0:01

As a long time Foreign correspondent,

0:04

I've worked in lots of places,

0:06

but nowhere is important to the

0:08

world as China. I'm Jane Perlez

0:10

former Beijing Bureau Chief for the

0:13

New York Times. Join me on

0:15

my new podcast, Face Off Us

0:17

Versus China where I'll take you

0:20

behind the scenes in the tumultuous

0:22

Us China relationship find Face Off

0:24

wherever you get your podcasts. This.

0:30

Is the red line. We'd. Be

0:32

three geopolitical expos on one big

0:34

issue: shipping news both here and

0:36

overseas. And I'm your host, Michael

0:39

Helium. It's.

0:43

Now been two months and prabowo

0:45

subianto. The. Man has been

0:47

Indonesia's defense ministers and twenty nineteen. Won.

0:50

The election in Indonesia taking

0:52

over ninety six million votes.

0:55

Know. As defense minister, the boy had

0:57

been a loud advocate for the military,

0:59

actively pushing for increases the defense spending.

1:02

The. Modernization of the Indonesian Armed Forces

1:04

as well as the overhaul of concepts

1:06

and ideas that have been fundamental to

1:08

the Indonesian military for long time. I've.

1:11

Been to move the Indonesian military beyond

1:13

his decades is mostly an internal police

1:15

force. To. Become a force. the could

1:17

one day project power ride into the South

1:20

China Sea. All. Which lay right

1:22

them on Indonesia doorstep. It's.

1:24

During this next term. But. Indonesia

1:27

will find it. So standing at a

1:29

whole series of crossroads. Deciding.

1:31

With to remain neutral. Or. Lean

1:33

toward the U S. Organ Lean toward China. To.

1:36

Decide whether to continue to adopt a

1:38

policy of diversify. Procurements ought to begin

1:41

to start to streamline the military and

1:43

actually build something that functions to purpose.

1:46

As. Well as probably the most crucial

1:48

cross road. answering the question: What is

1:51

the main purpose of the Indonesian military

1:53

going forward? As. prabowo have

1:55

to decide very quickly whether the indonesian

1:57

military will continue to operate as a

2:00

mostly the inwardly focused force, or whether

2:02

Indonesia can carry out that change, and

2:04

boost Indonesia into taking up its

2:07

role as a serious military power within

2:09

Southeast Asia. But will Prabhoi

2:11

do it? Will the rest of

2:13

the Indonesian economy actually allow it? And

2:15

are outside powers likely to get involved to

2:18

stop it? Well those are

2:20

just some of the questions we're going to be answering here today.

2:23

And to help us figure out how the

2:25

Indonesian military functions, and why these decisions going

2:27

forward are so important, we turn

2:29

to our first guest. Part

2:34

1 – Javelins

2:37

for Java You

2:43

have to go back into

2:45

history to understand their sense

2:48

of vulnerability as a acabulating

2:50

nation that sought to avoid

2:52

being too closely identified with

2:54

one or other camp in

2:57

the Cold War. And

2:59

the Bundung Declaration of the mid-1950s

3:01

speaks to that sense of Indonesian

3:04

desire for what they call free

3:06

and active foreign policy, which is

3:08

not tied down to one camp,

3:11

be it the first world or the second world, but

3:13

the non-aligned world. John

3:15

Blackslan is the Director of the

3:17

ANU North America Liaison Office and

3:19

a Professor of International Security and

3:21

Intelligence Studies in the Strategic and

3:23

Defence Studies Centre. Prior to

3:26

that, John was also the former Chief

3:28

Intelligence Staff Officer at the Australian HQ

3:30

Joint Operations Command, as well as the

3:32

nation's Defence Attache to Thailand and Myanmar,

3:34

with his expertise being the Indonesian military.

3:36

So we're thrilled to have him on

3:38

the program today. Throughout

3:40

history, they have led one

3:42

way or the other under Sukarnal,

3:44

President of the First President. They

3:46

led more towards the

3:48

Communist camp, being aligned to a certain

3:50

extent with China and with the Soviet

3:53

Union, and then up to the 65

3:55

coup, more aligned with the United

3:57

States, but never formally aligned with the United

3:59

States. None. Of those of you

4:01

know absolutely nothing of in Indonesia we actually

4:03

have an entire episode and short animated video.

4:06

It's going through the history of the country

4:08

available and on channel elsewhere so do wanna

4:10

get further down the weeds into that. You

4:12

can always pauses video and go check that

4:14

one out but for those vt already lit

4:16

as quickly go through some of the.point of

4:18

the country's history. In short, Indonesia is an

4:20

incredibly unique nation full of different religions, groups

4:23

and languages and in addition to sitting in

4:25

one of the most t geographic spots aim

4:27

on the planet. It's also a

4:29

massively huge nation, not only and people

4:31

and the a population nearly two hundred

4:34

and twenty million, but also in size.

4:36

As. It's an archipelago with have a seventeen

4:38

thousand islands that area wise you to

4:40

place the northwest corner of the country

4:42

in London. Be. South east corner

4:45

would reach for the way to

4:47

Kabul, Afghanistan. Just. Give you an

4:49

idea past huge this nation is that a single

4:51

government has to rule over. Now. To

4:53

descend of the history with the quickly

4:55

when the nice mister go by the.the

4:57

sixteen hundreds. They managed to rule over

5:00

the borders mostly by brute force, largely

5:02

centralizing the a role for Batavia Must

5:04

now called you Cada the current capital.

5:06

With. Batavia being based on the northwest

5:08

edges of Java ee main island

5:10

of Indonesia. With. Java, home to

5:12

around one hundred and forty million, only two

5:15

hundred and ninety million inhabitants of the country.

5:17

So. We can already see one of the problems here. The.

5:20

Wasp Indonesia is absolutely massive and was half

5:22

the population lives on the Island of Java,

5:24

but the Dutch East Indies would be mostly

5:26

conquer by the Japanese during World War Two.

5:29

So when Japan would lose, a lot of

5:31

the Indonesians took it upon themselves, declare independence.

5:34

And. By doing so, the invasion forces would end up

5:36

in a short war with the dots in the Uk

5:38

before affects all of us told them to back off

5:40

and the country would truly move into ruling himself. Be

5:43

later that country and the man who

5:46

ruled the newly created Indonesia from Nineteen

5:48

Forty Five to Ninety Sixty Seven. Was.

5:50

the man named sukarno now sir connor

5:52

was given the unenviable task of trying

5:54

to bring together all of these islands

5:57

and interests create a new national i

5:59

didn't making some very tough decisions

6:01

in those early days of the Indonesian Republic.

6:04

Ghana would end up making a whole series

6:06

of very difficult choices such as

6:08

instead of adopting the Javanese language for the

6:10

country he would instead implement Bahasa Indonesia as

6:12

the language of the country, a language

6:15

far closer to Malaysian than it was to

6:17

Javanese. With all of this being done as

6:19

a way to try and make sure the

6:21

outer islands were still included in the national

6:23

identity. He also went about trying to govern

6:26

the country balancing power between the Muslim factions,

6:28

the military forces who'd gained their prominence fighting

6:30

the Dutch and the communist factions which became

6:32

increasingly powerful. Then we got to

6:35

1965 and there was an

6:37

incredibly poorly organized coup against Sakano with

6:39

the coup either being organized by the communists or

6:41

the CIA depending on who you want to ask.

6:44

To which the Indonesian military seeing an opportunity

6:46

and being taken over by a man

6:48

named Suharto would then declare their allegiance

6:50

to Sakano, swear to protect him and

6:53

eliminate the communist forces that had helped to

6:55

carry out the coup. With

6:57

all this eventuating in somewhere between 500,000 and

6:59

a million communists being killed in the country,

7:01

quite a lot of which were killed merely

7:04

on the suspicion of the fact that they

7:06

were Chinese. Now once the communist bloc

7:08

could be mostly weakened, Suharto would then turn

7:10

on the man he swore to protect and

7:12

place Sakano under house arrest where he

7:14

would stay until his death. With Suharto

7:17

then placing himself as the president of the country

7:19

ruling from 1968 all the way up to 1998,

7:21

during which time the military became increasingly powerful

7:27

and embedded within a lot of

7:29

Indonesian institutions. And again we

7:31

cover this in far more detail in our previous

7:33

Indonesia episode but Sakano's policy

7:35

is somewhat difficult to pin down as

7:37

whilst he would rule Indonesia for 30

7:40

years he would simultaneously be a major

7:42

member of the Non-Aligned Movement whilst

7:45

also being a staunch anti-communist working

7:47

very closely with the US, UK

7:49

and Australian militaries. And why

7:51

we bring this off is that during that

7:53

30 years Sakano would build the majority of

7:55

the military structures and doctrines that

7:58

we see within the Indonesian military today. with

8:00

Sukarno claiming at all times that the

8:02

military's first and most important role was

8:05

to keep the Indonesian state together, even

8:08

by force if necessary. However,

8:10

Sukarno was forced out in 1998, so

8:12

the question I'll pose to you here

8:14

is how much is that central principle

8:16

of trying to keep the nation together

8:18

at all costs still the guiding factor

8:21

within Indonesia's politics? So

8:24

it's interesting, Indonesia is

8:26

held together politically and

8:28

economically by capitalizing

8:31

on, ironically enough, on the

8:33

Dutch legacy because it's the

8:35

Dutch that actually pulled

8:38

together the various people groups,

8:40

many different religions, languages, ethnicities,

8:43

demographics and economic circumstances

8:46

that after independence were

8:49

bound together politically through the use

8:51

of the Banchasila, the five principles

8:54

and of course the use of Bahasa

8:57

Indonesia. Rather than Javanese language,

8:59

they used Malay language as

9:02

the basis for common

9:04

parlance, common Nalingua

9:07

Franca if you like.

