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1:29

Hey everyone, welcome to

1:32

episode 439 of our Civil War

1:36

podcast. My

1:43

name is Rich. And I'm Tracy.

1:45

Hello y'all. Thanks for tuning into

1:47

the podcast. As we

1:49

said at the end of the last episode,

1:51

we're heading back to Virginia with this show.

1:55

As you guys will recall, the last

1:57

time we visited the Old Dominion and

2:00

in on what was going on with Robert

2:02

E. Lee and George Meade, it

2:04

was with episodes 4, 16, 17, and

2:08

18 when we looked at what

2:10

happened during the Bristow Station campaign

2:12

in October 1863. As

2:16

y'all will recall, after A. P. Hill

2:18

got his hat handed to him at

2:20

Bristow Station on October 14th and

2:23

the federal successfully withdrew into a

2:26

strong defensive position near the old

2:28

Bull Run battlefield, Robert

2:30

E. Lee decided to end what would

2:32

be his last offensive campaign against the

2:35

Army of the Potomac. Exactly,

2:37

and after Bristow Station, Lee

2:39

pulled the Army of Northern

2:41

Virginia back below the Rappahannock

2:43

River. As

2:45

long-time listeners will be aware,

2:48

the Rappahannock had more than

2:50

once served as the line

2:53

of demarcation between Confederate and

2:55

federal forces in Central Virginia.

2:58

In 1862, the Rappahannock had

3:01

separated the two armies, and

3:03

when Ambrose Burnside threw the Army

3:06

of the Potomac across the river

3:08

at Fredericksburg that December, he suffered

3:10

a crushing defeat in front of

3:13

Maurice Heights, after which

3:15

he pulled his battered army back

3:17

across the Rappahannock. In

3:19

his book on Fredericksburg and

3:22

Chancellorsville, historian Daniel E.

3:24

Sutherland points out that in order

3:26

for the Union to experience true

3:29

success in the eastern theater of

3:31

the war, quote, a

3:34

federal army had to penetrate

3:36

and establish itself south of

3:38

the Rappahannock. And

3:40

the federal certainly made their attempts to do

3:43

just that. There was

3:45

Burnside's failed attempt at Fredericksburg

3:47

and then his ill-fated mud

3:49

march in January 1863,

3:52

when the Army of the Potomac was

3:54

thwarted by bad weather before it could

3:57

even cross the Rappahannock as intended. Several

4:00

months later, Joseph Hooker, who

4:02

had succeeded Burnside in command

4:04

in late January, tried

4:06

again during the Chancellorsville campaign.

4:10

That attempt in the spring

4:12

of 1863 started promisingly enough

4:15

as Hooker stole a march on Lee, got

4:18

across the Rappahannock, and got around

4:20

Lee's flank in the wilderness west

4:22

of Fredericksburg, before fighting

4:25

Joe, lost his nerve, and

4:27

ended up retreating back across the river.

4:31

And then, that summer, after the end

4:33

of the Gettysburg campaign, which had removed

4:35

the war from that part of Virginia

4:37

for about six weeks, the

4:39

armies once again ended up staring at

4:42

each other across the Rappahannock River. Later

4:45

on, Lee made that brief but

4:47

unsuccessful foray north of the river,

4:50

which ended with AP Hills defeat

4:52

at Bristow Station, after

4:54

which the Army of Northern

4:56

Virginia pulled back, resuming its

4:58

position behind the Rappahannock, where

5:00

Lee intended to have it spend the winter of

5:03

1863-64 in Culpeper County. Lee

5:08

however was aware there was a chance

5:10

Meade might make one more attempt to

5:12

come to grips with the Army of

5:14

Northern Virginia before the turn of the

5:17

year. On October

5:19

28th, Lee wrote to his wife,

5:21

Mary, quote, General

5:23

Meade, I presume, will come on again,

5:26

end quote. And

5:29

Robert E. Lee was right. In

5:32

fact, he would not have long to

5:34

wait for Meade to make a move.

5:48

If we rewind the clock to the

5:50

summer of 1863, as July had turned

5:52

to August, George Meade faced

5:55

mounting pressure from Washington to force

5:57

the rebel army into the open

5:59

and to You did. You

6:01

see, the fact that repartee leads

6:03

battered or me managed to scold

6:05

active pitching half after Gettysburg didn't

6:07

sit well with either General in

6:09

Chief Henry How Like, or Abraham

6:11

Lincoln and his cabinet. With

6:14

grants capture of Vicksburg. Rosecrans.

