0:08

Hello, and thank you for

0:10

listening to the History of World

0:12

War II podcast, episode 448, When

0:16

an Unstoppable Force Meets an

0:18

Immovable Object. Last

0:21

time, the War for Smolensk was just

0:23

about over. Indeed, Army Group

0:25

Centres Commander von Bock had

0:27

declared it so on August 5th. However,

0:31

there were many moving parts in play that

0:33

would affect the next few months and thus

0:35

end up being the

0:37

beginning of the end of

0:39

Operation Barbarossa, though it

0:41

would take a few years to play itself

0:43

out. First, Hitler

0:46

was determined to take panzers away

0:48

from von Bock and send them

0:50

towards Kiev and Leningrad to wrap

0:52

up those contests there, and

0:54

though Guderian and Hoth were not

0:56

keen on this, they mostly let

0:58

it go as they firmly believed

1:01

that Stalin could not still have

1:03

adequate forces in between them and

1:05

Moscow. Thus, the Soviet capital

1:08

would fall to infantry and

1:10

artillery alone. Next was

1:12

a coming clash as both sides

1:14

made plans for the Yelnya salient,

1:16

that is, a bit of German-controlled

1:18

territory that stuck out further than

1:20

the rest of the front. Hitler

1:23

had told von Bock that he

1:25

could launch limited raids from this

1:27

bulge, while Stalin, on August 1st,

1:30

ordered Zhukov to destroy that

1:32

same bulge. It was as

1:34

close to a counterattack as Stalin was going

1:36

to get for now. But

1:39

of course, the Soviets did not

1:41

know that Hitler had also ordered

1:43

that ten divisions be used to

1:45

defend the salient, their closest

1:48

point to the Russian capital. But

1:51

as we have seen, as the Battle of Smolensk

1:53

was coming to an end, the

1:55

Nazi High Command could not agree

1:57

on the next major objective. Should...

2:00

the three army groups, but certainly the

2:02

center one, give up on advancing and

2:04

focus on destroying all enemy troops in

2:07

front of them. Or should

2:09

the advance on Moscow continue to

2:11

cut off the head of the

2:13

chicken, or in this case the

2:15

Russian bear, which should bring about

2:17

numerous advantages for the attackers. Yet

2:21

as we have seen Hitler won

2:23

the browbeating contest before August was

2:25

over. Moscow would be

2:27

abandoned. For now, the panzers would

2:29

flow north and south away from

2:31

army group center, and the goal

2:33

now was to destroy the enemy

2:35

formations in front of them, if

2:37

only to give von Bock's men

2:39

in the salient a rest as

2:41

they were being hammered by the

2:43

Soviets. And a glimpse

2:45

of how to carry this out was given

2:48

to the Germans back on July 13th. With

2:51

them capturing so many Soviet armies,

2:53

on that day they learned that

2:55

Stalin had ordered Timoshenko, the Western

2:57

Front commander, to attack the

3:00

German forces which had just taken Smolensk,

3:02

and who were now trying to enclose

3:04

the Soviet troops in the area. But

3:07

here, Timoshenko was going to do to the

3:10

Germans what they had been doing to

3:12

the Russians since June 22nd, 1941. Going

3:17

back a bit, just as the battle

3:19

of Smolensk was getting underway, per

3:22

Zhukov's orders, Tim oshenko was

3:24

to use four armies to

3:26

surround the Germans themselves trying

3:28

to surround Smolensk. As

3:31

this was Eastern Europe slash Western Asia,

3:33

there was always going to be enough

3:35

space to line up

3:37

your men further afield. However,

3:40

Timoshenko was to also put aside the

3:42

16th, 19th, and

3:44

20th armies for any emergency that

3:46

arose. Plus, he was

3:49

to create five attack armies.

