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Operation Typhoon: All or Nothing

Operation Typhoon: All or Nothing

Released Tuesday, 23rd January 2024
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Operation Typhoon: All or Nothing

Operation Typhoon: All or Nothing

Operation Typhoon: All or Nothing

Operation Typhoon: All or Nothing

Tuesday, 23rd January 2024
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Episode Transcript

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0:00

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1:00

["The Star-Spangled Banner"] Hello,

1:09

and thank you for listening to

1:11

The History of World War II

1:13

Podcast, episode 452, Operation Typhoon, all

1:16

or nothing. Last

1:21

time, the Germans had launched another

1:23

attack on November 15th, utilizing

1:25

the whole of Army Group Center. The

1:28

idea was for the two flanks

1:31

to dominate the land above and

1:33

below the capital, while von Bock's

1:35

main force drove straight at Moscow.

1:38

This was it. And

1:40

now that the attack was underway, the

1:42

fighting to the north of the main

1:44

road that led to Moscow looked more

1:46

favorable, as each day passed. Remember,

1:49

Devotnour's cavalry corps that was to

1:51

attack Hapner's units? Well, it

1:53

didn't turn out to be the Russian

1:55

victory that Zhukov was hoping for. True,

1:58

Hapner's men had been attacked. just

2:00

before the cavalry went in and the

2:02

Germans were slowed by this, but

2:05

that was it. And this failure

2:07

by the Russians handed them another

2:09

one. Yes, Hoppner had

2:11

been slowed down, but the focus

2:13

on him allowed Reinhardt, the commander

2:15

of the 41st Panzer Corps, to

2:18

get in between the 16th and

2:20

30th Soviet armies to cause

2:22

all kinds of stress. About

2:25

20 miles or 32 kilometers due

2:27

west of Moscow is the

2:29

town of Zengarod, and in

2:31

front of it was the

2:33

right flank of the Soviet

2:35

5th Army under General L.A.

2:37

Kvowrov. Trying to

2:39

keep up with the success of

2:41

Hoppner's left flank advance, Reinhardt came

2:43

in at Zengarod on November 19th.

2:46

Yet the initial German thrust here was

2:48

blunted. But the Russians knew the Germans

2:51

would be back. The

2:53

fate of the town was still in 5th

2:55

Army's hands. Again,

2:57

the town had been attacked, but not taken.

3:01

So Zhukov, on the 21st

3:03

of November, sent Rokozovsky himself

3:05

to help with the worsening

3:07

situation to the north of

3:09

Zengarod, specifically to Solnek-Nogorsk, and

3:11

just to the north of

3:14

that, Klin. Rokozovsky

3:16

rushed out, but he neatened have

3:18

worried. Solnek-Nogorsk fell while

3:20

he was on route, and

3:22

Klin fell the next day,

3:24

on the 22nd. The Nazi noose

3:27

was tightening around Moscow. As

3:30

tenuous as the center was, everyone in

3:32

Moscow could see that it was their

3:34

flanks that threatened to let loose a

3:37

German tidal wave. But

3:39

not all this was due

3:41

to German aggression. No Soviet

3:43

mistakes still lingered nearby. For

3:46

example, around this time, the commander

3:48

of the Soviet 30th Army, for

3:50

some inexplicable reason, swung a

3:53

part of his line to face north. Suddenly,

3:55

there was a gap created, and

3:57

the eager Reinhardt soon found it.

