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go to monday.com. Hello

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and thank you for listening

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to the history of World

0:43

War Two podcast. Episode 451

0:45

interview with James Holland about his book,

0:48

The Savage Storm, The Battle for Italy,

0:50

1943. Mr.

0:53

Holland, the author of such books

0:55

as Brothers in Arms, Normandy 44,

0:58

and Dambusters, comes on to discuss

1:00

the last days of Italy as

1:02

an Axis power. The

1:04

allies thinking this would be a

1:06

relatively straightforward affair, find themselves bogged

1:09

down to say the least. And

1:11

as Mr. Holland has a much bigger podcast

1:13

than mine, we have ways of making you

1:16

talk. I appreciate him coming

1:18

on and doing me this favor. Mr.

1:20

Holland, thank you very much for being

1:22

with us today. Oh, it was

1:24

an absolute pleasure. It's a delight. Thank you for

1:26

having me on. No, it's a

1:28

delight for me. I love all of your books.

1:30

I love the interviews that you've done, the stuff

1:32

that you've done on TV, your podcast as well.

1:35

And so I just want to let the listeners

1:37

know that in the next 30, 45

1:40

minutes, whatever, if they hear something that

1:42

sounds like a teenage girl giggling, that's

1:45

me. That's not James. That's me. I just want

1:47

to put that. I'm going to try and edit

1:49

all that out. But I'm a huge fan and

1:51

I really do appreciate you coming on today. Oh,

1:53

well, it's really nice to see

1:56

you. And thank you very much for having

1:58

me on. And I really appreciate it. Absolutely.

2:00

So, so let's just jump into this. So

2:02

we're talking about Italy. It's the late summer

2:04

of 1943 and Because

2:07

I enjoyed so much when

2:09

I was reading some of the earlier stuff

2:11

about North Africa I'm gonna phrase my first

2:14

question this way So ending

2:16

what General Richard O'Connor started with

2:18

Operation Compass in early 1941 The

2:22

Allies have finally taken North

2:24

Africa. They've taken Sicily and

2:26

now What next

2:28

because landing troops on mainland Italy

2:30

was not a foregone conclusion Can

2:32

you tell us how that ultimate

2:34

decision was eventually made? Yeah, so

2:36

really it goes back to the

2:39

decision in May 1943

2:41

at the Trident Conference in Washington to

2:44

prioritize Operation Overlord as it's going to

2:46

be called And this

2:48

of course is a cross-channel invasion from England to

2:50

Normandy Which we all now

2:52

know eventually took place on the 6th of June

2:54

1944 But then was scheduled

2:57

for the 1st of May 1944 back

2:59

in May 1943 when it was agreed and

3:01

everything was around that so Future

3:04

operations that had already been agreed to the Casablanca

3:06

Conference back in January 1943 that the Sicily

3:08

was going to follow Tunisia and the

3:10

clearing up of Of

3:13

all access forces in North Africa and

3:16

Sicily made perfectly good sense as a foothold

3:18

in Europe. It's it's further kind of encouraging

3:21

the challenge to get out of the

3:24

race and All

3:26

very good reasons for doing it. And it's also, you know,

3:29

I don't think we should underestimate the importance of seeing

3:32

a Husky

3:35

the invasion of Sicily as a kind of sort of a

3:37

dry run for overlord in a way I mean, you know

3:40

big amphibious operations, you know They require

3:42

a huge amount of logistics a huge

3:45

amount of that don't probably complicated lots

3:47

of different moving parts Not lots of

3:49

different levers, you know, can

3:51

the Allies pull it off? I mean, you

3:53

know torch was an amphibious operation but not

3:55

on the scale of crossing the Mediterranean Steve

3:58

right that the Sicily was At

4:02

the Trident Conference, it's agreed that that that

4:04

overlords the cross channel invasion to Normandy is

4:06

going to be the number one

4:09

main priority for the Western allies

4:11

in the West, right in the

4:13

fight against Nazi Germany. But

4:18

Sicily is kind of all wrapped up by the

4:20

17th of August. And there are

4:22

very good reasons for going into Italy. Number one,

4:24

you've got vast allied forces in the Mediterranean now.

4:26

And I'm not just talking about boots on the

4:28

ground. I'm talking about naval forces. I'm talking about

4:30

air forces, you know, some kind of four and

4:33

a half thousand aircraft. If you're talking about the

4:35

whole Mediterranean, you know, these are

4:37

huge numbers. And Italy

4:40

still isn't quite out of the war

4:42

at this point. You know, conversations

4:45

are starting and actually the first face to

4:47

face conversation, armistice conversations takes place in Lisbon,

4:49

as it happens, during the Italians and the

4:51

Allies on the 17th of August as well.

4:54

Lots of things happen on the 17th of

4:56

August, between the Schweinfurte raid, including the Peenemunde

4:59

raid, including the wrapping

5:01

up of the Sicilian campaign and the decision

5:03

by the chiefs of staff to actually go

5:05

into Italy. But there's another good reason

5:07

we're going to Italy and that is to get a further

5:11

foot in the in the door of Europe,

5:13

but also to draw off troops, German troops

5:15

from from northern France and

5:18

indeed Eastern Front into Italy, because

5:20

only there's 32 Italian divisions across

5:25

the Balkans and into Greece, as well

5:27

as those troops in Italy. So

5:30

with Italy out of the war, Germany is going to

5:32

either have to kind of give up those territories or

5:35

fill them with their own troops, you

5:37

know, 32 to kind of 50 divisions worth of troops

5:39

is a hell of a lot. And

5:41

they've got to come from somewhere. So that's going

5:43

to weaken other fronts. So potentially

5:45

that might might help Operation Overlord the

5:47

cross channel invasion. And

5:49

then the other reason is and this is a

5:51

growing reason is to get

5:55

to the fodger air fields now about kind

5:57

of a third of the way up the leg

5:59

on the Adriatic sites are on the eastern

6:01

side of Italy. There's one of the very

6:03

very few flat areas in Italy And

6:06

it's really flat as a board but surrounded

6:08

by mountains and so on But that's the

6:10

place where you can put lots of big

6:13

airfields airfields that can take four engine bombers

6:15

heavy bombers strategic bombers They're confirmed a tighten

6:17

the noose around Nazi Germany

6:19

the reason you want to do this is

6:21

because back in England getting ready for operation

6:24

overlord You need to have control of a

6:26

large swathe of the skies over Northwest Europe

6:28

Why do you need that because the moment you

6:31

land in Normandy the cats out

6:33

of the bag? And then it's a race

6:35

between which side can build up the most

6:37

men and material in the bridgehead as quickly

6:39

as possible Is it going to be

6:41

the Allies? You've got to get across the sea from England

6:44

who have Overwhelming amounts of material and men

6:46

and ordnance and all the rest of it Or

6:48

is it going to be the Germans who are

6:50

already on the continent and the key

6:52

thing is is the build-up the speed of builder?

6:55

Is no one's doubting that the Allies have got more than

6:57

the Germans is can they bring it to bear quick enough

6:59

to prevent the Germans from kicking them back into the sea

7:02

So you have to slow up the German response

7:04

to the Normandy bridgehead when it finally happens And

7:07

how you do that is by destroying

7:09

their transportation system and you do that

7:11

by blowing up bridges attacking marshalling yards

7:14

blowing up railways and so on and so

7:16

forth and you can only do

7:18

that by very low level precision bombing

7:20

and you can only Do that if

7:23

you haven't got Fokker-Wulfs a Messerschmitts hovering

7:25

above you Right so in other words

7:27

that is why it's an absolute prerequisite

7:29

for operation overlord You have to clear

7:31

the skies the problem is is

7:33

the Luftwaffe aircraft factories are deep in the Reich

7:35

most of the industry is in The west of

7:38

Germany which is very convenient if you're operating from

7:40

the eastern side of England because it's nice and

7:42

close Mm-hmm, but if you want to get to

7:44

the Messerschmitt works or the Junkers

7:46

works or whatever You've got to go deep into the

7:48

Reich and the problem that they have in the summer of

7:50

1943 as they're going into the fall of 1943 Is

7:53

that they haven't got a fighter plane

7:55

that can escort them all the bombers all

7:58

the way down into the into the? the

8:00

southern right. What

8:02

happens when they try it is they get slaughtered,

8:04

which is what happens on the 17th of August

8:07

when they do the Schweinfurth-Reckensburg raid, and

8:09

315 heavy bombers, and 60 get shot down.

8:13

Well, that's a 20% loss rate, and that is

8:16

just totally unsustainable. Panic button gets

8:18

hit, and they think, well, what are we going to do?

8:20

Because we set Operation Overlord, but without the skies there, we

8:22

can't do it. We're

8:24

not going to do it without getting our whole bomber

8:27

forces in the mighty 8th, the 8th Air Force, subject

8:30

of Master Zia coming up, et cetera,

8:32

without it getting decimated. So what are we going to

8:35

do? We need to get a long-range fighter escort, and

8:37

we need to further tighten the noose. Hey, here's a

8:39

thought. What about going into Italy? And then from Italy,

8:41

we can attack the southern right more easily from those

8:43

airfields in Foggia. And it's that

8:45

that persuades the Americans particularly that going

8:47

into Italy is a good idea. And

8:50

the fourth reason, of course, is to get

8:52

Rome, because Rome is a historic and ancient

8:54

capital in Europe. It's

8:57

highly prestigious. It's the capital of one of the

8:59

main enemies, i.e., Italy at that time. And

9:02

so there's these four reasons for

9:04

going in. And you

9:08

might as well. The

9:12

problem is, and this is the absolute kind

9:14

of big issue

9:16

with the entire plan, they

9:18

no longer have enough assault shipping to do

9:20

what they want to do. They've

9:23

got all the troops they could possibly need to effect a

9:25

very, very quick victory in Italy. They

9:27

don't have the means of getting the troops

9:29

to the beaches into Italy itself. And

9:32

that is the fundamental flaw

9:35

with the Italian campaign plan.

