What are we talking about when we are talking about doing science? How is doing science different from the other forms that we call knowledge or discovery? This is the philosophical task at hand covered by Karl Popper in his work Conjectures and Refutations. I have already done several episodes on Popper's book The Open Society And Its Enemies; but I thought it would be fruitful to talk a little as well about some of the philosophical underpinnings of the scientific method as they strike me as similar to the concept of fallibility which is so crucial in understanding liberalism.

In this episode I discuss Popper's notions on:

- The problem of demarcation in science

- The difference between asking "How do you know that?" vs "How can be best eliminate errors?"

- Criticizing our own theories if we can - Critical Rationalism

- Verificationism actually a weakness of a theory, not a strength of it.

- Scientific theories are risky - and can be disproved by certain observations

- Irrefutability a vice

- Dogmatic thinking in line with verification thinking and critical thinking in line with scientific thinking

- Using philosophy to solve problems outside of philosophy - its about problem solving not just internal gazing

I hope you enjoy another episode from the unperishable Karl Popper.