3:59

They are in a

4:02

particularly difficult position with regards to

4:04

training officers at field-grade level

4:07

to be able to command larger operations.

4:10

It's worth noting that the divisional echelon, which

4:12

is where most armies see offensive

4:15

operations being controlled from, was

4:18

eliminated in Ukraine as a savings measure

4:21

some time ago. They've had to try

4:23

and bring back those sorts of structures, but

4:25

they're trying to build it while also needing to staff

4:27

many, many units. Now the Russians

4:31

do have their training bases intact. They

4:34

were lacking trainers, but they've largely fixed

4:37

that problem. And

4:39

so while they're not able to generate a huge

4:41

number of additional troops, over time

4:43

they are able to keep adding to their

4:46

formations, which means

4:48

that over time the picture gets tougher

4:50

for the Ukrainians. And then you overlay the

4:52

equipment situation. And

4:55

Russia has moved onto a war footing. It

4:57

is receiving significant amounts of equipment

4:59

from Iran and North Korea and others.

5:02

And it has turned a corner in

5:05

terms of production of war material. Whereas

5:07

NATO has been somewhat complacent

5:10

because it has been giving to Ukraine

5:13

material that was in storage

5:15

without moving industry onto a war

5:17

footing. And what we are finding

5:19

now is that there are increasing

5:21

constraints on the availability of critical

5:23

materials, munitions being the main one. So

5:26

give me an example of the kinds of things that Ukraine

5:29

is running short of. People talk about artillery shells

5:31

in particular. Is that the key thing? Artillery

5:33

shells, also barrels, is

5:35

a key

5:36

requirement as well. And that will reduce the

5:38

accuracy of your equipment.

5:40

But also

5:42

they were given a massive range of equipment

5:44

by the West. They're operating about 17 different

5:46

artillery systems. And

5:49

many of those systems are obsolete. They're no longer in

5:51

production. And so there was a finite number

5:53

of spare parts for them. Like for

5:55

example the Challenger tanks that Britain gave. There

5:59

are a finite number of spare packs. And

6:01

so the longer you try and use those and

6:03

the more you go through those spares, you

6:05

get to a point where either obsolete

6:08

things need to be made again,

6:10

or that capability is no longer

6:12

usable and you lose the value of the training

6:14

that went into the troops who operate them. And

6:17

of course, there's been a big blow to Ukrainian

6:19

morale. I don't think there's much doubt about that

6:21

by the fact that the much anticipated

6:23

counter offensive has not gained much

6:26

ground. What do

6:28

you think went wrong there?

6:29

So I think the first thing we have to be very clear about is

6:32

the offensive could have worked.

6:33

There were a range of issues.

6:36

One of them was the

6:38

dispersal of effort

6:40

and material into multiple axes,

6:43

too many axes. The second

6:46

was that there was an overestimation

6:49

of the cohesion, shall

6:51

we say, of Ukrainian brigades. So

6:53

Western planners looked at a brigade

6:56

and thought, we know what a brigade is, it will operate

6:58

in such and such a way. The reality

7:01

was that because of a lack of staff officers

7:03

and the fact that these brigades had not had the opportunity

7:05

to train as brigades on the whole,

7:08

they actually fought as company groups

7:11

enabled by the brigade and the scale

7:13

at which the Ukrainians were operating was much smaller

7:15

than anticipated. And

7:17

it's worth noting that the Russians put up a

7:19

very stiff resistance. They also fought the

7:21

battle rather differently than their doctrine would

7:23

have suggested, rather than falling

7:26

back and defending in depth and trying to attract

7:28

the enemy in depth. They instead counterattacked

7:31

and defended forward. They lost

7:33

a lot of people and material in that process. But

7:36

the Russians took the view that Ukraine

7:38

has a finite number of troops. And so

7:40

Ukraine

7:41

is not in a position to be able to absorb

7:44

the losses, whereas Russia is. And

7:46

do you think that calculation, grim as it is,

7:49

is broadly accurate? I've seen estimates

7:51

that the average age of Ukrainian troops on the

7:53

front line is now approaching 40, is that right?

7:56

That is correct. Although it's very important to bear in mind that

7:58

that is not a reflection of

7:59

the Ukrainians working their way up the generations.