9:37

But the problem is, they've crossed that

9:39

rubicon. They've made the decision. We're going in.

9:42

And once you've, you know, these operations,

9:44

these plans sort of generate a momentum

9:46

all of their own, from which

9:49

there's no turning back. And you

9:51

stress that in your book, I mean,

9:53

and I'm kind of exaggerating, but like

9:55

every fifth page mentioned assault craft or

9:57

landing craft. I mean, even with the

10:00

industrial law. That was deliberate. That was

10:02

deliberate. Yeah, because it literally limited, changed,

10:04

focused, whatever, all these plans, because you

10:06

can make plans all you want, but

10:09

unless you've got the craft to do

10:11

it, the means to do it, it's

10:13

just two guys talking to each

10:15

other. And that's going to play into this. So

10:18

for all those reasons that you just gave,

10:20

which obviously were very good reasons, the Allies

10:23

were certainly motivated to go into mainland

10:25

Italy. But then again, the Germans on

10:28

the other side can see the same

10:30

reasoning. And they're like, oh, we have

10:32

to make sure their operation,

10:34

their landings, it's either not successful, or

10:37

they don't get too far north, or

10:39

they don't get to Foggia. So the

10:42

Germans can read this too. And so they're going

10:44

to do everything they can to stop it. Was

10:47

Churchill's desire for Rome, was it like,

10:50

I mean, I know it's a historical city. Was

10:53

it like, was it almost

10:55

like a political or whatever victory? Or is

10:57

it given his troops just something to shoot

10:59

for? Well, Churchill's one of these guys, he's

11:01

always got his eye on history and big

11:04

events and

11:08

all the rest of it. And for

11:10

him, Rome is the great capital

11:13

of Europe. It's Rome, Paris,

11:16

and Berlin to a lesser extent. I mean,

11:18

Berlin is a much newer city. Rome just

11:20

comes with all that history. And

11:23

it's the seat of Mussolini, Mussolini

11:25

has been deposed and fascism is

11:27

over, but even so, it's

11:29

a major psychological thing

11:32

that he's absolutely obsessed with.

11:36

And for

11:39

him, that's the most important reason.

11:41

But it's not the most important reason for

11:44

the rest of the combined chiefs of staff. I

11:46

mean, the combined chiefs of staff is to draw

11:48

off troops from elsewhere, the Eastern Front and particularly

11:50

the Western Front, and to

11:52

get the Fodger airfields. And those are two

11:54

extremely valid reasons that it has to be said.

11:57

The Problem is that the cooperation has to be set.

12:00

In a one thousand seven hundred forty three

12:02

landing craft as or cross to bear skydrive

12:04

you need a some crop because you can't

12:06

guarantee on getting into the ports you can't

12:08

get in supports because the Germans and Italians

12:10

enemy will have up with that that this

12:13

strongest offended and are also going to be

12:15

wrecked before you can get into them so

12:17

you can't As you get into that say

12:19

you have to have another way of delivering

12:21

troops, ammunition, guns, tanks or rests on to

12:23

into into the country. The way to do

12:25

that is used these shallow draft landing craft

12:27

of which seen as some can take out.

12:30

Of a to to thirty seven men somethin

12:32

but you know our hundred and twenty meters

12:34

long Under twenty hours long. What about right

12:36

So that there are varying size but they

12:39

can just delivered straight onto a beach and

12:41

so that negates the need for having a

12:43

port gotcha can do not going to have

12:45

them as a suburban. The problem is is

12:47

but by there are other commitments globally. Think

12:49

I'm that there is a massive pacific campaign

12:52

which the Americans have decided they want to

12:54

accelerate while bus that choice. Yeah you know

12:56

there are plans for amphibious operations in Burma.

12:58

We should be promises that the job the

13:00

Chinese thus as a to junk I checked

13:03

by the Americans. Now there is the preparation

13:05

and training for Operation Overlord the Cross timely

13:07

basis south's instead of having been a. Seventy.

13:10

Nine hundred and fifty bland and crop of they

13:12

had for huskies by the time the comes to.

13:15

Invading easily, they got two hundred and

13:17

eighty nine for our sub sub. a

13:20

farm is crossing of the straits. I'm

13:22

a senior in the boot of of

13:24

of Italy and they gods an three

13:26

hundred and fifty nine for the main

13:28

evasion which is gonna be operation Avalon

13:31

to south as Lennox. And that's just

13:33

not enough. is not enough to guarantee

13:35

success or quick success. Not not even

13:37

remotely. but. Safe. As

13:39

I say that that they've psychologically make that leap

13:42

that we need to get into Italy would eat,

13:44

get about? Yes, you know we need to drop

13:46

her off troops are we just gonna have to

13:48

do with it? And they hope that that naval

13:50

efforts and app air effort will be a kind

13:52

of force multiplier. Fuck. You can't substitute

13:54

is on the ground in these kind of operations,

13:56

and that's that's the truth of it. And and

13:59

they just don't. The not to do what

14:01

they want to do despite the kind of

14:03

incredible scholar production that's going on, you know

14:05

all. Blosil Croft I'm for has been going

14:07

on in in the United States and to

14:10

a lesser extent of Britain as well, right?

14:12

If I could. In your book you do

14:14

a very good job of showing the he

14:16

of the decisions made, but then a start

14:18

getting ambitious and more ambitious and more ambitious

14:21

and we're gonna. We're going to have a

14:23

rugged talk about some of that later, but

14:25

going back to Mussolini's on, there are so

14:27

many moving parts your beard your book doesn't

14:29

am. A job and describing the arrest of

14:32

Mussolini's the King whose selfishly thinking about his

14:34

future, the suffering, the abject suffering of the

14:36

Italians who one out of the war the

14:38

Germans are going to poor more troops into

14:41

Italy but you know and like he just

14:43

said they are they the the of the

14:45

landing craft as well but in the middle

14:47

of this. And

14:49

we and enjoy back to church of

14:52

her second one in Rome You I

14:54

think I would be okay. Insane Churchill

14:56

as a man of grand gesture as

14:58

he certainly loves grand chest gestures. And

15:00

for here's the allies: Need the Italians

15:02

to bow the war on, the become

15:04

neutral, or maybe even come on their

15:07

side? But you've got the Allies wanting

15:09

the Italians to do this at a

15:11

certain times. You get the Italians wanting

15:13

to do it in our own way

15:15

because they're living amongst the Germans and

15:17

so did you. kind of just walk

15:20

us through the decision. When the Italia

15:22

finally made that decision of as far

15:24

as what they're gonna do, Yeah,

15:27

so this is this is all part

15:29

of it. So so so having to having

15:31

done this sort of process psychological time

15:33

Rubicon have made the decision to go

15:35

to Italy is a knowing that they

15:37

am not enough salt crop really to guarantee

15:39

success say then convince themselves is gonna

15:41

be okay because. The. Talents will come

15:44

in on their side, right? The problem

15:46

with this. Is the timing

15:48

of the announcement of the almost

15:51

seems and. When

15:54

they did that the telling sign up in

15:56

on the afternoon of September the third on

15:58

the forefront of us the Britain's entry into

16:01

the war try Nineteen Forty three. And.

16:04

Part. Of the part of the signature

16:07

part of a deal with the signed

16:09

with the Italians is so the allies

16:11

who do have an invasion of mainland

16:14

Italy at some point but they're not

16:16

gonna tell book exactly when this is

16:18

gonna house right because. They. Need.

16:21

Tactical surprise. On.

16:25

Until they actually land there.

16:27

And they'll misses his announcement. And the idea

16:29

is the announcement of the armistice is gonna

16:32

be made to the world. On

16:34

the eve of the invasion ah until

16:36

that's the Nelson's the allies simply com

16:38

frosty Italian yeah but those they might

16:40

turn around and tell the germans right

16:42

There is nothing that the Italians of

16:44

dumb to convince the allies of that

16:46

trustworthy of of such a a have

16:48

an enormous decision and the sprite it's

16:50

of so the a busy summer take

16:52

this on the chin but they said

16:55

we'll just give us an indication of

16:57

the get wanna be within two weeks

16:59

while she's gonna be within six days.

17:01

I'm wrong but but but. To.

17:03

Tell his get it into their head,

17:05

but no reason whatsoever. This. Is is

17:08

going to be some time off to the twelfth of

17:10

September. And they think they they

17:12

need this time routed to get that troops ready

17:14

to kind of. Themselves.

17:16

Organize and the reason I need get ready

17:18

because basic that broke on I don't have

17:21

enough fuel and I don't have enough supplies.

17:23

One result of an appeal the Down: A

17:25

surprise because a large numbers of German troops

17:27

in Italy and they're hooking it a day

17:29

that determines simply no longer have the clouds

17:32

vet argue with that still acts as partners

17:34

at this moment right? So. They. Get

17:36

into that. had that is gonna come later. And

17:39

it's not. And so. The.

17:41

Whole thing is based on kind of sort

17:43

of either total miss miss representation and misunderstanding

17:45

of what's going on. The other thing is

17:48

is of these are as assume that the

17:50

allies going to land around Rome most. Basic.

17:54

Basic understanding of

17:56

Molson. of

17:58

military operations this time tells you

18:00

that you need, you absolutely have

18:03

to have as a non-negotiable prerequisite

18:05

control of the airspace over the

18:07

invasion. And

18:10

there is no way that Allied

18:12

fighter color can reach Rome, from

18:15

bases in Sicily or Malta or

18:17

whatever. So it's

18:19

bonkers that the Italians should think this, but be

18:21

that as of May, they do. Now

18:23

the second thing about all this is

18:26

that back in May 1943, the Allies intercepted a signal

18:31

by the Germans that suggested that

18:33

should at any point in the future

18:35

the Allies land in Italy, the Germans

18:37

would respond to this by retreating to

18:40

the Pisa-Rimini line. Now Pisa

18:42

is on the west coast of Italy,

18:44

about 200 miles north of Rome. And

18:47

Rimini is on the eastern coast, about 220 miles north of Rome.