6:17

Success in Middle Tennessee with the

6:20

Tell A Hummer Campaign and of

6:22

course the Federal victory at Gettysburg.

6:24

Lincoln believed a quick and to

6:26

the war was now possible. And

6:29

he was increasingly frustrated by

6:31

Meads. Deliberate. Command style.

6:35

Meets relative lack of activity

6:37

and August did little to

6:39

ease Lincoln's receding faith and

6:41

his abilities. It.

6:43

Didn't matter that Lincoln's

6:45

directive not to jeopardize

6:47

Washington as meet pursued

6:49

lead handcuffed meat. Or.

6:52

That made was being prudent

6:54

looking for the right opening

6:56

to strike the Rebels a

6:58

short lived opportunity. Finally arrived

7:00

in early September. when James

7:02

Longstreet into that his decisions

7:04

left the Army of Northern

7:06

Virginia to go to Tennessee.

7:08

And eight Braxton Brag and

7:10

his attempt to recapture Chattanooga.

7:12

But soon thereafter after the

7:15

Federal to see that took

7:17

a maga made last the

7:19

eleventh and Twelfth Corps which

7:21

were sent to shore up

7:23

William Rosecrans Army at Chattanooga.

7:26

Even with the loss of those troops,

7:29

the Army of the Potomac was still

7:31

about seventy thousand strong. But.

7:33

The loss of to Core

7:35

necessarily meant that Mead had

7:37

to rethink his plans to strike

7:39

the rebels. Well,

7:42

it was Robert Lee, however, who made

7:44

the next move. Leading. To the

7:46

clash at Bristow Station on October

7:48

fourteenth. as we

7:50

know after that with the federals have

7:53

been given a piece hill a bloody

7:55

nose and then successfully making it back

7:57

into the defense's round the old bull

8:00

run battlefield, Lee realized

8:02

his attempt to regain the initiative

8:04

had failed and he withdrew

8:06

south, pulling back across the

8:08

Rappahannock, where he waited to

8:11

see if Meade might make one

8:14

more attempt to come to grips with the

8:16

Army of Northern Virginia before the turn of

8:19

the year. Neither

8:31

Abraham Lincoln nor Henry Halleck was happy

8:34

with the telegram they received from

8:36

George Meade on the evening of October 20th.

8:39

In it, Meade informed them that Lee

8:41

was safely behind the Rappahannock River once

8:44

again, and that as the

8:46

rebels had withdrawn to the south, they

8:48

had destroyed the Orange and Alexandria Railroad

8:50

as they went. After

8:53

explaining the challenges he would face

8:55

moving the Army of the Potomac

8:57

South toward a confrontation with Lee,

9:00

particularly at the time it would take to

9:02

repair the railroad, Meade let

9:04

Halleck and Lincoln know that he was ready

9:06

to go into winter quarters, saying,

9:09

quote, it seems to

9:11

me, therefore, that the campaign is

9:13

virtually over for the present season.

9:16

Meade received Halleck's terse response the

9:19

night of October 21st, quote,

9:22

if you can conveniently leave your Army,

9:24

the President wishes to see you tomorrow.

9:28

Well, talk about getting called to the

9:30

principal's office. In

9:32

any case, Meade started out on the

9:34

morning of October 22nd, and by that

9:36

afternoon he was in Washington. Meade

9:39

met with Halleck, and then the two

9:41

generals proceeded to the White House. After

9:45

meeting with Lincoln, George Meade wrote

9:47

to his wife, telling her, quote,

9:49

the President was, as he always is,

9:52

very considerate and kind. He

9:55

found no fault with my operations, Although

9:58

it was very evident he was dead. Disappointed that

10:00

I had not got a battle out

10:02

of li. Because it

10:04

was late, Meet and his staff

10:07

spent the night in Washington before returning

10:09

to the Army the next day. Meet

10:11

later maintain that during the meeting at

10:14

the White House, Lincoln agreed that quote

10:16

there was not much to. Be. Gained

10:18

by a farther advance of given

10:20

his perception of the meeting meet

10:23

no doubt returned to his headquarters

10:25

ready to carry out his plans

10:27

to put the army into winter.

10:31

He must therefore have been surprised

10:33

when he received the following message

10:35

from selling on October twenty fourth:

10:38

Quell. The President desires

10:40

that you prepare to attack lease

10:42

Army. As surprising as

10:44

it might have, there was certainly

10:47

no miss. a misunderstanding that the

10:49

Presidential order wasn't open to appeal.

