Podchaser Logo
Home
How united are Arab and Muslim leaders on Gaza?

How united are Arab and Muslim leaders on Gaza?

Released Thursday, 23rd November 2023
Good episode? Give it some love!
How united are Arab and Muslim leaders on Gaza?

How united are Arab and Muslim leaders on Gaza?

How united are Arab and Muslim leaders on Gaza?

How united are Arab and Muslim leaders on Gaza?

Thursday, 23rd November 2023
Good episode? Give it some love!
Rate Episode

Episode Transcript

Transcripts are displayed as originally observed. Some content, including advertisements may have changed.

Use Ctrl + F to search

1:58

included the

2:00

leader of Syria, Bashar al-Assad,

2:03

who until recently has been something of

2:05

pariah in the Arab world.

2:08

Another guest was President Recep Tayyip Erdogan

2:10

of Turkey, who's long had uneasy

2:13

relations with both MBS and Assad.

2:16

I was in Turkey over the weekend from

2:18

a meeting organised by Chatham House and

2:20

the Koch Group. After the discussions,

2:23

I sat down with Dr. Sannem Vakil of

2:25

Chatham House. I started by asking

2:27

her about that summit of Arab and

2:30

Islamic leaders. Were they really

2:32

as united on Gaza as they seem?

2:35

Well, the optics would suggest they are

2:37

united, but from that summit and

2:39

the statement that emerged along

2:42

with some of the reporting, there is not

2:44

as much unity as there should be.

2:47

Of course, there has been unity

2:49

over the prioritization of humanitarian

2:52

aid, calling for a ceasefire,

2:55

but there are divergences among Arab

2:57

states in particular. Alongside

3:00

Iran, for example, there were calls

3:02

led by Algeria to boycott

3:05

Israel more broadly, impose an

3:07

oil embargo. The Iraqis have

3:10

a particularly interesting stance

3:13

where, because of their close ties with

3:15

Iran, they are also

3:17

being quite critical of

3:19

Israel and also prioritizing

3:22

a ceasefire and humanitarian aid, but we're

3:25

like harsher measures taken, whereas

3:27

you have a block of five Arab states,

3:30

Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, the UAE

3:32

and Saudi Arabia, that perhaps

3:34

see themselves as more

3:37

moderate, have direct

3:39

or indirect ties with Israel, and

3:41

hope to play either an immediate

3:44

or long-standing role in helping

3:47

the Palestinians, providing humanitarian

3:49

aid, but also being part of what will be a political

3:51

settlement.

3:52

And how realistic do you think

3:54

those aspirations are? Do you think

3:57

at the moment they're feeling a bit impotent or

3:59

are they just standing on of bad luck waiting

4:01

for their moment?

4:02

I think that they are taking

4:04

their time. They don't want

4:06

to be at the front and center

4:08

of this crisis. Of course, they've

4:11

been called out by their people

4:13

for not having prioritized the Palestinian

4:16

issue. We've seen protests

4:18

across the Arab world in support of

4:20

Palestine and against Israel's

4:23

military campaign in Gaza. So

4:25

I think they're playing a short term

4:27

multilateral game and longer

4:30

term, I think that these countries will

4:32

be very important in incentivizing

4:35

and perhaps even underwriting

4:38

a political settlement. The West is

4:41

not necessarily prioritizing

4:43

this conflict. There's distraction with Ukraine.

4:46

There's elections coming in many countries

4:48

next year. And so I think that many

4:50

Arab states will have a responsibility

4:52

and an opportunity through this crisis

4:55

should they take it. And how

4:58

much or little is it actually a threat

5:00

to them domestically? I was very struck at

5:02

the beginning of the conflict

5:05

when emotions were running high and they're still running

5:07

very high for obvious reasons. The

5:09

Egyptians authorized a demonstration and

5:11

then it sort of spilled into kind

5:13

of having an anti-CC regime

5:16

character to it. So do they feel they're

5:18

starting walking the tightrope?