18:51

So a long way north. While

18:56

the Allies are having their negotiations with the Italians,

18:58

they said to the Italians, look, we've got this

19:00

piece of information about the Germans wanting

19:02

to retreat to the Pisa-Rimini line. Do you know, is that

19:04

still true? And of course the Italians go, yeah, yeah, absolutely

19:06

it is. But

19:11

it is a very, very spurious basis

19:13

on which to form a major amphibious

19:15

operation of the scale of Operation Avalanche,

19:17

which is the one that eventually gets

19:19

launched on the morning of the 9th

19:21

of September, S S ferno. And

19:25

it's kind of wishful thinking. So part

19:27

of the deal is, and so how the Allies have taught

19:29

themselves into this is we haven't

19:31

got enough assault craft, but it's going to be okay

19:33

because we've got quite a lot of warships, we've got

19:35

quite a lot of air power, and

19:37

the Italians are going to come in on our

19:39

side. So all those coastal guns are going to

19:41

be in Italian hands, and then, you know, not

19:43

the Germans. And also the Germans are going to

19:46

retreat to the Pisa-Rimini line anyway, so it's all

19:48

going to be fine. And we're just going to

19:50

waltz into Rome, you know,

19:52

before Christmas. Well, on that basis, yes,

19:54

absolutely. But it's

19:56

very, very thin intelligence.

20:01

As it happens, that is precisely the

20:03

German plan. The Germans are getting fed

20:05

up with what the Italians are doing. They're also trying to second

20:07

guess what they're, they know the Italians are going to come out

20:09

of the war, but they don't know when they don't know what

20:11

that, what's going to happen. Yeah.

20:14

Precisely. And Hitler gets fed

20:17

up with this and tells his, his guys

20:20

in the OKW, the, uh, over commando de Verma, the

20:22

German general staff, that on the 9th of September, he's

20:24

going to tell the Italians what for. And what he's

20:26

going to say is all German troops in the South

20:29

of Italy are going to retreat to the piece of

20:31

remedy line. We're going to make our bastion there and

20:34

the Italians can just lump it. Right. And

20:36

we're going to take over the whole of Northern Italy and it's no longer

20:38

going to be Italian. It's going to be German. And

20:42

that's going to be that had they done that. So

20:44

had the allies landed on the 12th of September as

20:47

the Italians had got into their heads, they would,

20:49

there would have been no Italian campaign or certainly not in

20:52

the way that it would have done because the Germans

20:54

would have retreated. Right.

20:56

But they didn't. They landed on the morning of the

20:58

9th of September, the very day that Hitler was planning

21:01

to retreat to the piece of remedy line. So of

21:03

course he changed his mind. He can't. And

21:05

that was that. Yeah, exactly. And not

21:07

to jump too far ahead. Well, first of all, let me just say I

21:10

when I was about 20 to 25% into the book and talking about

21:14

this very moment, I kept, I just kept

21:16

whispering to myself, wishful thinking,

21:18

wishful thinking, you can't do that. You

21:20

can't skew reality to fit some pre,

21:22

you know, you know what I'm saying?

21:25

And I just. There's lots of

21:27

wishful thinking going on on the Allied side. And

21:30

you know, the truth is, is, you

21:32

know, the chief, the combined chiefs of staff have a very, very difficult

21:35

balance. You know, on the one hand, they want to get on with

21:37

the war and get it overdone with as quickly as possible by the

21:39

end of 19. You know, by the by the beginning

21:42

of September, 1943. Yeah,

21:44

the war is no longer really in doubt.

21:46

It's just, it's just how

21:48

soon can you do it? Yeah. The truth

21:50

of the matter is, is the Allies always

21:54

want to be six months

21:56

ahead of where their capability really lies. Mm hmm.

21:59

Good point. Because they've got enough to do

22:01

quite a lot, but they haven't quite got

22:03

enough to feel comfortable about it. So

22:06

what was the alternative that you don't

22:08

bother? But

22:11

then you've got this problem of closing the net

22:13

around Nazi Germany and getting to those

22:15

aircraft factories in the southern Reich. So

22:17

there's a real imperative to

22:19

get on with it. Otherwise, then it could creep into

22:22

1945 and then it could creep into 1946. Who

22:25

knows how long this war is going to drag on and how many more

22:27

young lives are going to be caught? It's

22:30

worth throwing caution to the wind and just going

22:32

for it. And that's

22:34

very much the mentality with the Italian

22:36

campaign. You

22:39

have to have some sympathy for these decisions.

22:41

These are gargantuan decisions that have to be

22:43

made. You've got to keep the population on

22:45

board. Everyone wants to rush

22:47

up. You can't just sit in the Mediterranean

22:49

with all these forces and do nothing until

22:52

overlord on May

22:55

1944 as it's scheduled at that point. So

22:58

you've got to be seen to be doing something and

23:00

just bombing stuff is just not enough. And

23:03

you have got all these forces in the Mediterranean. So you

23:05

can see how they get themselves into this terrible pickle where

23:07

they know they're

23:11

overreaching. They know they haven't got enough to do the job.

23:14

But on the other hand, they've got too much to do.

23:17

They've got too much to do nothing. They've got too much to do

23:19

nothing and they haven't got enough to do what they want to do

23:21

properly. And that is

23:23

just an unsolvable problem

23:26

without scaling back on

23:28

operations in the Pacific or

23:31

elsewhere or supplies to Russia or supplies

23:34

to Chiang Kai-chek in China. It

23:37

is a truly, truly global war. And

23:39

everyone wants everything all at once. And

23:43

they just don't have enough. And in

23:45

the pecking order of priorities, Italy

23:48

is lower down than the Pacific. It's lower

23:51

down than supplies to Chiang Kai-chek. It's lower

23:53

down than Operation Overlord at this stage of

23:55

the war, even though back in December 1941,

23:58

the Americans promised to do it Germany first. Then

24:00

they're still saying, well, we are, you know,

24:02

Germany is, we are planning to do Germany

24:04

first, but at the same time, we also

24:06

want to accelerate operations against Imperial Japan. You

24:09

know, and it's completely understandable, but it's just,

24:12

it creates the mess that is Italy. I

24:15

mean, that is the byproduct. You can't have your

24:17

cake and eat it all at the

24:19

same time. That's the problem. Absolutely. And

24:21

everything you just said plays itself

24:23

out later on in the book where the generals

24:25

are yelling, you know, the yelling is going down

24:28

the chain of command. It's as opposed to you

24:30

want, you know, faster, faster, do more, do more,

24:32

do more. But what you, but what can you

24:34

do? And what can you do? And the point,

24:36

the big problem is, is, is they do actually,

24:38

I mean, to cut along the story shortly, they

24:40

get to the Fodger airfields on the 27th of

24:42

September, massive tick, you know, Italy's out of the

24:44

war tick. Has they drawn off lots of German

24:46

troops? Yes, because Germans are now occupying the Balkans

24:48

and Greece and the Aegean and

24:50

pouring into Italy. So all

24:52

of what, you know, to the tune of about 50 divisions.

24:55

So that's a huge amount of troops

24:57

that the Germans have got to find.

24:59

I mean, you know, the British only

25:01

produce 54 divisions in the entire war.

25:04

Right. So, you know, that's a huge

25:06

number. But

25:10

it comes at a cost because, because

25:12

building up the strategic air forces in

25:15

Fodger, the

25:18

shipping available is the shipping available. And

25:20

so what you find is that strategic

25:22

air forces going to Fodger are competing

25:24

with the land forces for that shipping

25:26

space. Right. But

25:29

that's that's a problem. And

25:31

so so everyone traditionally has

25:33

blamed Mark Clark, the FIF army commander,

25:36

and they blamed Alexander, who is the

25:38

overall army group commander. And they blame

25:40

Monty for the first half of the Italian campaign

25:42

up until the end of 1943 for

25:45

eight army being slow and

25:47

stodgy and not getting enough of

25:49

a shift on. Right. You

25:52

try fighting Italy, you

25:55

know, in a highly mechanized war where

25:57

you've got lots and lots of winding roads. I mean, the

25:59

roads network in in Italy, for

26:01

example, it's one thing in a

26:04

city where it's asphalt, but outside of the city, it

26:06

is not. And

26:08

those roads are designed for

26:11

the occasional Fiat Topolino and

26:14

a mule and car. They're not

26:16

designed for 3000 vehicles per

26:18

division. They're just not. And

26:21

also, lots of them wind, you know, where you

26:23

have mountains, you have rivers, rivers are going to

26:25

the sea, so they're coming across the access of

26:27

the Allied advance. So you have

26:29

lots and lots and lots of bridges. If

26:32

you're retreating Germans, it's very easy to blow those

26:34

bridges up. It's very easy to blow up a

26:36

tunnel and a mountain. It's very easy to blow

26:38

up a mountain pass or a culvert or whatever.

26:41

At which point engineers then have to

26:44

compete with the infantry for shipping space

26:46

to bring up bridging equipment and

26:49

graders and dozers and all the rest

26:51

of it. And you can

26:53

start to see why the advance isn't

26:55

quite as fast as it might be

26:58

very quickly. And

27:01

then it starts to rain. So for the first of October

27:03

onwards, it just rains and rains and rains and rains and

27:05

rains. And so in the

27:07

valleys, it just turns into a quagmire. Whereas

27:10

in the mountains, it's just miserable and cold. So everyone's

27:12

having a filthy time. And it

27:15

is not the fault of the ground commanders. It

27:17

is the fault of, if anyone's

27:19

to blame, for the slowness of the

27:21

Italian campaign and for the debacle that

27:24

it becomes, if you look at it

27:26

through those lenses, it is the combined

27:28

chiefs of staff for not sufficiently

27:31

supporting it in the first place. Right.

27:35

And correct me if I'm wrong, but

27:37

I think it was General George Marshall

27:39

was warning about operations

27:42

sucking in more resources. Yes,

27:45

he was. But he was also saying back

27:47

in May 1943, once an operation is undertaken,

27:50

it needs to be back to the hill.

