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under declined and this is the as a

0:37

bunch of

0:53

i would be good today by picking a moment

0:55

and getting at the theory of how are covering

0:57

russia's invasion of ukraine on the show there

1:00

is no way to fully understand fully understand

1:03

this vast for the motivations of the

1:05

players and the reality on the ground are this

1:07

unknowable there is no one explanation

1:09

no one interpretation the can possibly

1:12

be correct and of anyone tells you they've got

1:14

that the be very skeptical even

1:17

if all models are incomplete summer

1:19

useful if of each episode has been about

1:21

a different model different framework you

1:24

can use to understand part of the crisis

1:26

we talked with adam hughes about the economic

1:28

framework with fiona hill about

1:31

putting stated aims for free to korea

1:33

about the great power conflict frame and

1:36

the russia china relationship with much guess

1:38

in and with timothy snyder about

1:40

competing history driving russia ukraine

1:43

the us and europe but there's

1:45

one model that model that of you have emailed

1:47

asking us to cover a model for foreign policy

1:50

the gets called realism realism

1:52

is and i'm simplifying here but

1:54

impart realism is about simplifying

1:57

realism is a political framework that understands

1:59

it an hour the relation a

2:01

, between relatively

2:04

rational states for power

2:06

and security security pretty structural

2:09

in that way it it sees the

2:11

actions and activities of states as

2:13

quite predictable given their

2:15

role and needs in the

2:18

international security hierarchy in

2:20

it's wonder forms and they're and lot

2:22

of forms of realism the to be much

2:25

less interested than other frameworks in

2:27

the ideological individual leaders are the values

2:30

the profess called it wants

2:32

to be structural not personal

2:34

or individualistic

2:36

this case there's a particular realist

2:38

analysis of come lot of people's attention which

2:41

is john muir simers model of the conflict

2:43

mere simers a very famous real a scholar

2:45

and his speech from a few years ago arguing

2:48

that the crisis in ukraine is largely

2:50

the fall to the west for opening nato to

2:52

ukraine and that we did that

2:55

despite russian warnings that despite was warnings

2:57

red line and through

2:59

that pushed them

3:01

into a corner it led to this invasion

3:04

that , an analysis done very very

3:06

viral it's very very controversial honest

3:09

say that i've learned an enormous amount from john your

3:11

summer over the years and i've learned from him in

3:13

this crisis hill and hill do think

3:15

there's truth in what he's saying and

3:17

he's genuine danger to the west

3:19

professions the west innocent

3:21

or unwillingness to scrutinise our own

3:23

actions why , he

3:25

heirs to be honest is in suggesting

3:28

there is all that much truth in what he saying

3:30

it just it denies too much agency to

3:32

put in who obviously could have made decisions

3:34

differently here he trains leaders to

3:37

grants people to lock the

3:39

contingency or note that

3:41

this week president zalewski said ukraine

3:43

would not be joining nato he said

3:45

that was a quote truth and it must

3:47

be recognized and co the

3:50

thing that did not and put in for but

3:53

for all that i wanted have wanted real perspective on the show

3:55

because looking at this war through the real lens

3:58

is valuable and so i and

4:00

as for to johnny ashford is

4:02

a senior fellow in a new back and engagement initiative

4:04

in the scarecrow center for strategy and security

4:07

she's what's called a neo classical villa he

4:09

begins with a structural state based

4:11

power based analysis of realism but

4:14

then opens it up to more influence

4:16

from domestic politics the psychology

4:18

of individual leader is that the messiness a reality

4:22

one , this kind of analysis will get you some

4:24

the others don't his way to think about negotiations

4:27

and settlements settlements it may be motivated

4:30

by all kinds of things by imperial tendencies

4:32

by isolation by eighty all

4:34

achieved by nostalgia for the russian the

4:37

by a desire to mark his own

4:39

place in history bites these mystic

4:41

philosophers that he reads we talked about

4:43

timothy snyder but he's

4:45

also motivated by the normal concerned

4:48

to see security and power the

4:50

other cited him cannot be bargain with perhaps

4:52

that side of him a real aside at him can

4:55

and maybe if you try to work with outside of

4:57

him and take outside him seriously

5:00

maybe you empower and you can

5:02

start can realistic pass out of this war

5:04

now maybe know

5:07

maybe i , say this was

5:10

someone had expect to be because we'll have a very

5:12

pessimistic reputation this was

5:14

the most hopeful of the conversations i've

5:16

had on the sports and because things are moving

5:18

very quickly i do on a note the recorded

5:20

this on tuesday march fifteenth as

5:22

always my email is as email is show and and y

5:24

times

5:31

the massport welcome to the show

5:33

great be here

5:34

the would his foreign policy realism

5:37

and what makes it realistic

5:39

it depends who you ask realism

5:41

is a word that can mean many many

5:44

things to many different people in

5:46

washington at the moment everybody

5:48

from bob kagan commonly

5:51

known as a new

5:51

sir because to john

5:54

mearsheimer is great

5:55

help is really but i did

5:57

see it at the biggest level of

5:59

real

5:59

it

6:00

that he who view of the international system

6:03

as a fundamentally unchanging

6:06

we're be

6:09

act on their interest

6:10

we are there aren't really rules

6:13

or norms

6:14

stream state and and

6:16

were security concerns

6:17

are all was paramount and so people

6:20

disagree a lot on the details but

6:22

that's kind of the very big her

6:24

am and you shouldn't confuse realism

6:27

with being realistic although

6:29

the too often go together it's

6:31

much more about that know

6:33

in of sort of on ending

6:35

com

6:36

the shouldn't between states in history

6:39

a lot in realism very appealing

6:41

but one of the things that is tricky to me

6:43

is that the analyses i

6:45

hear from realists seem to be

6:48

distinguished and that they view states

6:50

acting upon strategic interests

6:53

and the values and

6:55

identity and some of what

6:57

you might imagine as be softer

6:59

or fuzzier motivations are cast

7:02

better the side authentic you

7:04

know people if you cover politics

7:06

if you watch the behavior of of individuals

7:08

and states that doesn't seem very

7:11

realistic people are often very non strategic

7:13

and they are pursuing other goals

7:15

or poorly pursuing strategic

7:18

goals in ways that dot backfire

7:21

some of the big realist theories

7:23

the one that you'd get taught in any

7:25

sort of i are one oh one class those

7:28

are very pretty

7:29

dominant be struck trump series

7:31

right there see

7:32

already the billiard balls

7:34

knocking about the and

7:35

national system at one another and there's there's

7:37

nothing else to it but we all know

7:39

that isn't had the world works you know that is a

7:41

mortal of had the world works and

7:44

so there

7:44

are a number of more assertive nuanced

7:46

theories of realism debt

7:48

basically say well you know

7:50

be

7:50

structurally sense it's the security

7:53

threats that faith faith those

7:55

are the most important thing but

7:57

domestic politics can matter the

7:59

person

7:59

i [unk] cheese of individual leaders can matter

8:02

and some time leaders make their

8:04

own choices and what

8:06

realists would say is it's not

8:08

that state can't act

8:09

in ways that go against their own interests

8:12

it's that if they do that the international system

8:14

will punish them eventually the

8:16

realism is in some ways that of a self correcting

8:19

system it does allow for

8:21

those things

8:22

feed into it but you're right that

8:24

that some furious do tend to focus

8:27

very heavily at that structural level

8:29

and miss out on a lot of really important

8:31

that the world

8:33

let's talk about one of those they are so dumb

8:35

your summer is very famous realist foreign policy

8:37

scholar i've learned a lot from his work over

8:39

the years he's , this varies

8:42

by role and attention grabbing analysis

8:44

of the situation in russia and

8:46

in ukraine where he says it russia's invasion

8:49

of ukraine is fundamentally the west spot

8:51

so can you describe his argument

8:54

and tell me what you think he gets

8:56

right and what you think he gets wrong

8:58

john mearsheimer is a

9:00

very well known international relations theorist

9:03

one one of those people who had managed to bridge

9:05

that devalued from being an academic

9:07

superstar to being sort of in the media

9:09

over time as well his argument

9:12

at you know as he puts it in an essay in for

9:14

an affair that into the second twenty four team is

9:16

basically that through

9:19

with constantly expansion

9:21

of particularly nato

9:23

the former soviet

9:24

union the west effectively

9:27

pushed russia into

9:29

a corner and forced it to

9:31

last show and fees crimea

9:33

when he fourteen and to invade the rest of

9:35

ukraine

9:36

there is some truth

9:38

to that have helped right i think

9:41

john the older self that

9:43

story however so and and he looks at it a

9:45

very mono causal weight right

9:47

so for him the only really

9:49

important factor here is that

9:51

nato expansion that has pushed russia

9:54

back and he sort of overlook

9:56

the number of the other nuances in the city

9:59

the third

9:59

we we have the big structural

10:02

story queer russia has been

10:04

systematically pushed out of european

10:06

security over a couple of decades

10:08

we've seen the russians that increasingly

10:11

unhappy about that but

10:13

equally you know that didn't force

10:15

russia to start a war in ukraine the russian

10:18

we came the culpability for that

10:20

decision the structural factors

10:22

help us understand how we got where we are

10:24

today i think for a mere simon goes

10:27

too far is in basically

10:29

assigning guilt for to the west

10:31

based on that history that he's telling

10:35

look at her balance what i find hopefulness

10:37

account and and what i find difficult about

10:39

it what did that did find stop

10:42

for is dead obviously

10:44

the west the us europe we

10:46

are going to want to present themselves

10:48

as blameless as having done nothing cause

10:50

any of this and , course we

10:53

have had our roles in creating russia

10:55

as it because today both and literally

10:57

constructing it with economic advice we gave

10:59

and v different agreements we

11:02

we have made but also in creating the context

11:04

in which lot of your put in his acting

11:07

acting the other hand i

11:09

and you gotta to sabet it seems

11:11

to me that this account one

11:14

completely under rates the agency

11:16

of putting of hundred percent

11:18

clear he did not have to do this invasion seems

11:21

like most elites in russia thought he wouldn't so

11:23

whenever something is that contention on the ideas

11:25

of a singular actor singular

11:27

think it's hard to call it structural

11:29

i think it's hard to say we push him into corner in

11:31

and they had to do this and they predictably did this

11:34

but the other think it's tricky about this is if you

11:36

are looking at put in as a rational strategic

