0:00

Welcome

0:02

to the President's Inbox, a CFR

0:04

podcast about the foreign policy challenges

0:07

facing the United States. I'm Jim

0:09

Lindsay, Director of Studies at the Council

0:11

on Foreign Relations. This week's topic

0:14

is US-India relations.

0:21

With me to discuss the challenges

0:23

and tensions inherent in the evolving relationship

0:26

between Washington and New Delhi is

0:29

Ashley J. Tellis. Ashley

0:31

is the Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs

0:34

and a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie

0:36

Endowment for International Peace.

0:38

He specializes in international

0:41

security and US foreign and defense policy

0:44

with a special focus on Asia in

0:46

the Indian subcontinent.

0:49

Before joining the Carnegie Endowment, he

0:51

served as Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary

0:54

of State for Political Affairs and

0:56

Senior Advisor to the Ambassador at the

0:58

US Embassy in New Delhi during

1:00

the George W. Bush administration.

1:03

He is the author of Striking Asymmetries,

1:06

Nuclear Transitions in Southern

1:08

Asia. Earlier this month, he

1:10

wrote America's Bad Bet on India

1:13

for Foreign Affairs. Ashley,

1:16

thank you for joining me. Pleasure, Jim. Happy

1:18

to be here. Ashley,

1:20

I want to dive into the current state

1:23

of US-India relations into

1:25

the extent to which the interests and values

1:28

of the two countries align or diverge.

1:31

It's clear that the two countries have gotten

1:33

a lot closer in recent years, but

1:35

it hasn't always been that way. So

1:38

could you provide some context

1:40

on how US-India relations

1:42

have evolved over the last several decades?

1:45

Certainly. The Cold War was obviously

1:48

a very difficult period for

1:50

US-India relations because

1:52

the United States was embarked on this

1:55

major project of containing

1:57

the Soviet Union. And

1:58

in India, which had

2:01

recently become independent

2:03

at just about the time that the Cold War was beginning,

2:07

did not want to find itself trapped

2:10

between the two bipolar blocks as

2:13

they evolved.

2:14

And so India pursued a policy of

2:16

non-alignment. And that

2:18

policy of non-alignment essentially meant

2:21

that it would not be

2:23

either a close partner of the United States or

2:26

a close partner of the Soviet Union.

2:28

But it did seek to exploit

2:30

the competition between those two

2:33

great powers in order to advance

2:35

its own interests. That

2:37

was pretty much the story until

2:40

the end of the Cold War

2:42

in 1991. Now, of course, there were

2:44

moments throughout that period when

2:47

US-India relations ended up

2:50

being atypically intimate. So

2:53

for example, when India went

2:55

to war with China in 1962, the Kennedy administration

3:00

really bent backwards to

3:02

support India during that conflict.

3:04

But that didn't last for very

3:06

long.

3:07

And it was then replaced by all

3:09

the frictions that people remember

3:13

vividly to this day. So it's

3:15

been a sort of a yo-yo throughout the Cold War

3:17

period.

3:18

And there was a particular irritation

3:20

in India with US support

3:23

for Pakistan, correct?

3:24

That was a major

3:27

element. So I think there were two or three

3:29

dimensions

3:30

why India felt alienated

3:33

from the United States. First

3:35

I think it looked at the US

3:38

primarily as the successor

3:41

state to Great Britain in terms

3:44

of the management of the international

3:47

system.

3:48

The US was, of course, not a colonial

3:50

power in the subcontinent, but

3:52

it took over Great Britain's responsibilities

3:55

and how it managed the system. And

3:57

India, which was a post-colonial state. did

4:00

not particularly warm up to

4:02

the idea that it was moving

4:05

from a colonial era now to

4:07

an era of great power competition where countries

4:09

like itself would have no voice

4:11

or have a limited voice. So,

4:14

I think that was the first dimension. The second dimension

4:16

was that bipolarity

4:18

forced choices on India which

4:20

India didn't want to make.