27:52

His very word. Yes. And

27:54

that is not what they're doing. But of course, when

27:56

he said that in May 1943, he's talking about Operation

27:58

Overlord. He's not talking about... The invasion

28:00

of Italy but it holds true but but

28:02

yeah, but he said it Yeah, and and

28:05

he's absolutely right on you know, whether it's

28:07

applied to overlord Yeah, or whether it's applied

28:09

to operation avalanche in Italy I mean, you

28:11

know the the same rules absolutely apply so

28:13

he's not he is not Sticking

28:15

to what his own mantra and good

28:17

point, you know, he has to be blamed

28:19

for this. Yeah With a

28:21

huge amount of sympathy because these are

28:24

very very complex and difficult decisions and

28:26

it's all you know The whole thing

28:28

is a horrible ghastly kind

28:30

of Weighing

28:33

up and juggling act I mean,

28:35

you know it and as

28:37

it turns out I Personally

28:40

I think Italy was the right call because

28:44

Avalanche works at success. They don't get kicked

28:46

back into the sea, you know, the

28:48

Germans make a complete hash of it, right? They

28:51

also take the Germans take their eye off the ball

28:53

in southeast Italy So the British

28:55

are able to sail into Toronto, which

28:58

is a port with keys And

29:01

it doesn't require assault shipping it requires ships Right

29:03

and and they've got some of those so that's

29:05

fine and they can get in the back door

29:08

Which enables them to the allies to get to

29:10

fodger very quickly and the reason they can get

29:12

in the back door is because Kastling who's the

29:14

commander of chief of all German forces in the

29:16

south of Italy Has thrown all his

29:18

eggs into one basket to try and kick Mark

29:20

Clark's army out of them out at Salerno Right

29:23

and that's fine if you succeed but it's a

29:25

real cock up if you don't and he doesn't

29:27

because he's left one He's like half

29:29

a division of Lightly armed

29:32

paratroopers German paratroopers in the southeast of

29:34

Italy and and they can't possibly stop

29:36

the British from Getting into

29:38

Toronto and getting up the leg because of

29:40

that bit is not very mountainous And so

29:43

it's very easy to move power

29:45

ship Jager by their nature very lightly armed So they

29:47

haven't got any heavy weapons at all Right all they

29:49

can do is offer a few rear guards and some

29:51

you know mines and roads and blobs and bridges And

29:53

sort of hope to hold them up a little bit

29:55

which they do for a little bit But but you

29:57

know as I say by the 27th of September. Yeah

29:59

for jury is now light hands. So if

30:01

you think about the four aims of

30:03

going into Italy, drawing off German troops,

30:05

getting to Foggia, getting

30:08

Italy once and for all out of the war, and

30:10

capturing Rome, by the end

30:12

of September, they've got three

30:14

of those four things. And you'd have

30:16

to say, that's a pretty

30:18

good result. The bit they

30:21

haven't got is Rome. And the problem is, you

30:23

might say, well, why don't we just forget about Rome and just hold

30:25

the line? The problem you've got

30:28

is now that you're investing so

30:30

much effort into Foggia, including laying

30:32

oil pipelines from the coast, huge

30:34

amounts of infrastructure. You

30:36

think about what it, and the other

30:38

thing is also they increase what

30:40

is going to be six bomb groups. So that's

30:42

six, that's three,

30:45

six is 18, that's 18 squadrons of heavy

30:47

bombers to 21 bomb groups.

30:51

So 21 times three, so what's that? 60

30:54

squadrons, 63 squadrons. So

30:56

that's a huge increase in scale.

30:59

So if you're going to do that, you need to make

31:01

sure that the Germans are never going to counter attack and

31:04

kick you out of it again. So

31:06

to do that, you need a cushion. And that cushion

31:08

is at least 50 miles north of Rome. Oh,

31:11

they need that buffer to make sure nothing happens. They

31:13

need that buffer. So you can't just

31:15

sit there doing nothing. You've

31:18

got to keep pushing on and trying to get to Rome. What

31:20

that means is the original aim

31:23

of being in Rome before Christmas is long gone. And as

31:25

we all know, it ends up being not until the 4th

31:28

of 1944 that they finally get into

31:30

Rome. And one of the problems is

31:32

that the very modernity of the Allied

31:34

armies, this huge amount of mechanization they

31:36

do, and this the mantra of steel,

31:39

not flesh, using global clout

31:41

and mechanization and machines to do a

31:43

lot of the hard yards so that your

31:45

boots on the ground don't have to. All

31:48

of which is very noble and sensible

31:50

and unquestionably overall in the big scheme

31:52

of the entire World War II saves

31:54

a huge amount of lives. Nonetheless,

31:57

the problem with that is

31:59

that in Europe. the winters in the 1940s

32:01

are absolutely brutal. Yes. And

32:04

the old traditional campaigning seasons of,

32:07

you know, many hundreds of years

32:09

earlier, still holds fast. Yeah. And

32:11

it particularly holds fast in a

32:13

country like Italy, which is incredibly

32:15

mountainous, has limited infrastructure, and

32:18

is going through one of the worst winters on record. That

32:20

mechanization cannot be brought to bear in a way

32:22

that you want it to in the middle of

32:25

the summer. Right. So

32:27

it is no coincidence that through the winter

32:29

months, they have a really torrid time. The

32:31

moment it all clears up in the spring

32:33

and get off in May 1944, it's game over for

32:36

the Germans. You

32:38

know, they cruise into Rome. Right. I

32:41

just want to jump ahead for a second before

32:43

I ask my next question. When you were talking in

32:45

your book, when I'm about 80, 85% done with

32:47

it, you were mentioning the

32:50

rains. And it rained. And it's

32:52

in people's diaries. It's in their letters. Yeah. It's

32:55

just, see, I had dreams about rain

32:57

for two nights in a row of

33:00

reading that section. It was insane. But

33:02

your point was all of that rain

33:04

cancels out one of the biggest allies

33:07

advantage, and that's their air power. They're

33:09

spent, like you said, absolutely. Fagia is

33:11

being transformed. And yet, to a degree,

33:13

it doesn't matter because of all of

33:15

that rain. It was just exactly that.

33:17

But so, I want to, so the

33:19

allies land, they have their three landings.

33:21

There's Rommel in the north, there's Kesselring

33:23

in the south. Eventually, Rommel's going to

33:26

be moved out and he's going to

33:28

go, I think, to France to work

33:30

on their defenses. Kesselring, this is now.

33:32

So it's very much. Yeah. Sorry, go

33:34

ahead. So it's very much Rommel's idea

33:36

to move to the Pisa Rimini line. He's

33:38

got Hitler's air, and Hitler agrees with him. And

33:40

Rommel says, look, you know, I fought the allies.

33:43

I know they've got incredible air power. You want to have

33:45

the shortest lines possible. And the Pisa Rimini

33:47

line is the one bit of all of Italy

33:49

where the mountains go from one side to the

33:51

other without any break whatsoever. There are mountain passes,

33:54

but they are mountain passes, not

33:56

valley passes. Right. And

33:58

that is the only place. And this

34:00

means we can have an impregnable defense. They

34:03

won't be able to get there. You can protect the southern

34:05

right, and you don't have to have quite as much men

34:07

and material and resources driven into Italy, you know, just give

34:09

it up. And Hitler actually for once goes, yeah, okay, fine.

34:11

Right. The problem

34:13

is that, but Kesserink has other ideas. He

34:15

is the commander of German troops in the

34:17

south. And they've got many more German troops

34:19

there throughout the south than the Allies can

34:21

bring to bear Operation Avalanche, you know, which

34:24

is Mark Clark's land, Fifth Army landings of

34:26

south of Salerno, which is about, you know,

34:28

25 miles south of Naples. And

34:31

so, you know, 100 plus miles south of

34:33

Rome. And well,

34:35

quite a, yeah, about 140 miles south of Rome. And

34:39

the problem with that is that Kesserink then goes,

34:41

no, I'm going to contest this. Yeah. And

34:44

he makes, and he shoves a lot of

34:46

forces at the

34:50

Fifth Army, the US Fifth Army

34:52

landing and chucks

34:54

all his eggs in one basket. And

34:57

weirdly, Hitler is impressed by this, even

34:59

though it is an abject failure because

35:02

they don't kick the Allies back in. They don't,

35:04

Fifth Army, which is actually, although it's the United

35:07

States Fifth Army is a British

35:09

and American army. Or

35:12

rather it's an American army with British troops in it. Right.

35:15

They don't kick out. They

35:17

are unable to push the Fifth Army back into

35:19

the sea and

35:21

their force backwards. Hitler's

35:24

reaction to this, rather than going, oh, let's hop

35:26

for it quickly to the piece of Rimny line,

35:28

is, right, I now want to fight for every

35:30

single yard south of Rome. Right.

35:33

Which is what consigns both sides

35:35

to this awful slugging match over

35:37

the winter of 1943 and into 1944. And

35:41

the problem you have as a general in

35:44

the German army at this time is, if

35:49

you're kind of, if you're not making much

35:51

of a fuss and Hitler's not really watching

35:53

you, but the moment you catch Hitler's eye,

35:55

Hitler in spotlight shines very brightly on you.

35:58

And as a field commander, your ability

36:00

to maneuver is seriously hindered.

36:04

And so Kestering now can't do anything. He

36:06

can only stay and fight even when,

36:09

you know, his divisions are being decimated.