11:38

actor who's worried about say the size

11:41

of nato think it's pretty clear that

11:43

invade ukraine is likely to strengthen

11:46

need our lease that was her of a plausible

11:48

thing that to do and it has or

11:50

he very worried about longer power russia and he's

11:52

already operating under sanctions

11:54

and twenty four keen watching innovation

11:57

that is going to further sanction

11:59

an isolated the me which is not good for

12:01

russia's long term power that

12:03

at least a a judgment call her to

12:05

say it lately so

12:08

i don't know how you can look at the choices

12:11

put it is making and the strategic decisions

12:13

judgment calls it is making and

12:15

say this say this structural are

12:17

all set into motion in any kind

12:20

of inevitable way by western actions

12:23

i mean there is a level of inevitability

12:25

here in that if you go back to

12:27

the nineteen nineties and you look at

12:29

some of the realists who were arguing

12:31

against nato expansion in the nineties

12:33

people like george kennan people like

12:35

brent scowcroft you see them

12:37

arguing that eventually

12:40

if the u s kept expanding nato something

12:42

like what happens over the last

12:44

it might happen right that we would start a

12:46

new conflict with russia infant contacts

12:49

not not not the details but the broad

12:51

strokes are right and so that that is we are again

12:53

where i think the structural picture

12:55

don't have a lot capella

12:56

hi we got here today but

12:58

the problem with just looking at the structure

13:00

picture is it dot overlook a lot

13:02

of these other relevant factors it's

13:05

not just a story of mearsheimer puts

13:07

it about nato expansion what

13:09

triggered the my dawn revolution and twins

13:11

fourteen in ukraine was actually european

13:14

union

13:14

hi for ukraine and

13:16

to some extent for the russians

13:19

it's more about the trajectory

13:22

off the seats

13:23

what what russian called need abroad in

13:25

both political and economic terms

13:28

right they're worried about ukraine or

13:30

moldova or ballot without any

13:32

of be safe pulling away from russia towards

13:34

the west in a very zero some

13:36

way

13:36

it's not rickman can expansion even

13:38

the security concerns

13:39

play a role mere semifinalists

13:42

is also overlook

13:43

hum of putting on person

13:45

no history and branches

13:47

great if you look that up a way

13:50

that be us fashion relationship

13:52

unfolded

13:53

in the post soviet period

13:55

of the night and ninety four an extremely

13:58

difficult hard times from

13:59

anywhere in the the impact of shock

14:02

therapy proposed by the west supported

14:05

by the us was really harsh

14:07

than any russian

14:08

and it obvious that

14:10

puts him in particular beers

14:12

budget about

14:13

when we look at him talking about these things

14:16

that stuff is obviously playing increase

14:18

decision

14:19

local calculus so i think

14:21

the structural factors are how we

14:23

get in the place where putting

14:25

me

14:25

the end up making the decision that you need

14:28

to go to war but

14:29

other factors clearly played into his couch

14:33

so what than that i find are useful in

14:35

realism including some of the morris

14:38

with emergence of it either they give

14:40

it as a little bit like rational

14:42

actor models in economics which is a

14:44

land have are familiar with in foreign policy where

14:47

they have this quality of obviously being incomplete

14:50

they're revealing even so and

14:52

so it it seems to me it's healthy for

14:55

us in the united states ask a question of

14:58

assume vladimir putin easy rational

15:00

actor he is motivated

15:03

by reasonable strategic considerations

15:05

then what what that imply

15:08

about how we should have treated him or

15:10

what would that imply about how we should

15:13

treat him now

15:14

a funny you say that because actually

15:17

the series of neo realism that

15:19

is to feed a very structural version of realism

15:22

actually came out all some

15:24

of the economic theories about behavior of firms

15:26

in the markets and that's where can waltz one

15:28

of that the grandfather's of realism actually

15:31

got some of his ideas for this is very much

15:33

based in that seem rational

15:35

actor model and when

15:37

we come for thinking about how it impacts

15:40

act

15:40

meters in the real world i think

15:43

you're right that it's helpful to think of this

15:45

i've been imperfect model of the worth

15:47

it the good when you understand why

15:49

state often act the way they do

15:52

but it's never going to predict

15:54

what's going to happen and it's me

15:55

they're going perfectly account for all

15:57

the factors at play

15:59

the

15:59

one of the things that i think is really important

16:02

in the context of russian

16:03

the film making a myth crisis is

16:05

that i fully believe put in is irrational

16:08

first i

16:09

we believe in global rational decisions but

16:12

like many actors and economic that rationality

16:14

is constrained if constrained

16:17

by the information that he laughing the

16:19

people that he's getting from

16:21

and in the kind of personally

16:23

ship you can act of the russian

16:26

system putting

16:27

making decisions funny seem

16:29

rational to him but are not necessarily

16:32

rational when viewed from the outside and and back

16:35

here example from earlier of this crisis

16:37

me and of expanding nato not shrinking

16:39

it i think that's one of those trade off

16:41

that i i think putin has probably

16:43

been receiving bad

16:45

information or making poor assumptions

16:48

about

16:48

iirc this crisis

16:50

what what have we then decide now

16:53

what we were to decide he is rational

16:56

he meets miscalculations buddies

16:58

fundamentally a strategic actor the

17:00

can be reasoned with on those got even if these

17:02

other imperialistic nostalgic etc

17:05

ambitions existing him that these

17:07

also exist and him if

17:09

we were treat him as a that

17:11

what is the prescription what off

17:13

ramp or approach to him

17:15

does that offer

17:17

the approach that ukrainian

17:19

government is already t in which

17:21

is to try and find some

17:23

kind of negotiated settlement

17:26

to this conflict the ukrainian

17:28

for the russians have had three or four sets the formal

17:30

meeting so far and of and informal contacts

17:33

and we have actually seen the truth hum

17:36

a little closer together as

17:38

the russians have done incredibly

17:40

poorly in this conflict far

17:42

worse than we would have anticipated as ukrainian

17:44

for done better we seem

17:46

the ukrainian modify their

17:48

position from what the said prior

17:51

to the war you know that they wouldn't accept neutrality

17:53

they did come back from that point we

17:55

seen the russians to some extent modified a

17:57

position know saying that they're talking

17:59

a lot

17:59

laughing at regime change for example

18:02

this they're not even talking that demilitarization

18:04

in the same way anymore know they're talking

18:06

much more about ukrainian neutrality

18:08

the and potential territorial gains so

18:11

the fits in you how a

18:13

rational model of conflict resolution

18:16

works which is to say that the war

18:18

with view something to the parties

18:21

that enable them to come for negotiating

18:23

table and hammer a to see spider

18:25

house

18:25

i wrote a piece the oh and and before you

18:27

but i really do think it's basically

18:30

the only option for improving

18:32

the situation rather than heading to somewhere

18:34

worse

18:35

i had a lot of conversations about

18:38

ukraine recently and that is one

18:40

of the first optimistic things i've heard

18:43

from anyone so i wanna hold on it for

18:45

minutes your view

18:47

that we have actually seen some moderation

18:50

the positions

18:52

been relatively moderate

18:54

moderate

18:55

for lack of the a better word we've

18:57

been in this war that three weeks points

18:59

and

19:00

the over that time you know the ukrainian

19:02

positions shifted almost immediately

19:05

within i think of the few hours of

19:07

the invasion wolinsky offered to talk

19:10

to moscow about neutrality right for the ukrainian

19:12

position they are shifted very fast the

19:14

russian position has

19:17

been much much harder to discern

19:19

not least because we're trying to cut

19:21

through the fog of russian war propaganda

19:24

and sergei lavrov he's overseeing

19:26

outrageous thing

19:27

sergei lavrov being there bastard

19:29

uber the russian foreign minister well

19:32

known for being it somewhat

19:34

of an internet troll in his approach to

19:36

diplomacy really

19:37

we like to sort of ticket

19:40

the western diplomats and point of hypocrisy

19:42

and

19:43

not act very diplomatic

19:44

but if you look at the statement that

19:47

been made by russian government officials you

19:49

look at what's being said on russian

19:51

the a t v you do

19:53

start to feed the shift right for

19:55

the be a month were announced at the start

19:58

of the war am or what the russians are com

19:59

the security

20:00

the mission to aim for the

20:02

immense worth the demilitarization

20:05

and be not suffocation of ukraine

20:07

obviously you clean doesn't need to be not certified

20:10

but that is what the russians have been using as

20:12

a euphemism for

20:13

change don't have basically

20:15

gone away and to the extent that

20:17

russian

20:18

that be militarization they're

20:20

talking about it more in the sense of like the

20:22

war has destroyed a chunk

20:24

of ukraine's military industrial complex

20:27

and that ability to build

20:29

up there

20:29

military force

20:31

so again defense in moderation

20:33

there and they're no longer talking about

20:35

the regime change part at home so

20:38

again

20:38

returning

20:39

public statements what they might be thinking

20:42

but it does seem funny that we have

20:44

in some movement from even the russian

20:47

over the last few weeks and i don't think we're quite

20:49

there yet but give it another couple

20:51

of weeks and that might be the point for

20:53

the have an opening for negotiation

20:55

how about the united states and europe

20:58

because one thing i see at least

21:00

in our politics around this is

21:02

we've moved from attica quite realists

21:06

stance where the

21:08

attitude was it's was shame that russia

21:10

might invade ukraine and will sought some

21:12

sanctions some sanctions but it's really not

21:14

something we're going to get deeply involved and certainly

21:16

not in any kind of direct military way the

21:20

way the a base has played out the

21:23

way that ukraine has

21:25

inspired many in europe

21:27

and and in america what

21:29

people are seeing on the news what they're seeing on social

21:31

media he does seem to me in

21:33

a lot of different aspects the positions in

21:36

the us and europe at least politically

21:38

if not among politicians have

21:41

hardened do think that's true

21:43

i think that's true and not to

21:45

undermine my optimistic point i do

21:48

think that one of the biggest

21:50

obstacles to finding some kind

21:53

of p steel fi fire

21:55

here may actually be western

21:57

opposition to listing some of the sanctions on

21:59

russia

21:59

they i don't see the russians necessarily

22:02

agreeing to a deal as it doesn't come

22:04

with

22:04

some sanctions being

22:07

listed perhaps you know freeing up some

22:09