5:19

Well, of course they're not all in the same

5:22

predicament. I think that the Jordanians

5:24

and the Egyptians are in much more

5:27

of a position where they have

5:30

security concerns. Jordan has

5:32

a very large Palestinian population

5:35

that is rightfully incensed. Queen Rania has

5:38

been advocating in favor of humanitarian

5:40

aid and a ceasefire

5:43

very regularly. And the Egyptians, because

5:45

of their shared border and their long history,

5:47

are also in an uncomfortable position

5:49

nor do they want the Sinai to become

5:51

the new home of Palestinians

5:54

in Gaza. So the protests

5:56

that we have seen have been quite interesting and

5:58

you spoke rightly to the fact that... that Egyptians

6:01

took the opportunity to actually almost thank

6:03

the Palestinians for their right

6:05

to protest. And they very quickly pivoted

6:08

and complained about bread and the economy

6:11

and all of their own challenges. And this is a

6:13

tricky time for Sisi. He's supposedly

6:16

embarking on elections in December and

6:19

he is indeed walking a tight rope as are

6:21

the Jordanians. Broadly the Gulf

6:23

fits have different dynamics.

6:25

Don't have many demonstrations, but... No.

6:26

I mean, there were some protests in

6:28

Bahrain. I think that in the UAE

6:31

and Saudi Arabia, the outpouring

6:33

of anger is very much managed, contained

6:36

on social media, channeled in more,

6:38

let's say, constructive ways to provide

6:41

aid and to express frustration

6:43

in very carefully constructive

6:45

dialogue. They're not breaking ties. The

6:47

Emiratis, they've said at front and center

6:49

normalization will continue.

6:52

But they all see a pragmatism

6:55

in these dynamics that will be important

6:57

to continue regardless of this crisis.

6:59

Yeah.

6:59

So here in Turkey, which

7:02

Erdogan has over his many

7:04

years in power,

7:05

often been very frightened in his condemnations

7:08

of Israel over previous Gaza

7:10

conflict. And it seemed to be

7:12

actually kind of slightly warming to Netanyahu

7:15

and then, hang, this happened and you've

7:17

had huge demonstrations here in Istanbul.

7:20

What role, if any, do you think the Turks played?

7:22

Well, Erdogan played a very interesting

7:24

flip-flop over the past month because

7:27

he was quite cautious. And then he

7:29

clearly took a much more strident

7:32

and critical position of Israel, also withdrawing

7:35

their ambassador and restoring ties

7:37

after the rupture was quite

7:39

difficult, finding the right entry point. So this

7:42

is quite a move. And it comes on

7:44

this backdrop of a broader

7:47

regional diplomacy, everyone's

7:49

normalized ties with each other. So

7:51

the fact that Erdogan has taken this position

7:54

is really reflective of popular

7:56

anger here in Turkey, frustration

7:58

that is longstanding. goes back to

8:01

previous wars, 2009, 2014.

8:04

And we heard a lot of it at this conference,

8:06

though, almost to a man and

8:08

a woman that her participants were saying,

8:11

you know, how can the West

8:12

lecture us on Ukraine and let stuff like

8:15

the Israelis are doing go by? This

8:17

definitely exposes Western

8:19

countries and policymakers to

8:21

criticism of double standards and hypocrisy

8:24

that have long existed but are

8:26

being made worse by a war

8:29

in Ukraine that is wholeheartedly

8:31

defended by the West and what

8:33

is perceived in the Middle East to

8:35

be a green light to Israel to

8:37

kill Palestinians without

8:40

respect for international law

8:43

and human rights. And so that is unleashing

8:45

all sorts of grievances.

8:47

True.

8:48

And another aspect of that

8:51

summit in Riyadh was Iran, the

8:53

president of Iran actually being escorted in

8:55

by Mohammed bin Salman. What are you

8:57

made of that?

8:59

Really rather extraordinary. I was

9:01

in Riyadh in mid-October and

9:04

there was some speculation. In

9:06

meetings I had, you know, the Saudi

9:08

Iranian rapprochement is new. It's

9:11

only a number of months old. And I was

9:13

told that the ball is in Iran's court.