10:51

Sir George me set to work

10:54

devising a plan of action. Least

11:08

position along the Rappahannock was

11:10

fairly strong, with your score

11:12

extending from Kelly's Forward to

11:14

just above the railroad bridge

11:16

at Rappahannock Station. A

11:19

peaceful score continued. the line west

11:21

and Garda did number of for

11:23

it's. Jeb. Stuart's cavalry

11:26

patrolled both flanks. Two

11:28

points remained. Especially vulnerable

11:30

spells. Part of you'll

11:32

sector Kelly's forward and

11:35

Rappahannock station. Is

11:37

me did have a dell at him before

11:39

the turn of the year lease thought that

11:41

Kelly's forward with the most likely spot the

11:43

Yankees. Would try to cross the

11:46

river. That's because actually scored

11:48

The higher wooded bluff on

11:50

the north bank commanded the

11:52

southern bank. So. Lead knew

11:54

he would have a problem successfully

11:56

repelling a determined enemy attack at

11:59

the forward. To that

12:01

end, instead of fighting along the

12:03

river at that point, he established

12:05

a stronger position behind it. To

12:08

the west at Rappahannock stations,

12:10

Li maintained a pet deposit

12:12

on the north side the

12:14

river. At Ten, The Palm

12:16

was essentially a fortified work

12:18

designed to protect a bridgehead.

12:21

There seems to be some question

12:23

as to just why we maintain

12:25

this bridgehead Rappahannock Station on the

12:27

far side of the river. A

12:31

couple of series have been advanced,

12:33

none of which are terribly convincing.

12:36

I at any rate and the end it

12:38

was a mistake. One. For which

12:40

the Federals would make we pay.

12:44

On November seventh meet set the

12:46

Army of the Potomac in motion.

12:48

He split it into two wings.

12:50

John Sedgwick would command the right

12:52

lane made up at this, and

12:55

six for. And fit for. This.

12:57

Wings destination with Rappahannock

12:59

Station. William French

13:01

would lead the left wing, taking

13:04

his own third core together with

13:06

first core and second core and

13:08

for Kelly's for. Accompanied

13:10

by George Meat and his staff.

13:14

John Buford Cavalry Division had orders

13:16

to scream the armies right. Well,

13:19

Just Patrick's did the same on

13:21

the last. David

13:23

Mcmurtry. Greg's division of horseman

13:25

would remain in reserve, guarding

13:28

the army's wagons and it's

13:30

line of communication. Given

13:32

the nature of the ground at

13:34

Kelly's forward meet the lead French's

13:36

when would have the greatest chance

13:38

of success. Of forcing a

13:40

crossing. Once across the river,

13:43

the left wing could swing

13:45

west to assist Sedgwick at

13:47

Rappahannock Station, or a. Sedgwick

13:49

had also met with success in

13:52

the two wings could move quickly

13:54

south and link up at Brandy

13:56

Station. from brandy station

13:58

meet plan to go closely pursue

14:00

the rebel army, which by

14:02

that time ought to be retreating toward

14:04

the Rapidan River. Although

14:08

there was no question that George

14:10

Meade was undertaking this movement for

14:13

no other reason than he was

14:15

under pressure from Washington to do

14:17

something, his plan

14:19

nonetheless was straightforward, played

14:22

to his own army's strengths, and

14:25

was designed to exploit the enemy's

14:27

weaknesses, and therefore

14:29

seemed to have an excellent chance

14:32

of cracking the Confederate line along

14:34

the Rappahannock and forcing

14:36

Meade to give battle at a

14:38

disadvantage. When

14:42

Johann Rahl received the letter on Christmas Day

14:44

1776, he

14:46

put it away to read later. Maybe he

14:49

thought it was a season's greeting and wanted

14:51

to save it for the fireside. But what

14:53

it actually was, was a warning, delivered to

14:55

the Hessian colonel, letting him know that General

14:58

George Washington was crossing the Delaware and would

15:00

soon attack his forces. The

15:03

next day, when Rahl lost the Battle

15:05

of Trenton and died from two colonial

15:07

Boxing Day musket balls, the letter was

15:10

found, unopened in his vest pocket. As

15:12

someone with 15,000 unread emails in his

15:15

inbox, I feel like there's a lesson

15:17

there. Oh, well, this is

15:19

The Constant, a history of getting

15:21

things wrong. I'm Mark Chrysler. Every

15:23

episode, we look at the bad

15:25

ideas, mistakes and accidents that misshaped

15:27

our world. Find us at constantpodcast.com

15:29

or wherever you get your podcasts.