36:11

And what he consequently ends up doing

36:13

is constantly kind of firefighting and plugging

36:15

holes with, you know, a company here,

36:17

a battalion there. So these divisions are

36:20

never fighting as single divisions. So

36:22

they lose all their unit

36:24

cohesion. morale absolutely plummets. I

36:27

mean, they do a pretty

36:29

good job, but, you know, that

36:32

doesn't take a huge amount of skill to kind of sit in

36:34

a mountain and fire a machine gun or

36:36

lay some mines or get

36:39

your ZEISS icon binoculars out and act

36:42

as a spotter for the artillery below. I mean,

36:44

you know, this is pretty basic stuff. And

36:47

of course, you know, from a German point of view, if

36:50

you run away, you get

36:52

shot. So, you know, there's sort of

36:54

compelling reasons to stay there. And

36:57

so there's a difference, I think, between, you know,

37:00

tactical genius and high levels

37:02

of training and a highly

37:05

disciplined army, which is doing exactly

37:08

what it's told because Hitler tells them to. Right. And

37:10

you stress in your book that

37:12

the Allies had figured out by now that if

37:15

you're going to attack, it would be really good

37:17

to have a three to one

37:19

odds. And clearly that's not happening because now

37:21

the Kessel rings in charge and Hitler wants

37:23

them to fight. There's just more and more

37:25

troops that are going to pour into Italy

37:27

and he's going to use, Kessel rings is

37:29

going to use him because like you said,

37:31

Hitler's watching him now. So the American, excuse

37:33

me, the Allies do not have the numbers

37:35

theoretically that they need. They try to rely

37:37

on naval power and air power. But again,

37:39

the rains come along to negate a lot

37:41

of that. And so it does become a

37:44

slugfest when that was the exact

37:46

opposite of what was supposed to happen as

37:48

far as the Allies were concerned. Exactly. Yeah.

37:51

Yeah, it was. And this is all part of the

37:53

kind of battles that still get beyond Rome. But as

37:55

long as you're doing the attacking, you hold the initiative,

37:57

even if you're not attacking very successfully. But I would.

38:00

The U.S. Fifth Army does incredibly successfully

38:02

in the circumstances. I mean, you know,

38:06

Salerno is a close run thing, but they absolutely

38:08

see it off. And

38:10

yes, that is because of

38:13

the weight of fire from the naval support,

38:15

and it is also because of air support.

38:17

But ultimately, it's boots on the ground. And

38:19

these are the infantry divisions. It's the 36

38:22

Texans. It's the 45 Thunderbirds. It's

38:25

the 56th London Division and the 46th Midland Division.

38:28

These are, you know,

38:31

line infantry divisions, which

38:33

are really, when all is

38:35

said and done, they're the ones who are the

38:37

victors of Salerno. And

38:40

you know, Mark Clark does a really

38:42

good job of marshalling his troops in

38:45

the right places as deployments are really

38:47

sensible, showing the right

38:49

amount of backbone. I mean, I

38:51

find it absolutely just bizarre that anyone

38:53

could criticise Mark Clark for

38:58

Salerno, which is a terrific

39:00

victory snatched from

39:03

the jaws of extreme high

39:05

risk. I mean, because

39:07

nothing, nothing, none of the kind of

39:09

pre-battle expectations, the Italians are completely useless,

39:11

don't do anything. Certainly don't take the

39:14

attack to the Germans. The Germans mass

39:16

in much greater force than

39:18

had been appreciated or expected.

39:22

And they hold their nerve and they fight on.

39:25

You know, by the 27th of September,

39:27

as I've told you, Podger is in

39:29

Allied hands. By the 1st of October,

39:31

Naples, a great city, third city of

39:33

Italy, is in Allied hands. They get

39:35

across, the 5th Army gets across the

39:38

Volturno, a really unbelievably tough proposition,

39:40

a winding wide river with very waterlogged

39:42

flood plains overlooked by lots of hills

39:44

on which Germans have observers and machine

39:47

gun nests and mortars and all the

39:49

rest of it. They

39:51

get across that. And then by the end of the year, they

39:53

managed to get through what is an

39:56

unbelievably formidable defensive position, the Bernhard line

39:58

or the Winter line is Americans call

40:00

it, you know, I

40:02

mean, it's absolutely hats off. And

40:05

they're doing this by the infantry, falling up,

40:07

you know, 3000 foot high peaks like

40:10

Monte Samukro, right, with

40:12

mill trains, which they up until they got to

40:14

Italy, they'd never used before in their life. And

40:17

with no mountain training whatsoever. And they

40:20

prize off the Germans and win. Yeah,

40:22

I mean, yeah, what, why,

40:24

why are the Allies being criticized

40:26

for that? I mean, you know, the Allied troops on

40:28

the ground, I mean, the poor bloody

40:30

infantry are absolutely

40:33

amazing. When you consider

40:35

the difficulty of the terrain, the difficulty

40:37

of the conditions, a determined enemy, which

40:39

is being ordered to kind of fight

40:41

for every yard. And then who

40:44

has the height advantage? I mean, I'm in

40:47

awe of what they managed to achieve, frankly.

40:49

Absolutely. And you do a great job, you

40:51

give us the overall view, but then, and

40:54

this is what some of my favorite parts,

40:56

even though it's, it's kind of painful as

40:58

the reader, you zoom down to the to

41:00

the individual soldier, you give us a little

41:02

backstory, you tell us about his friends, and

41:04

maybe some of his friends are there with

41:06

them. And there's so many deaths. So it's

41:08

like you, you, you introduce us

41:10

to someone, and then they die

41:12

or their best friend dies, and they've got to

41:14

go on. Yeah, they've I mean, there was just

41:17

so much carnage. But like you said, it was

41:19

literally the men on the ground, the boots on

41:21

the ground who were deciding this, this battle. Yeah,

41:24

and I had a bit of a kind of change,

41:26

change, sort of damnancy moment for I started writing this

41:28

book, because, you know, I've

41:30

been very lucky that I've interviewed loads and

41:33

loads of veterans and from all over the

41:35

world, and loads of American veterans as well.

41:37

And it's been obviously a huge privilege. But

41:40

but for this book, I wanted to try and use

41:42

contemporary sources to one of the problems with with with

41:44

following the fortunes of someone who you've

41:48

got to know through an oral history through kind of, you know,

41:50

chatting to them, right? Is it self evidently

41:52

they survived because otherwise, it wouldn't be chatting to you in

41:54

2007, or whatever it was. And and Whereas

42:00

with Daris and Lesser's, as you've kind of intimated, you

42:02

don't know whether they're going to make it or not.

42:05

Because a diary could have come off a dead body. And

42:07

indeed it does. I mean, I'm

42:10

now doing the casino book at the moment. The

42:12

number of people that you get to know as

42:14

a reader, and who then get blown to smivorenes

42:16

by an 88 or whatever, is

42:19

horrendous. And

42:21

the other thing about Daris is if they're well-written,

42:25

and they're quite wordy, as opposed to one line a day, is

42:30

you get a very, very clear sense

42:32

of what that character is. So suddenly

42:34

that 21-year-old self, or 32-year-old self, or

42:36

24-year-old self, or whatever it is, whatever

42:38

age they are, really springs

42:41

off every single page. You start to get a

42:43

very clear idea of what they like, what they

42:45

don't like, what's upsetting them, you know, when they're

42:47

getting grouchy, you know, how upset they are about

42:49

losing friends, or whatever. You just, their characters come

42:52

to the fore, a sense of humor, all that

42:54

kind of stuff. And so you get to know

42:56

them. And, you

42:58

know, like any walk of life, you kind of like

43:01

them all, you know, and you like some

43:03

more than others, and warm to some more than others.

43:05

And, you know, you

43:07

get involved in their lives because they're recording it in

43:09

the moment, and they have no idea that Rome's going

43:11

to take till the 4th of June, or the war's

43:13

going to end in Europe on the 7th of May

43:15

1945, or whatever. They

43:18

have no idea. So it's all in the

43:20

moment. So there's no forward

43:22

projection. And that's just utterly

43:25

fascinating. Right. It's a snapshot. And

43:27

also, it's a snapshot, as is

43:29

a photograph, of course. It's a moment in

43:32

time. And the

43:34

other thing, of course, is that, you

43:38

know, people are using letters particularly, but also dairies,

43:41

as a kind of sort of psychiatrist, a couch,

43:43

as kind of an opportunity to let off steam

43:45

to sort of get things off their chest. And

43:48

so they tend to be pretty honest. And

43:53

also, what concerns someone on the

43:55

23rd of October 1943 is not

43:57

necessarily what they remember concerning. them

43:59

60 years later or 70 years

44:01

later when you're interviewing. So

44:04

you get a much clearer, more honest,

44:06

not honest sounds wrong because it sounds

44:08

like someone talking to you is it,

44:10

they're not. You get a

44:12

much truer, a much

44:15

greater reflection of what it

44:17

is really going on at that moment

44:20

through diaries and lessons than you do

44:22

through oral histories. Yes, I enjoy those

44:24

very much. So the

44:26

allies have landed, they're pushing their way

44:28

up the boot, Kesselring is determined to

44:30

defend. There's multiple defensive lines and so

44:33

there's a lot of slogging, there's a

44:35

lot of bad weather, there's a lot

44:37

of politics being played. But what we're

44:39

going to find out is that everything

44:41

is about to change, not only for

44:43

the Italian campaign, not only for the

44:46

entire European war, not only

44:48

because more German troops are coming into Italy and

44:50

they're going to outnumber the

44:52

allies, not only because there's a

44:55

series of defensive lines south of Rome, like

44:57

you were saying earlier, but all of this

44:59

again is still second place to the cross

45:01

channel invasion. No one's taking their eyes off

45:04

of that. So and like you said, this

45:06

is not going to be a victory. It's

45:08

not like your book is called 1943, the

45:11

end of Italy and the war. You

45:13

know, that makes me ask, is there, if I can ask, is

45:18

there going to be a follow up book to this

45:21

or maybe you're going to let your

45:23

other book that you wrote about Italy and yeah,

45:25

no, no, I'm doing it right now. Yes, I'm

45:27

doing it right now. Excited. Okay. Yeah, I'm doing

45:29

I'm writing casino 44 right now. I

45:33

like that. Okay, so the

45:35

allies are outmanned. They're not the top

45:37

priority. They're doing the best they can.