9:16

It was Ra'is' turn to reciprocate

9:18

because Saudi Arabia's foreign minister

9:20

Faisal bin Farhan had been to Tehran already.

9:23

And I was surprised that the

9:25

opportunity came so quickly. It really speaks

9:27

to, I think, Iran's pragmatism right now, recognizing

9:30

that after many years

9:33

of very tense and difficult ties with

9:35

the Gulf states and particularly Saudi Arabia,

9:38

I think they acknowledged that these

9:40

diplomatic ties are fragile and

9:42

it's important to keep them going despite

9:45

all of the concerns in the region. So

9:48

I think it was the perfect opportunity for

9:50

Ra'is the president of Iran to

9:52

come to Riyadh because it was under

9:55

the cover of these double summits. He

9:57

had some pomp and circumstance, but

9:59

it wasn't that. the full state visit and

10:01

they could show solidarity

10:04

on humanitarian issues, where of

10:06

course Iran plays a broader incendiary

10:08

role in supporting Hamas and other groups

10:11

that could destabilize the region further.

10:13

Yeah,

10:13

and speaking into that

10:15

a bit, there was a very interesting article in the FT

10:17

by my colleague Natima based in Tehran saying

10:19

that the reaction of the Iranian public

10:22

was rather different to this, partly because of their hostility

10:25

of quite a lot of them to their own regime and the way they

10:27

feel their regime has instrumentalized

10:29

the Palestinian nation. Is that something you see as well?

10:31

Absolutely. Natima is a fantastic

10:34

correspondent and I think she has a

10:36

really unique perspective in reflecting

10:38

what is taking place in Iran. Iranians

10:41

have long been very frustrated

10:43

that the regime doesn't reflect

10:46

or respect their views on

10:48

foreign policy. There has been a sort of long-standing

10:51

chant that Iranians use

10:53

in protest that they say, not Gaza, not

10:55

Lebanon, I give my life for Iran.

10:58

And it really speaks to the decades-long

11:00

frustration of Iranian resources

11:02

being channeled abroad rather than spent

11:05

back home. So that distance

11:07

between the Iranian street,

11:10

if you will, and the regime I think is quite

11:12

profound. And of course in

11:14

the backdrop of Iran's protests

11:16

of last year after the death of

11:18

the young Massa Ashina Amini, Iranians

11:21

are looking for other alternative

11:24

avenues to distance themselves

11:26

from the regime that really

11:29

is holding steadfast against popular

11:32

frustration. They're not showing any willingness

11:34

to reform anywhere and it creeps

11:37

out in all sorts of ways.

11:38

Yeah, and that does actually

11:40

raise an interesting question to me because

11:43

the question of public pose, why are you

11:45

pouring all these resources into Gaza, Lebanon,

11:48

etc. is the valid one. It's a long-standing

11:50

Iranian policy, so one kind of takes it for granted.

11:52

But what is Iran's

11:55

stake in being the center, the axis of resistance,

11:57

as they call it?

11:59

It's a really... It's a tricky issue

12:01

to explain simply,

12:02

so let me try to make it simple.

12:05

But apologies if my answer is longer

12:07

than you'd like. It definitely goes

12:09

back to the Iranian Revolution,

12:12

the ideological nature of the revolution

12:14

being very anti-American, and

12:17

many of the regime's leaders seeing the

12:19

role of the United States and by extension Israel's

12:22

presence in the region as being connected

12:24

to imperialism and colonialism.

