2:00

President ever. So

2:02

before turning to the future of the EU, I

2:05

began my conversation with Charles Grant by looking back

2:07

at the past. What did

2:09

De Laue represent and achieve? I

2:11

think De Laue made a real difference to the

2:13

way the EU functioned and to perceptions of the

2:16

EU all around the world. I mean the two

2:18

things stand out when you look back at De

2:20

Laue's career as Commission President. The

2:22

single market program was really his ideas.

2:24

He persuaded the heads of government

2:26

at the time he took over the Commission

2:28

in 1985 to relaunch Europe around

2:30

a single market program and then make the

2:33

constitutional changes required to implement the

2:35

program which was basically abolishing the

2:37

national veto over single market rules.

2:40

That was a success and that gave the ease

2:42

momentum and he moved on to his second great

2:45

thing which was economic and monetary union emu in

2:47

the jargon. And although the single

2:49

currency now called the euro has had its trials

2:51

and tribulations over the years. It has survived and

2:53

that was basically not entirely

2:55

De Laue's idea but the plan for emu was

2:57

really his idea and it wouldn't have happened when

2:59

it happened in the way it happened without

3:02

De Laue pushing it. So I think the single

3:04

market and the single currency are two quite big

3:06

achievements for Jacques De Laue. Yeah I mean the

3:08

book you wrote about him was if I remember

3:10

correctly called the house that Jacques built. Do you

3:12

think that the EU today is still basically the

3:15

house that Jacques built? I think a lot of

3:17

the way the EU works today

3:19

is very similar to how it worked when Jacques De

3:21

Laue was president for 10 years in the 80s and

3:23

90s. The basic institutional structure

3:25

commission cancelled parliament the balance of forces

3:27

between the federalist trying to integrate and

3:30

the intergovernmentalist trying to slow the integration.

3:32

That basically isn't going

3:34

to change. What has changed perhaps a little

3:36

bit is that the EU is gradually integrated

3:38

in recent years and some new areas like

3:40

health borrowing in its own name for the

3:43

rapid recovery and resilience facility against the damage

3:45

caused by COVID and doing more in defense.

3:47

I think the integration is chipping away a

3:49

little bit on the margins but the fundamental

3:51

balance is quite similar to how it was

3:53

in De Laue's day I think. Yeah

3:56

and De Laue of course was you know somebody who

3:58

believed very firmly in the EU. in integration

4:00

in ever closer union. But

4:03

something that happened after he left

4:05

office was the massive enlargement of

4:07

the EU. Has that basically changed

4:10

the EU so fundamentally that

4:13

the DeLorean vision no longer truly

4:15

applies or not? Well, there's

4:17

always been ambivalent over enlargement. He wasn't a massive enthusiast

4:19

for it, but in a way he paved the way

4:21

for it. The reason why the EU enlarged was because

4:24

lots of countries in Central and Eastern Europe wanted to

4:26

join the European Union. They wanted to join because it

4:28

was a success. And it was really his stewardship

4:31

at the top during his time as president

4:33

that made the EU a successful and effective

4:35

organization that made others want to join it.

4:37

So enlargement has really to some degree followed

4:40

on from what he did as commission president.

4:43

It has also brought in lots of countries that have different

4:45

visions of Europe. And we now see a kind

4:47

of balance between the more integrationist countries

4:49

and those with a somewhat

4:52

more skeptical disposition towards further European

4:54

unity. So I think my own

4:56

view is that we're not going to see

4:58

a fundamental change to the DeLorean system of

5:00

balance between federalism and intergovernmentalism because the

5:03

chances of another treaty change that

5:05

would lead to much more integration are basically close

5:07

to zero because treaty change requires unanimity. And there's

5:09

always going to be several countries that don't want

5:12

to do that. So when DeLorean

5:14

was around pushing forward integration, there were

5:16

four treaty changes set up by what

5:18

he did starting in 1985. But

5:21

that period of greater treaty change really came to an

5:23

end with the Lisbon Treaty, which was adopted

5:26

in 2009. And I don't think it's

5:28

going to happen again. So there'll be a little bit

5:30

more integration here and there in minor areas, I think.