9:09

It would de-emphasize the

9:11

centrality of political control

9:13

of the Javanese from

9:15

Java and provide a

9:17

top level commonality that

9:19

was not exclusive

9:21

to the main most

9:23

populated island, the dominant political and

9:25

economic island of Java and it's

9:28

that context that provided the ability

9:30

for Jakarta which is in Java

9:32

to govern the disparate

9:35

parts of the archipelago. It's

9:37

interesting of course that Jokowi sought

9:41

to build a new capital in

9:43

Kalimantan. There's

9:45

a sense in which that is partly

9:47

a reflection of the desire to get

9:49

away from Java being

9:52

seen as not only economically

9:54

the core but also politically the

9:56

core and therefore making the other

9:58

parts of India. Indonesia, I feel

10:00

more a part of a state

10:02

that is more reflective of them.

10:06

So, we'll unpack the relationship between the US and

10:08

Indonesia a bit more later. But for now, can

10:10

you give us a bit more of an understanding

10:12

on the other big player in this story? How

10:14

would you sum up the historical relationship between China

10:16

and Indonesia? So it's

10:18

interesting to reflect on the

10:20

economic and the security dynamics

10:22

at work. The economic dynamics

10:24

are most patently manifest in

10:26

the WUSH train, the Jakarta

10:29

to Bandung High Speed Rail,

10:31

which is touted as the

10:33

first stage of the significant

10:35

additional investment from China into

10:37

Indonesian infrastructure. And that is

10:40

shaping Indonesia's approach to international

10:42

affairs. And then

10:44

on the security front, there's

10:46

considerable disgrumpled about the Chinese

10:48

assertiveness over its claims in

10:50

the South China Sea, which

10:53

impinge on Indonesia's exclusive economic

10:55

zone that springs from its

10:57

territories around the Natuna Islands.

11:00

So I know this is a dynamic that we

11:02

see in other parts of the continent as well,

11:04

that whilst China is by far the largest trading

11:06

partner of Indonesia, when you actually

11:08

do polling of the average Indonesian about their

11:11

opinion on China, you do get a

11:13

somewhat mixed opinion with around 36% holding

11:15

positive views and around 37% holding negative views. But

11:20

how accurate do you think that assessment

11:22

is of the Indonesian population's feelings towards

11:24

China? So

11:27

I think like in any society, there's a

11:29

wide variety of views. And

11:31

of course, the Chinese diaspora

11:34

in Indonesia has had some

11:36

moments of considerable heartburn, if

11:39

not literal burn going back to

11:41

the right for May 1998, when

11:44

much of Chinatown in Jakarta was

11:46

burnt down. But also, if

11:48

they came back to The 65

11:50

Coup, where many of those seen

11:53

as aligned with the PKI, the

11:55

Communist Party of Indonesia, were ethnically

11:57

China and purged and removed. Many

12:03

other places across Southeast Asia and

12:05

beyond. Local Chinese entrepreneurs

12:07

are actually remain foundational to

12:09

the economic vibrancy of mean

12:11

he had sought economy so

12:13

the little can be been

12:15

a decent right parts of

12:17

the archipelago, the outlying islands

12:19

and as well as into

12:21

cool So this makes feeling

12:23

safe and is manifested in

12:25

the way Indonesia struggles to

12:27

reconcile it's approach to China

12:29

over security. Here in Oregon

12:31

we can. Turn

12:35

all and to speed and the check

12:37

out a bundle was. So.

12:39

Let's unpack Somebody security fan of the country for

12:41

minute. Now. With into these are

12:44

having such a large population is not

12:46

complete be surprising and it also has

12:48

a very large conventional military. And

12:50

around four hundred thousand personnel with in

12:52

the armed forces and ran over three

12:54

hundred thousand personnel with the paramilitary forces.

12:57

All. Of which won packing to be more detail that Iran.

12:59

But. Those numbers replace Indonesia by just

13:02

pure numbers wise. in the fourteenth

13:04

largest military anywhere in the world.

13:07

Above France, buff, Turkey, about Iran and even

13:09

above is around. But. When we

13:11

moved to military budgets to this a completely

13:13

different story that we see. With. Indonesia

13:15

actually down around the twenty seventh, a

13:17

military spending. Putting. It below

13:20

Algeria, Columbia, and even Singapore.

13:22

In fact, if we then look at percentage

13:24

of Gdp spent on defense, Indonesia spends just

13:26

less or just more and about one percent

13:28

of it's gdp on defense spending and year.

13:31

Bring. It again right toward the back of the

13:34

pack. Compatibility these other guys. But.

13:36

Now with incoming President Prabowo Subianto

13:38

who was the defense minister of

13:40

the outgoing President Joko we don't

13:42

have. He took that raising the

13:44

Indonesian military budget. And. undergoing some

13:46

pretty wide reaching monetization programs so coming into

13:48

role as president but also having a background

13:51

of the defense minister the country in his

13:53

upcoming time he has how much emphasis you

13:55

think you'll end up placing on the military

13:57

when he takes of control in october I

14:01

suspect Proboo will be more

14:03

hands-on and more actively involved

14:05

in understanding and being across

14:07

and perhaps being involved in

14:09

decisions affecting TNI, the Dara

14:12

Nacional in Indonesia, the Indonesian National Military,

14:14

because that's his comfort zone, that's his

14:16

home base if you like. And

14:19

last time around, defence expenditure in

14:21

Indonesia never went much

14:24

above 1% of GDP, which

14:26

in the grand scheme of things is pretty small. And

14:29

of course, this is really worthwhile bearing in

14:31

mind when you think about what you can

14:33

get from 1% of GDP from a country

14:35

like Indonesia. He only talked about

14:37

USD$9 billion in

14:39

expenditure on the military. That doesn't buy you

14:41

very much. And when

14:44

we think about what the future might look

14:46

like, where Indonesia may well

14:48

face more pressure over

14:50

its exclusive economic zone and

14:52

around the Tertunian Islands, Indonesia

14:54

is not well placed to

14:57

push back very hard on Chinese

14:59

assertiveness in that space simply because

15:01

China is much more advanced

15:03

in terms of its mastery

15:05

of those five domains, the air,

15:07

sea, land, space and cyber. So

15:11

the other odd factor here in Indonesia

15:13

is its somewhat odd procurement strategy. You

15:15

see, now usually if a country wants to operate

15:18

on a lower budget, they may do things like

15:20

buy the majority of their equipment from one country.

15:23

For example, someone like Belarus will often buy,

15:25

will often find it cheaper to get everything

15:27

they need pretty much from Russia. As that

15:29

way, all of the equipment they have has

15:31

the same calibers, saves on

15:33

shipping, has the same ammo boxes, often

15:36

the same software and usually interlinks much

15:38

better with one another. So

15:40

by purchasing everything you need from the one country, you do

15:42

tend to save a bit of money depending on

15:44

who the country is and what you're trying to buy. But

15:47

pursuing that strategy also leaves you open to

15:49

having that country cut off your arms supply

15:51

and you're having nothing overnight, which

15:54

is also a bit problematic. So

15:56

Most countries do tend to have the majority of their

15:58

arms come from one or two countries. And.

16:00

In a by bits and pieces from other places. And

16:03

now what I understand: not wanting to ever be

16:05

too reliant only one nation. Indonesia has

16:07

kind of taking that aversion to reliance on

16:09

any one. The absolute

16:11

extreme. As when we took a look

16:14

at the equipment currently in use by the in today's

16:16

military. We. I couldn't from

16:18

Germany, Uk, Netherlands, France,

16:20

Turkey, Belgium, Italy, Chechnya,

16:23

Russia, Austria, I'm and

16:25

Australia. South. Korea, China,

16:27

Us, South Africa, Thailand,

16:29

Ukraine, the U S

16:32

A, saw Spain, Brazil,

16:34

Canada, Israel, Norway, Switzerland,

16:36

Yugoslavia and East Germany,

16:38

Slovakia, Japan, Serbia, Brunei,

16:40

Singapore, New Zealand, Sweden,

16:43

and also some domestically

16:45

produced. Now. Outside of

16:47

Indonesia, just attempting to be incredibly passive

16:49

aggressive toward the Pakistani arms industry, Why?

16:52

Would they choose to sprout that procurement across

16:54

so many other countries? A

16:56

think it's worth bearing in mind Indonesia

16:58

is not at war with anybody. Only.

17:01

Cdc seeking to avoid big at

17:03

war with anybody. Else

17:05

to do that it

17:07

requires also and multiple

17:09

fronts of engagement, including

17:11

through military exchanges, military

17:13

contacts, and exercises, collaborative

17:15

benches. Indonesia has been

17:17

quite transactional about it's

17:19

approach to military procurement,

17:21

but still it's a

17:23

small batches of aircraft

17:25

that. Proved. Problem met

17:27

of and and not to take

17:29

up it's absolute recruiter swap that

17:31

is a fairly small batches that

17:33

is hard to keep my trying

17:36

to and resupply it and operational

17:38

oppression. It's

17:42

problematic the price I've taken. Perfect.

17:44

To trade another says he says

17:47

he cooks to that There is

17:49

insufficient transparency in the ways in

17:51

which to these trends exes take

17:53

place. And. The. beneficiaries

17:55

of these transactions it'll be since

17:58

it was cited for wow when

18:00

the oil scene becomes president and what

18:03

direction he wants to take things in. So

18:10

we have a military here with large

18:13

numbers of personnel spread right across a

18:15

country that stretches the same distance as

18:17

London to Kabul whilst also

18:19

trying to spend only just a smidge over

18:21

1% of the GDP on defense and

18:24

then to make matters more complicated they're then

18:26

trying to spend that 1% over a whole

18:28

lot of different vendors each with

18:30

different quality control, manuals, storages

18:32

and sometimes even calibers, loaders,

18:34

software or even operating procedures.

