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coverage. Hello

0:54

there, thanks for tuning in this

0:56

week to The Athletic Football Tactics

0:58

podcast. It is our penultimate episode

1:00

of 2023. I'm

1:03

Ali Maxwell with three wise men.

1:06

Wow, I'm here with three men. Michael

1:08

Cox, Liam Tharm, and Mark

1:10

Carey. Hi guys. Hello. Hi. Shout

1:13

out to Gavin B for the idea

1:15

behind this week's topic. Almost every week,

1:17

I put a call out to

1:19

the listeners. I say tweet us, I say comment

1:22

on the episode page, on The Athletic

1:24

app. We'd love to hear your ideas for

1:27

future episodes. And it's not an empty request. It's

1:30

not engagement for engagement's sake.

1:32

Sometimes the wind turbines

1:34

of our minds need

1:36

a little backup generator for ideas. And that's

1:38

what we got this week. But Gavin's idea

1:40

is this. Prior to the

1:43

2000s, there seemed to be a clear formula

1:45

to chasing a game. For

1:47

the last five minutes, put your center back up

1:49

and go long. Nowadays, the

1:51

way teams chase games is much more varied.

1:54

What are the options for how to chase a game? Which

1:56

options are best? And how much risk should

1:58

you be willing to take? as the clock

2:00

ticks down. It's perfect for us,

2:02

it's really interesting. So let's chop it up.

2:06

Michael, kick us off here. What

2:08

are the options when you're down and

2:10

you're chasing a game? Well, I'm interested in

2:13

his timeline or his chronology because I

2:15

think that still happens quite a lot.

2:17

I think that was the default much later than the 2000s as well,

2:20

even for quite technical players. I mean,

2:22

I remember that famous

2:24

2009 chairman, he said we final between Barcelona

2:26

and Inter. Barcelona putting Gerard Piquet

2:28

up front later on after they'd

2:31

taken off as Laitani Brimovic. Piquet

2:33

scored a wonderful goal, where he

2:35

kind of spun two players in the 60-yard box

2:37

and finished. So yeah, I

2:40

mean, I think it's a really good topic, but I

2:42

still think putting a centre back up is

2:44

quite a big part of it. I wonder if there's a

2:47

growing trend now of central defenders

2:49

being more about being ball players and not really

2:51

being the already dominant players or that

2:54

style. It's a big coaching aspect of this

2:56

right, it's not always just about the player

2:58

and the personnel, but I imagine

3:00

there's certain coaches that just really despise that idea

3:02

of the chaos and the control that you lose.

3:05

And you then also get into the situation

3:07

where the similar thing is the optimal thing

3:09

of really chasing the game is like

3:11

the final corner where you send the goalkeeper up.

3:13

And certain coaches seem to never

3:16

do it, even if it's like it's the final kick of the

3:18

game. You just not want them there

3:20

because they're just not that great a finisher. And then

3:22

you go, okay, what's the purpose of them being there?