4:00

During the next few days, the

4:03

41st and 46th Panzer Corps would

4:05

cross over the frozen Istra Reservoir,

4:08

located about 9 miles or 14 kilometers

4:10

south by southwest of the

4:12

just captured Sol Nez

4:15

Nogorsk, and 25 miles

4:17

or 40 kilometers to the northwest

4:20

of Moscow, to this Stalin threw

4:22

in everything, including the

4:24

kitchen sink. Leaving

4:27

them in, soon all reserves, even

4:29

Air Force personnel, were marching into

4:32

the gap left by German violence

4:35

and Soviet incompetence. But

4:37

it was this very combination that

4:39

allowed Army Group Center to reach

4:41

out towards Moscow to

4:44

their greatest extent so far. On

4:47

November 27, Colonel Hasso von

4:49

Mantefel, a part of the 7th

4:52

Panzer Division, crossed over the Volga

4:54

at Yakroma, due north of Moscow

4:56

by some 30 miles or 48

4:58

kilometers. This

5:01

was significant as the Volga was a

5:03

part of the waterways helping to stop

5:05

or slow down the Germans from getting

5:08

to a point that they could

5:10

then swing around and approach the capital

5:12

from the rear. To be

5:14

able to do this would allow supplies

5:16

to be cut from sustaining the war

5:18

nerves center in Stalin's

5:20

headquarters. But what happened

5:23

next was a sign of the

5:25

coming times. Not only

5:27

was von Mantefel down to just 36

5:30

operational tanks, but Stalin

5:33

had a nasty surprise for these

5:35

meddlesome panzers. Only

5:37

recently, out of sheer desperation, did

5:40

the Stavka decide to create shock

5:42

armies. These had been discussed

5:44

before the war, but now they were in

5:46

the midst of becoming a reality. The

5:49

idea was for these armies

5:51

to overcome difficult defensive dispositions

5:53

in order to create a

5:55

tactical penetration of sufficient breadth

5:57

and depth to permit the

6:00

of mobile formations for deep

6:02

exploitation. In other words, they

6:04

were to act as a fire brigade. So

6:07

their implementation would start at a

6:10

troubled spot, but the idea was

6:12

to turn a disadvantage into another

6:14

disadvantage, but this one for the

6:17

enemy. This mass of

6:19

men would come in, disrupt the

6:21

enemy's attack plan, and through sheer

6:23

numbers and momentum, smash the

6:25

enemy's spearhead, create a hole, enlarge

6:28

it, and then send mobile units

6:30

into the hole to take as

6:32

much territory as they could before

6:35

the enemy could recompose themselves. Thus,

6:38

the first shock army currently being

6:40

built out of seven rifle brigades

6:42

and 11 ski battalions, but they

6:44

were being put together for another

6:46

mission, was thrown into this

6:48

breach between the 16th and

6:50

30th armies. So when

6:53

von Mount Tufel's 36 panzers

6:55

reached Yakroma on the 27th,

6:58

they found themselves leaving two

7:01

days later. Despite

7:04

this local success, the stopgap

7:06

still had much to worry

7:08

about as elements of the

7:10

second panzer division entered and

7:12

held Krasnaya, Polyana, modern day

7:14

Lomnya, practically due north of

7:16

Moscow, but by only some 12

7:19

miles or 19 kilometers away

7:22

from the Kremlin itself. Still,

7:25

this was forward movement by the

7:27

Germans, again, like with von Mount

7:29

Tufel at Yakroma, but their success

7:32

was fleeting as the first shock

7:35

and 20th armies rushed in and

7:37

stopped the Germans from going any

7:39

further or from even consolidating what

7:41

they had. On a side

7:44

note, the 20th army was led by

7:46

a General Andrey Wlazov, but this moment

7:49

is not what he is known for, but

7:52

more on him later. With

7:54

his last offensive being worn down,

7:57

Hoppner called for a three-day halt

7:59

to rest, resupply,

8:01

and reevaluate. Clearly,

8:04

there were more Russian troops than

8:06

supposed. The idea was to regroup

8:08

and then start up again and

8:11

improve on their rather impressive gains.

8:14

But it was not to be. Before

8:17

those three days were up, Stalin

8:19

would launch his own offensive,

8:22

with a goal of undoing all of

8:25

the German gains in the last month.

8:28

According to the South now, remember when

8:30

Tula, just over 100 miles

8:32

due south of Moscow, was attacked

8:34

on November 18th? This

8:37

helped create that 30 mile wide

8:39

gap in the Soviet's defensive line,

8:41

which is when the tired Germans,

8:43

well, not so much ran into

8:46

the Siberian divisions, but were themselves

8:48

run into. Guderian cursed,

8:51

but would write that day the

8:53

Siberians were keen for battle and

8:55

well trained. And he was about

8:57

to find out how keen they

9:00

were. On November 22nd, after

9:03

a few days of not being

9:05

able to push into Tula, Guderian

9:07

stopped advancing. And he had

9:09

plenty of good reasons. But on the

9:11

23rd, von Bock flew down to Guderian

9:14

to see if he could get this

9:16

fast Heinz to be a more determined

9:18

fast Heinz. Guderian, in

9:20

response, listed his reasons for his

9:23

lack of advancement. To wit,

9:25

von Bock said, look, I know it's tough, but

9:27

can you at least make it to Kalomna, which

9:30

is about 65 miles or 104 kilometers to the

9:32

northeast of Tula, and would put

9:37

the panzers just past Moscow, again, to

9:39

be able to attack the capital from

9:41

the rear. Yet this

9:44

was another impossible task, set

9:46

by a man who wanted

9:48

this building nightmare over, and

9:50

who wanted to be his country's next

9:53

hero. Humans, even tough

9:55

men in mud covered uniforms, are

9:58

emotional creatures. But,

10:00

Colonna was safe, or was it?

