Episode Transcript
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0:00
It all started with mom. She's always
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0:26
Welcome
0:28
to The Other
0:31
Hand,
0:34
a podcast
0:36
by Jim Power and Chris Johns that looks
0:38
at the major political, economic and
0:40
financial developments around the world from
0:43
a uniquely Anglo-Irish perspective.
0:52
All our podcasts can be found at our Substack
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site and all good podcast platforms.
1:00
We're doing something a little bit different today. We
1:02
have a guest joining us from San
1:05
Francisco, Noah Smith. Noah
1:07
grew up in Texas. He studied physics
1:09
in college. He was an economics PhD
1:11
student at the University of Michigan.
1:14
He was an assistant finance professor at Stony
1:16
Brook University in New
1:19
York state. He was then an economic
1:21
columnist for Bloomberg Opinion,
1:23
left that in 2021 to become
1:25
a
1:26
full-time blogger. Although he had
1:28
been blogging, I think for about a decade
1:30
prior to that. The blog is called Noah
1:33
Opinion. I would strongly recommend to
1:35
all our listeners to check it out,
1:37
subscribe. It's absolutely fantastic.
1:40
He covers economics, politics,
1:42
finance, technology. An interesting
1:45
fact about Noah is that he believes that
1:47
rabbits
1:48
are an underrated pet
1:50
and he lives in San Francisco with two
1:52
rabbits, Cinnamon
1:54
and Constable Giggles. Noah
1:56
is also a self-described
1:59
techno.
1:59
optimist. And it's on
2:02
that note, no, I'd like to start off in
2:04
the economists today. There was
2:07
an interview with your Val Noah
2:09
Harari. Just throw a quote
2:11
at you. He said that AI
2:14
has hacked the operating system of human
2:16
civilization. And storytelling
2:18
computers will change the course of human
2:21
history. As a techno optimist,
2:23
how do you respond to that? Great,
2:26
let's, let's see what they can do. That's
2:28
pretty much my response.
2:29
It's, um, I don't know about the
2:32
metaphors of the operating system of human
2:34
society. I don't really know what that necessarily
2:36
means, um, which is not a criticism.
2:39
I do think that, you know, large language
2:41
models, chatbots like GPT
2:44
four or, or whatever, you know, they'll
2:46
change a lot of things because a lot of what we spend
2:48
our time doing is sort of talking to each other that
2:51
will, that will change. Also those,
2:54
those machines will provide a way for us to
2:56
tell computers and robots
2:58
and all, you know, mechanized systems what
3:00
to do simply by talking at them. So instead of
3:02
having you having to actually write code
3:05
and essentially write the instructions
3:07
of what the machine should do, you say, Hey
3:09
machine,
3:10
create a window on my screen that
3:12
looks like
3:13
this and you know, has this in it
3:16
and the machine will just do it. It'll understand
3:18
your language very naturally. And it will
3:20
be able to convert that into some sort of, you know,
3:23
computer code,
3:24
write that code and execute the code in
3:26
a way that you want. Or suppose you're using a robot
3:28
in a factory, uh, you can say, Hey robot,
3:31
you know, bring me that part from over there on the robot
3:33
just knows which part to bring you and knows sort
3:35
of how to do it. And I think that this is going
3:37
to change the way we use technology
3:40
because we'll be able to talk to technology
3:42
the way we are trained to talk to each other. So
3:44
I guess maybe if that's the operating system of human
3:46
civilization, you know, we, we talk to each other
3:49
to tell each other what to do. And we understand our
3:51
own
3:52
language and linguistic instructions, at
3:54
least some of the time. And I think computers will
3:56
now be able to do that. And that's a big change.
3:58
Uh, I think
4:01
one of the underrated possibilities that
4:04
people are not thinking about yet in connection with
4:06
this technology is that this will make technology
4:09
accessible to people who are
4:11
much less technically trained.
4:13
So right now you have to
4:15
use computers effectively or to use robots
4:17
or to use anything technological.
4:20
You essentially have to think like a simple
4:22
machine and you have to write lines
4:25
of code, you know, open your text editor, write lines
4:27
of code in a language and then compile it. And
4:29
that requires you to essentially
4:31
do machine part instructions in
4:34
your head before translating them onto
4:36
the page and telling the machine to do them.
4:38
So I think that has really given
4:40
a lot of advantage in our society to people
4:42
who have the capability to think like machines.
4:45
And now through the magic of
4:47
large language models, I think we are able
4:50
to, we will be able to skip
4:53
that step of forcing ourselves to think like a
4:55
machine. I think people who are not very
4:57
good at thinking like a machine will still be able
4:59
to use machines. And I think that
5:01
early evidence already points to this happening. So
5:03
I think that's a big underrated change
5:05
that people aren't talking about. That there is obviously
5:08
a lot of debate and disagreement. You know,
5:10
I've seen you write about Noam
5:12
Chomsky, Tyler account, people like that who
5:14
are very different views. Jeffrey
5:16
Hinton, who's just stepped down from
5:19
Google, has been saying a lot of
5:21
negative stuff really about
5:23
AI and chat GPT over the last
5:26
few days. You are very much on
5:28
the positive side of the debate. I
5:31
actually do agree
5:31
pretty strongly with Tyler Cowan on
5:33
this one. And he has also been on the positive
5:36
side of the debate and been fairly harshly
5:38
critical
5:39
of the people who want a pause in
5:41
AI research. I think that his
5:43
arguments are persuasive and the arguments of people who
5:45
don't want a pause
5:47
are persuasive to me. And, you know,
5:49
I don't want to put words in people's mouth. But to summarize those arguments,
5:53
I think
5:54
the first argument is that many people
5:56
will not pause. So if you make a pause,
5:58
that simply seeds the field to the people who
6:01
refuse to pause,
6:02
which in this case is China. Researchers in
6:04
other countries, these people aren't going to follow the U S
6:06
if, if we declare a pause, even if
6:08
we have an ability to do that. I think
6:10
the second, the second argument is that
6:13
we don't actually know what these technologies
6:16
are capable of yet. So to pause
6:18
simply delays the day when we find out. And
6:20
if we pause for six months, AI
6:22
research, we won't necessarily be able to
6:25
figure out things that would help us make AI safer
6:28
within those months. Because after
6:30
the AI research resumes, changes
6:33
will happen that will invalidate the findings we
6:35
found during the pause. And so I don't think,
6:37
I think a pause is not particularly effective in
6:40
this case because it will
6:42
essentially just delay the day
6:45
when we find out what the new technology is
6:47
capable of and are thus able to design
6:49
effective, you know, safeguards on
6:51
the technology.
