

those models. Don't think about that.

1:02:35

I have some other words am

1:02:38

trying to make sense of on

1:02:40

when you compare chapter base movements,

1:02:42

for instance, to hierarchical move on

1:02:44

chapter basements try to figure out

1:02:46

how they solve a problem locally

1:02:49

in their own lack. And

1:02:51

on a neighborhood or city or

1:02:53

state or whatever by day have

1:02:56

ways to communicate with other chapters

1:02:58

and ask them how will you

1:03:00

do a slider You do that

1:03:03

worked How can I like not

1:03:05

and based important resources to reinvent

1:03:08

the wheel straight and sk try

1:03:10

something A doesn't work they can

1:03:12

tell others but at the same

1:03:15

time day take into account that

1:03:17

like something that works for me

1:03:20

in Columbus. Ohio my not works

1:03:22

in Baltimore not my not work in

1:03:24

Arizona and over. And

1:03:27

then they are changing the

1:03:29

structure of their communication or

1:03:31

their collective actions as a

1:03:33

way to minimize their chance

1:03:35

of making mistakes and maximize

1:03:37

their chance of finding solutions

1:03:39

that work for them, not

1:03:41

assuming that the solution him

1:03:43

and works for every one.

1:03:46

Or. The area like a way for

1:03:48

everyone to do so. like it's

1:03:50

a way of incorporating dad situated

1:03:52

knowledge. Knowing.

1:03:54

Bad: we don't know what is

1:03:56

the. Alternative. Necessarily that

1:03:58

we can get. We know that

1:04:01

like along the way my figure

1:04:03

out that we were wrong all

1:04:05

along. Some people make this argument

1:04:07

in terms of like the Feminist

1:04:09

Resistance to like. Some. Conceptions

1:04:11

of a family and knock

1:04:14

for your family. And then

1:04:16

the snack. Change. In

1:04:19

people's attitude when same

1:04:21

sex marriage became legalize.

1:04:25

And like the tension between these

1:04:27

two ways of thinking about what

1:04:29

is the right way of solving

1:04:31

the problems that people were facing

1:04:33

I'm I'm realizing that will will

1:04:35

my my have and wrong. In

1:04:39

fact, like it's too costly to ask people

1:04:41

to not live in. not we're families given

1:04:43

everything else. Maybe in an alternate world it

1:04:46

would have worked for like it's that. They

1:04:48

do a better outcome that we

1:04:50

can like. seats ah any can

1:04:52

improve the lives of many who

1:04:54

we care about an otherwise they

1:04:56

they would be. I'm. In

1:04:59

trouble or like not benefit from those.

1:05:02

But. This example of science or of academia

1:05:04

more broadly. reminds. Us

1:05:06

that diversity can be hard to

1:05:08

achieve right? I have a says

1:05:10

you have a certain academic sub

1:05:12

field that as a different and

1:05:14

people think well a certain approach

1:05:16

is eighty percent likely to be

1:05:19

right. But you're only hiring people

1:05:21

in that sub field once every ten

1:05:23

years. You're going to hire one of

1:05:25

those consensus people are hundred percent of

1:05:27

the time and you know, going to

1:05:29

give twenty present you don't have room,

1:05:31

right? So you need to make some

1:05:33

extra special effort to nurture the diversity

1:05:35

in that sense. That is absolutely

1:05:37

true And video again look at

1:05:40

scientific community is you see that

1:05:42

like ah, when there is like

1:05:44

a critical mass who is kind

1:05:47

of negating the dominant or the

1:05:49

mainstream way of thinking about things,

1:05:51

stay off and start generating their

1:05:53

own journals. They're creating like departments

1:05:56

that like more likely to hire.

1:05:58

So I are like. The war

1:06:00

have this kind of tendency because

1:06:02

that's the only way that you

1:06:05

can protect these like more minority

1:06:07

groups. And I'm not say minority

1:06:09

to say like the minority here

1:06:11

is always right are being minor

1:06:13

the his or or likes. I'm

1:06:15

just saying like it's good to

1:06:18

preserve the diversity here. it's and

1:06:20

the pressure for conformity. Israel I

1:06:22

knew one ways to allow this

1:06:24

minority to persist just in case.

1:06:27

There. Majority was wrong. So you

1:06:29

have some people have explored Dalton

1:06:31

and any can borrow from that's

1:06:33

are like they create their own

1:06:35

enclaves. That. Helps them

1:06:38

to. Survive. Or

1:06:40

of and be successful in

1:06:42

their own smaller communities by

1:06:44

also protects them from the

1:06:47

pressure that they are filling

1:06:49

the around. the mainstream and

1:06:51

in social movements are like

1:06:53

social change literature you see

1:06:55

a lot of.kind of dynamic.people

1:06:57

generate groups to like protect

1:06:59

them from. The. Cost.

