0:01

You don't help the poor by making

0:04

everybody poorer. The

0:06

media has a frame and the frame is

0:08

Israel is the oppressor and the Palestinians are

0:11

the oppressed. I shouldn't be forced to

0:13

acknowledge my privilege unless I desire for

0:15

that to be part of my interaction

0:17

with somebody else. What I know to

0:19

be true and what all of my

0:21

fellow Gen Z know to be true

0:24

is that this is the most talented

0:26

generation yet. With respect to every indicia

0:28

of disadvantage, there is still a racial

0:31

hierarchy. And though I am of

0:33

course an Anglo, it's certainly not a

0:35

f***ing sex interview. Hello,

0:37

Monk listeners. Rudyard Griffiths here, your host and

0:39

moderator. Welcome to this. Our

0:41

continuing conversations called the Monk Dialogues.

0:43

These are in-depth questions and answers

0:45

with some of the world's sharpest

0:47

minds and brightest thinkers. On each

0:50

Monk dialogue, we go deep into

0:52

the big issues and ideas that

0:54

are driving the public conversation. The

0:58

Middle East, a region already mired in

1:00

conflict due to the ongoing war between

1:02

Israel and Hamas, just got

1:04

a lot more dangerous. In

1:07

response to a recent Israeli

1:09

strike on an Iranian consulate

1:11

facility in Damascus, Tehran

1:13

has sent hundreds of drones

1:15

and missiles to attack Israel,

1:17

setting the stage for

1:20

a potentially region-wide military

1:23

escalation. The world

1:25

is now watching closely as the

1:27

long shadow of war between Israel

1:29

and Iran, which has been playing

1:31

out for decades with proxies in

1:33

Gaza and Lebanon, now threatens to

1:35

plunge the region into

1:38

an era of unprecedented chaos

1:40

and strife. To unpack

1:42

this folding crisis, we are joined on this

1:44

special edition of the Monk Dialogues by Greg

1:46

Kallstrom. Greg is a Middle East correspondent for

1:49

The Economist who has covered the region for

1:51

more than a decade with Stinson Cairo, Beirut,

1:54

and Tel Aviv. Greg,

1:56

welcome to the program. Thanks

1:58

for having me. Thank you,

2:01

Greg, for coming on the show on short

2:03

notice. Let's begin by asking

2:05

you what surprised you the most as a

2:07

considered observer of the Middle East when

2:10

it comes to this weekend's surprise attack by

2:12

Iran on Israel? I

2:16

was surprised, and almost everyone

2:18

I've spoken to was surprised,

2:20

that Iran decided to retaliate

2:23

directly and in such a

2:25

big way against Israel. This

2:27

is a country that for

2:30

decades has preferred to fight

2:32

through proxy militias in the

2:34

Middle East. It's been

2:36

waging this shadow war with Israel for

2:39

many, many years, but it's never

2:41

done so directly. And the

2:43

fact that they were willing to change course on

2:45

this long held policy and

2:47

to do it not in a small symbolic

2:49

way, but to do it with a massive

2:52

barrage of almost 350 missiles and

2:55

drones, I think took many observers

2:57

by surprise and also took the

2:59

Israeli government by surprise because the

3:01

air strike that they carried out

3:04

in Damascus two weeks ago on

3:06

the Iranian embassy compound there that

3:08

precipitated these events, they

3:10

did that on the assessment that Iran

3:13

wasn't going to retaliate directly. And

3:15

I think they were a bit taken aback that Iran

3:17

did what it did. What

3:19

do you think, Greg, that Iran wasn't

3:22

deterred? in

3:24

the sense that, well, he said it,

3:26

Iran don't do this yet. That's exactly

3:28

what they did. They went out and

3:30

struck Israel and they

3:32

did it in a significant way,

3:34

much larger than many observers thought.

3:38

Why do you think American

3:40

deterrence did not prevent this

3:42

attack from happening? I

3:44

think there are two big reasons why it

3:47

didn't work. One of

3:50

them is that when

3:52

the Biden administration or any

3:55

American president really in recent years

3:57

has told Iran not to. to

4:00

do something and has made sort of vague

4:03

threats. As much as the Iranians

4:05

don't want to directly get involved

4:07

in a regional war, neither do

4:09

the Americans. And aside from the

4:11

assassination of Qasim Suleimani in 2020,

4:15

America really has tried to avoid

4:17

direct military confrontation with Iran. So

4:19

I don't think they take very

4:22

seriously these sorts of warnings from

4:25

the White House. I

4:27

think the other issue is the nature

4:30

of the Israeli attack in Damascus.

