Episode Transcript
Transcripts are displayed as originally observed. Some content, including advertisements may have changed.
Use Ctrl + F to search
0:06
Welcome
0:07
to the MedFavor Show. where the focus is
0:09
on helping you grow and preserve your wealth. Join
0:11
us as we discuss the craft of investing and
0:13
uncover new and profitable ideas, all
0:15
to help you grow wealthier and wiser. Better
0:17
investing starts here.
0:19
Matt Faber is the cofounder and chief investment officer
0:22
at Cambria Investment Management due to industry
0:24
regulations will not discuss any of Camry's funds
0:26
on this podcast. All opinions expressed by podcast
0:28
participants are solely their own opinions and do not reflect
0:30
the opinion of Camry Investment Management or affiliates.
0:33
For more information, visit kymriahinvestments
0:35
dot com. In
0:39
the
0:39
first half of twenty twenty two,
0:41
both stocks and bonds were
0:43
down. You've heard us talk about the importance
0:46
of diversifying beyond just stocks and bonds
0:48
alone on this podcast. And if you're looking for
0:50
an asset that can help you diversify your portfolio
0:52
and provide a potential hedge against
0:54
inflation and rising food prices, Look
0:57
no further than farmland. Now you
0:59
may be thinking yourself, Ma'am, I don't
1:01
wanna fly to a rural area. Work
1:03
with a broker. I've never met four, spend
1:05
hundreds of thousands of dollars to buy a farm
1:07
and then go figure out how to run it by myself.
1:09
Sounds like a nightmare. That's where
1:12
aaker trader comes in. acre trader
1:14
is an investing platform that makes it simple
1:16
to own shares of agricultural land and earn
1:18
passive income. They recently added Timberlin
1:21
to their offerings, and they have one or two properties
1:23
hitting the platform every week.
1:25
So you can start building a diverse ag land
1:27
portfolio quickly and easily online.
1:30
I personally invested it on Accur trader,
1:32
and can say it was an easy process.
1:34
If you wanna learn more about Accur trader,
1:36
check out episode three twelve. when I
1:38
spoke with the founder, Carter Molloy.
1:40
And if you're interested in deeper understanding
1:42
on how to become a farmland investor through their
1:44
platform, please visit acertrader dot
1:47
com forward slash med. That's acertrader
1:49
dot com forward slash med.
1:53
Audi
1:53
Friends, we got a fantastic show today.
1:56
Our guest is Andy Duke, a consultant in
1:58
the decision making space and previously
1:59
a professional poker player who's won
2:02
millions and millions of bucks. She's
2:04
also a bestselling author of books like
2:06
thinking in Bets and just released her newest
2:09
book, Quit, the power of
2:11
knowing when to walk away. Today's
2:13
episode, Annie shares why quitting
2:15
isn't always as bad as advertised. She
2:18
shares why biases lead us
2:20
to want to either quit a trade too early or
2:22
avoid quitting a bad trade and shares
2:24
actionable advice you can take to counteract
2:26
this problem. As we wind down,
2:28
we touch on the alliance for decision education,
2:31
a nonprofit and he founded
2:33
to empower students with essential skills
2:35
to make better decisions. Be sure
2:37
to check the link in the show notes for
2:39
the organization's virtual poker
2:41
tournament on October twenty seventh
2:43
at six thirty PM eastern. If
2:46
you retweet or repost my episode
2:48
with Annie on either Twitter or LinkedIn,
2:51
you'll be entered to receive a free entry
2:53
into the poker tournament. that's worth
2:55
twenty five hundred dollars. Please
2:58
note this episode with the fantastic Annie
3:00
Duke.
3:02
And they welcome the show. Well,
3:04
thank you for having me. I'm excited to
3:06
be here.
3:07
You know, I've probably spent
3:09
I was trying to think of someone
3:12
who I've spent more time with over
3:14
the last few years who I've never met in
3:16
person who I've actually never talked to
3:18
you're probably somewhere in the top
3:20
five. I've listened to all your podcast
3:23
and I've read your books You
3:25
have a new one out. We're gonna get into today
3:27
called Quit. So
3:29
I'm really excited. Before we get to your newest
3:31
book, which is great, and it
3:33
just come out I think it's probably
3:35
important to talk a little bit about
3:37
to the extent you can them. Your
3:39
first two books because it gives somewhat
3:41
of a framework and lead in to your most
3:44
recent
3:45
book. And I feel like it's hard to skip over
3:47
your writings and
3:49
and hop directly to what we're gonna talk about
3:51
today. So
3:51
Give us
3:53
a quick summary from the author herself
3:56
of your first two.
3:58
Really what the first two are exploring?
3:59
in
4:01
broadly is the problem
4:03
that we have as decision makers
4:05
in terms of
4:07
uncertainty.
4:08
though So Pretty
4:10
much every decision you make
4:13
is
4:13
made under uncertainty, and the uncertainty comes
4:16
in two forms. One
4:19
is just plain luck.
4:21
Right?
4:21
Like, you you could be totally omniscient,
4:24
and
4:24
you could
4:25
understand what the future might hold
4:28
perfectly from a probabilistic
4:30
standpoint. So you could know for sure, like, I'm
4:32
gonna win eighty percent at the time and twenty
4:34
percent at the time. But once you've made
4:36
the decision, you actually don't have control
4:39
over when you're going to observe
4:41
that eighty percent versus the
4:43
twenty percent So that means
4:45
that sort of definitionally speaking,
4:47
twenty percent of the time you're getting to get a bad outcome.
4:49
And you just don't have any control over that
4:51
even if you have perfect knowledge. But
4:54
then the fact is that for
4:56
most of the decisions we make, we don't
4:58
have perfect knowledge. So we try to
5:00
approach that But
5:01
for most of the things that we decide about, we
5:03
know very little in comparison to all there
5:05
is to be known. And we're trying to do some
5:07
forecasting, making educated guesses,
5:10
about what we think that the future might
5:12
hold given any option that
5:14
we're considering. But, I mean, we've all had
5:16
that feeling
5:17
after the fact of,
5:18
I wish I had known then what I
5:20
know now. And that's that feeling
5:23
of that sort of exertion of
5:26
hidden
5:26
information on the outcomes
5:28
that you get. So I was
5:30
really in both of those books, I was exploring
5:32
the topic, thinking about, I was
5:34
exploring that topic generally and how
5:36
it really
5:37
kind of can wreak havoc on
5:40
our ability to close feedback
5:42
loops. you know,
5:43
obviously, the way that we learn is from
5:46
experience partly. So
5:48
you make a decision, you get an outcome,
5:50
you say, what did I learn from that? And
5:52
then hopefully, that makes you make better decisions
5:54
going forward. But the influence
5:56
of luck and hit information make that
5:58
actually quite hard to do. to
6:00
figure out, like, what is the relationship between
6:02
outcomes and decisions? Because in the
6:04
short run, that relationship is
6:06
pretty loose. And what I
6:08
was trying to sort of explore there
6:11
was where do we go wrong
6:12
in figuring out
6:15
sort of what this feedback means? and
6:17
how could we maybe get a little bit better? So
6:19
that was what thinking embeds was about. And
6:21
then how to decide what's really just
6:23
a practical book to go along
6:25
with thinking embeds which it's to
6:27
say the thing you have control over
6:29
is the hidden information part. So I'm gonna
6:31
give you some tools, some real practical tools
6:33
that you can implement in your daily life
6:35
to try to improve quality of the
6:37
decisions that you make by improving
6:39
the quality of the information that's
6:41
going into the decision and by
6:43
learning how to actually structure the
6:45
way that you think about an option. Right? So
6:47
you have an option, you have to think about what are the
6:49
different possible outcomes, what are the payoffs, what
6:51
are the probabilities of those occurring all
6:53
informed obviously by your
6:55
mental models or the mathematical
6:57
models that you have or the information or the
6:59
facts on the ground that you believe that you know that
7:01
are relevant to what
7:03
you're deciding about. So that
7:06
was what that book was about. In how
7:08
to decide however, there
7:10
was a very short little section,
7:13
which was about a page and a half long,
7:15
which was actually about quitting. And
7:18
I was making the point that one of the things
7:20
that I wanted to explore in that is that when you
7:22
sort of look at some of the methods that
7:24
you might employee to
7:26
improve decision making, to improve our ability
7:28
to close these feedback loops. It
7:30
seems like you're gonna be taking a lot
7:32
of time. with your decisions which
7:35
is daunting because we make lots and lots of
7:37
decisions and, like, where are we gonna find the time
7:39
for that? And so chapter seven of
7:41
how to decide actually explores
7:43
how you might speed your decision making up.
7:45
Because for a lot of things that we decide, we should actually
7:47
be going faster. We should use a better process.
7:50
we should go faster because the amount of certainty
7:53
that we actually need in order to make a decision
7:55
is a lot less than we tend to
7:57
accumulate. And said one of the
7:59
things, and it's about a page and a half in there. One of
8:01
the things that allows you to go faster is that you have the
8:03
option to quit. Because when
8:05
you make a decision
8:07
under uncertainty, under
8:09
the influence of luck and hidden information, after
8:12
you've started something or after you've made the decision,
8:14
there's gonna be new information covered.
8:16
And having the ability
8:18
to change your mind makes it so that you
8:20
can be less certain when you make the initial
8:23
choice. So I had that little section in
8:25
how to decide that then blooms into you
8:27
know, I didn't know it at the time when I was writing it,
8:29
but it ended up blooming into the
8:30
current book that I wrote. I
8:32
was thinking about this this morning out
8:34
in the ocean, and I
8:36
think there's probably no other
8:38
phrase if you were
8:40
to say to me or I have a five year old
8:42
now. So if the teacher or
8:44
one of the coaches or something came
8:46
up to me and they said, you know
8:48
what, your
8:49
son's a quitter. I can't think of anything that
8:51
would, like, crush my soul or
8:53
be, like, you know, just, like,
8:55
viscerally,
8:55
emotionally, just hit
8:58
or particularly anyone who's involved in
9:00
sports. Right? Like, I feel like that phrase
9:02
is so ingrained. That's
9:04
like the number one
9:05
you can
9:06
be a terrible athlete, whatever, but like
9:08
a quitter. And
9:09
so this phrase, there's
9:11
so much
9:12
baggage maybe being the wrong word,
9:15
but a lot wrapped up in
9:16
this concept.
9:17
So
9:19
talk to us a little bit about why,
9:21
you know, quitting in general
9:23
may have a bad rap. I
9:25
think I've maybe heard you say at some point,
9:27
but It definitely has
9:28
a bad rap. Well, okay.
9:30
So you've kind of gotten to
9:32
kinda one of the core reasons why I wrote the book is
9:34
that I'm on a mission to rehabilitate the word
9:36
for people to realize that quitting is
9:38
totally fine. So
9:41
here's the issue. Like, I can tell you all sorts
9:43
of situations where your son might
9:45
quit in the middle of a game,
9:47
where if they continued, you would think it
9:49
was a stupid choice. like,
9:51
if your son got a concussion, I
9:54
assume you would very much like him to
9:56
quit. And it's really easy to
9:58
come up with all sorts situations
9:59
we're quitting is the better choice. Here's
10:02
the problem, I think, like, really broadly
10:04
before we get into the details that
10:06
we have when we're thinking about this great
10:08
quit decision. is that we think of them as
10:10
somehow as opposing forces, as
10:12
if it's a binary. And
10:15
when we think about this dichotomy,
10:18
them as opposing forces, grit
10:20
has won the day for sure. Like, grit
10:22
is a virtue. When you
10:23
say that someone's gritty, you're saying something
10:26
very very good about them. It's
10:28
synonymous with character. When
10:30
our child, you know,
10:31
starts
10:32
something like playing the trombone,
10:34
and then they come and complain to you,
10:36
you try to push them to continue to do it in
10:38
order to build their character, to
10:40
teach them to not be a quitter. And
10:43
quitting is a vice.
