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now. Find out more at the end of

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this podcast. On

1:05

the twenty fourth of June eighteen twelve,

1:07

Napoleon Bonaparte led an army,

1:09

the multinational grand army into

1:12

Russian

1:12

land. Almost a hundred and

1:14

twenty nine years later, Adolph

1:17

Hitler ordered another multinational army

1:19

across the same border. The

1:21

start of operation Barbara

1:23

Rosa, June the twenty second nineteen

1:26

forty one. Both

1:29

these midsummer invasions destroyed their

1:31

protagonists and destroyed millions

1:34

of lives as well. These

1:36

were terrible years to be in the

1:38

way.

1:49

The invention of Russia presented

1:52

by Michelin episode

1:55

four. The Secret Song of

1:57

War The producer is

1:59

miles water. Yep.

2:08

Great. Right. Ready to go.

2:10

And this is Anthony Beaver, author

2:13

of Stalin grad and one of the best selling

2:15

historians in the

2:16

world. The Nazis wanted

2:18

to advance to what they called the AA

2:20

line, which was the architectural Astrachan

2:23

line. Destroy the

2:26

Red Army. Any further

2:28

conflict could be achieved ready

2:30

by the Lufthansa just bombing them from time

2:32

to time. And they

2:35

also had planned what was called the hunger

2:37

plan, something which would have scarved

2:39

to death thirty million

2:40

Soviet. The rest will be turned into

2:43

Helots cultivating and providing the

2:45

food from the fertile areas

2:47

for Germany. The

2:49

Russians' capacity for

2:52

resilience and suffering has

2:54

demonstrated both in Stalin's

2:56

grab, but also in events

2:58

like the siege of Leningrad. This

3:00

must have a profound impact

3:02

on the country's psyche. Indeed.

3:05

No British French American

3:07

Army would have survived at Stalingrad.

3:10

I mean, there was an extraordinary mixture of, shall

3:12

we say, compulsion and idealism. There

3:15

were blocking squads. There were executions.

3:17

I mean, there was thirteen thousand

3:19

executions. But at the same time,

3:22

going through the letters from soldiers at the front.

3:25

There was a complete telelessness of their own lives.

3:27

You know, hello, mama, hello, papa.

3:29

I am well ready to lose my life

3:31

in the service of the country and all the rest of it.

3:34

And I think these were absolutely genuine. You

3:36

did have this extraordinary

3:38

feeling, but as I say, unimaginable, the end of

3:40

the battle, There were still ten thousand

3:43

civilians who had somehow survived

3:45

in the ruins of Stalingrad, including

3:47

about one thousand children, living off roots

3:49

pick from the ground or any sort of crumbs

3:51

they could pick up anywhere. It

3:54

is why the victory in

3:56

May nineteen forty five is regarded as

3:58

sacred. But this this

4:00

notion of Russian superiority of

4:03

the Russian suffering, which

4:05

is such a contrast to the decadent

4:07

west. It is, as you rightly

4:09

say, the suffering, which sort of surpasses

4:12

all understanding.

4:16

But of course, this wasn't the first time

4:18

they'd been invaded from the west. Dominic

4:21

Lieben is the author of Napoleon against

4:23

Russia.

4:25

Well, Napoleon invaded Russia because

4:27

Russia was the last sort of

4:29

independent continental great power.

4:32

His plan was to destroy

4:34

the Russian army, as always, in the first

4:36

month of the campaign. Force

4:39

the Russians into the

4:41

same kind of submission that

4:43

he'd forced the Austrians and

4:45

to an even greater extent the Prussians so

4:48

that France would be the only great power

4:50

in Europe. And he

4:52

reckoned he could do it.

4:55

Most people thought he would succeed.

4:58

Two invasions, both times

5:00

massive carnage inflicted by

5:02

the west. Napoleon

5:05

even occupied Moscow before being

5:07

forced to retreat. But

5:09

there are other examples, the polls they

5:11

burned Moscow to the ground. The Mongols

5:14

did the same. Throw in the Swedes,

5:16

the teutonic knights, the French and

5:18

British down in Crimea, There

5:20

are a lot of enemies in Russian history,

5:23

and you'll find them all listed and

5:25

recalled in detail in Russia today

5:27

in special multimedia

5:30

parks which school children must

5:32

attend.

5:34

There are two central themes of these parks,

5:37

We pride when united, and

5:39

our enemies are everywhere. Oh,

5:42

and one more thing, our leaders are

5:44

smart.