3:24

Is it to try and cause chaos? Is it to

3:27

have another defender that's then marking them to hopefully free

3:29

up someone else's wear? And

3:31

I guess, yeah, it's just what players do you want in what

3:33

position? So it's a great spectacle

3:35

to watch, but I see that the tactical sort of conundrum

3:37

it throws up. We often talk

3:39

about most of the elite managers being

3:42

obsessed with control. And a lot

3:44

of them are, whether it's possession-based

3:46

or otherwise, quite dogmatic in the way that

3:48

they approach the game tactically. Michael, is there

3:50

an extent to which maybe the modern manager

3:53

feels more so than in previous generations that

3:56

checking up a centre-back is almost like

3:58

admitting defeat their game plan. wasn't

4:00

good enough, isn't working and they almost don't want

4:02

to admit that. Yeah that's interesting, maybe there is

4:04

part of that involved. I'd

4:07

like to give a shout out to the Lionesses

4:09

and Millie Bright in particular because she's become such

4:11

a specialist at this. She's a centre back of

4:13

course and she's become such a specialist at being

4:15

a Plan B up front that when

4:18

she went out injured there was almost more chat

4:20

about who's going to be England's Plan B as

4:22

much as who's going to play in central defence

4:24

instead of her because England had worked on it,

4:26

they practiced it in friendly tournaments

4:28

and in the Euros last year against Spain it

4:30

worked to great effect. So

4:33

yeah there's still, I think there's still a

4:35

big case for doing that. At the same time I

4:37

think a lot of traditional centre forwards are now almost

4:39

regarded as purely Plan Bs. I mean if you've got

4:41

a player in your team that's purely good in the

4:44

air, a proper target man, they're not usually going to

4:46

be playing for the top clubs, even the kind of

4:49

sides battling relegation. You don't see that many type of

4:51

those players. I mean even someone like off the top

4:53

of my head, Kiefer Moore, down

4:55

at Bournemouth. You know maybe 10 years ago a player

4:57

like that would be a starting number 9 in the

4:59

Premier League but even he's regarded as a Plan

5:01

B for a star like Bournemouth and I know Bournemouth

5:03

have done quite technical football. I mean especially with 5

5:06

subs available and 9 on the bench now, teams

5:08

often do have that kind of player in reserve

5:11

to bring on for the last 20 minutes or

5:13

so. I think you made a good point Ali

5:15

about the tactical intelligence of managers

5:17

nowadays and that's not to say that they

5:19

weren't intelligent before and they were just randomly

5:21

throwing centre backs sort of at

5:24

the death of the game but I think

5:26

it's now more on the onus

5:28

on the managers to identify where there

5:30

are weaknesses in the opposition and

5:32

rather than it just be a centre back kind

5:34

of your most obvious change. It could be like

5:37

potentially there's maybe overloads to be had in the

5:39

wide areas. We've got a weakness in the opposition

5:41

full back and we can overload, we can double

5:43

up against them and maybe get into wide areas

5:46

and cross from there or cut back or whatever

5:48

it is. I think you've also got to look

5:50

at the perspective and whenever you

5:52

start doing it in the game, well what

5:54

then happens if that succeeds and that works?

5:56

There's a great example at the World Cup

5:58

where... It was

6:01

Netherlands against Argentina where Netherlands were two and all

6:03

down, brought on veg horse and Luke Deem off

6:05

the bench, which were two very much, two

6:07

big guys, two eyes to cross it to. And

6:10

they then recovered it to two all and went into extra

6:12

time. And I remember watching it in the office and saying,

6:15

how on earth do they attack now? I'm like, you've

6:17

got to play 30 minutes where you've got two players

6:20

that you'd brought on with the intention of doing just

6:22

this. But for the style that they played

6:24

when I watched them in the Nations League and in the build

6:26

up to the World Cup of trying to

6:28

play this quite stylish back three lots of crazy

6:30

midfielders and really sort of advancing wing backs.

6:32

I'm like, you now almost

6:34

have to prepare for, OK, well, if this works and we

6:37

get what we want, do we go back to plan A,

6:39

is there a plan C, et cetera, et cetera? It's I

6:41

guess it's as much about avoiding the panic that

6:43

can then sort of ensue from that because it

6:46

feels like quite a reactive strategy. And I wonder

6:48

as a defending team, if someone does it against

6:50

you, do you think, well, this

6:52

is it. They've got nothing else left.

6:54

If they then start shooting from distance, you go, they're

6:56

running out of ideas that it's probably the

6:58

hardest thing to defend against, but it can become the

7:00

most predictable, I think, because you go, OK, we know

7:02

we're just going to face balls into the box now.

7:04

We've got a keeper that can come and claim soft

7:06

defenders that can clear it every single time we get

7:08

it away. We go, OK, that's another win. And

7:11

I think that's the good thing about just doing it

7:13

with a center back, center back and go back to

7:15

the fence again without wanting to lay with a Milly

7:17

Bright point. That was exactly what happened against Spain in

7:19

the Euros last year. And that's what it's been

7:21

up from for 10 minutes. Helps get the

7:23

equalizer and then just went back in England,

7:25

shifted back to back four. So that's the

7:27

value of it. If there's extra time, obviously

7:29

that's, you know, if it's a 90 minute

7:31

game, it's not really going to be an issue, but extra time.