10:46
Right? It's synonymous with the lack of
10:48
character. In fact, it's synonymous
10:50
with cowardice. So
10:52
we have I mean, if you sort of go through,
10:55
like, thesaurus and you look at what are the
10:57
synonyms for grid and what are the synonyms for
10:59
quitting or or
11:01
you'll see that it's very heavily
11:03
imbalanced where grit is positive
11:05
and grit is negative. So we're seeing this
11:07
reflected back at us in the
11:09
English language. so much so
11:11
that when people
11:14
who clearly like,
11:16
nobody could question their grit, are
11:19
faced with a choice of like retirement,
11:21
so let's take Lindsay Von and Serena
11:23
Williams. What you'll see from
11:25
them is that they'll announce that they're leaving
11:27
the sport and then they'll follow
11:29
it with saying, I'm not quitting.
11:32
And they'll usually say something like, I'm
11:34
starting a new chapter or
11:36
I'm excited for what the future is going
11:38
to bring.
11:38
Serena says she is evolving.
11:41
She's
11:41
evolving. There you go. I'm evolving.
11:44
it seems so weird. Right? Lindsey
11:46
Vaughan is clearly
11:48
really gritty, but when she retired, she
11:50
announced that she wasn't quitting. She
11:52
said, I'm stopping skiing. This is in her
11:54
announcement. I am
11:55
stopping skiing. My body is broken.
11:58
Broken and it's
11:58
screaming at me to
11:59
stop. And then she followed it with, but
12:02
I'm not quitting. She
12:03
said, but
12:04
but you are quitting and why are you so afraid to
12:06
say this? And then same thing with Serena
12:08
Williams. Like, she's not quitting. She's evolving.
12:10
No. She's quitting. She's not gonna play professional
12:12
tennis anymore. She's quitting. That's
12:13
fine. she's,
12:15
you know, the
12:16
goat.
12:17
So I think she's allowed to do that, same
12:19
thing with Lindsay Von. But we have
12:21
such a negative bias toward the word
12:23
that when we do actually
12:25
quit and we want to talk about it to other
12:28
people, we use all these euphemisms,
12:30
like we evolve, like starting
12:32
a new chapter. The big
12:34
one in business is pivot.
12:38
But
12:38
pivoting is quitting.
12:40
So
12:40
why do we feel the need to
12:42
sort of, like, give the word, the
12:45
Voldemort treatment? Like, that's that
12:47
would not be said. And instead,
12:49
like, you know, serve it soft with
12:51
these euphemisms so that we can avoid
12:53
actually saying the word. So that's that's
12:55
really what I'm trying to do is just say, like, we
12:57
have to start this. And we have to
12:59
recognize that
13:02
there's
13:02
so many different cognitive biases
13:04
that I'm sure people are familiar with from
13:06
reading, you know, thinking fast and slow and why not
13:08
from Daniel Commons work and Richard Taylor's work,
13:10
that all you can pull the
13:12
same thread through them, which is
13:14
we have trouble as human beings stopping.
13:16
It's
13:17
very hard for us to be willing to do
13:20
that. And we have this big bias, which I
13:22
think
13:22
is probably surprising to people.
13:24
We have a bias toward grit.
13:26
in
13:26
general. So, you know,
13:28
people love Angela Duckworth's book
13:30
as do I, by the way. And I
13:32
think that if you read my book, I hope you have already
13:35
read hers. And if you haven't
13:37
read her book grit, you should go read it
13:39
because she
13:39
the science that she's talking
13:41
about is really important. But
13:43
given the popularity of those kinds of
13:44
books, I think that if you ask most people, like,
13:47
what's the what's the, you know,
13:49
sort of worse
13:50
part of the human condition. You
13:52
know, do you think do you think it is that
13:54
we just like quit things too much or that we
13:56
stick to things too long? And I think
13:58
most people will just intuitively
13:59
say, oh, we quit too much.
14:01
That's
14:01
the popularity of those books. But when you
14:04
actually look at the science, It's
14:06
actually usually the case that we stick to things
14:08
too long. And I think that's what we need to
14:10
recognize. And if that's the case, then
14:12
quitting is a good thing. So why are why are we
14:14
so mad at the word? you
14:16
talk a lot about opportunity cost
14:19
as
14:19
a way to think about quitting. And I think
14:21
that's for those who who
14:23
are listening to this topic, maybe walk
14:25
us through about how should we think about in
14:27
our lives, you know, some examples
14:30
of how we can implement this in a
14:32
thoughtful way that that is beneficial
14:34
rather than kinda getting stuck in
14:36
all sorts of situations. because my
14:38
goodness. I mean, there's so many examples, whether
14:40
it's personal relationships, whether it's
14:42
jobs, whether it's, you
14:45
know, moving on and on. How
14:47
can we start to think about this where it's
14:49
additive? So
14:49
let's try to take this a little bit of the time.
14:52
We can see how how the conversation goes. So
14:54
let me just start with opportunity cost.
14:56
So the issue with opportunity cost
14:58
is anytime you're you're pursuing a
15:00
particular path. That means
15:02
that that's time and attention that you can't
15:05
spend pursuing something else. So,
15:07
like, in a this simple sense, let's imagine
15:09
you're an investor and you're fully committed. And
15:11
then
15:11
you see something else another
15:14
trade that you'd like to put on. If
15:15
you're fully committed, that's stopping you from
15:18
being able to make that trade. So you would have
15:20
to quit some part
15:22
of your portfolio in order to free the capital
15:24
up to be
15:25
able to do the other thing. And
15:28
what you're saying is
15:30
the path that I'm on has a certain expected
15:32
value. I'm either winning to it or
15:34
I'm losing to it by a certain amount.
15:37
And there's also an expected value
15:39
associated with the paths that I am not taking,
15:42
and that is the opportunity cost.
15:43
Right? So if you're
15:45
on a path and there's some other path
15:47
that you could be on, where you would be
15:50
generating more profit. And
15:52
I'm not just talking about money, it could be more happiness,
15:54
for example. So let's think about
15:56
it as broadly as you more
15:59
ground towards your
15:59
goals.
16:01
Then the fact that you're doing
16:03
the thing you're doing has
16:05
costs associated with it. Those are
16:07
opportunity cons meaning that you can't go and do the thing that
16:09
would be better. And this
16:11
becomes a really important kind of starting
16:13
point for how think about quitting is that I
16:15
think that part of the problem for us
16:17
with quitting is we think if we quit, we stop
16:19
our progress.
16:21
at
16:21
least it slows us down.
16:23
But
16:23
actually quitting done well because
16:25
quitting is a skill. We ought to get good at it.
16:27
Qu quitting done well speeds us
16:29
up. it gets us to our goals more quickly
16:32
because if we're on a path
16:34
where say we're losing ground,
16:37
or where we're not gaining very much ground
16:39
in comparison to other things that we could be
16:41
doing. If we quit, then
16:43
we can do those other things that are gonna
16:45
cause us to gain more ground. So
16:48
when you quit at the right time, you're
16:50
actually gonna get to where you wanna go
16:52
faster. So I think
16:54
that's kind of a piece and that's getting
16:56
that concept of opportunity costs wrapped
16:58
into the way that we think about
17:00
quitting. So that would be kind of the FERC's place I
17:02
would go. There's a lot of other
17:03
places to go, which we can certainly talk about.
17:05
Well,
17:06
we'll wander down some paths. And so
17:08
I think here's the hard
17:10
part for a lot of people, you
17:12
know, quitting for many
17:15
it is, like, a finality. Right? Like,
17:17
it the the hard part for many is, like, it closes
17:19
the door on whatever it is. And it
17:21
could be a dream. It could be something trivial.
17:24
But it means it's And so in many
17:26
cases, I think people struggle with the
17:28
quitting concept because
17:32
Everyone's, in my mind, like, always
17:34
hopeful and cheering for something to work out,
17:36
whatever it may be, regardless
17:38
of the opportunity cost. Like, it it
17:40
implies a sense of fidelity and and and
17:42
maybe failure or maybe not so much
17:44
failure. But in the hard part and you talk about this
17:46
in the book, is there so
17:48
many examples of hindsight
17:51
bias where you look at it. Look, I live in
17:54
LA. So
17:55
many actors, producers,
17:58
involved
17:58
in this world that are just
17:59
hustling and struggling.
18:02
And, I mean, it's like
18:04
investment banking, but
18:06
with less pay. It's so competitive.
18:10
And you look out and you say,
18:12
okay. Well, at what
18:14
point is this like you know,
18:16
that I move on. You know, I've had a little bit
18:18
of success, but at what point? And then
18:20
you look at the people like Anthony Hopkins,
18:22
John Hamm, others who had
18:24
success they win win win and, like,
18:26
they're, like, fifty or something.
18:27
Okay. So John Ham and Anthony
18:30
Hopkins. Great examples. Right? So we wanna be
18:32
really survivorship bias, which
18:34
student retrospect is not true necessarily
18:36
prospectively. So we'll point
18:38
to people who, oh, they work to
18:40
work to work to work to work words and was until they were in their days
18:42
until they finally found success
18:44
and never give up never
18:46
give up. I actually saw someone post on Twitter, you
18:48
know, we know that the venture world is
18:50
little
18:51
slow at the moment. And there were
18:53
somebody who said, who's very successful,
18:55
who said, it took me fourteen
18:58
months to raise my So I say never
19:00
gave up. And the problem with that
19:01
is that what's true and retrospect is not
19:03
necessarily truth prospectively. Right?
19:06
So there's always
19:08
gonna be outliers. But for
19:10
every John
19:12
Hamm, there's
19:14
a hundred thousand people who,
19:16
you know, had big dreams and goals for
19:18
their selves and ended up being a waiter
19:20
with acting on the side.
19:23
for their whole lives.
19:25
So we have to remember
19:27
that, right, is that we have to think
19:29
about what the causal relationship is and not
19:31
fall prey to survivorship bias. So
19:33
the question is, like, how do you actually
19:36
untangle those problems, which are really
19:38
hard? Particularly when
19:40
Generally, when we're pursuing something,
19:43
there is some progress at least that we
19:45
feel we're making along the way. So if you take
19:47
something like acting, no doubt
19:49
John Ham got some roles. Were
19:53
they
19:53
the big breakout madman
19:55
role? No. But he was getting some roles. You
19:57
know, I'm sure he started off maybe extras, and
19:59
then he was gonna supporting roles or a
20:01
few lines here and there. And
20:03
it's really easy when you're in it, when you're in
20:05
the middle of that stuff to say my break is
20:08
coming tomorrow. I
20:09
just gotta keep going because I just got hired for
20:11
something and now I've seen this other producer and
20:13
I've created this other relationship. I know I
20:15
know that I'm gonna be able to break
20:18
through. but that can keep going on at infinitum.
20:20
And the problem
20:21
that we have is
20:24
a couplefold, one that you touched
20:27
on. which is that we set a goal,
20:29
which
20:29
is like a finish line and a race.
20:31
And so imagine if
20:32
you're running a marathon and and the finish
20:35
line is twenty six point two
20:37
miles. And you've made some progress.
20:39
You'd want eight miles or something, but then you break
20:41
your leg. Do you
20:42
continue running? And the problem
20:45
that we have is that we have intuition that we
20:47
won't. But a lot of people actually do
20:49
this. There's a woman I talk about in my book
20:51
called Siobhanokey. If you did this
20:53
and then three other people in that same
20:55
marathon. It was a two thousand nineteen
20:57
London marathon, and then just search marathons, and
20:59
you'll see that people are always doing this.
21:01
Because of what you said about failure,
21:03
is that we don't measure ourselves by, like,
21:05
I had a few acting rolls and that's okay.
21:08
We measure ourselves against it. We actually get
21:10
to twenty six point two miles. So It's
21:12
not that we gained eight miles. It's it's that
21:14
we're short the finish line. We're in
21:16
the losses, in this particular case,
21:18
by about eighteen miles. And
21:20
if we keep going, maybe we can actually achieve
21:22
the goal. But if
21:24
we quit, that's the moment
21:26
that we have to take a loss on
21:29
paper. and turn it into a realized
21:31
loss. Right? That's the moment that we
21:33
can never actually make it. If
21:35
we quit acting, we're never gonna
21:37
be John Hamm. And that's a
21:40
horrible moment for a human being.