18:37

The Indonesian military is one of the most

18:39

confusing on-paper forces I think I've ever seen.

18:41

So why is it designed in this way?

18:43

Do they plan on actually making changes to

18:45

these problems? Or is

18:47

there more to this story than what I can just

18:50

read here on the paper? Well to

18:52

answer that we turn to a second

18:54

guest. Part

18:58

2. The

19:00

Armored Archipelago When

19:07

we're thinking about the Indonesian military, one

19:09

thing you have to understand is the

19:12

importance of history. So most defense forces

19:14

tend to be externally looking. The Indonesian

19:16

military, by virtue of its history and

19:18

its function, has been largely internally looking.

19:21

Natalie Samby is the

19:23

Executive Director of Verve Research, an independent

19:25

think tank specialising in the military and

19:27

political affairs of Southeast Asia. In addition

19:30

to that, she's also a senior researcher

19:32

at the Asia Society and a PhD

19:34

scholar at the Strategic and Defense Studies

19:36

Centre. Natalie has advised multiple governments and

19:38

is an all honesty, quite a few

19:40

people's go-to expert for understanding the inner

19:42

workings of the Indonesian military. So

19:45

we're thrilled to have her back on the program today. If

19:48

you look back at the formation of the

19:50

Indonesian state, a lot of the guerrilla forces

19:52

that were fighting for independence against the Dutch

19:54

have been imbibed with this sense of trying

19:56

to protect sovereignty and territoriality. And

19:58

so again, with this pride The quantization of

20:00

sovereignty and territoriality, the Indonesian military

20:02

has played this central role again

20:04

as this idea of the

20:07

unitary state of Indonesia, the Republic of Indonesia

20:09

at all costs. That trickles down

20:11

into the contemporary era today. Natalie

20:15

Samby is the executive director

20:17

of Verve Research, an independent

20:19

think tank specialising in the military and

20:21

political affairs of Southeast Asia. In

20:23

addition to that, she's also a senior researcher at the

20:25

Asia Society and a PhD scholar

20:28

at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre

20:30

for the Australian National University. She's

20:32

advised multiple governments and is honestly the

20:35

go-to expert for understanding the inner workings

20:37

of this particular military. So

20:39

we're thrilled to have her back on the program today. While

20:42

it is a relatively stable, it's not

20:44

something that the military or the government

20:46

takes for granted. We still have our

20:48

hugely diverse country where you have a

20:50

lot of tensions between communities that won't

20:52

necessarily spill over into conflict

20:55

and separatism, but the very

20:57

threat of that necessitates that the military

20:59

maintain a physical presence throughout the archipelago.

21:02

Now, the other thing to remember

21:04

is that because Indonesia is an

21:06

archipelago that is often subject to

21:08

natural disasters and humanitarian

21:10

crises internally, that the military serves

21:12

its role as a first responder.

21:15

So again, it's not just a defence

21:17

role that the military plays. It's this

21:20

idea of helping the community, dealing with

21:22

crises, rescuing people and helping build back

21:24

infrastructure. Now, even

21:26

though the Indonesian military has for decades

21:29

now been pretty inwardly focused, lacking any

21:31

real long range air or naval capabilities,

21:33

as well as operating relatively few tanks

21:35

and mostly prioritizing the ability to curb

21:37

protests and uprisings. But today, and

21:40

probably the main reason we're having this conversation,

21:42

is that a lot of that seems to be slowly changing, with

21:45

Jakarta now having purchased quite a number of

21:47

high end items that would usually be associated

21:49

with much more power projection. These items,

21:51

including things like F-16s from the United States,

21:54

SU-27s and SU-30s from the Russians, as well

21:56

as reportedly a brand new order of 42

21:59

French rockets. with

22:01

the Rafales having an operational distance which

22:03

allows the Indonesian to engage enemy forces

22:05

as far away as the Spratly Islands.

22:08

And on top of that, chugging some of the

22:10

new improved anti-air equipment the Indonesians have just bought,

22:13

the new frigate programs they have underway, and the

22:15

South Korean submarine program they're undertaking. And this seems

22:17

to be a very different military from what we've

22:19

seen over the last few decades. One

22:22

that is moving from a very inwardly focused

22:24

coastal force to soon possibly becoming a real

22:26

regional player here. So why do you think

22:28

the Indonesians are putting so much emphasis on

22:30

these modernization programs now? That's definitely

22:33

a fair point. The Indonesian government has

22:35

tried to rectify this in the last couple of

22:37

decades. Of course, the

22:39

Indonesian democratic system has only been around

22:41

for about 24-25 years. So

22:44

the country has had a lot of other things to attend to.

22:47

But certainly in the last 10-15 years,

22:49

there has been a prioritization of military

22:51

modernization, which means particularly paying

22:53

more attention to the Navy and Air Force.

22:56

So that means buying platforms for the Navy

22:58

and particular land for the Air Force that

23:01

can reduce this distance between the islands to

23:03

improve the connectivity, to be able to move

23:06

things across the archipelago. Of course, the Indonesia

23:08

had strategic airlift with the C-130s, being able

23:10

to move people and goods particularly during crisis.

23:14

The Indonesian military is thinking a

23:16

lot more about force projection

23:18

and certainly deterrence capacities with

23:20

these high-end platforms. So

23:24

the other big reform going on at the moment

23:26

is actually within the Indonesian command structures, which

23:28

it seems like a small change, but it actually

23:31

to me indicates something much larger going on within

23:33

the Indonesian military. Now obviously

23:35

oversimplifying it a bit here, but to quickly explain

23:37

it and bring people up to speed, like most

23:39

militaries in the world, Indonesia has a few main

23:41

branches of the military. The Army, the Navy, the

23:44

Air Force, obviously they have a Marine Command as

23:46

well as Special Forces Command, and a few

23:48

other odds and ends that we probably don't have time to unpack

23:50

right now. But effectively right up

23:52

until recently, Indonesia had its army divided

23:55

amongst 15 regional commands, yet

23:57

its navy divided amongst 3 fleet commands as

23:59

well. it had its air force divided amongst

24:01

three air operations commands with also a rapid

24:03

response command tacked on the end as well.

24:06

Now again oversimplifying for time here but

24:08

the indonesian military as a whole was

24:10

actually pretty segmented between the branches and

24:13

for quite a lot of things if the army wanted to talk to

24:15

the local naval base the army would talk to

24:17

jakarta and jakarta would talk to the navy or the navy

24:19

would talk to jakarta and jakarta would talk to the air

24:22

force. So the major service branches

24:24

were fairly compartmentalized however that brings us

24:26

up to 2019

24:28

where indonesia announced the creation of three

24:30

joint territorial defense commands effectively a joint

24:32

commander that worked together and integrated information

24:34

between the army navy and air force

24:36

as well as some of the other

24:38

smaller branches and instead created

24:40

a more geographically focused command chain effectively

24:43

commanding just a small area of the country

24:45

but that command being in charge of all

24:48

the branches within that area of the country

24:50

effectively it was a way that if indonesia

24:52

wanted to carry out an invasion of a

24:54

neighboring state more importantly had come under invasion

24:57

itself it would allow the command

24:59

to make a much more coordinated response and

25:02

coordinated planning in those early times as

25:04

now they have a command that can actually work

25:06

together between all of the branches to defend a

25:09

certain area of the country with

25:11

the indonesians announcing three new territorial commands

25:13

with the first of these territorial commands

25:15

guagobilan one covering the western part of

25:17

indonesia including the strategically vital areas of

25:20

the malacca strait in the south china

25:22

sea guagobilan two covering the central region

25:24

of indonesia mostly focusing around the java

25:26

sea and parts of the indian ocean

25:29

and guagobilan three which oversees

25:31

the eastern parts of the country including

25:33

regions like parpwa and the arafura sea so

25:35

the question i have to ask you

25:37

is why bringing these territorial commands now

25:40

what is changed in the indonesian strategic

25:42

calculus that they feel it

25:44

necessary to make sure they have a geographical

25:46

response if they ever came under attack look

25:49

i think before with a large focus on internal

25:51

defense there wasn't a great need for the navy

25:53

and the air force to be able to work

25:55

so closely with the army now

25:57

we have this recognition of external defense you

26:00

have different kinds of contingencies that the Indonesian

26:02

military must think about and must plan for.

26:05

And that does involve working much

26:07

more closely between the Army, Navy

26:09

and Air Force. So the

26:11

Joint Defence Territorial Command concept really

26:13

reflects the recognition that external security

26:15

is something about the Indonesian military

26:17

ought to be thinking much more

26:20

about, particularly in light of growing

26:22

tensions between Southeast Asian states and

26:24

China and the South China Sea. And

26:26

the prospect for some of the incursions

26:29

within the Indonesian exclusive economic zone around

26:31

its Natuna Islands is something that causes

26:33

much more anxiety. And it's

26:35

an idea, again, that we need to

26:38

bring the three services much more closely

26:40

together. The idea of operating in a

26:42

joint environment is something that is still

26:44

evolving and needs more development

26:46

in the country. And that is something that

26:48

will help but operate far more efficiently as

26:50

well. Well, let's stick with command

26:53

structures for a minute here, as there's another

26:55

oddity within the Indonesian military that I kind

26:57

of want to unpack a little bit. That

26:59

being Indonesia's heavy reliance on battalion level commands.