4:32

I mean, Iran had

4:34

absorbed, up until that point,

4:36

almost six months of intensifying

4:38

Israeli attacks on its interests

4:40

in Syria. Israel had

4:42

wiped out almost the entire leadership

4:45

of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in

4:47

Syria. And Iran had mostly let

4:49

that pass without a direct response.

4:51

But by choosing

4:53

to strike the Iranian

4:55

embassy compound, what effectively

4:57

Iranian territory, Israel

4:59

did something that Iran saw as

5:01

an unacceptable provocation. And that caused

5:03

a lot of domestic pressure inside

5:06

of Iran from hardliners in

5:08

the government, in the Revolutionary Guard, but

5:10

also from some segments of society,

5:13

some ordinary people, demanding

5:15

a response. And so I think that

5:17

put the Iranian leadership in a position

5:19

where they felt like they had to

5:21

do something. They couldn't just let this

5:23

pass unanswered or do it indirectly, respond

5:26

indirectly through proxies. Greg,

5:28

what I'm hearing from you, if I'm

5:30

correct, in my understanding,

5:33

it's about reestablishing deterrence. Iran

5:36

felt that it was suffering

5:39

a lack of deterrence, the

5:41

ongoing assassinations of its

5:43

generals by Israeli planes, the

5:46

extent to which Israel was seemingly bombing

5:48

with impunity in Lebanon. And

5:51

no way am I saying

5:53

this to excuse Iran's actions. But

5:55

the reality was that Iran was

5:57

forced, wasn't it, into a war?

6:00

a bit of a corner here in terms

6:02

of having to restore some

6:04

credible deterrence in the face of

6:07

persistent Israeli attacks. It

6:10

did feel that way. I think if you look

6:12

at Israel's actions in

6:15

recent months and from talking

6:17

with Israeli officials in recent

6:19

months, there's a

6:21

pattern whereby Israel seemed

6:24

to think Israel acted as if

6:26

Iran was deterred. Israel was able

6:28

to carry out, again,

6:30

this series of assassinations in Syria, and it

6:32

went on the assumption that it could do

6:35

this and Iran would just

6:37

let this pass. There would be no

6:39

point at which Israel would escalate far

6:41

enough that Iran would be

6:43

forced to respond. That assumption held

6:45

true for months. Again, the

6:47

Israelis, going back to December,

6:50

have been carrying out this very intense

6:52

campaign. They've mostly

6:54

been able to do it without repercussions. At

6:57

some point, that logic was not going to hold.

6:59

Inevitably, there was going to come a point when

7:01

the Iranians would not just

7:03

keep absorbing these hits, and they would, as

7:05

you say, feel the need to try

7:08

and restore deterrence. I think that

7:10

was the goal of these

7:13

strikes on Israel on Saturday night. I

7:15

don't think they've achieved that goal, but that

7:18

is, I think, what they set out to do. Well,

7:21

let's talk about that because that's where I wanted to go

7:23

next. Right now,

7:25

we're recording this show on Sunday

7:27

around 1 p.m. Eastern. Reports

7:30

are coming out that a potential

7:33

Israeli retaliation that

7:35

might have occurred last

7:38

night were seemingly derailed

7:41

by a conversation that Joe

7:43

Biden had with Benjamin Netanyahu.

7:46

Iran is now threatening the United

7:49

States with retaliation against its bases

7:51

in the region if it's involved

7:53

in any kind of Israeli attack

7:56

on Iran. According

7:58

to reports by Axios,

8:01

President Biden told Benjamin

8:04

Netanyahu this weekend that the United

8:06

States will not participate in any

8:08

form of counter-strike against Iran. Taking

8:11

that all into account, Greg, could we

8:14

not say that, at least for now,

8:16

for the time being, Iran has restored

8:18

credible deterrence with not only Israel, but

8:21

the United States also? I'm

8:24

not sure it has deterred Israel with

8:26

this strike. I think if

8:28

you look at what Iran was trying

8:31

to do, on the one hand, it

8:33

was trying to restore deterrence and also,

8:35

say, a domestic constituency. But at

8:38

the same time, it was trying to do that

8:40

by carrying out a strike that

8:42

would not automatically trigger Israeli retaliation. And

8:44

so we ended up with a situation

8:46

where what they did was quite big.