6:52
Also, I think there has been a great
6:55
model
6:56
in terms of what the danger
6:58
is from AI,
6:59
I think that most people, when you
7:01
talk about AI, including Jeffrey
7:04
Hinton has talked about this. They will
7:06
talk about the danger in, as in terms of
7:09
replacing human jobs. I don't
7:11
know so much about the details of the technology
7:13
of AI, only the basics, but I do
7:15
know a bit about the economics of, of,
7:18
you know, job replacement, things like that. And I
7:20
think that
7:21
not only is that threat overblown,
7:24
but it also is not the kind of thing
7:26
that's amenable to a pause. So if you pause, if
7:28
AI is destined to make humans obsolete, which
7:30
I don't think it is, but if it is, then
7:33
pausing for six months and
7:35
giving humans an extra six months before
7:38
they go obsolete
7:39
is not going to do a damn thing.
7:41
And so I think that
7:44
is effectively useless. Now, the other
7:46
danger that people talk about
7:48
from AI is, you know,
7:50
sort of the technology going haywire
7:52
and inflicting harm upon humanity
7:55
via, you know, nuclear launches,
7:57
bioweapons, financial fraud.
7:59
sewing social division, you know, there's
8:02
a bunch of ideas that people
8:04
have for how this could happen. And I think
8:06
that a pause there would,
8:09
that would, you know, I mean, preventing the destruction
8:11
of humanity for six months is a useful thing
8:13
to do. And I don't actually know whether
8:16
or not, you know, AI will destroy humanity.
8:18
I think the current crop of AI will
8:20
definitely not
8:21
destroy humanity. That's not a thing that could happen.
8:23
But I think that we might reach relatively
8:26
soon an AI that could by
8:29
adding a bunch of stuff that the current AIs do
8:31
not have, such as the ability to act
8:33
as a perpetual agent that's always sort of on
8:35
and thinking and acting. Various other things
8:37
we need to add in order for it to be able to do that,
8:39
you know, we need to connect it, have APIs
8:42
to connect it to the financial system. And we'd have it
8:44
have to be able to like synthesize voices and
8:46
make calls and basically have to be extremely
8:48
multifunctional. I think that
8:50
we can see that it can do those
8:52
things. But the question is, would a pause
8:55
make us safer from that? And
8:57
I think what makes us safer from
8:59
AI trying to screw with our
9:01
systems, our, you know, technological
9:04
and weapons and finance systems and these things,
9:06
what makes us safer from that is having it done
9:09
in a small way and building safeguards
9:11
to it. So if you if you watch the Terminator
9:13
movies where the AI wakes up and launches
9:16
nukes and destroys humanity, it's the first thing
9:18
it ever does.
9:19
When the AI, the minute the AI comes online, it
9:21
thinks, oh, my God, humans are threatening me. And
9:24
the first thing it does is launch a global thermonuclear
9:26
war. We must absolutely not hook up AI
9:29
to any sort of weapon systems, especially
9:31
weapons of mass destruction. You know, if it's like some
9:33
little drone or something that could just cause
9:35
an accident as the worst thing or kill a civilian
9:37
or something, maybe I don't know. But then
9:40
I think that hooking up AI to the nuclear
9:42
weapon systems is a very bad idea. And
9:44
we should there seems to be a high
9:46
likelihood that AI will do small bad things before
9:49
it does the big bad thing that kills everybody. And
9:51
we'll see it do that. And we'll understand how it does
9:53
that. And we'll come up with countermeasures for it.
9:55
We'll know not to, you know, we'll have
9:57
we'll have changed the way our phones work so they don't.
9:59
just trust, you know, voices from
10:02
trusted people or we'll, we'll have some way of verifying
10:04
that a phone call comes from the right person,
10:07
or we'll have some way, we'll just add
10:09
verification systems for communication so AI
10:11
can't
10:12
deep fake its way into tricking people to do things.
10:14
We'll implement stricter controls on biological,
10:16
you know, synthetic bio kits that you can get at home. We
10:18
should be doing that anyway. But I think one
10:22
pretty consistent thing we've seen is that human beings
10:25
as a group, not individually, but as a collective
10:27
group are very, very, very good
10:29
at finding ways to destroy other human beings
10:31
and doing that for stupid, crazy reasons
10:34
of our own. We're very good at that. If
10:36
Ted Kaczynski
10:37
mailing bombs because he's concerned about the environment,
10:40
I mean, that's crazy.