of those frozen central bank reserves or something

22:11

i'm and it's not clear to me that

22:13

people in the west are are necessarily

22:16

going to accept that i

22:18

mean i do think what we've seen

22:20

over the last few weeks is the

22:22

white house continuing to hold to

22:25

a very very strict line

22:27

on the use of know what

22:28

for would you say it is not

22:30

being considered there will be

22:32

no no fly zone the us

22:34

will not have troops in ukraine but

22:36

we will descend members of

22:38

me felt that is to say countries under the article

22:40

five position

22:41

i make

22:42

but other realms

22:45

we have

22:45

in the us division

22:47

in the european position go further

22:50

than i think we would have anticipated before this crisis

22:52

started so the sanctions

22:55

went from and in severe sanctions

22:58

but severe thing

22:59

that are somewhat precedent

23:01

fits in their youth and then

23:03

within

23:04

than seventy two hours the fact this

23:06

conflict

23:06

they shifted to are a form of

23:08

economic warfare more analogous

23:10

to something we have

23:11

in from the nineteen forties is

23:14

kenneth

23:14

the same with arms shipments you know we saw

23:16

those initial shipments before the conflict

23:18

but the fact that you clean has managed to

23:20

hold on as long as they have

23:23

has actually increased countries to send more

23:26

and then we seem government

23:27

the order getting over the skis and some

23:29

of these things like that the debate over whether

23:31

we would send old mig

23:33

planes from eastern bloc members

23:36

of nato to ukraine and that ended

23:38

up phone during on politicians

23:40

basically couldn't figure out we could do it without

23:42

too much escalation risk so i

23:44

think you're right the attitudes of harden and

23:47

i think you know there is still that escalation

23:49

risk seeding in the background

23:52

underneath all of these decisions that are being made

23:55

the want to put a pin in escalation risk because we're

23:57

gonna come back to that but i do on

23:59

it the another moment about that the hardening

24:01

a position so we have these

24:04

really devastating sanctions that

24:06

we'd imposed on russia and there are

24:08

exceptions around energy cells in particular

24:11

but at this point we've destroyed their financial

24:13

system a lot of key

24:15

players in both their commercial

24:18

and financial architecture simply pull out

24:20

i mean he said mastercard aren't working in russia

24:22

anymore citibank citigroup is pulling

24:24

out of russia the things have gone even beyond

24:27

what the sexes themselves are potentially doing

24:30

the and it is a little hard for me

24:33

to imagine the kind of deal

24:37

who didn't can make where

24:40

it would be a dirty deal with ukraine

24:43

because if he's gonna stop an invasion

24:45

said he believes overtime he would win it

24:48

will probably because he got quite a bit of what

24:50

he wanted but given how we have

24:52

framed put in the

24:54

international system now in our

24:56

moral cosmology the idea that we're

24:59

going to have him wall

25:01

ukraine off from nato were and possibly

25:03

hold on to ferment of territory in

25:05

the east and

25:07

then just go back to treating

25:10

pressure normally and but the sanctions

25:12

even as he made all these games it's

25:15

hard for me to imagine the domestic politics about working

25:17

about working the united states and europe

25:19

it's going to be very very difficult for policymakers

25:22

to do it

25:23

i don't think that means they shouldn't

25:26

try because a

25:27

and humanly do think that

25:29

i mean it's too late for off ramps but not

25:31

in a week resolve the conflict

25:34

results in worse outcomes a

25:36

worse outcomes for people in

25:38

read ukraine potentially

25:40

worse outcomes for europe

25:42

more broadly and fill again i

25:44

i think it's going to be unpopular but

25:47

i do think that there's going to have to be some

25:49

thanks

25:50

relief in exchange

25:52

for actually ending the war and

25:54

i will note the as horrible as

25:56

that

25:56

in but you know the pecan is getting

25:58

emma forty one could

25:59

he probably going to get crimea part

26:02

of russia as part of this if this happens

26:04

but it's horrible that is he's also

26:06

not getting what he actually set out to do

26:09

i don't think were at risk

26:11

getting more of ukraine completely losing it's sovereignty

26:14

three weeks ago i would have told you that but i'm fairly

26:17

high public

26:17

working so the effort

26:19

that the west poured into this the sanctions

26:21

that we have put

26:22

on the have had some impact

26:24

the weapons

26:25

the ukrainian to resist the russians the

26:27

sanctions are hitting hard and

26:29

what

26:30

could you know you rather

26:32

than just letting the sanctions go on forever

26:34

we need to use them as an instrument

26:37

to try and improve the situation against we

26:39

need to offer a carrot know

26:41

we've used

26:42

did you see more on believing that

26:45

ukraine isn't in at least as

26:47

much danger of losing it's sovereignty

26:49

because that is remained closer to my

26:52

face case but i'm taking the conventional

26:54

wisdom from two weeks ago and you're you're falling this

26:56

more moment to moment by do you think that will happen

26:59

i think that the model lot of people have is

27:01

that the russian forces are so overwhelming

27:03

that if they simply maintain a commitment

27:06

to grinding through ukraine

27:09

eventually will simply when

27:12

you know i think that is possible

27:14

but i think there are also increasing

27:17

questions about how long

27:19

the russians can stay in

27:21

the field keep up this level of progress

27:24

with we some kind of fi fire

27:26

to sort of be coop and

27:29

sort of we fortify than

27:30

help for two weeks ago the presumption

27:32

definitely voice that the russians would

27:35

vote over ukraine quite fast and

27:37

even a couple weeks back you know the assumption

27:39

was that if the russians didn't do it fast

27:41

they would do it in a very slow writing

27:43

fashion i think that there

27:46

is certainly an element of truth to that

27:47

one of the scenario is one of the ways that this

27:49

could

27:50

oh is that the russians

27:52

basically increase their bombardment

27:54

of the major cities they bomb

27:56

ukraine into rubble but that does

27:58

the prefer we get you to political

28:01

though we have already seen the russians

28:03

try to insert

28:04

the government in up

28:06

the city in the the country doesn't

28:08

seem to be going very well we're

28:10

no closer to sort of the actual

28:13

ukrainian government collapsing having

28:15

to flee wiedersehen

28:16

her funny kid so if

28:19

the him changes their goal and the

28:21

destruction of ukrainian south into the thought

28:23

at least russians are doing that he that job and it's not

28:25

clear if they're gonna be able to complete that job so then

28:28

the other path then is that

28:30

the russians are doing badly enough

28:33

he doesn't mean they're going to lose in the long term but it

28:35

means that they may be unwilling to poor

28:37

more into this conflict they

28:40

might be willing to settle for something less

28:42

than the absolutist games they were going

28:44

for it

28:44

indo pacific happy

28:46

that woman people go haitians work in

28:48

almost all wars right it's it's rarely

28:50

to one fate loses in another state entirely

28:52

wins is almost all the since a compromise

28:55

he could future for more costly

28:58

than giving up on your absolute escape

29:01

this is where i think it is at

29:03

least interesting to imagine put in

29:05

as a strategic after because i think a model

29:08

of him that is consistent

29:10

with a lot of the information we have if

29:12

not all of it is it he believed

29:15

the russian identity in ukraine

29:17

was a lot stronger than it was he

29:20

believed the ukrainian military was

29:22

lot weaker than it was he believed that russian

29:24

military was lot stronger than it was

29:26

then the actual war has

29:29

undermined many of these police and so now

29:31

he's faced with a situation where

29:34

he's not going to preside over

29:37

a lightning invasion the topless ukrainian

29:39

government the and has at least substantial

29:41

portion of the population cheering the streets you're

29:44

dealing no matter what you do with

29:46

a ukrainian population the now

29:49

he seals and you're going

29:51

to be trying to do and occupation of and very

29:53

very large geographically and population

29:55

my country when you're economy

29:58

is shattered

29:59

you put into somebody who has

30:02

had various to paycheck and

30:04

in many ways correct criticisms

30:06

, america's foreign policy adventurism

30:09

and the way it would weaken our country

30:11

and the way we would not be able to hold territory

30:14

like afghanistan and iraq that

30:16

we thought we'd be able to hold he clearly understands

30:18

those ideas on some conceptual level

30:21

and so if he's even

30:23

minimally strategic even minimally point you've

30:26

got to be looking for some option

30:28

here fit isn't an unending

30:31

occupation ukraine

30:33

he doesn't it seems to me at

30:35

least have the troops

30:37

the morale of the treasury

30:39

finance an unending occupation

30:42

ukraine in a way that doesn't severely hurt

30:45

russia itself that too optimistic

30:47

about over the situation or his state of mind about

30:50

the possibility too optimistic

30:52

but i do think that this is one of those interesting

30:54

cases where we have this very insulated

30:58

personal a sick dictator he's

31:00

obviously been receiving bad information

31:02

one of the few things that can really cut through

31:04

that system is his ability

31:07

to look on the internet to turn on the news

31:08

and he can eat things aren't

31:10

going wow what a reality has

31:12

a way of intruding on

31:14

for that bubble in

31:15

contact of this conflict and

31:18

you know you see the putting maybe

31:20

thinking about america's intervention

31:22

have we got bogged down i would wonder

31:25

if he doesn't also have enough money to soviet

31:27

intervention in afghanistan which you know

31:29

happens when he was a young man ended

31:32

up costing the lives of many

31:34

young soviet men and boys

31:36

again and utter debacle for that

31:38

country and so he knows

31:41

the costs of occupation and

31:43

ukraine is incredibly import

31:45

he russia to pick compare silly

31:48

he may believe that the call will be

31:50

worth it but if he is

31:52

offered a veil it's

31:54

if we attract is settlements it

31:56

might be enough to overcome that inclination

31:59

and so again

31:59

the deal with the devil and this

32:02

is why nobody likes really

32:04

look what i'm saying is

32:06

that in the grand scheme of

32:08

thing

32:09

this will be better for everybody then

32:12

long term sanctions that end up in

32:14

misery thing

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slash as

33:03

you and i are here listening to this episode

33:05

for the same reason we like

33:07

or in my case love listening to

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great stories i , this moment

33:11

with my friend christian a few years ago we

33:14

were talking about this amazing article we

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had both red and it occurred to us there's

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all this fantastic journalism written