8:49

They fired 350 missiles and drones at

8:51

Israel. That's

8:54

a significant attack. But they telegraphed

8:56

it for two weeks in advance,

8:58

and they started the attack with

9:00

very slow-moving drones that took hours

9:03

to reach Israeli territory. So

9:05

they gave Israel and its

9:07

Western and Arab partners ample

9:09

time to prepare. And that's why, in the

9:11

end, no one was killed, only

9:13

one person was injured, and the damage was quite

9:16

minimal because most of these

9:18

projectiles were shot down. So Iran

9:20

was trying to juggle these two

9:22

competing interests of restoring deterrence, but

9:24

simultaneously not causing

9:27

Israel to escalate even further. And

9:29

it was impossible to reconcile those

9:31

two. So the fact that

9:33

this strike was as militarily ineffective

9:35

as it was, I think,

9:38

means that instead of deterring Israel,

9:41

it might actually reassure

9:43

Israel that it can continue to

9:45

carry out strikes on Iran with

9:47

some degree of impunity. It's

9:50

a different case for America and

9:52

for other, again, both

9:54

Western and Arab countries, which

9:57

are very determined to avoid. escalation,

10:00

they don't want to see Israel

10:03

respond against Iran because they are

10:05

worried that Iran will then respond

10:07

again against Israel and will

10:09

be in this escalatory cycle that will lead to

10:11

an even bigger regional conflict

10:13

than the one that we are already

10:16

in. So there's pressure coming

10:18

from outside on Israel. And if anyone is going

10:20

to deter Israel here, ironically,

10:22

it's not going to be the Iranians,

10:24

it's going to be the Biden administration

10:26

and other Israeli allies who will do

10:28

it. The use

10:30

of ballistic missiles in Iran's attack

10:32

on Israel has rightly drawn Greg

10:34

some significant comment and attention this

10:37

weekend. You know, it's one thing

10:39

to send slow-moving drones. Another

10:42

though, to use Iran's

10:44

advanced ballistic missiles, over

10:46

100 of them fired on

10:48

Israel. And

10:51

while most, if not all, with

10:54

an exception of just one or

10:56

two were taken out by Israel's Arrow

10:59

missile defense system, these

11:02

missiles and the platforms that

11:04

they use to launch, are they not,

11:07

Greg, the very system

11:09

that Iran would

11:11

hypothetically use to launch

11:14

a nuclear weapon at

11:17

another country? They

11:19

are, as we know from

11:21

extensive reporting, potentially

11:24

two to four weeks out from taking

11:26

their current uranium

11:28

stockpiles and

11:30

enriching them into weapons-grade

11:33

material. It

11:35

does, and it's quite significant that they chose to

11:38

use those weapons. I mean, as you

11:40

say, there's a huge difference between drones

11:42

that took hours, six to eight hours

11:45

in some cases, to reach Israel. And

11:48

ballistic missiles where the lag time is

11:50

measured in minutes from the time that

11:53

they're fired from Iran till the time

11:55

that they reach Israel. If

11:57

Iran had just used Drones,

11:59

even. In cruise missiles which are faster

12:01

than drones but not as fast as

12:03

ballistic missiles he had. If they had

12:05

done that you could say there was

12:08

a desire to to keep this attack

12:10

symbolic more than anything else. but I

12:12

think the fact that they used more

12:14

advanced weapon site they use ballistic missiles

12:16

and also that the numbers of missiles

12:18

that they fired or in tells you

12:20

that this wasn't just symbolic. There's been

12:22

some commentary of the past twenty four

12:24

hours and people saying. That this is

12:27

a gesture, anagrams, parts and. They

12:29

didn't intend to do any damage at all,

12:31

and it was just meant to send the

12:33

message to Israel. A little think that's accurate,

12:36

but again, because of what they used and

12:38

and how much of it they use, they

12:40

were trying to do some damage here. They

12:42

weren't trying to perhaps that cause mass casualties

12:45

and in major cities, but this was a

12:47

real attack. That with a significant attack, it

12:49

wasn't just some symbolic gesture. So.

