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week's podcast is about the differences

1:01

between how Europeans, Indians, and others

1:04

in the Indo-Pacific see the

1:06

world's problems. My guest

1:08

is Michael Fullilove, the Director of the Lowy

1:10

Institute here in Sydney, Australia, where I've been

1:12

spending the last month. Michael's

1:15

just back from two of the biggest

1:17

security forums in the world, the Rice-Sina

1:19

Dialogue in Delhi, and the

1:21

Munich Security Forum in Germany. As

1:24

a result, he's been fully exposed

1:26

to the very different ways in

1:28

which Indians and Europeans understand

1:30

global threats. So

1:33

can these clash of views ever

1:35

be reconciled? You

1:48

know, what's happened today with Russia is essentially

1:51

a lot of doors

1:55

have been shut to Russia and the West. Okay,

1:57

we know the reasons why. Russia

2:00

is turning more to Asia

2:02

or to parts of the

2:05

world which are not West. Now,

2:08

I think it makes

2:10

sense to give Russia multiple

2:12

options. That was India's

2:15

Foreign Minister S. Jai Shankar speaking at the

2:17

recent Raistina dialogue in Delhi, and

2:20

making it clear that India still

2:22

takes a fairly indulgent attitude to

2:24

Putin's Russia. The Indians

2:26

have pointedly not joined in Western

2:28

sanctions on Russia. That's a

2:30

very striking contrast with the mood in

2:32

Western Europe. As anyone who listened

2:35

to last week's podcast with Ann Applebaum will know.

2:38

And yet there are common points in the

2:40

global approach of India and the Western democracies,

2:43

most notably a shared concern about China.

2:46

Jai Shankar's comments were made in a

2:48

conversation with Michael Fullilov, so

2:50

when Michael got back to Sydney I

2:53

started by asking him about the contrast

2:55

in moods in Munich and Delhi. It

2:58

was head-snappingly different, and it was

3:01

quite a shock really to go

3:03

from the dark sombre energy in

3:05

Munich to the tremendous policy bazaar

3:08

that is the Raistina dialogue. The

3:10

positive chaos that you sense every

3:12

time you go to India, the

3:14

energy, the optimism, but

3:16

also a lot of confidence in

3:19

India's approach to the world, a feeling

3:21

that they've got the balance right, that

3:23

they've got a new sort of flexible

3:26

foreign policy, and that India's

3:28

time is coming. So I felt

3:31

in Munich, Europeans very down

3:33

at mouth. A lot

3:35

of solidarity and urgency still on Ukraine, but

3:37

more coming from the margins of Europe, or

3:39

the smaller countries in Europe I would say.

3:43

Of course a lot of bad news from the

3:45

battlefield in Ukraine, Zelensky looking

3:47

tired, Russian nukes in space,

3:50

a lot of negativity in Munich and a lot

3:52

of positivity in New Delhi. And

3:54

you were on stage on a panel with

3:57

Jai Shankar, the Indian foreign minister. India's

4:00

case. And yet making it

4:02

to Europeans must be quite tough now because

4:04

the Europeans are feeling pretty threatened. And

4:06

here are the Indians saying, you know, we

4:09

still need a good relationship with Russia. How

4:11

difficult is that now? Always India is in such

4:13

a strong position they can kind of get away

4:15

with it. Well, I agree with you. I think

4:18

Joshanka is one of the smartest and most effective

4:20

foreign ministers in the world because, you know,

4:23

you and I encounter, we're lucky enough to encounter lots

4:25

of foreign ministers. Most of them are just getting through

4:27

their day. They're getting through their call sheet. Joshanka

4:29

has a worldview and it's based

4:32

on studying history, thinking about

4:34

India's interests over the course of a

4:36

lifetime. And he is prosecuting that worldview.

4:38

So that's why he's so formidable and

4:41

interlocutor, not to say that one agrees with

4:43

everything he says, but he cannot be ignored.