7:33

Absolutely. Mark, we're in an

7:36

era where so many different and

7:38

precise aspects of the game

7:40

have had like scientific studies done on

7:42

them. And I wonder

7:44

if it's possible or whether it has been

7:47

done to run the numbers

7:49

on the decision to go long, so

7:51

to speak, whether it's with a center

7:53

back or with a, I always think

7:55

of Fernando Urente when I think of

7:57

the sort of plan B big striker

7:59

versus. continuing with plan A,

8:01

making plan A better, whether that be

8:03

a more, you know, continuing with a

8:05

more patient build-up approach to try and

8:08

work openings even if it seems a

8:10

little slower to do so. I

8:12

mean I presented the idea just now that

8:14

it's some sort of personal reason

8:16

managers don't want to look like their tactical

8:18

plan has failed, but there's every chance and

8:20

probably more likely that they've crunched

8:23

the numbers and it's been worked

8:25

out that that's actually maybe not the

8:28

smart play. Yeah, I haven't seen any kind

8:30

of academic studies or research to kind of

8:32

do this, but I think again it speaks

8:34

to the strength and the tactical

8:37

discipline of the manager to, as

8:39

we say, plan B almost sounds kind of defeatist,

8:41

but it's not so much going to plan B

8:44

other than having a tactical playbook

8:46

that you can call upon depending on

8:48

the different scenarios and I think

8:50

we'd be, I'd certainly be naive to assume that

8:52

they don't already do that, so maybe they'd

8:55

roll the ball into onto the pitch during training and

8:57

say okay you're you're playing a 4-3-3, you're losing 2-1,

8:59

you got 10 minutes to go, how can

9:04

we approach this game, how can we do these

9:06

sorts of things. So yes, I'm

9:08

sure they have probably crunched the numbers, but they've also

9:10

done their due diligence in the modern game

9:12

to be able to ensure that the team

9:14

is prepared for it and it's less kind

9:16

of instinctive on the fly and it's a

9:18

no stone unturned in a similar way to

9:20

ensure that you can get the outcome that

9:22

you want knowing you prepared for it. I

9:24

think building on our penalties pot as well

9:26

and that when we speak about the psychological

9:28

aspect of that, this is something you can

9:31

try and train but then there is a difference between being

9:34

on a training ground on a Tuesday afternoon

9:36

where there's not loads of fans around

9:38

like you can't, you can't perfectly

9:40

recreate it, there's a great clip of Arteta

9:42

before Arsenal's midfield where he plays the you

9:45

never walk alone music and

9:48

that's trying to find a way but it's a really imperfect

9:50

thing to try and trade and I guess

9:52

it's the footballing equivalent so I guess the

9:54

Hail Mary and NFL right that you're saying okay if

9:56

this comes off because they're ready then people say why

9:58

don't you just play this way the whole game if

10:00

this is what you do when you really need to score. But

10:02

it's like you keep doing this and

10:05

if it works and it comes off then

10:07

you're almost guaranteed to score but every time

10:09

it doesn't well then that becomes a big

10:11

problem because you're turning over the ball all

10:14

the time. And the Newcastle game last night

10:17

against Milan comes to mind and I know that they, this is

10:20

a great example because they were chasing a game even though they

10:22

were drawing because they needed the win. But

10:24

they had a couple of instances where they just

10:27

don't defend the transition very well. Their rest defence

10:29

looks a bit too wide, a

10:31

bit too stretched so by rest defence you mean

10:33

where the players are stirred to defend specifically when

10:35

the team's in attack so where they're positioned to

10:37

try and then pounce on to defend

10:40

loose balls, defend counter attacks and

10:42

maybe they get to the ball first and then

10:44

they miskick the clearance or they don't recycle the

10:46

ball well. A rough L gets in one

10:48

on one and hits the post with a good

10:51

chance and then there's a similar transition. The L

10:53

chance comes from I think a cross that gets

10:55

cleared away and then there's a situation where Fabian

10:57

Cher actually goes on the overlap and he's out

10:59

of position and Ani-Makoi's in commentary actually as it's

11:02

going on goes, oh no Cher's out of position

11:04

here and they break and end up scoring so

11:07

it's being prepared to I think lose the game in

11:09

trying to win it and there's I guess some coaches

11:11

that just aren't prepared to do that at certain times.

11:14

I also think going back to the original point of

11:16

having your centre back go into the box and just

11:18

kind of getting crosses or playing long balls is

11:21

actually the least optimal. The Cher

11:23

one was actually interesting from the Newcastle game

11:25

because he's trying to commit and run

11:28

off the ball and on the ball to get

11:30

bodies into a typical sequence of play to try

11:33

and work the ball into a more lucrative

11:35

area rather than a fast track into the box

11:37

where typically it's a congested

11:39

area where nearly 22 players

11:41

are in one third of the pitch where it's

11:44

suboptimal to do it that way and be so

11:46

so direct. I'd argue that if it's like that

11:48

you need to get the ball more into wide

11:50

areas and get crosses in. There are so many

11:52

different ways to kind of go for that Hail

11:54

Mary and I think that it's just assumed it's

11:57

the centre back just getting on the end of crosses. so

12:00

good I think as Liam said it's

12:02

more being prepared to leave gaps behind you

12:04

whether that's midfield runners just like maybe camping

12:06

out in the box a little bit more

12:08

knowing that there's there's a risk-taking element here

12:10

and then as you said

12:12

they might get caught on the break as Newcastle did

12:14

last night. They

12:30

don't hear all the gold! It's your

12:32

play down the bench! Shake

12:34

it! You're

12:37

not getting into the top corner! It

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What is the best

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13:34

how did we get to the point where the

13:36

phrase Plan B conjures up

13:38

such a specific image of putting

13:40

a tall player, centre-back or sub-striker

13:43

in the middle and putting in more crosses into

13:45

the box? You know, I think of Fernando Urente

13:47

as an example, but why does it need to

13:49

mean that? When did that happen?

13:51

Is this Spurs era of Urente? Yes. You're

13:54

thinking about it, yeah. Because you also did

13:56

it for Spain in 2010. In Portugal,

13:59

I think. I was going to ask if

14:01

this is a specifically British thing, whether

14:04

in continental Europe and the specifics

14:06

of each nation having their own

14:08

identity, did they also put a

14:11

big striker up top and swinging crosses historically?

14:13

That is a good question actually. I guess they do.

14:16

I remember doing a piece on this a couple

14:18

of years ago where Barcelona, you mentioned Pico

14:21

before, Barcelona were doing it quite a lot

14:23

and Stoke were playing some fantastic football at

14:25

that time. I remember the piece being, have

14:27

Stoke become Barcelona and Barcelona become Stoke? I

14:30

think it's not uncommon for it

14:32

to happen on the continent. It's

14:34

funny you bring up Stoke and Barcelona

14:36

because I was talking to someone

14:38

the other day, I think they were talking about

14:41

Sheffield Wednesday, their new manager is quite often playing

14:43

four natural centre backs and

14:45

he said Pep-esque playing a four centre

14:48

back and I said it's only three

14:50

years since that was considered Tony Puless'

14:52

thing, was playing as many centre backs

14:54

as you could and now it's considered

14:56

a Pep Guardiola thing. Fascinating. Yeah, I

14:58

mean on the plan B thing, I

15:00

guess that's plan B in terms of

15:02

an overall strategy rather than individual combinations

15:04

of players because really

15:07

if we talk about a centre back or a

15:09

back-up striker coming on for the last 15 minutes,

15:12

it's probably like plan D at highest. Do

15:14

you know what I mean? You've

15:16

probably used substitutes before that point, you

15:18

might have changed system. So

15:20

yeah, there's a long way you have to

15:23

go these days before you get to just

15:25

playing longer balls

15:27

and putting a really aerally dominant player up

15:29

there. But what I think teams have got

15:31

better at these days is, I

15:33

feel like maybe 20 years ago if you brought

15:35

on that kind of player, you

15:38

just played balls from a centre back just

15:40

like hoof forward towards the box and they

15:42

never worked. Defenders, if you've got

15:44

probably five teams, always revert to a back

15:46

five, often five good players in the air,

15:48

you're never going to be troubled by that.