15:27

Oh well, this is The Constant, a

15:29

history of getting things wrong. I'm Mark

15:31

Chrysler. Every episode we look at the

15:34

bad ideas, mistakes, and accidents that misshaped

15:36

our world. Find us at

15:38

constantpodcast.com or wherever you get your

15:40

podcasts. History

15:53

never says goodbye. It

15:56

just says, see you later.

16:00

Galliana was right when he said that. Events

16:02

keep happening over and over again in

16:05

some form. And that's the

16:07

reason I produced the podcast,

16:09

My History Can Beat Up Your

16:11

Politics. What is

16:13

it? We take stories of history and

16:15

apply them to the events of today

16:18

to help you, perhaps,

16:21

understand the matter. We are also

16:23

part of Airwave Media Network. I've

16:25

been doing the program since 2006.

16:28

That's a long time and

16:30

the show is a long name. My history

16:32

can beat up your politics. Find me

16:34

wherever you get podcasts. As

16:46

we said a few minutes ago, Lee's

16:48

decision to maintain a bridgehead on the

16:50

north side of the river at Rappahannock

16:52

Station was a curious one. The

16:55

Orange and Alexandria Railroad Bridge spanning

16:58

the river had been destroyed by

17:00

the Federals when they abandoned the

17:02

area in October. To

17:04

compensate for its loss, the Confederates

17:06

threw a pontoon bridge across the

17:08

river about 800 yards

17:10

upstream of the destroyed railroad

17:13

bridge. Two earthwork

17:15

forts constituted the heart of the

17:17

Confederate defenses on the north bank. The

17:20

smaller of the two was about 100 feet

17:22

to the left of, or west of,

17:24

the railroad tracks, while the

17:27

larger fort was another 400 feet

17:29

farther west. A

17:31

mile-long trench situated on a

17:33

low ridge connected the two

17:35

works and extended beyond

17:38

each one to the river. But

17:41

both flanks were vulnerable. On

17:44

the right, the enemy could use the

17:46

railroad embankment to cover his approach to

17:48

the smaller fort. And

17:51

on the left, the trench line was poorly

17:53

positioned. Since there, the enemy

17:55

could also approach without being seen

17:57

until almost upon the Rebel works.

18:02

In addition, there was no ditch in

18:04

front of the rebel works and there

18:06

was also no abatus, which

18:08

as you guys know by now was

18:10

when trees were felled in front of

18:12

the defenses so that the

18:14

trunks and branches formed a tangled

18:16

obstacle that would slow down any

18:18

attack. All of

18:20

that meant that the confederates would

18:23

have to largely depend on firepower

18:25

alone to repulse any federal attack.

18:28

But in that regard, the rebels were

18:30

handicapped by the fact that the four

18:32

pieces of artillery deployed in the forts

18:35

had poor fields of fire because of

18:37

the layout of the works and as

18:39

we said the infantry trench

18:42

line was vulnerable on both blanks.

18:46

One strength of the position

18:48

was that a veteran brigade

18:50

of Louisiana infantry from Jubal

18:52

Earley's division of Yolle's Corps

18:54

occupied the works. The

18:57

brigade was commanded by Harry Hayes and

18:59

could boast an outstanding record of service

19:02

in some of the hottest fighting in

19:04

the war's eastern theater. Here

19:07

though at Rappahannock Station on

19:09

November 7th, the Louisiana Tigers

19:11

were without their brigade commander

19:14

since Hayes was off serving on

19:16

a court of inquiry. Colonel

19:19

D.B. Penn of the southern Louisiana

19:21

was in charge in Hayes absence.

19:25

Four regiments, the 6th, 7th,

19:28

8th, and 9th Louisiana were deployed

19:30

on the north bank holding the

19:32

bridgehead while the brigade's

19:34

other regiment, the 5th Louisiana, was

19:37

held back on the south bank.

19:39

Two pieces of the Louisiana

19:42

Guard artillery under Lieutenant Robert

19:44

Moore were positioned in each fort.

19:47

Robert E. Lee seemed to be under

19:49

the impression that a brigade or two

19:52

of rebel infantry could hold the bridgehead

19:54

against any assault, especially

19:56

since he thought the Confederate artillery

19:58

would rake the enemy as they

20:01

approached. However,

20:03

not everyone was so confident.