4:46

And I think the Indians feel that

4:48

their time has come that on

4:51

the Russian side, lots of Russians

4:53

in Rosina, whereas none in Munich,

4:55

I think. That's been an interesting

4:57

dynamic. I mean, were they just

4:59

steering clear of the Europeans? Was

5:01

there any fraternization? I didn't see

5:03

any ice-deed clear of them. They

5:05

were sort of on their own

5:07

panels. But yeah, a Russian presence

5:09

along with the Ukrainian presence. And

5:11

I think Joshanka's view is that

5:13

it makes sense for India to

5:15

keep the channels of communication open

5:17

with Russia because it means that

5:19

Russia is not pushed into

5:21

China's embrace. So when Joshanka presents

5:23

it, he very much presents it

5:26

as a pragmatic thing, don't

5:28

push Russia into the arms of China,

5:31

it's a key message. But

5:33

I saw B.J.P. Spiceman, for example,

5:35

in Munich going a bit further

5:37

and saying Russia is an old friend of India and

5:39

we're not going to give up on that friendship. Did

5:41

you hear that as well? I mean, if not from

5:43

Joshanka, but from others. I asked

5:46

Joshanka whether there was an

5:48

overconfidence about the relationship between

5:50

Russia and China

5:53

because Joshanka's view is that the

5:55

Indian role can actually give Putin

5:58

options other than China. Xi Jinping.

6:00

And Xi Jinping said to me that

6:03

there's a long tradition of

6:05

Russian statecraft. They won't allow themselves

6:07

to be dominated by one party.

6:10

I'm not quite so convinced about that. I think

6:12

that China's economy is closing

6:15

on America's, even as Russia's economy

6:17

is in danger of being overtaken

6:19

by Australia's economy. I think Putin

6:21

understands that in the long term,

6:24

Russia will be the junior partner

6:26

of China. So personally, I don't

6:29

share India's confidence that

6:31

there will be a Russia-China

6:33

split. Yeah. I

6:36

mean, I suppose one commonality,

6:38

though, between India and

6:40

Australia and the US, and

6:42

the thing that makes the relationship still

6:45

very strong, is a shared anxiety about

6:47

China. So how closely

6:49

do you think the traditional Western

6:51

alliance and the Indians can

6:53

and are working together on China? I

6:57

think that China might

7:00

be the organizing principle, actually, behind

7:02

a lot of Indian foreign policy.

7:04

We think about the swing towards

7:06

the West. When India

7:08

joined the Quad countries, these four

7:10

highly capable, like-minded countries, the United

7:13

States, Japan, Australia, and India, that's

7:16

seen in Western capitals as a

7:18

great advance of India as a

7:20

member, even though in the closed

7:22

councils of the Quad, it's often

7:24

India that is not quite

7:26

as forward leaning on Quad matters as

7:28

the other three countries. So I think

7:30

that is a function of the

7:33

fact that India is another giant

7:35

next to China. I think the

7:37

memories of the border dispute in

7:39

2020, in which I think 20

7:41

or so Indian servicemen lost their

7:43

lives, are very strong. I

7:45

thought China was a big theme in Raizina.

7:47

For example, the Indian Defense Secretary called

7:49

China a bully. Jay Shankar

7:52

himself pointed out that on the question

7:54

of UN Security Council reform, which is

7:56

a long-standing preoccupation of the Indians, Jay

7:58

Shankar, without naming... China said the

8:01

biggest opposer of UN Security Council

8:03

reform is a non-Western country, meaning

8:05

China. Which would be bestly opposed

8:07

to India or have a joint

8:09

deal? Yes, and is determined to

8:11

preserve its equities on the council.

8:14

So I think that's where there is

8:16

commonality between the West and India, that

8:18

both of us in different ways see

8:22

very much the danger of an

8:25

Asia that is dominated by

8:27

China and wanting to preserve a

8:29

balance of forces including an

8:32

active forward leaning India.

