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1:09

Hey everyone, thanks for tuning

1:12

in to episode number 436 of our Civil

1:14

War Podcast. I'm

1:18

Mitch, and

1:21

Tracy won't be with us for this show.

1:24

She's off visiting family, and

1:26

I'm here at home holding down the

1:28

fort, so if you don't mind

1:30

listening to just the sound of

1:33

my voice, we'll forge

1:35

ahead and continue with the story

1:37

of what happened when Long Street

1:40

moved against Burnside at

1:43

Knoxville. As

1:45

we said before, when Braxton Bragg

1:47

decided to send James Long

1:49

Street off to eject

1:52

Ambrose Burnside from Knoxville, it

1:55

resulted in a significant reduction

1:57

in the number of troops Bragg had

1:59

available to man the lines

2:02

at Chattanooga. Longstreet

2:05

took his two infantry divisions from

2:07

the Army of Northern Virginia, two

2:10

artillery battalions with 35 guns, and

2:12

the 5,000 troopers of

2:16

Joseph Wheeler's cavalry corps.

2:19

In all, this gave Old Pete

2:22

about 17,000 men. But,

2:25

of course, that meant those Confederate

2:27

soldiers were being taken off

2:30

the table as far as Bragg's

2:32

ability to man the lines

2:34

at Chattanooga. If

2:37

we rewind the tape to

2:39

September 18th, the

2:41

beginning of the major fighting at the Battle of Chickamauga,

2:45

Bragg had about 66,000 men, including

2:49

Longstreet's just-arrived

2:52

troops, compared to Rosecran's 58,000

2:55

Yankees. Then,

2:59

by October 1st, Bragg's

3:02

strength at Chattanooga was

3:04

down to 47,500, but

3:08

the federal numbers had dropped to 35,000. However,

3:11

Bragg dispatched Longstreet

3:13

to deal with

3:16

Burnside the first week of November, and

3:19

so by November 23rd, just

3:22

prior to the battles for Chattanooga,

3:25

Bragg had an effective strength

3:27

of only about 37,000, while Grant had built

3:29

up his

3:34

force at Chattanooga to 70,000

3:37

men. So,

3:39

all of that's to say, detaching

3:42

Longstreet and 17,000 men

3:45

for the expedition to retake

3:47

Knoxville represented a

3:50

significant risk for Bragg, and

3:53

was obviously not a decision he would

3:55

have made lightly.

3:57

But,

3:58

Bragg was hoping... A.

4:01

That Long Street would succeed quickly

4:03

in defeating Burnside. And

4:07

B. That victory 100 miles

4:10

away up in East Tennessee would

4:12

derail Grant's plans there

4:14

at Chattanooga. We

4:17

have a feeling though that purely

4:20

military considerations probably

4:23

accounted for half the

4:25

reason Bragg was willing to

4:27

detach Long Street and lose 17,000

4:30

men from his force at

4:32

Chattanooga. We

4:34

have a feeling the other half

4:37

of the reason Bragg was willing to

4:39

detach Long Street was

4:41

that Braxton Bragg was more

4:44

than ready to part ways with Old

4:46

Pete, for reasons

4:48

we've already talked about quite a bit. So

4:52

while on the face of it, it may

4:55

not seem to make much sense for Bragg

4:57

to reduce the number of troops

5:00

he had available to man the

5:02

lines at Chattanooga at a critical moment.

5:05

He did have reasons for doing so.

5:08

He was hoping Long Street would succeed

5:11

quickly and thereby derail

5:13

Grant's plans at Chattanooga. And

5:17

considering their toxic relationship,

5:20

plus Long Street's recent failures

5:23

in Lookout Valley, well,

5:26

Bragg was more than ready to

5:28

part ways with Old Pete.

5:42

Bragg's November 4th orders

5:44

to Long Street called for Old

5:46

Pete, quote, to drive

5:48

Burnside out of East Tennessee.

5:52

Bragg emphasized that,

5:54

quote, the success

5:56

of the plan depends on rapid movements

5:59

and sudden blows.