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you d m dot com

34:03

let me then turn the lens a bit

34:05

more on us and talk

34:07

about maybe some other people who told like realists so

34:10

, is been a moment where liberal

34:12

interventionists and neo conservatives

34:14

are saying see we were right all

34:16

on this is what happens when america

34:18

back sauce in the general commentary jump

34:21

it or it's read an article called neoconservatism

34:23

of indication and his argument

34:25

there is it neo cons believe

34:28

the soviet union was evil that could not

34:30

be restrained through negotiations it had to be

34:32

deterred to consequences

34:34

and american strength and he writes quote of

34:36

the current moment deterrence is what america

34:38

lost in the years before lot of your put and took

34:41

a gamble of going into ukraine and

34:43

it is deterrence we need to restore

34:45

that is why this is a neoconservative moment

34:48

see right

34:49

the last few months we have been trying to

34:51

deter us from going if ukraine using a variety

34:54

of threatened economic responses

34:57

but we didn't admit you

34:59

tomato and we never made

35:01

a

35:01

commitment to militarily

35:03

defend ukraine for from that point

35:05

of view military detention

35:06

the haven't failed in europe

35:08

hussein has not second

35:11

states that are actual members of nato

35:14

and i i have trouble believing

35:17

this argument that it's because

35:19

america wasn't strong

35:21

enough that putting his acting the

35:23

way he is no viewers

35:25

like myself are actually many ways

35:27

me can be officer argument with we're

35:30

arguing that because the us

35:32

has pushed so far

35:34

into the air

35:35

rio particularly around russia the you

35:37

could make the same argument that china that

35:40

that is when we're starting to see the

35:42

faith push back because they're worried

35:44

about the extent of us game

35:46

in their region and so that's a very

35:49

different argument

35:50

and for me the current situation

35:52

really seems to sir support that

35:55

rather than necessarily supporting the notion

35:57

that putin is reacting because america

35:59

the weekend family

36:02

would you say and other interviews and situation

36:04

we're in now is a result of thirty years

36:07

of liberal interventionist foreign policy

36:09

choices but , that we're in

36:11

it although the current events visit

36:13

coming out and saying see you just didn't listen

36:15

to us can you say bit more about that

36:18

how do you see the that the big foreign

36:20

policy picture and who should come out of this a

36:23

little strengthened in their analysis

36:26

it's easy for me to say because you know one on one

36:28

side of the day i

36:29

my face come out on top but

36:31

different views do what you just said is

36:34

something or you been happening

36:36

people who spend

36:38

thirty years

36:39

through the default soviet union

36:42

arguing that the us

36:44

goal should be to expand

36:46

nato to expand the european union

36:49

to focus on pushing liberal

36:51

democracy and human rights in eastern

36:53

europe that these would be the things

36:55

that would meet europe safer and

36:57

more secure it's not

37:00

a tall clear to me that those

37:02

claims

37:03

have been proven true in any way impede

37:05

for i see if kind of the opposite

37:07

the states that have made it under

37:09

the need to umbrella their it a better

37:11

place than they would have an otherwise but states

37:13

like ukraine and this this could also apply

37:16

to georgia moldova bella

37:18

three all of those states they're kind of hop

37:20

between much

37:21

in the west and have been

37:23

placed in this position player

37:26

a hero some choice whether

37:28

you move towards the

37:29

whether you've tenure historical ties

37:32

to russia

37:33

he me that if what if provoked this

37:35

crisis at a large naval

37:37

i'm so for some liberal international

37:39

to turn around and say well this

37:41

is what we warned about all along that russia

37:44

would a bad actor and so

37:46

you know we've been proven right to me

37:48

rather ignores the concerns

37:51

about security

37:51

he that russia has been expressing

37:54

for thirty years again it doesn't in any we justify

37:56

that us mondays and but be have

37:58

been

37:58

the the theme

37:59

heard

38:00

the nineteen nineties about me

38:03

to expansion about the future trajectory

38:05

the clean another think and about

38:07

that that russia has been effectively excluded

38:10

from european security environment

38:12

and funny but the cutting prices

38:14

oh it for a state

38:17

that has been excluded from the security

38:19

environment

38:19

then he would you can offense for a end

38:22

up doing as a result of that and that's a

38:24

very realist approach to this crisis

38:26

but i think the evidence bear sit as

38:30

one critique i sometimes hear

38:32

that argument is that it

38:34

robs countries like

38:37

ukraine poland or others have

38:39

their own agency and

38:42

they have wanted to become more western they have

38:44

wanted to come under a

38:46

different umbrella or at least balance that

38:48

the powers threatening them against each other you

38:50

can make up a very similar argument about countries

38:53

in or near to china and it said

38:55

are seeking about

38:57

how to balance the pressures of a of a rising

38:59

china and the various american

39:03

stratagems to balance china's rise

39:06

on the other hand there's this concerned

39:08

that america's putting a lot of countries into this

39:10

we are no man's land where the one

39:12

hand we are encouraging ma'am and giving

39:14

them opportunities to westernize come closer

39:16

to us but we're not committed

39:18

enough to them to defend them against the consequences

39:22

of a russia or china

39:24

or others becoming aggravated

39:27

and deciding enough is enough how

39:29

do you balances out

39:31

are you going from the point of view of

39:33

us security right i

39:35

fully acknowledge up front that that

39:37

is my my bias that it

39:39

you point and so i'm concerned

39:42

about

39:42

the notion of nato

39:44

expansion for us security

39:46

and co electric fence for defeat that are already

39:48

inside

39:49

nico and i do think there is

39:52

a pension right the security

39:54

of the state that have

39:56

joined nato inside eastern europe

39:58

their security is probably

39:59

more assured then it with a thin

40:02

otherwise but you know some of the

40:04

a scholarship on this subject on the

40:06

question nato expansion basically concludes

40:09

the nato expansion with good for those states

40:11

and eastern europe because it gave him the security

40:13

guarantee help them both for democracy

40:15

at home helped with things like civilian

40:18

control of the military and stuff like that

40:19

but it wouldn't that from the point

40:22

of view of the us another existing nato members

40:24

during the

40:24

war because it added

40:26

a new level of security commitments

40:29

that would be hard to descend and

40:31

pushed as right up against russia's border

40:33

in a way that we weren't before so

40:35

i mean i don't think there's a necessarily a contradiction

40:38

their it depends on who's point of view

40:41

you're you're looking at i will

40:43

say i think the debate inside

40:45

me tell about me to

40:47

open door policy

40:49

have become

40:50

problematically ideological

40:53

the notion that nato's open

40:55

door he is

40:56

thank him for pool that we cannot

40:58

give up his mother actually how

41:01

is written in me to founding documents

41:03

article ten of beat us torture actually

41:05

says that the states that are members

41:07

of me

41:07

pam by consensus invite

41:09

other states to join the miss it would improve the aligned

41:12

the cuticle

41:13

all access it doesn't offer

41:15

a right for all fleet the necessarily

41:18

join the military alliance and that

41:20

has long been a concern that many realists

41:22

have suggested that need to expansion is

41:25

the treating it

41:25

or a club

41:27

the be enjoying if they want

41:30

and they have a right to do so necessarily

41:33

weekend the alliance more broadly

41:35

and you i think you mentioned asia

41:38

with regard to sort of taiwan

41:40

and the current crisis i think one of the left

41:42

that we can say about european security

41:45

over the last thirty years if we haven't

41:47

been as creative in europe as we have

41:49

been elsewhere you know the ambiguous

41:51

he that the united states has over taiwan

41:53

the one china policy if pro

41:55

part of even fly we haven't seen conflict

41:58

over that and years

41:59

it may be a place for we need to get more creative

42:02

in thinking about middle wave

42:05

the don't

42:05

necessarily involve nato membership

42:07

for every once or you know nato members

42:09

for know why

42:11

let me try to wade into this very tricky territory

42:14

because i don't be devil's all foreign policy forever

42:17