10:41
You'd have to work to get an AI that crazy,
10:43
or you have, you know, terrorists doing 9-11
10:46
or whatnot. And we already have, we've
10:48
been implementing safeguards to, you
10:50
know, guardians, nuclear terrorism, theft of nuclear
10:52
materials, things like that for a long time. And we
10:54
probably have to update those safeguards in the age
10:57
of rogue AI. We'd also know
10:59
AI doing small bad things would also tell us where
11:01
the rogue AI is coming from, who made it, how
11:03
to, how it works, how to stop it. You learn
11:06
about bad things by bad things happen. And that's just sort
11:08
of an unfortunate fact of the world. You know, it's,
11:10
you can't learn about bad things by having
11:13
a few internet enthusiasts sit
11:15
around and dream and ponder ways that
11:17
things could go bad. You don't learn much because
11:19
there's so many possibilities that they can dream
11:21
up that you don't know which possibilities are more likely. The way
11:23
you know which possibilities are more likely is by having AI
11:26
do some small bad things and figuring out, oh
11:28
my gosh, a small bad thing happened. Like
11:30
crashing car,
11:32
right? You know, you can sit there,
11:34
I can sit there and think of ways that a car could
11:36
crash or that AI could accidentally crash a car.
11:38
But that's essentially useless compared to
11:40
testing AI at low speeds,
11:43
we're in a non-fatal situation or in a safe situation,
11:46
watching it crash and then saying, okay, why did it crash?
11:49
That's how engineering works. A pause just
11:51
makes a delays the day when we will start
11:53
that process of learning how the machine
11:55
can crash. Thank you, Noah. I'd like to move
11:57
the discussion on from tech in the interest of time.
11:59
we could talk about it all day and
12:02
ask you to briefly comment
12:04
on a piece that you wrote recently about
12:06
the slow banking crash,
12:09
I think you called it. We've had three
12:11
banks now fail in the United States,
12:13
the second, third and fourth largest in
12:15
US bank failure history. Each
12:18
one has been described as a one-off, it's
12:20
self-contained, it's not going to happen again,
12:23
everything's okay, we are told. It
12:25
strikes me that from
12:27
a behavioral point of view, the business model of these
12:29
banks, which was to essentially, and I
12:32
oversimplify a little, to bet on
12:34
low interest rates, staying low forever
12:36
was clearly wrong. And if three of them
12:38
have done it, there must be more surely, aren't
12:40
there? They all have to some degree. Yeah, that's
12:42
right. So the way they did this primarily
12:45
was to pay, was to do
12:47
two things. Number one, they bought long-term
12:50
bonds, and the banks that failed bought
12:52
many more long-term bonds than other banks. So the
12:54
large banks that we have like Chase
12:56
or Citibank, their
12:59
ability to buy a lot of these long-term bonds is reduced
13:01
by the regulation that we implemented after the global
13:03
financial crisis.
13:05
And after those banks almost failed
13:06
because they're systemically financially important. But
13:09
during the Trump years, we changed that
13:11
law so that banks of
13:14
a slightly smaller size, the size of Silicon Valley
13:16
Bank and First Republic, both of which just failed, are
13:18
allowed to do a bunch of risky stuff. And unfortunately,
13:21
we changed that regulation at
13:24
a very inopportune time. And
13:26
so
13:27
those banks bet heavily on interest
13:29
rates staying low by buying long-term bonds. Because
13:31
remember, when interest rates go up,
13:33
the price of bonds goes down and the price of long-term
13:35
bonds goes down a lot. That is why those
13:37
bond portfolios took a hit. The second thing
13:39
they did was in order to keep making a profit margin,
13:42
they did not pass along higher interest
13:44
rates to their depositors. So that if you
13:46
had a savings account at Silicon
13:48
Valley Bank or at First Republic, it
13:51
was still only paying you 0.2% interest in
13:53
an era of 4% interest rates.
13:55
So you were losing, they were setting your money on fire. That
13:58
is an invitation to deposits to leave. Remember
14:00
that banks collapse when their deposits leave and when you can't
14:02
pay them out. So when your value
14:04
of your assets goes down, because
14:07
interest rates went up, so bond prices went down, it means
14:09
that you can raise less cash to pay your
14:11
deposit. So that makes it more likely for a bank to collapse.
14:14
And in addition, having depositors
14:16
want to leave, not because of panic, but just because
14:18
they're not getting a good rate of return on their deposits, is
14:21
another incentive for depositors to leave. So
14:24
the era of high interest rates created
14:26
these incentives for depositors to leave. And in March,
14:28
we saw that happen very fast to three banks. The
14:30
idea that first Republic Bank, so first
14:32
Republic Bank officially failed this week, but
14:35
really it failed due
14:37
to deposit outflows that happened in March, because
14:39
it acknowledged those deposit outflows in its quarterly report.
14:42
The first quarter does not include
14:44
April. Really, when we're talking about, you
14:46
think it's one after another because the news stories
14:49
come one after another, but in fact, these all happened at the same
14:51
time. When we talk about a one-off, we don't mean a
14:53
one-off in terms of one bank doing bad business
14:55
models. We mean there was a big
14:57
outflow and then the Fed and the FDIC
15:00
and the Treasury came in and basically backstop
15:03
deposits. And so we haven't seen, we have
15:05
not seen banks fail since that event.