6:01

However, while ejecting

6:04

the Yankees from Knoxville and

6:06

doing it swiftly was a straightforward

6:09

assignment, Longstreet

6:12

quickly discovered that successfully

6:14

completing his task wasn't

6:17

going to be easy. Right

6:19

out of the gate, old Pete found that he

6:22

was faced with significant transportation

6:25

and logistical challenges. While

6:29

the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad

6:31

connecting with Knoxville ran

6:34

up through East Tennessee, Longstreet

6:37

obviously wouldn't be able to simply hop

6:39

on it and ride it the one hundred miles

6:41

up to Knoxville. No,

6:45

he would only be able to use the

6:47

railroad for the distance the

6:49

Confederates controlled it. And

6:52

then, even after the Federals were

6:54

pushed back toward Knoxville, the

6:57

portion of the railroad that had been behind

7:00

their lines would have been wrecked,

7:03

and repairing the tracks would be

7:05

problematic. So from

7:07

that point on, Longstreet would have to

7:09

use wagons to haul supplies

7:12

to his advancing forces. But,

7:16

as you guys will recall, the Confederates

7:19

had, for quite a while, suffered

7:22

from a major wagon problem.

7:25

Namely, they didn't have enough of

7:27

them. Bragg

7:29

had never had enough wagons to adequately

7:32

supply his forces at Chattanooga,

7:35

and now he wasn't going

7:38

to be able to magically

7:40

conjure up hundreds out of thin

7:42

air to send off with Longstreet.

7:47

That was going to be a big problem once

7:49

Longstreet ran out of railroad. But

7:53

old Pete discovered that even using

7:55

the East Tennessee and Georgia

7:58

to transport his

7:59

part of the way to Knoxville

8:02

was not without complications. The

8:06

tracks were in rough shape and

8:08

the locomotives and rolling stock

8:11

were in poor condition. It took

8:14

Longstreet eight days to

8:16

complete the movement of his infantry

8:18

and artillery to Sweetwater,

8:20

Tennessee, 60 miles

8:22

up the line. Well,

8:26

the slow pace of Longstreet's

8:28

movement, coupled with the

8:31

rapid pace of his complaints,

8:34

irritated Braxton Bragg,

8:36

to put it mildly. The

8:38

fractured relationship

8:41

between the two generals is clearly

8:43

seen in their communications during

8:46

this time. In any

8:49

case, Bragg had emphasized

8:52

that, quote, the success

8:54

of the plan depends on rapid movements

8:56

and sudden blows, end quote.

9:00

But, unfortunately for the

9:02

Confederates, Longstreet's

9:05

difficulties and his anything

9:07

but rapid movement northward would

9:10

ensure that actually

9:13

there would be no

9:16

sudden blows struck against Burnside.

9:20

On November 11th, Longstreet complained

9:22

to Bragg, quote, instead

9:25

of being prepared to make a campaign,

9:28

I find myself not more than half prepared

9:31

to subsist.

9:44

As we talked about in the last show, prior

9:47

to his commitment of Longstreet

9:49

to the Knoxville expedition,

9:52

Braxton Bragg, by the end of October,

9:55

had increased the number of Confederates

9:57

pressuring Burnside in East Tennessee. by

10:01

sending first one division

10:04

of rebel infantry and then

10:06

another to join the

10:08

Confederate cavalry that had been

10:10

harassing the Yankees. And

10:14

by the end of October, under this

10:16

increased Confederate pressure, Burnside

10:19

was reacting precisely according

10:22

to Bragg's script and withdrawing

10:24

his forces into an area right

10:26

around Knoxville. Well,

10:30

Burnside's supply situation in East

10:32

Tennessee had never been very good.

