0:02

Welcome to the President's Inbox, a

0:04

CFR podcast about the foreign policy

0:07

challenges facing the United States.

0:09

I'm Jim Lindsay, Director of Studies at

0:11

the Council on Foreign Relations. This

0:13

week's topic is Erdogan's

0:16

victory.

0:21

With me to discuss what the re-election of

0:23

Recep Tayyip Erdogan as President of

0:25

Turkey means for U.S.-Turkish relations

0:28

and the future of NATO is Stephen

0:30

A. Cook.

0:31

Stephen is the E&I Enrico

0:33

Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and

0:35

Africa Studies at the Council.

0:38

He has written extensively on the Middle East.

0:41

He is the author of False Dawn, Protest,

0:44

Democracy, and Violence in

0:46

the New Middle East, and a columnist for

0:48

Foreign Policy Magazine. His

0:51

most recent piece is titled, Why

0:53

Turkey Experts

0:54

Got the Election All Wrong. Stephen,

0:57

thanks for joining me. Pleasure to be back with you, Jim.

1:00

Always good to have you, Stephen. Now for

1:02

months, I have been reading that President

1:04

Erdogan's two-decade dominance

1:07

of Turkish politics was about to

1:09

end. The economy is in the

1:11

worst shape in 20 years. Employment

1:14

is hitting 10%. Inflation

1:17

is topping 70%. Many

1:19

Turks are fearful that he is dismantling

1:22

Turkey's democracy. By

1:24

all accounts, Erdogan's government mishandled

1:27

the response to the horrific earthquake

1:30

that hit southeastern Turkey in February

1:32

and left

1:33

tens of thousands of Turks dead,

1:35

many of whom died because Erdogan's government

1:38

turned a blind eye to shoddy construction

1:40

practices. Yet, Erdogan

1:43

dominated the first round of voting and then

1:45

achieved an outright majority in the second round.

1:47

What happened? I was hearing those things as

1:49

well. I think that there

1:51

was a problem, which

1:54

was the reason for writing the piece, there was a problem

1:56

in the analysis ahead of the election.

1:58

Certainly, everything that you

1:59

enumerated were problems, the economy,

2:02

the response to the earthquake, deepening authoritarianism

2:05

in the country. Those are not things that scream

2:07

re-election. They definitely are not things that scream

2:09

re-election, but nevertheless, as you point out, Erdogan

2:12

has prevailed. And I think that there's

2:15

a number of reasons for that. First,

2:18

in the run-up to the elections, the

2:21

Justice and Development Party, President Erdogan's

2:23

party, and their agents buried within the bureaucracy

2:26

were able to essentially clear the field for

2:28

President Erdogan. His most

2:30

potent potential adversary, the mayor of Istanbul,

2:33

Ekrami Mamoulou, was banned from

2:35

politics. His case is on appeal,

2:37

but he, on the flimsiest

2:40

of charges of insulting

2:42

the justices of the Supreme Election Council

2:44

during the 2019 local elections,

2:47

has now been banned from politics and is facing

2:49

a prison term. They used

2:51

the state, the tax authority

2:54

to go after opponents. The

2:57

large majority of the media is in the hands

2:59

of Erdogan-friendly media

3:01

conglomerates,

3:03

just an entire effort

3:06

to ensure Erdogan's victory. And then,

3:08

of course, on the day of,

3:10

certainly in the first round, there were

3:12

many, many challenges to ballots

3:15

in opposition strongholds. And

3:18

there remains a question whether those ballots were ever

3:20

really counted. Nevertheless, we went to

3:22

a second round. And

3:25

despite all of the challenges, all

3:27

of the challenges, Erdogan still had a message

3:30

about traditional

3:32

values, about culture, about national

3:34

identity that resonated with at least half

3:37

of the population. So walk me through

3:39

that, Stephen. What is the argument

3:41

that Erdogan is making to his supporters

3:44

or people on the fence to bring them into the

3:46

ballot booth to vote for him?

3:48

He is saying that his

3:50

opponents, and we can talk a lot about the

3:52

opposition and their deficits. But let's

3:55

talk about Erdogan, because I think that one of

3:57

the secrets to Erdogan's longevity

3:59

AKP's longevity, even though the AKP

4:02

didn't do as well, they and their partners

4:04

now continue to enjoy parliamentary majority,

4:06

but relatively speaking, is that

4:08

that message that they have been

4:12

sending to the Turkish public for 20 years

4:14

now about prosperity, about

4:17

power, about piety, those things, people

4:19

have actually felt those things. Yes, Turkey is in

4:22

a terrible economic situation, but

4:24

Erdogan has effectively turned that into a nationalist

4:27

issue, suggesting that there are outside

4:30

forces, that there's this interest rate lobby

4:32

that is trying to bring Turkey to its knees.