15:51

But if teams get the ball out, why

15:53

then put crosses in? I think that's going

15:55

to cause a lot more problems and it

15:57

kind of goes back to what Liam said

15:59

about. well why don't

16:01

you play that way at the start? I mean, crossing

16:03

the ball from wide is a perfectly legitimate tactic. Hoofing

16:06

it from centre back towards centre forward doesn't

16:09

really work, does it? So I think teams have become

16:11

a bit more intelligent with how they do that. Plan

16:13

B or Plan E or Plan F or whatever. And

16:16

that all feeds into the shape running with opposition analysis

16:18

now is that's what part it is for. It's not

16:20

just like we want to know what this team does

16:22

on a basic level. It will be, okay, if they're

16:24

going one that up, two that up, one

16:27

that down, two that down, etc. You hear the manager

16:29

say in press conferences we've prepared for every sort of

16:31

situation and that will be what that work is. It's

16:34

weird because you want to prepare for it but you don't

16:36

really want to actually have to use the plan because you

16:38

want to be in control and in a position where that's

16:40

okay. So yeah, I think it can

16:42

be hard to notice a lot but subs will

16:44

definitely come after you've already tried to make tweaks

16:46

whether that will be system or at

16:48

times switching players around. Even more minute stuff here

16:51

in terms of how you build up and your

16:53

approach there. I think you can get

16:55

a set piece where you might try something different on a

16:57

third or fourth set piece. It's yeah, subs have to be

16:59

weighed under this. It's going to say

17:01

as well. It's an obvious point to make but it

17:04

is worth noting that you do have more opportunity and

17:06

more time to be able to do Plan B, C

17:08

and D for example because of the sheer volume of

17:10

time that's been sort of added on with. Nick

17:13

Miller did a piece on this fairly recently and

17:15

the average amount of added time per

17:18

game. So the first and the

17:20

second half combined. Mostly hovered somewhere

17:22

between six minutes and seven

17:24

minutes, six and a half. Let's say

17:26

for the ten seasons before this one and

17:28

last season. It was closer to eight minutes.