8:35

But India sees the world very differently

8:37

from the rest of us. And so

8:39

we have to take India as it

8:41

is, as a big emerging giant. We

8:43

have to see where the commonality is

8:45

with which we can work. I think

8:47

we need to be more ambitious. I'd

8:49

like Australia, which the Australia-India

8:51

relationship has thickened very substantially

8:54

in the last couple of years. But

8:56

I'd like to see what more can

8:59

we do on the economic front, encouraging

9:01

more Australian investment in India and vice

9:03

versa, more interoperability between the Australian and

9:05

Indian militaries, more communication between our foreign

9:08

services and our intelligence services. I

9:10

think we need to do

9:12

more with India while always understanding that they

9:15

come at the world from a very different

9:17

place from Australia's. Yeah, and I mean, when

9:19

the crisis really happens, I've had Indian say

9:21

to me in terms, look, that India will

9:23

never get involved in a conflict over Taiwan.

9:26

Whereas here in Australia, the government

9:29

is very careful to remain ambiguous on that.

9:32

I think a lot of people in the security

9:34

world assume that Australia probably would

9:36

be involved. So that's a pretty

9:38

fundamental difference. Jay Shankar

9:40

asked me actually on the panel in

9:42

Ryzena. He asked me, is Australia more

9:45

of a Western country or an Indo-Pacific

9:47

country? He asked you. He

9:49

asked me. Yeah. Look, we

9:51

all have multiple identities, Minister. You know,

9:53

I'm a Tottenham Hotspur's fan, but I'm

9:56

a big Australia cricket fan. I like

9:58

the South Sydney Rabbitos in Ragdoll. We

10:00

went to Taylor Swift with my son a

10:02

couple of days ago. We all have sort

10:04

of multiple identities and Australia is both a

10:07

Western country and an Indo-Pacific

10:10

country. But when

10:12

it comes down to it, I think our

10:14

membership of the West, our tradition

10:16

and history of making common cause with

10:18

a global ally, first the Brits, first

10:20

the United States, I think that's a

10:24

subterranean element in

10:26

our foreign policy that is not going to

10:29

go away. And I think that that differentiates

10:31

us certainly from India, which sees itself as

10:33

much more flexible. I think we

10:35

can be flexible, but we are stitched in

10:38

to the West through the alliance with the

10:40

United States, the membership of the Five Eyes

10:43

intelligence sharing network. That element of

10:45

our identity is not going anywhere.