21:42
Because as long as you have the gamble
21:44
on, in other words, you're continuing,
21:46
maybe you
21:46
can actually make it work.
21:48
And
21:48
when you quit, that's when
21:50
you're taking the sure loss. So
21:53
let's just start there. So one
21:55
of the things in in terms of untangling
21:57
these problems is to recognize that when you're in it,
21:59
when you're sort of facing those decisions
22:01
down, particularly as you start to
22:04
accumulate this
22:05
time and effort. And, you know, it becomes part
22:07
of your identity, what you're doing, and,
22:09
you know, you're you're sort of moving a little bit
22:11
toward your goals. It's gonna be really hard to
22:14
stop. So what we have to do with that is
22:16
not leave the decision to when we're in
22:18
it. We have to do it in
22:20
advance. So let's think about if
22:22
you started. Okay? because we can we can do it later,
22:24
but let's talk about let's say I set out
22:26
for LA, and I'm like, I'm
22:28
gonna be the next John Ham.
22:31
Basically, what you can do is say, what is my
22:33
tolerance beforehand? How
22:35
many years am I trying to give this a
22:37
go? am I willing to try to
22:39
give this a go? And figure that
22:41
out in advance, and
22:42
then decide what success looks
22:44
like for you. So, you
22:46
know,
22:46
let's say that you decide that you're young enough that
22:49
you're willing to give it five years, and
22:51
then say, what what do I need
22:53
to observe? like, how
22:55
many roles would I have to have gotten?
22:57
Would I have to be net positive in terms
22:59
of income and not waiting
23:01
tables anymore? Like, whatever it is for
23:03
you, you figure it out. and then
23:05
write those things down. We'll call them kill
23:07
criteria. And if you
23:09
haven't hit those, then you kill the project,
23:11
you go and do something else.
23:13
So Now, what if you're already five years
23:15
in though?
23:16
And you didn't do this in advance?
23:18
And
23:18
you're like, but I got these rolls and I, you
23:21
know, I got a line in this
23:23
film and I got to stand on the
23:25
set next to Brad Pitt or something and so
23:27
I feel like I've really made it and I know
23:29
it's just around the corner. know, the
23:31
producer said they were gonna help me out or
23:33
something like that. Well, sit down at that
23:35
moment and said, how long am I willing to
23:37
continue to do this? And what would I need to
23:39
see? So when people say things like I know
23:41
I can turn it around, it's
23:43
really good to say, what does that
23:45
look like? What does turning it around
23:47
mean here? In what
23:49
period of time? Write that stuff
23:51
down and commit that if you don't meet
23:53
those criteria, that
23:54
you're going to walk away. And
23:56
this is kind of the
23:58
one of the best
23:59
ways to deal with it, and you should be putting that
24:02
on kind of a regular
24:03
cadence. So here's a really simple
24:06
example of a kill criteria. A stop
24:08
loss is a kill criteria. It's
24:10
saying I know that if I own a stock
24:12
and I losing on it, and now I'm in the lost sis. It's
24:14
gonna be really hard for me to sell it because I'm gonna
24:16
say, ridiculous things like, well, now it's really
24:18
cheap. Even
24:19
though,
24:21
I know that
24:21
if I were approach that stock today, that
24:24
I would not think it was a buy. So it's a
24:26
very classic sunk cost fallacy,
24:28
you know, I wanna get my money
24:30
back. so you're using all these rationalizations.
24:32
And, of course, it doesn't make sense. Why would you
24:34
need to get your money back in that particular stock? Like,
24:36
just go put it in something else and get your ten
24:38
dollars back that way. But this
24:40
is what happens to us and we know this.
24:42
Right? So what do we do? In advance, when we
24:44
put in this the buy order,
24:47
we also put in a stop loss order because
24:49
what we recognize is that after we've lost a certain
24:51
amount of money, so we've accumulated
24:53
those sunk costs. So it'd be really hard for us
24:55
to walk away at that moment. So let's make the decision
24:58
in advance. Well, you can do that
25:00
for your acting career also.
25:02
There's
25:02
a lot that you mentioned that I
25:04
think is is really on point. You have a
25:06
few phrases in the book that I'm definitely
25:09
storing away. We'll definitely cite you
25:11
with him, but but kill criteria is a great
25:13
one, and and this illusion of progress is
25:16
another. As you mentioned, stop
25:18
losses I have some friends that have a very large
25:21
research organization, and
25:23
they've been publishing investment
25:25
research for twenty years hundreds of millions
25:27
of dollars in revenue just to vary
25:29
a large successful business.
25:32
And a number of years ago, they
25:35
ran a experiment and
25:37
looked at all of the recommendations
25:39
they made over the years. And then
25:41
they said, okay, what if because there's some
25:43
trend following philosophy within the
25:45
organization in some areas. But they said, what
25:47
if we had added stop
25:49
losses to these recommendations? would they have
25:51
worked out better? And the answer is universally yes.
25:54
Right? And listeners, this is not saying this is for
25:56
everyone or the approach and and and
25:58
Anna McQuanton.
26:00
Everyone listening kind of knows that. But
26:02
the phrase that you had, it's one of
26:04
my favorite phrases in the book, and there's a lot,
26:06
is the phrase of being in
26:09
it. trying to make a decision when you're in it. We did a poll,
26:12
which we'd love to do on Twitter. And I and
26:14
there's two versions, but they're kind of the same
26:16
thing. One was you have a written
26:18
investing plan and the vast majority
26:20
of people, you know, eighty, ninety percent, the
26:22
answer is no. And
26:24
then the second, which is a derivative of the first,
26:27
but same situation is said,
26:29
when you make an investment, do
26:32
you as when you buy something
26:34
mutual fund, ETF, stock,
26:37
whatever, Bitcoin, do you
26:39
establish the sell criteria ahead of time
26:41
when you place the trade. And it's like ninety percent said no.
26:43
No. They don't. Yeah. I've
26:45
done some coaching
26:46
with PM. And
26:48
you know,
26:49
I I here here's where
26:51
I think this problem is, is these are
26:53
PMs. They're expert investors. Obviously, they
26:55
you know, if they have a team, they have
26:58
clients and analysts who work with them and
27:00
they have
27:01
some sort of investment thesis.
27:03
And the thesis for what they're gonna
27:06
trade is making some sort of prediction
27:08
about what the fundamentals are gonna look
27:10
like and then what the implications of that
27:12
are. Right? So they are writing
27:15
down the thesis. But here's the problem that we have,
27:17
whether it's investing or anything else, is that
27:19
we have the intuition. That
27:21
once we've made
27:21
that decision to start something,
27:24
that when the world goes against us.
27:26
Right? So we do this information discovery. We
27:28
find out, oops, I broke my leg in the
27:30
middle of the marathon. that when the
27:32
world goes against us, we will react to that
27:34
and we will actually exercise the option to quit.
27:36
So in the case of these PMs,
27:39
They've got their thesis. The thesis implies
27:41
certain things about what the fundamentals are gonna
27:43
look like, for example, in the future.
27:45
And then when the fundamentals don't
27:47
look like that, they assume
27:50
they they make the assumption, the intuition that they're
27:52
gonna react to that in some kind of rational
27:54
way. But what we know is that
27:55
they don't. It's
27:56
just not true. And
27:58
so you want to take that
27:59
extra step. I know it feels like a distinction
28:02
without a difference, but it really
28:04
isn't. it
28:04
really is different. To say, here's my thesis.
28:06
This is this is why. This is my
28:08
rationale for why I'm putting this trade
28:11
on. And I'm gonna
28:13
write down specifically what my
28:15
stop out criteria are. And also by
28:17
the way, what my buyout criteria
28:19
are because we do have an attendant problem,
28:21
which is we actually tend to quit
28:23
too soon when we're in the games.
28:26
we're making money on something, we'll stop out
28:28
often too early. And when we're
28:30
losing money on something, we'll stop
28:31
out too late.
28:33
So it actually helps with
28:36
both sides of the equation. Remember, I'm not
28:38
disagreeing that sometimes we're not gritty
28:40
enough. Right? I just don't think that that in
28:42
general is our biggest problem. But
28:44
in this case, it's it's true. And
28:46
Alexey must have some really interest work with some
28:48
collaborators where he was looking at expert investors.
28:50
These were institutional investors in
28:52
conditions where they were fully committed.
28:55
and they needed to free up capital to trade
28:57
some new thesis. So he
28:59
looked at the buy side decisions
29:01
and what he found was that they were
29:04
really generating a lot of alpha. I think it was like a hundred and twenty bps
29:06
on average, on their decisions to
29:08
enter into a
29:10
position.
29:10
But what was interesting was
29:11
when he looked at their exit decisions,
29:14
remember they're freeing up capital to go do something else.
29:16
When he looked at their exit decisions, they were
29:18
actually losing about seventy bps.
29:21
to those decisions. Now what was the
29:23
benchmark, of course, because we wanna know what that is? It's
29:25
what if I threw dot darts at the portfolio
29:27
to figure out what to sell? Alright? So that
29:30
that's the appropriate benchmark in this
29:32
particular case, and they're losing seventy bps to
29:34
that. Now, these are really smart people who making
29:36
a lot of money when they're deciding
29:38
to buy. So why is that happening?
29:40
Well, the first thing that he found was that
29:42
they were using a heuristic where they were
29:44
only looking at the tails of their portfolio. In other
29:46
words, the extreme winners or the
29:48
extreme losers. in order to decide what to buy or
29:50
sell. But, you know, that's a proxy.
29:52
Right? Like, ideally, you would look at your whole
29:54
portfolio to try to figure out what had the highest
29:56
expected value. keep
29:58
that, and then what had the lowest expected
29:59
value sell that so that you could go put your money
30:02
into this new great thing that you wanted to
30:04
trade. But they don't do that. They look at
30:06
the tails, and then the problem is have a
30:08
huge feedback problem. Right?
30:09
Because nobody's tracking
30:12
it. On
30:13
the buy side, you're tracking what you
30:15
own. So
30:16
you're getting this really nice feedback
30:18
loop that's telling you is the world unfolding
30:20
the way that I predicted, the in the
30:22
way that made me want to buy this in
30:24
the first place. But when your portfolio, so
30:27
nobody's checking it against any kind of
30:29
benchmark. And this is why
30:31
we need to have this x criteria.
30:33
Right? Like, you need to what is that
30:35
criteria that you're gonna sell or you're gonna
30:37
draw down or you're gonna buy up
30:40
or whatever? as you enter into
30:42
the decision because then
30:44
this problem wouldn't be a problem anymore
30:46
because either it would satisfy those things
30:48
or not. you wouldn't just be looking
30:50
at a certain subset of your portfolio
30:52
to decide how to free that capital up.
30:54
Yeah.
30:54
I mean, looking at a lot of my friends and
30:57
discretionary investing world. And I'm talking about firms
30:59
that manage billions, tens of billions,
31:01
hundred billions. So often, you
31:04
look at the fundamental subjective process.
31:06
Can so many of these little phrases
31:08
kind of survivor bias of outcomes
31:10
work their way in where you talk to
31:13
someone and the challenge particularly is,
31:15
you know, in the investing world, the
31:17
market environment could last
31:19
a decade for from
31:22
financial crisis to not too long
31:24
ago, it was one very particular
31:26
environment, growth stocks, growthy type
31:28
investments, S and P, and
31:30
every little dip resulted in new
31:32
highs. And so listening to
31:34
investors, like, this is a a random example,
31:36
but, like, you have a portfolio management
31:38
team, all the analysts or PMs get together, they
31:40
pitch their stocks, and they pick, like and
31:43
then, you know, you have the
31:45
example where the one PM He's
31:47
like, yeah. But, like, do you guys remember when so
31:49
on so stock went down by fifty percent
31:51
and we doubled down, and then it's like our
31:53
best performer. So, like, you have a sample size
31:56
of, like, too or and so
31:58
what what's so interesting about what you're talking
32:00
about in every institution you guys need to
32:02
hire, Annie, is I don't know if you do
32:04
this, but come consult for some of these
32:06
book, big shops and Yes. I have a job that
32:08
where I do that. She's a million dollars a day
32:10
listeners. If you mentioned the message show, you
32:12
get a ten percent discount. So
32:14
But what really hit home to me earlier that you
32:17
were talking about is, you know, no
32:19
one has a plan or written rules, first of all. So
32:21
start to think about that.