17:31

It was on the increase and this season

17:33

and this is slightly outdated data but it's

17:35

in double figures. It's about 11 minutes. So

17:37

even that when you're thinking about chasing the

17:39

game a couple of minutes is quite crucial

17:42

to be added on to maybe just try something different

17:44

and then maybe go for the helmet. Really go for

17:47

broke if you really want to just lump it into

17:49

the box. There's so much more opportunity and

17:51

I think you're kind of seeing it in the demeanor of the

17:54

players. Maybe not so much the manager. The

17:56

demeanor of the players to actually still continue

17:58

to play football when it's done. the

18:00

89th minute because in theory they still got

18:02

about 11 minutes to go rather than you

18:04

start to normally see a bit of panic

18:07

of you know playing it a little bit longer

18:10

it's quite clear that this is start to change now. All

18:12

I was gonna add was we speak

18:14

about now that the role of analysis in shaping this

18:17

I could be wrong but from some of the reading that

18:19

I've done a lot of the reason for a lot of

18:21

the direct play in in sort of the

18:23

very late 90s particularly in English in

18:25

the early 2000s is rooted in Charles Reap

18:27

and Charles Hughes right and the research that

18:30

was done there the early sort of data

18:32

analysis and you know findings that more goals

18:34

are scored from sort of playing direct and playing

18:36

long accessing those positions of maximum opportunity so

18:38

they were doing what they thought was right

18:40

at the time and the managers are now

18:42

and we could probably have this discussion in

18:44

five ten years time where they're doing even more

18:46

different things and the rules look even more different

18:48

now and because there'll be more you hope

18:50

more in depth and more nuanced sort of

18:52

data analysis that finds even more ways of

18:54

playing effectively. Let's try

18:57

and drill down and pick out some specifics here

18:59

I mean Michael are there

19:01

any incidences other than that

19:03

Barcelona PK performance of teams

19:05

doing something innovative or interesting

19:08

or notably effective when chasing a game? One

19:11

that stands out is Chelsea PSG

19:14

in 2014 when Chelsea were managed

19:16

by Jose Mourinho and they ended

19:18

up playing with three out-and-out strikers

19:21

Eto Bar who eventually

19:23

got the win and Fernando Torres and

19:25

it just struck me it's really effective because I think a

19:28

lot of the time when teams end up with three strikers

19:31

they just get in each other's way like there's

19:33

just too many players in the box I remember

19:35

Arsenal when they were trailing in European competitions always

19:37

used to bring in a Canu

19:39

as an extra cent for it and he

19:41

just like wasn't suited to it he got

19:43

in other players way everything became about just

19:45

playing long balls to him and

19:48

this I mean Chelsea played in this game I think in

19:50

the end it was almost a front fall with Schöller on

19:52

the left it was just really effective

19:54

clearly Mourinho what I think the players said afterwards

19:56

they'd worked in it on training they'd worked on

19:58

you know 80 minutes they did that 85 minutes

20:00

they were going to do that. They had a very

20:02

precise plan and one of the subs, Denver

20:05

Bar, came up with the winning goal. So

20:07

I think managers have just, they have

20:10

got more of a game plan,

20:12

they have got more options, they know precisely what

20:14

they're going to do. I don't think they're thinking

20:16

on their feet and they're not just shoving on

20:18

an extra striker and saying go on, play up

20:21

front. The formation around them adjusts and

20:23

I know that sounds an obvious thing but I think if you go

20:25

back 20, 25 years it was a

20:27

little bit random and a little bit chaotic.

20:30

I always like to go into the Athletic

20:32

Archives for the one doing a podcast and

20:34

see what we've maybe written about it already

20:37

and I found one called The Premier

20:39

League's Greatest Tactical Substitutions. I thought this

20:41

is perfect. Do you know the writer,

20:43

the author of this piece? Yeah,

20:46

it was me. It was you. Yeah,

20:48

it was you. This was one of the

20:50

reader's requests. Was it? Yeah. Can you remember

20:52

the games that you referred to? People are

20:55

demanding this analysis. Gavin, readers

20:57

of the site. Was this another Gavin Beers? That's what

20:59

the people want. He's not back to his later. He

21:02

doesn't specify. Billor Arsenal in 1998 was one of them.

21:04

Brilliant shout, yes. I

21:06

can't remember the others. It was Spurs against Arsenal,

21:08

Harry Redknapp bringing on Jermaine Dafoe for Aaron Lennon.

21:11

You know what, I did just think that and

21:13

then I got confused with another memory which he's

21:16

sitting next to Harry Redknapp at a dinner once

21:18

and mentioning that game to him and

21:20

he had no recollection of it at all. So

21:22

I couldn't remember whether that was before or after

21:24

that. That's incredible. Well, there's

21:27

that one and Robessa Mancini bringing on Nigel

21:29

De Jong for Sami Nazary when he beat

21:31

Newcastle 2-0. So that was a good one

21:33

because they were with Neil Nell. He

21:35

brought on a holding midfielder De Jong for Nazary,

21:38

a playmaker, but then pushed Jaiya Terry

21:40

forward, which was his, that was his plan

21:42

B. So that's quite a good example of

21:44

an obvious plan B that wasn't just, you

21:46

know, playing long balls. And of course, tourists

21:48

scored two crucial goals. What are Liverpool

21:50

doing so well on this

21:52

front? They stand out in terms of their

21:54

record coming from behind. This season they've been

21:57

behind 10 times already. Quite

21:59

a lot, I would say. for a team expected

22:01

to win almost every game. They've equalised

22:03

nine times out of ten, obviously losing

22:06

just the once. That's the best record

22:08

this season. But last year as well,

22:10

Mark, Newcastle, Arsenal and Liverpool had the

22:12

best equalising rate, that the highest percentage

22:16

of games successfully chased,

22:18

for want of a better phrase. Yeah,

22:21

I mean the Liverpool example, certainly this season,

22:23

I think probably worth noting that quite a

22:25

few of those have been kind of early

22:27

on, so when they've equalised or taken the

22:29

lead, they've had a lot of

22:31

opportunities to do so. And it speaks to the point

22:33

that I said before, four

22:36

more of the elite teams against the weaker teams, they

22:38

have, you almost don't want to wake up

22:40

the beast. The earlier you maybe score

22:42

against them, the more they sort of kick into gear

22:45

a little bit. I think the Liverpool

22:47

one's interesting in terms of their

22:50

approach. I mentioned before about,

22:53

in my mind, the optimal way against a team

22:56

who's maybe gone ahead and maybe sitting in

22:58

more of a deeper block. For Liverpool, I

23:01

think one of their key challenges has been

23:03

actually getting the ball wide. What was previously

23:05

their strength? They don't get wide quite as

23:07

much now. Their volume of crosses in open

23:10

play has gone down dramatically for reasons that

23:12

we've spoken about already with Trent Alexander-Arnold playing

23:14

more narrow. But I looked

23:16

into the numbers and I looked at how

23:18

often they crossed the ball in open play

23:20

per 100 touches when they were winning and

23:22

when they were losing. So

23:24

when they were in a winning game state, they crossed the

23:26

ball just 0.8 times per

23:29

100 touches. When they were behind, that number

23:31

leaps up to two times per 100 touches.