usa you begin from the perspective of us security

42:20

i don't know that's for i begin

42:22

or even where most people begin i

42:25

have some be asthma of us security

42:28

the values i believe in for the world and

42:30

then also some recognition i hope

42:32

of our minutes and the commitments we will

42:34

and will not make criticism

42:37

of the position relating out here is

42:40

, nato's open door policy is not one hundred

42:42

percent of security policy it's somewhat

42:44

a values policy we want punches become

42:46

more democratic we want them to

42:48

become part of the liberal

42:51

it infrastructure that we think

42:53

of as the west but

42:55

obviously we don't always live up to our values

42:58

and whenever we begin talking about them accusations

43:01

of hypocrisy fly fast furious

43:03

and most of them are warranted just

43:05

warranted sick about the tension between the values

43:07

between have and the commitments

43:09

for willing to make

43:11

there's a difficult conversation

43:13

i think we'll or something get this rap as

43:15

being immortal or

43:17

amoral and

43:19

not really true there

43:21

are lots of really

43:22

the reader therapeutically classical realists

43:25

were writing in the aftermath

43:27

of the world wars you talk

43:29

a lot of that saudis and how to be applied

43:32

and way that i like to think about it is

43:34

you know a quote from hands morgan

43:36

says is one of the father's the american be like

43:38

and then he basically says and i'm paraphrasing

43:41

politicians can only percy

43:43

what they

43:43

think is right they have to be constrained

43:47

by an understanding of what is possible

43:49

in specific time and place

43:51

and that is how i think

43:53

all of us interests so i think

43:56

of for

43:57

we can achieve in the world how

43:59

does it

43:59

the hack american pure home

44:02

and

44:03

bread or values

44:05

does the uphold our values that

44:07

is the tertiary consideration

44:09

we if it is

44:11

something we are able to do with a

44:14

hurting american secure superstar

44:16

a t too much home and

44:18

the other way your some pain your

44:21

this argument

44:22

and even in oh wow really

44:25

want to give russia china fear

44:27

of influence and and that's immoral

44:29

i don't think that's the right way to frame this a

44:31

tall i you know i'm not seeing the russia

44:34

has enormous

44:34

right you can fall ukraine

44:37

i think that's a pupil notion i

44:39

do think that ukraine though is a place

44:42

where american interest

44:45

relatively small russian interests

44:48

are much bigger and we do not

44:50

have

44:51

interesting getting a larger conflict

44:53

with run over that for didn't the spheres

44:55

of influence idea that it's way

44:58

or the constraints of for is

45:00

possible without harming american

45:02

security and prosperity that's where they

45:04

come to play and so from my point of view

45:06

the notion that we have repeatedly

45:09

told ukraine that we would let the nato

45:11

and defend them and nowhere

45:13

the we can me that

45:15

is almost more in moral been

45:17

saying up front

45:19

do too much risk for as we

45:21

will not descend you you need to find

45:23

another solution like the thin stage

45:25

during world war two like the austrians

45:28

did afterward

45:29

this gets it something i find

45:31

very frustrating and foreign policy conversations

45:34

which is it a very heavy overlay

45:37

of aesthetics in my view the

45:40

people who claim that

45:42

they are pursuing american security

45:45

often seem to me a very

45:48

was he your under specified definitions

45:50

of american security and how

45:53

it will actually play out the people who

45:55

claim to be motivated by values

45:58

often seem to be the beep the be fine

46:00

with tremendous levels of hypocrisy

46:02

in america's foreign policy values

46:05

and who we do and don't help and what

46:07

that's because we do don't focus on

46:10

a your lot about the ukrainians

46:12

who could die in russia's invasion and properly

46:14

so i'm hearing much less about the afghans

46:17

who might die from starvation

46:19

in the coming months from of the yemen's

46:22

who are caught in a

46:24

war that america is hop to finance or

46:26

partnership a saudi arabia and

46:28

that reads i think this

46:30

question of whether or not the

46:33

stated goals actually

46:35

it preferred

46:37

means something that that you've pushed foreign

46:39

foreign policy is a belief in restrict

46:43

can you talk you talk about why you think more

46:45

american restraint would be better for more american

46:47

security or for american

46:50

values because if the assumption is

46:52

if we care about them and we should be doing more

46:54

to achieve it that argument you've made

46:56

in that some others make is that you actually look

46:58

at our history maybe we should be doing less

47:01

people angry

47:02

the meet the extent to which

47:04

american foreign policy goofy

47:07

into the cold war has become

47:09

incredibly expensive and

47:12

in particular expansiveness very military

47:14

sense though we

47:15

oh fifteen a lot of expansion on

47:18

things like sanctions

47:20

expansion off send us

47:22

alliances like nato

47:24

that american oh

47:27

have become just far more

47:29

universal than the word during the cold

47:31

war know during the cold war we often said

47:34

similar things right

47:35

we were standing for a liberal democracies everywhere

47:38

but policymakers during that period

47:40

fundamentally understood again

47:42

that we were constrained

47:44

by that to prepare a competition

47:46

that they were places where we may be

47:49

couldn't do anything and

47:51

there were places didn't want to act because

47:53

we didn't want sent hagner so

47:55

be it in a lot of the history the cold war is

47:57

both sides both superpower served

47:59

he went up that lying to try

48:02

void a bigger conflict fulfill

48:04

her

48:04

the other side in the post

48:07

soviet period since the

48:08

the cold war instead american

48:11

foreign policy has become defined much more

48:13

is you know why aren't we doing

48:15

more for else can we do around

48:17

the world you know everything from the

48:19

invasion of iraq the war on

48:22

terror were not just going to

48:24

going and destroy the taliban

48:26

in two thousand two thousand were also into and

48:28

petr within the spread human rights in

48:30

educate afghan women and

48:33

there are a lot of us foreign policy objectives

48:35

during the period that look like that i

48:37

think the lots of cool

48:39

all points of that he's

48:41

some of the debate that we're seeing today over

48:43

ukraine it's people and people new

48:45

thing

48:45

why don't we just set up a no fly zone over ukraine

48:48

and the answer is because russia is

48:50

the nuclear power and we don't want

48:52

to get

48:53

you can war with a nuclear power that thirty

48:55

years of

48:57

america focusing last

48:59

on

49:00

twitter an action in foreign policy

49:02

is good for us security and more on

49:04

whether

49:05

the do it but we should actually do whether we

49:07

should do more i think that has brought

49:09

us to a place where our foreign policy

49:11

debate is very problematic

49:14

i think this is actually very interesting

49:17

moment in that because to tensions

49:19

strike me as being really

49:21

pitted against each other i would

49:23

say that american politics since george

49:25

w bush's presidency and

49:28

the many for posse disastrous of it there were

49:30

still living through i've been thinking recently

49:32

about how to find joe biden

49:34

presidency and foreign policy has been by bush

49:37

era initiatives withdrawing from

49:39

afghanistan for one but also

49:41

to the extent you believe nato expansion

49:44

is expansion contributor a contributor crisis that that

49:46

was done under george w bush over

49:48

the objections of some of both

49:50

his own advisers and and many the european

49:52

countries so we we still the some

49:55

degree live in george w bush is foreign policy

49:57

world the end the aftermath of

49:59

his to since

50:01

since then there's been under obama

50:04

under trump under biden in different

50:06

ways among all of them much more skepticism

50:09

of putting american boots on the ground

50:12

much more sense of the limits in but we

50:14

can do in terms of occupation nation

50:16

building in terms of what the american military

50:18

can do that

50:21

has rather than leading to a lot of a sprayed

50:23

i think lead to a

50:25

search for ways

50:27

of exerting our power the

50:30

feel to us like they are not war and

50:33

so we have very very aggressive sanctions policies

50:36

you talk about the enthusiasm washington

50:39

for setting up no fly zones we

50:41

, to lot of arming of people now so are arming

50:44

ukrainians but that's obviously been a

50:46

consistent theme in a foreign policy and in

50:48

recent decades or we fooling

50:50

ourselves about the degree to which

50:53

we are now at war with russia