5:46

In eighteen twelve, the Russian leader

5:48

was Alexander the first. Just

5:50

as Napoleon had been tricked at the beginning

5:53

of the campaign, into thinking that

5:55

the Russians would fight in the border land

5:57

and the force marched forward and

5:59

lost thousands of horses. As a

6:01

result, So again, once he

6:03

gets to Moscow, he doesn't know what to do.

6:06

He sort of sits in Moscow for six

6:07

weeks, expecting Alexander to make peace.

6:10

And basically, Alexander just laughed at

6:12

it.

6:17

Just a month and a half after defeating

6:19

the Russians at Borodino, Napoleon

6:22

was forced to

6:22

flee. And every week that Napoleon

6:25

sits in Moscow, The winter gets closer.

6:28

The French find it harder to feed themselves

6:30

and a bubble feed their horses, horses

6:33

of the peter, the polioteira warfare

6:35

that ways, particularly on a campaign

6:37

like the rush. You know, your horses

6:40

without your cavalry, there's no reconnaissance, there's

6:42

no shock, there's no pursuit. Can't

6:45

draw your gowns. So the horses,

6:47

the tank will glory the airplane, mobile

6:50

artillery, the whole bloody lot. You

6:52

know, long campaign in Russia and devastating

6:55

for horses unless they're properly looked

6:57

after. A bubble devastating for

6:59

horses which haven't been bred on the

7:01

step. And they're therefore much

7:03

less tough than the Russian costs out of light

7:05

cavalry losses. I bet. From

7:08

your description, Alexander comes

7:10

out of all this as a

7:12

a pretty shrewd character. He was a

7:14

shrewd character. He was an extremely effective

7:17

diplomat. He was also,

7:20

you know, grand strategist. There's

7:22

another element we should mention though, the

7:24

role of the Russians themselves, the

7:27

great patriots who rose up and

7:29

has sold the invader and who

7:31

played perhaps the key role in Napoleon's

7:34

defeat. That was a huge deal

7:36

in the nineteenth century and well into the

7:38

twentieth century. So nowadays, we

7:41

often talk about the myth or the cult

7:43

of the Great Patriotic War referring to the years

7:45

nineteen forty one to nineteen forty five. But

7:47

what people often forget is that a

7:49

lot of that is based on the earlier

7:51

cults of the first patriotic war,

7:54

the patriotic war. This is Misha

7:56

Gabavitch, Russian born historian, expert

7:59

on the military in the national tale.

8:01

Very, very quickly, that gets

8:03

subsumed in a cult

8:06

of the emperor, you know, the

8:08

the czar essentially with divine

8:11

inspiration hero who almost

8:13

single handedly, I'm exaggerating a little bit, had

8:15

repelled Napoleon. And what's

8:17

fascinating is that this is a story that's

8:20

in a sense repeated then

8:22

in the twentieth century with a great patriotic one

8:24

of nineteen forty one to forty five.

8:26

So Stalin was the one who

8:28

who became, you know, the almost lone

8:30

nemesis of Hitler who had

8:33

commanded, of course, you know, the people

8:35

of the Soviet Union but it was really

8:37

Stalin's leadership that proved decisive. Why

8:40

does that happen? So we're talking

8:42

about an absurdist and

8:44

centralized state. Where,

8:46

of course, any sort of

8:49

grassroots legitimacy that's

8:51

not derived from the supreme

8:53

leader. Always

8:55

presents a threat.

9:01

What I think he's saying is that this isn't

9:04

just about history. This is about

9:06

the interpretation, even the weaponizing

9:08

of the great national tale. We've

9:11

seen off all these invaders and it's

9:13

our great leaders you have to thank.

9:15

But is that right? For example,

9:18

in nineteen forty one at the start of

9:20

the Nazi invasion, It's well

9:22

known, Stalin had been

9:24

fooled.

9:30

Stalin's psychology journey particular period.