4:35

But overall, up until the last five years,

4:38

Turks have felt more prosperous. Turkey

4:40

has, from their perspective,

4:41

more powerful. The religious values

4:44

that the AKP has allowed people

4:46

to express in public in ways that were never

4:48

possible before the AKP's time

4:51

and power is

4:52

consistent with people's values.

4:54

And he said, I'm going to protect those things for

4:57

you. I'm going to protect your traditional

4:59

values. I'm going to protect

5:01

you from all of those outside

5:03

external forces, in particular the United

5:05

States that wants to bring Turkey to its knees,

5:08

and that my opponents

5:09

won't do those things. My opponents are

5:12

weak. They are agents

5:14

of the United States, they're agents of the Europeans.

5:17

They are gay. That was part of his

5:19

closing arguments, was attacks on the LGBTQ

5:22

community and connecting Kilec

5:24

D'Orolo, Kamal Kilec D'Orolo, his opponent,

5:26

the opposition leader to

5:29

the LGBT community worldwide.

5:31

Sounds like

5:32

Erdogan ran a campaign that at least in

5:35

some part was a culture war.

5:37

Absolutely. He has, since

5:39

at least 2008, 2009, has ruled based on division. And

5:45

this is a formula that's worked and it

5:47

worked well in this election.

5:49

And his opponent is also from a minority group. He's in

5:51

Alabey. Tell me what that means. We'll go

5:53

into a long discussion of it. Give

5:56

me the 10 second version. The 10 second version

5:58

is that he's not a Sunni Muslim.

5:59

Sunni Muslims don't necessarily consider Al-Avis

6:02

to be good Muslims. So

6:04

in any event, this was yes, a

6:06

culture war. And so all of the emphasis

6:09

on economic problems and

6:11

the

6:12

slow response to the earthquake

6:14

or the corruption that led

6:17

to shoddy construction, which is not really

6:19

a new problem in Turkey. I remind

6:21

people of the 1999 Ismet earthquake,

6:23

which killed thousands of people as well,

6:26

which was four years before AKP

6:28

came to power and two years before it even existed. So

6:32

it's like,

6:33

remember the book by Thomas Frank, What's the

6:35

Matter with Kansas, in which he asked, why do

6:37

people vote against their economic interest? Because

6:39

culture and identity issues, it's a similar

6:42

kind of dynamic. Okay. So let's talk about

6:45

the losing side, the losing candidate. Obviously

6:48

they did not get to run their preferred

6:50

candidate because as you mentioned, he went

6:52

to jail. What mistakes did

6:54

that candidate make besides having

6:57

the wrong religious faith for at least some

6:59

people in Turkey? Well, I think the cardinal

7:01

error that Kamal Khaled Shderola

7:03

made, which was essentially foisting himself

7:05

on the opposition coalition in,

7:08

you know, the polls were wrong, but

7:10

I think on one thing that they were right on,

7:13

which is that he was the weakest of all the potential

7:15

opposition candidates. But nevertheless, he

7:17

believed it was his turn to run. So

7:19

there were several parties who sort of came together

7:22

in a coalition to back one

7:24

candidate. A six party coalition and

7:27

Kamal Khaled Shderola is the leader of the Republican

7:29

People's Party, which is the main opposition party,

7:32

the party, Ataturk's party, the founder

7:34

of modern Turkey. And of

7:36

the major figures in what's

7:38

called the table of six, he polled

7:41

least well against Erdogan.

7:43

But he had the biggest party. But he had the biggest party

7:46

and he felt that it was his turn to

7:48

run. In fact, in early March, there was

7:50

a problem in the coalition. One of the major

7:53

parties in the coalition called the good party

7:55

or the E party in Turkish, the

7:57

leader of that party, a woman named Meral Akshener.

8:00

bolted from the coalition because she felt

8:02

that Kiele Czderola was a weak candidate. I

8:04

think the other big problem was

8:06

that

8:08

if they did believe that there was

8:10

a possibility that the Justice and Development

8:12

Party was going to play games with the ballot boxes, and

8:15

I mentioned before, there's a question about these challenge

8:18

ballots and whether they were actually counted.