27:01

Now, for those of you who haven't wandered into the

27:04

weeds or military affairs yet, there are different levels of

27:06

military formations. For those

27:08

of you who might be unaware, every

27:10

country can design their military in completely

27:12

different ways. With some countries designing their

27:14

military around a very highly centralized mass

27:16

formation type military, whereas other militaries design

27:18

their forces around small independent forces that

27:20

can move quickly when required. Now, depending

27:22

on how many personnel in each formation

27:25

and what that formation is being asked

27:27

to do will determine its designation. So

27:29

to quickly lay out some terms here

27:31

and start from the very bottom of command structures.

27:33

So obviously you start with something like a fire team,

27:35

which might be three to five people, you

27:37

go up to a squad, which usually about one to

27:39

two fire teams, then you go up to a

27:41

section, which would be about two to three fire teams. From

27:44

there you go up to platoons, which usually about three

27:46

to five squads, maybe with some

27:48

vehicles. And from there you go up to

27:50

a company with a company usually having about

27:53

two to five platoons. And then from company,

27:55

you go up to battalion with battalions having

27:57

around two to six companies or possibly a

27:59

battery well. The battalion commands

28:01

usually mean somewhere between 60-250 personnel depending on

28:05

the military, but coming with its own HQ

28:07

and being somewhat self sufficient. From a battalion

28:09

we go up to a regiment which usually

28:12

has about 3-5 battalions in it, but is

28:14

also regularly not self sufficient and

28:16

from there we go up to a brigade, with

28:18

brigade being made up of several battalions, and

28:21

is also quite often self sufficient as well,

28:23

with a brigade usually consisting of somewhere between

28:25

about 2 and 15 thousand soldiers depending on

28:27

the nationality. Now obviously from there it does

28:29

get bigger with divisions and corps and armies,

28:31

but for now let's just focus on those

28:33

two main ones, the brigade level command and

28:35

the battalion level command. When

28:37

you look at most militaries that have

28:39

large amounts of personnel, or heavily reliant

28:42

conscripts, militaries like Russia for instance, those

28:44

guys tend to favour brigade level commands

28:46

for self sufficient deployments, whereas Indonesia really

28:49

focuses on the battalion level commands, choosing

28:51

a military that is full of these

28:54

very small but quite independent force structures.

28:56

So with Indonesia having this massive manpower

28:58

military, why do they prioritise these

29:00

very small scale units? I

29:02

mean again there are a couple of

29:04

considerations there, one is historical, a lot

29:06

of these battalions had been organised around

29:08

charismatic figures, and so they're trying to

29:10

get the Indonesian military as a unified

29:12

force has been a challenge throughout the

29:14

early formative period of the Indonesian military.

29:17

A lot of these battalion commanders are

29:19

responsible for the health of Indonesian soldiers,

29:22

are not paid well relative to other

29:24

militaries in the region, and so the

29:26

loyalty of these soldiers is then invested

29:28

in these battalion commanders. And that's not

29:30

simply something that can be done either

29:32

at the brigade or division level, there's

29:34

not that sense of closeness between those

29:36

higher up commanders, and certainly

29:39

the ability for these higher up commanders to

29:41

then manage the number of battalions under their

29:43

command is much more challenging. So

29:45

I would argue that maybe it's that

29:47

physical arrangement of a smaller, more manageable

29:49

size of a battalion, and that historical

29:52

relationship and that sense of

29:54

loyalty that is built between soldiers in

29:56

that level, and their companies, the company

29:58

commanders and the military. And then up towards

30:00

the battalion. And again some

30:02

of this does make sense to me as well, with

30:04

Indonesia being an archipelago with over 17,000 islands. That

30:08

sometimes you don't need more than a battalion to

30:10

be able to defend an entire island. But there

30:12

is another odd trait within this battalion level commander

30:14

kind of want to unpack here. As what we've

30:16

found over the years, is that a lot of

30:18

these commanders at the battalion level are also expected

30:20

to supplement the funds of the battalion. In

30:23

other words at the battalion level, quite often a

30:25

lot of these formations are not given enough money

30:27

to run the battalion, with the battalion commander being

30:29

given a lot of leeway on how he uses

30:31

his battalion, but also being expected

30:33

to make up the budgetary shortfall by using

30:35

his men. In other words, imagine a US

30:38

major or lieutenant colonel being asked to run

30:40

a side hustle in order to make sure

30:42

that his battalion actually has ammunition for their

30:44

guns. So to anyone sitting in a

30:47

more westernised military, this sounds like

30:49

quite an odd concept, and one that's

30:51

pretty rife for exploitation. So can

30:53

you take us through how this system

30:55

works, and why the Indonesians have gone

30:57

down this road of effectively relying on

30:59

battalion commanders to keep these forces supplied?

31:02

Different battalions will have different ways

31:05

of ensuring that remuneration. We

31:07

call this kirky capital, the ability for

31:09

militaries to raise money for themselves. We're

31:12

not saying necessarily that's right, but in under

31:14

the current circumstances, because now costs take up

31:16

such a large part of the Indonesian budget,

31:19

and it just simply isn't enough for a

31:21

lot of these soldiers to live super comfortably.

31:24

Battalion commanders have to become quite creative in

31:26

figuring out how to raise this revenue

31:29

for their people. And this

31:31

might include anything from signing contracts

31:33

to provide security for prisons, from

31:36

building roads, signing MOUs with different

31:39

ministries, or providing private

31:41

security for mining companies, amongst

31:43

other things. It might even

31:45

be certain illegal activities, historically

31:47

speaking, smuggling and illegal or

31:50

smugglier goods. But in

31:52

this case, sometimes some of

31:54

these activities are legitimate, but they're not

31:56

necessarily part of the official defence budget.

31:59

It's revenue that they've got. gain in cooperation and

32:01

partnership with other government departments. However,

32:03

that's when it starts to be

32:05

more problematic. We have the

32:07

military continually stepping in to then

32:09

take on jobs which might be

32:12

better done either within private industry

32:14

or developing civilian capacity within certain

32:16

ministries or within certain

32:18

civilian agencies like Sentry and Rescue.

32:21

So that's not necessarily a positive sign.

32:24

And certainly there's an idea of then incentivising

32:26

the military to try and seek out these

32:28

contracts and position themselves as

32:31

a service provider of first choice. So it

32:34

needs to be considered in a really nuanced way. So

32:37

if the Indonesian army doesn't have enough money to

32:39

pay these battalions what they need to function? What

32:41

options do they actually have to try and solve some of these

32:43

issues? Do you think it will be necessary for

32:46

the Indonesian military to look at things like cutting the

32:48

amount of personnel they have on the books in order

32:50

to reduce their wage costs or

32:52

even cutting back on some of these modernisation programs

32:54

and new purchases? What options

32:56

do you think the military actually has feasibly in front of

32:58

them in order to try and make

33:01

up that wage shortfall, let alone try and

33:03

undertake the expansions that the new government is

33:05

trying to propose? Or to simply

33:07

just require the military getting more money from the

33:09

federal budget? Okay so there

33:11

are a couple approaches there as

33:13

you outlined. Now I don't see

33:15

that there's potential for reducing necessarily

33:17

the size of the territorial commands.

33:19

If the Indonesian military's requirements its

33:21

job in terms of internal security

33:23

and providing social service and humanitarian

33:25

support is not alleviated. So those

33:27

roles have to stay the same.

33:30

The one thing that can change is

33:32

that the Indonesian military still has, as

33:34

our good friend Evan Luxmana would say,

33:36

log jams, it has an excess of

33:39

people at the colonel level and above.

33:41

And so what it means is when you join

33:43

the Indonesian military, particularly as an officer, this

33:46

is employment for life. The Indonesian

33:48

military doesn't start to push you out once

33:50

you turn colonel and it looks like your

33:52

promotion prospects are stalled. No, no, no. The

33:55

Indonesian military will find you a job. Now

33:58

as if there are more and more... Of issue

34:00

that the colonel level and above their only

34:02

six number of positions. Sort.

34:04

Indonesian Military has done as it's and

34:06

Emma use we the other government ministries

34:09

to put these offices into civilian position.

34:11

So imagine you're sitting and patna finance

34:13

his trailer and all of a sudden

34:15

death and ale to job and goes

34:18

to a kennel. That's a situation that's

34:20

happening in Indonesia Mysteries right now. And

34:22

that's where I think the Innovation Military's

34:24

Human Resources policies really need to undergo

34:26

a sense of reform because it's not

34:29

doing the military any favors having these

34:31

people who are not bringing back. That's

34:33

that, a sense. Of function to the

34:35

Ministry of Defense or to the military.

34:37

so throughout other ministries taking positions away

34:39

from civilians who need those positions. Could.

34:42

Be the nation Military's can look at cutting costs

34:44

personnel. Oh, that's where it needs to be done

34:46

because that actually yields the most benefit. Some.

34:50

We talk friends and previous segment but be

34:52

procurement chamber and nation is easily one of

34:54

the most on things and ever same. With.

34:57

In my opinion, the country buying from way

34:59

too many supplies. Sookie. Six to

35:01

what is the philosophy behind the singing and you

35:03

can be into These are actually looking to change

35:05

with this income government. Again, there's that

35:08

philosophy element of this idea of non

35:10

aligned men and having multiple friends or

35:12

enemies. But. Actually said, it doesn't make

35:14

the situation for the Indonesian military any is

35:16

that when it tries to not only operate

35:18

or is not platforms and making sure it's

35:20

got the right people, that and servicing and

35:23

engineering this kind of platforms and then for

35:25

sustainment as well. So. You

35:27

see this process changing anytime soon. As

35:30

I can depend on the discretion

35:32

of let's say the defense minister

35:34

or a deputy first minister and

35:36

other people with vested interests in

35:38

again she said and partners. Let.

