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1:58
included the
2:00
leader of Syria, Bashar al-Assad,
2:03
who until recently has been something of
2:05
pariah in the Arab world.
2:08
Another guest was President Recep Tayyip Erdogan
2:10
of Turkey, who's long had uneasy
2:13
relations with both MBS and Assad.
2:16
I was in Turkey over the weekend from
2:18
a meeting organised by Chatham House and
2:20
the Koch Group. After the discussions,
2:23
I sat down with Dr. Sannem Vakil of
2:25
Chatham House. I started by asking
2:27
her about that summit of Arab and
2:30
Islamic leaders. Were they really
2:32
as united on Gaza as they seem?
2:35
Well, the optics would suggest they are
2:37
united, but from that summit and
2:39
the statement that emerged along
2:42
with some of the reporting, there is not
2:44
as much unity as there should be.
2:47
Of course, there has been unity
2:49
over the prioritization of humanitarian
2:52
aid, calling for a ceasefire,
2:55
but there are divergences among Arab
2:57
states in particular. Alongside
3:00
Iran, for example, there were calls
3:02
led by Algeria to boycott
3:05
Israel more broadly, impose an
3:07
oil embargo. The Iraqis have
3:10
a particularly interesting stance
3:13
where, because of their close ties with
3:15
Iran, they are also
3:17
being quite critical of
3:19
Israel and also prioritizing
3:22
a ceasefire and humanitarian aid, but we're
3:25
like harsher measures taken, whereas
3:27
you have a block of five Arab states,
3:30
Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, the UAE
3:32
and Saudi Arabia, that perhaps
3:34
see themselves as more
3:37
moderate, have direct
3:39
or indirect ties with Israel, and
3:41
hope to play either an immediate
3:44
or long-standing role in helping
3:47
the Palestinians, providing humanitarian
3:49
aid, but also being part of what will be a political
3:51
settlement.
3:52
And how realistic do you think
3:54
those aspirations are? Do you think
3:57
at the moment they're feeling a bit impotent or
3:59
are they just standing on of bad luck waiting
4:01
for their moment?
4:02
I think that they are taking
4:04
their time. They don't want
4:06
to be at the front and center
4:08
of this crisis. Of course, they've
4:11
been called out by their people
4:13
for not having prioritized the Palestinian
4:16
issue. We've seen protests
4:18
across the Arab world in support of
4:20
Palestine and against Israel's
4:23
military campaign in Gaza. So
4:25
I think they're playing a short term
4:27
multilateral game and longer
4:30
term, I think that these countries will
4:32
be very important in incentivizing
4:35
and perhaps even underwriting
4:38
a political settlement. The West is
4:41
not necessarily prioritizing
4:43
this conflict. There's distraction with Ukraine.
4:46
There's elections coming in many countries
4:48
next year. And so I think that many
4:50
Arab states will have a responsibility
4:52
and an opportunity through this crisis
4:55
should they take it. And how
4:58
much or little is it actually a threat
5:00
to them domestically? I was very struck at
5:02
the beginning of the conflict
5:05
when emotions were running high and they're still running
5:07
very high for obvious reasons. The
5:09
Egyptians authorized a demonstration and
5:11
then it sort of spilled into kind
5:13
of having an anti-CC regime
5:16
character to it. So do they feel they're
5:18
starting walking the tightrope?
5:19
Well, of course they're not all in the same
5:22
predicament. I think that the Jordanians
5:24
and the Egyptians are in much more
5:27
of a position where they have
5:30
security concerns. Jordan has
5:32
a very large Palestinian population
5:35
that is rightfully incensed. Queen Rania has
5:38
been advocating in favor of humanitarian
5:40
aid and a ceasefire
5:43
very regularly. And the Egyptians, because
5:45
of their shared border and their long history,
5:47
are also in an uncomfortable position
5:49
nor do they want the Sinai to become
5:51
the new home of Palestinians
5:54
in Gaza. So the protests
5:56
that we have seen have been quite interesting and
5:58
you spoke rightly to the fact that... that Egyptians
6:01
took the opportunity to actually almost thank
6:03
the Palestinians for their right
6:05
to protest. And they very quickly pivoted
6:08
and complained about bread and the economy
6:11
and all of their own challenges. And this is a
6:13
tricky time for Sisi. He's supposedly
6:16
embarking on elections in December and
6:19
he is indeed walking a tight rope as are
6:21
the Jordanians. Broadly the Gulf
6:23
fits have different dynamics.
6:25
Don't have many demonstrations, but... No.