23:33

So more than double when we're talking about the inclination

23:35

to get it wide and cross. So I

23:38

think, well, the example being most recently against Crystal

23:41

Palace, their equalizer, granted against 10 men, was to

23:43

get the ball into an overload on the right-hand

23:45

side, cross it, and then they sort of picked

23:47

up something of a second ball and it was

23:50

a deflected finish. But it shows that obviously when

23:52

you're chasing the game, we said about rather than

23:54

those sort of vertical balls from

23:56

sort of back to front to get the ball

23:58

into wide areas. more of an inclination

24:01

for a side to cross the ball and

24:03

obviously equalise or go ahead. See, I think

24:05

this is really interesting because we've focused a

24:07

lot on the target in the middle, whether

24:09

it's a tall striker or a centre-back. But

24:11

how about having Trent

24:13

Alexander-Arnold, if you're going to resort

24:15

to crossing or make that your

24:17

plan BCD, well, what

24:20

a difference it makes to have the best crosser

24:22

in the world, providing the

24:24

service rather than playing long straight balls or having

24:26

full backs who aren't as natural in terms of

24:28

delivering that are doing that. And it makes complete

24:31

sense to go around the block. If you're going

24:33

to be playing against a deep block when you're

24:35

chasing the game, then go directly through

24:37

it because that's arguably the most

24:39

optimal way to try and equalise. It's where

24:42

the spaces are isn't, right? And yeah, when

24:44

teams start to compact that central area. So the

24:46

one golden thread I'd really say

24:48

in terms of player profiles that runs through

24:50

Newcastle, Arsenal, Liverpool, looking back to last season,

24:52

is they're wingers or they're wide-midfielders. They've all

24:55

got players that play inverted. So

24:57

on the opposite side to their dominant foot,

24:59

they can go 1v1, can go on the

25:01

outside, can shoot from distance. Because at times,

25:03

I think back to, was it Sacher in

25:05

the game against Manchester United where as

25:07

good as you can be tactively, sometimes you need a

25:09

player to smash run-in from 20 yards to open the

25:11

game up a bit again. It's not always the prettiest

25:13

goals that you score. And it's been the same for

25:15

Liverpool when they've done a lot of that this season

25:18

actually not only coming back, but doing it with

25:20

a man down. And again, we've done a whole

25:22

podcast on that so people can listen to that.

25:24

But yeah, I think it's having that

25:26

quality sometimes. Make the space and cause

25:28

problems. So I think having those

25:30

players can really end up splitting games open sometimes.

25:32

And it could potentially drag the centre back across

25:34

if you're creating an overload in a wide area

25:36

and it's a two-on-one in the full back, then

25:38

the centre back's gonna come across, then everyone's gonna

25:40

shuffle over, then you create space elsewhere, as I

25:42

say, rather than just the game being in front

25:45

of all of the back four, back five, whatever,

25:47

by playing more deeper balls into the box and

25:49

crossing from less lucrative areas,

25:51

shall we say. And you're

25:53

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Incorporated. So

28:21

it's become clear that you can change your

28:23

tactics or you can decide not to do

28:25

that. But what else can you change? Well,

28:27

personnel. And these

28:29

days you can change more of your team

28:32

than ever before. Half of your outfield players

28:34

if you so wish. Let's talk about substitutes.

28:37

Or Michael, finishers. Game

28:40

changers. You sometimes

28:42

can be a bit of a scrooge

28:44

about things like new phrasing for stuff

28:46

when you stand on substitutes being renamed

28:48

finishers. Well he just said inverted wingers.

28:50

I famously invented that. Yeah

28:52

and holding the ball and then giving it to your teammate

28:54

at the last minute to take the penalty. You invented that

28:57

too. Well, that needs a shorter name. It's a bit too

28:59

long. Did

29:01

I get it out from the archives? No, I mean

29:03

finishers means something different doesn't it? If you

29:05

say he's a really good finisher that

29:07

means he's really good at scoring chances. So I just,

29:10

you know, if we want a phrase for, I don't

29:12

know, Ed Ingeco

29:14

or Javier Hernandez going back

29:16

a few years as a great plan B.

29:18

I just don't think he's a great finisher.

29:20

That can mean two different things. Be a

29:22

better one. Game ender. It obviously just contrasts

29:24

nicely from starter and finish doesn't it? It's

29:26

I guess why it's, but I agree it

29:29

does become possibly problematic as terminology because people

29:31

can easily confuse it. I don't think there's

29:34

footballers getting confused what their manager means when he says

29:36

we need you to be a real finisher for us.

29:38

The easy way to do it is to come off

29:40

the bench and score loads of goals and then just

29:42

you mean both things don't you? I

29:45

think the word itself isn't the

29:47

principal point really is it? It's the acceptance of the atmosphere.

29:52

Motivated rather than like you've been chucked on

29:54

the bench and jettisoned. What's wrong with super

29:57

sub? That's a lovely thing. But

30:00

you can't have five super-subs, otherwise it loses

30:02

meaning instantly. I guess it's more the principle

30:04

of like, it's not what the word means,

30:06

it's about saying here, we're open-minded to the

30:08

point that you can have a

30:10

really significant and important role where you come on and

30:12

you impact games. It's kind of like another American football

30:15

example, it's like the kicking right that comes on all

30:17

the special teams that come on and your role isn't

30:19

to play, 90 minutes is to come on and have

30:21

a specific impact. So I guess

30:23

yeah, it's, call it what you want, I guess

30:25

it doesn't really matter. It's being open-minded to having

30:27

players that can play a very specific, albeit shortened

30:29

role. Game changer, don't mind that.