8:21

You would think that they would have eyes

8:23

on every single ballot box, but they

8:26

lost track of 20,000 ballot boxes,

8:28

and no one's ever going to know whether

8:31

those ballots were actually counted.

8:33

In terms of messaging,

8:36

they talked about returning

8:38

Turkey to a democratic system

8:41

and the economy. But everyone can

8:43

turn around and say, hey,

8:45

I'm the real Democrat here. Pious women

8:47

who wear hijab now have the freedom to wear it wherever

8:49

they want. I've expanded participation

8:53

in Turkish politics. We have elections on

8:55

time. They're free and fair.

8:57

Whereas under the traditional

9:00

elite in Turkey, pious

9:02

women didn't really enjoy the right to

9:04

go anywhere that they wanted. Maybe they had the right

9:06

formally, but they didn't feel like they could. Turkey

9:09

was marked by authoritarian politics.

9:12

If you talk to a supporter of

9:14

Erdogan in the AKP, and you say, there's

9:16

been a descent into authoritarianism in Turkey after

9:18

promising democratization

9:20

early in the AKP's time

9:23

in office, they'll

9:24

look at you like you're crazy. Say, what

9:27

are you talking about? We had an 88% turnout in the first

9:29

round of the election. Erdogan has done all of

9:31

these things that have made

9:34

us freer, and his

9:36

constituency in ways do feel freer than

9:39

they did prior to his coming to

9:41

power. Let's move the conversation on and

9:43

talk about what happens now that Erdogan

9:46

is getting another five-year

9:48

term.

9:49

Is Turkey headed toward autocracy, as

9:51

many of his critics argue? I think it's

9:53

a distinct possibility. There's been this debate

9:56

that I've been involved in is how do we talk about

9:58

Turkey? Is it a liberal democracy?

9:59

Is it competitive authoritarianism? It's

10:02

certainly competitive in comparison to Egypt,

10:04

one of my other favorite countries in the world. Your

10:07

most favorite country. Besides my own. But

10:10

if the outcome continues to be the same,

10:13

it's a distinction without much of a difference.

10:15

And I wonder, it is genuine that

10:17

Turks feel that their votes

10:20

have to matter and they're infused

10:22

with meaning. But if they vote

10:25

and they contest these elections and they come out in

10:27

these large numbers, and they can't get over the top, I

10:29

wonder if that is going to depoliticize

10:32

society. And I wonder

10:34

now that Erdogan has won another

10:37

five year term, what he is going

10:39

to do to ensure

10:42

that the changes that he and the AKP

10:44

have wrought over 20 years can

10:47

be protected from his opponents.

10:49

And that's going to come in the form of a new constitution.

10:52

He's promised that finally

10:54

he's going to write a new constitution. This has

10:56

been on his agenda since 2007.

10:59

Wasn't able to do it, had to settle for constitutional

11:01

amendments in 2017. But in the run

11:03

up to the election, he's been saying, I'm going to write a new constitution.

11:05

And I think that constitution, if he

11:08

gets it done, is going to lock in those

11:10

changes that will really

11:12

reflect

11:13

his worldview, his sensibilities,

11:16

the AKP values that

11:19

may in fact seal the deal

11:21

where Turkey can no longer be considered

11:24

anything other than an authoritarian political system.

11:27

What about his decisions on the economic

11:29

front? The markets don't think very

11:31

much of his economic policies,

11:34

which are unorthodox to

11:36

say the least. I will note that the value

11:38

of the Turkish lira has fallen about 20%

11:42

against the dollar over the last year.

11:45

That means imports are much more expensive,

11:48

means more inflation.

11:50

Is Erdogan going to be able to turn

11:52

around the economy? It's

11:54

a good question. He really does pursue unorthodox

11:57

economic policy in the face of inflation. You're supposed

11:59

to raise the economy. interest rates. In fact,

12:02

he has demanded that the

12:05

central bank, which is supposed to be independent,

12:07

pursue a low interest rate

12:09

policy. This is opposite what the Federal Reserve

12:12

has done here in the United States. Exactly opposite of what- Or

12:14

the central bank in England or Germany.

12:17

All of the opposite of all those

12:20

things and inflation is running

12:22

very, very high. Official rate of inflation

12:24

is 43%, but it's at probably

12:26

double that, if not more.