6:26
I mean, there were some protests in
6:28
Bahrain. I think that in the UAE
6:31
and Saudi Arabia, the outpouring
6:33
of anger is very much managed, contained
6:36
on social media, channeled in more,
6:38
let's say, constructive ways to provide
6:41
aid and to express frustration
6:43
in very carefully constructive
6:45
dialogue. They're not breaking ties. The
6:47
Emiratis, they've said at front and center
6:49
normalization will continue.
6:52
But they all see a pragmatism
6:55
in these dynamics that will be important
6:57
to continue regardless of this crisis.
6:59
Yeah.
6:59
So here in Turkey, which
7:02
Erdogan has over his many
7:04
years in power,
7:05
often been very frightened in his condemnations
7:08
of Israel over previous Gaza
7:10
conflict. And it seemed to be
7:12
actually kind of slightly warming to Netanyahu
7:15
and then, hang, this happened and you've
7:17
had huge demonstrations here in Istanbul.
7:20
What role, if any, do you think the Turks played?
7:22
Well, Erdogan played a very interesting
7:24
flip-flop over the past month because
7:27
he was quite cautious. And then he
7:29
clearly took a much more strident
7:32
and critical position of Israel, also withdrawing
7:35
their ambassador and restoring ties
7:37
after the rupture was quite
7:39
difficult, finding the right entry point. So this
7:42
is quite a move. And it comes on
7:44
this backdrop of a broader
7:47
regional diplomacy, everyone's
7:49
normalized ties with each other. So
7:51
the fact that Erdogan has taken this position
7:54
is really reflective of popular
7:56
anger here in Turkey, frustration
7:58
that is longstanding. goes back to
8:01
previous wars, 2009, 2014.
8:04
And we heard a lot of it at this conference,
8:06
though, almost to a man and
8:08
a woman that her participants were saying,
8:11
you know, how can the West
8:12
lecture us on Ukraine and let stuff like
8:15
the Israelis are doing go by? This
8:17
definitely exposes Western
8:19
countries and policymakers to
8:21
criticism of double standards and hypocrisy
8:24
that have long existed but are
8:26
being made worse by a war
8:29
in Ukraine that is wholeheartedly
8:31
defended by the West and what
8:33
is perceived in the Middle East to
8:35
be a green light to Israel to
8:37
kill Palestinians without
8:40
respect for international law
8:43
and human rights. And so that is unleashing
8:45
all sorts of grievances.
8:47
True.
8:48
And another aspect of that
8:51
summit in Riyadh was Iran, the
8:53
president of Iran actually being escorted in
8:55
by Mohammed bin Salman. What are you
8:57
made of that?
8:59
Really rather extraordinary. I was
9:01
in Riyadh in mid-October and
9:04
there was some speculation. In
9:06
meetings I had, you know, the Saudi
9:08
Iranian rapprochement is new. It's
9:11
only a number of months old. And I was
9:13
told that the ball is in Iran's court.
9:16
It was Ra'is' turn to reciprocate
9:18
because Saudi Arabia's foreign minister
9:20
Faisal bin Farhan had been to Tehran already.
9:23
And I was surprised that the
9:25
opportunity came so quickly. It really speaks
9:27
to, I think, Iran's pragmatism right now, recognizing
9:30
that after many years
9:33
of very tense and difficult ties with
9:35
the Gulf states and particularly Saudi Arabia,
9:38
I think they acknowledged that these
9:40
diplomatic ties are fragile and
9:42
it's important to keep them going despite
9:45
all of the concerns in the region. So
9:48
I think it was the perfect opportunity for
9:50
Ra'is the president of Iran to
9:52
come to Riyadh because it was under
9:55
the cover of these double summits. He
9:57
had some pomp and circumstance, but
9:59
it wasn't that. the full state visit and
10:01
they could show solidarity
10:04
on humanitarian issues, where of
10:06
course Iran plays a broader incendiary
10:08
role in supporting Hamas and other groups
10:11
that could destabilize the region further.
10:13
Yeah,
10:13
and speaking into that
10:15
a bit, there was a very interesting article in the FT
10:17
by my colleague Natima based in Tehran saying
10:19
that the reaction of the Iranian public
10:22
was rather different to this, partly because of their hostility
10:25
of quite a lot of them to their own regime and the way they
10:27
feel their regime has instrumentalized
10:29
the Palestinian nation. Is that something you see as well?
10:31
Absolutely. Natima is a fantastic
10:34
correspondent and I think she has a
10:36
really unique perspective in reflecting
10:38
what is taking place in Iran. Iranians
10:41
have long been very frustrated
10:43
that the regime doesn't reflect
10:46
or respect their views on
10:48
foreign policy. There has been a sort of long-standing
10:51
chant that Iranians use
10:53
in protest that they say, not Gaza, not
10:55
Lebanon, I give my life for Iran.