45:39

The geography is horrible. The weather is

45:41

even worse. The Italians are suffering and

45:44

but no one knows who could they

45:46

can trust as far as the Italians,

45:48

even as individuals. And

45:50

we're going to leave it there. I love cliffhangers

45:53

as a podcaster. I want everybody to go out

45:55

and check out this book. If

45:57

there's any way that are only try this. However,

46:00

you would like to wrap this up, please feel

46:02

free to do as far as the story. But

46:05

again, I just wanted to leave something for the

46:07

readers. I

46:09

want them to have the experience

46:11

I did reading the last few

46:13

chapters. Well, thank you so

46:15

much. I mean, I mean, what I

46:17

was so fascinated about this was that, you

46:20

know, the Italian campaign is kind of sort of thought

46:23

up, dreamt up, planned and all the rest of it and launched

46:26

in the kind of, you know, the heat of the

46:28

Mediterranean. The sun is bearing down, they're

46:30

all sweaty, you know, it's absolutely baking hot, there's sort

46:32

of, you know, malaria and all the rest of it.

46:35

Just a few months later, it ends at the end of

46:37

December 1943 in this absolute wretched quagmire

46:41

of a sort of awful

46:44

winter, awful kind of attritional

46:46

ghastly fighting through the mountains. You know,

46:48

everyone's miserable. The Germans are miserable, the

46:51

Italian civilians are miserable. You

46:53

know, the Allies are miserable. It's just

46:56

completely awful. And it's

46:59

a cautionary tale because it's a sort

47:01

of, it's that disconnect

47:04

between the optimism

47:07

with which they launch it in

47:09

the heat of summer to the

47:12

kind of grinding down of

47:16

a campaign which the Allies

47:18

cannot get out of. They cannot

47:21

avoid and yet, you know,

47:23

because they crossed that Rubicon, they're in there

47:25

and they've got to see it through to

47:27

the bitter end. But how that bitter end

47:29

is going to pan out, no one is

47:31

quite sure on the 31st of December Right.

47:35

And as the new year comes, it's

47:37

going to be even less important because

47:39

everybody's focused on overlord, the cross channel

47:41

invasion. Right. Yeah. And

47:44

so if I could real quick, I want

47:47

to tell everybody, I want to recommend

47:49

to everybody, before you read this book,

47:51

and you should definitely read this book,

47:53

go read The Malta book by Mr.

47:55

Holland, because that will, that was so

47:57

intense that this book is almost a

47:59

payoff. It's like Malta and the

48:01

Mediterranean went through hell and with this book

48:03

you finally get to see them You know

48:05

North Africa has wrapped up and they're going

48:07

on. So it's almost like a payoff for

48:09

suffering that everything that Malta Went

48:12

through but at the same time contributed to

48:14

the war effort. Well, thank you for that

48:16

I mean Malta is a great story and

48:18

and the whole you know, it says obviously

48:20

inextricably linked with the North Africa campaign you

48:24

know two days is interesting because it's it's a

48:26

moment where the British and the Americans kind of

48:28

work out out of Do

48:30

this right? You know, they

48:32

work out that their way forward is is,

48:34

you know, it's amphibious operations It's a marriage

48:36

of air lands and sea forces Naval forces

48:39

and they work out how to do it and

48:41

they do but then they come into Sicily Which

48:44

is by populated and then they come into Italy

48:46

which is even more populated and it's problematic because

48:48

you know They're destroying huge amounts of civilian

48:50

life and infrastructure as they're going forward Right this

48:52

kind of way of war that they've they've worked

48:54

out and they're supposed to be the good guys

48:56

so, you know, there's a paradox there which they

48:59

don't quite sort of get to the bottom of

49:01

right and you know all of

49:03

that just adds to the drama and and the kind

49:05

of sort of You

49:07

know the fascinating Strands of

49:09

of the fighting that takes place in in Italy

49:12

and one that's going to be frankly repeated in Northwest

49:14

Europe you know when they get into Northwest Europe because

49:17

You know the amount of tonnage of bombs that's

49:19

dropped on France for example, you know elsewhere

49:22

is just enormous, but that's the Allied war they've

49:24

worked it out and that's that's why I kind

49:26

of sort of understanding of the Mediterranean campaign is

49:29

so vital for anyone who wants to

49:31

kind of understand what goes on in Normandy and

49:33

Northwest Europe or indeed that's the stages of the

49:35

Italian campaign, you know, it's an evolution It's a

49:37

you know, these things aren't just sort of designed

49:40

and created it with a click of a finger. It's

49:42

a it's a process and

49:45

you see you see that

49:47

process and development of technology

49:49

and understanding and operational

49:52

and tactical skill You

49:55

see that kind of evolving and developing as the Allies

49:57

kind of sort of moved through and you know the

49:59

Americans obviously are slightly related to the party in

50:01

North Africa than the British and the Commonwealth forces.

50:03

But they still play an absolutely intrinsic part in

50:06

it. And all of it is just really, you

50:08

know, it's just endlessly fascinating, which is why, you

50:10

know, we're all interested in the subject and why

50:12

we keep on wanting to learn more and read

50:14

more about it. And it's all

50:16

connected. Absolutely. And I think it was you

50:20

said in the book, and this is the last thing I'll

50:22

bring up, this you said in the book something like when

50:24

they were fighting in North Africa, that

50:26

was almost war in its purest form,

50:28

you didn't have to worry about civilians,

50:30

you didn't have to worry about buildings or

50:33

cattle or whatever, they were just able to

50:35

go at each other in the desert. But

50:37

once they're in Italy, it is a completely

50:39

different type of war. But there's only one

50:41

way to win, which is to destroy

50:44

everything in your path if needed.

50:47

Well, yes,

50:49

because the

50:51

number one number one job of allied

50:54

commanders and war leaders is to win the war as

50:56

quickly as possible with the fewest loss of lives of

50:58

your own sight. And you

51:01

know, the Allies would say, well,

51:03

it's extremely unfortunate that Italian

51:05

civilians are getting killed, right? But we didn't ask them

51:07

to join the war. I mean, they didn't have to

51:09

declare war on Britain and France on the 10th of

51:11

June 1940. Right. You know, they could have

51:15

they and they could have sorted out, you

51:18

know, disarm the Germans and made this

51:20

a much easier fight for us, but they chose

51:22

not to. Yeah, you know, I mean, that was

51:24

because our leaders were completely factors. And obviously, you

51:26

know, an Italian civilian in the kind of, you

51:29

know, mountain village knows none

51:31

of this stuff and is completely innocent. But

51:34

that would be the view of the

51:36

Allies. And it's the same with strategic

51:39

bombing of Germany. It's like you stop the

51:41

war, we'll stop. We won't destroy

51:43

Dresden or or Seimel or Würzburg or

51:45

whatever. It's a really, really simple equation.

51:50

So, you know, the blame for that is

51:52

with the enemy war, you know, the Axis

51:54

war leaders. And, but

51:57

it's still, it's still. They're

52:00

kind of sort of moral conundrum because, you know,

52:02

the Western allies are supposed to be the good

52:04

guys. And yet, to

52:07

ultimately achieve good, you've got to do an awful

52:09

lot of bad. And

52:11

that's problematic. You know,

52:14

it's, you

52:16

know, destroying cities and destroying towns.

52:18

I mean, it's

52:20

a problem. You know, when the allies finally get into

52:22

Naples, for example, most of the damage caused is not

52:24

by the Germans. I

52:27

mean, the Germans do cause a lot of damage, but the

52:29

bulk of it is 175 bombing missions and

52:32

raids that have landed on Naples like

52:34

a year alone. So that's from the allies.

52:37

Or you know, Benevente, which is a completely,

52:40

you know, town not far away from Naples.

52:42

It was largely destroyed in an attack in,

52:44

I think, March or April of 1943 by

52:46

Mediterranean strategic

52:48

bombers. But ultimately, you

52:50

know, the allies do a lot to kind of

52:52

clear it all up. And as

52:54

I say, moment of the war is over, then, you

52:56

know, they stop firing their guns. But you

53:00

know, it is, it is, it is interesting, you

53:02

know, and there's no kind of, you

53:05

know, I'm not preaching about this stuff.

53:07

I'm just saying it's kind of interesting and

53:09

it's problematic. And you know, it's all the

53:11

more interesting with the backdrop of what's going

53:14

on in Ukraine at the moment. And

53:16

indeed, exactly. And Israel and Gaza. Exactly. Because,

53:19

you know, the problems that the Israeli defense force

53:21

are having in Gaza city. And that's the same

53:23

problems the allies had in,

53:26

you know, in Italy in 1943, 44, or the allies

53:29

had in North West Europe in 1944, 45. I

53:31

mean, it's exactly the same problems. And you can have

53:33

all these ideals about Geneva conventions and, you

53:35

know, collateral damage and not wanting to hit civilians and

53:37

all the rest of it. But the hard reality of

53:39

war is if you have a war, even

53:42

in the modern age where sophisticated weaponry

53:45

ultimately is still about blowing stuff up. And

53:48

the problem with urban fighting particularly is really

53:51

fascinating because if

53:53

you keep the buildings intact, that

53:55

means it's very, very close court of fighting and you

53:58

can't see ahead, which means you can't. really plan. You

54:00

can't see around the street corner, you can't see to

54:02

the next building. If you destroy

54:04

it all, you have piles of rubble, which, you

54:06

know, into which the enemy can bury themselves, but

54:08

at least you've got a field of fire. Yeah.

54:10

And it's about survival. So yeah, then it's about

54:12

survival. And it's about lesser of two evils and,

54:15

and, or from, from an attacker's point of view.

54:17

And so that's why the,

54:19

you know, that's why the Israelis

54:22

are destroying Gaza city is because

54:24

the alternative is, is an unbelievably

54:27

costly urban fight that

54:29

they probably won't they'll struggle to win.