12:29

It strikes me there's been some speculation that

12:31

he will change and he

12:34

has the capacity to change. But

12:36

it strikes me that if he does do that, it won't be

12:39

very soon. He has been running against

12:41

the so-called interest rate lobby for

12:43

the better part of the last decade and he's not likely

12:46

to surrender to the interest rate lobby very,

12:48

very soon. There are rumors that the

12:50

former minister of finance, a guy named Mehmet Shimshek,

12:52

who has a Wall Street background

12:55

will come back into the government and that

12:57

will give confidence in the markets.

12:59

But unless they actually take some

13:01

real action to stem the problem with

13:03

the lira, I think Turks are going to continue

13:05

to struggle with high inflation. I think

13:07

what Erdogan is thinking

13:09

is that with his rapprochement

13:12

with Gulf countries, he

13:14

can- Persian Gulf. Persian Gulf countries or

13:17

for our friends in the Western

13:19

side of the Gulf, the Arabian Gulf countries, that

13:23

their sizable sovereign

13:25

wealth funds will invest in Turkey

13:27

as they have been doing, that he can have

13:29

credit swaps with the Emiratis

13:31

and the Chinese that will keep Turkey

13:34

afloat.

13:35

In fact, President Erdogan, right before the end of

13:37

the campaign, said he would go to the Gulf to

13:39

thank them for depositing money in the

13:41

central bank and that

13:43

this will keep Turkey afloat while they

13:45

pursue an export-led growth

13:47

strategy that will solve

13:50

Turkey's problems. As you said, the lira is

13:53

worth, what was the figure? 10% less? It's

13:56

dropped by 20% this year. Imports are more

13:58

expensive, but Turkey's exports

13:59

be more competitive around the world. But you have

14:02

to make high quality

14:03

products that people want to buy.

14:05

I'm just telling you what the strategy, what

14:08

might be the strategy is an export led growth

14:10

strategy rather than applying

14:13

pain, more pain on

14:16

his core constituency, which is that broader

14:18

middle class of Turks that

14:20

emerged in the middle part of

14:23

his time in office. That strategy can

14:25

work if your outsiders, in this case,

14:27

the Saudis and the Emiratis

14:29

continue to write big checks, but

14:31

they may stop at some point, presumably. This

14:34

is one of the problems. I mean, the caprice of authoritarian

14:36

leaders, things may change where

14:39

they decide not to. My sense

14:41

is that the Gulf leaders believe

14:43

that investment in Turkey is a way for them to get

14:46

leverage over Erdogan that they were unable to

14:48

get by, for example, funding

14:50

Khalifa Heftar in Libya or others

14:53

to oppose the insuscis- So why would they want leverage

14:56

over Erdogan?

14:57

They are

14:59

concerned about the exercise of Turkish

15:02

power in the region. Broadly speaking,

15:04

Erdogan sees himself as a leader of the

15:06

Muslim world. I think Saudis and Egyptians

15:08

have something to say about that. They

15:11

are concerned that the Justice and Development Party is

15:13

essentially the

15:14

Muslim Brotherhood. Now, I don't think that that's

15:17

entirely accurate, but Erdogan

15:19

is an Islamist and these countries, their

15:22

leaders- Explain what you mean by Islamist.

15:24

Turkish Islamism is different from

15:27

Islamism that you find in the Arab

15:29

world, but essentially it's a style of

15:31

politics in which religion

15:34

plays this prominent role

15:36

and

15:36

that it

15:38

is the threat to the monarchies of-

15:41

Okay. Why would the Crown Prince of

15:43

Saudi Arabia to pick one person out

15:45

of the bunch be threatened by the Muslim

15:47

Brotherhood or an Islamist

15:49

approach to politics? Because these are ideas

15:51

that Islamists espouse that are potentially

15:54

attractive to broad

15:57

numbers of people in these countries and

15:59

they'd like to- keep these ideas out

16:01

because they're fundamentally anti-system

16:04

messages. An anti-monarchical,

16:07

I should say. Obviously,

16:10

in the case of the Gulf countries, anti-monarchical

16:13

because that's the system. That's

16:15

the way in which they have sought to gain some leverage

16:17

over Erdogan.