3:51

These were to be commanded

3:53

by NKVD generals and

3:55

Major General K.K. Roszkowski's

3:58

force. Such was... the

4:00

personnel resources of Soviet

4:02

Russia. As we have

4:04

seen, the attack around Smolensk was

4:07

going well for the Germans, but the

4:09

Soviet counterattack started in earnest on

4:11

July 23rd, when NKVD

4:14

Lieutenant General V.I. Kachelov

4:16

and his 28th Army

4:18

moved out to retake the town

4:21

of Popechep, located about 35 miles

4:24

or 56 kilometers southwest

4:26

of Yelnya. But

4:28

in order for this staggering amount of

4:30

troop movements to make any sense, certainly

4:32

on this massive scale, if

4:34

one was to draw half of a clock

4:37

face to the east of Smolensk, to

4:39

where the Germans would be standing after this

4:41

battle should all the area be taken, Popechep

4:44

is at the five o'clock position. With

4:47

Zhukov making sure this 28th Army,

4:49

as well as the other ones,

4:51

were larger than those of the

4:53

previous counterattacks, which had all failed,

4:56

Kachelov's men did well, at

4:59

first. Again, they started on

5:01

July 23rd, and by the 27th,

5:03

Guderian was getting nervous. His

5:06

job was to swing north to join

5:08

up with Hoth's panzers and thus close

5:10

the circle. But now it

5:12

looked as if his 10th Panzer

5:14

Division and the SS Division, Großdeutschland,

5:17

might get cut off from

5:19

the other German units. This

5:21

was intolerable, so Guderian gathered his

5:24

forces for his own counter-counter

5:27

attack. Just

5:29

south of where the 28th Army had

5:31

started their drive, and they were now

5:33

moving in a northwesterly direction, Guderian

5:36

had his 14th Panzer Corps, made up

5:38

of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions,

5:40

and 7th Army Corps, comprising the 197th,

5:42

23rd, and 78th Infantry Divisions, drive

5:48

east and head again to a

5:50

point just south of where the

5:52

28th Army had started. This was

5:54

done by July 31st, and the

5:57

next day, Guderian had his 9th

5:59

Army Corps made up of

6:01

two infantry divisions, drive a

6:03

bit further south, thus creating

6:05

a partial circle around Kachelas'

6:07

28th Army. It would

6:09

take six more days, but this attack by the

6:11

28th Army would stall and

6:13

be mauled in its turn. As

6:16

for General Kachelas, he would

6:18

not go the way of a coward, and

6:20

he died in a tank, leading a charge.

6:23

But the Germans' nightmares were

6:26

just beginning. Kachelas

6:28

had moved out on July 23rd,

6:30

but the next day, two other

6:33

NKVD armies joined in. Major

6:35

General V.A. Komenko's 30th Army,

6:38

made up of three rifle

6:40

divisions, a tank regiment, and

6:42

a fighter regiment, started their

6:44

drive due north of Yelnya,

6:46

so at the two o'clock

6:48

position. And just

6:50

below this 30th Army was

6:52

Major General S.A. Kalinin's 24th

6:54

Army of four rifle divisions

6:56

and one tank battalion. The

6:59

idea was for Komenko's 30th Army

7:01

to get the attention of the

7:03

Germans, which would, hopefully, allow

7:06

Kalinin's men to penetrate further

7:08

and faster into enemy territory.

7:11

Starting at the three o'clock position, if

7:14

Kalinin's men could make progress, they

7:16

would then be free to turn

7:18

north and surround the German troops

7:20

fighting Komenko's men, or they

7:23

could turn south and get in

7:25

behind the battlefront, just east of

7:27

Smolensk. That would cause tons

7:30

of headaches for von Bach. Unfortunately

7:32

for Komenko and Kalinin, Fliegerkorps

7:35

VIII had yet to depart to

7:37

help Army Group North, so they

7:39

were able to fly over the

7:41

Russians, mostly unopposed, and maul their

7:44

mainly infantry attacks. Thus,

7:46

much would not come from

7:48

this most hoped-for counterattack. It

7:51

would be the same for the other,

7:53

though unofficial, attacking formation, made

7:55

up of Colonel General Gordo

7:57

Vikhov's cavalry group, itself three-year.

8:00

cavalry groups and one rifle division.

8:03

About 100 miles southwest of

8:05

Smolensk, this cavalry group started

8:07

out well enough, given Guderian

8:09

a headache as this force

8:11

was in his rear, cutting

8:13

across his supply route. But

8:16

as this was trying to achieve something so

8:18

far in the German rear, other

8:20

German units made short work of

8:22

the cavalry. It was the

8:24

same for another attack far to the

8:26

north at the 12 o'clock position. This

8:30

was a lot of failure, but before

8:32

Stalin could truly go into panic mode

8:34

about the way to Moscow being open,

8:36

he learned that the one

8:39

non-NKVD army, that of Raskinkowski's,

8:41

had done better. Coming

8:44

in near the point between the

8:46

2 and 3 o'clock, Raskinowski had

8:48

the smallest of formations and it

8:50

guarded the most important area, that

8:52

being the road to Moscow.

8:55

Yet perhaps the non-NKVD officer wanted to

8:57

prove himself, or because he knew what

9:00

would happen to him if he failed,

9:03

if the Germans didn't get him first, this

9:05

man achieved the most while

9:08

not being successful. Rushing

9:11

forward with only two rifle

9:13

and four artillery regiments, not

9:15

divisions, these men engaged

9:17

the Germans. Then the general

9:19

got a lucky break as he came upon some

9:21

stragglers of the 38th Rifle Division

9:24

who had been beaten further west.