10:03

When Guderian came at Tula, its

10:06

defenders, made up of workers' brigades

10:08

and NKVD units, had

10:10

stopped him cold. How? They

10:13

feared Stalin more than

10:15

those panzers. Then

10:17

Guderian remembered that his order from

10:20

von Bock was to reach Colonna as

10:22

opposed to taking Tula. So he

10:25

pushed a little bit to the east, beneath

10:27

the town, rather than to

10:29

the northeast, and when relatively free of

10:31

Soviet defenders from the town, he started

10:34

heading north again. This

10:36

allowed him to reach Venev

10:38

on November 24th, the first

10:40

town passed Tula. He

10:43

and von Bock considered his offensive

10:45

was back on. As

10:47

the saying goes, a drowning man will

10:49

even grab at the tip of a

10:52

sword. Now pushing

10:54

to the northeast, the 2nd Panzer

10:56

Army reached Kashira, a mere 10

10:58

miles, or 16 kilometers

11:01

short of Colonna. After

11:03

that, Bolden's 50th Soviet Army reached

11:06

the area, but the

11:08

panzers and their support units mauled

11:10

the 50th pretty badly, which

11:12

was now not in a position to

11:15

stop the panzers. On the other

11:17

hand, all that fighting and their losses got

11:20

the attention of General Zhukov, the

11:22

Iron Man. But

11:24

first, the reason von Bock wanted

11:27

Guderian to reach Colonna was because

11:29

right behind it was the Moskva

11:31

River, as that is the last

11:33

major waterway in the area. Once

11:36

beyond it, if the Germans managed to

11:38

get that far, they could then turn

11:40

and make a run for Moscow's rear

11:43

without having to fear another blown

11:45

bridge in their path. But

11:48

again, the panzers would not

11:50

make it that far. And

11:53

now that Zhukov was looking south, he

11:56

pulled out one of his last reserve

11:58

units, the 1st Guards cabinet. Corps

12:00

and sent them to Kshira

12:02

as they arrived mere hours

12:04

before the 17th Panzer Division

12:06

did, and above them

12:09

was an unusually large number

12:11

of close support aircraft. Zhukov

12:15

wasn't plain. The

12:17

1st Guards cavalrymen of General Bevlov

12:20

might not have retaken the town,

12:22

but they did scatter a few

12:24

of the 17th Division's outpost, and

12:26

then what did the Russian horsemen

12:28

do? They dashed

12:30

into the midst that was Army

12:33

Group Center's rear areas, and

12:35

they would stay there for five

12:37

months, causing chaos and mayhem

12:39

among the enemy's supply lines. But

12:44

going back a few days and back

12:46

to the Tula area, where men under

12:48

Bolden held the town, Guderian had

12:51

had enough. He gathered up what was

12:53

left of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, about

12:55

110 tanks, and again

12:58

put them under Kampfgruppe

13:00

Eberbach, or Balergruppe Eberbach,

13:02

the last name of

13:04

General Heinrich Eberbach, who

13:07

had been doing solid work thus

13:09

far. Balergruppe Eberbach

13:11

was to make a counterclockwise

13:13

sweep around Tula, while 43rd

13:15

Army Corps would match this

13:18

with a clockwise sweep. But

13:21

here Guderian, now truly frustrated,

13:23

would lead this attack himself.

13:26

If this worked out, Tula, seemingly

13:28

impervious to a direct attack, might

13:31

wither, if surrounded. But

13:33

here, Guderian got to experience

13:35

what his men had been

13:37

going through recently, fighting in

13:39

temperatures far below 0 degrees

13:42

Celsius. Yet somehow,

13:44

even with the double swing around Tula,

13:46

the Soviet 340th Rifle and 112th Tank

13:51

Divisions held open a

13:53

corridor that the Germans simply could

13:55

not crush. Guderian, angered

13:57

by everything around him now, was to

13:59

be blamed von Kluge for his

14:01

slowness, which could have helped in the

14:04

area. But as von

14:06

Bock made clear to Guderian, von

14:08

Kluge wasn't being pessimistic. He

14:11

was simply out of fuel. He was down

14:13

on his number of men and panzers, and

14:15

he was constantly being harassed by Soviet air

14:17

power. He, Kluge, was

14:20

not the problem. And then

14:22

an earlier madness repeated itself as

14:24

the temperatures dropped, along

14:26

with the German sense of

14:29

reality. On the far right

14:31

of Army Group Center, the Second Army

14:33

was pushing ahead. At its

14:35

head was not von Weeks, who was sick.