16:18

To be honest with you, unlike,

16:21

for example, Egypt,

16:22

Turkey has assets that are worth

16:25

buying, Turkish defense

16:27

contractors produce good defense

16:29

articles. Turkey is a manufacturing

16:32

center for Europe. Any Ford automobile

16:34

that's sold in Europe has been manufactured in Turkey. It's

16:36

a real economy. The idea

16:39

of export-led growth isn't crazy.

16:41

The idea that there will be investment isn't

16:44

crazy. The question

16:46

is whether

16:48

these Gulf countries want to continue to invest.

16:50

Okay. Let's talk about foreign policy, a

16:53

bit more about foreign policy. I

16:55

will note that President Joe Biden, who

16:57

has positioned himself as

16:59

champion democracy around the world,

17:02

tweeted his congratulations to Erdogan

17:05

after Erdogan's victory. What are you making

17:07

that? You always ask me these questions. If

17:10

you were sitting next to the president, what would you advise

17:12

the president to do? If I had been sitting

17:14

next to the president, when he took to Twitter

17:17

to congratulate the president, I'd

17:19

say, Mr. President,

17:21

maybe you want to put down your phone, wait

17:23

a little while longer. Why

17:26

is that everyone else's best I can tell? Yes,

17:28

Hamas and lots of others. Well,

17:30

President Macron of France,

17:32

for example, Vladimir Putin, also

17:34

tweeted. President Biden has made

17:36

a big deal, at least rhetorically, about

17:39

values in American foreign policy. Now,

17:42

I've written that I thought that this was a mistake,

17:44

that no American president can

17:47

not talk about American values,

17:49

but that a values forward foreign

17:52

policy, as the administration announced early

17:54

on, was going to lead to trouble and lead

17:56

to accusations

17:57

of hypocrisy. Here's Erdogan,

18:00

is, I mean, Turkey is a repressive

18:03

state. It gets a pass because it's a NATO ally,

18:05

but it has tens of thousands of political

18:07

prisoners. It represses its Kurdish population,

18:10

its opposition and its leadership has promised

18:12

to send back Syrian refugees

18:14

against their will into a war zone, into

18:17

a country that's led by a war criminal.

18:19

And here was the president congratulating Erdogan

18:22

and saying they look forward to working together. Again,

18:24

it just, it didn't look quite right. But again,

18:27

Turkey is a NATO ally. It's an important

18:30

one. It's playing a role

18:34

in the Ukraine conflict that doesn't

18:36

necessarily sit well with its NATO allies,

18:39

but by carving

18:41

out this kind of gray area where it supports

18:44

Ukraine's sovereignty and has said all the right things and

18:46

early on sold Ukraine

18:49

important military equipment, including drones,

18:51

but has also maintained ties

18:53

with

18:54

Russia and helped Russia skirt sanctions

18:57

and a variety of other things. But it has facilitated

18:59

a dialogue between President

19:01

Erdogan and President Putin that has led to, for example, the

19:03

Black Sea grain deal, which

19:05

if you're worried about the stability of countries around the

19:07

region, getting grain

19:09

out of the Black Sea is very, very important.

19:12

Egypt, the largest import of wheat in the world. I don't

19:14

know what Egypt would do without the Black Sea

19:16

grain deal. There's good and there's bad, but

19:18

it did seem odd

19:21

that the president was so quick to congratulate

19:24

Erdogan given his emphasis on values

19:26

and his statements that the United States really does need to stand

19:28

for something in the world. Isn't the answer to

19:30

that question the point you just made that

19:33

Erdogan has reasonably

19:35

good ties with Vladimir Putin?

19:37

I said a moment ago, Putin tweeted his

19:39

congratulations. I don't believe he tweeted, he sent his

19:41

congratulations to Erdogan calling

19:44

him his dear friends. Does

19:46

Erdogan, given his economic situation,

19:49

have an incentive to want

19:51

to provide something to President

19:53

Putin?

19:54

It's certainly the case that the Turks

19:56

have an expertise

19:59

in Vegas. sanctions. They

20:01

help the Iranians evade sanctions and

20:04

Putin actually has money. And

20:06

also Turkish business has

20:08

moved into Russia where Western companies have

20:11

moved out. And so there is a mutually beneficial

20:13

relationship here. And of course, you know,

20:15

Turkey buys gas and oil from the Russians,

20:18

which is perfectly legal. At a discount. At a discount, right.