10:35

In fact, logistical concerns were

10:38

the major reason it had taken the Federals

10:41

two years to invade East Tennessee,

10:44

despite Abraham Lincoln's fervent

10:46

desire to liberate that Unionist

10:49

region. You

10:51

see, coming down from Kentucky, a

10:53

Union army would have no easy

10:56

direct rail connection to Knoxville,

10:59

and so supplies would have to

11:02

be hauled by wagon down

11:04

to East Tennessee through the Cumberland

11:07

Gap. At

11:10

any rate, Burnside felt compelled to

11:12

maintain a large garrison at

11:14

Cumberland Gap to protect his rather

11:16

precarious line of supply back to Kentucky,

11:20

and so that left him with an effective field

11:22

force of only about 14,000 men

11:26

to occupy East Tennessee. All

11:30

of that's to say that Burnside's situation

11:33

in East Tennessee was far

11:35

from secure even before

11:38

Bragg up the Annie by sending

11:40

Longstreet to eject him from Knoxville.

11:45

Well, after the start of Longstreet's movement,

11:48

as on the Confederate side, old

11:51

Pete and Bragg quarreled

11:53

about the issues surrounding Longstreet's

11:56

difficulties, on

11:58

the federal side, Ambrose Burnside

12:00

and Ulysses S. Grant became

12:03

aware that the Confederates were undertaking

12:05

a major effort to eject

12:08

Burnside from Knoxville. By

12:11

November 13th, Burnside was certain

12:14

that Long Street was coming for him. He

12:17

told Grant that rather than making

12:20

a firm defensive stand

12:22

near Loudon, southwest of Knoxville,

12:25

where he might attempt to prevent

12:27

the rebels from crossing the Tennessee

12:29

River, he would instead

12:33

withdraw his force toward

12:35

Knoxville, where it would man

12:37

the fortifications protecting the town.

12:39

And Burnside

12:42

laid out his reasons, telling Grant,

12:46

if we concentrate in the neighborhood of Loudon,

12:49

the enemy will have the advantage of being

12:51

able to reinforce from the railroad.

12:55

Whereas if we concentrate at Knoxville,

12:58

not only the present force of the enemy, but

13:01

all reinforcements would have to

13:03

march some 40 miles before

13:05

fighting. And

13:09

Grant agreed with Burnside's plan. At

13:13

this time at Chattanooga, Grant was

13:15

still waiting for Sherman's troops to

13:17

arrive on the scene, and he

13:19

told Burnside that if he, Burnside,

13:22

could hold off Long Street for

13:25

seven days, then that

13:27

should be enough time for Sherman to show up at

13:29

Chattanooga, and then Grant

13:31

would send help to Burnside at

13:33

Knoxville. So

13:36

Grant was asking Burnside to

13:39

hold off Long Street for seven days,

13:42

and then Grant would send him help. Until

13:46

that help arrived, though, Ambrose

13:49

Burnside would be on his

13:51

own.

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14:34

Hey everyone, we just wanted

14:36

to take a minute to let you know about some

14:39

content on another Airwave

14:41

Media podcast that we thought

14:43

you guys would be interested in.

14:45

Over on the Art of Crime

14:47

podcast, the host, Gavin,

14:50

has done several episodes related to the

14:52

Lincoln assassination. The

14:54

Art of Crime is a history podcast

14:56

about the unlikely collisions between

14:59

true crime and the arts.

15:00

Season two revolves

15:02

around artists who committed or

15:05

at least attempted an assassination

15:07

and includes a two-part series

15:10

on John Wilkes Booth.

15:12

There is also a bonus episode

15:14

on Laura Keene, the English-born

15:17

actor-manager who was performing

15:20

in Our American Cousin at

15:22

Ford's Theater at the time of Lincoln's

15:24

assassination.

15:25

All three episodes situate

15:28

Booth and Keene within the context

15:30

of 19th century theater history.

15:33

The two-part Booth series explores

15:35

the assassin's politics and contrasts

15:38

them with his renowned brother, the

15:40

actor and abolitionist,

15:42

Edwin Booth. The Art

15:44

of Crime is available everywhere

15:46

you get your podcasts.