9:32

Despite all the warnings, he was still

9:35

convinced that somehow it

9:37

was not in Hitler's interest. And

9:39

I think that this was actually the reason

9:42

for the disaster of nineteen forty

9:44

one for the Red Army and for the Soviet

9:46

Union that Stalin refused

9:48

to really prepare or

9:51

take the threat of invasion

9:52

seriously. So initially, the

9:55

Wehrmacht sweep through Soviet

9:57

defenses. And it looks

9:59

as though Hitler may succeed where

10:02

Napoleon failed. Why

10:05

does Stalin cried become this

10:08

extraordinarily decisive battle

10:12

not just in operation

10:14

Barbarossa, but in the

10:16

entire Second World War. The

10:18

point about Skalingrad, which was

10:21

at the end of a series of disasters,

10:24

both the British and the Americans in

10:27

Europe, in North Africa, and

10:29

above all in the Far East. But

10:31

then we suddenly get the turnaround.

10:33

Of course, the British will make emphasis

10:36

on Alameen and all the rest

10:38

of it. But, I mean, that was a tiny sideshare

10:40

in comparison to what was happening

10:43

in this vast clash

10:45

of of giants in the

10:47

Soviet Union. And Hitler

10:49

thought that if he could secure

10:52

the oil of the Caucasus, then

10:55

once again his plan of

10:57

Germany being self sufficient and

10:59

able to fight on would still work.

11:02

And this led to the

11:04

complete psychological turning point

11:06

in the whole of the second world war. And from

11:08

that point on as the Western allies

11:10

had to acknowledge. The Soviet Union was

11:12

now a very great power

11:14

indeed, and everything had

11:16

started to change in that particular way.

11:19

With some two million casualties,

11:22

Stalin grad was the bloodiest, most

11:24

cisive battle of the Second World

11:26

War. Was victory down to

11:28

Stalin or the bravery of

11:30

the Russians who as the opening

11:32

song suggested arose for

11:34

a fight to the death against the dark

11:37

fascist forces in a People's

11:39

War. A sacred war.

11:43

History in Russia waivers between the

11:45

two, the people and the leader.

11:47

When it serves the Russian leaders, it's

11:50

uncle Joe who won the war. There's

11:53

another city that played an equally heroic

11:55

role Sebastopol in Crimea.

11:58

It held out for two hundred and fifty days

12:00

against the Italians and the Germans. A

12:04

century earlier, it had held out against

12:06

another pair of invaders, the British

12:08

and the French and the Crimean War.

12:10

And these two events are linked in

12:12

the Russian memory. I

12:14

also think that Crimea is very relevant

12:17

today. But a bit of history first.

12:20

Tell us about this place Crimea, Roger,

12:22

if you would. First of all, where

12:24

is

12:24

it? Well, the Crimea It's

12:27

almost an island in the Black Sea

12:29

attached by a narrow peninsula to

12:31

what is now Ukraine. Roger

12:33

Breithwaite. Former ambassador in

12:35

Moscow and author of Russia,

12:37

myths and realities.

12:39

Ancient times, there were a number of Greek colonies

12:42

there. And then various

12:44

people moved in the Buffalo, the

12:46

Tata's, who were a branch of the Mongols, have

12:48

moved in and set up a

12:50

state of their own there in about

12:52

the fifteenth century. They

12:56

regularly conducted raids

12:58

into Muscovy, Russia,

13:01

captured people and took them away as slaves.

13:03

They burned villages. They looted everything

13:05

inside. Right through into the

13:07

eighteenth century. By

13:09

then, Catherine the Great and

13:11

her great adviser, Patemkin,

13:15

decided that enough was enough, and

13:17

they captured Crimea. They built

13:19

a great naval base there in Sevastopol, which

13:21

is the most wonderful natural harbor.

13:24

And in the eighteen

13:26

fifties, we in the French

13:28

invaded Crimea and laid siege

13:30

to Sevastopol, and one

13:33

of Tolstoy's best works

13:35

is based on his experience as

13:37

an artillery officer during

13:39

that siege. Why did we and

13:41

the French get involved in the first place?

13:44

Well, it was, of course, a distant war as

13:46

far as we were concerned, but we were an empire

13:48

then. Our empire stretched right

13:51

across to India, Afghanistan,

13:54

and we were always terrified that

13:56

Russians would in some way cut our

13:58

lines of communication through the Mediterranean,

14:01

through the Middle East, to our empire.

14:03

So when the Russians and the Turks started

14:05

fighting in the Black Sea, we

14:08

piled in with our naval power, which

14:10

enabled us to see off the Russians

14:12

and then with this botched

14:14

attempt to invade Crimea.