32:23
And Most of the the reason
32:25
that people think, you know, they need the rules
32:27
is is for the losers, and I think
32:29
that's useful. But you need it
32:31
for the winners also.
32:32
Right. And so I was getting ready to say as, like, you know,
32:35
some of our I'm a trend followers, and
32:37
and I have to do angel investing. And so so
32:39
much of investing is about these power
32:41
laws, these very large outcomes where you
32:43
make ten fifty, a hundred
32:44
x or whatever. And so but
32:46
so many
32:47
investors, we see
32:49
There's great phrase. I wanna attribute this to
32:51
Jerry Parker. So Jerry, sorry if this
32:53
wasn't you. What did he say? He said
32:56
investors are hopeful of losses and fearful
32:58
of gains. And so the
33:00
one bagger or the two bagger, it's amazing.
33:02
You doubled. You tripled your money
33:04
thinking about the vacation in France,
33:06
buying a new condo, whatever,
33:10
but that's often just on the
33:12
path to the five ten, fifty, a
33:14
hundred pagger. And so thinking about how to
33:16
deal with one stock that
33:18
becomes ninety percent of your
33:20
portfolio. Are you people
33:22
love the binary in out, but how to
33:24
think about what to do with that? Ahead of time,
33:26
before you're in it, before you're stuck in
33:28
the middle. I think
33:29
it's this is really important for people to
33:32
understand, is that, you
33:33
know, Richard Dyer talks a lot Nobel Laureate
33:35
talks a lot about mental accounting.
33:38
And mental accounting
33:39
is a cognitive phenomenon. Right?
33:41
It's not like your actual balance sheet
33:43
necessarily, although it can align with that. Right? So
33:45
if I buy a stock at fifty and it's
33:47
at forty, in my mental
33:50
accounting, I'm in the loss is ten dollars and
33:52
also in my actual Right?
33:54
And if I buy a stock at fifty and it's now trading at sixty
33:56
in my mental accounting, I'm in the gains,
33:58
and also on my ledger. But this is
34:00
also true, like, for example, if we go back to
34:03
the marathon, and thinking about it as a cognitive phenomenon.
34:05
If I've run sixteen miles of a marathon,
34:07
you could say, well, aren't you
34:09
in the game six fifteen miles.
34:11
But no, because it's a marathon, there's a finish
34:13
line, which is twenty-six point two miles. So I'm
34:15
actually in the losses there, ten point two
34:18
miles. So this is just the
34:20
cognitive phenomenon. And this idea of being in the games or being
34:22
in the losses distorts
34:24
our behavior. It as much
34:26
as how much do we want to
34:28
leave luck in
34:30
the equation. Right? In other words, do we want to
34:33
take on risk or do we
34:34
want to reduce risk risk on risk off?
34:37
Right?
34:38
So this is work
34:40
from back from Condiment
34:41
University. So people with Daniel Condiment,
34:44
people are very familiar with the idea of
34:46
loss aversion. which stops us
34:48
from starting things. Right? It's like, oh, I
34:50
don't wanna buy that stock because maybe I'll
34:52
lose and then I'll feel bad. Even if the
34:53
stock is positive
34:56
value. and it's
34:56
within your risk tolerance. You won't do it because it just has
34:58
a higher possible loss associated with
35:00
it, but then some other thing.
35:03
that actually has a lower expected value,
35:05
but, like, you're less likely to just have a
35:07
loss. And so you'll you'll choose the thing
35:09
that has a smaller loss associated with it
35:11
even if it's got a lower expected value
35:13
because of loss aversion. So that's a
35:15
starting problem. But what he points out is
35:17
that there's a companion problem
35:20
which is called sure
35:22
loss aversion. SURE, short loss aversion.
35:24
And that's once we've already started
35:26
something. We now cognitively
35:28
will end up either in the games or in
35:32
the lawsuits. And what happens is when we're in the
35:34
losses, we don't want to turn
35:35
that into a
35:38
shore loss.
35:40
k?
35:40
So as long as I own the position, as long as I have the
35:42
stock, right?
35:43
I could
35:44
get my money back. So
35:46
if
35:47
I keep risk on,
35:49
it's a way for me to maybe not
35:51
have to turn a loss on paper into
35:53
a short loss, into a realized
35:56
loss, and we're averse
35:58
to that to turning things into shore losses and that will stop us
35:59
from stopping. Now on the
36:02
flip
36:02
side is that when
36:04
we're in the gates, we
36:07
want to go risk off because we do want to
36:09
turn gain on paper into a shore gain
36:11
or a
36:12
realized gain.
36:14
Now, this is so much so that you just pointed out, we're
36:17
willing to pay to
36:20
have the opportunity on both sides of
36:22
the coin.
36:24
So the original work that he did, which I'm gonna put in
36:26
a slightly different example with Amos
36:29
Kiberski, goes like this. I
36:32
owe you a hundred dollars. So I'm gonna
36:34
give you a hundred dollars or you can
36:36
flip a coin. And if you win, I'll
36:39
give you two twenty and you
36:41
lose, I'll give you zero. Now, obviously, you know
36:43
that two twenty doing that has a higher expected value.
36:45
Right? In one case, you're gonna get a
36:47
hundred, but it's sure. it's
36:50
guaranteed. In the other case, you have an expected value
36:52
a long run win of
36:54
a hundred and ten dollars. So
36:58
you really ought to take that gamble
37:00
because you're winning to the decision,
37:02
but people won't. Why won't
37:05
they? Because If you take the gamble as opposed to
37:07
taking the sure when, that's the only way
37:09
that you can go to zero. So
37:11
they don't do it. So they're
37:13
paying ten dollars. for the
37:15
opportunity to not risk zero. But
37:18
now let's take the flip side of the
37:20
equation.
37:21
Now you owe me a hundred dollars. Okay?
37:24
Sad for you. So you owe me a hundred
37:26
dollars. And so now you're in the
37:28
losses a
37:30
hundred. And I say to you, okay, you owe me a hundred dollars, but you want
37:32
to flip a coin.
37:34
And if
37:35
you win zero,
37:37
you don't owe me anything. And if you lose, you're gonna
37:39
owe me two hundred and twenty
37:41
dollars. Okay. So again, that
37:44
expected value is worse. In one case, you're negative
37:46
a hundred. the other case, if you
37:48
take the gamble and you leave the risk
37:50
on, it's really a hundred and ten loss in the long
37:52
run. It's costing you ten dollars to take the
37:54
gamble, but indeed
37:56
people do. Why? Because it's the only way to
37:58
avoid the shore loss.
37:59
That's the way that you
38:00
can get to zero. It's the only
38:03
path open to you.
38:05
So
38:05
it's on both sides of the equation
38:07
that we make these irrational decisions, which
38:09
is why we need to be thinking
38:11
about these benchmarks or kill
38:13
criteria in advance. so that
38:15
we can absolutely be more rational
38:17
both in terms of when we quit, but also
38:19
in terms of when we persevere. Howard
38:21
Bauchner: Is there
38:22
any practical tips on this to start
38:24
to think about, hey, there's some things you can do
38:26
to get just better at removing,
38:28
you know, the shame or the
38:31
mental block of thinking
38:33
about quitting.
38:34
So, yeah, I mean, look,
38:37
ideally, you
38:38
need to start doing is thinking about things on a longer time horizon.
38:40
So there's a phrase that I
38:42
think everybody should be saying to them. I'm stealing it
38:44
from Ron Conway, who's the founder of SVA Joel.
38:47
and the phrase
38:48
is life too short.
38:49
So what you have to realize is you have a limited
38:51
time on the planet and you have
38:53
limited attention for
38:56
things. And it's a complete
38:58
tragedy to spend your
39:00
time on something that you are not getting
39:02
enjoyment out of that is not making
39:04
your life better as far as you can tell just because
39:06
there's a finish line and you're afraid of
39:08
finishing short of the finish line. Because
39:11
those precious moments how
39:14
much you know, by chapter two, you realize that the book isn't for
39:16
you and you read ten more chapters, that time
39:18
that it takes you to read those ten
39:20
chapters as time you could spend
39:23
reading a book that is actually gonna be
39:25
worth your while or I don't know watching a
39:27
TV show or hang out with your family or going
39:29
dirt biking, I don't really care, but it's gonna be
39:31
better than whatever you're doing. And so we have
39:33
to keep reminding ourselves that life's too short to ever spend your time on
39:35
something that isn't worthwhile. And just to be
39:37
clear, this is something that is
39:39
very much ingrained in
39:42
the book grit by Angela Duckworth. It's just people misinterpret her work
39:44
because what she says is you have to explore a
39:46
lot of stuff to find the thing that you're
39:50
passionate about. define the thing that you're is worthwhile, and then
39:52
stick to that even that if it's
39:54
hard. She's not saying perseverance on
39:56
its own is a virtue and that
39:58
you should stick to things no
39:59
matter what. There's a big
40:01
immersed interpretation going on, and that's kind of
40:03
what we're saying.
40:05
So in poker, you know, there was a saying among the top players which
40:07
is life is Poker is one long
40:10
game. And what was that? It's okay to fold
40:12
one hand. because you're gonna play
40:14
thousands and thousands of them.
40:15
It's okay to quit
40:16
a game because you're gonna play
40:18
play in thousands of thousands of
40:20
those. Right? So
40:21
it's one long game. And the thing is
40:23
to make decisions that are maximizing
40:26
your expected value over your
40:28
lifetime, and that's
40:29
gonna require a
40:30
tremendous amount of quitting. Now, here's
40:32
the thing that I want people to
40:33
know though, is that certainly
40:36
experience helps you
40:38
with this. you know, it's
40:40
like the stock market goes down,
40:42
but you've experienced this before. So you're
40:44
not panicking. And
40:46
you're like, I'm
40:47
just gonna you know, I wanna invest in all
40:49
parts of the cycle, and I've been
40:51
here
40:51
before, and I know it'll
40:54
be fine. Right?
40:54
So that's gonna help you. It's good. That type of experience is
40:56
gonna help you with these types of decisions.
40:58
But in the end, I think that
41:00
what we have to recognize is that
41:03
you know, that can help, but we're gonna be
41:05
really crappy at the
41:08
decisions. So there's kind of three strategies
41:10
that we can use to help us be
41:12
better in ordered to disentangle the emotions from the
41:14
decision. One we already talked about, which is think about
41:16
these things
41:18
in advance.
41:19
So when I
41:20
say things like, invested all cycles
41:23
of the market, that's actually that's
41:25
actually part of my sort of
41:27
kill criteria. Right? It's like my advanced planning. If the market goes down, I
41:29
don't much care. There's amount
41:31
of rebalancing
41:32
that I do. I
41:34
wanna make sure that my portfolio is balanced in particular way. I have
41:37
on a regular cadence that doesn't have anything to
41:39
do with whether the market is up or
41:41
down to evaluate what
41:44
sector I do and do not wanna be in, you know, how heavily I wanna
41:46
be in one thing versus another and that kind of
41:48
thing. But it's separate apart from market
41:50
movements, and that's because I
41:53
know I'm gonna be a bad decision maker in those moments. And
41:55
so I have made pre commitments to how I'm gonna behave
41:57
in those moments. Okay? So
42:00
even there, that's part of how
42:02
I'm taking the emotion out of it. And
42:04
then the second thing is you gotta get
42:06
yourself a quitting
42:08
coach because The other thing so you can be not in it thinking
42:10
about it in advance. That's one way
42:12
you can do it. But the thing is that
42:14
other people aren't in it with you.