15:07
We may, there's two banks that are quite
15:09
wobbly, Western Alliance and Pacific West
15:12
Bank Corp. And those two banks are
15:15
much smaller. They're about $40 billion in assets
15:17
each compared to $200 billion for both Silicon Valley
15:20
and first Republic. They had some deposit
15:22
outflows, not as bad. They may also fail.
15:24
It's not clear. Since the Fed and
15:26
the FDIC and the Treasury backstopped
15:29
uninsured deposits, we haven't seen
15:31
other bank failures. So I think that the
15:34
idea that, oh, they backstop the deposits
15:36
and yet we're still seeing one after another of these
15:38
bank failures. No, those happened at the same time. However,
15:40
that said, the incentives
15:43
for deposits to flow out of the banking system
15:45
remain. And the only way that banks
15:48
can keep money, keep
15:50
deposits in the system and
15:52
strengthen themselves by
15:54
keeping deposits in the system.
15:56
The only way they can do that is by raising interest
15:58
rates that they pay to depositors.
15:59
And the easiest way to do that is
16:02
to simply make the depositors more aware of
16:04
the high interest rate savings account alternative
16:06
that they already have called a money market account.
16:09
So they can do that, which is also FDIC
16:11
insured. It's basically just better than a traditional
16:13
savings account in every way. And banks have been frankly
16:16
a little
16:17
dishonest in letting people keep their money. And traditional
16:19
savings account, when the money market account is what the traditional
16:22
savings account used to be, it does pay you
16:24
interest. So banks can do that. That
16:26
just weakens the value of their business because that
16:29
means they don't make as much of an interest rate spread. The spread
16:31
between their bonds or their loans,
16:33
whatever their assets are, the interest rate that those pay
16:36
the banks, and the interest rate the banks have to pay their
16:38
depositors goes down. So that difference goes down.
16:40
And then banks get weaker in terms of profitability.
16:43
So banks have to sacrifice profitability in order
16:45
to survive. That will happen. And it will also
16:47
reduce lending because that will make
16:49
them cut back on risky long term loans.
16:52
And it'll just make them cut back on loans in general to sort of
16:54
preserve their cash, just
16:56
in case depositors want to take money out. That
16:59
decrease in loan activity will
17:01
cause
17:02
either a recession or something like a recession
17:05
in that it will decrease aggregate demand. It
17:08
will decrease lending. It will decrease the amount of money flowing
17:10
into people's pockets and
17:12
businesses' pockets. And it will decrease the amount
17:14
that people in businesses spend on things, which will
17:17
hold down inflation, but will also cause a slowdown
17:19
in economic activity, which is probably
17:22
what the Fed wanted in the first place when it raised
17:24
interest rates. In other words, this is kind of
17:26
just how monetary policy works. This
17:29
is this is how we slow the economy
17:31
in order to quash inflation. Is it not the
17:33
case that, yes, the deposits
17:36
flowed because they
17:37
weren't getting any kind of return on those
17:39
deposits and they had a good alternative for the first
17:42
time in a long time? But
17:43
it was also the case that perhaps slightly
17:46
smarter depositors worked out that
17:48
the losses on those bond portfolios
17:51
had on paper
17:53
technically maybe rendered the
17:55
bank's capital ratios skinny
17:57
to the point that they were technically insolvent. there
18:00
was actually a solvency worry as
18:03
well as a chase for yield. Sure.
18:06
Yes, absolutely. So the chase for yield
18:09
is the thing that is still in
18:11
action. So the solvency worry
18:13
was there. It's no longer there because if your
18:16
bank is 100% insolvent and if your bank's assets go
18:19
to zero tomorrow,
18:21
it doesn't matter a bit to you because the
18:23
government has guaranteed
18:25
your entire deposits now.
18:27
You will not lose a penny of your money. Your money is
18:29
fine. Who is responsible for maintaining
18:31
the
18:32
paperwork that gives
18:34
you your money will change as
18:36
it changed with First Republic being acquired by JP
18:38
Morgan, but as a depositor, you're in
18:41
zero danger from your bank going and solving.
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So why wouldn't the feds just simply
19:20
say, okay, rather than going through all that rigmarole
19:24
complicated stuff of
19:26
the deal that was done with JP Morgan because
19:28
there are all sorts of cross guarantees
19:30
and loan loss sharing
19:33
potentially going forward. It was a pretty complicated
19:35
setup. Why didn't they just shut First Republic
19:37
and give everybody a check?
19:39
Because that is annoying and disruptive.
19:41
I mean, if your bank account vanishes and then you get a check
19:43
and then you have to go find another bank, open another bank
19:46
account and deposit that check,
19:48
that is annoying and disruptive, possibly
19:50
even scary,
19:51
but certainly would disrupt normal economic
19:53
activity. Whereas if instead now you just have
19:55
a JP Morgan account and your account just switches
19:58
to a different bank.
19:59
That is very... easy and smooth transition.
20:02
So you think that today's Federal
20:05
Reserve interest rate rise is probably
20:07
the last one? That's
20:09
my guess. I think that they will raise
20:11
interest rates to the level they
20:13
said they would raise interest rates to, and I have to go check
20:16
to see if this gets them all the way there, if they need one
20:18
more hike. I think this gets
20:20
them all the way there.
20:21
Where other they're close, and the
20:23
point is that the Fed places an extremely
20:26
high premium on its credibility,
20:28
and people who want to predict the Fed need
20:30
to understand that fact first,
20:32
is that the Fed credibility over
20:34
everything, if the Fed goes back on what
20:36
it says, then it feels rightly
20:39
or wrongly that that will crush
20:41
its ability to make monetary policy work in the
20:43
future. So it places a huge premium on credibility.