20:06

Division commander Jubal Early would

20:08

write in his after-action report,

20:10

quote, the works on

20:13

the north side of the river

20:15

were, in my judgment, very inadequate

20:17

and not judiciously laid out

20:20

or constructed, end

20:22

quote. Well,

20:25

the Federals would soon reach

20:27

the same conclusion as old

20:29

Jub. At

20:31

about 11 o'clock on the

20:33

morning of November 7th Confederate

20:35

cavalry pickets reported strong columns

20:37

of Yankee infantry approaching

20:40

Rappahannock Station. With

20:53

Uncle John Cedric coming on with fifth

20:56

and sixth corps numbering about 30,000

20:58

men, to say the 900

21:01

Louisiana Tigers at Rappahannock Station

21:03

were outnumbered is a bit

21:05

of an understatement. Colonel Penn,

21:07

of course, had sounded the alarm and

21:10

when Jubal Early arrived on the

21:12

scene he quickly ordered up reinforcements.

21:15

After double-quicking seven miles, a

21:18

brigade of 1100

21:20

North Carolinians commanded by Colonel

21:22

Archibald Godwin hustled across the

21:24

pontoon bridge and joined the

21:26

Louisianans who cheered

21:28

another arrival Harry Hayes

21:31

who had rode to rejoin his men when he

21:33

heard the Yankees were on the march. Early

21:37

had also called up a couple of

21:39

batteries of artillery and had the guns

21:41

drop trail on the near side of

21:43

the river to provide covering fire. When

21:47

Robert E. Lee, who had also arrived on the

21:49

scene, ordered a gun to limber

21:51

up and go over to the North Bank

21:53

it was unable to do so since

21:56

by that time Federal Sharpshooters from

21:58

5th Corps and had advanced

22:00

to within a few yards of the

22:02

river and brought the pontoon bridge under

22:04

fire. Three Union

22:07

batteries also deployed so as to

22:09

bring the Rebel Works and pontoon

22:11

bridge under fire, meaning

22:13

the Confederates would now be hard pressed

22:15

to bring over more reinforcements or

22:18

retreat should a withdrawal

22:20

become necessary. Lee

22:23

was uncertain whether the federal activity

22:25

at Rappahannock Station would turn into

22:27

a full-scale attack or whether it

22:30

was merely a faint to cover

22:32

a real crossing downriver at Kelly's

22:34

Ford. In any

22:36

case, he believed it was now too late

22:38

in the day for anything else to happen,

22:41

so he departed. As

22:44

he later wrote in his report, quote,

22:47

the increasing darkness induced the

22:49

belief that nothing would be

22:51

attempted until morning. However,

22:54

John Sedgwick had spent considerable

22:56

time examining the Rebel defenses.

23:00

While he thought them to be

23:02

strong, he also identified their many

23:04

weaknesses, and so while the Union

23:06

artillery was pounding away at the

23:08

enemy, the federal infantry

23:10

had crept closer to the Confederate

23:13

Works. When the

23:15

federal infantry attack came, it

23:17

was made at dusk by

23:20

troops of Brigadier General David

23:22

Russell's division of Horatio Wright's

23:24

Sixth Corps. Wright thought the

23:27

timing ideal. There was enough

23:29

daylight as the men moved into position

23:31

to allow them to see where their

23:33

attack would go in, while

23:36

the growing darkness would serve to

23:38

conceal their charge against the Confederate

23:40

Works. Colonel Peter

23:42

L. Makers' brigade of Russell's division

23:45

spearheaded the assault. The

23:47

6th Maine and 5th Wisconsin formed

23:49

the brigade's first line, while

23:52

two Pennsylvania regiments, the 49th and 119th, were in

23:54

the second line. Like Robert E. Clearly

24:00

the Louisianians and North

24:02

Carolinians manning the Confederate

24:04

works thought that the

24:06

fading daylight signaled the end of

24:09

any possibility the enemy might attack

24:11

the bridgehead. So the

24:13

rebels were taken completely by surprise

24:16

as the Yankees of the 6th

24:19

Maine and 5th Wisconsin with bayonets

24:21

fixed stormed out of the shadows.