5:32

But I don't foresee a fundamental shift in

5:34

the balance of power in Europe towards more

5:36

integration anymore. And DeLore,

5:38

of course, had a very

5:41

difficult relationship with Margaret

5:43

Thatcher, initially quite a successful relationship because

5:45

they were both very committed to the

5:47

single market. But she

5:49

parted company with him very, very

5:51

clearly over the single currency. And

5:53

I think her famous statement, No,

5:55

no, no, was about that

5:58

single currency project. Do

6:00

you think in a sense inadvertently, De

6:02

Law really triggered

6:04

the process that eventually led to Brexit? Well,

6:07

he certainly became an important player in British politics. As

6:09

you rightly say, he got on very well with Margaret

6:11

Thatcher for his first three years as Commission President. They

6:13

agreed on the single market and quite a few other

6:15

things too. They found out not

6:18

only over the single currency, but also over social

6:20

policy, because De Law said, let's make the EU

6:22

a social Europe and let's have a social charter

6:24

and workers rights. And he came to the trades

6:27

union Congress as his annual conference and talked about

6:29

those issues, which really upset her a lot. And

6:32

because he was indirectly linked to the fall of

6:34

Mrs Thatcher, because as you rightly say, she said,

6:36

no, no, no in response to his own ideas.

6:39

And that provoked Jeffrey Hyde to resign and bring down

6:41

Thatcher. He's always been a bépoirre

6:43

for British Euro skeptics, and

6:45

he became a symbol for them. But he not

6:47

only became a symbol for British Euro skeptics and

6:50

gave them a target dilemma. He also played quite

6:52

a role in converting the British Labour Party to

6:54

be Premier. People forget that in the mid 1980s,

6:57

the Labour Party was the anti-European party in Britain

6:59

and the Conservative Party was the pro-European party in

7:01

Britain, nobody remembers that these days. But

7:03

he's giving Europe a social dimension help to

7:06

convert the Labour Party to the more pro

7:08

EU, which it remains to this day. I

7:11

don't think I've really blamed De Law for Brexit.

7:13

I mean, Europe was integrating and doing more things,

7:15

which annoyed British Euro skeptics. He caused a bit

7:17

more integration than would have been otherwise. So he

7:20

had something to do with it. I think there are many reasons for

7:22

Brexit, which nothing to do with Jack De Law. And

7:25

looking forward now, Ursula von der Leyen,

7:27

the current Commission President, issued

7:29

a statement shortly after De Law died, obviously

7:32

praising him as a great European, but

7:34

also saying that she was very much

7:37

his heir. Do you think

7:39

in any kind of meaningful sense, other than that

7:41

she has the same job, she is an heir

7:43

to De Law? Well, she's the most

7:45

effective and successful Commission President since De Law,

7:47

by quite a long way. They have some

7:49

things in common. They're both

7:51

great opportunists, seizing the

7:53

opportunity to push forward European integration when it appears

7:55

to them. In her case, she exploited

7:58

the COVID crisis and the war on Ukraine. to

8:00

get the EU to do more and more

8:03

integrated defence policy, for example, doing more on

8:05

health and it used to do joint procurement

8:07

of weapons and of medicines. So she's a

8:09

great exploiter of opportunities in the way that

8:11

Delors was. Delors expounded his opportunities for the

8:14

favorable conjuncture for integration in the 1980s. They

8:17

don't quite a lot in common in that respect. Also,

8:19

they're both upsetting the member states by pushing Europe

8:21

too much too fast for some of the member

8:24

states' taste. She in particular is so

8:26

Atlanticist and quite often China and things like that,

8:28

which really upsets quite a lot of the members.

8:30

He upsets the member states who are left keen

8:32

on European integration. One difference is

8:34

that, although Delors was quite a

8:37

centralizer within the European Commission, who did

8:39

try and run things along fairly smooth centralizing

8:41

lines, she's a much more of a centralizer.

8:43

She really takes all the decisions with her

8:45

chief of staff and a couple of other

8:47

close advisors, much more than Delors did, and

8:49

she excludes other commissioners and member state

8:52

governments from some of the decisions she takes, which does

8:54

upset some of the member state governments. So there is

8:56

a bit of a pushback against her. But of course,

8:58

Delors had a similar pushback as he did more than

9:00

they wanted him to do as well. So there's a

9:03

clue between von der Leyen and chapter more, I believe.