50:55

orly to degree to which russia sees us as a direct

50:58

combat and i mean are we fooling ourselves that

51:00

they don't understand our sanctions now as

51:02

a kind of economic war that direct

51:05

arms permission from nato won't actually

51:08

escalate into a shooting more i worry

51:10

that we've drawn a line in our own mental

51:12

conception of american actions

51:14

that might not be the line other people draw

51:17

i think that pretty accurate i i think there

51:19

is a and call it a pathology

51:21

in american foreign policy thinking today

51:24

that he's almost anything the us

51:26

does abroad

51:28

not war as peaceful

51:30

is it's not dropping a bomb

51:32

we had an only cove to do

51:34

more in ukraine the fact is

51:36

we're already doing have fought

51:39

for ukraine we are arming

51:41

the ukrainians were sending them all kinds

51:43

of aid or authorizing emergency

51:46

loans your this is

51:48

not on the scale of land

51:49

but this is equivalent to

51:51

that process from the nineteen forties and

51:54

then on the sanctions

51:55

they'd we have thanks

51:57

and russia in a way that is

51:59

horrible point only to live on in the modern

52:02

iraq iran with not an economy

52:04

like russia and we have

52:06

please sanctions please sanctions again

52:09

the closest example strike com

52:12

go back to the nineteen forties nineteen

52:14

thirties of states

52:16

aging and that level of warfare against

52:19

another state in so

52:21

i think we're under this funny

52:23

thing how damaging

52:25

those tools can beat how much

52:28

we are involved in this conflict

52:30

and how others might see at know i'm a little

52:32

more reassured today than

52:35

i was

52:36

we pursue back i don't

52:38

think the economic step that we've taken

52:40

so far going to eat escalation

52:43

necessarily in the absence of further

52:45

steps i don't think the

52:47

arms are again i don't think

52:49

they're going to be to escalation as the stuff

52:51

right now but i think

52:54

in both cases further

52:56

steps could quite easily prompt

52:58

a russian responsive some kind on

53:01

the financial side we could see some sort

53:03

of russian cyber

53:05

how can the u a financial system or

53:07

some sort of asymmetric response from

53:09

them on the use of weapons the

53:12

weapons are attempting target

53:14

for the russians we know

53:16

good last weekend the russians

53:18

struck an airbase just inside

53:20

you clean from the polish border that the reported

53:22

widely used to the mustering zone for foreign

53:25

fighters coming into ukraine and

53:27

so again the risk of

53:30

a new

53:30

calculation by one side or the other

53:33

see the russians strike a convoy just

53:35

on the wrong side of the border or something like

53:37

that could quite easily spark

53:39

a larger conflicts and i think we're under

53:42

playing the escalation risks with

53:44

the things that we're already doing even

53:47

as i i think washington has greatly

53:49

will that the no fly zone idea

53:50

the good people feel a particular day it would

53:52

be

54:06

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54:38

and be tell prescription process

54:49

the we underrate the degree to which

54:51

sanctions could backfire or

54:53

turn russians against us and

54:55

i say this for two reasons one is of is think we seen

54:57

it in other countries i'm

54:59

at purdue if we believe that put in has in has

55:02

of control over what russian see in

55:04

the media the way that

55:06

an american and european

55:09

lead sanctions regime leading

55:11

to total economic devastation of russia

55:13

narrative eyes by pottinger put in the

55:16

idea that is gonna turn russians against

55:18

him as opposed to us may

55:20

not be true but also was

55:22

thinking about an email i got from a

55:24

listener visa or a russian expat

55:26

and is somebody who doesn't pretty be liked

55:29

by putin but it's furious

55:31

about the sanctions because

55:34

to them we are destroying

55:36

the you know the lies the savings of all

55:39

these ordinary russians who had nothing to do with

55:41

at the end you know what they hear in the media conversation

55:43

is enormous clean like us they could

55:45

do more like why can't we harmless economically

55:48

even more expansively

55:50

, get the oil blocked blocked

55:53

i want to know it i have some a saint impulses

55:55

and i haven't because i wanna see russia stopped

55:58

but v extent it doesn't stop that's

56:00

it a country but when it really does is

56:02

make it much harder for individual russians

56:05

practically does trying to go abroad

56:07

pedigree those in danger from this regime

56:10

have nothing to do with this war pizza

56:13

what he does it is it destroys their savings

56:15

or makes him inaccessible

56:17

that really going to achieve

56:20

our goals or is that

56:22

just couldn't turn a lot of russians against

56:24

us and kozlov human suffering

56:27

nick motive is written this great book on sanctions

56:29

mentioned it in an interview how many russians

56:31

for tennessee was thrown out the can access a lot

56:33

of their money because if he said mastercard

56:35

pulling out as they basically can't get out

56:38

how we told ourselves a story in which are sanctions

56:40

are targeted and logical that's

56:43

not actually true

56:44

i think we've been telling yourself the story

56:46

for years now russia ears

56:49

and mean an order of magnitude

56:51

more powerful sanctions and

56:53

we'd seen in recent years that

56:56

you know if somebody that works from saints and there

56:58

are so many cases where

57:01

american thanks and have started

57:03

out as be very careful calibrated

57:05

targeted sanctions just

57:08

focused on him be so just focus

57:10

those pies to militias are targets

57:12

or something like that and then over

57:14

time the sanctions sort of slowly

57:17

grow and get bigger and bigger

57:19

and there's more and more and eventually

57:21

you end up with it can be

57:23

very hard for ordinary

57:26

citizens in those states to

57:29

trade with other countries fright so

57:31

you know in some of the worst cases in

57:34

places like it on we've seen difficulties

57:36

you know obtaining medical supplies

57:39

right the us government's at one point had to

57:41

facility a humanitarian channel

57:43

because no bank would allow companies to

57:45

trade

57:46

the could on just do that trade filled

57:48

with you i think under estimate

57:50

that the sanctions have on

57:53

the average person in the state we think they're targeted

57:55

sanctions it's fine but they don't

57:58

be targeted on

57:59

the other hand i think we also overestimate

58:03

the extent to which the actually hurt those in

58:05

charge fill in

58:07

the twenty four team case after recipe

58:10

tenure with on all these exact

58:12

him on for russia and

58:14

you're one of the things that russian government

58:16

did with he provided

58:18

you might fun to be oligarch

58:20

that were specifically sanctioned under

58:22

those

58:23

authorities so the rotenberg

58:25

brothers example hillary sort of oligarchs

58:27

and ten when ties you know they got

58:30

contracts to do infrastructure projects

58:32

inside russia to meet up

58:33

for losing some of their business to

58:35

you that sanctions so

58:38

how many pieces actually

58:41

her dude in charge and

58:43

again the russian keith is qualitatively

58:45

different right now because it's so big

58:48

that it would not

58:49

find me if there were not some folks

58:51

around flat and you're putting saying we

58:53

can use a star advantage russian

58:56

economy that is more insulated

58:58

from the west will be to our advantage

59:00

and they might be right from the point of view

59:02

of their narrow week in panic

59:05

the other problem with believing you have a very

59:07

targeted approach to or is that you

59:09

might be wrong and you've been writing

59:11

about the possibilities for escalate

59:14

, spirals the don't come from

59:16

the intentions of any side but

59:18

come from mistakes from fog

59:20

of war from policies

59:24

creating , loop

59:26

said that the people are anticipating what

59:28

right now do you think of as more plausible

59:31

that ways for escalation

59:34

then net we are giving them

59:36

credit for

59:37

i think we're seriously under

59:39

gimme in the the

59:41

risks of arms transfers and no

59:43

i don't necessarily advocate

59:45

the ending the arms transfers ukrainian government

59:48

but i do think we should acknowledge

59:50

that it's going to get more difficult and

59:53

also in a scenario

59:55

where see

59:56

the ukrainian government had to sleep kiev

59:59

or

59:59

ignore you we're we're talking about an insurgent

1:00:02

the i think that are a number of

1:00:04

cases where the russians might

1:00:06

be tempted

1:00:07

straight into shipments and just

1:00:09

but i do technical reasons be easiest

1:00:11

place to do that is when the shipments are being assembled

1:00:14

on the soil of me to member states so

1:00:16