20:21

So this is a relationship that is going to

20:23

continue regardless of what's happening

20:25

in Ukraine and regardless of what's the US and

20:27

NATO wishes are.

20:29

So again, it seemed

20:32

unseemly, but American foreign policy is often

20:34

in that place that is strategically tenable, but

20:36

morally questionable. Well,

20:38

we'll have a whole nother podcast. I

20:40

don't want to, I don't want to go down that

20:42

avenue. I want to stay focused on what's

20:45

happening with Turkey. So my sense is then

20:47

that you see Erdogan continuing

20:49

to play both sides of the

20:51

fence. Does he have any red lines, Steve?

20:55

Well,

20:55

Erdogan's

20:57

red lines with regard to Russia,

21:00

I think are the red lines that everybody

21:02

has, which is the brandishing

21:04

of nuclear weapons or even the use of them.

21:07

I think that that would very much put

21:09

Turkey in the firmly, firmly

21:11

in the camp of where its NATO allies are. But until

21:14

that happens, I think the Turks will continue

21:16

to play this role for good and bad

21:19

with Ukraine and with Russia.

21:22

Other than that, again, there's

21:24

going to be a lot of continuity in the Turkish

21:26

approach to the world. Erdogan sees

21:29

Turkey as a rising power

21:31

throughout

21:31

his tenure. He said that the world is bigger than

21:33

five, meaning it's bigger than the five permanent

21:36

members of the UN Security Council. He

21:38

sees Turkey as a power in the Mediterranean, in

21:41

the Middle East, in the Muslim world, in Europe, in

21:43

Central Asia. And

21:45

as a result, he's going to pursue an independent

21:47

foreign policy as he has been doing

21:50

and doesn't see a reason because he was reelected

21:53

to change course. Okay. Erdogan

21:55

wants to pursue this independent

21:57

Turkish foreign policy,

21:59

Turkey is also a member

22:02

of NATO, as you've noted.

22:04

Erdogan surprised some people, I think, earlier

22:07

this year when he agreed to allow

22:09

Finland to join NATO, but

22:11

he has remained opposed

22:14

to allowing Sweden to join

22:17

NATO. That raises a couple

22:19

of questions. Maybe the first one is,

22:21

why did Finland get in, but not Sweden?

22:24

Well, of those two, Sweden was the most

22:27

problematic. Sweden has become

22:29

the home for Kurdish

22:31

activists

22:32

and followers of

22:34

Fethiul Gülen, who Erdogan

22:37

and the Turkish establishment blames for the Falcou

22:39

in 2016. Fethiul Gülen is

22:41

a cleric. He's actually a permanent resident

22:43

of the United States, but his

22:46

followers who are journalists and activists, many

22:48

of them have gone to Stockholm to continue

22:51

their activities. Erdogan

22:53

has demanded that Sweden change its

22:55

laws so that they can extradite

22:58

Kurdish activists and Gülenists to

23:01

Turkey. Sweden has changed its laws

23:03

in a number of days, in early June.

23:06

Those changes are supposed to go into effect, but

23:08

I think that there's a view that

23:10

Erdogan

23:12

is going to move the goalposts, as

23:14

they say, and that in the upcoming NATO summit,

23:16

in Vilnius, there's going to be some Turkey-related

23:19

Sweden drama, because Erdogan wants

23:21

to prove to his NATO partners

23:23

that he is not to be ... They

23:26

shouldn't assume that he's just

23:29

going to allow Sweden to come in without getting something

23:31

in return. That's going to be a negotiation

23:33

not between Turkey and Sweden. Sweden says

23:36

it's going to do all the right things. The

23:38

Turks will probably say, but they needs to do

23:40

more, but it's really about negotiating

23:42

between the United States

23:44

and Turkey over Turkey's

23:46

desire for new F-16s, and perhaps

23:48

being let back into the F-35 program.

23:52

Just to be clear there, when we talk about Kurds and

23:54

about Gülenists, they're separate groups, they're

23:56

not identical groups. Just be clear. Yes,

23:58

separate groups.

23:59

what appears to be the haggling that

24:02

is about to take place in the Bazaar.

24:04

You have been in the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul.

24:06

It's one of the world's great wonders, a wonderful place

24:09

to be. So the Turks have

24:11

some experience with negotiating.

24:14

You've mentioned that on the table

24:16

for price admission for Sweden

24:19

and NATO is F-16s and

24:21

maybe the F-35 program. Explain

24:24

to me how those come to be joined together.