24:25

Then as Elmaker put it, quote,

24:28

a desperate hand-to-hand struggle

24:30

ensued. A portion

24:32

of the 20th Maine of Colonel

24:34

Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain's 5th Corps brigade

24:36

was on the left of Elmaker's

24:38

men. After learning

24:41

that Elmaker's troops were going to attack

24:43

the enemy works, the 20th Captain

24:45

Walter Morrill joined the assault with about 50

24:47

of his men. For

24:50

his actions here at Rappahannock Station,

24:52

Morrill would be awarded the Medal

24:54

of Honor. As

24:57

inky darkness covered the landscape,

24:59

Federals and Confederates engaged in

25:02

vicious hand-to-hand combat inside the

25:04

rebel works, stabbing

25:06

with bayonets and using rifle

25:08

butts as clubs. Ultimately,

25:11

when Elmaker also called up his

25:14

two second line regiments, the

25:16

49th and 119th Pennsylvania,

25:20

Federal numbers began to tell at the

25:22

point of attack as more

25:24

and more Yankees streamed into the

25:26

works. The brutality

25:28

of the close quarters fighting here matched

25:30

anything witnessed up to that point in

25:32

the war. A New

25:35

Jersey officer walked over the field

25:37

after the battle and noted, quote,

25:39

here the unusual sight of death

25:42

by bayonet wounds was witnessed, end

25:45

quote. With the

25:47

rebel defenses cracked wide open,

25:49

dozens of Louisianans manning the

25:51

two forts surrendered while others

25:54

sought to escape across the

25:56

pontoon bridge, even though it

25:58

was swept by enemy fire. With

26:01

the Yankees clearly overwhelming the defenders

26:03

of the two rebel forts, to

26:06

the left of those works, Godwin

26:08

pivoted some of his North Carolinians

26:10

to seal off the enemy breakthrough.

26:13

The Tar Heels poured musket

26:16

fire into elmaker's Federals, but

26:19

despite Archibald Godwin's outstanding

26:21

tactical leadership, the Confederates'

26:24

situation was desperate. The

26:27

rebels' predicament grew worse when Russell

26:29

ordered another of his brigades, this

26:31

one commanded by Colonel Emery Upton

26:33

to advance and assault the portion

26:35

of the Confederate line to its

26:37

front. Upton, to

26:39

elmaker's right, had his brigade formed up

26:42

in two lines of battle, with

26:44

two Pennsylvania regiments in the second

26:46

line and the fifth main in 121st New

26:48

York up front. When

26:52

he received Russell's order to attack,

26:55

Upton immediately launched the fifth main and

26:57

121st New York forward. There

27:01

was no time to stop and load, so

27:04

Upton ordered the men to do so as they

27:06

advanced. When that

27:08

was accomplished, Upton ordered the men to

27:10

double quick. About

27:13

150 yards from the

27:15

Confederate defenses, Upton had

27:17

the men throw off their knapsacks

27:19

and fix bayonets. He

27:21

cautioned them not to fire a shot until

27:24

they were within the enemy works. Charging

27:27

forward silently, only raising

27:30

a mighty shout when their charge was

27:32

within 10 yards of crashing home, the

27:35

main men and New Yorkers struck

27:37

the portion of the rebel line held

27:39

by the 54th North Carolina, like a

27:42

thunderbolt. and

28:00

without firing a shot. The

28:02

enemy fought stubbornly over their

28:04

colors, but being overpowered soon

28:07

surrendered. The 121st New York

28:09

then turned to the left

28:11

to hit the rear of

28:13

the North Carolinians who were

28:15

causing trouble for elmakers Federals.

28:19

Meanwhile the 5th Maine turned to the

28:21

right to hit the two Louisiana regiments

28:23

holding the far left of the rebel

28:25

line. And

28:27

quicker than you can say Bob's your

28:29

uncle, hundreds of Louisiana's

28:31

and North Carolinians were surrendering or

28:34

rushing towards the Rappahannock hoping to

28:36

escape across the river. As the

28:40

Confederate bridge had collapsed Archibald

28:42

Godwin gathered together a grab

28:44

bag force of North Carolinians

28:46

and Louisiana's and personally led several

28:49

charges in an effort to reach

28:51

the pontoon bridge. But

28:53

according to Jubal Early's after action

28:56

report quote, when his men

28:58

had dwindled to 60 or 70

29:01

the rest having been captured killed

29:03

wounded or lost in the darkness

29:06

Godwin was literally overpowered by mere

29:08

force of numbers and was taken

29:10

with his arms in his hands. Up

29:14

and down the line hundreds of

29:16

Confederate soldiers surrendered but hundreds

29:18

more tried to escape. Those

29:21

lucky enough to reach the pontoon bridge

29:23

had to decide whether to swim across

29:26

the river or run across

29:28

the bridge swept by enemy artillery

29:30

and musket fire. Those

29:33

who chose to take to the water

29:35

were fired upon by Federals lining the

29:37

riverbank. Many perished

29:40

either from enemy lead or

29:42

drowning. Two who

29:44

made it though were the commanders

29:46

of the 6th Louisiana and 7th

29:48

Louisiana. The most

29:50

prominent escapee was Harry Hayes.