12:52

Gray given the barrier real in

12:54

high stakes of this competition with

12:56

a ran and ran again on

12:58

the verge of becoming on nuclear

13:00

power. What? Does this

13:02

say about. Israel's. Upcoming

13:05

actions? Is this the moment

13:07

for them to turn the

13:09

proverbial other cheek and not

13:11

retaliate, even try to build

13:13

a consensus amongst the. Western.

13:15

Powers to further containing constrain

13:18

around or is some kind

13:20

of equivalency in response to

13:23

Or Rand's attack and necessary

13:25

for Israel to reestablish it's

13:28

deterrence over a Ram. Give

13:30

us your sense. I.

13:33

Would be very surprised if Israel

13:35

turn the other cheek. That is

13:38

not usually what the Israeli government

13:40

doesn't mean there is a precedent

13:42

in Nineteen Eighty One when as

13:44

said I'm saying fired scud missiles

13:47

at Israel during the Gulf War

13:49

and the Americans as Israel not

13:51

to respond and in that case

13:53

it complies. But it complies because

13:55

the Americans were busy fighting a

13:58

war against Saddam Hussein and. Are

14:00

open and they were able to

14:03

the victims and co eighth and

14:05

impose sanctions and a no fly

14:07

zone So it's Israel. Didn't seal

14:09

the need to take action unilaterally

14:11

because there was an international coalition

14:14

ah taking action on it's the

14:16

house Very different situation. Now where

14:18

the it's by the ministration is

14:20

asking Israel not to respond but

14:22

it is not doing anything directly

14:25

to confront Iran said diminish your

14:27

arms military capabilities and and nor

14:29

are a. Of America's allies so

14:31

I would be surprised if Israel

14:33

good nothing I think police the

14:35

phone might do to strike at

14:37

Iranian targets elsewhere in the roots

14:39

and perhaps again in Syria to

14:41

demonstrate to the Iranians that they

14:43

weren't deterred by these missile and

14:45

drone strikes that to try and

14:47

do it in a way that

14:49

would have less risk a destination

14:51

then. Are attacking directly on

14:54

Iranian soil? But that's a very

14:56

real possibility. Or it's still. Despite

14:58

the warnings from Americans, Most here it's

15:00

been a real possibility at the Israelis will

15:02

do. That they could state are all

15:04

the bases in Iran where these missiles

15:06

and rooms are fired from? They did

15:09

say top Iran's nuclear facilities, which they've

15:11

been threatening to do for many years

15:13

now and there is a real chance

15:15

of that and I think there is

15:17

almost certainly Israel would be something in

15:20

response to this attack. How.

15:22

Do you think this weekend's events

15:25

kind of raises the stakes were

15:27

Israel and the rest of the

15:29

world? In in terms of Iran's

15:31

nuclear program, we know that the

15:34

International Atomic Energy Agency has effectively

15:36

been unable to comply with. International

15:39

agreements around the auditing and

15:41

surveillance of Iran's nuclear program.

15:43

I'm. We. Know. As.

15:46

we've discussed before that the

15:48

stockpiles could be refined into

15:50

weapons grade material very quickly

15:52

and a matter of weeks

15:54

and now we seen a

15:56

demonstration the very first ever

15:58

direct attack on Israel from

16:01

Iran using the very

16:03

ballistic missiles that potentially could carry

16:05

a nuclear warhead.