1:07:02

Of deviation fight at the same time

1:07:04

and the size their bought this so

1:07:06

they have a chance to be hurt

1:07:09

by the rest. The

1:07:11

guy a lot this example of

1:07:13

Rosa Parks that like if you're

1:07:16

thinking that she is just as

1:07:18

tired person who didn't want to

1:07:20

date her seats because she is

1:07:22

sick of the. Racists

1:07:25

rules and practices in her

1:07:27

town. While you're missing like

1:07:29

that, that's partly true, but.

1:07:32

You're missing a lot of

1:07:34

important for Mason about what

1:07:36

actually helps. To. Make

1:07:38

an action like hers to

1:07:41

be a. Milestone.

1:07:43

Are like a significant driver

1:07:45

of like something like a

1:07:47

civil rights movement. Rates that

1:07:50

like she is an arm

1:07:52

or a local organizer of

1:07:54

Naacp. Her husband is a

1:07:57

youth organizer for the same

1:07:59

organization. She has been thinking

1:08:01

about like doing this for like

1:08:04

long time and they have tried

1:08:06

like other people who wanna to.

1:08:09

Not change the scene and see

1:08:11

what happens. And I'm. She.

1:08:13

Had like an army of

1:08:16

other organizers and activists who

1:08:18

when that happened ah reassured

1:08:20

her that like the costs,

1:08:23

Is not something that she's the

1:08:25

only one who bears advice. Ah

1:08:27

it's not like she will lose

1:08:30

her job and not gonna have

1:08:32

any support whatsoever and she's alone

1:08:34

a bear the consequences but also

1:08:36

be amplified her voice. Right there

1:08:38

were plans to help out to the our.

1:08:41

Yeah yeah, Yeah and like she

1:08:43

isn't the first person who has

1:08:45

ever decided to change Like not

1:08:47

change or see are not follow

1:08:50

the racists laws are practices in

1:08:52

her hometown. The difference is that.

1:08:55

The. Connections that she has.

1:08:57

Ah, I'm I'm the counter

1:09:00

community that protects her. From.

1:09:03

Just. Like doing something that makes her go

1:09:05

to jail and those are just. As

1:09:08

it would be the case for everyone else

1:09:10

in, the same thing goes for scientific. Yeah.

1:09:13

But the Rosa Parks examples a good

1:09:15

one because this was the less they

1:09:17

want to talk about season we said

1:09:19

we'd perfectly to be under god guess

1:09:21

year because you write a lot about

1:09:23

social movements and their importance and here's

1:09:25

a perfect example of one right? And

1:09:27

the you know someone who hadn't thought

1:09:29

about this very carefully might just say

1:09:32

why we to social movement be have

1:09:34

a democracy everyone's gonna vote they're going

1:09:36

to get what they want but these

1:09:38

collective behavior kind of issues are really

1:09:40

do matter So even if we live

1:09:42

in. A perfect democracy with which

1:09:44

we don't as a whole nother

1:09:46

per day. But even if we

1:09:48

did this kind of coordination, game

1:09:50

theory, network theory kind of thing

1:09:53

becomes really important to making the

1:09:55

society you live in closer to

1:09:57

his own ideals Stance: True because.

1:10:00

When you're thinking about like a

1:10:02

democratic society am, one of their

1:10:04

distinctive features is that like people

1:10:07

have roughly equal say in how

1:10:09

things go. So this it's self

1:10:11

governing society rights I'd like. It's.

1:10:14

And might be the case in an ideal

1:10:16

gas. At that

1:10:19

life, each Michael had like

1:10:21

the same effect on like

1:10:24

the temperature. roughly speaking, spotlights

1:10:26

didn't We don't live in

1:10:28

an ideal gas situation. Ah,

1:10:31

I'm We have so many

1:10:33

other mechanisms to first make

1:10:36

collective action possible, but also

1:10:38

generate power. Generate influence, generates

1:10:41

mechanisms that can advantage some

1:10:43

people and disadvantage others. right?

1:10:47

But they have the same

1:10:49

kind of ah I'm mechanisms

1:10:51

can be used to. Amplify

1:10:55

change right? Like it's likes, you

1:10:57

are increasing the number of connections

1:10:59

between people. So something that would

1:11:01

happen to someone and no one

1:11:03

else would hear about. Because.