42:18
So
42:18
we've all had that experience of watching somebody in a relationship where
42:20
you're just thinking like, man, this is so
42:22
obvious that you should be ending this
42:25
thing. You know, and they're not ending it because they keep
42:27
saying, no, we're gonna I think we can turn it around
42:29
and we're doing our seventeenth rounds
42:31
of couples counseling
42:32
and whatever and you're like, oh my gosh, it's never gonna
42:34
work. We can see it from the outside. Right?
42:36
When someone's miserable in the job, we can see it
42:38
from the outside. When they have a startup that
42:41
just isn't working, And you can tell it's
42:44
just grinding away. It's something for fear
42:46
of having failed. You can see
42:48
it from
42:50
the outside. But you can't see that from the inside. So get somebody
42:52
from the outside to really help
42:54
you. And this is where things like financial
42:56
advisers, for example, are so
42:58
incredibly helpful. because
43:00
it's not only that you can have, like, stop out criteria
43:04
to understand, like, when should I
43:06
be selling? what would be the
43:08
conditions under which I might buy up, so on so
43:10
forth. But you can make that commitment
43:12
with the help of somebody who's gonna coach
43:14
you and guide you in those moments where
43:16
you're panicking. And this is such an incredibly powerful
43:18
concept. And by the way, backed up
43:20
very well by science. I just wanna say
43:22
that, that Daniel
43:24
Donovan himself
43:26
has a quitting coach. This is where I got the idea from.
43:28
Dan O'Connor's coaching coach is Richard Thaler. I
43:30
mean, I think we all do pretty well to
43:32
like a couple Nobel laureates looking
43:34
for a quitting coach. But if Daniel Donovan needs
43:36
a quitting coach, don't you think you do?
43:39
I mean, come on. So
43:40
the science actually some of the science that really backs us up
43:42
is so fun. So it's a a very star who's
43:44
like a real giant in the field of what
43:46
we call escalation of commitment. This
43:50
when you get bad news or bad signals from the world sort
43:52
of doubling down on the path
43:54
that you're on as opposed to walking away.
43:57
he did this really simple thing, which is he
43:59
looked
43:59
at
44:01
bank loans
44:02
that were in
44:03
a state where they needed to be
44:06
written off.
44:07
And essentially, he
44:09
just compared what happens when
44:11
new management
44:14
comes in? you know, so you have some loan officer who's
44:16
responsible for the loan. Let's say they get replaced but
44:18
from somebody else or new management
44:20
comes in or
44:22
that kind of thing. And what he found was that when
44:24
the person who made the original decision
44:26
or approved the original
44:28
decision to give the loan was
44:30
still in place. They write sat books. But
44:33
when someone new came in, all of
44:35
a sudden you got this rationality about
44:38
what the state of those loans were, and now all of a sudden, they got
44:40
written off. Like, all the bad ones sort
44:42
of got written off all at once. And
44:45
you can see where that is. Right? Like, it's like, I gave
44:48
the loan. I'm endowed to it. It was my
44:50
decision. I don't wanna feel like I made a mistake or,
44:52
you know, you're sort of feeling the loss of
44:54
the money. And as long as you keep
44:56
it on the books, maybe they'll pay it back.
44:58
But obviously, if that's not the
45:00
case, you should write it off and you shouldn't keep it on your
45:02
balance sheet anymore. But it takes
45:04
new people people who are fresh to the decision to be able to
45:06
actually do that. Howard Bauchner: I mean, the quid and
45:08
coach
45:08
concept, I mean, it's
45:11
Everyone can relate to this. Right? Like, just
45:13
think about your friend, your so and
45:15
so that there's the decision that's
45:17
just so obvious and you can see that but but, like, I can
45:19
see it apply in my life too where maybe it's
45:22
not, you know, the most life
45:24
changing outcomes. But a
45:26
good example, we always
45:27
give to investors about their
45:29
portfolios.
45:30
We say, you know, the average
45:32
financial advisor that's been in business twenty years
45:35
owns across his book of business, something like two hundred
45:37
mutual funds. Because they've just bought them, they've
45:40
collected them, they, you know, they could
45:42
then get the attachment to them, the
45:44
old, like, with Baylor
45:46
mug, you know, again, they just sit there.
45:48
But that feels a little abstract. And
45:50
so I always tell people I
45:51
say, listen. pause the podcast, go out, walk out to your
45:54
garage. Take a look around
45:56
what's in your garage, and I guarantee you
45:58
there's zero zero
45:59
of you
46:01
that if tomorrow
46:02
your garage was empty, you would go buy
46:05
all the same stuff in the garage. Right?
46:07
Like that old aquarium sitting there and
46:09
everybody. Like, oh, maybe I'll
46:10
use again
46:11
someday. roller skates, like, on
46:14
and on. And I I just went through this
46:16
personally because we renovated our house,
46:18
which is kind of a bummer because
46:20
when you move, you have to take
46:22
everything and move it to a new place, so it's it's
46:24
easy to cleanse. But when you're renovating
46:26
You
46:26
stick it all in your garage.
46:29
Right. And so through
46:30
this very
46:32
painful and retrospective process
46:34
where it's like every item, do you
46:36
keep or give away? And I wish, and I still
46:38
may do this, by the way. So but wish
46:40
I either had a friend come over or I wish
46:42
we just said, let's getting rid of all of it. Like,
46:44
we we this is it. Sorry.
46:46
Clean slate. This is
46:48
all gone. to save ourselves the middle clutter of having decide about all these
46:50
things. But it's almost like you wish you a I had
46:52
hired a friend of mine and be like, alright. We need an
46:54
objective third
46:56
party. to
46:57
be like, yo, you're never
46:59
gonna use these golf
47:00
clubs from you know, and so
47:02
where I'm going with this is I'm
47:04
ready for the Annie Duke app or,
47:06
like, it's, like, that when AI, get the Anaduke AI in a
47:08
couple years, put all my Google glasses, and
47:11
be, like, alright, Andy, can you walk me
47:13
through this, you know, this this
47:16
let give me some framework for how to think about this because
47:18
I feel like everyone on
47:19
the planet could use some form
47:22
of non
47:24
impartial third
47:25
party decision maker. I talked to
47:27
a woman, doctor Sarah Allspokes
47:29
to Martinez, for the book, and it
47:31
was a completely accidental thing. So people
47:33
will write into me. And I
47:35
I really try to respond to everybody.
47:37
I don't succeed, but I try.
47:40
And she happened to write into me
47:42
as I was starting to think about
47:44
this book. And I
47:44
think I might have been, like, a couple chapters in or something. She actually
47:46
ended up in chapter two, but and she wrote
47:48
me and she said, I'm thinking about quitting my job,
47:50
but I really need help. can
47:52
you give me any taps? And I'm like, oh, I happen to be writing a book about quitting. Do you wanna
47:55
get on a Zoom? So we got on a
47:57
Zoom. No. It's a really interesting story, and I think
47:59
it
47:59
shows you
47:59
the power just talking to
48:02
someone who has an outside view, right, who can sort
48:04
of maybe see things more clearly than you
48:06
can because they're not carrying
48:07
all the degree of
48:10
sunken as you point out endowment. Like, it's my
48:12
mug, don't take it away, or even
48:14
your identity being wrapped up in what you're
48:16
doing. So she was in
48:18
emergency room
48:19
the head physician. And she had
48:20
done that for many years and then she
48:23
got promoted and became an administrator
48:25
as well. So by the time I talked
48:27
to her, she was only doing about six shifts
48:29
a month in the and the rest of it was administrative work.
48:31
And when she had started, she
48:33
really loved emergent
48:36
medicine you know, she
48:37
loved the challenge of it, you know, the
48:39
problem solving so and so forth. And the other thing
48:41
that she liked about it was it was basically
48:44
shift work. So you did your shift. And yeah, the shift was really hard, but when you
48:46
went home, you were done. And that
48:48
wasn't the case with administrative work
48:50
anymore. And what she had started
48:52
to
48:52
find over
48:54
the last few years was that it was impinging on her family
48:56
life. So she had two children that
48:59
were who were quite young.
49:02
And she just found that, like, her job was not particularly compatible
49:04
with making sure that when she
49:05
came home, she was paying attention to her
49:07
children because she was having to attend to
49:10
administrative stuff
49:12
sort of twenty four seven. So she was miserable.
49:14
And as she described what had kind of
49:16
happened over the last few years, if you
49:18
had listened to it, ma'am, you would have been like,
49:21
wait, why
49:21
is she writing to me? Like, I mean,
49:23
it's very
49:24
clear that she should quit. She's really unhappy.
49:26
So it turned out she
49:28
had another job in often, which is why she
49:30
had written me. And so after she
49:32
told me how
49:33
unhappy she was, I said to
49:36
her so I just wanna understand, like, what's stopping you from quitting
49:38
here? And she said,
49:40
well,
49:40
what if I hate the new job? So, I
49:42
mean, this is like
49:43
a very deep answer. because
49:46
one of the insights from Conant University combined with
49:48
the work of Richard Zekhauser on
49:50
status quo bias is that
49:53
when we're already doing something. We don't
49:56
think about it in any
49:57
way as a new decision or one
49:59
that
49:59
we were starting each
50:02
day anew. Right? It's like, it's just the status quo. It's the
50:04
thing about the passive least resistance. What's
50:05
always been done? But remember, loss
50:08
aversion is a
50:10
starting problem.
50:10
problem When we think
50:11
about the losses that might be
50:14
associated with the decision, it prevents us
50:16
from starting. So now we can see this here,
50:18
right? Is some
50:20
associated with her new job? What if I hate it? So it's
50:22
preventing her from starting and
50:24
switching to that, but notice that
50:27
the fact that she was already miserable in her own job, she was
50:30
willing to tolerate because it doesn't feel like
50:32
she's starting something fresh. So there's a
50:34
lots of version in that case
50:36
is asymmetric. Right? Like, we feel it on the switch, but
50:38
we don't feel it on the thing that we're
50:40
doing. So I just
50:42
paused at sort of acting as
50:44
our quitting coach. Right? And I said, alright. Well, let
50:46
me ask you something. I hear you
50:48
like it's scary. So if it's
50:50
a year from now, so let's say that you stay in the job
50:52
that you're in now, it's now a year
50:54
from now. What do you think the
50:56
probability is that you're happy in the job? And
50:58
she immediately said zero percent. She'd
51:00
been miserable for a few years. It's
51:02
not like
51:02
was an unknown quantity. So she said zero percent. So
51:04
I said,
51:05
well, what's the probability you'll be happy in the
51:06
new job? And she said, well, I don't know.
51:09
I haven't done it yet. I
51:11
said, well, just give a guess. Like, what's your best guess? because I guess
51:13
fifty fifty, like, maybe half the time. I'm really happy in it.
51:15
And I just said to
51:18
Orsera, is
51:19
fifty percent greater than
51:21
zero. Her
51:22
face was just like, you know, in
51:24
that moment, she was like, oh my god, this is like
51:26
so obvious. Of course, I'm supposed to quit. But
51:29
she couldn't see it before because she was in it. Right? And all of
51:31
those things, like loss aversion and status
51:33
quo bias. And then
51:36
you know, the other thing is that she was
51:38
really worried that the other doctors would think she was a wolf
51:40
that her bosses
51:42
in terms of the
51:44
administration administrative
51:45
position would be really disappointed
51:47
in her. And then there
51:48
was all the time and effort in her training
51:51
that she had put into the job and
51:53
what if she abandoned that When
51:55
it simply put, it's just you're gonna be happy zero percent of the time
51:57
here and fifty percent of the time here. So go
51:59
do the
51:59
other thing. but
52:02
she needed someone from the outside to relieve her of all of that debris
52:04
and allow her to actually make
52:06
the switch, which she did end up doing.
52:09
wonder
52:09
what percent of the time that
52:12
someone comes to listeners and Anna, you can I
52:14
wanna hear your guess where
52:16
they have a situation like this.
52:19
and they're thinking about quitting
52:22
something.