14:18

The point is in nineteen

14:21

forty one, the Germans besiege

14:23

Sevastopol, that siege

14:25

too lasted something like two

14:27

hundred and fifty days, and that

14:30

siege two led to

14:32

a Russian defeat. But it was a

14:34

glorious defeat, rush sink of the defense

14:36

of Sevastopol against the British and French

14:38

and against the Germans as

14:40

a glorious defeat. And it came

14:43

to my mind the other day, it plays

14:45

the same sort of emotional part

14:47

in their view of their own history as

14:49

Dunkirk does for us. So

14:51

how did crimea end up in

14:53

Ukraine. Well, that

14:56

was an administrative quirk

14:59

by Nikita who shaft who at that

15:01

time was the boss of the Soviet Union.

15:04

In the Soviet Union, there were

15:06

union republics which

15:09

theoretically had the right to secede

15:11

from the Soviet Union, but of course, that was rubbish.

15:13

They were firmly under control of Moscow.

15:16

So Christophe could hand

15:18

out bits of territory without it having

15:20

any particular effect

15:22

on people's everyday lives. And

15:25

on the 300th anniversary of

15:28

in the Russian version of the history, Ukraine

15:30

joining Russia he handed

15:32

Crimea, which was then part of Russia,

15:35

to the Ukrainians as sort of 300th

15:37

birthday present. It had no

15:40

it had no noticeable impact

15:42

on everyday life. But

15:45

of course, when Ukraine became independent,

15:48

in nineteen ninety one, it

15:50

took Crimea with it. And

15:53

that was bound to be the emotions,

15:55

but also the fact of the naval base in Severnvaleal

15:58

was bound to be a huge

16:00

source of contention between the Ukrainians

16:02

and the Russians.

16:04

You're not kidding. Misha

16:06

Gabovitch again. So

16:08

Russians have always assumed that

16:11

their empire is very very different.

16:13

From colonial empires. Much

16:15

more benign, of course. And that

16:18

it came into being not as result

16:20

of conquest. But as a result

16:22

of a constant defensive movement.

16:25

And this is a vision of history that is propagated

16:28

very intensely today in a

16:30

series of multimedia parks called Russia

16:33

My History, where essentially all of Russian

16:35

history is portrayed as a never

16:37

ending struggle against external enemies,

16:40

in the course of which Russians are

16:43

forced to move

16:45

their borders. Ever

16:47

further out simply to secure

16:51

Prussia.

16:54

Which means all their wars are

16:56

defense live and sacred.

16:59

Understand this mindset, and

17:02

the takeover of Crimea, the

17:04

special military operation in Ukraine, the

17:06

constant references to the Nazis, it

17:09

all starts to make some twisted sense.

17:12

Putin even considers himself a bit

17:14

of a history buff except his

17:17

interpretations, are often

17:19

wrong. Many of Russia's

17:21

wars were aggressive and

17:23

not defensive. And what's more they

17:25

could trigger unintended consequences. A

17:28

good example, the Russo Japanese

17:30

War of nineteen o four to nineteen o five

17:33

Little mentioned in Pugin speeches because

17:36

the

17:37

Russians lost. The Russians

17:39

expected to win that war. It was a classic example

17:41

of a war that the Russians expected to

17:43

be short and gloriously victorious over

17:46

what they regarded as a racially inferior

17:48

enemy. There was a strong sense that Japanese

17:51

were sort of subversion of the Mongols

17:53

as it were from the

17:54

past. And this, of course, turned

17:56

out to be quite wrong. Professor Simon

17:58

Depp and of University College London.

18:00

And this is Robert

18:02

Service, author of books on Lennon

18:04

and The Last Tsar. There was

18:06

a lobby of opinion that Great

18:08

Russia had to keep on expanding

18:11

and that the Japanese were ripe for

18:14

picking. Nicholas a second,

18:16

who'd been to Japan? He knew the

18:19

Far East, but he knew it as a tourist.

18:22

He had no conception of

18:24

what it was if a country industrialized.

18:28

When the Japanese surprised the Russian

18:30

fleet, that Tsar was staggered and

18:33

not just because the declaration of

18:35

war hadn't yet arrived, but

18:37

it got worse much worse when

18:40

he sent the Russian Baltic fleet

18:42

halfway around the world to

18:43

assist. Some of the Imperial Navy

18:47

got into trouble. In the

18:49

North Sea so that the intelligence

18:52

arm of the navy was

18:55

less than totally adequate

18:58

and mistook a British trawler

19:00

for the advancing Japanese fleet.

19:03

This happened so when it dug a bank and it

19:05

did, it happened off dog a bank.