16:08

So what does this all mean

16:10

for Iran's nuclear program? Is this gonna get renewed

16:14

attention and pressure

16:16

from the international community to

16:19

do something here, to head off the

16:21

threat of a nuclear Iran? It

16:25

does certainly up the

16:27

stakes. And you're right, even

16:30

before the events of the

16:32

past two weeks, even before October

16:34

7th and the start of the Gaza war, we

16:37

were getting to a point where you

16:39

couldn't keep kicking the can down the

16:42

road because Iran had accelerated its production

16:44

of highly enriched uranium, not

16:46

all the way up to weapons grade to 90%,

16:49

but it was producing significant quantities

16:51

of uranium to

16:53

60% purity, which has no civilian

16:56

use and only serves as a way

16:58

station to enrich up to

17:00

weapons grade. So they were

17:02

getting to a point where they were on the

17:04

threshold of being able to make enough uranium

17:07

for a dirty bomb. They had made

17:09

significant progress, as we've seen now in

17:11

the past day on their ballistic

17:13

missile program, the delivery system for a

17:16

nuclear weapon. The only thing they really

17:18

had left to do was to work

17:20

on the process of manufacturing a

17:22

warhead, taking that enriched uranium,

17:24

fabricating it into a warhead and fitting

17:27

it onto a missile. But they

17:29

were getting close to a point where, as you

17:31

say, conceivably, they were weeks away from

17:34

having a bomb's worth of highly enriched uranium.

17:36

So we were at a point already

17:38

where there was a crisis brewing. And

17:40

I think also what's happened now over the past

17:42

six months, which heightens that crisis,

17:46

is that Iran's sense

17:48

of its security

17:50

doctrine is probably changing

17:52

at the moment. They

17:54

have these nuclear facilities. They

17:57

have invested quite heavily in these

17:59

nuclear facilities. They've suffered through many,

18:01

many years of sanctions in

18:03

order to run this rogue nuclear program,

18:05

but they don't yet have a

18:07

nuclear deterrent as a result of

18:10

it. So these facilities are vulnerable. They're targets.