8:02

So when Ukraine was on the defense, they

8:05

prioritized mobilization for

8:07

people who needed less training, i.e. had

8:09

previous military experience, and

8:11

they also prioritized people who would be steady,

8:14

essentially. And the people

8:16

who had previously been through conscription were

8:18

disproportionately older, and it made sense

8:20

to target that group. And so actually

8:23

Ukraine has not mobilized a large

8:26

number of its younger people. So

8:28

the average age of Ukrainian units is not

8:30

so much a reflection of them running out of people. But

8:33

the thing I would emphasize here is that you

8:36

could double the size of the Ukrainian armed forces, you

8:38

could conscript twice as many people into it, and it

8:40

wouldn't actually make any difference.

8:43

Because unless you have the ability

8:45

to command those troops to provide

8:47

the artillery, the enablers, and so on,

8:50

then they're not usable, especially for offensive

8:52

operations. So the critical

8:55

thing here is not just how many troops

8:57

can you have in the field, but it's how

8:59

many functional units of action, and

9:01

what scale are they operating at. If I

9:04

can only move 120 people

9:06

at you at a time, because there are

9:08

so many people I can conduct the command and control

9:10

for, that is a much smaller problem

9:13

that you're presenting to me than if you can move

9:15

a whole brigade of 3000

9:17

people at me across multiple directions.

9:20

But that requires a lot of synchronization and

9:22

planning, and therefore trained officers. And

9:24

if you scale a military from 150,000 ground

9:27

forces to 700,000

9:29

ground forces, then

9:31

the number of people who've been through staff

9:33

training, and who are practiced

9:36

in the organization and synchronization

9:38

of that military activity, is

9:41

going to be too few. You know, it's worth noting

9:43

that in the Second World War, British

9:46

troops had a minimum of 20 weeks

9:48

training, more in most cases,

9:50

before they were considered basically proficient. Most

9:54

Ukrainian soldiers are lucky if they've had five.

9:57

And so we need to now shift

9:59

from... the rapid

10:01

mobilization of personnel to be able to defend

10:04

to a more deliberate training process

10:07

to make sure that the troops are properly prepared for

10:09

attack. To come back to

10:11

the question I started with, you said

10:14

stalemate is not sustainable

10:16

and the implication of most of what you're saying is that

10:19

the next phase then might be that Russia goes on the

10:21

attack and begins to make substantial

10:23

gains. Is that a real danger?

10:25

Well we're very fortunate that Russia keeps going

10:27

on the attack prematurely.

10:29

Every time that the Russians start getting themselves

10:31

into a position where they have an opportunity they

10:33

end up making quite serious blunders. We're

10:36

seeing that in Avdivika at the moment where

10:39

their troops haven't had the opportunity to

10:41

train properly

10:42

and so they are taking very heavy

10:44

losses. However

10:47

the fact they are forming new units

10:49

like this shows what happens when the

10:51

pressure comes off and the Ukrainians

10:54

are in this fight challenge where on the one hand they need

10:56

to as I say train more deliberately to be able

10:58

to take the offensive themselves but

11:00

at the same time if they withdraw

11:02

troops and start training and

11:05

they're not attacking then the

11:07

pressure comes off the Russians and they can also

11:09

start training at school. So 2024

11:13

is going to be quite difficult I think especially

11:15

with the decline in available munitions

11:18

making sure that you keep up the rate of attrition against

11:21

Russian forces will be difficult

11:23

and if the attrition rate diminishes

11:26

and the number of troops

11:29

killed and seriously wounded then the

11:31

number of troops that the Russians have to train

11:33

and equip goes up.

11:35

So we have to be really really

11:37

cautious and deliberate now

11:40

in formulating a long-term plan

11:42

that carries us through 2024 and into 2025. What I'm saying sounds very

11:45

pessimistic but

11:49

you could draw a very pessimistic picture throughout

11:51

this entire conflict and

11:53

every time the worst outcome has been

11:56

averted because of careful planning

11:58

and decisions that have been made. We have a huge

12:00

amount of agency in where this goes from here.

12:03

So there's no room for complacency. But

12:05

there is also the capacity, as I say, to fix

12:07

the training issue, to

12:10

make the investment into the industrial base

12:12

and to put Ukraine on a position where

12:15

actually they can beat the Russians. It's

12:17

doable.

12:18

But the idea that this is just going to die

12:20

down in some sort of stalemate is wishful

12:22

thinking, right? It's a complacency that kind

12:25

of says, oh, this will just become a manageable problem.