24:27

The United States and its NATO

24:29

allies very much want

24:32

Sweden to be within the alliance. That part I

24:34

get. That part I understand. Erdogan has his reservations

24:36

about Sweden. He also wants F-16s

24:40

and he wants to be back into the

24:42

F-35 program. He was expelled from the F-35

24:44

program

24:45

for Turkey's purchase

24:47

of Russia's air defense system that

24:50

was designed specifically to shoot down

24:52

NATO aircraft. Because US officials were

24:54

worried that the Turks would then become

24:57

a conveyor of information to the

24:59

Russians about how to shoot

25:02

down our fifth generation war plane

25:05

via their operation of the

25:08

S-400 because it requires Russian

25:10

technicians to help with software

25:12

upgrades and so on. I get that. Where do

25:14

the F-16s come in? Turkey,

25:18

having not gotten the F-35s

25:20

being thrown out of the F-35 program, requested

25:24

F-16s. It's relying on right

25:26

now F-16s that are out

25:28

of date and need an upgrade and they

25:30

feel a gap. For the first

25:33

time in a long time, the Greeks have

25:35

air superiority over the Turks in

25:38

the Aegean. You'll have to explain why that's

25:40

relevant just quickly. Well,

25:43

there are disputes over territory

25:45

and territorial waters

25:47

in the Aegean, which is the

25:49

place where Greece and Turkey meet.

25:51

Long standing historical revival

25:54

of the recent tensions. Exactly. And

25:56

up until the earthquake, there had

25:58

been almost daily.

26:00

incursions on the part of Turks over

26:02

Greek territory and dogfights,

26:05

not actual shooting, but dogfights over

26:07

the Aegean between the Greek and Turkish air forces.

26:10

So the Turks have requested new F-16s.

26:14

The Biden administration has expressed its

26:16

support for this in principle, but

26:18

the president has reminded the Turks

26:20

that there is a process to this, meaning that Congress

26:23

will have it say. But the

26:25

chairman of the Senate

26:26

Foreign Relations Committee is

26:29

not inclined to approve

26:31

F-16s for Turkey. So

26:33

there is going to be this negotiation where

26:35

we say to Turks, and in fact, Secretary

26:38

Blinken has recently said, it's

26:40

now is time to approve Sweden getting in

26:42

and the Turks have yet said anything about

26:44

it. And the betting is

26:47

that there will be some sort of quid

26:49

pro quo in which it's

26:51

a Sweden for F-16 deal. But

26:53

that may not be good enough for Senator

26:56

Robert Menendez, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations

26:58

Committee, who has said that he will

27:00

not approve F-16s

27:02

to Turkey unless Turkey promises

27:04

not to use those F-16s

27:07

to menace other NATO

27:09

allies.

27:10

Insert here Greece. Specifically

27:12

meaning Greece. But this is Menendez

27:15

dictating

27:17

the way in which Turkey calculates

27:19

its interests and its security

27:21

threats. I'm not sure that's going to sit very

27:23

well

27:24

with the folks in Ankara. So

27:27

I expect there'll be some drama.

27:29

So the Biden administration is going to be

27:31

basically playing a two level game on

27:33

the one hand, negotiating with the Turks, on

27:35

the other hand, negotiating with

27:39

a separate and equal branch of government

27:41

here in the United States. That's exactly right. So you've

27:43

written a lot about Jim and, you

27:46

know, unlike President Trump, who is

27:48

willing to run over Congress on

27:50

issues related to weapon sales

27:52

to Saudi Arabia, it

27:54

doesn't strike me that President Biden is

27:57

willing to use the powers that he

27:59

has. to ignore

28:01

congressional concerns about a sale to

28:03

Turkey. He did spend what, six terms in the

28:05

United States Senate. That's his favorite. I think he's absorbed

28:08

many of the norms of the Senate. Stephen, I want

28:10

to close with the big picture question,

28:13

which is given

28:15

what you know of Erdogan and what his

28:17

preferences are, what his constraints

28:19

are, what his ambitions are,

28:22

how should the United States handle him going forward?

28:24

Is tough love on order?

28:27

Should we be conciliatory? Some

28:30

third strategy? Once

28:32

again, if I was sitting next to the president, I would

28:34

say, president, if you ask me that question, let's

28:37

as a basis of this discussion, let's keep

28:39

in mind that there's a vast reservoir of

28:41

anti-Americanism

28:43

in Turkey so that things

28:45

like tough love may be turned

28:47

around against the United States and may undermine

28:49

the things that we want to achieve.