9:26

Also the general found 90 tanks

9:29

without a leader. He

9:31

gave them a leader himself and

9:34

a cause to join him in stopping

9:36

the enemy from reaching Moscow. Whether

9:39

Raskinowski was surprised the Germans were

9:41

rushing at him is unknown, but

9:44

not only did his men stop

9:46

the German advance, soon they turned

9:48

the enemy around. This

9:50

was something that the 7th Panzer

9:52

nor the 20th Motorized Divisions were

9:55

used to. Neither was

9:57

von Bock who sent the 17th Panzer

9:59

to a of

12:00

the situation in the last few days, the

12:02

appearance of strong enemy forces on the front

12:05

and to the flanks of Army Group Center,

12:07

the supply position, and the need to give

12:09

2nd and 3rd armored groups

12:12

about 10 days to rehabilitate

12:14

their units makes it

12:16

necessary to postpone. For the moment,

12:18

the further tasks and objectives lay

12:20

down in Director No. 33 of

12:22

19th July. That

12:27

Army Group North would continue to attempt

12:29

to encircle Leningrad and meet up with

12:31

the Finnish Army. That Army

12:34

Group Center would go over to

12:36

the defensive, taking advantage of suitable

12:38

terrain. But that attacks

12:40

with limited objectives may be

12:42

still mounted there. That

12:45

operations on the Southeastern Front

12:47

will, for the present, be

12:49

conducted only by formations of

12:51

Army Group South. That

12:53

the Air Force will switch the main

12:55

weight of air attacks to the Northeastern

12:57

Front. These reinforcements will be

12:59

moved up in time to go into

13:02

action at the beginning of the offensive

13:04

by Army Group North and

13:06

at its vital point, which was early

13:08

morning, August 6th. Besides

13:10

his fear of going the way

13:12

of Napoleon, Hitler could see for

13:14

himself that Army Groups North and

13:16

South had been unable to duplicate

13:19

Center's success of surrounding and

13:21

destroying large groups of enemy troops.

13:24

This left von Bock's flanks open

13:26

to attack. Hence, it

13:28

didn't make sense to go further with

13:30

his panzers until at least the South

13:33

could be locked down and the battle

13:35

line pushed further closer

13:37

to Moscow. And

13:40

yet, the generals around

13:42

Hitler still hemmed and hawn as

13:44

they did not agree with their

13:46

leaders' plans. After all,

13:48

Bock's League was to cut through

13:50

an enemy's forces, reach the capital

13:52

or whatever important point, and

13:55

end the hostilities quickly. Now,

13:57

here was Hitler thinking in more traditional

14:00

traditional ways of fighting, and the

14:02

German army simply did not have

14:04

the manpower, resources, nor supplies for

14:07

such an endeavor. Thus,

14:09

the grumbling continued. To

14:12

wit, Hitler issued his own declaration,

14:14

as if he needed to explain

14:17

himself. But apparently, he

14:19

did. On August 21st,

14:21

he sent out to all the

14:23

commands the principal object that must

14:25

yet be achieved before the onset

14:27

of winter is not the capture

14:30

of Moscow, but rather in the

14:32

south, the occupation of the Crimea

14:34

and the industrial and coal regions

14:36

of the Donets. This

14:38

was his attempt to answer his

14:41

staff's question, which was namely, we

14:44

only have enough time and

14:46

resources for one big push.

14:49

Where should it be? Per Hitler,

14:51

it would be in the south. But

14:54

he still approved offensive actions

14:56

for Guderian and Hoth. Hitler

14:59

was making a declaration and

15:01

then breaking it. Which one can

15:03

do if one is the

15:05

warlord in question? Either

15:08

way, Guderian and Hoth were ready to

15:10

go. Back on July 20th,

15:12

46 Panzer Corps under

15:14

General Heinrich von Wittenhof had seized

15:16

a Yellnea bridgehead over the Dessna

15:19

River and strengthened it. By now,

15:21

the Panzer Corps as well as

15:23

the others were used to this

15:26

and expected, as always, to start

15:28

moving again in a few days.