4:22

It didn't want to be part of either bloc. And

4:25

then the third was that because

4:27

of bloc politics, the United

4:29

States ended up in an awkward

4:32

position of being allied with Pakistan,

4:34

not because Washington actually thought

4:36

about Pakistan as a serious partner,

4:39

but because the Pakistanis were smart

4:41

enough to exploit bloc politics

4:45

through the mechanism of joining an alliance

4:48

as opposed to India which attempted to

4:50

exploit bloc politics by essentially sitting

4:53

out of alliances. But

4:55

Pakistan's choices,

4:57

exploiting bloc politics by joining the alliance,

5:00

meant that the United States could provide

5:03

Pakistan with both significant

5:06

economic and military assistance.

5:08

And guess what? That

5:10

military assistance was obviously used by the

5:12

Pakistanis against India and that

5:14

colored

5:15

New Delhi's perceptions of Washington in

5:17

ways that were not particularly conducive

5:20

to building the relationship that both sides wanted

5:22

in the abstract.

5:25

Now that tension

5:27

changed somewhat during the administration

5:30

of George W. Bush. You

5:32

played a major role in

5:34

it. You were working as

5:36

an aide to the US Ambassador

5:38

time Robert Blackwell who for

5:40

the purposes of full disclosure, I will notice

5:42

a senior fellow here at the Council

5:45

on Foreign Relations. In

5:48

particular, you brokered a

5:50

civilian nuclear deal

5:52

that I think many people regard as a pivotal

5:55

point in US-Indian relations

5:58

to sort of change the course and

6:00

tenor of the conversation between

6:03

the two capitals. Could you walk us through

6:06

that pivot point a bit?

6:08

Sure. And let me actually start,

6:10

Jim, by talking about the post-1991 period. After

6:15

the Soviet Union collapsed, one

6:17

of the three pillars of

6:19

U.S.-India antagonisms disappeared.

6:22

Not politics didn't matter

6:25

anymore. And the demise

6:27

of the Soviet Union meant that

6:29

the grievances

6:31

that we had about

6:33

India and its affiliations of the Soviet

6:35

Union didn't matter. But

6:37

there were two other pillars. One was

6:40

India's state-run economic

6:42

system,

6:44

which thankfully also

6:46

began to transform after 1991, thanks

6:50

to India's economic reforms. And

6:53

so India began to shift from

6:55

state control of the economy to a more market-led

6:58

economy. And that offered

7:00

opportunities for U.S. businesses

7:03

and for the U.S. government. So there were

7:05

two of the three big

7:08

impediments that disappeared post-1991.

7:11

But there was a third. And the third

7:13

impediment sort of is rooted

7:16

in India's 1974 decision to test a nuclear weapon.

7:20

And that

7:22

test alarmed the United States

7:25

because it woke us up to the challenges

7:27

of nuclear proliferation.

7:29

And after that 1974 test,

7:31

the United States responded by

7:33

creating an ever-tightening sanctions

7:36

regime,

7:37

of which India was the principal target,

7:40

because we were trying to prevent India

7:42

from becoming a full-blown nuclear weapons

7:45

power.

7:46

Now India tested nuclear weapons

7:48

again in 1998, during

7:51

which time the Clinton administration, which was

7:53

then in office, again piled

7:56

on a further set of sanctions on

7:58

India.

7:59

By the time George Bush comes into

8:01

office, the one big impediment

8:04

structurally

8:05

that still prevents

8:08

the full transformation of the relationship

8:10

was India's nuclear status.

8:13

And Bill Clinton attempted to resolve

8:15

that problem by trying

8:17

to put the genie back in the bottle and

8:20

telling India that although it tested nuclear

8:22

weapons, it must not deploy nuclear forces.

8:25

That was the essence of the bargain that he thought would

8:27

be palatable.

8:28

Needless to say, the Indians wanted

8:30

no part of that kind of solution.

8:33

What President Bush did was that he

8:35

recognized that our extant

8:38

non-proliferation policy towards India had failed,

8:41

ditto for Pakistan, and

8:43

we needed to change course. And

8:46

throughout the first term, and this is really a

8:48

tribute to Bob's leadership at the embassy

8:51

actually in Delhi, throughout the first

8:53

term of the Bush administration, Bob

8:56

led a campaign to

8:57

create a rapprochement

9:00

between India and the United States on nuclear

9:03

matters. And

9:05

we really were advocating some

9:07

sort of a deal. The precise contours

9:10

of the deal are not pertinent

9:12

at this point, but we were advocating a deal.