35:40

Me: put it like that. that

35:42

in mind too rude as bring us

35:44

to be joined crux on line most

35:47

of his conversation be pressure being placed

35:49

in jakarta by washington and beijing and

35:51

for indonesia particular the complacent a pre

35:53

on tight spot as of one hand

35:55

the relationship between jakarta and beijing has

35:57

been increasingly corners of the last few

35:59

years With the incoming president even

36:01

travelling to China very soon after he'd won

36:03

the election, announcing right after the visit that

36:06

there would be a resumption of joint military

36:08

exercises being conducted between the militaries of Indonesia

36:10

and China. And a lot of

36:12

this makes sense, China is the largest trading

36:14

partner of Indonesia, and quite a number of

36:16

the larger Indonesian businesses are also run by

36:19

Chinese expats. And for China, taking Indonesia seriously

36:21

is also very important, as not only do

36:23

60% of China's trade outflows,

36:26

as well as 70% of China's

36:28

LNG end up being transported through

36:30

Indonesian waters. But whether Indonesia

36:32

is an ally or neutral or an enemy

36:34

will have an absolutely massive impact on any

36:37

future wars in Taiwan or the South China

36:39

Sea. But on the other hand,

36:41

the Chinese Nine Dash Line, their claim

36:43

along the South China Sea, also enters

36:45

Indonesia's northern waters, with their two sides

36:48

Coast Guard having entered scuttle over the

36:50

years, and Chinese fishermen being caught in

36:52

Indonesian waters semi-regularly. So

36:54

with having China being their largest trading

36:56

partner, whilst China also lays claims to

36:58

their northern islands, how does

37:00

Jakarta plan on squaring that circle? This

37:03

choice is often proposed as a binary, but

37:05

from Indonesia's perspective, the answer is why can't

37:07

it be both? Indonesia,

37:10

like so many other Southeast Asian states,

37:12

is hedging. It's enjoying, like

37:14

Australia as well, its economic prospects and

37:16

development from China and its security relationship

37:18

with the United States. But as you

37:20

said, it's also developing military engagement and

37:23

security partnerships with a whole number of

37:25

different actors. Indonesia is

37:27

going to look for the best deal it can get

37:29

for now, as long as it's

37:31

not aligned. And if that means

37:33

engaging and exercising with other militaries

37:35

in the region, which also includes

37:37

Japan and India and France and

37:39

South Korea, however, if

37:42

you look at the quality, the

37:44

quantity, the sophistication and the longevity

37:46

of Indonesia's security partnership with the

37:49

United States, its relationship with China

37:51

doesn't come close. It doesn't mean

37:53

that it won't develop that way in the

37:55

future, but we must be mindful of the

37:57

fact and volume of Indonesian

37:59

military. officers that have engaged with

38:01

and graduated through America, if not

38:03

Australia and other professional military education

38:06

institutions that have done exercises that

38:08

have done the range of course,

38:10

far as trips the number that

38:12

have gone through Chinese institutions and engaged

38:15

in Chinese exercises as well. What

38:17

we do want to encourage is

38:19

the Indonesian military doing more exercises

38:21

with ASEAN partners. That's something I

38:23

think that's really important. And also

38:25

having the Indonesian Navy engage

38:27

and do maritime exercises with the Indian

38:30

Navy, again another big tick. So

38:32

I do understand that Indonesia will as much as

38:35

it can want to walk the line between these

38:37

two sides. But what happens when that no longer

38:39

becomes an option? What happens if let's say we

38:41

do see a war break out over Taiwan? Do

38:43

you think the Indonesians would still hold fast to

38:46

this principle of neutrality? Or that would

38:48

push the Indonesians to pick one side over the other?

38:51

Indonesia's priority would be evacuating its people

38:53

and certainly assisting other Southeast Asian countries

38:55

like the Philippines to move however many

38:57

thousands of people working there. In

39:00

terms of alignment during that kind

39:02

of contingency, it would really depend

39:05

on which side had

39:07

initiated hostilities if at all. Indonesia

39:09

at the moment has stated that it would

39:11

adopt a posture of neutrality. It wouldn't want

39:14

ships to be going through its archipelagos

39:16

en route to warlike

39:18

activities. It's very difficult to

39:21

say what a country will do in the midst

39:23

of crisis. And I think

39:25

that's something that in Australia it's an

39:27

area we can think much more about.

39:29

We can certainly do that by having

39:32

conversations with Indonesian partners to get a

39:34

better understanding of how the country and

39:36

its strategically thinking about this kind of

39:38

problem. But I think Indonesia theoretically would

39:41

be on the side of international law

39:43

and at the same time maintain its

39:45

sense of non-alignment. So let me give you

39:47

an example in terms of Russia and Ukraine.

39:49

When Indonesia's foreign ministry first issued its reaction

39:52

to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it did

39:54

not name Russia as the country

39:56

that had invaded Ukraine. It just simply asked

39:58

for all sides. to cease hostilities.

40:01

Now, again, Indonesia has subsequently criticized

40:03

the Russians and set another occasion,

40:06

but what we see is the emergence

40:08

of Indonesia's national posture and national values

40:10

making itself known in these kinds of

40:12

crises. You would have to look at

40:14

the specificities of what happened, what

40:16

was going on in the context, which state

40:18

was responsible, how does Indonesia feel towards that

40:20

state? What are the costs for Indonesia of

40:22

joining one side or another? So that's the

40:24

kind of analysis I think we could think

40:26

about if you're looking at a number of

40:28

different contingencies. So Indonesia

40:31

has a new incoming president, the former defence minister

40:33

under the current president. So having come from a

40:35

background within the military and having a lot of

40:37

deep connections with the armed forces, how much do

40:39

you think that'll affect how he runs the presidency

40:42

and how much do you think it'll look to

40:44

shake up how the Indonesian military is run at

40:46

the moment? It's not the first time

40:48

we've had a former general serve in the role

40:50

of defence minister. In fact, that's been more of

40:52

the norm than the exception. But under

40:55

President Jokowi, you had someone that was

40:57

not relatively engaged in this kind of

40:59

procurement, not having the background, not having

41:02

the first-hand knowledge. But now

41:04

you're going to have somebody in Provost Biyantra

41:06

who's not only served as defence minister, but

41:08

will continue to exert influence at the level

41:10

of president. He has been in that

41:12

portfolio for four and a half years. He

41:15

has very strong views on which countries he

41:17

wants to partner with. And if you want

41:19

to have any evidence of that, you only

41:21

have to look at his travel itinerary since

41:23

he became defence minister in November 2019 and

41:26

see that he made multiple trips

41:28

during the pandemic to countries in

41:30

Europe, particularly to France, amongst others.

41:32

And surprise, surprise, last week, France's

41:34

naval group announced that it's

41:36

going to be healthy Indonesia build to

41:38

Skokhyn submarines. So there's no surprises there

41:41

when we look at the

41:43

intent. The question is, what's

41:45

the split between the president and

41:47

the defence ministry and the military?

41:50

But as someone who has a very

41:52

strong sense of self, who wants his

41:54

presidency and his legacies to be very

41:56

well cemented, I think it's most likely

41:58

that he will install a defence minister

42:01

and deputy defence minister who are close allies

42:03

of him who will share a similar vision

42:05

because the minister for defence, the

42:07

deputy minister for defence are the ones that are running

42:09

the ministry. They're the ones that are making the decisions

42:11

on procurement, not the military. The military has to just

42:14

put up with whatever it's given. And

42:16

my understanding from conversations in January, the military

42:18

is not necessarily happy with what

42:20

Praboa and his folk have purchased. Why did

42:22

you buy these? And part of the answer might

42:24

be because there's a strategic relationship you want

42:26

to deepen or because it gave the biggest

42:28

kickback. So to bring all of this to

42:30

a bit of a close, how successful do you

42:32

think the next 10 years of Indonesian military policy

42:35

is likely to be with all these changes underway?

42:37

Do you think we're actually likely to see the

42:39

Indonesian military hit some of these lofty goals that

42:41

have been set by Praboa? Or do you think

42:44

the budgetary constraints will probably take a lot of

42:46

the air out of the tyres here? The

42:48

way in which the Indonesian military will evolve

42:50

over the next decade will be fascinating if

42:53

it can actually get into place a

42:55

lot of its modernisation. But the

42:58

modernisation project can't advance without the

43:00

rest of the country moving forward

43:02

as well. So the challenge for

43:04

President Praboa in the next five

43:06

years, and if it's not him

43:08

beyond that, his successor will be

43:10

to ensure that Indonesia as a

43:12

country will be prosperous, that Indonesia's

43:14

infrastructure, its health systems, education

43:17

systems are all robust, that

43:19

its children are looked after,

43:22

and that will ensure sufficient resources and

43:24

support for the Indonesian military at the

43:27

same time. And if that's the case,

43:29

then maybe we can see a slight

43:31

de-emphasis on that social services role that

43:33

the military is playing because there might

43:36

be greater resilience and greater capacity amongst

43:38

other actors within the state. So I'm

43:40

really interested to see whether or not

43:43

those really deep-seated historical elements is something

43:45

that's going to evolve in the next 10 years.

43:53

So what comes next for Indonesia as

43:56

they enter this period of dramatic change,

43:58

trying to modernise an armed forces in

44:00

the midst of a pivotal moment with

44:02

the country's primary economic partner, and the

44:04

country's primary military partner appear to be

44:06

steaming toward conflict with one another. A

44:09

lose-lose situation for Indonesia. So how does

44:11

Indonesia plan to enter this new period

44:13

with that fundamental problem hanging above their

44:15

head? And now that Prabhupala is leaving

44:17

the defense ministry into the top job,

44:20

will he change and attempt to balance

44:22

his views between civilian and military ones?