20:45
It will raise interest rates a little too high
20:48
if that means, not a lot too
20:50
high, but it will raise interest rates a little too high, even
20:53
if that means hurting the economy a little too
20:55
much, just to preserve its own credibility. Noah,
20:57
could I just ask you about,
20:59
Sam, you've written a lot about globalization,
21:02
free trade, industrial policy, as
21:04
Chris mentioned in recent days. Since 2016,
21:08
I guess, we've seen Trump,
21:10
we've seen Brexit in the United Kingdom. There
21:13
has been a definite backlash
21:16
against globalization and the impact that
21:18
free
21:18
trade has had. How
21:20
do you assess the globalization
21:23
agenda at this juncture? Is it
21:25
irreparably damaged or is this
21:27
just a blip in a long-term trend?
21:31
Globalization in terms of trade as a percent of the economy has been
21:33
going down at a gentle rate
21:35
since the global financial crisis of 2008, which is now 15
21:37
years ago. Weird
21:39
to think that, right? It was such an apocal event and now
21:42
it's 15 years in the past. So the global financial
21:44
crisis
21:45
happened a long time ago, and
21:47
globalization has been shrinking slightly since then. What
21:50
has happened
21:51
in the last decade is
21:53
an increasing series of steps to
21:57
break up some of the specifics of the
21:59
old trading regime.
21:59
that prevailed during the 2000s and early 2010s. So
22:04
people think this started with Trump
22:06
and his tariffs on China, but in fact it did not. It
22:08
started with China. In the early 2010s and
22:10
mid 2010s, Xi Jinping starts, although
22:14
the plans were laid out in the Hu Jintao administration,
22:16
but Xi Jinping comes in and basically
22:19
decides to execute all these plans to
22:21
move China up the value chain by onshoring
22:24
production of high value components and building
22:27
brands, which is just good for
22:29
Chinese companies and value capture, et cetera, and
22:32
also to start securing
22:34
supply chains for the purpose of national
22:36
security. The idea that we don't
22:38
want our supply chains to get disrupted in the event of a war
22:41
is something that Americans are thinking of now and that
22:43
China was thinking of long ago because
22:45
they were actually thinking about the possibility of war
22:48
much earlier and much more seriously
22:50
than we were. And so China,
22:52
because they would start it, and
22:55
so China started making
22:57
efforts toward decoupling long before. Of
22:59
course, everyone knows the story of Trump coming in and slapping
23:01
tariffs on China and all these sort of sometimes
23:04
haphazard attacks
23:05
against China that were then
23:08
kind of refined by the Biden administration. The Biden administration
23:10
kept many of the tariffs, kept and
23:13
expanded export controls a lot and kept investment
23:15
restriction through CFIUS, the
23:17
committee that reviews Chinese investments. The Biden
23:19
administration
23:21
preserved or extended many of the Trump
23:23
administration's efforts toward decoupling
23:26
and then added on a lot of its own.
23:29
And now is adding another layer,
23:31
which is industrial policy. Trump didn't have really
23:33
industrial policy beyond yelling at companies
23:36
to put factories in the United States, which didn't work.
23:38
Biden has passed the CHIPS Act, the
23:40
Inflation Reduction Act, and those two
23:43
bills together basically promote two
23:45
industries, the semiconductor industry and the
23:47
clean energy industry. And those
23:49
two
23:50
industries are the focus of our new industrial policy,
23:53
and that's going to add a layer. And in addition,
23:55
on top of those things, Biden has come up with this
23:57
concept called French shoring, which in practice...
24:00
This is going to mean putting factories
24:02
anywhere but in China and this concept
24:04
of de-risking. So I know we don't
24:06
have that much time, but let me take a minute and say why
24:09
de-risking is the right word for this. Companies
24:13
that put all of their manufacturing in China are
24:15
in an existential danger from a
24:17
war over Taiwan or a war over anything,
24:19
South China Sea anywhere. The minute that the United
24:22
States and China start shooting at each other, the
24:24
value of direct investments in China,
24:26
of factories in China
24:28
goes to zero. It goes poof because you won't be able to get
24:30
your stuff out. You certainly won't be able to get your capital out,
24:32
but you won't be able to even get your stuff out.
24:35
Maybe even not your people out. If
24:38
all your manufacturing is in China and there's a war, which
24:41
is not something ... And because the war
24:43
would be started by China, that's not something
24:45
that American business people can even ... They
24:47
can yell at America to be peaceful and reasonable
24:50
and blah, blah, whatever they want all day, but
24:52
Xi Jinping is just not listening to them. If
24:54
he wants to start a war, he'll start a war and the United States
24:56
will fight if we get attacked.
24:59
And that's just how ...
25:01
There's no way that's not going to happen. Everyone
25:05
now realizes that being in China poses an existential
25:07
risk. The idea of de-risking
25:09
is basically to take your stuff and put some
25:11
percent of it in India, in Vietnam, in Indonesia,
25:14
in Malaysia, or in rich countries, Japan,
25:17
Korea, the United States, Taiwan,
25:19
et cetera. Maybe not Taiwan because it
25:21
could be blockaded. I don't know. But essentially
25:23
to take some portion of production
25:26
out of China, put it elsewhere to lessen
25:28
the existential risk so that even if half of your
25:30
stuff goes poof, half will not and you'll
25:32
survive.
25:33
One of the things that strikes me about the
25:36
extraordinary post that you put up on your
25:38
sub-stack earlier this week
25:40
on all of this when you explained
25:43
this new industrial policy, there were so many
25:45
things that I could talk to you about.