9:15

In the second term after Bush got

9:17

reelected, he made this

9:19

very bold decision

9:21

to then move forward with the deal.

9:24

And the deal in its core

9:27

essentially accepted India as a de facto

9:29

nuclear weapons deal.

9:31

And so he offered India something

9:34

that we have not offered to any

9:36

non-NPT signatory, the NPT

9:39

being the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

9:42

We gave India the privilege of maintaining

9:44

its nuclear weapons program

9:46

and doing whatever it wanted with this nuclear

9:48

weapons program while still offering

9:50

it full opportunities

9:52

for nuclear cooperation,

9:54

as well as cooperation in other

9:56

areas of advanced high technology.

10:00

So in other words, India, although not

10:02

being an NPT signatory, could maintain

10:04

its weapons program while still having

10:07

a new and

10:08

very productive relationship with the United States.

10:11

And that's really what opened the doors to

10:14

the remarkable change in

10:17

the US-India relationship that has occurred

10:19

since that day.

10:20

Well, let's talk about that remarkable

10:22

change, Ashley. How would you describe

10:24

it? And what are the highlights

10:28

of that improved relationship?

10:30

So there are several dimensions

10:32

to it. In fact, it is so encompassing

10:36

that it is hard to summarize, Jim,

10:38

in any way that does justice to

10:41

the change. But let me sort of

10:43

flag the following.

10:44

Today, in the area of

10:47

diplomatic coordination,

10:49

we coordinate

10:52

very, very deeply

10:54

and extensively with India. In

10:57

fact, I think there are few non-allied

11:01

partners that

11:03

we cooperate as extensively

11:06

with as we do with India. I think it's

11:08

an important point to flag that the United States

11:11

and India, while their relations have improved,

11:13

they are not allies in the sense that the United

11:15

States has allies in NATO

11:18

or allies with Japan and

11:20

South Korea.

11:21

Absolutely, absolutely. In that sense,

11:23

the relationship with India is unique. And

11:27

that uniqueness makes

11:29

the fact that we have such deep

11:31

diplomatic intensity of engagement

11:34

all the more remarkable.

11:36

So that's one area. Second area

11:38

is defense and strategic policies.

11:42

During the Cold War, we had very tenuous

11:44

links with India in

11:46

the realm of defense relations.

11:48

Today, our defense relations have expanded,

11:51

again, in exponential

11:53

ways.

11:54

If you look at the linkages between our two societies,

11:57

there were always Indian Americans present

11:59

in the world.

11:59

the United States, particularly after 1965.

12:03

But today, the Indian American

12:05

community is really a community

12:08

that has enjoyed all the benefits

12:10

of the American dream and has contributed in

12:13

remarkable ways

12:15

to the United States, right? So

12:17

you have very tight ties now between

12:19

the two societies. You can certainly see

12:21

that in the high tech industry with a large number

12:24

of Indian Americans as CEOs

12:27

of big tech companies. Absolutely, absolutely.

12:30

And you can see that in the linkages

12:32

that this community has brought with

12:35

the technology communities back in India and

12:38

the interlinkages between Silicon Valley

12:40

and Bangalore and so on and so forth. If

12:42

you look at now our cooperation in

12:45

energy,

12:46

in the area of science and

12:48

technology,

12:50

in the area of education, there

12:52

doesn't seem to be a single area that you

12:54

can identify where there

12:57

have not been quite sterling

12:59

successes. And so,

13:01

you know, when one looks back at this relationship

13:03

from the 2000 to 2004

13:06

vantage point when Bob and I were in

13:08

Delhi, it looks like

13:10

nothing that we could have imagined.

13:12

Really, really remarkable

13:15

changes. And yet, the

13:17

point that you made, Jim, is really the point

13:19

that we always need to remember.