29:53

He had done his best to

29:55

rally his Louisiana's but as the

29:57

situation descended into chaos he was

29:59

was surrounded and nearly captured.

30:01

However, as Hayes was about

30:04

to hand over his sword,

30:06

his horse was startled by something and

30:08

bolted. The surprised

30:10

Federals opened fire, but the

30:12

bullets missed their mark as

30:15

Hayes raced away, steering his

30:17

mount toward the pontoon bridge. The

30:20

commander of the 9th Louisiana also

30:22

galloped across the bridge to safety.

30:25

But when all was said and

30:27

done, the collapse of the Rappahannock

30:29

Station bridgehead was a disaster for

30:31

the Confederates. There

30:34

was little Division Commander Jubal Early could

30:36

do as two of his brigades were

30:38

wrecked in front of his eyes there

30:41

just across the river. Old

30:44

Jub would lament, quote, I

30:47

had the mortification to hear the final

30:49

struggle of these devoted men and to

30:52

be made painfully aware of their capture

30:54

without the possibility of being able to go

30:57

to their relief. Once

30:59

it was clear that no one else was going

31:01

to escape across the bridge, Early

31:03

called for volunteers and had them set

31:06

fire to the span so that the

31:08

Yankees couldn't use it to cross the

31:10

river. Hayes

31:22

Brigade and Godwin's Brigade suffered

31:25

devastating losses at Rappahannock Station.

31:28

The Louisianans lost 702

31:31

killed, wounded, and captured

31:34

while the North Carolinians suffered 928 casualties for

31:36

a total Confederate loss of 1,630 men. The

31:38

four guns and the forts were also lost

31:46

as well as six flags. When

31:50

muster was called for both brigades three

31:52

days later, fewer than 500 men

31:55

answered the call. Federal

31:58

losses were much shore.