18:12

They could be potentially struck by

18:15

Israel in the coming days or

18:17

weeks. And so that gives the

18:19

Iranians a sense of vulnerability. They're now worried about

18:22

not just a strike on their nuclear facilities, but

18:24

on their military bases, they're worried about a direct

18:26

strike from Israel, which is not something they've had

18:29

to worry about in recent

18:31

years. And so that might,

18:33

for certainly some elements of the

18:35

government, the Revolutionary Guard, that

18:37

might lead them to argue that what Iran

18:40

needs is a nuclear deterrent. It needs

18:42

to take that last step and build

18:44

a functioning weapon to act

18:46

as a safeguard against attack by

18:48

Israel or by America or by

18:51

other external powers. So again,

18:53

we were already getting to a breaking

18:55

point with Iran's nuclear program, and now

18:58

we have a moment where the events

19:01

of the past six months are going

19:03

to reinforce for some Iranian policymakers why

19:05

they might want to acquire a nuclear weapon. In

19:09

the last 12 hours or so, we've heard

19:11

comments from Benny Gantz and Defense

19:14

Minister Gellant talking up the

19:16

idea of creating an international

19:19

alliance against Iran. I'm

19:22

struggling to understand the purpose of

19:24

such alliance. How

19:26

would this serve Israel's interests

19:28

if it wasn't ultimately directed

19:30

at eliminating

19:32

the threat of Iran's nuclear

19:34

program? What do you

19:37

see here as their potential for Iran

19:39

to create a military alliance? It was

19:41

discussed under the Obama presidency, specifically with

19:43

U.S. cooperation, to strike

19:45

Iran's nuclear facilities and

19:48

take this threat off the board. I

19:52

think certainly for

19:54

Benjamin Netanyahu, any

19:57

talk of a coalition would be linked

19:59

to. Iran's nuclear program. You

20:01

know, he has threatened for

20:03

more than a decade now that Israel

20:05

would carry out a unilateral

20:08

strike on Iran's nuclear facilities,

20:10

but he's never done it. And

20:12

one of the reasons he's never done it is

20:14

that he is aware and the Israeli army is

20:17

aware that they can only

20:19

do so much damage to Iran's nuclear facilities. They

20:21

only have so much

20:23

military capability. And so at

20:26

this point, given how dispersed Iran's nuclear

20:28

sites are, given how well fortified some

20:30

of them are, Israel could carry

20:32

out a strike that would perhaps set

20:34

back Iran's nuclear program by six months,

20:36

a year, on the outside. That's

20:39

all. And what it would also do

20:41

is give the Iranians added incentive to

20:44

develop a nuclear weapon to prevent any

20:46

future Israeli strikes. So what Netanyahu has

20:48

always wanted is for the Americans to

20:50

do the job for him. And he

20:52

wants the United States, which obviously has

20:54

much more military capability,

20:57

to carry out a bigger strike that

21:00

would do years worth of

21:02

damage to Iran's nuclear program. And

21:05

I think now any talk of a coalition

21:07

from him, that's certainly one thing that he

21:09

has in mind, is that he would like

21:11

to see military action

21:13

against Iran's nuclear sites. But

21:16

I think the problem is that almost

21:18

none of the participants in this coalition

21:21

want to take that sort of, what

21:23

they would see as offensive action against

21:25

Iran. America doesn't want

21:27

to do it. It has no desire to get

21:29

dragged into a war with Iran. Other western countries

21:31

don't want to do it. And

21:33

Arab states, even the ones that either

21:36

have official relations with Israel, like the

21:38

UAE, or are friendly with

21:40

Israel in private, like Saudi Arabia, the

21:44

last thing they want is a regional war because

21:46

they're worried they're going to end up on the

21:48

front lines of that. They are right across the

21:50

Persian Gulf from Iran, and

21:52

they are worried that they could be

21:54

targeted. So Israel Would like

21:56

to cobble together some kind of coalition, and

21:58

there's been some talk of. That you

22:00

know in in Washington in recent years

22:02

as well. But there's a fundamental issue

22:04

here which that Israel see thought as

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23:03

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23:05

great debate. It's

23:09

not a little bit about where

23:11

the Biden Administration's policy on a

23:13

rant goes. from here, we know

23:16

that they have struggled in their

23:18

relations with. I. Told Khamenei.

23:21

They tried to bring the.

23:24

Obama era agreements on halting

23:26

Iran's nuclear program back into

23:28

force that didn't work. They've

23:30

released eight dollars to Qatar

23:32

that were in the form

23:34

of seized money ah of

23:37

a ram and they've continued

23:39

to allow this Aransas sell

23:41

oil on to world markets.

23:43

In all, this seem to

23:45

have little or no effect

23:47

on Iran's decisions this weekend

23:49

to attack Israel. Has the

23:51

Biden Administration really run out

23:53

of. rope gas you pick

23:56

the analogy when it comes to

23:58

managing the iranian threat For

24:01

the Biden administration, it has been three

24:04

plus years of failed attempts

24:06

to manage Iran. They

24:08

came in saying

24:10

that they would revive the JCPOA,

24:12

the nuclear deal that then

24:14

Trump exited when he was

24:16

president. And the Biden

24:18

administration spent its first months in office

24:22

trying to revive

24:24

that deal with the Iranians only to

24:26

have a change of power in Iran.

24:29

The more moderate president who negotiated that

24:31

deal left

24:34

office and a hardline president,

24:36

Ibrahim Raisi, replaced him

24:38

and had no interest in making a deal

24:40

with the Americans. And so the

24:42

effort to revive the deal

24:45

failed. The administration then pivoted to trying

24:48

to contain Iran and trying to

24:50

not go back to the full

24:52

JCPOA, but strike a lesser deal

24:54

that would give Iran access to

24:57

a bit of money in exchange

24:59

for de-escalation in the

25:01

region. And that was what

25:03

Biden pursued up until October

25:05

7th when that spectacularly imploded.

25:07

So the administration has never

25:09

been able to find a way to deal

25:12

with the Iranians, and that's not entirely their

25:14

fault. Some of that has to do with this

25:17

real shift towards hardline politics in Iran

25:19

over the past several years. It's not

25:21

entirely un-America that they weren't able to

25:24

revive the nuclear deal, but they have

25:26

struggled, really struggled to figure out how

25:28

to handle the Iranians. And I think

25:31

now they have to balance

25:33

between, on the one hand, having made

25:35

this very public commitment to Israel's security

25:37

and obviously wanting to

25:40

uphold that commitment, also wanting to

25:43

restrain the Israelis from carrying

25:45

out any significant attack on Iran, and

25:47

having to deal with the competing interests

25:50

of their partners in the Gulf, again,

25:52

countries like Saudi and the UAE, which

25:55

have tried to improve their relations with Iran in

25:57

recent years as a way of insulating themselves from

25:59

the end. conflict. And so Biden

26:01

is caught between an Israel that is very, very hawkish

26:04

on Iran at the moment, an Arab

26:06

world that is surprisingly dovish

26:09

on Iran at the moment. And

26:11

then of course, America's own domestic

26:13

politics where any effort to

26:15

talk to the Iranians is seen as

26:17

tantamount to treason within the Republican Party.