13:22

That we have a relationship now with

13:25

a developing country

13:28

that is also a very proud

13:30

and independent country. And

13:33

the relationship that it wants

13:35

with the United States is obviously

13:37

one of benefit,

13:39

one of mutual benefit whenever possible,

13:42

but also in many ways one of asymmetric

13:44

benefit.

13:46

That is, India has the ambition

13:48

to become a great power,

13:51

someday like the United States

13:53

itself. And it wants

13:56

US assistance in getting

13:58

there. But But precisely

14:01

because India does not want

14:03

to become a confederate

14:05

of the United States, does not want to sacrifice

14:08

its independence, even

14:10

as it is assisted by the United

14:12

States, it's very cautious

14:15

and always very conscious about

14:18

the limits of its partnership.

14:20

And that's the point that I think

14:22

we need to remember because sometimes, you

14:24

know, Americans tend to be excessively

14:27

romantic. We think of

14:29

our partnerships as partnerships between

14:32

friends.

14:33

We are comrades in arms. That's

14:35

right, as opposed to partnerships

14:37

between countries that have unique

14:40

interests.

14:41

And that, I think, is when we get into trouble

14:44

in terms of misplaced or inflated expectations.

14:48

And that's really the issue that is worth

14:50

pondering on when we think about the relationship

14:52

with India. Well, Ashley, let me draw you

14:55

out on that. As you read The Mood here

14:57

in Washington, D.C.,

14:59

how would you describe what

15:02

Washington thinks India

15:05

is going to do down the road, or what they hope

15:08

India will do down the road? I

15:10

think first there is a real

15:14

affection for India. In

15:16

a way, again, that is quite startling

15:18

compared to the totality of the Cold War experience.

15:22

There is a genuine desire to

15:24

help India rise in capacity,

15:28

and that is driven by the imperatives

15:31

now of the new competition

15:33

with China. And, you

15:35

know, the most sophisticated among policymakers

15:38

will emphasize that even

15:40

if China was not at issue, it is

15:42

still in our national interest to have a good

15:45

relationship with India.

15:47

And I have no difficulty buying that argument to

15:49

a point. But I think

15:51

the competition with China intensifies

15:55

the desire to

15:58

strengthen the partnership. because

16:00

of the belief that that

16:03

partnership helps create a

16:05

certain geopolitical equilibrium

16:08

in Asia

16:09

that advances US interests.

16:12

So I would say when I look at Washington today,

16:15

the relationship sort of

16:17

swings between two bookends. One

16:21

bookend is the desire

16:23

to build up Indian power as

16:26

a way of creating a geopolitical

16:29

equilibrium in Asia, but without asking

16:32

anything much of India in return.

16:35

So in essence a counterweight to China?

16:37

Correct, building a counterweight that serves

16:39

its own purpose,

16:41

that creates its own benefits and

16:43

leave it at that.

16:45

And there's a second bookend which

16:48

is build up Indian power

16:50

in order to balance China's rise,

16:53

but also perpetually linked

16:56

to the hope

16:57

that India will do things for

17:00

us

17:01

in the context of our own rivalry with China.

17:04

So these are the two bookends. One bookend

17:06

says build Indian power because that's

17:08

a good thing in itself. And

17:11

there's another bookend that says build Indian

17:13

power because admittedly

17:16

it is a good thing in itself, but

17:18

also because it

17:21

has the potential to help us

17:24

in our rivalry with China, however that

17:26

evolves over time. And I

17:28

think those are the two bookends that

17:30

policymakers are always grappling

17:33

with. And different layers of

17:35

the government and the bureaucracies

17:37

obviously are moved

17:40

by one bookend more than the other,

17:43

but that's pretty much the sort of decision

17:46

space within which US

17:48

policy choices are made.

17:50

Now I take it from your article,

17:53

particularly its title Ashley, you're

17:55

skeptical that India is

17:57

going to be willing to fight for the future of India.