12:27

So there is that ideological

12:29

worldview hanging there. And then

12:31

a second layer emerges from Iran's

12:33

experience during the Iran-Iraq

12:36

War. It felt very much surrounded

12:39

and isolated by its neighbors,

12:41

and of course the West sort of piled in and supported

12:44

Saddam Hussein in this eight-year-long

12:46

war. And through that

12:48

experience, they came out having

12:50

survived and the revolution

12:53

relatively consolidated, they

12:55

began to develop relations

12:58

with non-state actors, recognizing

13:01

that there weren't too many states in the Middle East

13:03

that were feeling comfortable with the Islamic Republic

13:05

and its radical Islamic political

13:08

system. And so they strengthened their

13:10

ties and nurtured their ties, first

13:12

with Lebanon's Hezbollah group, and

13:15

over four decades they found opportunities

13:18

in weak states to also

13:21

develop relations with political

13:23

groups, military groups. And

13:25

it turns out over the years, these

13:28

sort of hodgepodge of groups in multiple countries

13:30

ranging from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq,

13:33

the Palestinian territories, and Yemen have

13:35

broadly come together as the axis of

13:37

resistance. And they're not necessarily

13:40

ideologically connected by

13:42

religious space, but they're ideologically

13:44

connected in their opposition to Israel and

13:46

the role of the United States in the

13:48

West. And it helps protect Iran,

13:51

the presence of these groups around

13:53

Israel and near American military

13:56

bases in the region, they help protect

13:59

Iran from being... directly attacked

14:01

within Iran and that has been known

14:03

as Iran's forward defense strategy.

14:06

And is that Iran's

14:08

forward defense strategy partly what

14:10

was provoking or at least

14:12

persuading the Gulf states to

14:14

go with the Abraham Accord, the Bahrain,

14:17

the UAE, and with a big question

14:19

until all this blew up that Saudi seemed

14:21

to be on the brink of also normalizing

14:23

relations? How much of that was

14:25

about Iran?

14:26

Well certainly the Iran

14:28

security question is

14:30

the one that hangs as a thread

14:32

through all of these conflicts including the Palestinian

14:35

one and it was a driver of normalization

14:38

for the Bahrainis and the Emiratis

14:41

with Israel. But there's an element

14:43

to that that is broader and it's tied

14:45

to the role of the US in the

14:47

Middle East and there's been a prevailing

14:50

view among American partners

14:53

in the region that the US is de-prioritizing

14:55

the Middle East, focusing on its domestic

14:58

dynamics and issues, focusing

15:00

on China and that has left

15:03

a security vacuum. And so

15:05

these countries have been looking to solidify

15:08

their relations with the US and see relations

15:10

with Israel as the perfect way

15:12

to do that. Right

15:14

and

15:15

one of the other interesting guests

15:17

at this conference in Riyadh was President Assad

15:19

of Syria and there's a certain irony in him

15:22

signing up to a denunciation of bombing

15:24

and human rights abuses but he

15:26

was there. Does that signal

15:28

that he's not made it? He's safe,

15:30

he's back in the phone.

15:31

I think on this surface yes

15:33

it looks like Assad is here to stay,

15:36

he has survived the isolation

15:39

and the efforts at unseating him but

15:42

I think his road back and the

15:44

sort of rehabilitation of Bashar al-Assad

15:46

isn't

15:47

going to be warm

15:49

and result in investment

15:51

in Syria or strengthened

15:53

by lateral ties across the

15:56

Arab world. I think that this outreach

15:58

to Bashar al-Assad was really led by by the UAE,

16:01

again, seeing that the

16:03

severing of ties across the region that

16:05

was not just with Syria, but also with Iran,

16:08

there was a period of tension with Turkey. No

16:11

direct dialogue worked against Emirati

16:13

interests. And so they sort of paved

16:15

the way at reconciliation,

16:18

and it's underpinned by pragmatism

16:20

and security vacuum

16:23

and looking to directly try to problem

16:25

solve some of the challenges, which include

16:28

also the export of captagon,

16:30

the drug being produced in

16:32

Syria and being used to bankroll the Assad

16:35

regime. And that has posed a sort of

16:37

domestic challenge across many borders.

16:39

Exactly. And ultimately

16:41

thinking that over time through greater

16:44

investment, you know, perhaps

16:47

there could be a more balanced

16:49

relationship with Syria that could serve

16:52

Gulf interests. And maybe, you know, quite

16:54

reductively, people have also thought

16:56

that balanced relations would

16:58

help Bashar al-Assad also

17:00

diversify his relations away

17:03

from Iran and Russia and other countries

17:05

that are involved. An

17:06

asked question on the Gaza conflict itself,

17:08

which has framed, you know, so much of these discussions.