34:01

Once that was accomplished, the Trobriand ordered

34:03

the rest of his brigade across the

34:05

river. Their swift and

34:08

complete success at Kelly's Ford cost the

34:10

Federals just 42 men, while

34:13

on the Confederate side, the 2nd

34:15

North Carolina and 30th North Carolina

34:18

lost around 330 men,

34:21

mostly captured. By

34:23

three o'clock that afternoon, the Yankees had

34:25

thrown up a pontoon and

34:28

an entire Federal Division had crossed to

34:30

the far side of the Rappahannock at

34:32

Kelly's Ford. Robert

34:35

Rhodes hesitated to assault the

34:37

enemy launchment, since the Yankees

34:39

sensibly remained close to the

34:41

riverbank, under cover of their

34:43

massed artillery across the way. Finally,

34:47

Rhodes decided the enemy was

34:49

too strong for any reasonable

34:51

chance of success, and

34:53

he gave up on the idea of throwing the

34:56

Yankees back across the river. With

34:58

the twin Federal successes at Rappahannock

35:00

Station and Kelly's Ford on November

35:03

7th, George Meade

35:05

now firmly held the initiative in

35:07

this new campaign. Since

35:10

Lee's position immediately behind the

35:12

Rappahannock was no longer tenable,

35:14

the Confederate commander wasted no time

35:16

in issuing orders that pulled the

35:19

army back to the southwest

35:21

to position between Brandy Station

35:23

and Culpeper. The

35:25

orders came as an unwelcome surprise to

35:27

most of the army, since

35:30

the men had assumed campaigning was done

35:32

for the year and had

35:34

started working on their winter quarters. One

35:37

soldier in the 16th North Carolina

35:40

was philosophical about it all

35:42

though, saying, quote,

35:45

Some of the men had completed nice cabins

35:47

and expected to move into them the next

35:50

morning, but such

35:52

is war. In the

35:54

darkness, the Confederates pulled back to their

35:56

new positions. A.P. Hill's corps

35:58

was on the left. while Dick

36:01

Ewell's corps held the right. The

36:03

withdrawal was completed with little fuss and

36:05

the rebel rear guard was hurrying to

36:08

join their comrades in the new line

36:10

as the sun rose on the morning

36:12

of November 8th. Despite

36:14

his twin successes at Rappahannock

36:16

Station and Kelly's Ford, George

36:19

Meade didn't immediately pursue the

36:21

withdrawing Confederates. In

36:24

fact, he didn't even realize the rebels

36:26

were pulling back. Instead,

36:28

Meade expected Lee would launch a

36:31

major counter attack at Kelly's Ford

36:34

and issued orders to strengthen the

36:36

federal position there. He

36:38

also ordered Sedgwick to put up

36:40

a new pontoon bridge at Rappahannock

36:42

Station and mount a demonstration there

36:45

designed to distract the enemy

36:47

who, Meade assumed, would be

36:50

attacking Kelly's Ford. When

36:52

Meade finally realized on the 8th

36:55

that Lee had pulled back, he

36:57

ordered the various infantry corps to

36:59

push southwest after the rebels while

37:01

the federal cavalry covered the army's

37:04

flanks. However, that

37:06

advance took most of the day

37:08

and by that time, Robert E.

37:10

Lee had decided to withdraw once

37:12

again, this time below the Rappahann

37:15

River. Lee was

37:17

pulling back again because he'd realized

37:19

his new line was vulnerable to

37:21

being turned since his left

37:24

flank was up in the air. So

37:27

the Confederate wagons made the trek toward the

37:29

Rappahann during the day on the 8th and

37:32

after dark, the rebel infantry

37:34

followed. Once safely below

37:36

the river, most of the

37:38

Confederate soldiers found themselves occupying the

37:41

same camps they'd been in before

37:43

stepping off on the Bristow Station

37:45

campaign the previous month.

37:47

As the new day dawned on

37:49

the morning of November 9th, Meade

37:51

discovered Lee had pulled back once

37:53

again. Any

37:55

delight Meade may have enjoyed over

37:58

the successes at Rappahannock Station. and

38:00

Kelly's Ford was quickly sniffed out.

38:03

When telegrams from Washington started

38:05

to arrive, expressing displeasure

38:07

that Mead hadn't pressed forward

38:10

aggressively enough to catch Lee

38:12

before he pulled back behind

38:14

the Rapidan. George

38:16

Mead pondered his options. The

38:19

weather had taken a turn for the worse

38:21

on the 8th and if Mead had his

38:23

druthers, he'd now go into winter quarters.

38:26

But with Washington once more breathing

38:29

down his neck, that might not

38:31

be possible. Knowing

38:33

the decision wasn't his to make,

38:35

Mead wired Halleck and Secretary of

38:37

War Edwin Stanton on November 13th,

38:40

asking for a meeting. George

38:43

Mead went to Washington the next day.

38:46

He said and wrote little about that visit

38:48

to the Capitol, but he

38:51

obviously didn't receive permission to go

38:53

into winter quarters, because

38:55

after his return to the Army, he began

38:57

to plan another forward movement,

39:00

this one across the Rapidan. And

39:05

with the next episode, we'll

39:07

talk about how Mead's maneuvering

39:09

and Lee's response led

39:11

to the two armies facing off

39:13

at Mine Run. That

39:22

means it's time for this episode's book

39:25

recommendation. And our recommendation this

39:27

time is The Maps of

39:29

the Bristow Station and Mine Run

39:31

Campaigns by Bradley M Gottfried.

39:35

This is a re-recommendation from

39:37

back when we did Bristow

39:39

Station, but it does

39:41

include Rappahannock Station and Kelly's Ford,

39:43

as well as Mine Run. So,

39:46

well, there you go. It's

39:49

a good resource for all

39:51

of these actions, engagements, battles,

39:54

and not quite battles. Don't

39:57

forget you can find a list

39:59

of all of our book recommendations.

40:02

If you head over to the

40:04

podcast website, which is www.CivilWarPodcast.org. Also

40:08

at the website, you can find posts

40:10

on each episode, our

40:12

contact info, photos if

40:15

you're wondering what we look like, and

40:17

links to the podcast Facebook

40:20

page and Instagram. There's

40:23

also information about joining the straw

40:25

foot brigade over on Patreon. Just

40:28

like Brett M., Randy Paul,

40:31

Bradley C., S.

40:33

Rine, and Robert B. did

40:35

recently. Yep. Thanks.

40:38

One and all. We appreciate your

40:40

support of the podcast. Thanks

40:43

to all of you for listening to this episode

40:45

of the podcast. Rich and I

40:47

do hope that you join us again next time,

40:49

but until then, take care. Thanks

40:53

everyone. Bye.