19:07

It was a shambles.

19:09

When the Baltic fleet finally did get

19:11

around to the Pacific, the Japanese

19:14

destroyed that one too. They

19:16

were very heavily overstretched on

19:19

the supply line. And

19:21

when things went badly wrong, of course, that

19:23

meant that disillusioned and injured

19:25

troops were coming back down the

19:27

same supply line, making

19:30

particular sort of flash points not

19:32

a bit of the stations in the Urals along the

19:34

way. That that point about injured

19:37

troops returning along a rather

19:39

narrow supply line. And

19:41

everything bunching up is a really

19:43

good one. That I think is worth emphasizing

19:46

because it it's quite serious that. And they they

19:48

they you don't normally see very much

19:50

about that in the books you're right. I mean, it's mostly

19:52

about Sushima and the embarrassment, you know,

19:54

the fleet that sails all the way around. All the way around. All the

19:56

way around the world. Yeah. Fire in the natural desert

19:59

tankers. I mean, this is bizarre story.

20:01

Yeah. They were humiliated in

20:03

the war of nineteen o four. So

20:06

the rationale for

20:08

maintaining the powers

20:11

of the Romanos were shattered.

20:13

The myth of the Romanos were shattered

20:16

by this inglorious military

20:19

engagement in the Far East. The

20:23

story of Russia between nineteen o five

20:25

and end of the war in nineteen forty

20:27

five is so bizarre and

20:29

bloody, endlessly bloody,

20:32

that it's almost impossible to boil down

20:34

into any sort of coherent count,

20:36

but I think you should give it a go. Okay

20:40

then. Well, let's start with the chaos,

20:42

particularly in the military as Russian troops

20:44

lose all faith in the Tsar. And his

20:46

mystic adviser, Rasputin. During

20:48

the first World War, that is, Faster. Okay.

20:51

Nineteen seventeen, revolution in Saint

20:53

Petersburg, then Lenin's return

20:56

the end of the tarr followed

20:58

by three years of war between the whites

21:00

and the reds, the whites. The

21:03

remnants of the Imperial Army,

21:06

a few cossacks, and, of course,

21:08

outside

21:09

forces. So

21:10

basically Imperial. Yes. So

21:12

these were the imperial forces. Next

21:15

up, the union of Soviet socialist republics

21:17

under comrade Stalin, a Georgian which

21:20

is followed by ruthless repression, deportation,

21:23

and execution on an unbelievable scale.

21:27

And hunger particularly in Ukraine,

21:29

which had tried briefly to break free

21:31

as had other places like Georgia and

21:34

five year plans, collectivization, more

21:37

hunger, and death. And in nineteen

21:39

thirty nine, the molotov Ribbentrop packed

21:42

when Hitler and Stalin agreed to slice

21:44

Poland in

21:45

two. Followed by Nazi

21:47

invasion, the heroism of Stalingrad,

21:50

and victory in the sacred war. The thing

21:52

that happens when you read so much history I

21:54

mean, Napoleon Bonaparte, or you read about the

21:56

first or the second world

21:57

war, you read about the famine in Ukraine. Forget

22:00

contemporary events. I just think,

22:02

to be caught in the middle of all

22:04

that, I think this again and again, to

22:06

be caught in the middle of

22:07

all those troop movements must

22:09

have been horrific. Wow.

22:12

You know, you were living ordinary lives

22:14

and suddenly, these monstrous

22:17

formation appear on formations.

22:20

Out of the appearing Your

22:22

guns don't. Locust. Locust with

22:24

guns. What a great prescription mouths.

22:27

These are the bare bones of the period.

22:30

But what was it like to be taught about all

22:32

this? How, for example, was it

22:34

taught in Ukraine? So

22:36

my name is Katarina Hinkulova. Or

22:39

you can make it Katarina Hinkulova.

22:42

And I come from Kiev, Ukraine.

22:44

If you recognize Catarina, it's because

22:47

she introduces all these episodes. So

22:50

I started university

22:52

at nineteen ninety two, and

22:54

the the university I went to was the University

22:56

of Kemahill Academy. It's building was

22:58

housing a Soviet navy

23:01

school. But in the early nineteen nineties, it was

23:03

trying to reconnect Ukraine with European

23:06

educational traditions. So that was this

23:08

very new concept to study history of

23:10

civilization because the way history was

23:12

taught in the Soviet Union, it was about the class

23:14

struggle. Whatever it was, it was always about

23:16

class struggle, but then it was also about dates. It was

23:18

all very specifically in

23:20

this year, this revolution happened, and

23:22

that revolution happened. But you didn't

23:24

really study history as these ideas

23:27

and these big events that changed

23:29

the way humankind was

23:31

moving. And presumably, This

23:33

is the first cohort that is learning

23:35

about Ukrainian history

23:38

in a way that it would never have been taught

23:40

in the Soviet Union.