10:58
And it really speaks to the decades-long
11:00
frustration of Iranian resources
11:02
being channeled abroad rather than spent
11:05
back home. So that distance
11:07
between the Iranian street,
11:10
if you will, and the regime I think is quite
11:12
profound. And of course in
11:14
the backdrop of Iran's protests
11:16
of last year after the death of
11:18
the young Massa Ashina Amini, Iranians
11:21
are looking for other alternative
11:24
avenues to distance themselves
11:26
from the regime that really
11:29
is holding steadfast against popular
11:32
frustration. They're not showing any willingness
11:34
to reform anywhere and it creeps
11:37
out in all sorts of ways.
11:38
Yeah, and that does actually
11:40
raise an interesting question to me because
11:43
the question of public pose, why are you
11:45
pouring all these resources into Gaza, Lebanon,
11:48
etc. is the valid one. It's a long-standing
11:50
Iranian policy, so one kind of takes it for granted.
11:52
But what is Iran's
11:55
stake in being the center, the axis of resistance,
11:57
as they call it?
11:59
It's a really... It's a tricky issue
12:01
to explain simply,
12:02
so let me try to make it simple.
12:05
But apologies if my answer is longer
12:07
than you'd like. It definitely goes
12:09
back to the Iranian Revolution,
12:12
the ideological nature of the revolution
12:14
being very anti-American, and
12:17
many of the regime's leaders seeing the
12:19
role of the United States and by extension Israel's
12:22
presence in the region as being connected
12:24
to imperialism and colonialism.
12:27
So there is that ideological
12:29
worldview hanging there. And then
12:31
a second layer emerges from Iran's
12:33
experience during the Iran-Iraq
12:36
War. It felt very much surrounded
12:39
and isolated by its neighbors,
12:41
and of course the West sort of piled in and supported
12:44
Saddam Hussein in this eight-year-long
12:46
war. And through that
12:48
experience, they came out having
12:50
survived and the revolution
12:53
relatively consolidated, they
12:55
began to develop relations
12:58
with non-state actors, recognizing
13:01
that there weren't too many states in the Middle East
13:03
that were feeling comfortable with the Islamic Republic
13:05
and its radical Islamic political
13:08
system. And so they strengthened their
13:10
ties and nurtured their ties, first
13:12
with Lebanon's Hezbollah group, and
13:15
over four decades they found opportunities
13:18
in weak states to also
13:21
develop relations with political
13:23
groups, military groups. And
13:25
it turns out over the years, these
13:28
sort of hodgepodge of groups in multiple countries
13:30
ranging from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq,
13:33
the Palestinian territories, and Yemen have
13:35
broadly come together as the axis of
13:37
resistance. And they're not necessarily
13:40
ideologically connected by
13:42
religious space, but they're ideologically
13:44
connected in their opposition to Israel and
13:46
the role of the United States in the
13:48
West. And it helps protect Iran,
13:51
the presence of these groups around
13:53
Israel and near American military
13:56
bases in the region, they help protect
13:59
Iran from being... directly attacked
14:01
within Iran and that has been known
14:03
as Iran's forward defense strategy.
14:06
And is that Iran's
14:08
forward defense strategy partly what
14:10
was provoking or at least
14:12
persuading the Gulf states to
14:14
go with the Abraham Accord, the Bahrain,
14:17
the UAE, and with a big question
14:19
until all this blew up that Saudi seemed
14:21
to be on the brink of also normalizing
14:23
relations? How much of that was
14:25
about Iran?
14:26
Well certainly the Iran
14:28
security question is
14:30
the one that hangs as a thread
14:32
through all of these conflicts including the Palestinian
14:35
one and it was a driver of normalization
14:38
for the Bahrainis and the Emiratis
14:41
with Israel. But there's an element
14:43
to that that is broader and it's tied
14:45
to the role of the US in the
14:47
Middle East and there's been a prevailing
14:50
view among American partners
14:53
in the region that the US is de-prioritizing
14:55
the Middle East, focusing on its domestic
14:58
dynamics and issues, focusing
15:00
on China and that has left
15:03
a security vacuum. And so
15:05
these countries have been looking to solidify
15:08
their relations with the US and see relations
15:10
with Israel as the perfect way
15:12
to do that. Right
15:14
and
15:15
one of the other interesting guests
15:17
at this conference in Riyadh was President Assad
15:19
of Syria and there's a certain irony in him
15:22
signing up to a denunciation of bombing
15:24
and human rights abuses but he
15:26
was there. Does that signal
15:28
that he's not made it? He's safe,
15:30
he's back in the phone.