15:31

After all, that's how it went. There

15:33

would be a battle for a bridgehead, the

15:35

Germans would win, and then they would spend

15:38

the next few days bringing more men across,

15:40

adding on other pontoon bridges, and

15:42

cleaning up any enemy activity

15:44

behind them, and then

15:46

move on. But times, they

15:49

were a-changin'. There would be

15:52

no big move in the next few days,

15:54

or even in the next few weeks, for

15:56

the Russians were

15:58

coming. Experians like

16:00

the other generals, like Nazi military

16:03

philosophy, focused on the offensive,

16:06

but defense wasn't ignored,

16:08

just de-emphasized. And up

16:10

till now, it hadn't been needed all that much. Again,

16:14

that was about to change. Parts

16:17

of the 10th Panzer Division and the

16:19

SS Reich Division were currently holding Jäunier,

16:22

but before there could be another dash,

16:24

albeit slower, as many panzers had been

16:26

moved to the north or south, Temoshenko

16:30

started in with his attacks.

16:32

And the plural tense here hardly

16:35

does it justice. Temoshenko

16:38

was told by Zhukov, who was

16:40

ordered by Stalin, to have Soviet

16:42

troops trapped in the Smolensk pocket,

16:45

freed by September 8th. So

16:47

for the next two weeks, Russian troops

16:49

came at the town Yelnya at

16:52

least 12 times each

16:54

and every day. The Germans

16:56

now thoroughly subsumed with defensive

16:58

gestures, one each time, but

17:01

each time afterward, they had

17:03

less ammunition. They had less

17:05

fuel and fewer men. The

17:08

good news for the Germans was that

17:10

as the Smolensk pocket was hard upon,

17:13

as it was being ruthlessly reduced, more

17:15

and more German infantry were being freed

17:18

up to help rush to Yelnya to

17:20

keep the city in German hands. And

17:23

those men would be needed, as

17:26

it was about to get worse, because,

17:28

well, it can always get

17:31

worse. By

17:34

mid-August, most of von Bock's panzers

17:36

were heading either for Leningrad or

17:38

Kiev, which forced the 9th

17:40

and 4th armies to now defend the

17:42

area. Following the

17:45

departing panzers, most of Kesselring's two

17:47

Flieger corps went with them. And

17:50

as this was the farthest east

17:52

the Germans had penetrated, they were

17:54

just beyond their own supply line,

17:57

Which was the exact opposite for the Russians.

18:00

With each retreat, Their. Supply

18:02

lines shrink. And.

18:04

Then it happened. The. Blitzkrieg for

18:07

now. Was. At an end. Focusing.

18:10

On defense to allow the loaned

18:12

Panzer to do their jobs in

18:14

the north and south, the Germans

18:16

gave up the initiative and Timoshenko.

18:19

Caught. It. Before. Could even

18:21

hit the ground. By

18:23

August eleventh, Timoshenko was city

18:25

von box along his entire

18:28

front. The. River Va up

18:30

north of Ya Nia was caused

18:32

by the Soviet Nineteenth Army,

18:34

which was supported by the one

18:37

hundred and first tank divisions and

18:39

forty third mixed aviation division.

18:41

Together, they were able to penetrate

18:44

six miles into German held territory

18:46

before being held up themselves

18:48

by Russian exhaustion and German determination.

18:50

Meanwhile, as Timoshenko harried the Germans

18:53

north of the only Us

18:55

zoo costs now and command of

18:57

the Reserve Front. Focused on

19:00

the town itself which allow the

19:02

Soviet fiftieth and Fifty Third cavalry

19:04

divisions to get into the German

19:07

rear to caused all kinds of

19:09

hell. And. Very few German

19:11

soldiers during this time along the

19:13

front were spared from this hell

19:16

for the next two weeks, German

19:18

soldiers could not remember a time

19:20

when they were not been bombed

19:22

or strafed for watching enemy parachutists

19:25

come down behind them for fighting

19:27

off maddening attacks or surviving hours

19:29

long artillery bombardment and as he

19:31

only us was to have been

19:34

a temporary stop only before Hitler

19:36

one against his generals. It.

19:38

Was not suited for defense. Whatever

19:40

the Germans did to hold the

19:43

Soviets had base. They. Would have

19:45

to do on their own. Yet

19:48

this tale of woe was about to come

19:50

to an end and not a happy one.