12:27

No, it won't. It will go one way or the other. And

12:29

if it went the wrong way, I mean, do you

12:32

think Putin's original

12:34

ambition, which was clearly to take Kiev, might

12:37

even come back on the table?

12:38

It's still on the same. What do we mean by take

12:40

Kiev? Right. There's the military occupation

12:43

of Kiev, which at this point is beyond Russia's

12:45

capacity. But the

12:47

Russians are talking about fighting for three more years. And

12:51

if they exhaust Ukraine and put Ukraine

12:53

in a position where it can't join NATO because

12:55

its land is occupied and NATO isn't

12:57

comfortable with essentially being put in a position

13:00

where it's automatically being challenged

13:02

on article five, it is

13:05

having to keep up this fight. Then

13:07

the Russians could get Kiev into a position

13:10

where it is, you know, essentially subservient. And

13:12

then pressure comes off, cease

13:14

fires achieved, Russia can rebuild. And then you

13:16

are in a position where the occupation of Kiev is a viable

13:19

second bite, as it were, as

13:21

we saw in Chechnya. Right. Bad outcome

13:23

the first time, but the Russians salvaged their position

13:26

through pressure and negotiations and

13:29

then they came back. And so,

13:31

yes, this isn't a threat that's going away and

13:34

Russia has not diminished its goals. And

13:37

do you see, I mean, obviously you go

13:39

to Ukraine a lot and you know that side. Do

13:42

you have any sense of Russian thinking? I

13:44

mean, a Russian acquaintance of mine

13:46

said that his impression was that they're

13:48

getting much more confident.

13:50

They are getting much more confident. Yes. Firstly,

13:52

as they say, from an industrial point of view, they

13:55

were really feeling shortages. There

13:57

are still bottlenecks. Barrels are also an

13:59

issue for them.

13:59

that

14:00

situation is easing and

14:02

is likely to ease further over the next few

14:05

months

14:06

as basically supply starts to correlate

14:08

more closely with demand.

14:10

There is no longer on the Russian side this sense

14:12

that there is a big punch that the Ukrainians

14:15

are holding back that they're anticipating and

14:17

so they are feeling like they have

14:20

more opportunity or initiative

14:23

and they are sensing

14:26

and sniffing in the wind a sense

14:28

of frustration in the West which

14:31

in Russia feeds an overly optimistic

14:34

I think but very persistent

14:36

belief that essentially the West is going to throw in the towel.

14:39

I don't think that's the case. Even with Donald

14:41

Trump in the background? Well that's their big hope

14:43

you know and it's the hope that they tell themselves. Even

14:46

then I don't see most European countries throwing

14:48

in the towel but the point is is that

14:50

just continuing is not enough right you

14:52

actually need to invest

14:54

pretty substantially in your own military

14:56

industrial capacity if you are to lead

14:59

to a positive outcome here.

15:01

If that's the key though is there any sign

15:03

that the West is doing that that it's ramping

15:05

up military production and is prepared

15:08

to you know make the changes

15:10

to the economy and things as mundane as

15:12

planning law to actually get it done?

15:15

There's definitely a sense of urgency in defense ministries

15:18

but if we think about it in a

15:20

cross-government sense most of the ministries

15:23

don't think that they're at war

15:24

or that they're in a pre-war situation

15:27

and they are still following peacetime

15:29

procedures and so we see

15:32

significant reluctance to do

15:34

things efficiently or quickly outside

15:37

of ministries of defense and that's becoming a real

15:39

bottleneck you know there are and

15:41

it's just right across the West it's the same in the US

15:43

the same in Europe the US is slightly different

15:46

the US is significantly expanding

15:48

capacity and is mobilizing its defense industry

15:51

if you look at the increased rate of missile production

15:53

and so on but that is overwhelmingly

15:56

driven by the requirement

15:58

to deter China in the West.

15:59

the Indo-Pacific.

16:01

And so other than artillery ammunition,

16:03

what they're investing in is primarily not

16:06

related to the European theater.

16:08

And I think the politics in the US

16:10

is going to increasingly be one in which they

16:13

say, look, if China goes

16:15

for Taiwan or some other scenario,

16:18

it is catastrophic for the global economy.