1:11:06

That person is a disconnected or

1:11:08

like have the pores resources of

1:11:10

that other and when you're in

1:11:12

Tacoma social movements you are in

1:11:14

a dislike heightened level that like

1:11:16

everyone is much more or less

1:11:18

like and prime to think about

1:11:20

this problem first but seconds they

1:11:22

might like have. Extra.

1:11:24

Connections that make them hear about

1:11:27

this kind of news. So many

1:11:29

shooting happens or like a chilling

1:11:31

happens on to a member of

1:11:33

a population or by a member

1:11:36

of some group. Everyone else gonna

1:11:38

know about it in a way

1:11:40

that it wouldn't happen before, right?

1:11:42

So the networks can help us.

1:11:45

explains how changes way more likely

1:11:47

and stability is a basin of

1:11:49

attraction is kind of like shrunk

1:11:51

because people are more connected. Because

1:11:55

people are more prime

1:11:57

event to. Think.

1:11:59

About. That lack of connections

1:12:01

that they had to have problems

1:12:03

are on the lack of connections

1:12:05

that would prevent them from hearing.

1:12:07

About some. Phenomena. So

1:12:10

if I wanted to start my

1:12:12

own social movement, word insights from

1:12:15

Complexity Theory an evolutionary game theory

1:12:17

help me. Build. More affected social

1:12:19

movement or is it more describing things

1:12:21

after the fact? Lonely question.

1:12:24

I think my conclusion

1:12:26

or what I've learned

1:12:28

from Social aren't. Complexity.

1:12:31

Theory is not a

1:12:33

recipe for starting a

1:12:35

social movement. It's a

1:12:37

recipe for know laying.

1:12:39

died, And. Then

1:12:42

change is going to happen.

1:12:44

I have an influence way

1:12:46

beyond what I thought I

1:12:48

have Because I'm not just

1:12:51

myself, I'm also an extended

1:12:53

network of people who know

1:12:55

me or they might take

1:12:57

what I say. I'm. With.

1:13:00

More confidence except there were more

1:13:02

confidence that they would that someone

1:13:04

else. I'm I'm S. I am

1:13:07

at the state that like a

1:13:09

movement like a wave is approaching

1:13:11

me. Ah it's not like I

1:13:14

can just disconnect s I am

1:13:16

feeding into and I can amplify

1:13:18

it by a lot. On

1:13:21

bar or I can be a

1:13:23

wait for it to dampen it.

1:13:25

Tom. So. My

1:13:28

my conclusion from complexity theory

1:13:30

his dad says. So. Higher

1:13:33

start rethinking why you think

1:13:35

AH you as an individual

1:13:37

can do and start thinking

1:13:40

of yourself as a molecule,

1:13:42

an ideal gas. That

1:13:45

like the addition of your action

1:13:47

with bunch others will generate change

1:13:50

because I can have cascading effect

1:13:52

You anyone can ask getting a

1:13:54

favorite direct connect but also if

1:13:57

you want to start change. Ah

1:13:59

my. Your connections go find

1:14:01

others for like minded support

1:14:04

them. Be supported by them.

1:14:07

And know that without that. Not

1:14:10

much gonna come out of. Well,

1:14:12

just so you you just give

1:14:14

me a little Tiffany years. I

1:14:17

very much appreciate this because of

1:14:19

course. Physicists: Or that other

1:14:21

phase transitions rain litter which is highly

1:14:23

delegates if not exactly the same as

1:14:26

as social transition to various sorts. This.

1:14:29

But. You know to stand up for

1:14:31

my visit his friends. We don't only

1:14:34

think about ideal gases, sometimes you think

1:14:36

about a lattice or a solid which

1:14:38

are kind of very primitive network kind

1:14:41

of models right? and something you notice

1:14:43

when you have a lattice that has

1:14:45

has his physical system on of it's

1:14:48

going to do a phase transition is

1:14:50

that far away from the phase transition.

1:14:52

Correlations between what's going on a nearby

1:14:55

lattice points might be ah, either only

1:14:57

infinite range or only short range. It's.

1:14:59

Exactly at the critical point at

1:15:02

the phase transition that you have

1:15:04

both to arrange correlation and long

1:15:06

range correlations and you just explained

1:15:08

why that's important to a social

1:15:10

movement. Solitaire that counts as a.

1:15:13

Self. whether you planned it or not, you have

1:15:15

it very much help me. Launched by social movement

1:15:18

when I when I get to that. Says

1:15:21

a higher hit are you are they so much

1:15:23

Be on the Landscape podcast. Thank. You so much

1:15:25

for having me a legitimate.