52:22
It seems
52:24
like most
52:24
of the time they already know the answer
52:26
Right? Like, they know the answer is probably to
52:28
quit. They're just kind
52:30
of, you know, for one of
52:34
the many emotional attachments to it, you know, either
52:36
need someone to agree with him,
52:38
push him, or whatnot. But
52:40
I love to say
52:42
to people And this goes back to
52:44
the optionality of quitting
52:46
something, you know, when someone
52:48
comes up and goes like, mav, you know,
52:50
I got fired from my job. Mav, something bad
52:52
happen, and and Joker Wilnich has a good example of this. But
52:55
I'd say first of all, I'm sorry, you know, you went
52:57
through this. But And second
52:59
of all, congratulations Congratulations. Isaac, congratulations. And you they
53:01
they're usually taking it back. Like, hey. I just got
53:04
divorced. But sorry about this. I had this lunch today,
53:06
and I
53:08
said, Sorry to hear that. But congratulations. Like, this is, you know, a
53:10
a new seat is a good thing. Joko's the
53:13
thing mental attitude he takes is he
53:15
just says good to these sorta
53:18
situations, whether they're gonna be positive nose. They just because good. Now
53:20
you can put it behind you and move forward
53:22
with the rest of your life with what
53:24
whatever. Maybe that may be a lot better. You
53:27
know, I mean,
53:27
so this reminds me of a couple of things,
53:30
so if I can just throw two things
53:32
out. Here's the first thing. Again,
53:34
this this has to do with opportunity cost. And the fact
53:36
is that once we it's something we tend not
53:38
to explore the other things that might be available to
53:40
us. So when something is forced
53:42
upon us, it allows us to go maybe
53:44
find something better. We
53:46
don't always but it gives us the chance to do that. And I think you
53:48
know, a lot of startup founders when
53:50
things start to falter and they're
53:51
not going, well, one
53:54
of the rationalizations that they have for
53:56
continuing is that what about
53:57
my employees? I
53:58
owe it to my employees
54:00
to keep
54:02
going. And this goes to that congratulations kind of thing. Well, no,
54:04
you actually owe it to your employees to shut
54:06
this down. Why? Because your
54:08
employees, this is a startup. are
54:11
working for very little cash comp and a lot of
54:14
equity, and they're very smart
54:16
obviously, and they're very dedicated and
54:18
they're gritty
54:20
And now by continuing, you're trapping
54:22
them in a job where you've determined
54:24
that the equity isn't worth their
54:28
time. So you
54:28
owe it to your employees to
54:29
actually let them go so that they have
54:31
the opportunity to go find something that is
54:33
worth their time. and
54:35
their attention the equity is worthwhile. And I think that
54:38
that's such an insightful way to think about
54:40
it. Stuart Butterfield was the one who kind
54:42
of first framed it that way for me as he
54:44
was making the decision to shut his
54:46
company glitched down, which
54:48
was
54:48
developing game never ending.
54:50
and he that's the way that he sort of talked himself through
54:52
that is that I owe it to my employees because I'm now determined that the
54:54
equity is not venture scale, and that's
54:56
what they signed up for. And now that
55:00
I realize not worth their time. I need to free them. And think
55:02
that what this goes to is
55:04
actually in relation to some of this
55:06
explore, exploit,
55:08
like, people wanna read algorithms to live by Brian Christian
55:10
and Tom Griffiths. This is explored much
55:12
more deeply. But I think about the
55:15
way that ants operate So
55:18
forager ants, you know, they're in
55:19
a colony, they go to to they go to
55:21
some new territory, they look around for food, so they're all
55:23
kind of scattered looking around for
55:25
food. And then an ant finds a food source,
55:27
when as it brings the food
55:30
back to the colony, it lays down a
55:32
Fairmont Trail. Now, obviously, when it's
55:34
one ant, that's pretty faint,
55:36
but other ants will kind of pick it up, and
55:38
they're pretty wired to
55:40
follow that pheromone trail. So
55:42
now another four
55:44
hundred ant gonna follow that Fairmont Trail when they find the same food
55:46
on the way back. They're also
55:48
going to lay down a Fairmont Trail, and that's
55:50
gonna get reinforced
55:52
until you end up with the ants marching in a line, you know, like, the ants marching
55:54
one by one, hurrah. Okay. So
55:56
when you actually look at that behavior
55:59
their marching in the line is that pheromont trail gets stronger
56:01
and stronger on the way to that quality
56:04
food sort. When you actually look at
56:06
the colony, what you'll see is about ten to
56:08
fifteen percent or so. of the
56:10
Foringer ants aren't following
56:12
along. They're just they're
56:13
sort of scattered wandering around. So
56:15
you're like, what's
56:16
the deal with this? So, like, these
56:18
malinguish. Are they like anti
56:20
pannerists? Like, what's the deal? Why aren't they
56:22
getting with the program? And it turns out
56:24
that what scientists have figured out is because
56:26
they're continuing to look for
56:28
food. So why are they continuing to load
56:30
for food? Well, because the world is uncertain. Right? Like, you find the food. Maybe
56:32
it's, like, watermelon on someone's back deck.
56:34
But then maybe they come and clean
56:38
it up. and then the food's
56:40
not there anymore. So you have these other ants that are continuing to explore,
56:42
which is really helpful for the colony
56:44
because now they discover backup
56:48
food sources. And those backup food sources are
56:50
really important when your plan a doesn't work
56:52
out anymore because someone clean the watermelon up.
56:55
And then sometimes that backup plan that you're sort
56:58
of out there searching for turns out to be
57:00
even better than the thing that you were exploiting
57:02
in the first place, and so you can
57:04
switch to that. Now,
57:05
obviously, human beings are in a colony. So what
57:08
happens is we go toward the
57:10
watermelon and we don't
57:11
see any of the other stuff
57:13
that's available to us. So in some ways,
57:15
when that watermelon gets cleaned up, that
57:17
starts us in
57:18
exploration mode and we start looking
57:20
around for other food sources. Right?
57:24
And so actually have a chapter in the book on forced
57:26
quitting. Lessons from forced quitting
57:28
because, look, I'm not saying, you know, it
57:30
doesn't always work out
57:32
for everybody. But what it does
57:34
do is free you up to start
57:36
exploring other opportunities. And I think
57:38
that we saw a really big example of this with
57:40
a great resignation. So people, I think when they're
57:42
thinking about the great resignation, they think that
57:44
everybody sort of across every
57:46
sector quit. but
57:48
it's not true. The people who quit
57:50
were actually the ones who were
57:52
laid off in the
57:55
first place. In other words,
57:57
people in the service sector. So you have people in
57:59
the service sector who
57:59
are forced to quit. That's what
58:02
being fired is or being laid
58:04
off is. that
58:06
presumably allows them to start thinking about
58:08
the world differently examining their
58:10
values. What do we really want out of a job?
58:12
What are opportunities that are available to me that they exploring
58:14
before. And when the world starts
58:16
opening up, they don't necessarily go
58:18
back to their old old job.
58:22
Right? Because you have the great reopening. Now there's lots of opportunities available. So
58:24
they're sort of looking around and you see them quit,
58:26
but they weren't quitting just to quit. They were quitting
58:29
to switch to something new.
58:32
which they were exploring because the pandemic had put a pause
58:34
on their career. You don't see that
58:36
same behavior from people who held their
58:39
jobs through the whole thing. because
58:41
those ants were on the pheromone
58:43
trail going to the watermelon, whereas the
58:45
other ones were forced to
58:47
wander around. Right? And I think that this is it's like such
58:49
an important lesson when you talk about like good or
58:52
congratulations when that
58:52
happens to kind of reform
58:55
that as an opportunity to
58:57
start anew. Howard Bauchner: And
58:58
the life is short comment. I think
59:01
it's it's so thoughtful because it's
59:03
not judgmental. Right? Like it and someone who's
59:05
in it, the the funny thing I know
59:07
you work with Everyone knows going into start
59:09
ups. It's like whatever eighty,
59:11
ninety percent fail, whatever the number is.
59:13
It's a lot. And
59:15
every founder knows that, and every founder talks
59:18
about it, but then you ask the founder, you
59:20
know, they're gonna be the ten percent that
59:22
succeeds. Right? Like and
59:24
so Yeah.
59:24
I think I have those stats in the book, which I don't have at the top of my head,
59:26
but it's something like seventy percent of founders
59:28
think they're gonna be the one
59:30
or it might be higher than
59:32
that. It's like
59:34
lake will be gone, like, times ten,
59:36
and they're all talented and brilliant. And
59:39
Well, they
59:39
are all generally talented and
59:42
brilliant. It's just most
59:42
startups fail. Yeah. And so, like, that's just the math of it. But
59:44
I thought and you lay this out in the book,
59:46
and listeners, there's a lot of really great stories
59:49
in there. We're not gonna touch
59:51
on today, so you gotta go read it. But
59:53
kind of walking through the framework of I
59:55
think he said it was Conway, but, you know,
59:57
he he says, look, I basically,
59:59
raid
59:59
I'm paraphrasing. You can you can correct me because
1:00:02
basically, start up, I think you need to
1:00:04
shut down. And they're like, no.
1:00:05
We're not gonna do that. Here's the reason why. And
1:00:07
and like you said, he's he's not super
1:00:09
judgmental. He's like, okay. Like, maybe you might succeed. But let's lay
1:00:11
out the criteria
1:00:12
because you're in this.
1:00:15
from which we can
1:00:15
make an objective decision in three or six
1:00:18
months. Like, what would it we need to
1:00:19
see for this to continue? because then it
1:00:22
gives it and then I think this work trade with
1:00:24
employees too,
1:00:25
where, like, look, this
1:00:27
isn't really working out. But if you think
1:00:29
you really this hasn't happened, like, what needs
1:00:31
to happen for this to work out and have
1:00:33
the criteria? because otherwise, it just
1:00:35
feels very emotional. So I thought that that was like one
1:00:37
of my favorite favorite parts of the book, that
1:00:39
sort of line
1:00:42
of thinking. Yes.
1:00:43
So, Ron Conway, it shows us
1:00:45
the combination, the powerful combination of kill
1:00:47
criteria and equating coach. So,
1:00:50
Conway can see that the enterprise is
1:00:52
no longer worth
1:00:52
pursuing. He goes to the founder, the
1:00:53
founder says, no, I can turn it around. He
1:00:56
says, fine. What does that look
1:00:58
like? Let's set out and say,
1:01:00
this is what, you know, revenue is gonna look like
1:01:02
in two months or this is how far along the
1:01:04
product's gonna be in two months, whatever. You
1:01:06
figure out, you know, and you work on
1:01:08
that together. So notice he's not disagreeing with him as you pointed out.
1:01:10
He's he's like, sure. Yeah. So let's figure out what that
1:01:12
looks like, and then they revisit it in two months
1:01:14
and, you
1:01:16
know, If they've hit it great, if they haven't, no. And this is something
1:01:18
that I have people use with employees all the time as
1:01:20
well. I think that it makes it a lot easier.
1:01:23
And, you know, he really takes pride in that
1:01:26
because he says life's too short. Like, I don't
1:01:28
want this founder to waste their time on something that
1:01:30
isn't worth
1:01:32
their time. I would prefer for them to be going on to something else so that,
1:01:34
you know, free their attention up so they can go
1:01:36
do something great. And what
1:01:37
I think is really important
1:01:38
to point out about this is
1:01:41
because somebody will send this to me
1:01:42
like,
1:01:43
but if he knows that it should be
1:01:45
shut down today, why isn't he making
1:01:47
them shut down today? And
1:01:48
the answer is because they're not ready But
1:01:50
yeah, they might not shut it down
1:01:52
for two months. But if he didn't
1:01:55
go through this process. They might not shut it down until literally every
1:01:57
bit of capital was burned. Right? They might go on for
1:01:59
another year and a
1:02:02
half. And
1:02:02
So it's not really a
1:02:04
waste of two months to use this kind of
1:02:06
process. It's actually saving
1:02:08
you, like, another year, another two
1:02:10
years where they might work on something that
1:02:13
really isn't worth their while. And I think that that's something incredibly
1:02:15
important to think about, astroteller
1:02:17
at x, which is
1:02:19
Google's innovation hub, he
1:02:21
says the same thing, you know. And this is this thing about, like, waste
1:02:23
is not a backward looking problem. It's a forward
1:02:26
looking problem. Right? Like,
1:02:28
if you spent money on something that's gone. What matters is should I
1:02:30
spend another dollar on it going
1:02:32
forward? He actually approaches projects
1:02:34
trying to get to the answer about whether you should
1:02:36
quit or
1:02:38
not. really fast. And as he says, if I can get to the
1:02:40
answer two
1:02:40
million dollars instead of nine million dollars,
1:02:43
it's not that I've wasted two million
1:02:45
dollars. I've saved seven.