25:48
First is the extent to which over here in Europe,
25:51
I don't think the body politic,
25:53
I don't think policymakers, I don't
25:55
think the business community fully
25:58
gets what Biden done with
26:00
these two acts, I think that it
26:03
is all so new and so
26:05
counter
26:06
many deeply ingrained beliefs, not
26:09
least the belief that free trade is good
26:11
and that we must do everything that we can to protect it
26:13
and anything that we do that might damage free
26:15
trade is a bad. The old free
26:17
trade orthodoxy seems to be much stronger
26:20
here in Europe, particularly the UK, than
26:22
it is in the United States. The
26:25
narrative that economists or some
26:27
economists had about the issues that
26:29
were raised by the consequences
26:31
of the free trade that you talk about in your article,
26:34
in particular, the destruction of
26:37
jobs that went to China and elsewhere.
26:40
The first
26:41
narrow technical question I would ask
26:43
you is, was the destruction
26:45
of all those smokestack industry jobs,
26:48
industrial jobs, as much a function
26:51
of automation as it was going to China? That's
26:53
very difficult to tell
26:54
because when
26:56
China comes here and starts out
26:58
competing you, one way that you stay alive is to
27:00
automate. Those things are hopelessly entangled
27:02
in the data and we can't really tell the difference. Our
27:06
general best
27:07
impression is that up
27:10
through the early 2010s, automation
27:14
maybe was half the size of China
27:17
in terms of this shock to jobs, in
27:20
terms of from 2000 to 2012, for
27:23
example. But then you
27:25
run into periodization issues
27:27
like what period you're talking about. The
27:30
big China shock is generally reckoned to
27:32
be the 2000s mainly, probably
27:34
ending in around 2012 or 2013.
27:37
My bigger question is over
27:39
the consequences of all of this, the disappearing
27:42
jobs, which as well, particularly
27:44
the UK, either to automation or to China
27:46
or to both. The consensus, as I
27:49
understood it, amongst some economists
27:51
was that
27:52
all of that at the very macro
27:54
level was still a good thing. Countries
27:57
benefited from the free trade, from the
27:59
globalized
27:59
from the rise
28:02
of China because we were able to import
28:04
a whole load of cheaper stuff than we were before.
28:07
And that what we messed up was the distribution
28:09
of those gains.
28:10
I sense from you that you disagree
28:12
with that consensus. I
28:15
don't know because it depends on
28:17
what you care about. So I think
28:19
that the lifting of a billion
28:22
Chinese people out of poverty
28:24
is such a good thing for the world
28:26
that I would feel morally
28:28
bankrupt saying that we should not have done this.
28:31
At the same time from a narrowly nationalistic
28:33
interested national interest perspective,
28:36
I think that
28:37
there were a lot of you know, overall, this was probably
28:40
a net negative for the United States and probably will find out
28:42
for Europe as well. It
28:45
not not only destroyed those those smokestack
28:47
jobs or whatever, but you know, I think
28:49
more importantly, what was ultimately more important
28:51
is that it created a superpower competitor
28:54
that does not like us and was never prepared to like
28:56
us. And so national
28:58
security is what is what is driving these things.
29:01
If you tell people, well, now your stuff
29:03
will be slightly more expensive.
29:06
That carries almost no water.
29:08
Economists, you know,
29:10
who do like the IMF
29:12
recently did estimates of consumer surplus
29:14
from losses, consumer surplus losses
29:17
from friends shoring and decoupling or all these things. These
29:19
are all just like in valued in dollars. Americans
29:21
do not think of national security in terms of dollars
29:24
and economists do not think about national security period. And
29:26
no one's listening to economists. And so this
29:28
is something that people need to understand. In 2006, a lot of people listened
29:31
to what economists had to say. And
29:34
now very few people listen to what economists had
29:36
to say during the pandemic. They were completely
29:38
ignored on environmental stuff and climate tech.
29:41
They've been completely ignored. And so
29:43
really very little of what,
29:45
you know, economists have no influence with
29:47
either party right now. The
29:50
people driving economic policy are are
29:52
people at think tanks who may have an economist
29:54
background or may not. And
29:57
so that that is a thing that needs
29:59
to be understood.
29:59
that no matter what economists think about
30:02
free trade now, or no matter what their papers or models
30:04
say, no one's listening to them at all.
30:06
And so- Does that worry you? Do
30:08
you think that economists, even though they're not being listened
30:10
to, still have something to say?
30:12
That's a very good question, and I'm gonna write
30:14
about that soon. But I think that economists
30:17
are fairly behind the curve
30:19
on thinking about these things. No one has,
30:22
only a very few researchers have bothered to think about
30:24
industrial policy, and it's all been in the context
30:26
of developing countries, whether or not,
30:28
say, Indonesia can get
30:30
richer faster by promoting this
30:32
industry or that industry. Very few economists,
30:35
if any, have thought about industrial
30:37
policy at the, for
30:39
rich countries, in terms of national
30:42
security competition and things like that. It
30:44
is just not a thing that economists have thought of. They're
30:46
incredibly behind the curve, and if they're smart,
30:49
they'll scramble to catch up. And if they're not smart,
30:51
then they'll simply keep doing whatever, retreat
30:53
into the ivory tower and do whatever useless theory
30:56
that they're doing that no one cares about, or
30:59
just continue to focus on other issues
31:01
where they do have more clout, like minimum
31:03
wage or some welfare
31:05
policies on which some people still
31:07
do listen to economists. But no one's listening
31:10
to them about trade and about
31:12
national security and these issues. Am
31:15
I worried about this? No, economists,
31:17
it is incumbent upon economists to do the
31:19
work that forces me to worry that no one's listening
31:21
to economists, because so far, there's nothing to listen to them
31:24
about.