15:54

Burnside didn't have much time

15:56

to prepare for the approaching

15:58

Confederates. Despite

16:01

the delays, after moving by

16:03

rail and road, Longstreet's

16:05

force appeared just south of the Tennessee

16:08

River near the town of Loudon

16:10

on November 13th. Longstreet

16:14

initially planned on approaching

16:16

Knoxville from the south, but

16:19

without enough wagons to carry

16:21

his pontoons, he was forced

16:23

to move his bridging equipment by

16:26

rail as close to the Tennessee

16:28

River as possible. This

16:31

meant he would have to cross to the north

16:33

bank of the river miles west

16:36

of Knoxville, then strike

16:38

east toward the town. And

16:41

once across the Tennessee, he needed to

16:44

bring the Yankees to battle as soon

16:46

as possible, since a quick

16:48

fight and victory was

16:51

essential, considering his

16:53

shaky supply situation. Well,

16:58

on November 14th, the rebels lurched

17:00

across the river under a rainy

17:02

sky 40 miles southwest

17:05

of Knoxville at Huff's Ferry

17:08

near Loudon. The

17:10

crossing was made by Micah Jenkins'

17:12

division. As

17:14

you guys will probably recall, this was

17:17

John B. Hood's division, but

17:19

with Hood still sidelined

17:21

by his Chickamauga wounding, Jenkins

17:24

had been placed in command of it. In

17:28

any case, as Jenkins crossed

17:30

the river at Huff's Ferry, Longstreet's

17:33

other division, commanded by Lafayette

17:36

McClaws, diverted the Yankees'

17:38

attention with a faint to the northeast.

17:43

Farther to the east, a further

17:45

diversion was undertaken by Wheeler's

17:48

cavalry, who threatened Knoxville

17:51

from the south. At

17:54

Huff's Ferry, Jenkins met

17:57

very little resistance as he crossed the river. He

18:01

far outnumbered the Federals stationed

18:03

at Loudon, who were the men

18:06

of Julius White's division from

18:08

the 23rd Corps. And

18:10

White quickly withdrew several miles

18:13

eastward along the north bank of the river

18:16

to Lenoir's station

18:18

on the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad.

18:23

Already at Lenoir's station were

18:25

about 5,000 soldiers of the 9th Corps. And

18:30

these men had spent the last several days

18:32

working to put up quarters they

18:35

fully expected would be their homes

18:37

for the winter. And

18:39

the news on the 14th that the Confederates

18:41

were crossing the Tennessee Enforce

18:44

nearby came as a complete

18:46

shock to these 9th Corps men. Corporal

18:50

William Todd of the 79th New York noted, I

19:21

had just finished my chimney in the afternoon

19:23

previous, and it was drying

19:25

splendidly. Nearly

19:28

all the troops had built log houses

19:30

and a more comfortable camp for winter

19:33

quarters I have never seen. Corporal

19:38

Todd also recorded the state of

19:40

affairs and the wake of the order

19:42

for the troops to prepare to move out.

19:46

A short time after receiving

19:48

our orders, Lenoir's station presented

19:51

a very exciting appearance. Women

19:54

running about here and there packing

19:56

up their furniture and bedding, preferring

19:59

to leave their homes. homes rather than

20:01

remain there when the rebels had possession.

20:05

Curriers and horsemen galloping about

20:07

as if it was their last moment. Teamsters

20:11

yelling and lashing their mules. Troops

20:14

marching back and forward and batteries

20:17

taking position. All

20:19

so much changed from the quiet appearance

20:22

of yesterday that a person

20:24

hardly knew what to make of it.