16:21

We are managing that risk. NATO

16:23

is an alliance. And given that this is a European

16:26

security threat, we expect Europeans

16:28

to pull their weight. And if we look at

16:30

ammunition

16:30

supply as quite a good example,

16:33

Europe has provided about, I

16:36

think, 300,000 rounds of 155 to

16:39

Ukraine. The US has provided around 2 million.

16:42

So Europe has provided a lot of financial

16:45

aid and other things. But in the defense industrial

16:47

side, there is a real lack

16:49

of capacity in Europe. Yeah.

16:52

I think I want to tell you, you say that Britain produces as

16:54

many of those channels in a year as Ukraine uses in less

16:57

than 24 hours. Is that right? That was the case. Yes.

16:59

That's what the UK was doing at the beginning of the conflict.

17:02

It has increased production.

17:04

But

17:05

one of the issues

17:07

is that each European state

17:09

is essentially going to arms companies and saying,

17:12

could you produce a little bit more? And

17:15

those arms companies look at the numbers

17:18

and they say, well, there's no guarantee that there's

17:20

going to be follow-on orders. And it's actually

17:22

quite a small increase. And so

17:24

it's not worth us investing in the infrastructure

17:28

manufacturing capacity to be able to make

17:30

more rounds. So what we're going to do is we're going to add your

17:33

order onto the end of our existing orders and

17:35

we'll fulfill it when we get around to it. But

17:37

if you put the orders together around

17:39

Europe, then it really does start

17:42

to add up to some quite substantial amounts. And most

17:44

companies in order to fulfill that would need to increase

17:46

capacity and the financial

17:48

equation would start

17:50

justifying that. And so either

17:52

individual countries need to order more or make

17:54

the orders over the longer term, or they

17:56

need to make those orders together. Sounds

17:59

like we're still in the thinking. And as you say,

18:01

we're in a crucial year of coming up. And

18:03

I mean, was one sign of Ukraine's

18:06

shortages of munitions that America decides to give

18:08

them cluster munitions, which are quite controversial

18:10

because there wasn't enough in the cupboard? Absolutely.

18:13

I mean, cluster munitions made sense in their own

18:15

right in terms of them being a very useful

18:17

military capability. They were literally designed

18:19

for how they were employed.

18:21

But

18:23

the release of cluster munitions,

18:25

DPI-TM specifically, also alleviated

18:28

the

18:29

strain on stockpile availability

18:32

and so extended the runway or the

18:34

amount of time by which Ukraine could maintain

18:37

fire superiority at the front. Every

18:39

time we've done that, released

18:41

a new capability to bias time, the

18:44

question becomes, well, what are you going to do with

18:46

the timing port? And far

18:48

too often the answer is people use

18:50

that as a justification for delaying decisions

18:53

rather than as an opportunity

18:55

to

18:56

get ahead of the curve. I mean, it's a fairly

18:58

downbeat discussion so far. Some optimists

19:02

say, well, it's not all bleak that Ukraine has done

19:04

well in the Black Sea and that it's forced the

19:06

Russian Navy to take it.

19:10

That would be the appropriate

19:12

way. But on the naval front, they're doing well. Is that

19:14

correct? It is correct. And throughout

19:17

this, Ukraine has had many tactical successes. If

19:19

you look at its long-range strike campaign knocking

19:22

out a Russian submarine in its earth, the

19:24

number of Black Sea fleet assets

19:26

that have been degraded,

19:27

and not just the ships but the physical infrastructure,

19:30

its dry docks, for example, its headquarters,

19:33

and just pushing back the fleet from

19:35

being able to maintain a presence off Ukraine's

19:37

coast is a very substantial achievement.

19:41

The question becomes, and this is the

19:43

issue when people sort of say,

19:45

well, we are making progress. Look at these

19:47

other things. Most of these other

19:50

lines of efforts create opportunity.

19:52

That's

19:52

what they do. So pushing back

19:54

the Black Sea fleet may enable more

19:57

goods to flow in and out of Edessa. thereby

20:00

reopen the Ukrainian economy. What

20:02

did the Russians do? Firstly, they used aircraft

20:04

to trip sea mines to deter commercial

20:06

actors from thinking that it was worthwhile. And

20:08

secondly, they used long range strikes to damage the

20:11

port facilities. And so

20:13

the opportunity is not one that we can capitalize

20:15

on necessarily. The isolation

20:17

of Crimea logistically by denying

20:20

resupply by sea and then potential

20:23

future strikes on the Kerch bridge and

20:25

the threats through the neck of Crimea would

20:28

create a real strategic problem for the Russians.