1:02:48
And
1:02:48
that's definitely Conway's approach as well. Yeah. I
1:02:50
mean, one
1:02:51
of the biggest takeaways that
1:02:54
professional particularly
1:02:56
startup investors say, and
1:02:58
and I think they could be a little more clear
1:03:00
about it with all the the
1:03:02
founders from the get go is
1:03:04
that, cases in
1:03:06
many cares the wrong word. I wouldn't say they don't care if a startup
1:03:08
fails. Obviously, they prefer it as amazing.
1:03:10
But if a founder has an
1:03:12
idea, they
1:03:14
try it, it doesn't work out, but they fail
1:03:16
with, like, grace, dignity,
1:03:18
transparency, and do it in a
1:03:20
way that
1:03:22
almost always the
1:03:24
second go round, that founder will get a
1:03:26
shot. Like, if if he has another idea, she
1:03:28
has a great company number two,
1:03:32
But so often you see the ones that are, you know, have the
1:03:34
shame, embarrassment, or afraid, and they just
1:03:36
kinda go ostrich fold. Like, head and
1:03:40
the sand, stop
1:03:40
updating, disappear, or just, you know, kind of what you
1:03:42
said, just
1:03:42
like nuke all the money in a in a
1:03:45
Hill Mary Pass, that's
1:03:47
probably less likely to
1:03:49
get, you know, a new
1:03:52
second shot. I mean, everyone in VC
1:03:54
loves second shots. Look at
1:03:56
look at Laurie, what's his name? They just got funded at dollars.
1:03:58
WeWork Newman. Yeah.
1:03:59
Right. Yes. That's true. Although,
1:04:02
I But,
1:04:04
yeah, I
1:04:04
mean, I think this is one of the things that we have to remember that we have such
1:04:07
a bias against quitting that there's all sorts
1:04:09
of ways
1:04:09
that we rationalize
1:04:12
that
1:04:13
we shouldn't quit. So, you know, it might be I owe it to
1:04:14
my employees. Right? That could be one. But one
1:04:16
of
1:04:16
the things that Conway hears all
1:04:18
the time is I owe it to my investors.
1:04:21
My investors believed in me. They've invested money in me. And
1:04:24
so I owe it to them to give it every
1:04:26
last try in order to try to
1:04:28
turn it
1:04:28
around. And he says, no. You
1:04:30
and he said no shit if
1:04:32
you owe it to your investors to return capital
1:04:34
and also just so that you know,
1:04:37
they're more like to give you
1:04:39
more capital in the future. If you do that, it's
1:04:42
not a bad thing. They're not gonna think that you
1:04:44
were a quitter in the
1:04:46
sense that we open the
1:04:48
podcast with. Right? They're gonna actually say, wow, this is a really
1:04:50
thoughtful individual who got
1:04:52
to the answer, figured out it was
1:04:54
a no, and return the
1:04:56
capital and he points out to them
1:04:58
again as an outside observer with lots of
1:05:00
experience that they're likely
1:05:02
to be funded again. Astra teller says the
1:05:04
same thing, you know, really because they funding
1:05:06
such big innovations. These are generally
1:05:08
people who are coming in with innovations they
1:05:10
wanna pursue that are kind of like
1:05:13
their lives work. So, you know, they're
1:05:15
very attached to it. It's there's a lot of mugs involved, like, thalers mugs that they have
1:05:18
there. And when it
1:05:20
comes to that decision about whether to shut the
1:05:22
project down,
1:05:24
you know,
1:05:25
they're all afraid that, well, I'm gonna lose my job and
1:05:26
you're gonna fire me from here and, you know,
1:05:28
so on so forth. And and ask for
1:05:31
a teller to look at all these people
1:05:33
here. They were all on projects that we set down and
1:05:35
look there over here now. So he's trying to
1:05:38
point out to them that
1:05:40
there's life after that as
1:05:42
well because I think, again, when we're in
1:05:44
it, we don't see the long time
1:05:46
horizon. We don't see that idea that, like,
1:05:48
it's one long poker game. or, you know,
1:05:50
life is one long game. And we're just
1:05:52
so afraid of that moment
1:05:54
again of taking the shore loss,
1:05:56
of going from its
1:05:58
failing to
1:05:58
Now it has
1:05:59
failed. We've taken all the risk off
1:06:02
because we've quit. And now we know
1:06:04
for sure, we can't turn
1:06:06
it around. It's such an awful moment to us that we can't
1:06:08
see beyond that and we start to
1:06:10
rationalize the decision to stick
1:06:12
to
1:06:12
decision to stick to it it.
1:06:14
part of the rationalization is people are gonna criticize me
1:06:16
or they're gonna think poorly of me if I walk
1:06:18
away. That's not really true. It's more you're
1:06:20
gonna think poorly of yourself.
1:06:23
but most people are gonna be relieved for you. Tell
1:06:25
me
1:06:25
your opinion on this. Is this useful or not? With
1:06:27
a lot of the decision making and
1:06:30
quitting would be
1:06:32
an example there's a lot of sayings and platitudes
1:06:34
and all the sort of
1:06:36
comments that everyone loves to
1:06:38
use, particularly
1:06:40
with survivor bias examples. And there's a million
1:06:42
of them, you know, quit while you're ahead.
1:06:44
Don't be a quitter. There's probably
1:06:48
fifty. are those best avoided in the decision making process? If
1:06:50
you're trying to make an objective decision and,
1:06:52
like, almost every time you're talking to a friend or
1:06:54
something about this
1:06:56
and they they trot out one of these comments as if it's like the here
1:06:58
I've blessed you with this, you know,
1:07:00
insight. They feel dangerous to me
1:07:02
because often they feel like
1:07:05
a survivor bias hindsight
1:07:08
outcome. There's so many things
1:07:08
wrong with them. First of all, let me just say
1:07:11
most most of those things have carry
1:07:13
with them what's called the illusion of explanatory depth, which is
1:07:15
one of my favorite phrases, which is something that
1:07:17
isn't really deep but
1:07:19
feels deep. So The best
1:07:21
example of that is when people say it is what it
1:07:24
is. Right? It sounds like, oh, that's
1:07:26
really deep. But if you think about it, it's not deep
1:07:28
at all. It's just the illusion of
1:07:30
explanatory depth. But when it
1:07:32
comes to aphorisms about
1:07:32
quitting, they're all giving you really bad
1:07:34
advice.
1:07:34
Right? Like winners never
1:07:36
quit,
1:07:37
quiters never win. How
1:07:39
could that possibly be if I'm holding a bad
1:07:42
position? Like, I've got a stock that's
1:07:44
losing. I shouldn't run it to zero. I
1:07:46
should quit and go put my money in
1:07:48
something else. And in fact, when you think about
1:07:49
things like some cost and endowment and status quo
1:07:52
bias and sort of
1:07:54
the path fail nature of
1:07:56
goals. Right? Like, that stopping
1:07:58
short of the finish line is just a failure. No
1:07:59
matter that you already ran sixteen miles, it
1:08:02
doesn't matter. Like, all of these
1:08:04
forces, o mission, o mission bias.
1:08:06
So in some words, that make it
1:08:08
so hard for us to quit, that
1:08:10
the act of quitting is actually one
1:08:12
of courage. because
1:08:14
you're really bucking all of these
1:08:16
cognitive debris that makes it really,
1:08:18
really hard to walk away from something
1:08:20
including the
1:08:22
head trash that we have, which has to
1:08:24
do with what we call external validity, how how
1:08:26
are other people going to think about me, where
1:08:28
you think they're going to think you're a loser.
1:08:30
And you have to have the power of your conviction to be able
1:08:32
to walk away from something because you know that
1:08:34
even if they can't see it, that you
1:08:36
know this is not the right path
1:08:39
for you to be on. because the
1:08:41
right time to quit, the perfect time to quit is
1:08:43
usually gonna be when it's not obvious to people around you. Because
1:08:46
it's a forecasting problem.
1:08:49
what you don't wanna do is get
1:08:51
into a situation where you're already fallen into
1:08:53
the crevasse. And yeah, then nobody's gonna criticize you
1:08:55
for not continuing them
1:08:58
out because it's not a choice anymore. You before And other gonna
1:09:00
see it, so
1:09:03
it's really scary to
1:09:06
walk away in those situations where some
1:09:08
people may call you a quitter. And it takes a
1:09:10
lot of
1:09:10
courage. So when we think about these aphorisms,
1:09:14
like winners never quit and quiters never win. Of course, winners. Winners quit
1:09:16
a lot. It's part of how they win. They
1:09:18
have to because they have to always be
1:09:21
switching. That thing's
1:09:22
not working. Let me move over for
1:09:24
this thing. If at first you don't
1:09:26
succeed, try try again. We need to add something to that which is if
1:09:30
wow it's worthwhile. Right? Never
1:09:32
give up. Well, never give up unless you're
1:09:34
one of those people who goes on, you know,
1:09:36
American Idol back in the day
1:09:38
when they show the Bad Auditions.
1:09:41
Who's Simon Cow says, I'm sorry, you're screeching like a cat,
1:09:43
and you're like, I'm not giving up my dream, and it's
1:09:46
like, are you kidding
1:09:48
me? You're
1:09:49
terrible at this.
1:09:50
Makes for good TV though. It does make for good TV. And then
1:09:53
what's
1:09:56
interesting is The only aphorism that's
1:09:58
positive about quitting, quit while you're ahead, which is encourages this horribly behavior
1:10:01
of stopping out
1:10:04
as you when you're at two x or three
1:10:06
x, when if you had held onto it, it would go to twenty x, and the expected value says
1:10:08
that you
1:10:11
shouldn't actually sell it. So we need to stop thinking in aphorisms and
1:10:13
we have to start thinking in nuance and
1:10:15
really get down to what the
1:10:17
core of the matter
1:10:19
is, which is you know, on balance, if
1:10:21
you look at the cost and benefits of what you've already started and
1:10:23
you assess it
1:10:27
today, or do the benefits still outweigh the cost in comparison to other
1:10:29
things you might be doing, including
1:10:31
switching costs. Right? And
1:10:33
that that's really
1:10:36
that's really what it comes down to. And,
1:10:38
you know, we just we we really, for a variety of
1:10:40
reasons that have to do
1:10:42
it ourselves and other people, we
1:10:45
generally just don't get to that decision until it's
1:10:47
way too certain that things are going badly. And every single second,
1:10:49
you know, this is the
1:10:52
astroteller thing. yeah,
1:10:54
after nine million dollars, you know for sure it's
1:10:56
not gonna work. But if you already had the information that you needed after
1:10:58
dumping two million dollars into it, you just wasted seven million dollars
1:11:03
you could have spending amazing because you were so afraid of walking
1:11:06
away because
1:11:06
winners never quit and quiters never win.
1:11:10
Well, you
1:11:11
have some great examples in the book and I don't wanna get to them
1:11:13
here, but just give the the listeners
1:11:15
a a tease about,
1:11:17
you know, some
1:11:19
people who are reluctant to quit because so much
1:11:21
of what they're doing is is that it becomes their
1:11:24
identity. And one of
1:11:26
my favorite quotes, the last couple
1:11:28
years was an Adam Grant quote, and I always get it
1:11:30
backwards because I use it both ways now. But he talks about he's
1:11:34
like, I don't want my ideas
1:11:36
to become my identity. And I and I use it both ways. I
1:11:38
don't want my identity to become my ideas where you get attached to something,
1:11:40
and then you can't
1:11:42
quit it because it becomes who
1:11:44
you are. And so many of these when we
1:11:46
talk about athletes, you know, how many have quit right at the top. I mean, Serena
1:11:49
and maybe John Elway,
1:11:51
but so many MJ and
1:11:53
everyone else just keep mom and People were really mad at Barry Sanders. I mean, I think that's the other thing
1:11:55
that we
1:11:57
need
1:11:59
to remember. is that as we look on
1:12:02
other people, it's it's that feeling of, you know, it's why I wanna fall into the crevasse.