10:47

Yeah. And so coming back

10:49

to Munich, which you had been to just before

10:51

Delhi, I mean, you said there was this very

10:54

gloomy mood. How

10:57

much does that resonate here, say,

10:59

if you're sitting in the Australian

11:01

security establishment? Do

11:03

you feel, well, that's really bad, but we're a

11:05

very long way from it? Or is it actually

11:08

something that worries Australia too? Well,

11:11

we know it worries Australia because Lowy

11:13

Institute polling shows that Australians are very

11:15

seized of the Ukraine issue. I

11:18

think about eight and 10 Australians the

11:20

last time we polled are in favor

11:22

of sanctions against Russia military aid to

11:24

Ukraine. So I think we

11:27

understand that there's a global balance. And

11:29

if we get to a

11:32

point where Russia can invade

11:34

Ukraine and can pull off some

11:36

sort of victory, then how long

11:38

before it invades or threatens

11:40

or coerces a NATO country? And

11:43

you'd be crazy to think that those

11:45

sorts of fissures in the international rules

11:47

based order don't also have

11:50

implications for Australia. Of course they

11:52

do. So I think those issues

11:54

do matter to us. But I think whereas

11:57

in Munich, China was almost

11:59

not a factor. Wang Yi spoke,

12:01

but it was not a well-attended

12:03

session. And of course, naturally, Europeans

12:05

are focused on the near

12:07

threat, and that is Russia,

12:09

I think, here in Australia,

12:11

as in India, China remains

12:13

a very dominant sort of

12:15

preoccupation. One theory

12:17

that you hear kind of doing

12:19

around in the security world is

12:22

that the Russia and China

12:24

threats, if you want to use

12:26

that word, are sort of

12:28

linked, and that they're almost geographically linked, because

12:30

this is one territorial block, they have a

12:33

common border. And that's

12:35

another reason why even sitting in the

12:37

Indo-Pacific, you may have more of your

12:39

eyes on China, but in

12:42

some ways, this is all part of the same picture. Is

12:45

that generally accepted? What do you think? I

12:48

don't know if I'd put it quite that strongly,

12:50

but remember that Australia has always

12:52

seen itself as a country with

12:55

global interests. We have never defined

12:58

our interests as only being in

13:00

the South Pacific or only extending

13:02

to Southeast Asia. That's why there

13:04

are Australians scattered in cemeteries across

13:06

the Middle East, across Western Europe,

13:08

all throughout Pacific and

13:11

Southeast Asia. Australia has always seen

13:13

itself as a country with global interests,

13:15

if not global capacities. I

13:18

wouldn't say that there's one theatre, but there

13:20

is a global game, and the

13:22

different elements, Russia's behaviour, China's behaviour,

13:24

are connected to each other, they

13:26

feed into each other. China

13:29

was no doubt discomforted a

13:31

year or so ago, when it

13:33

looked like Putin was on the

13:35

back foot, when Progosion was marching

13:37

on Moscow, when it felt like

13:39

the West was having its moment,

13:41

that the connections between like-minded democracies

13:43

were thickening. I think that

13:45

would have caused a lot

13:47

of anxiety in Beijing, whereas

13:50

when Putin is in a stronger

13:52

position I think the connections between

13:55

these two authoritarian states are significant.

13:58

So, the old place, you've been travelling a lot. very

14:00

exhausting, given the distances from

14:02

Australia. You've been to the US. How concerned

14:05

are Australians by a sense

14:07

that everything may be overturned if Trump

14:10

wins? Yeah, I've been twice to the

14:12

United States in the last couple of months. It

14:15

is a crazy idea, I think, for those of

14:17

us in the rest of the West, that there

14:19

is an even money chance that Donald Trump will

14:21

return to the White House. But I think that's

14:23

the case. And certainly

14:25

you don't have to go

14:27

to the United States at Munich as well.