17:59

follow the United States in

18:02

terms of any confrontation

18:04

it might have with China,

18:07

especially if those confrontations don't

18:10

directly involve India. And

18:12

I'd like you to sort of explain to me why

18:15

that is. I take it that part of the argument

18:17

is that India sees it as a proud,

18:20

independent country that doesn't

18:22

want to tether its future to

18:25

another country. Americans

18:27

should be at least somewhat sympathetic

18:29

to that because there is a long strand

18:32

of that similar thought in American

18:34

foreign policy going back to George

18:37

Washington and his farewell address. But

18:40

I would imagine it also reflects India's

18:43

particular geopolitical

18:45

position. It shares a border

18:47

with China, which has been

18:50

contested recently, which I

18:52

imagine sort of changes the perspective

18:55

from Delhi. It looks different than it does

18:57

from Washington.

18:59

Oh, quite clearly so. New

19:02

Delhi has a vested

19:05

interest

19:06

in making certain that Chinese

19:08

power does not come to dominate Asia.

19:12

Because if China comes to dominate Asia

19:14

unambiguously, then

19:17

India will be condemned to

19:19

playing second fiddle.

19:21

And so there are strong incentives

19:23

for India to partner with the United States in

19:26

making certain

19:27

that Asia is a genuinely multipolar

19:30

system. But

19:32

there are limits to what

19:34

India is willing to do

19:37

for the United States,

19:39

even in the context of that quest

19:41

for multipolarity. And

19:44

there are several reasons for that. First,

19:47

the US grievances with China

19:50

are not always India's grievances with

19:52

China.

19:54

So while India has a stake in a certain

19:56

outcome, that is China

19:59

not dominate Asia, It

20:01

does not necessarily

20:03

support the United States in every

20:06

detail

20:07

of the US competition with China. So

20:10

that's one very simple reality.

20:12

India has its own interests, they

20:14

converge with ours,

20:16

but they're not always congruent with ours. Second,

20:20

India can do

20:22

much with the United States and is willing to do

20:24

much with the United States in the areas

20:27

of diplomatic coordination,

20:30

in the areas of economic cooperation,

20:33

even in the areas of defense cooperation.

20:36

But I think it is still

20:38

skeptical

20:40

and for reasons that are completely understandable

20:42

from New Delhi's perspective

20:43

about engaging in any

20:46

coalition military activities

20:48

vis-a-vis China. And in

20:50

my mind there are two stark reasons

20:52

for that.

20:54

The first is,

20:56

India cannot escape its geography, it

20:59

lives next door to China. The

21:02

United States lives very

21:04

far away

21:05

and in some sense the

21:08

US has many more options with

21:11

respect to its confrontation with China

21:13

than India has simply because of proximity.

21:17

The second is India

21:19

has a much weaker state in

21:21

comparison to China. If

21:24

you take raw GDP as a metric,

21:27

China today is anywhere between 4

21:30

and 5 times larger

21:32

than India.

21:33

And so while the Indians

21:35

have a vested interest in

21:38

working with the United States to limit China's

21:41

capacity to harm their interests, they

21:44

are not in the business of doing things that

21:46

might appear to be excessively

21:48

provocative to the Chinese. And

21:51

so they have used

21:53

American assistance and partnership

21:55

to build up their own national capabilities

21:58

because building up those capabilities

22:01

is actually an investment in their own defense

22:04

vis-a-vis China. But they

22:06

are simply not eager to behave

22:09

as other US allies might.

22:11

And the two classic opposing

22:14

cases would be Japan and Australia.

22:18

Where Japan and Australia clearly see

22:21

working with the United States even in the context

22:23

of conflict as being

22:25

central to their national security interests.

22:28

And that's what AUKUS means

22:31

in one instance and that's what the

22:33

Japanese redefinition of

22:35

its national strategy means in a different instance.

22:38

Both of them see working

22:41

with the United States hand

22:43

in glove as being very important

22:46

for success vis-a-vis China.

22:47

I think India has a much more restrained

22:50

perception of what

22:52

managing China requires.

22:54

It requires competing with China in terms

22:57

of providing alternatives to

22:59

other Asian states.

23:01

And that's why it's working through the quad,

23:03

working in Southeast Asia and so on and so forth. It

23:06

requires creating diversification

23:09

options in the area of economics so

23:11

that China does not become the sole monopoly

23:14

provider

23:15

of goods, especially high-end

23:17

goods to the world.