30:31

I'm tempted to say let's all be grown-ups and just

30:34

call it, call them substitutes. But

30:37

I'm also less flippantly and facetiously aware,

30:39

Mark, that this is probably one

30:42

consequence of the increased analysis in

30:44

the game and over the last

30:46

10, 15 years, trying to

30:48

do things a little differently, trying to do things

30:50

better. This is more about messaging

30:53

to your players and it's more of

30:55

a probably motivational thing than anything else.

30:57

Yeah, and it's a psychological thing. I

30:59

think that there's been a greater appreciation

31:01

of psychology within sport more broadly and

31:03

football more specifically in recent years. It

31:06

obviously speaks to my background, so I'm

31:08

really interested in that side of things. But

31:10

also again, that no stone unturned

31:12

approach of learning from different sports.

31:14

And Liam, you mentioned American football.

31:16

I think that the finisher phrase

31:18

has been taken from Eddie Jones

31:20

talking about it a lot in

31:22

Rugby. So I know that might

31:24

be to Michael's dismay. I

31:27

think that it's learning from different sports,

31:29

different disciplines. I know that Gareth Southgate

31:31

has gone to train, hasn't

31:33

he got the England squad to train with the army in

31:35

the past? And just learning about the impact of

31:37

different backgrounds and how you can actually do

31:39

that. I know that Jurgen Klopp has worked

31:41

with in pre-season training someone who was, I

31:44

think, an underwater diver and how long you

31:46

can push your body to the limit. All

31:48

these different things to instill

31:50

more kind of psychological confidence, more

31:53

robustness and more resilience. And

31:55

it's not just about using psychology to improve

31:58

a player's performance mark, but there's a lot

32:00

of science and analysis that goes into things

32:02

like substitutions and how to get the best

32:04

out of them. Yeah, and I

32:06

looked into, as I always like to look

32:08

at the previous research that's been done, more

32:10

kind of at the physical level, I think.

32:13

I looked at something that was done by

32:15

a lab, lab alley,

32:17

lab in Spain rather than Spanish

32:19

lads, looking at behaviours

32:22

of teams. And it was from

32:24

the 2019-20 season where they had

32:26

just three substitutions and the 2020-21

32:30

season where they had the five substitutions for

32:32

the first time in La Liga. And

32:34

basically total running distance was

32:36

similar across both of those seasons,

32:39

but the running distance at higher

32:41

speeds were more prevalent in the

32:43

five substitution season.

32:45

So it speaks to Liam's point

32:47

before that it shows that the pace of

32:49

the game is able to be sustained for

32:51

longer with this new format now that we've

32:53

got five substitutions. And I guess that can

32:56

be positive from an attacking

32:58

and a defensive perspective because you could have

33:00

more concentration in both sides and

33:02

then it's still kind of whoever has

33:05

the stronger resilience comes out on top.