bad is one potential area for escalation

1:00:19

another one that i'm i'm concerned

1:00:21

about you you might call it

1:00:23

freelancing by member states

1:00:25

of nato or just

1:00:27

the striking out on their own and doing different

1:00:30

things so one thing that we've learned today

1:00:32

is that i'm a couple of eastern

1:00:34

european leaders are actually

1:00:37

planning to visit kiev to talk to the lenski

1:00:39

in person and that's incredibly

1:00:41

the right this is the era of zoom

1:00:43

and instead they are going to fly

1:00:46

or drive into a war you're surrounded

1:00:48

by tanks way they could be killed it

1:00:51

kind of escalation risk

1:00:53

that i worry that state might be picking

1:00:56

on their own without necessarily

1:00:58

having the backing of the fool nato

1:01:00

alliance so there's a lot of these

1:01:02

scenarios and the all involved

1:01:05

nom ne

1:01:06

perception misunderstanding

1:01:09

accidental escalations firing

1:01:11

the kills number of me to truth

1:01:14

on the border something like that but

1:01:16

anyone who studied history can tell you that

1:01:18

is a war starts with it is not something

1:01:20

that is out of the realm of positive

1:01:23

that's what you're right now about nuclear

1:01:25

weapons being be and point of escalation

1:01:29

at the moment attacks have been work under rating

1:01:32

and but you just without earlier massive

1:01:35

cyberattacks and this is something

1:01:37

that that every security expert spoken to

1:01:39

for years says we are nowhere near

1:01:42

prepared for we don't really know how we'd we'd

1:01:44

respond to them we know we have sued

1:01:46

phone abilities and all kinds of critical

1:01:48

infrastructure and financial infrastructure

1:01:51

they are not hard and at this point

1:01:53

we know rushes been looking these vulnerabilities for

1:01:55

long time south russia wanted

1:01:58

to begin striking

1:02:00

back at the us and europe

1:02:03

in more or less a terms who struck at them that

1:02:05

may be how they go about it can

1:02:08

you talk a bit about the risks of

1:02:10

cyberattacks here and what might be the potential

1:02:13

lines they get crossed leading

1:02:16

them to happen

1:02:18

yeah so am i going to start by saying here that i'm

1:02:20

not a cyber experts so i mostly

1:02:23

couldn't you what others have told me

1:02:25

q interesting things that pop out in

1:02:27

this crisis and the cyber front one is

1:02:30

it we have seen markedly little use

1:02:32

of those techniques by the russians they

1:02:35

took down some government web sites

1:02:37

and servers in the first days of this

1:02:39

intervention but it really not engaged

1:02:41

in a large scale yes but a tall and

1:02:44

the most likely explanation appears to be

1:02:46

that despite all the hype over the years

1:02:49

fiber network exploitation he's

1:02:51

actually not as useful for them

1:02:53

the field you as many people

1:02:55

think so you know that one's interesting

1:02:57

and i think you know the cyber scholars are watching

1:02:59

that and it'll be interesting seagoing

1:03:01

thurber depresses skip the use of that

1:03:04

over time the offer area

1:03:06

where i have been hearing been hearing of

1:03:08

calls for the us

1:03:10

the aging cyber attacks

1:03:12

and you think it's interesting that

1:03:14

the white house

1:03:15

we really use that as far

1:03:17

more ethical a tory than some of the other steps

1:03:20

were taken the arms the thing since etc

1:03:22

because the calls to sort of use faber

1:03:25

techniques to strike directly

1:03:27

that russian infrastructure

1:03:30

stop russian train make train hard

1:03:32

for russia to fight the war in ukraine those

1:03:35

seem to be viewed pretty clearly

1:03:37

as making be

1:03:38

when an actual clarity cutest conflict

1:03:42

and so

1:03:42

i find that interesting and i also

1:03:44

wonder if that is part of forties

1:03:46

we could present constraining russia on that

1:03:49

felt that they are worried that

1:03:51

a direct cyberattack woods

1:03:53

in why that he consider the u s a full

1:03:55

party to this conflict am and us

1:03:57

might enter in i can a conventional military

1:03:59

the warriors

1:04:02

of fiber in the conflict is is really interesting

1:04:04

in that it just hasn't been as relevant we might

1:04:06

think so i'm more concerned

1:04:09

these days about the sort of conventional

1:04:11

escalation risks rather than the cyber

1:04:13

one

1:04:14

better the nuclear ones for minute because

1:04:17

that's how many people's minds

1:04:19

though you said that quote

1:04:21

duke escalation is possible said the united

1:04:23

states or to nato partners intervene in russia's

1:04:26

war against ukraine now that's coming out of put

1:04:28

in and and sergei lavrov been

1:04:30

very very clear about that's something

1:04:33

i see often the

1:04:35

people here that and as

1:04:37

they they see as back off in the

1:04:39

face of of puddings nuclear saber

1:04:42

rattling his wealth

1:04:44

wealth back down

1:04:45

whenever

1:04:47

he suggests that don't

1:04:49

we just encourage more of it in the future

1:04:51

if he's taken a stance that he's

1:04:53

willing to do this and everybody else taken a stance

1:04:55

that were not willing to risk gets

1:04:58

the not create a kind

1:05:00

of imbalanced the

1:05:03

older than the could get you into

1:05:05

a worse threat space

1:05:07

be out by ten years from now how

1:05:09

do you think about the gamesmanship around nuclear

1:05:12

here and how the by the administration has approached

1:05:15

i think the binding ministration has approach this

1:05:17

largely correctly which is to point

1:05:20

out the reality that the

1:05:22

us has extended it's nuclear umbrella

1:05:24

to a number of states and europe that are members

1:05:27

of nato we haven't done so to ukraine

1:05:29

and so i concur with what they're doing and

1:05:31

i think it's actually the

1:05:33

rak approach which is to say you know we've

1:05:35

made a very clear decision that

1:05:37

we're not willing to risk a nuclear exchange

1:05:39

for ukraine

1:05:40

we didn't work in a motel in the first place an

1:05:43

escalating know we're

1:05:45

it might bring that risk of nuclear exchange

1:05:48

he's in some ways just undermining

1:05:50

those previous decisions i

1:05:52

think that calculus would look very

1:05:54

different if we saw sea

1:05:56

of russian invasion of a ball

1:05:58

sleep and paris

1:05:59

fishermen and the fact

1:06:02

that expanding me to meant expanding the

1:06:04

us nuclear power we

1:06:06

do have to remember i think again that

1:06:08

all through the cold war we

1:06:10

were constrained by the notion that

1:06:12

other states had nuclear weapons

1:06:15

and that we didn't know

1:06:16

we want to take

1:06:18

them on head on as a result that

1:06:20

is one of the reasons why the cold war has so

1:06:22

many what conflicts and

1:06:24

fly after the desert the big

1:06:27

sigh

1:06:27

either drinking fifty nine for fit

1:06:29

feel berlin few bites cetera

1:06:31

why we see the superpowers resort

1:06:34

who promptly cornflakes far

1:06:36

away from europe and to arms

1:06:38

control and confidence building measures on

1:06:40

the european continent right be were trying to

1:06:42

avoid getting back into

1:06:44

that can a crisis because both faith knew

1:06:46

that it could end badly

1:06:48

and who i just have real trouble

1:06:50

with these arguments that faith that

1:06:53

putting this kinda thing nuclear black male

1:06:55

and we must push back against him and engage

1:06:57

in think friendship because that

1:06:59

is in effect asking us to put whole world

1:07:02

under a new

1:07:02

the umbrella in a way that we have never done

1:07:04

historic

1:07:06

their dinner a series of rounds

1:07:08

of or you could be going to particles in peace

1:07:11

talks but negotiations have some sort

1:07:13

between ukraine and russia during

1:07:15

this conflict there more the began on monday how

1:07:18

do you understand where that

1:07:20

is right now should we take that

1:07:22

as serious as of somebody both sides of the have to do

1:07:25

for international support what

1:07:27

is your assessment of

1:07:29

the of the we keep reading about but also

1:07:31

reading about them going nowhere

1:07:33

i think they are

1:07:35

necessary and in many ways

1:07:37

i actually think the ukrainians

1:07:40

are doing the right thing when they

1:07:41

didn't necessarily have to

1:07:43

going ahead with these negotiations

1:07:46

i i think in fact the ukrainians could have received

1:07:48

quite a lot of western support as they simply

1:07:50

said we will not talk to the russian aggressor

1:07:52

i think they would assigned to feed him and of support in

1:07:55

various european capitals in particular for that

1:07:57

i take their willingness to engage in

1:07:59

town

1:07:59

i'm that they are willing

1:08:02

to try and find a solution

1:08:04

here that doesn't necessarily

1:08:06

involve either complete

1:08:09

capitulation by ukraine or

1:08:11

a complete withdrawal by russia and

1:08:13

as i said a little earlier