23:19

That's something it wants to work with. It

23:22

wants to work with the United States

23:24

in terms of exercising,

23:27

in terms of building up the capabilities

23:29

to signal to China that

23:31

it has powerful friends.

23:34

But I think it looks at

23:36

America's conflicts with China

23:38

as America's conflicts with China.

23:41

And does not want to make any decisions

23:43

that prejudge

23:45

or pre-commit it

23:47

to working with the United States

23:49

in the context of

23:51

a geopolitical meltdown. And

23:53

from an Indian point of view, it is an entirely

23:55

rational calculation on the part

23:57

of New Delhi. Surprises.

24:01

Oh, it certainly sounds that way Ashley.

24:03

I mean having the notion of sharing a border with

24:05

the country It's also far more

24:07

powerful than you creates

24:09

a level of vulnerability that doesn't exist

24:12

for Australia

24:13

or for Japan, but

24:16

I'm curious about that because there has been conflict

24:19

in the Himalayas in what China

24:21

claims is South Tibet which

24:24

the Indians say is not

24:27

What I noticed is that? Well,

24:29

the Indian

24:31

Army has done Exercises

24:34

with the US military and high altitudes.

24:37

We haven't seen Delhi make any

24:39

overt public call on

24:42

the United States for assistance in dealing

24:44

with

24:45

The very real conflict it

24:47

faces. I mean people are dying up

24:49

in the mountains and I think that

24:51

will be a persistent feature

24:55

of India's defense policy So

24:58

if you look at the crisis which occurred

25:00

in May 2020

25:02

When Chinese soldiers attacked their Indian counterparts

25:05

and there was the first loss of life along

25:07

the sign of Indian border and decades

25:10

India appealed to the United States for

25:13

diplomatic support and We

25:16

responded very publicly

25:19

and very quickly

25:20

India appealed to the United States

25:23

for material assistance

25:25

and we responded by providing India

25:28

with high, you know, cold weather gear

25:30

and Pieces of kit that

25:33

India needed for operations there We

25:36

also provided India with very

25:38

very unprecedented levels of intelligence

25:41

support In order to

25:43

enable India to sort of stand its ground

25:46

But the one thing that I do not expect India

25:49

will ever do is

25:50

Ask the United States

25:53

to put boots on the ground to

25:55

fight its fights Because

25:59

that

25:59

That takes India into geopolitical

26:02

territory

26:03

that it has very consciously

26:06

stayed away from.

26:08

The point that I constantly make

26:11

is that

26:12

India wants capabilities

26:15

that enable it to stand

26:17

on its own, even

26:20

vis-a-vis a superior power like China.

26:23

But it does not imagine that

26:26

coalition defense operations against China

26:29

are anywhere on its

26:32

menu of options. Now

26:34

remember, there is a very important historical

26:36

anecdote. In 1962,

26:40

during the height of the Sino-Indian War,

26:42

Prime Minister Nehru then appealed to President

26:45

Kennedy

26:46

for assistance. And

26:49

President Kennedy responded fulsomely by

26:52

signing, you know, authorizing

26:55

transfers of equipment and so on and so forth. He

26:58

also authorized

27:01

that the United States take responsibility

27:04

for the air defense of India. And

27:07

that would require of course, you know, American

27:10

aircraft, American pilots,

27:13

American surface-to-air missiles, etc.,

27:15

etc., to operate out of Indian soil.

27:19

Prime Minister Nehru did not exercise,

27:22

did not accept that offer, even though

27:24

we signed an agreement which I think is still

27:26

on the books for an air defense vis-a-vis

27:29

China.

27:30

But that would have been a bridge too far.

27:33

And so even someone like Nehru who was

27:35

beleaguered as a result of this,

27:38

you know, extreme Chinese attack in 1962,

27:41

simply did not cross the line where

27:43

he wanted, you know, American

27:46

kit, American manpower, and

27:48

American capabilities essentially operating

27:50

on the soil.