9:05

Yeah. And just as a footnote, I guess you mentioned

9:07

a powerful chief of staff. I mean, Delors had

9:09

one of those in Paschal Lamey, who later

9:11

became a commissioner himself and von

9:13

der Leyen very much so in the case

9:15

of her chief of staff, Bjorn Sieber. Yeah,

9:17

well, both those figures are very important for

9:19

the way the commission operates. I think, as

9:21

I said, the Delors Lamey regime is a

9:23

bit less centralizing than that of von

9:26

der Leyen and Sieber. Other commissioners were consulted,

9:28

like Leon Britton in Delors' day was a

9:31

very important commissioner, and Peter Sutherland

9:33

in the earlier phase of Delors' term at the top.

9:36

I think those, if you talk to commissioners in

9:38

von der Leyen's commission, some of the

9:40

most senior figures in it really say they're not consulted on

9:42

some decisions at all. But to be fair to her, she

9:44

deals with a much more difficult environment. There are now 27

9:46

member states. The

9:49

challenges she faces are different from those faced by

9:51

Delors. Delors didn't have to worry about the growth

9:53

of the far right across Europe, near as much

9:55

as she does. Didn't have to worry about migration.

9:57

It's a crisis that's impossible to solve really. like

12:00

France and Germany, for instance, if we enlarge the

12:02

European Union to take in more countries, we have

12:05

to reform the institutions and have more majority voting,

12:07

but that requires more integration and treaty change. And

12:09

I don't think many member-state governments will be prepared

12:11

to do that. So I think there is a

12:13

bit of a question mark as to how much

12:15

the EU can really enlarge, given the strength of

12:17

the Eurosceptic forces across the European Union. So

12:20

does that mean that, for example, what was

12:22

hailed as a big breakthrough, the formal opening

12:24

of negotiations with Ukraine, a kind of a

12:26

sign of hope for the Ukrainians in a

12:28

very tough period? That actually

12:30

that may not be worth as much as

12:32

people think? Well, I personally hope

12:34

very much that the EU does enlarge to Ukraine and

12:37

indeed to the Balkans in the long run, because I

12:39

think for strategic reasons we have to take

12:41

in these countries and give them a hug

12:43

and keep them out of the cold, especially with

12:45

threats like Vladimir Putin on the edge of Europe.

12:47

But I'm rather worried about it because some countries,

12:49

as I said, don't really want to enlarge unless

12:51

they can get institutional reform through in terms of

12:53

more majority votes. I think that's highly

12:56

unlikely to happen. Then there are budgetary

12:58

issues as well. If Ukraine joins the

13:00

EU today, there will be much less

13:02

money available for farm funds and regional policy

13:05

funds for the existing member states. And when

13:07

public opinion of these existing member states sees

13:09

that enlargement is going to mean they lose

13:11

out the benefits of EU membership to quite

13:13

a large degree, they may turn

13:16

against enlargement. There has to be

13:18

a referendum in France for a two thirds majority

13:20

vote in both houses of the French parliament to

13:22

get enlargement through. That's highly doubtful whether that can

13:24

really happen. A lot of countries

13:26

have rule of law problems, and I think some

13:29

member states will block the accession of

13:31

countries which don't respect the rule of law. You

13:33

just need one country to create

13:35

problems for the enlargement process. And every

13:37

step of the enlargement process, 27 countries

13:40

have to vote in favour of opening a

13:42

chapter with North Macedonia on judicial reform, for

13:44

example. If Viktor Orban or anybody else wants

13:46

to be difficult, he can be difficult and he can stop

13:48

everything happening in its tracks. So I am

13:50

rather worried about enlargement happening. I hope it happens, but

13:52

I think the geostrategic imperative will have

13:55

to be very strong and it probably will

13:57

require Putin to behave even

13:59

worse. is

16:00

unlikely to be repeated anytime soon because Germany

16:02

now is the paymaster of Europe who contributes

16:04

a huge amount to the funds of the

16:06

European Union. It's very reluctant to see further

16:08

European level borrowing. It wants people to tighten

16:10

their belts and much rather have a bit

16:12

of austerity. This argument is as old as

16:15

the European Union itself between those who want to spend more money

16:17

in the south of Europe and the east of Europe and those

16:19

who want to spend less in the north of Europe like Germany

16:21

and its frugal allies. I

16:24

don't think that's going to change anytime soon because the

16:26

Germans are not in any mood to suddenly increase

16:28

the budget. That's one reason why I think Delors

16:30

European Union will remain roughly the

16:32

same as the future European Union, von der

16:34

Leyen, whoever else is leading it in the

16:36

future because integration isn't just about treaty changes.