54:31

So, you know,

54:33

it's, it's really, really problematic. And, and, and,

54:37

you can argue over whether the Israeli defense

54:39

force ought to be there or not, you

54:41

know, that's a different point, but having committed

54:44

to that, that is an inevitable result of

54:46

what, what they're doing. And it's exactly the

54:48

same in Italy in 1943. Yeah. There's no

54:50

good, careful, safe way to conduct war. I

54:53

think exactly that that is a much neater

54:55

and pithier way of saying what I've just

54:57

said in the last five minutes. No, but

54:59

yes. Well, I took your genius and I

55:02

just crunched it, but, but Italy, Italy is

55:04

going to find out like Germany, like Japan,

55:06

like other nations. The worst thing about

55:08

war is losing and

55:11

that's what Italy's going through. So

55:13

Mr. Holland, again, this book was

55:15

incredible. We have barely touched the

55:18

vast majority of strands of this tapestry. That is

55:20

the Italian campaign. You did an incredible job and

55:22

I want to thank you for the experience. I

55:25

want to thank you for coming on for

55:27

the listeners. Thank you. Absolutely. For the listeners,

55:30

it's the Savage Storm, the battle for

55:32

Italy, 1943. Mr. Holland, thank

55:35

you very much, sir. No,

55:37

thank you. Thank you for giving me such

55:40

an opportunity to mouth off about the

55:43

Italian campaign. Hello,

55:54

and thank you for listening to the

55:56

history of World War II podcast, episode

55:58

451. Part 2,

56:01

hope is not a sound

56:03

strategy. Last time,

56:05

the panzers of Army Group Center

56:08

had reached and taken Kalinan to

56:10

the northwest of Moscow, while Guderian

56:12

reached an area close to Tula

56:14

due south of the capital. The

56:17

fact that the Germans did not

56:19

control Tula was not overly concerning,

56:22

as they were at the end of

56:24

a tenuous supply line. The thinking was,

56:26

just imagine if we had had all

56:28

the fuel we needed. No,

56:30

things would turn around, and having troops

56:32

on three sides of the enemy's capital

56:34

was a pretty good place to be,

56:36

you know, if you ignored the worsening

56:38

weather. However, what the

56:41

Germans were missing, and would continue

56:43

to miss, is that Stalin, being

56:45

convinced the cunning Japanese would not

56:48

attack Russian territory by his spy

56:50

Richard Sorge, stationed in Tokyo, was

56:53

recalling these experienced divisions from

56:55

their Far East stations. They

56:57

were experienced because they had gone

57:00

toe to toe with the Japanese

57:02

Army from May until September in

57:04

1939, over a

57:06

border dispute of some ten miles,

57:09

or sixteen kilometers. From

57:12

there, it was Japanese pride and

57:14

Russian truculence that caused the two

57:16

sides to bang their heads together

57:19

for months. In the end,

57:21

General Zhukov arrived on the scene, gathered

57:24

information, and then dealt to the

57:26

enemy a series of embarrassing losses.

57:29

But partially, the Japanese helped, as

57:31

their tactics here were the same

57:33

as they would be in the

57:35

future, against the Allies in the

57:37

Pacific. Simply, they charged at the

57:39

enemy, hoping that fright, momentum, and

57:42

a superior will to win would

57:44

feed them through. It

57:46

did not, on mainland Asia or

57:48

among the Pacific Islands. As

57:51

covered last time, the Soviet Far

57:53

Eastern divisions started to arrive, and

57:56

for simplicity sake, the numbers drive

57:58

the point home. At

58:00

this moment in time, late October, the

58:02

Soviets have 269 divisions and 65 brigades along

58:07

the entire front, totaling 2.2 million

58:09

men. When

58:12

November came to an end, Moscow would

58:14

have 343 divisions and 98 brigades, totaling

58:18

just over 4 million

58:21

men. And no surprise, most

58:23

of these were standing right

58:25

in front of Moscow. For

58:28

comparison's sake, Von Bock had 136 divisions,

58:32

well, on paper. In reality,

58:34

it was more like 83 divisions, totaling

58:38

some 2.7 million men. And

58:41

he would get no reinforcements.

58:43

Stalin, for his part, could

58:45

call on more if

58:47

he needed to. And he

58:49

was about to find out that he did

58:51

need to. In mid-October,

58:53

the OKH issued another directive.

58:56

Basically saying, continue the operations

58:58

that will lead us into

59:00

the enemy's capital city. And

59:03

those orders contained specific directives

59:06

for Von Bock's formations. First,

59:09

9th Army was to attack towards

59:11

the Volga Reservoir, about 25 miles

59:13

or 40 kilometers due east of

59:16

Kalinin, modern day Tver, and about

59:18

80 miles or 128 kilometers northwest

59:20

of Moscow. If

59:24

successful, this would put the Germans

59:26

closer to better controlling the territory

59:28

due north of Moscow. Next,

59:31

third and fourth panzer groups were to make

59:33

for Yarsa level, about 200 miles or 321

59:37

kilometers to the northeast of

59:39

the Volga Reservoir. This would

59:41

actually put them to the northeast

59:43

of Moscow, a considerable push, to

59:46

say the least. Now,

59:48

considering how badly the Germans had to fight

59:51

just to get this far, telling

59:53

two under-strength panzer groups to make

59:55

another 200 miles further

59:57

into enemy territory quite

1:00:00

suspect. Did Berlin really believe in

1:00:02

their soldiers and panzers that much?

1:00:05

The answer is mostly, yes,

1:00:08

mostly. But it's probably fair

1:00:10

to say that wishful thinking started

1:00:13

to creep into the planning and

1:00:15

the OKH wasn't done

1:00:17

just yet. Next

1:00:19

second panzer army, and it's worth noting that

1:00:21

just to get here, they were now down

1:00:24

to 50 operational panzers

1:00:26

out of the 600 they

1:00:28

had started with, was to push

1:00:30

towards Gorky on the German right

1:00:32

or to the south of Moscow,

1:00:35

again by some 200 miles. Again,

1:00:38

another incredible nay impossible task

1:00:40

handed to those exhausted troops

1:00:43

who still were

1:00:45

not wearing winter clothes. That

1:00:47

second army was to be on the

1:00:49

second panzer's right flank, mattered little. No

1:00:52

one was getting another 200 miles

1:00:54

anywhere along the front in

1:00:56

November. Yet this latest offing

1:00:59

was to commence on November

1:01:01

15th. And fourth

1:01:03

army was to be given the main

1:01:05

task of heading towards Moscow and

1:01:07

destroying all before them. Not

1:01:10

that there could remain that much left, right?

1:01:13

It's worth repeating that these objectives

1:01:15

were unrealistic, even if Berlin knew

1:01:18

nothing of the far eastern reinforcements

1:01:20

that were now arriving in the

1:01:22

area, because the supply lines

1:01:24

alone would have been cut at

1:01:26

numerous places. But as confident

1:01:29

as von Bach was, and

1:01:31

he was, there seemed to

1:01:33

be an unspoken idea in

1:01:35

Berlin about wrapping all of

1:01:37

this up by Christmas. And

1:01:39

then the Mediterranean and that

1:01:41

pesky island Malta would be

1:01:44

given its proper attention. As

1:01:47

the two sides were about to

1:01:49

clash again, von Bach was supremely

1:01:51

confident while General Zhukov asked and

1:01:54

received permission to handle the entire

1:01:56

defense of the capital. Stalin

1:01:58

said yes to this. but

1:02:00

then eviscerated his own

1:02:02

permission by constantly suggesting

1:02:05

things. Stalin was not

1:02:07

a man to sit on the sidelines. And

1:02:10

probably from his lack of experience,

1:02:12

even given this last summer, Stalin

1:02:15

had an unrealistic fear that

1:02:17

the enemy had the men

1:02:19

and means to surround his

1:02:22

major cities, Leningrad, Moscow, Rostov

1:02:24

in the south, and Stalingrad.

1:02:26

Worse, once they were surrounded, they

1:02:29

would be captured, which helps

1:02:31

explain his meddling in Zhukov's

1:02:33

affairs. After

1:02:35

Stalin gave Zhukov the reins, he

1:02:37

then sent him more men to

1:02:40

the main west front, to Konev's

1:02:42

Kalinin front, and to Timoshenko's southwestern

1:02:44

front in the south. And

1:02:47

now that Zhukov was in control and

1:02:49

reinforced, Stalin intervened and told

1:02:51

him to launch a series of

1:02:53

attacks. Why let the Germans

1:02:55

have the initiative? But Zhukov knew

1:02:58

that in their current position, it

1:03:00

was best to have the enemy struggle just

1:03:02

to get to them and then

1:03:04

engage with them. But Stalin

1:03:07

was not to be gainsed. One

1:03:10

day before the Germans were to launch

1:03:12

their attack, Zhukov got their first

1:03:14

on November 14th, by

1:03:16

having Lieutenant General Zakharin's 49th

1:03:18

Army attack the 12th and

1:03:20

13th Army Corps close to

1:03:22

Serperkov, about 30 miles or

1:03:25

48 kilometers south of

1:03:27

the capital. After this,

1:03:29

the 2nd Cavalry Corps were sent in

1:03:31

to take advantage of any German disarray.

1:03:34

Problem was, there was not

1:03:37

any German disarray, so the

1:03:39

cavalry achieved practically nothing, except

1:03:42

dying. Next, about 35

1:03:45

miles or 56 kilometers west

1:03:47

by northwest of Moscow, Roszkowski

1:03:49

had his 16th Army charge

1:03:51

into the gap in between

1:03:53

the 14th Motorized and 7th

1:03:56

Panzer Divisions. If Stalin

1:03:58

was hoping for a further separation, of

1:04:00

the army, he did not get

1:04:02

what he wanted. Very little came

1:04:04

of this attack as well. Zhukov

1:04:07

could only keep quiet. He

1:04:10

kept quiet, but he hoped Stalin was seeing

1:04:12

the results of his premature

1:04:14

attacks. Of all

1:04:17

the attackers just mentioned, one-third of

1:04:19

those men were now gone, and

1:04:21

the Germans hadn't even started yet.