27:52

Throughout the Cold War,

27:54

even though India had a

27:56

very close military relationship with the then

27:58

Soviet Union, They

28:01

made sure that no

28:03

Soviets were present on Indian territory,

28:06

no bases were operated

28:09

on Indian territory and so on and so forth. So

28:11

you know, when India says that

28:13

it wants to deal with the world independently,

28:16

we really need to take that seriously

28:19

and not be trapped by our

28:21

hopes

28:22

that under some circumstances

28:25

India might be willing to abridge that independence,

28:28

even if it is in support of dealing

28:30

with a common challenge like China.

28:32

So let me ask you, Ashley, what

28:35

policy prescriptions follow

28:37

from this diagnosis

28:40

of the fundamental structure of

28:43

US-Indian relations?

28:46

Does it simply mean

28:48

we should expect New Delhi to disappoint

28:50

us? Is it that we should realize

28:53

that we have more leverage over New

28:56

Delhi than we think we have? Because

28:58

the hope that they will sort of follow

29:01

us in dealing with China is one

29:03

that will never be realized.

29:04

What do we make of this structure and its

29:07

consequences for policy choices?

29:10

So I would say several things, right? The

29:13

US has enormous leverage over India simply

29:15

because of the disparities in relative power.

29:18

But whether it is wise to

29:20

use that leverage

29:22

in any naked form,

29:25

I think needs to be considered.

29:28

My own judgment is that

29:31

the more we respect

29:33

India's preferences and its limitations,

29:37

the fewer the miss

29:40

expectations that

29:42

we will have about India. And

29:44

so if you ask me what is the policy

29:46

implication, I think the main policy

29:48

implication is you

29:51

do with India all

29:53

that is necessary

29:55

to help it to stand on

29:57

its own vis-a-vis China.

30:00

But don't move into that territory

30:03

where the things you are doing

30:06

somehow create expectations

30:09

that India will do more

30:12

than it is either capable or vicious

30:14

to. And

30:16

if we can keep this

30:19

sort of rule in our

30:22

consciousness at all times, I

30:25

think we will have

30:27

a very balanced policy towards India. So

30:30

for example, should we be more critical of India

30:32

for not being critical enough

30:35

in our view of the Russian invasion

30:37

of Ukraine? Should we

30:39

be more critical of the

30:41

democratic backsliding we see

30:43

in India?

30:45

I think we've been critical on both counts.

30:48

But thus far, we've done it very

30:50

artfully in private

30:52

because of two

30:55

calculations which I think are pretty sound.

30:57

First, we

31:00

do not need to open more fronts

31:03

of disagreement with

31:05

what is otherwise a friendly

31:08

state. And that would certainly

31:10

be the case if we engaged

31:13

in public acrimony. Remember

31:16

India is a postcolonial state. It's very

31:18

proud. It does not want to be

31:20

lectured by others with respect

31:23

to its own foreign policy choices.

31:26

And so

31:27

condemning them publicly for

31:29

the choices they make, I think would

31:31

have just stirred the pot further.

31:34

There's a second reason which I think is also

31:37

very important and which I think the administration

31:39

appreciates,

31:41

which is a public spat

31:43

with India on either of these two issues.

31:46

Would not change the outcomes.

31:48

It would not change India's policy towards Russia.

31:52

It would not rectify

31:54

whatever democratic backsliding is occurring.

31:57

And so I think the administration has made

31:59

the judge

31:59

correctly in my view, that

32:02

whatever the disagreements are,

32:04

we deal with them privately.

32:06

And we deal with them, hopefully, with

32:09

a certain measure of candor.

32:11

You know, you don't have to understate

32:13

the character of the disagreement,

32:15

but I think managing

32:19

that, you know, communicating that

32:21

respectfully is the smart way

32:23

to proceed. On that note, I'm

32:25

going to close up the President's inbox for this

32:27

week. My guest has been Ashley

32:30

Tellis, who is the Tata Chair

32:32

for Strategic Affairs and a senior

32:34

fellow at the Carnegie Endowment

32:36

for International Peace. Ashley, thank you for

32:38

joining me. Always a pleasure,

32:40

Jim. Thank you. Please subscribe

32:42

to the President's inbox on Apple Podcasts,

32:45

Google Podcasts, Spotify, or Facebook.