44:25

Or will he continue to preference the military

44:27

sector over the civilian one? Well,

44:29

to answer that, we turn to our final

44:31

guest. Port

44:35

3 Deciding

44:38

Which Fire to Fight

44:45

The Indonesian military and

44:47

its build-up actually centers

44:50

around much broader national

44:52

security perceptions. If

44:54

you look at a successive

44:56

series of the Indonesian defense

44:59

white paper, they basically confront

45:01

a host of security challenges.

45:04

Colin Ko is a senior fellow at

45:06

the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies

45:08

at the S. Rajaratnam School of International

45:10

Studies, whose research specializes in the naval

45:12

affairs of the Indo-Pacific. On top of

45:14

all this, Colin has gone on to

45:16

publish several op-eds, policies, and academic journals,

45:18

as well as go on to teach

45:20

for the Singaporean Armed Forces Professional Military

45:22

Education and Training courses. So we're thrilled

45:25

to have him on the program today.

45:28

Ever since the wave of reformacy

45:30

back in the late 1990s into

45:32

the early 2000s, we

45:34

have seen attempts to try

45:37

to professionalize the Indonesian military,

45:39

but the overall defense posture

45:41

hasn't really changed. It has

45:43

been revolving mainly around what

45:45

we tend to see as

45:47

domestic security challenges. And

45:49

by domestic security, we are referring to a

45:52

host of what we The

45:54

first question is, how do we

45:56

make sure that we're not only talking about

45:58

the economic

46:00

inequality and

46:02

underdevelopment across the Indonesian

46:05

archipelago, pandemic issues, and

46:07

of course what happened

46:09

right now in Papua,

46:12

Papua still has the Indonesian

46:14

authorities having their hands full

46:17

in trying to deal with

46:19

that. And on top of

46:21

that, of course, the Indonesians

46:23

recognize the growing importance of

46:25

looking externally into issues

46:27

related to their territorial integrity

46:29

and sovereignty. And that largely

46:32

revolves around the South China

46:34

Sea. Suffice to

46:36

say is that the Indonesian

46:38

defense doctrine is one that

46:40

is revolved around trying to

46:43

acquire a whole range of

46:45

capabilities to deal with a

46:47

whole spectrum of security challenges,

46:49

ranging mainly from non-traditional to

46:51

what we call traditional security

46:53

challenges. Now

46:56

obviously we don't have enough time to go fully

46:58

into West Papua with this episode, but we do

47:00

have a whole entire another episode dedicated specifically to

47:02

the issues going on at West Papua at the

47:04

moment. So if you want to know more about

47:06

that, you can check that one out. But for

47:08

now, Colin, I thought I would open up the

47:10

chat today by taking a look at Indonesia's defense

47:12

spending, as the country currently caps their military spending

47:14

at around 1% of GDP,

47:16

so about 8.7 billion US

47:18

dollars. Or to put it in real

47:20

terms, the entire yearly budget for

47:23

the Indonesian military is what the US

47:25

chooses through about every four days. Now

47:27

a lot of people will boil all of

47:30

Indonesia's military problems down to this one specific

47:32

issue that they simply just aren't spending

47:34

enough on the military at the moment. But how do

47:36

you think Jakarta will attempt to fix this problem? Do

47:38

you think they'll look at cutting spending and laying off

47:41

soldiers? Do you think they'll roll back some of

47:43

these programs? Or do you think they'll look at

47:45

increasing the military budget by taking from elsewhere within

47:47

the Indonesian budget? What options does Jakarta have to

47:49

try and solve some of these funding problems? There

47:52

were a few approaches that were

47:54

being highlighted. Obviously, Indonesia needs to spend

47:56

beyond the current cap, in terms

47:58

of the GDP. per capital

48:01

or defense. In order to raise

48:03

the cap for defense, then

48:05

how do you solve the funding?

48:07

One is to try to issue

48:09

bonds. Obviously issuing

48:12

bonds is a good thing

48:14

if the economy is doing well, but if

48:16

you issue bonds, it also means that you

48:18

have to pay for the bonds in the

48:20

future. The other

48:22

thing is to acquire

48:24

loans, concessional loans, or

48:26

other preferential loans from

48:28

both public and private

48:30

sectors. That would be a way of trying

48:32

to drag some capital into the Indonesian system so they

48:34

could invest it somewhere. But I'm sure if they go

48:37

through with that plan, there's very likely to be a

48:39

push to try and invest that back into the Indonesian

48:41

economy, therefore investing into the

48:43

Indonesian domestic defense arms industry. Now that's an

48:45

issue we haven't talked about too much so

48:47

far. Can you take us through

48:49

what the state of the Indonesian domestic arms industry

48:52

is and whether they could sustain what the Indonesians

48:54

are currently using if they were to ramp up

48:56

their efforts a bit? If

48:58

I could pull it down

49:00

into a few categories where they have

49:03

achieved some appreciable level of

49:05

self-sufficiency on land, they are

49:07

able to manufacture a whole

49:09

range of small arms and

49:11

light weapons. They are able

49:14

to manufacture a range of

49:16

light to medium armored fighting

49:18

vehicles. However, they are

49:20

not able to manufacture main metal

49:22

tanks. So at least on the

49:24

front of the land forces, they

49:26

are able to achieve a much

49:29

higher appreciable level of self-sufficiency compared

49:31

to the other services. Indonesia

49:33

has its own supply chain but of

49:36

course the question is whether it's able

49:38

to churn out the desired volumes in

49:40

type of a conflict because on paper

49:42

and in practice, it often is a

49:44

world part. On paper, you could have

49:47

this industrial capacity but then you realize

49:49

that in the conflict, the level of

49:51

consumption and the real consumption of your

49:53

ammunition in the battlefield could outstrip your

49:55

industrial capacity. So that is on the

49:58

land forces front. On aerospace, Indonesia

50:00

isn't able to manufacture or develop

50:02

its own jet fighters. It might

50:05

be able to undertake some very

50:07

basic upgrading and service life extension

50:10

programs for its jet fighters who

50:12

are following help, but that's about

50:14

it. For naval forces,

50:16

that tends to be much

50:18

more comprehensive compared to

50:21

the aerospace industry is able

50:23

to manufacture a whole range

50:25

of coastal and in-shore patrol

50:27

and attack craft. It's able

50:29

to manufacture large amphibious ships.

50:31

It's able to build its

50:34

own auxiliaries. It's able to

50:36

build its own corvettes under

50:38

license from the Netherlands shipbuilder

50:40

Damon, for example. And

50:42

now it is undertaking the construction

50:44

of a frigate that is much

50:47

larger and that will definitely be

50:49

a plus point for the Indonesian

50:51

and the naval shipbuilding industry. Generally,

50:54

the Indonesian have a

50:56

pretty significant defense industry, but

50:58

it clearly has weaknesses in some

51:00

of those key areas. And that

51:02

could be an issue if it's

51:05

going to prosecute a protracted combat

51:07

operation, because the big ticket items

51:10

such as multi-row jet fighters are

51:13

still pretty much reliant on

51:15

foreign assistance. And for

51:17

naval forces, those blue water

51:19

fighting capabilities are also dependent

51:21

on foreign help. So this

51:24

is why I don't think the Indonesian defense

51:26

industry, while it is able to fill some

51:28

gaps in its current defense build up, it

51:30

is still far from sufficient in fulfilling

51:33

all of Indonesia's defense needs.

51:36

Now, whilst some of what's being produced will go

51:38

toward the Indonesian armed forces, some of

51:41

it will also go toward the Indonesian internal forces.

51:43

So I think we should take a moment

51:46

to unpack this all a bit and talk

51:48

about Indonesia's internal forces. Now, the Indonesian internal

51:50

forces is a bit of a catchall term

51:52

from everything from the National Police Force or

51:54

the Porii, the Indonesian Coast Guard, the Bokamla,

51:57

a maritime security agency, as well

51:59

as the Kamra peoples. security which is effectively

52:01

a sort of reserve force. Now

52:03

each of these forces is completely distinct

52:05

with unique chains of command and reporting

52:07

structures but we'll focus on the main

52:09

one for the moment being the Indonesian

52:12

Polri or national police. Now the Polri

52:14

sit within their own command structure separate

52:16

to the military but often do liaise

52:18

with the military particularly in moments of

52:20

emergency or disasters and much like the

52:22

military the Polri are stationed right across

52:24

the entire country but take their orders

52:26

centrally from Jakarta with the Polri

52:28

then overseeing the provincial and then municipal police below

52:31

them. Now when it comes

52:33

to cracking down an internal unrest the national

52:35

military as well as the Polri do afford

52:37

jakantas and particular bonuses they like to take

52:39

advantage of. One example being that the two

52:41

organizations are governed by completely different sets of

52:43

rules and laws as whilst the

52:46

Polri operates under civilian law and acts

52:48

as a law enforcement body the

52:50

Indonesian army operates under military law which means it's

52:52

governed by a completely different set of rules and

52:54

regulations when it comes to things like taxes

52:57

fundraising and in particular how protesters

52:59

are treated during events which

53:01

Jakarta has found ways to take advantage of in

53:04

the past. Now if we look at these internal

53:06

forces across that entire umbrella as well as looking

53:08

at the Indonesian reserve forces which sit under the

53:10

chain of command of the military how would you

53:12

describe the operational capabilities of each of these groups?