20:37

Ambros Burnside arrived at Lenoir's

20:40

station from Knoxville on the

20:42

morning of the 14th to personally

20:45

supervise things. He

20:48

ordered White's 23rd Corps Division

20:50

to turn around and move back

20:52

toward the Confederate crossing site and

20:55

slow down the rebels long

20:57

enough for the Federal wagon train to

20:59

get a head start on the withdrawal

21:02

back to Knoxville. White's

21:05

troops would be aided by Edward

21:07

Ferraro's 9th Corps Division which

21:10

had been roused from its comfortable

21:13

bivouac at Lenoir's station. After

21:17

shaking out their divisions and advancing

21:20

in line of battle, White and

21:22

Ferraro drove the Confederate skirmishers

21:25

back for a mile and a half

21:27

toward the river until darkness,

21:30

a pelting rain, and stiffening

21:33

rebel resistance brought them to a

21:35

halt. Burnside

21:38

considered ordering a night attack on

21:40

the Confederate bridgehead on the north side

21:42

of the river, but he ultimately

21:45

decided against it, instead

21:47

choosing to stick with his plan

21:50

and pull back to Knoxville. So

21:54

on the morning of the 15th, White's

21:57

and Ferraro's Federals made their

21:59

way to the way back to Lenoirs

22:01

station, where by early

22:04

afternoon they'd established

22:06

a defensive position. The

22:09

lead elements of the Confederate

22:11

advance didn't come into contact with

22:13

the Yankees at Lenoirs station

22:15

until about nightfall on the

22:17

15th. On

22:20

November 16th, Burnside ordered

22:23

the resumption of the withdrawal

22:26

to Knoxville. Right

22:29

before daylight, the march was

22:31

slow going as the long

22:34

column of artillery pieces,

22:36

supply wagons, and infantry

22:39

all slogged up the muddy Loudon

22:42

Road, away from Lenoirs

22:44

station. Meanwhile,

22:47

the Confederates were not idle.

22:51

Although he hadn't pressured Burnside during

22:53

the night, Longstreet, upon

22:56

reaching Lenoirs station, split

22:59

his force in an attempt

23:01

to prevent the Yankees from reaching

23:03

the defenses of Knoxville. While

23:07

Jenkins division continued the direct

23:09

pursuit of the Federals up the

23:11

Loudon Road, Old Pete

23:14

sent McClaws Division north

23:17

on the Kingston Road to try to

23:19

reach Campbell's station before

23:21

Burnside. Campbell's

23:25

station was 10 miles further up the

23:27

rail line from Lenoirs station,

23:31

and if McClaws could get there and

23:33

set up a blocking position, then

23:36

the mass of Burnside's Federals

23:39

coming up the Loudon Road would

23:42

be cut off from Knoxville and

23:44

in a world of hurt, sandwiched

23:47

between McClaws in front and Jenkins

23:50

behind. And

23:53

on that cold November day, for

23:56

Burnside's Federals tramping

23:58

up the Loudon Road, The threat

24:01

of being trapped by the rebels was

24:04

palpable. A

24:06

9th Corps soldier, Private Charles

24:09

Nightingale of the 29th Massachusetts

24:12

said,

24:12

quote,

24:13

After marching some two

24:15

hours, I stopped beside the road

24:17

to rest, as I was very tired

24:20

and had suffered with the chills during

24:22

the night. While stopping,

24:25

I met two or three of our boys, and

24:28

after going a short distance farther, we

24:30

proposed stopping and making some

24:32

coffee, which we did. And

24:35

I went to work as rapidly as possible and

24:37

cooked me some meat, and had scarcely

24:40

got it done when our rear

24:42

guard of mounted infantry came along and

24:44

said, Boys, throw

24:47

away your knapsacks and double quick

24:49

it, or the Rebs will gobble you

24:51

up.

24:55

Another 9th Corps soldier in

24:57

the 20th Michigan confirmed

25:00

their perilous position, saying,

25:03

quote,

25:04

We had not hardly got out

25:06

of sight of Lenoir before our cavalry

25:09

was driven in, and the enemy kept close

25:11

on to us like a pack of hounds after

25:13

their prey. Every

25:16

mile or two the brigade was formed into

25:18

line of battle, and as soon as

25:20

the cavalry would come up, we would

25:22

again march on. We

25:24

marched in this manner about eight miles

25:27

to Campbells Station.