31:25
There are a lot of people in the UK who
31:27
would listen to
31:28
you and look at what Biden has
31:30
done, and you've must have seen, it's come out of Brussels
31:32
as well, people complaining like hell about
31:35
protectionism and subsidies and all of
31:37
the things that policy over here is
31:40
geared towards eliminating, trying
31:42
to reduce barriers to trade, the old
31:44
fashioned belief in free trade
31:46
is good. It may well be simplistic,
31:49
it may well be over, and is not being
31:51
listened to in the States.
31:52
But I gotta tell you now, it's still being listened to
31:54
over here. There's a big mismatch
31:58
of what people are thinking about on both sides of the world.
31:59
the Atlantic on this very issue. And
32:02
I don't think people over here,
32:03
they should read what you've written because it's
32:06
so big and it's so different to
32:08
the way policy is still thought about
32:10
here in Europe. Well, right. And I think
32:12
that for Britain, global Britain,
32:15
Brexit was all about free, buccaneering free
32:17
trade agreements all around the world. Britain
32:20
has much bigger problems than the question
32:22
of protectionism versus or industrial
32:24
policy versus free trade.
32:27
Britain just
32:29
has deep economic problems. It's
32:31
in a period of
32:33
potentially secular stagnation. And
32:35
I think that while industrial policy
32:37
might to some degree help it out of that,
32:40
I think that there are probably deeper things
32:42
that need to happen, including an improvement
32:44
in the leadership capabilities,
32:47
because I just saw Britain almost
32:49
select Jeremy Corbyn and actually
32:52
choose Liz Truss as prime minister,
32:54
who is not only outlasted by a head of lettuce,
32:57
but probably could be outgoverned by a head of lettuce
32:59
as well. And she immediately just grabbed
33:01
onto the most, you know, like
33:04
absolutely
33:06
dead 1982 level
33:09
Reaganomics dogma that economists
33:11
themselves would already have tossed out the window.
33:14
And so what they my point is, what they haven't
33:16
tossed out is this fundamental belief
33:19
that they took in with their mother's milk belief
33:21
in free trade, which you say has just
33:24
gone from the American agenda.
33:25
It's gone from the American agenda, but I think Britain
33:27
has bigger fish to fry, honestly. The people
33:29
who need to be thinking about the free trade versus, you
33:32
know, industrial policy kind of thing are primarily
33:34
in Germany and France right now. Those people
33:37
need to be thinking hard. And of course, that affects Ireland
33:39
because Ireland is sort of along for the ride in the EU
33:41
with that, though small. But Britain itself
33:44
is going to be a decade
33:46
digging out from the self-inflicted wounds
33:49
of Brexit and from the dysfunction of its
33:51
political
33:52
class. And I just, it's
33:54
almost daunting to me to tackle the problems
33:58
of Britain because I just.
34:00
Who's listening in Britain?
34:02
We have a strange psychodrama in Britain
34:04
in that what we must talk about
34:06
is anything but the problems.
34:08
I know. Ah, and then
34:10
when you do talk about the problems, the
34:13
vitriol is immediate. No
34:15
matter which side you take, you can even express
34:18
a point of view very reasonably
34:20
and mildly and the amount of vitriol
34:23
that people on social media will respond to is akin,
34:25
is
34:26
just beyond even what you
34:28
encounter in America,
34:30
which is already a very high level of vitriol. Let
34:32
me give you an anecdote. When I was younger,
34:34
I used to really enjoy
34:36
watching negative British
34:39
reviews of video games and books. And
34:41
I would look on YouTube just to find
34:43
people in a British accent trashing
34:46
a video gamer book. Even if I kind
34:48
of liked the video gamer book, it was just funny to
34:50
see it get trashed by a person in a British
34:52
accent because British people were just
34:54
so good at trashing stuff. Unfortunately,
34:57
that appears to have been applied as
34:59
a philosophy of government.
35:02
Noah, can I ask you, Donald
35:04
Trump is in Ireland tonight actually
35:06
visiting his golf resort? I'm
35:09
sorry.
35:10
Exactly. Thank you. I
35:12
just looking ahead to the next US presidential
35:15
election, I mean, how vitriolic
35:17
is that going to be? How divisive?
35:19
Very much, very much. My assessment
35:22
is that the popular unrest
35:24
in America has largely peaked.
35:26
Enthusiasm for
35:28
street actions, riots, insurrections,
35:32
fights with your neighbors, running down protesters
35:34
in a car. It has
35:36
intensified among an increasingly shrinking
35:39
tiny set of people, an ever tinier set
35:41
of people are going crazier and crazier
35:43
like they did in the 1970s and will be violent. While
35:47
the mass of people just think, oh my God,
35:49
is there anything else I can pay attention to other than
35:51
this? I've overdosed on this. I don't just
35:53
want to see people yelling about Donald Trump
35:55
forever and ever. Please make it go away.