33:07

But the game is faster for longer

33:09

and as a consequence with having more

33:11

entertainment. Always love the work

33:13

those muchachos are doing to help us understand the game

33:15

a little bit better. Michael, when it

33:18

comes to subs and using subs, the thing that

33:20

I always find most interesting is this battle,

33:23

if you like, between on the one side,

33:27

fresh legs being needed, players

33:29

who are not fatigued, who maybe will be up

33:31

against an opposite man who is fatigued and therefore

33:33

you get the benefit of that versus what you

33:36

often hear as well, which is a lot

33:39

of changes can actually disrupt the flow

33:41

of the game and coherence

33:43

can be affected in a negative way

33:46

rather than getting the positives of an

33:48

injection of fresh legs and

33:50

high performance. I mean, is

33:52

there any is there really an answer to that

33:54

discussion or is that just one that will always go on? Well,

33:57

what I think is interesting is that managers are almost

33:59

in the same position. incentivized to use more subs

34:01

than they need because they've only got a certain

34:03

number of windows to make them so

34:05

you don't want To make three subs at three separate

34:07

windows because then you you feel like

34:09

you're missing out so I think managers tend to

34:11

make double subs even if maybe if they don't

34:13

really want to just because You feel

34:15

you have to and of course if there's players who are just sitting on

34:17

the bench for the 90 minutes You don't get on they

34:20

start to get aggrieved. So yeah, it's quite a

34:22

tricky balance. I kind of

34:25

agree with Maybe what you're implying

34:27

which is that teams become a bit

34:30

Disorganized and things become a bit chaotic when

34:32

you change so many players I mean people

34:35

used to hate those international friendlies when teams

34:38

could change You know

34:40

the whole team We're halfway there

34:42

in normal league games with five subs now,

34:44

which feels quite weird to me There's

34:46

a great example going back to the World Cup again Spinn

34:49

against Germany where they both started with a quote

34:51

unquote sort of false nine or not a not

34:53

a box presence So Spinn had a sense here

34:55

as the false nine in there there for three

34:57

three Germany had Miller up top

34:59

and their 43 one both bought on one

35:01

of the quite some quite big lads a

35:03

sprain bought on I've already and early into

35:06

the second half Germany brought on

35:08

full crud later on and both players school after coming

35:10

on but it became a second half where it gone

35:13

from being Very cagey quite attritional and very

35:15

balanced not really many chances to again They

35:17

just completely opened up because both teams and suddenly

35:19

couldn't really hold the ball very well They

35:22

had presences going forward But there wasn't as much

35:24

sustained possession because they were having that midfielder drop

35:26

in and making those overloads and being neat and

35:28

connecting The play it's as much about what you're

35:30

prepared to lose and give up as what you

35:32

want to have And I guess they're just as

35:35

we said before like there's certain coaches that just

35:37

don't want to lose control of the game in

35:39

that way I'm one truism that is

35:41

still as far as I can tell broadly true Is

35:43

that managers are loath to

35:45

change their defenders compared to midfielders

35:47

and attacking players? Let's look

35:49

at the most used subs in

35:52

the Premier League this season And I think

35:54

it's a really nice split because Harvey Elliott

35:56

Pierre Huybier Yuri Tilleman's have all

35:58

been brought on 12 times So

38:00

originally the five subs thing came in for

38:02

Covid and then the Premier League went back

38:04

to three subs and Guardiola complained quite a

38:06

lot about that but ironically, maybe, was the

38:08

manager who used the fewest amount of subs

38:11

and often went through a game and didn't

38:13

use any at all. So yeah, he has

38:15

been quite cautious with his use of changes.

38:17

Yeah, I looked into it across the previous

38:19

four seasons and City have made either the

38:21

fewest or the second fewest subs per game

38:24

on average in the Premier League. So yeah, it

38:26

does speak to that. I think it's been most

38:29

interesting or salient when they have

38:31

been needing to chase the game or at least score

38:33

a goal and he still hasn't done it. He's kind

38:35

of doubled down because I guess he's asking

38:37

his players to, he's trusting his players and

38:39

asking them to fulfil almost out of anger.

38:41

You set out to fulfil this game plan,

38:43

go out there and do it. I shouldn't

38:45

have to be changing things for you. Well,

38:47

that's at least the impression that I've got.

38:49

But one of the memorable ones was last season, of

38:51

course, they won the Champions League against Arby

38:53

Leipzig and I think it was the first leg

38:56

and there was still time to obviously come back

38:58

into it. But I think people were querying why

39:00

he didn't make a single substitution when they drew

39:02

1-1 away at Leipzig.

39:04

And I remember one a couple of seasons

39:06

ago now against Crystal Palace and it was

39:08

a nil-nil draw. And again, people

39:11

were lamenting him for not making any substitutions and

39:13

he just chose to double down and just say

39:15

that that was the team that I asked to

39:17

go and fulfil that game plan and it's up

39:19

to them to do it. So I

39:22

don't know if it's just a Guardiola sort

39:24

of way of being stubborn

39:26

sometimes to make sure that he sort of

39:28

lets the players know that. We know

39:30

he often changes between games rather than

39:33

within. But yeah, in stark contrast to

39:35

Roberto D'Serbi. D'Serbi is obsessed

39:37

with substitutions, Liam. They make 4.75

39:39

changes a game and their average

39:41

substitute plays 25 minutes,

39:44

the longest on average of

39:46

any team in the league. Some of that

39:48

has been injury-induced. I think there's been

39:50

knocks at players who picked up their

39:52

games, particularly forwards. But he's also

39:54

made a few half-time changes as well. I think

39:56

the time's double subs. Again,

39:58

in part because... I

40:00

think gone one nil down or conceded first a

40:02

lot more this season than what they did last

40:04

season. They had a better habit of scoring first

40:07

or going ahead earlier in game. So I think

40:09

he's then found a case of, okay,

40:11

they have just been chasing a game more. And I

40:14

guess his way of adapting that and responding to that

40:16

and the way that he wants to play

40:18

is adding one another forward. At

40:20

times he'll often do like for like swaps. I think the

40:23

best way that he's actually made changes this

40:25

season was a way to Marseille where

40:28

they were two nil down, I think about

40:30

half an hour into the game or 20 minutes into the game. And

40:33

the first thing he did really was actually tweak

40:35

the tactics he went from his

40:37

sort of narrows or four, four, two, if you

40:39

like, where he's got the number nine sort of coming

40:41

off and playing alongside the 10. And he went to

40:43

a four, three, three, because they were getting man marked

40:46

on on the last line and stuff was going into

40:48

the two strikers and things just

40:50

weren't sticking. So he went to a single pivot

40:52

and then brought on Billy Gilmore because he's the

40:54

best player they've got playing that role specifically. And

40:56

suddenly they could then get two number eights to

40:58

make a front five and it was front five

41:00

against the back four couldn't man mark as well.

41:02

And they did better. And you know, you do

41:05

rest his history, as they say, just bringing

41:07

the two together of man city and Brighton, I've

41:09

looked at the game state and the share of

41:11

time in each game state, man city, just 9%

41:13

of the time in a losing

41:15

game state, which is the fewest of anyone in the

41:18

Premier League Brighton 35%. So

41:21

only Luton, Bentley and Sheffield United have spent

41:23

more time in a losing game state. So

41:25

it speaks to making substitutions maybe out of

41:27

necessity as much as anything. Brilliant.

41:29

Well, thank you so much, guys, for putting so

41:31

much thought into things like

41:33

how to chase a game and

41:36

what to do with your allotted

41:38

substitutions. It's been great fun this

41:40

week on the Athletic Football Tactics

41:43

podcast. So shout out Gavin B

41:45

for the idea. Thanks also to

41:47

Prasanna and Caleb for

41:49

their suggestions on the Athletic app.

41:51

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41:53

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41:59

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