15:31
I think on this surface yes
15:33
it looks like Assad is here to stay,
15:36
he has survived the isolation
15:39
and the efforts at unseating him but
15:42
I think his road back and the
15:44
sort of rehabilitation of Bashar al-Assad
15:46
isn't
15:47
going to be warm
15:49
and result in investment
15:51
in Syria or strengthened
15:53
by lateral ties across the
15:56
Arab world. I think that this outreach
15:58
to Bashar al-Assad was really led by by the UAE,
16:01
again, seeing that the
16:03
severing of ties across the region that
16:05
was not just with Syria, but also with Iran,
16:08
there was a period of tension with Turkey. No
16:11
direct dialogue worked against Emirati
16:13
interests. And so they sort of paved
16:15
the way at reconciliation,
16:18
and it's underpinned by pragmatism
16:20
and security vacuum
16:23
and looking to directly try to problem
16:25
solve some of the challenges, which include
16:28
also the export of captagon,
16:30
the drug being produced in
16:32
Syria and being used to bankroll the Assad
16:35
regime. And that has posed a sort of
16:37
domestic challenge across many borders.
16:39
Exactly. And ultimately
16:41
thinking that over time through greater
16:44
investment, you know, perhaps
16:47
there could be a more balanced
16:49
relationship with Syria that could serve
16:52
Gulf interests. And maybe, you know, quite
16:54
reductively, people have also thought
16:56
that balanced relations would
16:58
help Bashar al-Assad also
17:00
diversify his relations away
17:03
from Iran and Russia and other countries
17:05
that are involved. An
17:06
asked question on the Gaza conflict itself,
17:08
which has framed, you know, so much of these discussions.
17:11
I should say we're talking on a Saturday. This
17:13
won't go out until a Thursday. And I hesitate
17:16
because we always feel to be a day
17:18
away and a hour away from another
17:20
really appalling thing happening that could reframe
17:22
the whole conflict. But with that proviso,
17:25
do you have a sense
17:27
that the West misgivings
17:30
about what Israel is doing, which have always been
17:32
there, I think, in the background, even though I don't think that
17:34
many people here in Turkey would necessarily accept
17:36
that, but they're becoming more open
17:39
and that you hear sometimes people saying Israel's
17:41
window is closing in Gaza.
17:44
Is that inaccurate or do you think actually, given
17:47
Israel, how enraged Israel
17:49
is, that that's going to keep going for quite a while?
17:51
To be very honest, Gideon, I think it's really
17:53
hard to say. I hope the window
17:55
is closing because I really fear
17:57
that too many lives have been lost at this
18:00
point and I think that ordinary
18:02
Palestinians shouldn't be paying this price.
18:05
But I do very much worry, I know that
18:07
the window is closing from the West perspective,
18:10
but I very much worry that in this climate
18:12
in Israel today, which is extraordinarily
18:16
defensive, that they will continue
18:18
regardless and radicalize. And
18:20
it is also taking place in the context
18:22
of increasing violence in the West Bank
18:25
and over 100 people have died
18:27
over there. At the same time, Prime
18:30
Minister Netanyahu is under huge pressure,
18:32
continuing the war, I mean, sorry
18:34
to sound conspiratorial, but continuing
18:37
the war is a sort of lifeline
18:39
to his political
18:39
survival. I think that sounds very sory in the call.
18:42
The same thought has occurred to me that
18:45
the day the war ends, the inquest in Israel
18:47
begins and the beginning of Netanyahu's political
18:49
career.
18:49
Yes. And on Saturday, there
18:52
will be protests in Israel calling
18:54
for Netanyahu's. And
18:56
if you will, I think right now,
18:59
if he doesn't get these hostages released, then
19:01
we've heard much reporting that a deal
19:03
is on the table. So why these
19:05
poor individuals haven't been released is beyond
19:08
me. So Western pressure
19:10
doesn't necessarily guarantee a sort
19:12
of cease and desist on the Israeli side.
19:15
My biggest concern is that Israeli
19:17
society and the Israeli political
19:20
leadership is not ready to cease
19:22
and desist because of the horrors of October 7th,
19:24
but also because of the failures on their
19:26
end of October 7th and a whole strategy
19:29
that is effectively collapsed. And that is
19:31
clear on the Palestinian side, but more broadly,
19:33
part of the discussion that they are not having
19:36
that they will also have is that the Iran strategy
19:38
has also failed. So the two pillars, Iran
19:40
and Palestine, are collapsing and
19:42
they need a whole new plan going forward. That
19:50
was Sannam Vakil, director of the Middle East program
19:53
at Chatham House in London, ending
19:55
this edition of the Rachman Review. Please
19:57
join me again next week.
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