14:38

No, he was replaced by

14:40

a Colonel General Rudolf Schmidt, and

14:43

the Second Army had started out

14:45

well enough. First, it

14:47

had pushed aside, no small feat,

14:49

the Soviet Third and Thirteenth Army,

14:51

and was making for Veronze, located

14:53

about 130 miles or 209 kilometers

14:55

south by southeast of

15:01

Tula. The point is, the

15:03

town was so far behind the current

15:05

lines that this too was

15:07

another pipe tree. Between

15:09

the weather, Soviet domination of the air,

15:11

and a lack of regular fuel supplies,

15:14

this endeavor was also brought to a

15:16

halt at the end of November. And

15:20

as had happened on Army Group Center's

15:22

left flank earlier, Army Group

15:24

South's far left flank was supposed

15:27

to be working with Schmidt, but

15:30

they had their own problems, so

15:32

could not contribute to Schmidt's goal,

15:34

unrealistic as it was. Thus

15:38

were the flanking attacks stalled, which

15:40

would be tolerable if the main show,

15:42

that is, von

15:45

Bock's Schwurppunk, or focal point,

15:47

literally heavy point, his attack

15:49

on the center, went

15:51

well. But Irony will

15:53

step in for a laugh, because, and

15:55

not that it probably would have made

15:58

a difference. one of Von Bock's. The

16:00

box officers will not only delay

16:02

with one of his flanking attacks,

16:04

but for his pains. He.

16:07

Will be given. Von Box

16:09

job. In. A matter of

16:11

days. He. Who lives

16:13

by the sword? Die. By

16:15

this. Postscript

16:17

General Andre Last, as commander of

16:20

the Soviet Twenty Eight Army, that

16:22

worked with the First Shock Army,

16:24

would later be captured trying to

16:27

help lift the siege of Leningrad.

16:30

And when he became a prisoner

16:32

keep defected to Nazi Germany now

16:34

on their sites he became the

16:36

leader of the Russian Liberation Army.

16:39

Does was mostly and intellectual exercise

16:41

versus a real formation of men

16:43

but it did allow the Germans

16:45

to say the Soviet soldiers stay

16:47

wie die you should surrender and

16:50

joined the Russian Liberation Army under

16:52

Generals Laws asked he will lead

16:54

you to freedom. This,

16:57

as you can imagine, rarely worked.

16:59

But by Nineteen Forty Four, the

17:01

Germans could see how this war

17:03

was going to play out if

17:06

something did not change. And so

17:08

that year Heinrich Himmler created a

17:10

real army of collaborationist. Officially the

17:13

are Oh A. But then Vlasov

17:15

change sides again and may Nineteen

17:17

Forty Five where they are Oh

17:20

A follow in his orders, helped

17:22

fight the Germans and the Prague

17:24

upright. Soon. After he

17:27

was captured by Soviet troops with

17:29

the Americans healthy. But. Then

17:31

he was given to the

17:33

Soviets who promptly tortured, tried

17:35

and in St. Greetings.

17:38

Everyone from Central Virginia. So as you

17:40

can probably tell by my rather sexy

17:43

voice, yeah, I've got something so the

17:45

nose is stuffed up, but I'm doing

17:47

the best I can so hopefully that

17:49

was into off putting any weights. I

17:51

like to say hi to some new

17:53

members and those who have donated, so

17:55

let's see here the latest members. Andrew

17:58

now men from Salisbury. Maryland

18:00

thank you very much Andrew as Steve

18:02

Cozier to see a not sure to

18:04

say it from Haber Town, Pennsylvania to

18:07

see a communications is where he spends

18:09

his days So thank you very much

18:11

Steve. As far as donations a see

18:14

there's a Stephen Mullet thank you very

18:16

much Stevens and a James Oswald who

18:18

recently sounds are the podcast is burning

18:20

through them stay as he sent me

18:23

very nice message about him and his

18:25

dad watching Old World War Two series

18:27

and he's us in join the podcast.

18:29

Alas a James thank you very much.

18:32

That's why I'm doing this so I'm

18:34

As I said on some interview many

18:36

many years ago, I got an ipod.

18:39

I was waiting for someone else to

18:41

start World War Two podcast like Mike

18:43

Duncan History Rome. It. Did

18:45

not come out. So out

18:47

of sheer frustration of or whatever I

18:49

decided start my own. but anyway it's

18:51

does just a little tidbits. Take care

18:54

everyone and we will see you soon

18:56

With the last of the Army Group

18:58

Center them will get Armor Group South

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cuts them up. And.

19:02

They will just go at it. Take.

19:04

Care everyone. Did.

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