23:41

Well, yes and no. Why

23:44

it wasn't confusing is because

23:46

people mostly in Soviet Union were very very

23:48

cynical. About literally, you

23:50

know, everything. And that kind of reality that

23:52

was presented to them. They were very cynical and

23:54

they didn't really believe it. So so all the communist

23:57

slogans and what you read in newspapers

23:59

and what you saw on TV. So in that respect,

24:03

the final years of the Soviet Union

24:05

were

24:05

very, very different from what we're seeing, for

24:07

example, in Russia now. So

24:13

at home, would you talk about

24:15

things like, for example, the Ukrainian

24:17

famine, the great famine of the nineteen thirties?

24:20

And what was really going on in Ukraine

24:22

in the second world war? I mean, did you have differentiated

24:25

conversations?

24:27

At some point, we started having those conversations,

24:29

and it was interesting because it was

24:32

very far cry from official history,

24:34

but also its

24:36

history of Ukraine. As

24:39

you know, the Peristroika kicked off and things

24:41

started opening up. People started

24:43

learning about the Stalinist purges

24:45

and the famine about Second

24:47

World War and as that

24:49

information became public knowledge, I

24:52

learned about my own family's history, so

24:54

that was the point that my father told me

24:57

just how many people in his family were

24:59

taken away in short and my grandmother

25:02

was I knew that she was in

25:04

the woods. She was very, very young, and there was always

25:06

been I was very little. There was this sort of myth

25:08

how she, you know, signed up because,

25:10

you know, she was very excited about joining

25:12

up and And I think that was

25:14

to some degree, that was true. Although,

25:16

I think there was some pressure put on her to

25:19

join the war effort, and then she later

25:21

told me all sorts of terrible things that happened

25:23

to her in terms of kind of harassment and

25:25

probably worse and just, you know, it was it was pretty

25:27

awful. But also she

25:30

suddenly just started talking about the famine

25:32

and that she she was very little at the

25:34

time and she saw these people who would

25:36

walk on foot from countryside, these

25:38

bodies in the street, and never

25:40

enough food, and her father was, so my great

25:42

grandfather, was a baker. And

25:45

she said that he took some

25:48

raw dough from work and brought

25:50

it home and they ate it at night. And

25:52

that's how they survived because it was literally just sort

25:54

of nothing to eat. And I said, and why was

25:56

the dough raw? Why did you why didn't

25:58

he bake it? And she said, well, because that will make us smell

26:01

baked bread would alert the neighbors or alert

26:03

the police or that didn't

26:05

come out until early nineteen nineties.

26:08

And as you were learning about

26:10

all these things, both at home and then later

26:12

at university, how

26:15

dramatic and intense was

26:17

the experience of

26:20

trying to work out that

26:23

relationship between Ukraine and

26:25

Russia. You know this, the what

26:28

what did you say, German word for it? The sort of

26:30

science of memory, memory studies

26:32

or something like

26:33

this. They're

26:33

going and out to be built even. The overcoming

26:35

of the past. So I think

26:37

if you'd asked me that question in the

26:40

nineteen nineties, I would have answered it one

26:42

way and then two thousand fourteen and way.

26:44

And then now it's another way, yes or

26:46

so we have these layers. Yeah,

26:50

realization that suddenly there was this

26:52

whole other world of this,

26:54

you know, Ukrainianness that I hadn't

26:56

been told about

26:57

just, you know, for my parents to prevent

26:59

me from kind of blurting it out and gindergarten

27:02

or at school and then endangering everyone

27:04

else.

27:06

There are few countries whose invention, the

27:09

telling of its history, has

27:11

been so weaponized or

27:13

fudged than is the case with

27:16

Russia. It's

27:18

the blurring of the Soviet

27:21

and Russian experiences, which

27:24

makes it so complicated, and

27:26

that is what the Kremlin as

27:29

well as ordinary Russians are having to

27:31

come to terms with right now.

27:36

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The idea grew and blossomed

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