26:19

And this is an election year to

26:21

boot. So I think he's really

26:24

going to have a hard time finding any

26:26

constructive way to engage with

26:28

Iran at this point. What

26:31

do you expect is going to happen with oil markets

26:33

in the coming week with these threats

26:36

now of a potential regional

26:39

conflict brewing? We

26:41

also know that this part of the

26:43

world is pretty important to shipping global

26:45

supply chains. The straits of Hormuz after

26:47

all go right through this area, bordered

26:51

by Iran. What's the potential

26:53

here in terms of a new

26:55

threat emerging to the global economy? On

26:59

the one hand, I think we've all

27:01

been a bit surprised at how sanguine

27:04

oil markets have been over

27:06

the past six months. If someone

27:08

had told me a year ago that there would

27:11

be a regional war in the Middle East

27:13

that had drawn in half a dozen countries

27:16

across the region, and there would be a

27:18

de facto blockade of the Red Sea, and

27:20

Israel and Iran would be trading

27:22

blows directly, and oil would

27:25

still be below $100 a barrel, that would have been

27:27

somewhat surprising assessment. But

27:30

here we are. It ticked up earlier

27:33

this month because of

27:35

concerns about how Iran

27:37

might retaliate against Israel and whether there would

27:39

be increased conflict

27:41

in the region as a

27:43

result. But then we got

27:45

some unhappy inflation

27:48

numbers out of America and a report

27:51

that America had larger crude oil

27:53

stockpiles than anyone anticipated, and oil

27:55

prices promptly dropped by a dollar

27:57

or two. So it's been

27:59

very hard to predict what's going

28:01

to happen. It's not just about conflict in the

28:03

Middle East. It also has to do with what's

28:06

happening with economies in America, in Europe,

28:09

in China. It's a very complicated picture.

28:11

I think if there

28:13

is not a significant Israeli response, if it

28:15

doesn't look like we're heading for the war

28:18

to end all wars in the Middle East,

28:20

then I think the only way

28:22

it could have a significant impact is if Iran

28:24

keeps doing the same thing

28:26

that it did on Saturday, which

28:28

was hijacking a cargo ship transiting through

28:31

the Strait of Hormuz. I think

28:33

that sort of thing could actually have more of an

28:35

impact on oil markets than whatever kit-for-tat

28:37

is going on between Israel and

28:39

Iran. What do

28:41

you think the likely Israeli responses are going to

28:44

be? It's hard to guess

28:46

right now. There are so many moving pieces.

28:48

Events could quickly overtake us in the hours

28:50

and days to come, but do you

28:52

think Israel will pursue a strategy

28:54

of building an international alliance against

28:57

Iran, trying to contain

28:59

Iranian power through a process

29:02

of kind of consultation and

29:05

partnership? Or is there

29:07

the potential here that Israel

29:10

acts on its own, understanding

29:12

that ultimately it's responsible for

29:14

its own security? With

29:17

the caveat that I could be spectacularly

29:19

wrong in 48 hours, I tend

29:22

to lean towards the first option,

29:24

the more pragmatic approach. I mean,

29:26

there are a lot

29:28

of voices within the Israeli security establishment

29:30

right now who are counseling

29:33

that, who recognize that they were

29:35

wrong in their assessment of how Iran

29:37

would respond to the original strike in

29:40

Damascus on April 1st, and who

29:42

think as a result of

29:44

that they shouldn't rush into a big

29:47

reprisal against Iran. They should take some

29:49

time. They should, as you say, coordinate

29:52

with allies to whom they owe a

29:54

debt now. I mean, America, Britain, France,

29:56

Jordan, other Arab states, all

29:59

of them played a role. in shooting down some

30:01

of these Iranian drones. And I think

30:03

that earns them a right

30:06

to have some say in how Israel

30:08

chooses to respond. So the

30:10

logical thing to do is to wait

30:12

the beat, to consult with allies, to

30:14

figure out a more considered response. And

30:16

that is what some people,

30:19

again, within the Israeli establishment are pushing for.