16:38

It's also about spending more at the central level.

16:41

I think the appetite of the net contributors to

16:43

the EU like Germany and the Netherlands for spending

16:45

more money at EU level is very limited. However

16:48

enlargement is funded, if enlargement happens, it'll have

16:51

to be done within existing budgets to a

16:53

large degree. That means not bigger budgets for

16:55

now, not unless there's another crisis, not more

16:57

borrowing at EU level. I think the Germans

16:59

will win that argument in the foreseeable future.

17:02

We mentioned Trump a bit earlier. How

17:04

much of a difference would it make for the

17:06

EU who occupies the White House? Because I guess

17:08

looking back at the history of the European Union,

17:11

broadly speaking, almost every American administration

17:13

has, if occasionally exasperated

17:15

by the EU, regarded

17:17

European integration as a positive thing. Now

17:20

you might have a US president who's actively hostile to

17:22

the EU. Is that a big problem? I

17:25

think it is a big problem because at

17:27

the time I've been following the EU, all

17:29

the US presidents have been favorable to integration

17:31

except perhaps George Bush Jr., who was rather

17:33

ambivalent about it. Donald Trump

17:35

is much less sympathetic to the EU than

17:37

George Bush Jr., certainly. I think the biggest

17:40

short-term or immediate problem created by a Trump

17:42

presidency would be for the European unity over

17:44

Ukraine. So far, the EU has been very

17:46

united on the Ukraine war, despite Viktor Orban

17:49

cabbling and holding up a few things. Essentially,

17:51

the EU has agreed to a

17:53

dozen rounds of sanctions against Russia and has

17:56

kept politically to a strong line of support

17:58

for Ukraine. But if Trump... gets back

18:00

to the White House, then some

18:02

countries, all Bannon, maybe some others

18:04

will try and work

18:07

with Trump, try and please Trump, carry

18:09

favor with Trump by taking a rather

18:11

different line towards Ukraine and Russia. Other

18:13

countries may worry that the Article Five

18:15

security guarantee of the NATO treaty

18:17

would be devalued by Trump. Let's remember the

18:19

last time he was President Trump, he questioned

18:21

the Article Five guarantee that NATO gives to

18:23

its members and was even threatened

18:25

at one point to pull out of NATO.

18:27

So if Trump messes around with NATO or

18:29

devalues that security guarantee, some countries in Europe

18:31

may think Russia is

18:34

a real threat, America may not protect us, we

18:36

better reach an accommodation with Russia so that European

18:39

unity over Ukraine could be diminished by a

18:41

Trump presidency. Having said that, if the countries

18:43

that matter most, Britain, France, Germany, hopefully Italy,

18:45

are pretty strongly pro Ukraine at the moment,

18:48

I don't think that'll change if Trump

18:50

gets back, but nevertheless, I do worry about

18:52

European unity being maintained under a Trump presidency.

18:55

You mentioned Britain. So let's end on that

18:57

point, since we're sitting in the UK, Britain

19:00

is out of the

19:02

EU. And Kia Starma, who's likely to be

19:04

the next Prime Minister, has said that even

19:07

if Labour wins the election, he will not

19:09

bring the UK back into the single-market or

19:11

the customs union. But do

19:13

you think if Trump were to win,

19:15

that might set the stage actually for

19:18

a slightly more

19:20

ambitious British and European

19:22

union approach to the

19:25

EU-UK relationship? I think

19:27

what the Labour Party, the Labour government

19:29

will hope for, if it gets into office in the

19:31

years time, will be a much

19:34

closer relationship to the EU, is to

19:36

want a unique bespoke relationship, which

19:38

would make the EU compromised on some of its

19:40

principles, such as the integrity of the single market

19:42

and no cherry picking and not being a bit of

19:44

a single market without being in all of it. The

19:47

EU at the moment says no to that, the EU

19:49

says we're not going to compromise on those principles, the

19:51

EU says we like the current deal, the trade and

19:53

cooperation agreement, there's no reason to give special favours to

19:55

the British, even if we might find T.S. Darwin a

19:57

more agreeable chap to deal with than Rishi Sunak or...