1:04:23

Worth at least 157, but probably closer to

1:04:28

200 Soviet tanks were now

1:04:30

lost. Added to this

1:04:32

was the 44th Cavalry Division

1:04:34

of Major General Devator's 3rd

1:04:36

Cavalry Corps. That was now

1:04:38

practically non-existent. Another unit

1:04:41

lost 75% of

1:04:43

their personnel. So on one

1:04:45

hand, these attacks weakened the

1:04:47

defenders overall, but it gave

1:04:49

them confidence to be the

1:04:52

ones attacking. Yet bullets

1:04:54

nor shells care about

1:04:56

feelings. The

1:04:58

day before Zhukov launched his attacks,

1:05:01

the chief of staff of the

1:05:03

OKH, or Army High Command, Halder,

1:05:05

met with the Army Group Chiefs of Staff

1:05:08

at the TESCS. And it

1:05:10

was a good meeting. After all,

1:05:12

how many men could the weakened

1:05:14

Soviet state still have before Moscow?

1:05:17

And then one officer ironically invoked

1:05:19

the aid of the weather by

1:05:21

saying, give us six more weeks

1:05:23

of cold weather as it froze

1:05:25

the mud, but he did not

1:05:27

want snow. Yet those familiar

1:05:29

with Mother Nature know she's

1:05:32

not one on granting wishes.

1:05:35

But on that supernatural level, the

1:05:37

pull of taking the enemy's capital,

1:05:39

the great city of the Russians,

1:05:42

it was just too tantalizing for the

1:05:45

Germans. Their desire could

1:05:47

not let them see any other

1:05:49

outcome. Another great victory was to

1:05:52

hand. Heady days, indeed.

1:05:56

Yet there was an ounce of

1:05:58

reality then interjected into this meeting.

1:06:01

Von Bock's chief of staff, Von

1:06:03

Gryffinburg, then showed up after examining

1:06:05

the front and he agreed with

1:06:08

Von Bock. Moscow

1:06:10

had to be taken by

1:06:12

a frontal attack that Halder's

1:06:15

overreaching idea of a massive

1:06:17

encirclement towards Moscow, hundreds of

1:06:19

miles in the making, was

1:06:21

impractical and equally impossible. The

1:06:24

question of fuel alone negated

1:06:26

this. So Halder

1:06:28

agreed to let Von Bock have

1:06:30

his head with his less ambitious

1:06:33

plan. They would charge at

1:06:35

the capital. But then, bringing

1:06:37

the party down, Kesselring, in charge

1:06:39

of the Lutwaffe said, not only

1:06:41

have a large number of my

1:06:43

planes already headed for the Mediterranean,

1:06:45

but on November 18th, even

1:06:48

more were ordered to leave, per Hitler.

1:06:50

So whatever you're going to do, do

1:06:53

it quickly. But

1:06:55

then the real Debbie Downer

1:06:58

spoke up, the OKH Quartermaster

1:07:00

representative. Basically, he said,

1:07:03

we cannot sustain you through this.

1:07:05

Period. I don't care how much you scale

1:07:07

it back. Currently, fuel deliveries

1:07:10

were one-fourth of what they should

1:07:12

be and that will not change

1:07:14

anytime soon. Which

1:07:16

is when Halder completely left

1:07:18

planet Earth, he left reality

1:07:20

behind, or rather, took

1:07:23

a ride on the Nazi superiority

1:07:25

express when he said the OKH

1:07:27

was not going to stand in

1:07:29

Von Bock's way if he

1:07:31

thinks he can succeed. You also

1:07:33

need a little bit of

1:07:35

luck and war. True enough,

1:07:38

but no amount of favorable turns

1:07:40

would power a panzer. But

1:07:42

that's hindsight, the easiest job

1:07:45

in the world. But

1:07:48

it was the fuel situation that caused

1:07:50

Von Bock to scale back his attack

1:07:53

a bit, though they were still

1:07:55

unrealistic. And as

1:07:57

this last battle was to be launched, those

1:07:59

German units going for Moscow numbered some 233,000

1:08:01

men with 1,880 guns, 1,300 tanks, and about 800

1:08:10

aircraft. But again, in

1:08:13

a few days, some of those would be

1:08:15

departing for the Mediterranean. This

1:08:17

force was going up against the Soviet's 240,000

1:08:19

men, so almost even there. 1,254

1:08:26

guns, there another German advantage.

1:08:29

502 tanks, again another German advantage,

1:08:32

but 1,238 aircraft versus the 800

1:08:34

mentioned by

1:08:39

the Germans. And the

1:08:41

Germans' airstrips were barely worthy of

1:08:43

that name. Meanwhile, the Soviet planes

1:08:45

were taking off from permanent airfields

1:08:48

all around Moscow. And

1:08:51

one of the reasons the Germans were

1:08:53

in such a state was constant enemy

1:08:55

air attacks. True, the planes

1:08:57

were not taking out that many

1:08:59

panzers, but they were bombing and

1:09:01

strafing men and supply trucks. It

1:09:04

had the same effect. To

1:09:06

the north of Moscow, the attack got

1:09:08

underway on November 15. The

1:09:11

attack had been labeled Operation Volga

1:09:14

Reservoir. The idea was to have

1:09:16

German forces push towards and reach

1:09:18

the reservoir and the Moscow Canal

1:09:21

just below it. The latter

1:09:23

is about 60 miles or 96 kilometers

1:09:26

north by northwest of

1:09:28

the capital. Thus, on the

1:09:30

15th, the 9th Army's 27th

1:09:32

Army Corps, assisted by the

1:09:34

3rd Panzer Group's 56th Panzer

1:09:36

Corps and Hoppner's 5th and

1:09:39

46th Army Corps headed out.

1:09:41

Of course, the last two were delayed by

1:09:43

a day as they were defending, still

1:09:46

defending, Kalinin, which was still

1:09:48

being attacked by Soviet troops.

1:09:51

But these two units were replaced with

1:09:53

other German formations and then the 5th

1:09:55

and 46th Army Corps

1:09:57

rushed to catch up. Leading

1:10:00

German elements fought through and reached

1:10:02

the reservoir and canal on November

1:10:04

18th. Things were looking

1:10:06

good. Then the other German

1:10:08

units caught up and joined in. Suddenly,

1:10:11

Raskosowski's line was breaking up

1:10:14

and breaking up fast. Von Bock

1:10:16

heard of this and moved his

1:10:19

command train closer to the fighting.

1:10:21

He wanted to be on hand

1:10:23

to give aid or direct what

1:10:25

looked like a promising thrust into

1:10:27

the capital's defenses. Raskosowski,

1:10:30

for his part, saw the writing

1:10:32

on the wall and asked Zhukov

1:10:34

if he could retreat to the

1:10:36

Istra River, but was told

1:10:38

no. So Raskosowski, not

1:10:40

wanting to be captured or worse, and

1:10:42

did not want to be the one

1:10:44

to let the Germans reach the capital,

1:10:47

went over Zhukov's head to ask

1:10:49

the Chief of Staff, Shepov Shekov,

1:10:51

who said yes as he trusted

1:10:54

the local commander. When

1:10:56

Zhukov heard of this, he

1:10:58

sent another message to the

1:11:00

front saying, belay that order, you

1:11:03

will listen to me. And

1:11:05

to prove how sincere he

1:11:07

was, Zhukov had the commander

1:11:09

and commissar of the 133rd Rifle Division

1:11:14

shot right in front of

1:11:16

his own men for allowing

1:11:18

an unauthorized retreat. Raskosowski

1:11:20

and everyone else got

1:11:23

the message. Stolen might

1:11:25

be the Man of Steel and Hitler

1:11:28

the chosen one to lead Germany to

1:11:30

greatness, but General Zhukov,

1:11:32

he was the Iron Man. He

1:11:35

would defend Moscow and the people of the

1:11:37

city. And anyone who got in

1:11:39

his way would go the

1:11:41

way of the commander and commissar. Death

1:11:45

to all enemies and those disloyal

1:11:47

to the cause. Greetings

1:11:52

everyone from Central Virginia. Also I just want

1:11:54

to say hi to some new members and

1:11:56

thank those who have donated. And again, I

1:11:58

want to thank James Holland for coming on.

1:12:01

Huge fan, love everything he does. Anyway, so

1:12:03

hopefully I didn't gush too much

1:12:05

or I was able to edit it out.

1:12:08

Don't worry about that. Anyway, so Walter

1:12:10

Stotts from Lambertville, Michigan, but I think

1:12:13

Walter wrote to me and he said

1:12:15

he was just renewing. Either way, Walter,

1:12:17

thank you very much for supporting the

1:12:19

show. Joel Devlin

1:12:21

from Balkham Hills, New South Wales,

1:12:23

Australia. So thank you, Joel. Peter

1:12:26

Greco from Katie, Texas. And he sent me

1:12:28

a very nice email. So Peter, thank you

1:12:31

very much for that. So those are the

1:12:33

latest members who pay five bucks a month

1:12:35

or they can pay annually and they get two

1:12:38

episodes extra a month. Normally

1:12:40

stuff behind the scenes, the

1:12:42

smaller stories. Currently we're doing

1:12:45

the allies taking over of Madagascar.

1:12:47

Let's see here. As far as those who have

1:12:50

donated, Kyle Ryder. Thank you

1:12:52

very much, Kyle. Cool name. Chad

1:12:55

Reinhardt. Okay, Reinhardt, that's another

1:12:57

cool name. David Richards.

1:12:59

Okay, everybody's got cool names but me.

1:13:01

I'm gonna, anyway,

1:13:03

that's neither here nor there. And

1:13:05

Wesley Woods from Waynesville, North Carolina.

1:13:08

Hello, Wesley. Thank you very much for

1:13:10

donating. Thank you all for supporting the

1:13:12

show. So trying to get back on

1:13:14

a roll where I was putting out

1:13:16

a show like every four or five

1:13:18

days. The holidays really messed that up.

1:13:21

But anyway, so that's what we're gonna try to

1:13:23

do. So hope you enjoyed the interview. Please check

1:13:26

out his book. We're back on the story. I

1:13:29

think there's probably gonna be one more episode

1:13:31

of Army Group Center. Then we'll

1:13:33

cover Army Group South. And once we bring

1:13:35

them back up to speed, and

1:13:38

then it's off to the races. Take

1:13:41

care, everyone. And

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