35:58
I think people
35:58
obviously have reservations about Biden. because of his age,
36:01
but I think that really very few people, relatively
36:03
few people in America would like to see a return of Trump
36:06
and the years of chaos
36:09
that he brought. And so I think
36:11
that the 2024 election is a big
36:14
danger, but if America
36:16
can make it past the 2024 election safely without either
36:20
electing Donald Trump or falling into some sort
36:22
of constitutional crisis or chaos, I
36:24
think that you will very rapidly see
36:26
a move toward
36:27
a relative amount of social
36:32
rest or peace or whatever the opposite of unrest
36:35
is in America,
36:36
because most people are just so
36:39
tired of it. And I think you saw this in the
36:41
late 70s and early 80s, you
36:44
saw, although there were still some
36:46
extreme crazies who were blowing stuff up and killing
36:48
people and tried to kill Gerald twice
36:51
in one month, you definitely saw this movement
36:53
of the mass of people of like, oh my God, can we
36:55
just stop this? And I think you'll
36:57
see that again, but 2024 is a big hurdle
36:59
that we have to make it past.
37:00
This is the last thing I will say
37:03
and leave the concluding remarks
37:05
and all questions to Jim. But one of
37:07
the things towards the end of your piece on industrial policy
37:09
that struck me consistent with what you're
37:12
just saying about things shifting is that,
37:14
you know, over here, we assume that America is fundamentally
37:16
divided, can't agree on anything, and
37:19
that it's going to be horrible. Whoever wins the election,
37:22
all this industrial policy stuff, with
37:24
one notable exception, which we won't
37:26
have time to go into, but most of this industrial
37:29
policy stuff, one of the jaw dropping
37:31
aspects of it that I hadn't fully appreciated
37:34
is that it's bipartisan.
37:36
That's right. And the entire reason is
37:38
national security because both Democrats
37:40
and Republicans have become freaked out
37:42
by China. Democrats more because
37:44
they're wedded to labor and they see the smokestack
37:47
job disappearing, but also because they're upset
37:49
about China's human rights abuses, Republicans
37:51
because they see a threat to, you know, Western
37:54
civilization and power and whatnot,
37:56
and also because Republicans increasingly draw
37:58
their political support for the world.
37:59
from the working class in America, a shift
38:02
that has happened in the UK as well, I know, with the
38:04
working class in general drifting to the right. They're
38:07
bipartisan because they both perceive
38:09
the same threat for some different
38:11
reasons and some overlapping reasons. And
38:13
as long as that threat is there, there
38:16
will be some amount of unity in policy.
38:18
And that's why these bills, the Inflation
38:20
Reduction Act was not a bipartisan bill.
38:22
It was passed by only Democrats
38:25
with a slim majority. And because the
38:28
Republicans and Democrats do not see eye
38:30
to eye on climate change yet, which is unfortunate
38:32
in my opinion. They also do not see eye to eye on
38:34
things like poverty reduction or whatever, but
38:39
they definitely see eye to eye on China. It
38:42
is an amazing unifying force in American
38:44
politics to watch everybody. And it's
38:46
scary to a certain extent. I've seen even
38:48
sort of national security hawks a
38:51
little freaked out by the degree to which there
38:53
has
38:53
been a sort of unshakable anti-China
38:56
consensus taking hold within our halls
38:58
of policy. And I think that it's
39:00
a dangerous thing, but
39:03
it presents opportunities for actually getting
39:05
bipartisan stuff done and building infrastructure
39:08
and building some of the capacity
39:10
to increase industry again, provide
39:13
broad-based middle-class jobs and things. So
39:16
it's a danger and an opportunity, this bipartisan
39:18
consensus about China. Jim, I'll leave the last word
39:20
to you. In 30 seconds, I
39:22
have a brother living in San Francisco. I visit
39:25
regularly. And when I travel
39:27
into the city,
39:29
I am appalled at what I see. I
39:31
mean, it seems like a city that
39:33
the whole liberal agenda
39:35
has really destroyed over
39:37
the last couple of decades.
39:39
Am I being harsh? Harsh but fair. I
39:41
wouldn't say that it's necessarily the same liberal agenda
39:44
as you'd find in New York, but I'd
39:46
say there are some things that are uniquely bad about
39:48
San Francisco and dysfunctional and have been that way for
39:50
a while and are just reaching a breaking point.
39:53
And I would say that there's other
39:54
ways in which progressive ideas that are
39:56
common throughout the country have not helped San Francisco.
39:59
So I think we...
39:59
We are heading for a reckoning.
40:01
We are heading for sort of a breakdown
40:04
in San Francisco over urbanist
40:06
issues and over how a city
40:08
can survive and thrive in the modern
40:10
world. And that breakdown is happening now. It'll
40:12
be interesting to see how it turns out. Listen, Noah,
40:15
on behalf of myself and Chris,
40:17
I'd like to thank you very much for that. It was fascinating.
40:20
You've been listening to Noah Smith, who
40:22
has a blog called
40:24
Noah Opinion. I would strongly recommend
40:27
people check it out. It's fantastic
40:30
stuff. You'll hear a lot more
40:32
of what we've been discussing tonight. So, Noah,
40:34
thank you very much. Yes, thank you, Noah. All
40:36
right. Thank you very much. It
40:38
was great. And one thing, the blog is Noah Opinion with Noah
40:41
in the middle.
40:42
Okay. And it's a sub stack. You can
40:44
find it on sub stack. It is sub stack. Please,
40:46
everybody, sign up.
40:57
You have been listening to Chris Johns and Jim
40:59
Power on the other hand. We
41:04
hope you enjoyed it. Our
41:07
back catalog of podcasts can be found
41:09
on our sub stack count, www.cjpeconomics.substack.com.
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Or on podcast platforms such
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to our sub stack account. Comments
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and feedback are much appreciated.
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