19:52

For. the germans on august

19:54

thirtieth following a three hour

19:57

artillery barrage and remember the

19:59

soviets more pieces than did the

20:01

Germans, Soviet forces charged

20:03

forward and pushed back the German

20:05

23rd Infantry Division some

20:08

six miles, which was bad

20:10

enough. But the number of German men

20:13

and equipment being lost in each process

20:15

was too much. This was not

20:18

sustainable. So on September 2nd, von

20:21

Braudlich, Halder, and von Bock

20:23

all agreed, Yelnya

20:26

was to be abandoned. The

20:28

9th and 20th German Army Corps pulled

20:30

back on September 5th, which allowed the

20:32

Soviet 100th, 103rd, 309th, and

20:37

120th Rifle Divisions to

20:39

re-enter Yelnya. Stalin,

20:41

for once, got his

20:44

way. As for the loaned

20:46

panzers that went north and south, in

20:49

early September, Army Group North,

20:51

now reinforced, reached the

20:53

suburbs of Leningrad and cut the

20:55

city from any and all land

20:57

communications. And to the

20:59

south, the soon to be over Battle

21:02

of Kiev was not only another German

21:04

victory, but the largest

21:06

one to date, with two-thirds of

21:08

a million troops being trapped in

21:10

this Kessel or pocket. And

21:13

this Kessel was the size of Belgium.

21:16

To Guderian and Hoth, this looked

21:18

like Hitler was clearing the flanks

21:20

of Army Group Center so they

21:23

could continue to push towards Moscow.

21:25

And it seemed they were right. On

21:28

September 6th, with the Battle of

21:30

Kiev ending in another 20 days,

21:32

and that seemed a foregone conclusion,

21:34

Hitler issued Directive No. 35,

21:37

which stated in part, the

21:40

flanking Army Groups have

21:42

created the prerequisites for

21:44

conducting a decisive operation

21:46

against Army Group Temoshenko.

21:48

And Hitler wanted this done ASAP, so

21:51

that we can go on the offensive

21:53

in the general direction of the asthma

21:56

and destroy the enemy in the region

21:58

east of Smolensk level envelopment.

22:01

After destroying the main mass

22:03

of Timoshenko's group of forces

22:06

in decisive encirclement operations, Army

22:08

Group Center will begin pursuing enemy

22:11

forces along the Moscow Axis. With

22:14

this, von Bock was only too

22:16

happy to realize that Guderian and

22:18

his panzers would be returning just

22:21

as soon as Kiev was beaten down,

22:24

and from the north he would

22:26

also receive the return of Colonel

22:28

General Hoppner's 4th Panzer Group. But

22:31

not only was Army Group Center to destroy the

22:33

forces in front of them, they

22:35

were to make sure that nothing

22:37

of significance made it back

22:40

to Moscow, thus leaving it relatively

22:43

undefended. Time

22:45

would tell. Greetings

22:50

everyone from Central Virginia. So I just

22:52

want to say hello to some members

22:54

and thank those who have donated. Let's

22:57

see here, latest members, Melanie Jacobs

22:59

from Folsom, California. Thank you, Melanie.

23:02

Nicholas is at Nierhood, I believe, from

23:04

Graham, Washington. Thank you, Nicholas, and he

23:06

also wrote to me. Thank you very

23:08

much. As far as those who have

23:10

donated making this Christmas a little brighter,

23:13

and I certainly do appreciate it, Jeffrey

23:16

Meredith. Also, there was

23:18

Dale Fowler, and I think Dale

23:20

has donated before, thank you, Dale.

23:22

Scott Wilson, and again, Nicholas Nierhood,

23:26

sorry Nicholas, I keep butchering that, and you even

23:28

sent me an email on how to pronounce your

23:30

name. That's how embarrassed

23:32

I am right now. Let's see

23:34

here. Then there's my favorite one,

23:36

Poeticus Program College Bound. I

23:39

hope someone is bound for college

23:41

and they listen to the show.

23:43

So whoever, thank you very much.

23:45

There's also Ken Johnston and Matayosh

23:48

Dirks. So if I'm overpronouncing that,

23:50

I normally underpronounce it. I apologize,

23:52

but that's what it said on

23:55

Google, so I'm going with it. And

23:57

lastly, I would like to make a special

23:59

mention. of Eli Vanderley, who

24:02

is from Eaton Rapids, Michigan. He sent me

24:04

a very nice email. Thank you very much,

24:06

Eli. And I hope everybody has

24:09

a wonderful Christmas, even if you don't deserve

24:11

it. I certainly don't. And

24:13

a happy new year and spend time with your friends

24:15

and family, because at the end

24:17

of the day, that's all that matters.

24:21

Take care, everyone. For

24:24

the ones who get it done, the most important

24:26

part is the one you need now, and the

24:28

best partner is the one who can deliver. That's

24:31

why millions of maintenance and repair pros

24:33

trust Grainger, because we have professional grade

24:35

supplies for every industry, even hard to

24:37

find products. And we have same day

24:40

pickup and next day delivery on most

24:42

orders. But most importantly, we have an

24:44

unwavering commitment to help keep you up

24:46

and running. Call, clickgringer.com, or just stop

24:48

by. Grainger, for the ones

24:51

who get it done.