1:12:04
Because when Barry Sanders quits
1:12:06
at the top of the game,
1:12:09
people
1:12:10
are, like, their heads explode.
1:12:12
You
1:12:12
know, when Seinfeld quit,
1:12:14
you know, wait, why? Because
1:12:17
it's not obvious to them
1:12:19
that that's the time you quit. But as Seinfeld said, like, I don't wanna be around
1:12:21
for when I jumped the shark. You
1:12:23
know? Like,
1:12:25
things are good
1:12:27
now. before we let
1:12:27
you go a little bit. Tell me what the alliance
1:12:30
for decision education is.
1:12:32
Give us some insight because you guys
1:12:34
are hosting a poker tournament coming up.
1:12:37
give us a little preview of
1:12:39
what y'all have been doing. We're hosting an online
1:12:39
poker an online
1:12:42
tournament to raise
1:12:44
funds for the alliance for decision education. So you can go
1:12:46
over to the website there, which I'm sure will be in the show notes. And
1:12:48
you can sign up for the
1:12:51
Poker tournaments, which which you We
1:12:54
hope you will. This is an organization
1:12:56
that I cofounded with Eric Brooks. And we are trying to
1:12:58
bring decision education into every t through twelve classroom.
1:13:04
So, you know, I mean, when we think
1:13:06
about the education system, like, think about teaching
1:13:08
something
1:13:09
the amateur
1:13:11
the like trigonometry, why? you know,
1:13:12
I mean, the idea that, you know, I
1:13:14
think that, you know, when those types of things were common, people thought, well, if we give people really
1:13:19
hard math problems to
1:13:19
deal with. It's gonna teach them how to think and reason. And that's
1:13:21
been a disappointment over and over again back
1:13:23
from the early nineteen hundreds,
1:13:26
actually
1:13:26
a guy named Thornite disprove that.
1:13:28
What we really need to be doing is saying, look, in
1:13:31
a world where you don't need to memorize
1:13:33
you don't need to memorize facts anymore
1:13:35
facts anymore. where you can look up any
1:13:35
mathematical formula. But what we need to do is
1:13:38
teach people how to think. We have to
1:13:40
teach people
1:13:42
how to decide And we need to start teaching those skills
1:13:44
very early. Right? Things like how do
1:13:47
you figure out what's true? how
1:13:51
do you construct a good decision to figure out what option
1:13:53
to choose? How do you think
1:13:55
about habits and habit
1:13:58
formation and changing your habits?
1:14:00
Here's one for a little bit older
1:14:02
kids. How do you start thinking probabilistically? Right? How do you start
1:14:04
to realize that
1:14:07
for any option you're considering, like,
1:14:09
there's different ways that things could turn out and you need to
1:14:11
sort of examine those and start doing some forecasting around that. So really
1:14:13
thinking about the model of
1:14:15
social emotional learning. where
1:14:18
kids these days, you
1:14:20
know, in K through twelve, every single year
1:14:22
are getting some social emotional learning in
1:14:24
order to help them with like bullying,
1:14:26
for example, and emotional control, and empathy.
1:14:28
And we think we need to do
1:14:31
the same with decision and
1:14:33
education. And it's a little bit of a
1:14:35
tragedy that in the adult
1:14:38
world, work
1:14:39
on decision making and
1:14:41
decision science has
1:14:42
become so incredibly popular. but not thinking about,
1:14:44
well, if it's really good for a thirty five year old,
1:14:46
it would probably be really good for an eight year
1:14:48
old. So
1:14:51
to
1:14:51
take the kind of knowledge
1:14:53
that has
1:14:54
so permeated the adult
1:14:56
world in terms of books like
1:14:58
thinking fast and slow by condiment where people
1:15:00
are really starting to understand this decision making space.
1:15:02
You know, the work of Michael Mobesan, for
1:15:05
example, or Phil Telbach. out of Grant,
1:15:07
Don
1:15:07
Moore, so on and so forth,
1:15:10
Katie Milkmann. And say, let's take
1:15:12
what we know from that and start
1:15:14
thinking about how we could implement that into
1:15:16
K through twelve to create better
1:15:18
decision makers. And our motto motto is, better decisions lead
1:15:20
to better lives, which
1:15:22
lead to a better society.
1:15:24
And I
1:15:25
think we're all feeling that need right now. How do you guys just
1:15:27
go better? Or do you is the kind of mission
1:15:27
to train teachers? Are you doing online courses?
1:15:30
Or are your goal to get actual,
1:15:32
like,
1:15:34
coursework into the schools? Like, how how do
1:15:36
you go about this mission? Yeah. So
1:15:38
so the goal
1:15:39
is definitely to
1:15:41
get actual class working to every single
1:15:43
school. But the way we're doing that is not by being direct program providers, although we
1:15:46
do some of that. when
1:15:49
we looked at other educational movements that were really successful, like
1:15:51
the movement and
1:15:56
actually STEM, What we
1:15:58
saw is that behind the scenes, there was an organization which we would call a field field
1:16:00
catalyst. Basically saying
1:16:03
we're gonna take
1:16:06
this
1:16:06
world, we're gonna define the field in our case
1:16:09
decision education. We're gonna create
1:16:11
common language around it.
1:16:13
and then we're gonna start to accelerate that field. We're gonna
1:16:15
catalyze the field. So we do that in a variety of ways.
1:16:17
Some of that is to
1:16:20
curriculum development. We
1:16:23
have a teacher fellowship where teachers come in and they
1:16:25
learn the material and then they create curricula that
1:16:27
they then bring into their own
1:16:30
schools. We also
1:16:32
fund research. So we
1:16:32
take people who are doing research,
1:16:35
maybe an adult decision making, and get them to start doing that research and thinking about
1:16:39
the applications to children so that
1:16:41
we can get a body
1:16:43
of
1:16:44
scientific proof that this
1:16:45
is worthwhile and to understand really
1:16:47
from that standpoint what works And
1:16:50
then obviously, we're trying to create push
1:16:52
and pull in terms of policy levers,
1:16:54
parents demanding this for their children.
1:16:57
And that's really how something like
1:16:59
stem happens. Right? Or social emotional There was a a organization
1:17:01
called Castle that's been around for,
1:17:03
like, three decades. But it
1:17:05
wasn't until ten or fifteen
1:17:08
years ago, you
1:17:10
started to see social emotional learning appear in every single school. But what they were doing was taking people who sort
1:17:15
of circling their center of gravity and
1:17:18
bringing them into the fold. So, like, another thing we do is we fund other nonprofits. We help to
1:17:20
accelerate other nonprofits who are in
1:17:22
our space doing things like pivots.
1:17:26
for example, or financial literacy, which would
1:17:29
be definitely in the space of what we
1:17:31
do. And, you know, we just have
1:17:33
a long view of it. we sort of think
1:17:35
about it as a moonshot, something that would
1:17:37
really improve individual lives and really
1:17:39
improve society. And it's
1:17:41
gonna take a decade. and we're here for
1:17:44
it. You know, and we hope other people
1:17:45
are willing to come along for the ride because we think
1:17:47
that this is one of
1:17:49
the most important things we can be doing
1:17:51
right now. we'll post the link in the show notes listeners.
1:17:52
And we did a podcast with a a
1:17:54
group that's doing similar but focused on
1:17:56
personal finance, getting
1:17:59
into schools. Tim, Renzneta, NextGen Personal Finance, and
1:18:01
they've started to have a lot of success. Where do it
1:18:05
was, like, ten
1:18:08
percent of high school is taught, any sort of
1:18:10
Oh, that's amazing. Yeah. For some of my but now it's up to almost
1:18:11
half, which is kind of amazing. But we'll post
1:18:13
link in the channel listeners,
1:18:16
both for
1:18:17
any's website alliance for decision education dot org, as well as the poker
1:18:19
tournament, as well as
1:18:23
the new book. quit,
1:18:26
check it out, listeners. It's really awesome. Annie, this was a whirlwind. love
1:18:28
to have you back in the future.
1:18:30
Thanks so much for joining us today.
1:18:35
Well, thank you for having me. Podcast listeners will
1:18:37
post show notes to today's conversation
1:18:39
at web favorite dot
1:18:42
com forward slash podcast. If you love the show, if you hate it, shoot us feedback
1:18:44
at the mebabershow dot com. We
1:18:46
love to read the reviews. Please
1:18:49
review us on iTunes and subscribe the show.
1:18:51
Anywhere good podcasts are found. Thanks for
1:18:54
listening friends and good
1:18:56
investing.
1:18:59
Today's podcast is
1:18:59
sponsored by the Cambria shareholder
1:19:02
Yield ETF, ticker symbol, SYLD.
1:19:04
SYLD is an actively
1:19:07
managed ETF targeting value stocks
1:19:09
that also rank highly on a metric called shareholder yield, which combines dividends
1:19:11
and net buybacks. which combines
1:19:14
dividends and that buybacks Visit
1:19:16
WWW dot cambriafund dot com
1:19:18
forward slash SYLD to learn more. To
1:19:22
determine if
1:19:22
this fund is an appropriate investment for consider the fund's
1:19:25
investment objectives, risk factors, charges, and
1:19:27
expense before investing. This and other
1:19:29
information can be found in the
1:19:31
funds full or summaries respect us,
1:19:33
which may be obtained by calling 8553834636
1:19:35
also ETF info. We're visiting our
1:19:38
website at WWW dot
1:19:41
Camryfunds dot com. Read the
1:19:43
perspectives carefully before investing or sending money. The Camry ETFs distributed by Alps Distributors
1:19:45
Inc. twelve
1:19:46
ninety Broadway, suite a thousand,
1:19:51
Denver, Colorado eight thousand two hundred and three, which is not affiliated with
1:19:53
Cambra Investment Management LP, the investment advisor
1:19:56
for the fund. There's no guarantee
1:19:58
the fund will achieve its investment
1:19:59
goal, investing involves
1:20:02
risk, including the possible loss principle. High yielding stocks are often speculative, high risk investments.
1:20:04
The
1:20:04
underlying holdings of the
1:20:06
fund may be leveraged,
1:20:08
which expose
1:20:10
the holdings to higher volatility and may accelerate the impact
1:20:12
of any losses. These companies can be paying
1:20:14
out more than they can support and
1:20:16
may reduce their dividends or stop paying dividends
1:20:18
at any time. which could have a material adverse on the stock price
1:20:21
of these companies and the fund's performance.
1:20:23
Investments in smaller companies
1:20:24
typically exhibit
1:20:28
higher volatility narrowly focused funds typically exhibit higher volatility.
1:20:30
The fund is managed using proprietary
1:20:31
investment strategies and processes. There can
1:20:33
be no guarantee of these
1:20:35
strategies and process disease will produce
1:20:37
the intended results and no guarantee that the fund will achieve its investment objective. This could result
1:20:39
in the funds underperformance compared
1:20:43
to other funds similar investment objectives, there is
1:20:45
no guarantee dividends will be paid. Diversification may not protect against market loss.
1:20:48
Shareholder yield refers
1:20:50
to how much money
1:20:52
shareholders received from a company that is
1:20:54
in the form of cash dividends, net stock repurchases, and debt reduction. Buybacks
1:20:56
are also
1:20:58
known as share repurchases,
1:21:00
when a company buys its own outstanding shares
1:21:02
to reduce the number of shares available in the open market, thus increasing the proportion of shares owned by
1:21:05
investors. Companies buyback shares for
1:21:07
a number of reasons, such
1:21:10
as increase the value of remaining shares available by reducing
1:21:12
the supply or to prevent other shareholders
1:21:15
from taking a controlling stake.
Podchaser is the ultimate destination for podcast data, search, and discovery. Learn More