14:30

There was a clear sense that Trump is

14:32

looking stronger and that Biden

14:35

is looking weaker and

14:37

older. And that has to

14:39

be a source of great anxiety

14:41

because of the implications of having

14:43

someone who would be hell bent

14:45

on exacting revenge on

14:48

his opponents, who said

14:50

in the lead up to Munich that

14:52

if a delinquent NATO state were invaded,

14:54

that not only would he do nothing, but more or

14:57

less he'd say, you know, have your way with him,

14:59

he would say to Vladimir Putin. So the stakes are

15:01

high. The positive argument

15:04

I would put is this, that

15:06

the economy in the United States

15:08

is strong, it's roaring back, and

15:11

that you think at some point Biden starts

15:13

to get some credit for that, that

15:16

presidents tend to get reelected,

15:19

that surely the troubles that Trump is up

15:21

against, the days that he's going to have

15:23

to spend in courtrooms in Manhattan over the

15:26

next couple of months when he should be

15:28

out campaigning, surely these things start to come

15:30

into play. I think the other thing I

15:32

would say as an historian is that the

15:35

presidency is a team sport and it's natural

15:37

that we focus on the

15:39

frailties and the strengths of the individuals

15:41

at the center and hence we keep

15:43

coming back to Biden. But

15:46

of course, when we think about the

15:48

performance of administrations, we look at the

15:50

team, when you look at George W's

15:52

presidency, you don't just think about W,

15:54

you think about on the foreign policy

15:56

side, Condi, Rumsfeld, Powell, you think about

15:58

the people around them. And being

16:00

in the United States, I was struck by

16:03

the strength of the Biden team with

16:05

Blinken, with Sullivan, Avril

16:08

Haines, with Burns. It's actually a strong

16:10

sort of team that America can feel

16:12

at the moment. And so I sort

16:14

of take some optimism from that, that

16:17

that will be rewarded by Americans as

16:19

well. And in fact, one

16:21

of the things that strikes me about that team

16:23

is that unless they're hiding it very well, it's

16:26

distinguished by the fact that they don't

16:28

really fight much amongst each other. Whereas

16:30

he mentioned the George W Bush team,

16:32

they were at that as well. I

16:34

mean, Conde Rice and Rumsfeldt, it

16:37

was very, very difficult. Is it

16:39

your sense that this is an unusually cohesive

16:41

administration? I think it's very collegial. They've all

16:43

known each other for a long time. They've

16:46

worked together very closely. They have

16:48

a sort of a division of labor that

16:50

seems to work where they send Burns out

16:52

to do sort of special missions and Blinken

16:54

does other things and compare that to what

16:57

we had in the first Trump administration, which

16:59

was sort of the hunger games with

17:01

chiefs of staff being sacked and secretaries

17:04

of state being sacked and a really

17:06

poisonous relationship between the

17:09

team. So look, I

17:11

don't know, do Americans consider these things?

17:13

Probably not. But to me, I think

17:16

there is a slightly unbalanced sense

17:18

to the international commentary on Biden's

17:20

age. Yes, he's not a

17:22

young man. Yes, you would prefer that American

17:24

presidents were in the prime of their life.

17:26

But if you judge Biden on

17:29

his performance in office against

17:32

all the challenges and the complicated environment

17:34

in which he's operating on the economic

17:36

side, on the foreign policy side, I

17:39

think he's doing well. And at some

17:41

level, one hopes that that would be

17:43

rewarded in November. But, you know, there's

17:45

nine months to go. And that

17:48

is a long time in

17:50

presidential politics. And there are so many incidents

17:52

that could push it in either direction that it's hard

17:54

to come up with a prediction closer than, you know,

17:57

it's probably an even money bet. historian

18:00

of the US, you've done a book on the

18:02

New Deal, you're doing a book on John F

18:04

Kennedy. When you look at

18:06

Joe Biden as a Democrat and as a

18:08

president, how much do you think he's in

18:10

a line of continuity with those presidents, particularly

18:12

in the kind of commitment to the Western

18:14

Alliance? I think he started in the Rooseveltian

18:17

tradition, you remember, even though he had a

18:19

very narrow mandate, he wanted to go big

18:21

on economic reform in particular with the rise

18:23

of the new left in the United States.

18:26

But over time, he's probably reverted to more

18:28

of a Kennedy esque, tough-minded

18:30

approach, foreign policy led,

18:33

just as JFK did. There's also an

18:35

interesting Kennedy connection because

18:37

Biden has always historically been close

18:40

to the Kennedy family.

18:42

And of course, Caroline Kennedy

18:44

is his ambassador here in

18:46

Australia. And yet Robert

18:49

Kennedy Jr. is running against Biden

18:51

to the dismay, I

18:54

might say, of the rest of the Kennedy

18:56

family. So those connections continue.

18:59

I'd say if you think about

19:01

Biden, historically, he looks like a

19:03

pretty successful president in three years.

19:05

Of course, he's made all sorts

19:08

of missteps as anybody does, but

19:11

a very solid foreign policy record,

19:13

the economy roaring back. I

19:15

guess the caveat on that is Ukraine,

19:17

I think last year it felt like

19:20

and Afghanistan. Of course, yeah,

19:22

Afghanistan was definitely a black mark. But,

19:24

you know, what happens in Ukraine over

19:26

the next few months, of course, will

19:28

feed heavily into how historians think about

19:30

the Biden administration. And again, coming out

19:33

of Munich, there was a deep

19:35

sort of sense of unease that things could

19:38

go quite poorly. I hope that's not the

19:40

case. I am an

19:42

enormous admirer of the moral, physical personal

19:44

courage of Zelensky and the Ukrainians. I

19:46

hope that Republicans in the Congress come

19:49

to their senses and pass that military

19:51

aid bill, which is so essential. But,

19:53

you know, I did come back from

19:55

overseas, I guess, to finish where we

19:57

started with a sense of unease.

20:00

that the wind is in our faces a little bit at the

20:02

moment. That

20:07

was Michael Fulliloff of the Loey of Student

20:10

Sydney, ending this edition of the Rachman Review.

20:13

Thanks for listening. Please join us again

20:15

next week. I'm

20:41

Michael Fulliloff of the Loey of Student Sydney, ending

20:43

this edition of the Rachman Review.