53:16

The Indonesian internal security forces

53:18

mainly revolving around the national

53:20

police as well as other

53:23

paramilitary forces obviously they are

53:25

largely configured not just to

53:28

deal with internal unrest and

53:30

even counterinsurgency of what we

53:32

generally call low intensity security

53:35

operations but for the most

53:37

part especially since the early

53:40

2000s it has been

53:42

largely been geared towards

53:45

counter-terrorism so counter-terrorism is

53:47

certainly a key mission of

53:49

these internal security forces and

53:51

the equipments reflects the orientation

53:54

in that regard. We

53:56

are looking at largely mobile

53:59

likely armored for the most

54:01

part, and of course the

54:03

light infantry type forces and

54:05

of course centered around a

54:07

pretty considerable core of special

54:09

forces. Whereas for the

54:11

Indonesian military, well of course they

54:13

do have elements who could be

54:15

put into domestic security operations at

54:18

any one part of time. The

54:20

TNI, air naval, as well

54:22

as ground forces, they are

54:24

definitely equipped for conventional war

54:26

fighting. But again, this is

54:28

one area that they have

54:30

been trying to build up

54:32

because obviously their main armament

54:34

system, which they call the

54:36

Alu sister, you know, infantry

54:39

hasn't really reached the level

54:41

as desired by the

54:44

Indonesians. Okay, so if

54:46

we now pivot back toward the armed forces, I

54:48

want to figure out what sort of fighting capacity

54:50

they currently have. We have seen that they've got

54:52

some brand new flashy toys, but

54:54

if the president would actually give that order,

54:56

and order an invasion of a neighboring state

54:59

like let's say Australia or the Philippines, do

55:01

you think they'd actually have the capabilities to

55:03

pull something like that off? On

55:06

paper, it does appear to

55:08

be a large armed forces,

55:11

but it clearly lacks a

55:13

long-range expeditionary power projection capabilities.

55:15

They have a small handful

55:17

of mid-air refuelling tankers that

55:19

are based on the C-130,

55:22

Charlie. However, besides a

55:24

handful of large amphibious assault

55:26

ships, as well as jet

55:29

fighters that are multi-role in

55:31

nature, the Navy on

55:33

paper looks like a large Navy.

55:35

However, if we put a distinction

55:38

between what we see as offshore

55:40

capable assets, as well as those

55:42

that are designed and optimized mainly

55:45

for coastal and in-shore operations, clearly

55:48

offshore assets belong

55:50

to the minority. And these

55:52

offshore assets usually will

55:55

be very instrumental in helping to

55:57

police Indonesian maritime zone up. to

55:59

200 North economic

56:04

zone and even further fill

56:06

into its extended continental shelf

56:08

clips. And then not just

56:11

that we deem the Indonesian

56:13

archipelago itself, according to the

56:15

international maritime law, what we

56:17

deem to be archipelago waters

56:19

and close within the archipelago

56:21

baselines that itself already encompass

56:24

a huge expense. These waters

56:26

actually consume the bulk of

56:28

the Indonesian naval capacity and

56:30

I'm not even counting the Coast

56:33

Guard and other paramilitary maritime security

56:35

agencies as well. So what

56:37

I'm trying to argue here is that

56:40

if Indonesia already has difficulty

56:42

in policing its own boundaries

56:44

and even effectively putting out

56:46

a presence in its own

56:49

maritime zone and throughout its

56:51

archipelago, then I think

56:53

it is a little far fetched to

56:55

imagine that Indonesia has the

56:57

capacity to invade its

57:00

neighbors. And truth to be told,

57:02

the TNI itself does have

57:05

issues and create challenges even

57:07

to the thing its own

57:09

borders. In other words, it

57:11

doesn't really have the capacity

57:13

to effectively police its

57:15

archipelago expense. OK,

57:20

we know Indonesia is going to have problems

57:22

projecting outwards from the archipelago, but what about

57:24

defending itself? As more and more,

57:26

it seems that China has interests in the

57:29

South China Sea. Now, we know during Jokowi's

57:31

term in power, we did see economic ties

57:33

deepen between China and Indonesia, whilst at the

57:35

same time we saw that during these terms,

57:37

strategic ties between the two become a little

57:39

frostier times, particularly during incidents like in 2016

57:42

and 2020 when there were open confrontations between

57:44

the Chinese and Indonesian navies. Now, during that

57:46

period, we did see Jokowi order some of

57:48

the facilities, particularly the northern Indonesian islands that

57:50

sit within the Nine Dash Line beefed up

57:53

with a number of these facilities receiving additional air

57:55

defences, as well as having additional personnel and

57:57

defensive materials moved into the region. Do

58:00

you think we'll continue to see this sort of

58:02

build up of forces across these Northern Islands? Or

58:05

do you think with the resumption of military exercises

58:07

between Jakarta and Beijing, it will likely see Prabawa

58:09

use it as an excuse to divert funds away

58:11

from that Northern build up and toward other areas

58:13

of the military that probably need it? Indonesia

58:18

especially since the time

58:20

when President Yudhoyono

58:22

was in power, there has

58:25

already been a rather concerted

58:27

plan and a clear strategic

58:30

intention to try to bebop

58:32

Indonesia's presence in the

58:34

Natuna area. That build up

58:36

has sort of continued right into

58:39

the early Jokowi era. And

58:41

two years into Jokowi, he's come as

58:43

president. But in 2016, there

58:46

was a flat out with China of

58:48

the Natuna Islands. And that

58:50

actually further reinforced Jakarta's conviction

58:52

to bebop its military presence

58:55

in the Natuna area. So

58:58

I think on that count, there is

59:00

no denial that there is a longstanding

59:02

interest by Indonesia to bebop its presence

59:04

in the Natunas, not because it wanted

59:06

to be involved in any conflict of

59:08

any sort. But I believe

59:11

it is also somewhat concerned about

59:13

the tensions that were developing in

59:15

the area and by having a

59:17

much more robust military and cold

59:19

guard presence in the area, it

59:21

serves as an insurance. And of

59:23

course, those forces do come in

59:25

handy on the day to day

59:27

basis, especially when it comes to

59:29

safeguarding the so-called North Natuna

59:31

Sea that was declared by Jakarta back

59:33

in 2017. And

59:35

that was largely in response to

59:38

Chinese transgressions, the Indonesian Izzak and

59:40

of course Vietnamese illegal fishing in

59:43

the area. So on that front,

59:45

there is no denial that Indonesia

59:47

definitely has interest. However, on the

59:50

first question about the defense build

59:52

up and just a few

59:54

years back during the time when there was

59:56

COVID-19, there was a discussion about this US

59:58

100. $125

1:00:01

billion defence build-up that is

1:00:03

a multi-year programme and that

1:00:05

led to quite a controversy

1:00:08

in Indonesia. Because on

1:00:10

the one hand, there is

1:00:12

clear recognition that yes, Indonesia

1:00:14

does need to modernise its

1:00:16

defences, given that there was

1:00:18

a whole spate of issues

1:00:20

with the Indonesian military and

1:00:22

the loss of the submarine

1:00:24

KRI Nangala back some years

1:00:26

ago further reinforced the need

1:00:28

to modernise the TNI. So

1:00:31

if I had a magic wand and I made you

1:00:33

the Indonesian defence minister tomorrow, what would

1:00:35

you do differently? How would you solve some of these

1:00:38

issues? First

1:00:40

of all, I have to be a little

1:00:42

bit controversial here. Of course, people tend to

1:00:44

focus on what to buy. I think the

1:00:47

issue here is before you know what to

1:00:49

buy, you need to have a strategy, you

1:00:51

need to have a plan. If you look

1:00:53

at the defence white papers, there's no lack

1:00:56

of the Indonesian explanation about its track perceptions.

1:00:58

And it does appear that Indonesia's

1:01:01

armed forces has to

1:01:03

actually tackle a whole spectrum

1:01:05

of internal to external

1:01:07

security challenges, having to fulfil

1:01:09

a very tall order for

1:01:12

an armed forces that appears

1:01:14

in terms of its size

1:01:16

and capacity, rather disproportionate to

1:01:18

its geographical size and its

1:01:20

whole range of issues. Second

1:01:23

is if I'm put in

1:01:25

charge. I will try to

1:01:28

use as much effort as

1:01:30

possible to negotiate

1:01:32

and manage the inter-service rivalries between

1:01:34

the various servicers, as well as

1:01:37

between the Indonesian military and the

1:01:39

other agencies that are responsible for

1:01:41

security. Because at the end of

1:01:44

the day, it is really down

1:01:46

to politics. How do you split

1:01:48

that pie amongst the various agencies

1:01:50

that are off-demand funding? And

1:01:53

they will justify why they need to get

1:01:55

certain things and they will try to justify

1:01:57

in terms of the whole range of issues.

1:02:00

of missions and the whole range of mandates

1:02:02

that they are supposed to cover. And then

1:02:04

you start to realize that they do have

1:02:06

overlapping defense and security sector that leads to

1:02:09

the third and final point as

1:02:11

the defense procurement plan itself.

1:02:13

There has been recognition about the

1:02:16

need to streamline defense procurement.

1:02:18

And I do know Indonesian

1:02:20

defense academics who have been

1:02:22

passionately highlighting this particular aspect.