20:31

But you need to synchronize those things and follow through.

20:33

Just denying resupply in

20:35

the Sevastopol is no good if that can be resupply

20:38

over the Kerch bridge and over the neck. And

20:40

so the real question with these lines

20:42

of efforts is are

20:44

we putting in place

20:47

what we need to enable the

20:49

reclamation of Ukrainian territory?

20:52

Because if we're not doing that, then the window

20:54

of opportunity that we have created through the

20:56

disruption to the Black Sea Fleet and so on will close.

20:59

And that's where we need, as I

21:01

say, longer term planning that

21:04

synchronizes these things rather than just

21:07

the celebration of very impressive

21:09

tactical feats

21:11

but without the necessary exploitation.

21:13

You're a frequent visitor to Ukraine,

21:15

to Kiev and to the front line. What's

21:18

your sense of the Ukrainian mood now?

21:21

I think there was a real turning point this time

21:23

last year

21:24

with the civilian population which

21:27

was

21:28

towards weariness.

21:30

And that didn't necessarily affect the military

21:32

at the time because the offensive was in

21:34

the offing. But I would say that caught

21:36

up with the military in July. And

21:39

that weariness was essentially a realization

21:41

that this is going to be a very long, costly war.

21:43

That there isn't going to be a

21:46

rapid conclusion. Weariness,

21:48

however, is not the same thing

21:51

as despair. And it is not the

21:53

same thing as a lack of will to fight. And

21:55

I think we have to be very clear

21:58

that morale is not the same thing as happiness.

22:00

For Ukrainians, when they

22:02

look at what's happening on the occupied territories, when

22:05

they look at what Russia does when it takes

22:07

over places, defeat is

22:09

not just a change of who's in charge and essentially

22:11

you can carry on with your life. Defeat

22:13

means the evisceration of their culture and identity,

22:16

their freedoms, their ability to

22:19

travel inside their own country, let alone

22:21

abroad, the disappearance of their

22:23

friends and family, the risk that their

22:25

family will be detained and tortured.

22:27

And so

22:29

when you are facing an existential

22:31

threat like that, defeat is unacceptable. And

22:34

so I don't get any sense that Ukrainians

22:37

are any less determined to defend

22:39

their country or indeed liberate their country. But

22:42

their perception of risk, their perception

22:45

of how you achieve that is

22:48

now being shaped by the expectation that they

22:50

need to conserve their resources, conserve

22:52

their force and

22:54

dig in for what might be a protracted

22:56

and difficult fight. And what are relations

22:58

like between Kiev and

23:01

the key Western capitals, particularly Washington?

23:04

I sort of get flatters and you follow it much

23:07

more closely than I do of

23:09

tensions every now and then in straight comments here

23:11

and there.

23:12

There's always tensions because

23:15

firstly, we don't have skin

23:18

in the game. You know, we're not taking casualties,

23:20

but the Ukrainians are critically dependent upon

23:23

their Western partners. And

23:26

so dependency is not a nice position to

23:28

be in, frankly, it's an uncomfortable position

23:30

to be in. And at the

23:32

same time, when Western partners

23:34

are offering advice and so on, they don't necessarily

23:36

have the clearest picture of what's happening forward

23:38

or why things are the way they are, because

23:41

they're not there.

23:42

So there's always tensions.

23:45

Very often those tensions are resolved when people

23:47

are able to meet in person at the border

23:50

or elsewhere. And that's

23:52

why it's really important that those meetings

23:54

take place so that trust

23:56

can be built, personal relationships can be built.

23:59

shared view of

24:01

practical objectives, certainly. And

24:04

I think that the relationship is

24:06

one that we'll endure. Where we

24:09

are right now is in

24:11

a slight chicken and egg position,

24:14

where

24:15

most of Ukraine's partners are wanting the Ukrainians

24:18

to explain what the plan is.

24:20

The Ukrainian

24:21

position is that that's slightly difficult,

24:23

because unless they know what equipment they're going to have

24:26

and what equipment is assured, then

24:28

it's difficult to come up with a plan. And

24:31

then you have another issue, which is a political

24:33

one in Ukraine about who's responsible

24:35

for the failure of the offensive. Now,

24:39

I think that's largely an unhelpful conversation.