25:40

On the 16th, Burnside's predicament,

25:44

in what essentially became a race

25:46

for Campbells Station, forced

25:49

him to abandon some of his supply wagons

25:52

to speed the movement of his column

25:55

up the muddy Loudon Road. But

25:59

fueled by desperate men. Federation, federal

26:01

combat units managed to reach

26:04

Campbell's station around noon,

26:07

less than an hour before McCleod's

26:10

Confederates. Meanwhile,

26:13

Jenkins' pursuit of the withdrawing Yankees

26:16

had been frustrated time and again by

26:19

a succession of enemy blocking

26:21

positions and unsuccessful

26:24

Confederate flanking attempts. Although

26:29

the Federals won the race to Campbell's

26:31

station, beating both McCleod's

26:34

and fending off Jenkins, there

26:38

was sharp fighting there when

26:40

Longstreet tried to hammer both

26:43

enemy flanks and pull off

26:45

a double envelopment, with

26:47

McCleod's hitting the Yankees right

26:50

and Jenkins striking their left.

26:54

However, unfortunately for the

26:56

Confederates, it proved impossible

26:59

to coordinate the assaults of the two

27:01

wings, and so Burnside

27:04

was able to successfully withdraw

27:07

under cover of artillery fire to

27:09

a ridge about three-quarters of

27:12

a mile to the east. And

27:15

from that good ground, with night

27:17

falling, and with there being

27:19

little chance the exhausted Confederates

27:22

would be able to mount another attack

27:24

that day, the equally

27:27

exhausted Yankees could finally

27:29

breathe a sigh of relief. The

27:33

Federals, most of them starting

27:36

their third night without sleep, pulled

27:39

out of their positions after dark and

27:41

stumbled northeastward toward Knoxville.

27:46

The race for the crossroads at Campbell's

27:48

station on November 16, 1863, and the ensuing fighting

27:53

there, is usually a mere

27:56

footnote in most Civil War histories,

27:59

if it's made

27:59

mentioned at all,

28:01

but it was significant nonetheless,

28:04

since if Longstreet had won

28:06

the race and managed to cut Burnside

28:09

off from Knoxville, things

28:12

would likely have turned out much differently for

28:14

the Confederates there in East Tennessee.

28:19

As it was, Ambrose Burnside was

28:21

able to continue his withdrawal

28:23

to Knoxville where his troops

28:26

will man the fortifications there. And

28:30

so, as we'll see with the next episode,

28:33

Longstreet's failure to catch

28:36

the Yankees at Lenore's station

28:39

and his inability to bag

28:42

them at Campbell's station and

28:45

quickly end the campaign, well,

28:48

that all would have major repercussions

28:51

for the Rebels.

29:01

That means it's time for this episode's book

29:03

recommendation, and our recommendation

29:05

this time is The Knoxville

29:08

Campaign, Burnside and Longstreet

29:11

in East Tennessee by

29:13

Earl J. Hess.

29:16

We're fans of pretty much

29:18

anything Hess writes, and

29:20

this particular title is no

29:23

exception. You

29:25

know the drill. You can find a list

29:27

of all of our book recommendations, every

29:30

last one of them, if you head over

29:32

to the podcast website, which is

29:35

www.civilwarpodcast.org.

29:41

As I cross the finish line with this episode,

29:43

I want to take just a second and thank

29:46

the newest members of the Strawfoot

29:48

Brigade for their support of

29:50

the podcast. So a big

29:52

thank you to Marco, Alex

29:56

M., and David R. And

29:59

thanks. to Leroy E. for

30:01

his donation. Alright,

30:06

I'm a big old introvert,

30:09

so it's probably good I

30:11

can't see all of you, but still,

30:15

I'm tired of hearing myself talking.

30:19

And you might be too. So

30:22

I better wrap it up. Thanks

30:25

for listening to this episode of the podcast.

30:28

I hope you'll be back for the

30:30

next Knoxville show. But

30:33

until then,

30:33

take care. Thanks

30:36

everyone.