17:11

I should say we're talking on a Saturday. This

17:13

won't go out until a Thursday. And I hesitate

17:16

because we always feel to be a day

17:18

away and a hour away from another

17:20

really appalling thing happening that could reframe

17:22

the whole conflict. But with that proviso,

17:25

do you have a sense

17:27

that the West misgivings

17:30

about what Israel is doing, which have always been

17:32

there, I think, in the background, even though I don't think that

17:34

many people here in Turkey would necessarily accept

17:36

that, but they're becoming more open

17:39

and that you hear sometimes people saying Israel's

17:41

window is closing in Gaza.

17:44

Is that inaccurate or do you think actually, given

17:47

Israel, how enraged Israel

17:49

is, that that's going to keep going for quite a while?

17:51

To be very honest, Gideon, I think it's really

17:53

hard to say. I hope the window

17:55

is closing because I really fear

17:57

that too many lives have been lost at this

18:00

point and I think that ordinary

18:02

Palestinians shouldn't be paying this price.

18:05

But I do very much worry, I know that

18:07

the window is closing from the West perspective,

18:10

but I very much worry that in this climate

18:12

in Israel today, which is extraordinarily

18:16

defensive, that they will continue

18:18

regardless and radicalize. And

18:20

it is also taking place in the context

18:22

of increasing violence in the West Bank

18:25

and over 100 people have died

18:27

over there. At the same time, Prime

18:30

Minister Netanyahu is under huge pressure,

18:32

continuing the war, I mean, sorry

18:34

to sound conspiratorial, but continuing

18:37

the war is a sort of lifeline

18:39

to his political

18:39

survival. I think that sounds very sory in the call.

18:42

The same thought has occurred to me that

18:45

the day the war ends, the inquest in Israel

18:47

begins and the beginning of Netanyahu's political

18:49

career.

18:49

Yes. And on Saturday, there

18:52

will be protests in Israel calling

18:54

for Netanyahu's. And

18:56

if you will, I think right now,

18:59

if he doesn't get these hostages released, then

19:01

we've heard much reporting that a deal

19:03

is on the table. So why these

19:05

poor individuals haven't been released is beyond

19:08

me. So Western pressure

19:10

doesn't necessarily guarantee a sort

19:12

of cease and desist on the Israeli side.

19:15

My biggest concern is that Israeli

19:17

society and the Israeli political

19:20

leadership is not ready to cease

19:22

and desist because of the horrors of October 7th,

19:24

but also because of the failures on their

19:26

end of October 7th and a whole strategy

19:29

that is effectively collapsed. And that is

19:31

clear on the Palestinian side, but more broadly,

19:33

part of the discussion that they are not having

19:36

that they will also have is that the Iran strategy

19:38

has also failed. So the two pillars, Iran

19:40

and Palestine, are collapsing and

19:42

they need a whole new plan going forward. That

19:50

was Sannam Vakil, director of the Middle East program

19:53

at Chatham House in London, ending

19:55

this edition of the Rachman Review. Please

19:57

join me again next week.

20:07

Ready to pop the question? The jewelers

20:10

at BlueNile.com have got sparkled

20:12

down to a science with beautiful

20:14

lab-grown diamonds worthy of your most brilliant

20:17

moments. Their lab-grown diamonds

20:19

are independently graded and guaranteed

20:21

identical to natural diamonds,

20:23

and they're ready to ship to your door. Go

20:25

to BlueNile.com and use promo code

20:28

LISTEN to get $50 off your purchase of $500 or more. That's

20:32

code LISTEN at BlueNile.com

20:34

for $50 off. BlueNile.com

20:36

code LISTEN.

Rate

Join Podchaser to...

  • Rate podcasts and episodes
  • Follow podcasts and creators
  • Create podcast and episode lists
  • & much more

Episode Tags

Do you host or manage this podcast?
Claim and edit this page to your liking.
,

Unlock more with Podchaser Pro

  • Audience Insights
  • Contact Information
  • Demographics
  • Charts
  • Sponsor History
  • and More!
Pro Features