28:52

In principle, I'm not opposed to it. I think that

28:55

only 9% of Turks approve

28:58

of the United States. So it doesn't really cost

29:00

you that much if you call Erdogan on

29:02

values issues. But of course, there's

29:05

a major land war in Europe right now and you

29:07

do want to do everything possible to

29:10

keep NATO unified. And I think

29:12

what I would say to the president is exactly what I've been saying

29:14

for a number of years now, which is that Turkey

29:16

is a power in its own right and

29:19

wants to pursue an independent foreign policy.

29:21

And so where our interests coincide, those

29:23

are places that we can exploit and work together

29:26

with them. Where do you see those being? Well, I think

29:28

the Black Sea Grain Deal was one that was

29:30

very important. It wasn't specific

29:32

to the conflict, but it provided

29:35

benefits to the United States beyond

29:37

that conflict. Food insecurity in Egypt,

29:39

a country with 110 million people, many

29:42

of whom are very poor, would be very bad

29:45

for the Middle East, a place where I think

29:47

the United States has some significant interests.

29:50

So that's one of those things. And

29:52

then another example where interests don't

29:54

align, which is in Syria,

29:56

we do need to oppose the Turks.

29:58

We need to be vocal about... what they're

30:00

doing in attacking our allies. What

30:03

exactly are they doing? 10 second

30:05

version. Turkey's Air Force

30:09

and its proxies on the ground in

30:11

Syria are attacking American allies,

30:14

a Kurdish fighting force called the People's Protection

30:16

Unit. Those

30:17

Kurdish fighters have been helpful to the

30:20

United States in degrading and defeating

30:22

ISIS in the words of President Obama and

30:24

keeping ISIS fighters in makeshift

30:27

jails in northern Syria. The Turks

30:29

see those guys, those Kurdish fighters as

30:31

terrorists, as an extension of a terrorist

30:34

organization that it has been fighting since the

30:36

mid 1980s. But this issue

30:38

of ISIS is extraordinarily important to the United States in the region

30:40

more broadly. And we

30:43

have to be, I

30:44

think when it comes to this issue and them

30:46

attacking the YPG, I think we

30:48

need to be much more proactive in getting them

30:51

to stop doing that. And then there are places where

30:53

the United States and Turkey have different views

30:55

on things, but

30:56

it's not so important we can get out of each

30:58

other's way. That's perhaps

31:01

Turkey's views on issues

31:03

in Africa, whether it's Somalia or Ethiopia

31:06

and the Horn, those kinds of things. Turkish

31:08

activity isn't that critical.

31:10

We may not like it, but mistakes aren't

31:12

high enough on what the Turks are doing may not

31:14

be as damaging as, for example, in

31:16

Syria. So you're telling me that it's complicated.

31:20

It is. Turkey, you know, just to

31:22

close, a

31:23

lot of policymakers, a lot of people in Washington

31:25

kind of look at Turkey and the relationship

31:27

with rose colored glasses, the mythology about,

31:30

you know, fighting together and dying together

31:32

in Korea in the 1950s and standing

31:34

shoulder to shoulder on NATO's

31:36

southeastern flank during the Cold War. Those

31:39

things are true, but this was always a difficult

31:41

relationship. And I think it's going to continue

31:43

to be a difficult relationship.

31:45

On that note, I'll close up the president's

31:47

inbox for this week. My guest has

31:49

been Stephen Cook, the ENI and Rico

31:51

Matay senior fellow for Middle

31:54

East and Africa Studies at the Council.

31:56

Stephen, as always, thanks for joining me. Thanks

31:58

for having me. Please subscribe to the

32:00

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love the feedback. The publications

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mentioned in this episode and a transcript of our

32:11

conversation are available on the

32:14

podcast page for the President's

32:16

Inbox on CFR.org. As

32:19

always, opinions expressed on the President's

32:21

Inbox are solely those of the host or

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our guests, not of CFR, which

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takes no institutional positions on

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matters of policy. Today's

32:31

episode was produced by Esther Fang with

32:33

Director of Podcasting, Gabrielle

32:35

Sierra. Special thanks go out

32:37

to Michelle Carrillo. This is Jim Lindsay.

32:40

Thanks for listening.