1:08:14

one of the things that we had seen during this

1:08:16

process is it seems

1:08:18

that in the first round of talks you know the cranium

1:08:21

and russian delegations to showed up and

1:08:23

sort of read one another statements

1:08:25

that know what we understand is happening

1:08:28

is that they are actually talking about

1:08:30

some of these issues and there

1:08:32

are going to be some issues that will be

1:08:34

very difficult to resolve the

1:08:37

status of a the trees

1:08:39

in eastern ukraine in the ones that russia no

1:08:41

claims is independent state ukraine

1:08:43

obviously claims as it's territory that's

1:08:45

gonna be tough but if citizens

1:08:48

have in feed backed off

1:08:50

of their demands for begin change or

1:08:52

power sharing and kids i'm

1:08:54

ukrainians are willing tuck that neutrality

1:08:56

which it seems like they are you

1:08:58

know again i think we're starting to see some

1:09:01

movement they are towards an

1:09:03

agreement the both sides might be able to

1:09:05

accept and

1:09:06

i think they'd be easier for the us

1:09:09

is going to be encouraging

1:09:11

those talks with ain't necessarily

1:09:13

taking a position and at the end

1:09:15

when it appears that there is more

1:09:17

hope of a deal coming in

1:09:19

to talk about what sanctions relief

1:09:21

might be involved in this with the russians

1:09:24

but letting ukrainians take the lead because

1:09:26

you ukrainian security at

1:09:28

stake it is their deal to me

1:09:31

i want to end it by in a realist way

1:09:33

looking at some of the other big powers

1:09:36

that are involved in this conflict

1:09:39

that are we thinking

1:09:42

or changing their policy

1:09:44

stances in in relationship to it am i come

1:09:46

out from it's changed let

1:09:48

me begin with germany thought how

1:09:50

would you describe the role germany is playing

1:09:52

and away germany is changing

1:09:55

a sea change in german security

1:09:57

policy in the last three weeks

1:09:59

the germans went from being basically

1:10:02

most reluctant large number

1:10:04

of nato to offering

1:10:06

to spend more than two percent of their gdp

1:10:08

on and can you think extra

1:10:11

funding to get up for that amount of the next four

1:10:13

years at least initially know

1:10:16

it's still an open question the

1:10:18

expense of whether that's gonna be easily

1:10:20

translated in see the

1:10:23

actual military capabilities is

1:10:25

gonna take gonna lot of different things europeans

1:10:28

coming to some kind of lehman on

1:10:30

highly to spend this money

1:10:32

what strategic direction

1:10:34

you can occur to us not parachuting

1:10:37

in and dom anything those top

1:10:38

but i do think we've gone

1:10:40

from a place

1:10:41

a month and a half ago where the notion of germany

1:10:44

as a geopolitical actor was

1:10:47

relatively unthinkable to a place we

1:10:49

are now germany as part of a broader

1:10:51

europe

1:10:52

might actually be able to act

1:10:54

as a power center in in coming years

1:10:57

that china

1:10:59

china has been to in a very difficult

1:11:01

situation in this country can

1:11:03

i say that not not that anybody should feel

1:11:05

sympathetic for he's in pain but

1:11:08

china is trying to walk a very

1:11:10

fine line here not repudiating

1:11:13

it

1:11:13

third it increasingly close partnership

1:11:15

russia will know

1:11:18

during the us too much a

1:11:20

doing things like help of russia circumvent

1:11:22

sanctions then again i

1:11:24

defer to china experts on this

1:11:26

but my feeling is that that china is

1:11:28

not going to be able to sustain this balancing act

1:11:31

for love the russians have no requested

1:11:33

chinese assistant we

1:11:35

don't yet know whether that will take the form

1:11:38

of the victims or

1:11:39

you know what washington

1:11:41

hope no one will be so apes which

1:11:43

is to say in a tank it's nibbles

1:11:45

drop for soldiers but it's going

1:11:48

to be increasingly hard for china to

1:11:50

speed and the notion

1:11:52

that they are not keeping sites in the conflicts

1:11:54

and that we may have already crossed that

1:11:56

point

1:11:57

and finally because i've been little

1:12:00

surprised by the role they've been playing and

1:12:02

the answers if taken india

1:12:05

yeah be into this news is really

1:12:07

interesting so a

1:12:09

one of india's biggest arms

1:12:11

supplier

1:12:12

russia in fact that the start

1:12:14

of this crisis before the board actually has been

1:12:17

flooded with it and took a trip to india

1:12:19

had these smiling happy pictures

1:12:21

with admin and from moody's and

1:12:24

that relationship has been relatively close

1:12:26

in recent years when you add to

1:12:28

that the fact that the indians

1:12:30

import something like eighty percent

1:12:33

of their oil from overseas

1:12:35

to fuel what is a and giants

1:12:37

economy you can see why the indians

1:12:40

are concerns about

1:12:42

potentially losing access to western

1:12:44

markets right they're concerned that losing access

1:12:47

to russian oil losing access

1:12:49

to food supplies their theories precious

1:12:51

minerals and metals fresh exports

1:12:53

and india also obviously has his long

1:12:55

history of non alignment and so it

1:12:57

came as a surprise to many in washington

1:13:00

who

1:13:01

the more you to the way we've been talking about indian

1:13:04

the last few years as a democratic bulwark

1:13:06

against china right part of america as democratic

1:13:08

alliance in the the indo pacific

1:13:11

but actually you know india

1:13:12

you very much sort of a third

1:13:14

party apart from this conflict it's

1:13:17

not

1:13:17

either side and it is

1:13:19

showing that it is definitely still willing

1:13:21

to work with the russians in the commercial and trade

1:13:24

space insofar as it benefits

1:13:26

india

1:13:28

good good place to end it so

1:13:30

always a final question what a three bucks you'd recommend

1:13:33

to the audience

1:13:34

the us we already mentions one of the books

1:13:36

i was gonna say which is nick molders

1:13:39

new book the economic that him with

1:13:42

his of really excellent

1:13:44

overview of the rise

1:13:46

thank him as an economic cool

1:13:49

in particular because he goes back further than

1:13:51

many histories of sanctions do he doesn't

1:13:53

just go back to the two thousands

1:13:55

or even the seventies he goes all

1:13:58

the way back to the first world

1:13:59

war and talks a lot about how

1:14:02

the concept of sanctions developed and

1:14:04

i think as we move from

1:14:07

the targeted sanctions of the post cold war period

1:14:09

back to something approaching that economic

1:14:11

warfare this is a really helpful book

1:14:13

for understanding you know we've we've done this before

1:14:16

what happened last time a second

1:14:18

book that i would recommend is mary

1:14:20

sororities not one inch which

1:14:23

is a very recently published

1:14:25

history all of us russian

1:14:27

relations

1:14:28

the post cold war period phony for

1:14:30

expansion but not only that he

1:14:32

basically look at how

1:14:35

the us russian the relationship between

1:14:38

from actually being in a very

1:14:40

good place and ninety ninety one to

1:14:42

being

1:14:43

if we drag today and

1:14:45

how step by both the west

1:14:47

and russia created this sort

1:14:49

of long running large scale security

1:14:52

spiral like we just talked about to

1:14:54

bring us to where we are today so that's that's

1:14:56

of really

1:14:56

when book

1:14:58

then the third book is is a little older

1:15:00

i recommend

1:15:01

mark the sleepwalkers

1:15:04

how youtube went to war in ninety fourth

1:15:06

one

1:15:06

if a wonderful history book for those who

1:15:08

haven't read about the origins of the first world

1:15:11

war but one of things i think clark

1:15:13

does incredibly effective when the book he's

1:15:15

show

1:15:16

the perspective of all the main actors

1:15:18

and so that really nobody wants

1:15:21

to the war and certainly nobody wants

1:15:23

to the war

1:15:23

more yet somehow we ended

1:15:25

up there any

1:15:26

that a small step and in

1:15:28

the context of ukraine

1:15:30

of the escalation risks that we're talking

1:15:33

about i think the sleepwalkers is a really

1:15:35

valuable

1:15:36

comparison piece for thinking

1:15:38

about the ways in which small steps

1:15:41

result in really big help

1:15:43

and acid thank you very much

1:15:45

they grabbing me

1:15:59

the jury he was you can help us out or

1:16:01

sick the next episode he can read podcast

1:16:04

on whatever player list of he got out or

1:16:06

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1:16:08

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1:16:17

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1:16:21

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1:16:37

the of recline show was a production of new york

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karma any galvin and jeff go

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