1:02:25

The issue here is very often

1:02:27

it runs into long-standing bureaucratic intricacies

1:02:29

in Indonesia, which in other words

1:02:32

also means that even if a

1:02:34

crisis that erupts overnight, it may

1:02:36

not necessarily propel the Indonesians into

1:02:39

revising the way they look at

1:02:41

defense procurement. However, there is always

1:02:43

this storica baggage that

1:02:45

often underpin and influences

1:02:48

the way they look at defense procurement where they

1:02:50

were passed subjected to arms

1:02:53

embargo by the West, especially the

1:02:55

US. So I think they are pretty

1:02:57

much conditioned on the fact that they

1:02:59

could not put all their eggs into

1:03:01

one basket. So you'll find that they

1:03:04

tend to reach out to a whole

1:03:06

range of vendors and thereby get a

1:03:08

whole diversity of defense equipment from multiple

1:03:10

sources and it does pose a logistical

1:03:13

nightmare. They know the issue, they know

1:03:15

that it's costly, but somehow their past

1:03:17

historical experiences might have been one of

1:03:19

the key factors in driving them to

1:03:22

behave that way. Knowing that it's

1:03:24

costly, knowing that it is sometimes not

1:03:26

so logical from the practical point

1:03:28

of view, they still have to do that

1:03:30

because they have to give themselves some insurance

1:03:32

that they will not be cut off any

1:03:34

supply in times of conflict by any of

1:03:36

the bad thoughts. So

1:03:42

what comes next for Indonesia? The

1:03:44

country is entering some pretty tumultuous waters

1:03:47

here, as this new administration is now

1:03:49

entering a situation where Indonesia's economy is

1:03:51

increasingly leaning toward China, whilst its majority

1:03:53

of military officers probably have closer ties

1:03:56

to the United States and Australia, or

1:03:58

whilst the actual population that country has their

1:04:01

opinions very much and

1:05:04

making any ordering of parts and equipment almost

1:05:06

always very small quite expensive orders

1:05:09

meaning that the indonesian military really

1:05:11

has no easy foundation to build

1:05:14

this great military modernization upon. So

1:05:16

with all these problems how

1:05:18

are they planning to address these issues? As

1:05:21

much as we've been talking about it all this time

1:05:23

and it seems to be front and center on the

1:05:25

indonesian agenda at the moment in all

1:05:27

honesty it kind of feels like a secondary

1:05:29

thought. You see as

1:05:31

we pointed out earlier on indonesia's military

1:05:33

will really only grow as the indonesian

1:05:36

budget grows with it and

1:05:38

the military will probably only get the funding

1:05:40

and needs if the economy is doing well

1:05:43

which to do so is actually going to require

1:05:45

a number of basic issues be fixed within the

1:05:47

country. However just to give

1:05:49

you an example of the key issues facing

1:05:51

indonesia here we just have to take a

1:05:53

look at indonesia's internal logistics. Now

1:05:56

within the 17,000 islands depending

1:05:59

on where you are can either be an incredibly

1:06:01

overcrowded metropolis or, frankly, an area that

1:06:03

barely has running water or power, with

1:06:06

most islands in the archipelago designed

1:06:09

around functioning somewhat self-sufficiently. But

1:06:11

this has only come about because

1:06:13

of the archipelago's lack of internal

1:06:15

transportation and logistical infrastructure. As

1:06:17

an example, if I'm sitting on a rural island

1:06:20

like Wawa Bori and I mail

1:06:22

a package, I would be able

1:06:24

to have that package reach somewhere like Chicago,

1:06:26

London or Moscow long before it

1:06:28

can be sorted and then shipped back towards

1:06:30

the outer islands. For

1:06:33

Indonesia, the further you go out from the

1:06:35

major cities, the more some of these problems

1:06:37

start appearing. And again, that is just one

1:06:39

basic issue that makes it difficult for even

1:06:41

the internal forces to operate within their own

1:06:43

country, let alone try and project outwards into

1:06:45

the Indian Ocean or the South China Sea.

1:06:48

Indonesia is a huge archipelago, with some provinces

1:06:51

that the state feels very comfortable with and

1:06:53

others like Aceh or West Papua that have

1:06:55

already caused a lot of worries to the

1:06:57

military command. Cabal is

1:06:59

now stepping into a role where he has to attempt

1:07:01

to govern 290 million people across 17,000 islands.

1:07:07

And when it comes to issues like these,

1:07:09

these are primary issues and probably top of

1:07:11

the list of things to do for the

1:07:13

armed forces as they attempt

1:07:15

to try and hold down control over their

1:07:17

entire archipelago, with a growing population

1:07:19

and an increasingly intensifying neighbourhood, with a

1:07:22

budget that already doesn't cover what it's

1:07:24

doing at the moment. That is the

1:07:26

nearly Sisafian task that the Indonesian military

1:07:28

is being asked to undertake. So

1:07:31

for now, as much as people are talking

1:07:33

about Indonesia's modernization program, there's still quite a

1:07:35

lot to achieve within its own borders, long

1:07:38

before it can ever feasibly think about taking on

1:07:40

even more headaches on top of that. Thank

1:07:49

you so much for checking out the show this week.

1:07:51

It's always nice for me to be looking at defence

1:07:53

issues where most of the guests live within a pretty

1:07:55

good time zone for me. And it's also an issue

1:07:57

that I think most people either misunderstand or simply just

1:07:59

don't look at. look into enough. Again, Indonesia,

1:08:01

as I've said before, is likely

1:08:03

to be a very important nation going forward. In

1:08:06

fact, it's something we've covered not only on this channel,

1:08:08

but also on our sister channel Context Matters, if you're

1:08:10

interested, where we debunked the Chinese invasion

1:08:12

plans for Australia that will rife around the

1:08:15

news for a while and look to Indonesia's

1:08:17

role within that theoretical scenario. So if you're

1:08:19

interested in that, you can check out our

1:08:21

sister channel Context Matters. Otherwise, if you want

1:08:23

to stay up today the next time the

1:08:25

red line drops a video, then you can

1:08:28

find all of our links and info on

1:08:30

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1:08:32

Discord and TikTok on the handle at the

1:08:34

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1:08:36

follow me on Twitter, I'm on the handle

1:08:38

at MikeHillionOz, Oz is in Australia. This show

1:08:40

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1:08:43

amazing Patreons, who donate a small amount of

1:08:45

money each month to help keep myself on

1:08:47

the team keep the show going and speaking

1:08:49

of our amazing Patreons, this week I'd like

1:08:51

to thank Charles Scholl, Michael McLendon, Stephanie Parity

1:08:53

and Travis, who are the latest Patreons to

1:08:55

sign up or increase their donations at the

1:08:57

time of recording. This show is only possible

1:08:59

with the support of listeners like these guys,

1:09:01

and from everyone here at the show, we

1:09:03

cannot thank them enough. So if you feel

1:09:05

you have a couple of dollars you could

1:09:07

spare and you want special access to content

1:09:09

like our recent workshop, unpacking Russia's modern day

1:09:11

invasion plans and how a Russian invasion of

1:09:13

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1:09:15

our recent workshop looking at the Chinese war

1:09:17

plans for Taiwan, you can sign up to

1:09:19

our Patreon today by clicking the links in

1:09:21

the description. But for now, this episode on

1:09:24

the Indonesian military is all thanks to you

1:09:26

guys. As usual, here are our three book

1:09:28

recommendations. The first is Out of Business and

1:09:30

on Budget, the Challenge of Military Financing in

1:09:32

Indonesia by Lex Rifle for a pretty in-depth

1:09:34

look at how the Indonesian military is funded

1:09:36

and some of the problems we've brought up

1:09:38

in the episode. The second is The Road

1:09:41

by John Martinkus for a look at

1:09:43

the unfolding situation in West Papua and

1:09:45

how it compares to the events of

1:09:47

East Timor decades ago. And the third

1:09:49

is A Man of Contradictions, Stoker Widodo

1:09:51

and the Struggle to Remake Indonesia by

1:09:53

Ben Bland for a look at the

1:09:55

inner workings of Indonesian politics. I want

1:09:58

to say thanks to this week's guests,

1:10:00

John Blackslan, Natalie Samby, and Colin Coe.

1:10:02

All of you were absolutely amazing on

1:10:04

this one and I also want to

1:10:06

give an additional thanks to the primary

1:10:08

researchers of this piece. That being Genevieve

1:10:10

Donnellan-May, Robbie Sutton, Gabriel Lane, Ben Nutter

1:10:12

and Daniela Givella. Absolutely amazing work pulling

1:10:14

this one together as always. In addition

1:10:17

to these guys I'd also like to

1:10:19

thank Cameron Gale, the producer, Jack Shenkman,

1:10:21

the production manager, Daniela Givella, Nader Stiller,

1:10:23

Robbie Sutton, Nick McNally, Jemima Pentreef, Ben

1:10:25

Nutter, Genevieve Donnellan-May, Perry Grace, Gabriel Lane,

1:10:28

Laurence Van Kielbielk, Mason Wise, Isaac

1:10:30

Gibbs, Andrew Garbery, Scott Mithler-Ferguson and

1:10:32

Sean Cotillem, our research assistants and

1:10:34

writers. Jamie Tano, our media director,

1:10:37

Raoul Devanarayanan our OSINT analyst, Francis

1:10:39

Leach our director of Breaking News,

1:10:41

Mark Spencer our second voiceover artist,

1:10:44

Kashyap Maheshri and Alexander Woolgarten from

1:10:46

our online team, Jonah Garn our

1:10:48

production assistant, Alexei Haimakainen our discord

1:10:50

moderator, Joe Hawthorne our audio cleaner,

1:10:53

Marissa Rafter our videographer and Nick

1:10:55

Mutch our field correspondent. As always

1:10:57

this is the team that makes the show what

1:10:59

it is today. But with all that in mind, The

1:11:02

Redline will be back in a fortnight with

1:11:04

another international episode. But until then, thank you

1:11:06

for listening and good night. The

1:11:14

views and opinions expressed in this episode are

1:11:17

solely those of Michael, our guests

1:11:19

and The Redline Podcast. They

1:11:22

do not represent any government or organization

1:11:24

and are solely our own. For

1:11:27

more information, please visit

1:11:29

theredlinepodcast.com.