24:41

I think that lessons learned are important,

24:44

but

24:45

there is this element where

24:47

success has many, many

24:50

parents, but failure is an orphan. And

24:52

of course, it's usually wrong and unfair. Whoever gets

24:54

singled out and blamed, and it is

24:56

usually singled out. And lots

24:59

of people have varying levels of responsibility

25:01

for how things are unfolded. So

25:04

the important thing is that we get beyond

25:06

this kind of looking for an explanation and

25:09

resolve the problems. The problems are fairly

25:11

evident. But that's a process

25:13

which is generating, I would suggest,

25:16

some conflicting messages from inside Ukraine.

25:18

And we saw that recently with General

25:20

Solusny putting out his thinking, and then a spokesperson

25:23

for the presidential office,

25:24

essentially criticizing General Solusny for what

25:27

he said. What was it that he said that they particularly

25:29

didn't like? That it was a stalemate. But

25:32

if we think about how that's viewed among

25:35

allies, it means that there's questions

25:37

that are raised about,

25:39

well, when a plan is proposed, is this actually the

25:41

plan? Who's responsible for the plan? So

25:43

I think the Ukrainians are very cognizant of that. But

25:46

the conversations that need to happen quite quickly are

25:49

ones in which a plan is formulated

25:51

and the resourcing for it is worked out.

25:54

And that needs to be a plan, which is not just about a

25:56

campaign season, but as I say, reflects the

25:58

fact that the industrial base might be a plan.

25:59

take some time to spin up and so more opportunity

26:02

will become available over the course of 2024

26:05

and you need to plan over the course of that year. You

26:07

said that it's crucial the West maintains its

26:10

focus, maintains the meetings, but obviously

26:12

the international situation has changed dramatically

26:14

with the Israel-Gaza war and

26:17

the continuing tensions in Taiwan. I mean, you're

26:19

just back, I gather from Taiwan. How much

26:21

of those developments, particularly the Israel-Gaza

26:24

stuff, changed what's happening

26:26

in Ukraine or the overall picture

26:29

for Ukraine?

26:30

In some ways, I think I

26:32

hate to use these words because it suggests

26:35

that I'm implying that what's happening

26:37

is a good thing, which is not. It's a catastrophe,

26:39

what's happening in the Middle East. But I think

26:41

it does actually benefit Ukraine in some ways if

26:44

it's exploited properly.

26:45

The primary benefit is that there

26:47

has been a dynamic in Ukraine where the

26:50

media has been laser focused.

26:52

And when you're conducting offensive operations, you really

26:55

can't tell the media very much. There's

26:57

stuff that's being planned and prepared and you can't

26:59

brief the media on it. And because

27:02

you need to misdirect and because you can't

27:04

explain what's being prepared without risking

27:06

its viability, you end

27:08

up with people who are either not involved

27:11

in the planning, speculating

27:13

and that being taken up as the truth because you're not prepared

27:15

to contradict it. Or you have to come up

27:17

with something that's not really accurate. And

27:20

so you get trapped in this dynamic where there

27:22

is an insociable demand by

27:24

the international press for an explanation

27:27

of what is going to happen. But because

27:29

the answer is by definition arbitrary,

27:32

you then get trapped with

27:34

false expectations. And I can

27:36

think of a number of instances during the war

27:38

where Ukraine has been pushed into some fairly

27:40

bad decision making by essentially the expectation

27:43

of the international community because it's needed

27:45

to play to the gallery in order

27:47

to get the resources that it needs. It needs

27:49

to be perceived to be succeeding

27:52

in order to win the resources to be

27:54

able to succeed, which is not a comfortable position

27:56

to be in. And so the diminished

27:59

focus and attention

27:59

might actually create the space

28:02

where they can thrash out some of the

28:04

more difficult questions with their partners without

28:07

that sort of laser eye of Sauron's

28:09

scrutiny

28:10

that has been slightly unhelpful,

28:12

I think, in the past. Are they going

28:15

to be put in the position where they're competing for the same munitions? I

28:17

mean, somebody said to me that some of these shells

28:20

that they need were pre-positioned in Israel, might

28:22

have been moved out to Ukraine and now won't be. There

28:24

has been some munitions that have been pushed into

28:26

Israel, but fundamentally,

28:29

unless Israel ends up in a war in Lebanon,

28:32

155mm ammunition is not going to be the main thing that they're consuming,

28:36

because the Israelis have complete control

28:38

of the air, and

28:40

they have a significant air force, and they're delivering

28:43

most of their effects with air-delivered bombs, which

28:46

is something that Ukraine doesn't require. There

28:49

is a question about air defense and receptors, but

28:52

the interesting thing there is that air defense and receptors

28:54

are critical for a Taiwan contingency, they're

28:56

critical for Ukraine, and

28:59

they may become critical for Israel.