30:21

I think the wild card here is that

30:24

ultimately the decision comes down to Benjamin

30:27

Netanyahu, who has historically

30:29

throughout his career been

30:31

reluctant to use military forces, but

30:34

actually quite cautious. But we've

30:36

seen over the past six months, his primary

30:38

concern is staying in power. His

30:40

primary concern is heading

30:43

off early elections for as long as

30:45

possible. And to do that, he has

30:47

been catering to

30:49

the interests of his far right

30:51

coalition partners. So I can

30:54

tell you what makes sense. I can tell you what's logical,

30:56

but what Netanyahu is going to decide at the end of

30:58

the day is a bit harder to predict now than it

31:00

would have been a year or two ago. And

31:03

that's my final question. Netanyahu's entire

31:05

political career has really been

31:08

bound up in his obsession

31:11

with Iran. This is someone

31:13

who has seen Iran as

31:15

a strategic challenge for Israel

31:17

that has gone unanswered, and

31:20

that he is

31:22

committed to trying to limit,

31:24

contain, remove. Why

31:27

doesn't the events of

31:29

this weekend finally provide

31:31

Netanyahu with the

31:34

moment, the set of ingredients that

31:36

allows him to act

31:38

on what he might see as his

31:40

kind of ultimate purpose as one

31:43

of Israel's longest serving political

31:47

leaders to once

31:49

and for all deal with Iran? It's

31:53

been his obsession for many, many

31:55

years, you're right. I mean, there was a funny

31:57

moment, I think more than a decade ago now,

31:59

where the the state comptroller

32:02

put out a report on the cost of

32:04

living in Israel after mass protests about the

32:06

high cost of living. And Netanyahu held a

32:08

press conference to address the report

32:10

on the day that it was released. And he

32:13

started the press conference by saying, I want to

32:15

talk to you about the cost of living, but

32:17

before that, I want to talk to you about

32:19

something that threatens life itself, and that is Iran.

32:21

So, you know, even a report about housing

32:24

prices and the price of

32:26

cottage cheese, he found a way to spin

32:28

that back into being about Iran.

32:31

And I think it's a dangerous moment

32:33

in some ways right now where you

32:35

have this prime minister who has been

32:38

obsessed with Iran, who sees an opportunity

32:40

now to do something about Iran and

32:43

to enlist allies, particularly the

32:45

United States, in doing

32:47

something about Iran. At

32:49

the same time, as you say, that

32:51

prime minister has a short

32:54

term interest in maintaining the

32:56

state of war because it prevents early elections, at

32:58

least he thinks it will, and it keeps him

33:00

in power. And also a

33:02

prime minister who has no trust

33:04

and has no credibility. I mean, amongst Israelis,

33:07

if you look at the polls, just about every poll says 75%

33:09

of them want

33:12

him gone, want the new prime minister. Certainly

33:16

when you talk to foreign diplomats, they

33:18

are sick of him and their governments want to

33:20

deal with a new Israeli prime minister. There's

33:23

no trust. There's no credibility. You

33:26

put all of those things together, and

33:28

I think it's a very worrying confluence

33:30

of events right now. Greg,

33:33

thank you so much for coming on the

33:35

program today. Just terrific insights. You brought real

33:38

balance, consideration to

33:40

your analysis and views. It's a

33:42

credit to you and your writings. If

33:45

you want to find out more about

33:47

your views on the emerging crisis, where can

33:49

they go? Social media, the

33:51

web, tell us. Twitter

33:53

is the best, GL Carlstrom

33:55

on Twitter. Excellent.

33:58

Thank you, Greg. I

34:01

am following you and I really urge

34:03

our listeners to do so also

34:05

to get your thoughtful analysis,

34:08

the very type of commentary that you've heard today. Thanks

34:10

so much for coming on the program. Thank

34:13

you. My pleasure. Well,

34:17

that wraps up today's dialogue. I want to

34:19

thank our guest, Greg Karlstrom. You've

34:21

certainly given us a lot to think about.

34:24

If you have feedback or reflections on what

34:26

you've just heard on this or any of

34:28

our podcasts, please send us an email to

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