29:02

We're not making enough of them. We need

29:04

to make more of them for our own defense and for our

29:06

deterrence posture. And so there

29:08

is absolutely no reason not to invest in that as a

29:10

capability, and then where they go

29:13

is dependent upon where they're needed. So

29:16

at the moment, I don't think there is an issue

29:18

where resources are being diverted. If

29:20

we start seeing a wider escalation in the Middle

29:22

East, and US logistical capacity,

29:25

for example, airlift and other things starts being

29:27

pulled away, that's where European

29:29

partners may well need to step up on Ukraine.

29:32

Last question. I mean, talking to some

29:34

of the

29:35

political people in the West,

29:38

and even a few of the very senior

29:40

military figures, I've sort of sensed the shift

29:42

that they're now partly in response

29:44

to the perceived failure of the counter-offensive, saying,

29:47

well, we need to reframe this

29:49

whole thing and say, if you look

29:51

at the big picture, Ukraine has done incredibly well, and

29:54

maybe it's time to call a halt, and

29:56

we'll have a political negotiation, and yeah, they'll

29:58

have to give up a little bit of terror. factory,

30:01

but overall it'll be good and

30:04

this will happen sometime in the middle of next year.

30:07

Is that a fantasy or is that possible? Have

30:09

you heard similar?

30:11

Oh, I mean, throughout the entire conflict, people

30:13

have thrown out these sorts of ideas at various

30:15

times and it very much reeks

30:18

of retreating into the world that you wished

30:20

existed rather than the one that's actually in front

30:22

of you. Because the Russians,

30:25

yeah, they'll take a ceasefire. They'll

30:27

take a ceasefire and they'll prepare and they'll

30:30

go again. And if we get

30:32

into a position where Ukraine is forced

30:34

to make some sort of concession, Russia

30:36

will ban kids and then exploit,

30:39

they will capitalize on weakness. If

30:42

we're in a position where our view is, well, look, actually

30:44

we need this to go away because we're not

30:47

able to keep it up, then Russia has

30:49

no incentive not to push further. And

30:52

the other thing is, is that we've been pushing

30:54

around this sort of information narrative for

30:56

a long time that, oh, the Russians aren't that scary.

30:58

They have an economy the size of Italy, and you

31:00

say, right. And yet they're what? Outproducing

31:03

the entire of NATO. What deterrence

31:05

message does that send to the Iranians or the

31:07

Chinese or the Russians? If

31:09

your response to this is, oh dear, it's all a bit

31:12

difficult, can we make this problem go away? So

31:15

I don't think that the negotiated

31:17

position that is being proposed is a realistic

31:19

one. It's signaling weakness and you'll get the opposite

31:22

of what you want.

31:23

It's always interesting that people who raised

31:25

this

31:26

start from the position of asking, well, what concessions

31:29

should Ukraine make? Rather than

31:31

asking, well, if we want a lasting peace,

31:33

what is required?

31:35

And Ukraine, I think would be very

31:37

comfortable actually making concessions.

31:40

They would be very pragmatic in making concessions

31:43

if they thought that those concessions

31:45

bought them a lasting peace and a future

31:47

as an independent country with a democracy

31:50

and their rights. But if

31:52

they have to make concessions and it doesn't

31:54

buy them anything, then there is absolutely no reason

31:56

to the Ukrainian government to negotiate or to stop

31:58

fighting.

31:59

So I find the way that this desire

32:02

for the whole problem to go away is sort of

32:04

framed as deeply unrealistic

32:07

and it portrays a shallowness in

32:09

political strategy. Because ultimately

32:12

you need to convince the Russians that a lasting

32:14

peace is better than the alternative for

32:16

them.

32:17

Otherwise, they're not going to come to the negotiating table in

32:19

good faith.

32:26

That was Jack Watling of the Royal United Services

32:28

Institute here in London, ending this edition

32:31

of the Rachman Review. Please

32:33

join me again next week.

32:46

Thanks for watching.